Russian Orthodoxy and Political Culture Transformation

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Introduction

Russian Orthodox Christianity has served as a major if not principal taproot of Russian culture, and has done so in varying forms and to varying degrees since the formal adoption of the Eastern Orthodox rites as official religion by Prince Vladimir of the Kievan Rus’ in June of 988 A.D. The specific role of Russian Orthodoxy in the governance of Russia has been closely investigated. In addition, the political role of religion, particularly Russian Orthodoxy, during the Soviet era has been the subject of close scholarly examination. This paper focuses on the changing role of Orthodoxy under current conditions.

Both the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the package of radical reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev included, and in large measure revolved around, the core idea of cultural transformation. In the former case, the difficulties of this task were seriously underestimated by Lenin, who initially envisioned a brief incubation and maturation of the New Soviet Man, and only later considered that the culture reformation process would take at least a generation. Russian communism as essentially a drive for cultural transformation was perceived by Nicholas Berdyaev as rooted in Russian culture itself, and specifically in the Messianic psychology induced by Orthodoxy, though mutated (diabolically, in his view) in Bolshevism:

The basic phenomenon which we have to notice is that we have here a transposition of religious motives and religious psychology into a non-religious or anti-religious sphere, into the region of social problems, so that the spiritual energy of religion flows into social channels, which then take on a religious character, and become a breeding-ground for a peculiar form of social idolatry. Creative social energy was not free to find its realization in the conditions of actual Russian life, it was not directed into actual social construction; it entered into its own self, modified the texture of the soul, elicited a passionate visionary social idealism, and accumulated an explosive force in the depths of the subconscious mind. No one had a more profound insight than Dostoevsky that Russian Socialism was not a
political but a religious question, the question of God, of immortality, and the radical reconstruction of all human life.⁴ (emphasis in original)

Even if one rejects Berdyaev’s understanding of Russian communism as rooted in Russian religious psychology, there can be no question that the entire Soviet enterprise involved most fundamentally a cultural transformation (and specifically political-cultural). A critical component of this was the transformation of the traditional role of both organized religion and of the Orthodox religious mindset. More recently than Berdyaev, though ante dating the USSR’s collapse in 1991, Robert Tucker’s examination of Russian political culture underscores the point:

Communism had been designed by its principal founder as in essence a new culture containing within itself a system of party-state power. From Lenin’s movement "dream" of 1902 to his post-revolutionary dream of a society in party-led movement toward socialism and communism there was continuity. Both before and after 1917, he and others tried to translate the dream into socio-political reality. The conquest of real political power in the Revolution made a huge difference by creating all sorts of possibilities for success in the culture-building effort that had not existed before 1917.⁵

Frederick Barghoorn’s examination of Soviet political culture also noted the centrality of the telic, quasi-religious orientation of Soviet communism: "An unremitting effort is made to imbue the everyday life of the citizen with a lofty sense of purpose."⁶ So it remained with Gorbachev, although significantly transmuted with respect to the validity of certain concepts previously deemed revisionist or outright heretical (such as socialist pluralism or the social utility of religion). Perestroika was to involve a massive political cultural transformation that would enable the realization of genuine democracy and thereby a healthy socialism. Given the centrality of Orthodoxy for Russian culture and its vitality through and past the Soviet era, what is the role of Orthodoxy in the unfolding drama of Russian political life? More
importantly, what role is Orthodoxy playing, both as a worldview and as a set of concrete social structures, in Russian political cultural transformation? These questions appear particularly acute now that the USSR has collapsed. The mode of collapse was by and large peaceful and brought about in part by mass popular activity, which itself suggests a massive shift in political culture. Has such a shift occurred, and if so, what role did Russian Orthodoxy play?

This study examines the role of Russian Orthodoxy in the transformation of Russian political culture during the transition away from the Soviet Leninist model. We first examine the concept of political culture itself, specifically its utility in accounting for political behavior and regime-type; then consider the general role and content of Russian Orthodoxy in Russian political life; and conclude by examining the role of Orthodoxy in the contemporary transformation of Russian political order.

The Utility of Political Culture as a Concept

The concept of political culture is complex and deeply rooted in the Western tradition of comparative political studies. Political culture may be defined most broadly as the long-term, deeply rooted psychological orientations toward power and authority within a given cultural community. Archie Brown’s comparative examination of political culture in communist regimes understood it as

the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups....It is closely related to cultural values and orientations more generally. It focuses attention, however, on that part of a culture which bears relevance to politics.
As a concept, political culture is concerned with a given political community's orientation toward: governmental authority in general, and the regime under whose power it resides; citizens themselves as political actors; and other members of the community, as well as those outside the community. Other significant dimensions include the degree of fragmentation or homogeneity within the community, and the degree of allegiance or alienation imbedded within the underlying culture toward the political order.

The concept of political culture is alluring as an explanatory concept, yet it is elusive in definition, in measurement, in serving as a point of cross-national comparison, and particularly in establishing historical or political causation. Further, the very phrase "political culture" can and indeed does bear several meanings in contemporary social science research; some of the more contentious disputes about the concept appear to revolve around rather different meanings of the term.

Intuitively, it appears reasonable to conclude that, since human cultures differ so clearly and dramatically, and since culture includes the domain of governance or power-wielding within a given community, then cultural differences might be at least partially responsible for differences in patterns of governance. Yet turning even the most plausible of intuitions into analytically useful and measurable concepts has always been, and remains, highly problematic.

In fact, methodological problems of political culture studies are daunting, if not prohibitive. Significant barriers include problems of operationalization (turning concepts such as "political efficacy" into measurable entities); specific problems with operationalizing the concept of political culture for empirical and specifically comparative purposes; problems of valid, reliable measurement of the results of such analysis; the problem of cross-national validity of concepts used as indicative measures of political cultural differences; and problems of culture-boundness—i.e., the unconscious reading into the subject culture characteristics it may not possess, or the failure to perceive salient characteristics, or both.⁹

These problems were all seriously compounded by the closed character of the Russian state to conventional social science research until very recently.
research guided by the canons of contemporary social science was difficult at best until Gorbachev’s glasnost. (We might note in passing, however, that most recent such research in Russia points toward a vigorous religiosity that is politically salient; this theme is resumed in the final section.)

While these method problems are real, and none except perhaps the last is ultimately surmountable, they do not negate the value of the concept of political culture or diminish its heuristic value. Judicious weighing of the problems of method with the overall value of the concept of political culture would appear to underscore Tucker’s conclusion about political culture as a concept, particularly with respect to Russian studies:

Does the scholarly value of the concept of political culture turn on its explanatory potency? Might not the central importance of a concept like that of political culture be that it assists us to take our bearings in the study of the political life of a society, to focus on what is happening or not happening, to describe and analyze and order many significant data, and to raise fruitful questions for thought and research—without explaining anything? May it not be, further, that political culture and its vicissitudes comprise a great deal of what it is that we should wish to explain?10

With these caveats in mind, we proceed from three major assumptions. First, cultural differences do indeed have an influence upon the nature of politics within the respective cultures. This assumption is at the foundation of any study dealing with political culture, but it should be stated as an assumption rather than operate implicitly; even across quite diverse ideological and conventional academic disciplinary lines, the major disputes tend to revolve around issues of social scientific method (conceptualization, measurement, etc.) and the degree of autonomy of "political culture" from culture in general, particularly in sociology and anthropology. 11
The most rigorous, systematic comparisons of political cultures conducted by contemporary political scientists corroborate the long-held view that underlying cultural differences are critical, and that large-scale cultural shifts do occur as a partial result of large-scale socio-economic change. Significantly, Ronald Inglehart has concluded after exhaustive, systematic, long-term studies of mass attitudes:

Prevailing worldviews differ from society to society, reflecting the different historical experiences of different peoples. Consequently, we find enduring, but not immutable, differences between the values, attitudes, and habits of different peoples. This means that different individuals and groups of people react differently in similar situations. As we have seen, surveys carried out repeatedly over many years show enduring cross-national differences in levels of overall life satisfaction, happiness, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and support for the existing social order. These attributes are part of a coherent syndrome, with given nationalities consistently ranking high (or relatively low) on all of them. High or low scores on this syndrome have important consequences, shaping the prospects for viable democracy, among other things.¹²

The second assumption guiding this study is that religion plays a critical role, if not the central role, in a given culture’s self-understandings and self-identity, at least in the pre-modern era. Emile Durkheim’s pioneering work on the role of religion in culture and communal identity maintained that religion is "the system of symbols by means of which society becomes conscious of itself, it is the characteristic way of thinking of collective existence."¹³ This would appear to be more pertinent in some cultures than others, but in any case Russia must be understood as having a national identity particularly tightly intertwined with religious identity. The very vehemence of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century anti-religious impulses in Russia suggests as much. It is not likely that a weak cultural feature should generate such political animus, as Berdyaev, Zernov, Sergei Bulgakov, Nikita Struve, and others have pointed out.¹⁴
The third assumption guiding this study is that Russian Orthodoxy was, and still is, a significant source of the Durkheimian "system of symbols by which society becomes conscious of itself," at least to the degree that overlooking its political role seriously attenuates understanding of Russian political life. This study seeks to identify those elements of Russian Orthodoxy that have significantly nourished Russian political culture, that have proven their durability (for better or worse) by surviving several generations of periodically intense repression, and, given the continued vitality of Orthodoxy, that appear to be playing a significant role in shaping post-Soviet political culture.

**Russian Political Culture**

The popular resistance to the attempted coup d'état of August 1991 appears to reflect a sea-change in traditional Russian political culture. To be sure, periodic political upheavals characterize Russian history at least since the earliest days of the Cossacks. Yet the political climate of Russia since the realization of Gorbachev’s *glasnost* seems to reflect a substantial shift in mass orientations toward the political order—a political culture shift, in other words. A brief review of Russia’s basic political cultural orientations will underscore the nature of this shift, and will enable a clearer understanding of Orthodoxy’s role, then and now.

The most prominent traits of traditional Russian political life noted in Western scholarship include: centralization of authority; a tendency for power to be concentrated rather than separated or dispersed; a deep distrust by powerholders of genuinely popular rule (even in the Soviet era, and perhaps especially there) and apparent skepticism of the wisdom of parliamentary governance; little or no identifiable sense of political efficacy as Western studies of political culture conventionally employ the concept; no deeply rooted tradition of toleration (neither
by the regime nor within the society at large); and a sense of national uniqueness with occasional quasi-Messianic or xenophobic manifestations.

Stephen White’s examination of Russian political culture focuses on three areas: the structures of government; the perceptions of politics; and the scope of government. Concerning the first, Russian autocracy had no checks upon authority either in theory or in practice. Further, says White, popular links with representative institutions (such as those between British subjects and Parliament) "were extremely tenuous, both in terms of levels of participation in the political process and...in terms of knowledge of and attachment to those institutions among the mass of the citizen body." This was clearly not fertile ground for the emergence of a civic culture.

Regarding mass perceptions of politics, White notes the "highly personalized attachment to political authority, in particular to the person of the tsar." It is useful to recall here Marc Szeftel’s point that the tsar "stood as the living symbol of Christian tsardom entrusted to him by God, receiving his direct and intimate connection with God through the ceremony of anointment." This personalization of authority undoubtedly served as a psychological taproot of the Stalin cult, as did the form of eschatological history, transmuted from Russia’s traditional Messianic role to the Marxist–Leninist vision of "full communism." This theme is explored in greater detail in the next section; here we need only note the buttressing effect of these patrimonial traits upon autocratic rule.

Significantly, the tendency to personalize authority is common to regimes newly emergent from colonial rule, or in some cases, in regimes having long since passed a period of foreign, despotic domination (e.g., many African and Latin American regimes). White notes this patrimonial tendency as being related to the regime’s "centralized and bureaucratic governing style." From a Western democratic perspective, it is surprising that these tendencies in Russia met with popular resistance so infrequently; it would thus seem safe to conclude that acceptance of these traits was indeed an element of the underlying political culture. Why this was so—the specific economic, social, and intellectual reasons—brings us to Tucker’s point about the conceptual utility of political culture for a fuller understanding of the
political phenomenon in question. In this case, the religious dimension of the culture appears critical.

Concerning the scope of government, White notes Russia’s lack of sub-group activity, lack of genuinely autonomous judicial institutions, and an "absence of the familiar liberal distinction between actions (which must be subject to due process of law), and beliefs (which are a matter for the individual alone and can be no legitimate concern of the government)." One can easily see the latter characteristics contributing to totalitarian autocracy under the pressures of a militantly secularizing, rapidly industrializing regime.

White’s summary of traditional Russian political culture is worth repeating here to emphasize both its continuity into the Soviet era and the manifest failure by 1991 of the official ideology to transform political culture into the Soviet ideal:

Representative institutions...were weakly articulated and ineffective; levels of popular participation and representation were low; and governing style was centralized, bureaucratic and highly authoritarian. Popular political attachments, in consequence, were highly personalized; and political knowledge and experience, outside an extremely limited circle, was virtually non-existent. The scope of government was unusually broad: it extended not only to those spheres of life in which other governments of the time were active, but also into economic entrepreneurship and control, religion and morals, and the administration of justice. It was based, finally, upon a society of a highly "traditional" *gemeinschaft*, type, in which there was a strong tradition of group solidarity, together with its converse, a suspicion of outsiders; a greater degree of reliance upon face-to-face relations than upon anonymous procedures; and in which it was accepted that every aspect of the life of the community, from taxation and agriculture to beliefs and behavior, should be subject to the regulation of the community as a whole.  

Before considering Soviet efforts to transform traditional Russian political culture into a new culture, it may be helpful to consider briefly some of the more explicitly political aspects of Eastern European culture.
The scholarly literature dealing with this question has painted a picture that does not reflect a culture with strong, deeply rooted democratic characteristics, but rather one with decidedly authoritarian tendencies. Some of these appear directly related to strains in Orthodoxy, others are specific to a region or a given nation's historical experience (e.g., the Tatar Yoke in Russia, Turkish domination over certain Balkan regions, etc.).

The non-democratic legacy in much of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union indeed raises the question of the antecedent cultural roots necessary for democracy. Dinko Tomasic's seminal works Personality and Culture in East European Politics (1948) and The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism (1953) depict a broad cultural pattern inimical to democratic governance as understood in the West. The years of communist governance many have done little if anything to reverse this pattern, and may in fact have further entrenched non-democratic Eastern European tendencies.

It has been argued that the deepest cultural roots in the region—including the religious ones—may prove the most difficult obstacles to democratization. Although the perdurability of these roots may have contributed to the grand failure of communism as an enterprise in cultural reconstruction, they do not necessarily bode well for a liberal, pluralist democracy. Significantly for our purposes, these Slavic "habits of the heart" are to a substantial degree religiously rooted. Stepan Mestrovic suggests that the emphasis on the Virgin Mary in both Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy (as opposed to Jesus-centric Protestantism) further reinforces cultural tendencies away from the rationalistic, egalitarian patterns that have served in the West as a cultural taproot of democratic governance:

Eastern European culture is still dominated more by the Virgin than by the dynamo, and the reverse is true in Western Europe and the United States. Erich Fromm's analyses of mother-centered cultures from Mexico to medieval Europe as fostering a passive character orientation still seem applicable to Eastern Europe....
The Christian symbolism of Eastern Europe reflects the family patterns uncovered by Tomasic as much as the Christian symbolism in Western Europe and the United States reflects the essential egalitarianism discovered by Tocqueville. In the Protestant West, Jesus is a far more important figure than the Virgin Mary, or any other carryover from female goddesses of the past. By contrast, the USSR and Eastern Europe are predominantly Orthodox or Catholic, and both of these religions focus on the Virgin Mary. In fact, the Orthodox faiths worship Mary more than God the Father, Jesus, or the Holy Spirit—she is the center of idolatry, art, theology, and folk worship. 24

The final statement may be disputed by theologians, as other above assertions might be by cultural historians. Nevertheless, the religiously rooted differences between the political evolutionary paths of Western and Eastern Europe (including Russia) as a whole are stark. To the Soviet would-be reformers of political culture, these religiously rooted historical differences between East and West were ultimately irrelevant once transcended in both regions by the triumph of socialism. But these reformers failed.

Indeed, Soviet attempts at cultural transformation were as comprehensive as they were deadly earnest. As noted earlier, in one sense cultural transformation lay at the heart of the entire Soviet enterprise. The pertinent questions here are: What specific elements of traditional Russian culture were to be extirpated, or transcended? In what specific domains, if any, was the Soviet enterprise of culture transformation successful? And what consequences issue from 74 years of essentially forcible culture reformation? Finally, what role has Russian Orthodoxy played in all of this?

In its ideal form, the new culture the Bolsheviks sought to create differed sharply from the traditional Russian political culture as outlined above. The new order was to be democratic, not autocratic, and to have a politically active citizenry, not an apolitical mass. Most importantly, while retaining the traditional emphasis on gemeinschaft-type community (cultural sobornost) in the form of collectivism, the philosophical foundation of the new order was to be no longer Orthodoxy, but
dialectical materialism. The here-and-now was no prologue to the divine, eternal Kingdom but rather the place where a kingdom would be built and enjoyed by *homo faber* himself. In short, much of the form of culture was retained, particularly the eschatological dimension, but the substance, in the ideal at least, was polar opposite.

Most attempts at Soviet cultural transformation failed so dramatically that the regime virtually collapsed of its own weight by the end of 1991. Yet several basic cultural characteristics of the tsarist regime—particularly the emphasis on community and communal welfare—were not so much rejected by the Bolsheviks as transferred to Marxism–Leninism. Other traits of the old order (autocracy, formal establishment of a national church, legal disenfranchisement, etc.) were of course formally rejected by the Revolutionaries and replaced by new forms aimed at molding a new political culture. The political events of March 1989 through August 1991 speak clearly and directly to the level of popular acceptance of the Soviet ideology and its cultural vision.

Significantly, this was the critical point at which the regime failed; it was unable to produce a political cultural-identity shift toward acceptance of Soviet power as legitimate. The quasi-religious character of the failed official ideology is precisely what makes an understanding of the political cultural dimension of Orthodoxy so important. Of greater significance still is the continued and apparently growing vitality of Orthodoxy beyond being a mere historical-cultural reference point to serving as a point of political reference in the critical transition from communist autocracy.

**The Role of Orthodoxy in Russian Political Culture**

Nicholas Zernov's brilliant treatment of the Russian religious renaissance of the early twentieth century did nothing to disguise the complex role of the national Church:
This huge and awkwardly constituted body, containing more than a hundred million members, stretched across the whole realm.... To some observers it appeared to be moribund, dominated by bureaucracy and subservient to the secular government; to others it seemed full of life and vigour. It contained so many contrasts that almost any description of it, however contradictory, could be accepted as being at least partly true....

The Orthodox Church permeated every side of Russian life, personal, family, social and national. The majority of Russians identified themselves as members of the Church, and though as individuals they might be skeptics, agnostics, or even atheists, few of them broke away entirely from that body which, more than any other, expressed the character of the Russian people and their essential unity.25

Several questions must be posed regarding the role of Orthodoxy in contemporary Russian political cultural transformation: What specific elements of the Russian political legacy, and of the political culture in general, are traceable to Russian Orthodoxy? What general pattern of church–state relations did the Bolsheviks (and now post-Soviet Russian leaders) inherit? How is the political culture currently changing, and what specific role does Orthodoxy appear to be playing both as a set of ideas and as a concrete social phenomenon?

To expand on the first question, did those elements of the Russian political cultural legacy that are traceable to Russian Orthodoxy emerge despite the theological and philosophical content of Orthodoxy, or because of them, or was there no such relation? Durkheim’s definition of religion as a "system of symbols by which society becomes conscious of itself" would seem to rule out the last option.

Three major aspects of the Russian political cultural legacy appear traceable to Orthodoxy, each with a distinct effect on the post-Soviet political order: the sense of communal identity Orthodoxy provided; the de facto encouragement of a "non-civic" political culture; and the subordination of ecclesiastical power to state power in a manner that directly shaped the character of the state, the church, and the larger society.
The first and perhaps most fundamental dimension of Orthodoxy’s contribution to Russian political culture has to do with communal identity. From a primordial sense of identity emerge patterns of culture: values and norms, sense of purpose, and expectations of self and others. In premodern times it appears to have been nearly universal for religion to be at the very heart of a society’s identity. Robert Tucker has underscored the centrality of the religious dimension of Russian identity:

*Rus’* developed in history as a community of right believers, meaning those of the Russian Orthodox faith. In its sustaining myth, Russian society was a political community of the faithful, an Orthodox tsardom. So persistent was this pattern that as late as the early twentieth century a peasant—and the vast majority of Russians were peasants then—would speak of himself not as a "Russian" but as "Orthodox" (*pravoslavny*). Russian was his language; Orthodoxy, his identity. Since the tsar was a centerpiece of the mythos, waning faith in the tsar was a sign of the coming end of tsardom.... The revolutionary reconstitution of a society always sees the rise of a new conception of the meaning of membership in that society.... The Bolsheviks’ militant atheism, their unremitting effort through anti-religious propaganda to dislodge Orthodoxy from Russian minds, was the other side of their project of instilling in those same minds a new set of right beliefs, a new transnational orthodoxy.²⁶

As Russia was moving into the twentieth century, the religion-based sense of communal identity became increasingly problematic. A spirit of revolutionary secularism became more and more appealing, particularly to the intelligentsia, among whom it prevailed. But some eventually balked at the turn away from religion. The phenomenon Nicholas Zernov termed "the Russian religious renaissance of the 20th century" may be understood as a philosophic reaction against the vehement demand for radical secularism, although this renaissance was not necessarily defensive of the tsarist political order. For Berdyaev, as for virtually all prominent figures in this renaissance, the question of Russia’s religion-based sense of identity was so critical
that Russian history up to and including the period of forcible secularization by Stalin was simply incomprehensible without reference to it:

How was it possible for Holy Russia to be turned into an arsenal of militant atheism? How is it that a people who are religious by their very structure and live exclusively by faith have proved to be such a fruitful field for anti-religious propaganda? To explain that, one must have an insight into the religious psychology of the Russian people.27

Although the full range of that "religious psychology" is beyond the scope of this essay, it seems safe to conclude that historical Russian Orthodoxy did have a profound impact upon the nation’s political psychology, and particularly in undergirding a sense of communal identity.

The second major aspect of Russian Orthodoxy that shaped the political culture was its historically "non-civic" orientation. Regardless of the truth or falsehood of its fundamental theological tenets, Russian Orthodoxy appears to have done little to engender a sense of political efficacy as understood in the contemporary West—that is, "a sense of subjective political competence" giving rise to mass democracy. The very notion of political competence would have a radically different content for Orthodox believers, up to and into the Soviet era. Its main effect appears to have been to reinforce autocratic tendencies, although to what degree and precisely how cannot be empirically determined. Given the centrality of Orthodoxy for Russian identity, the longevity of its cultural influence, and its explicit demand for submission to political authority, it seems safe to conclude that much of the traditional "subject orientation" of Russia’s political culture is directly traceable to the prevailing religion.

Historians note the critical role Orthodoxy played in shaping popular orientations toward politics, not only in terms of its defense of autocracy, but through its appeal to popular consciousness. As Szeftel has noted, both the Orthodox Church and the Russian state strongly emphasized the religious and mystical qualities of the tsar’s
power, "which continued to resonate strongly in the popular mind, not only after 1721, but until the Revolution of 1917."

Were the central ideas of Orthodoxy so deeply etched into the popular consciousness that advocacy of revolution constituted first and foremost an essentially religious reorientation? Berdyaev concluded as much, principally in *The Origins of Russian Communism* (1937) and *The Russian Revolution* (1931). John Curtiss also notes:

> By 1907 large numbers of people had been alienated from the leaders of the church. In the sharp conflicts of the Revolution of 1905 an increasing number of peasants as well as urban workingmen were coming to feel that the Church as an institution, and not a few of its individual members, were following policies which were sharply opposed to what many of the people considered to be their own interests.

One student of the Russian Revolution suggests a link between the superficiality of Orthodox clerical influence upon popular culture at the mass level and tenuous regime support:

> Observers of pre-revolutionary Russia concur that the Orthodox Church, represented in the village by the priest (*pop*), exerted little cultural influence on the parishioners. The priest's primary function was ritualistic-magic, and his main duty to ensure the flock's safe passage into the next world. A. S. Ermolov, in discussing with Nicholas II the revolutionary unrest, disabused him of the notion that the government could rely on the priests to keep the villages in line: "the clergy in Russia has no influence on the population." The cultural role of the church in the rural districts was confined to elementary schooling, which taught children to read and write, with bits of religious didacticism thrown in.... The notion of a supreme order permeating alike the realms of nature and law had for the peasant no meaning. He thought rather in archaic terms of Homeric epics in which the whims of gods decide human destiny.
While this assertion is surely open to question, of larger significance is that these observations of Russia’s political circumstance just prior to the Revolution presume a culture that had been dominated by Orthodoxy for many generations. There would be no point in debating the political significance of Orthodoxy’s changing cultural role if it had not played a critical part in the formulation of that culture in the first place.

While significant popular disaffection with Orthodoxy and with religion in general appears to have developed during this period, the general character elements conditioning democracy (as self-rule writ large, in contrast to autocracy, or self-rule by one) were not directly encouraged by historical Russian Orthodoxy, regardless of the potentially democratic impulses in its theological tenets. Yet the traditional passivity and other non-democratic characteristics may be undergoing transformation with the Church’s experience of having survived Soviet rule.

What are the cultural elements that condition a society for democratic self-governance, and to the extent that Orthodoxy today constitutes a significant social and cultural force in Russia, what role is Orthodoxy playing in either fostering or hindering those conditions? Those cultural elements that appear to this writer as indispensable would include restraint of demands upon government and other citizens; tolerance, on the part of the government toward citizens and among citizens; acceptance of compromise sufficiently to arrive at consensus; no forcing of spurious unanimity by diktat; and willingness of incumbents to surrender power when faced with a clear popular mandate to do so. With the possible exception of the last Romanov’s abdication in 1917, one searches in vain to find much evidence of these traits in Russian political culture. James Billington asserts that the roots of a democratic political culture along Western lines were severed with the Muscovite takeover of Novgorod toward the end of the fifteenth century, with the imposition of Moscow’s vision of Russian Orthodoxy at the time.31

The question becomes how and to what degree Russian Orthodoxy hindered the cultivation of these virtues. A brief look at the "anthropological" dimension of
Orthodox thought will provide clues to the relation, both past and present, between Orthodoxy as a theology and as actually practiced.

At the inauguration of President Boris Yeltsin in July 1991, Patriarch Alexii II implored the President to base his policies on "anthropological realism," underscoring the vital connection between the anthropological dimension of theological conceptions and political life:

You have taken responsibility for a society that is gravely ill. The 70 year destruction of its spiritual system and internal unity was accompanied by the strengthening of heavy hoops of external statehood....There is no point today in looking for some kind of bearers of evil incarnate in our country, supposing that everything will sort itself out if they are removed from the political arena. As a pastor, I know all too well that evil thoughts are lodged deep in people’s hearts and that there is nothing more complicated and important than healing the human heart. I tell you this, urging you to proceed unceasingly on the basis of anthropological realism.32

Given the continued importance of Orthodoxy for Russian culture and political life even to the present (as evidenced by the Patriarch’s very role in the inauguration), what might "anthropological realism" look like from an Orthodox perspective? This question is critically important for understanding the current and future role of Orthodoxy in Russian political culture, as it touches on core Orthodox conceptions of ontology, human nature, social life, and therefore political life. Further, on at least some of these concepts one can expect little mutability to fit the spirit of a given age. Others, of course, are mutable, and Orthodoxy often prides itself on conceptual flexibility on non-core issues. The question is whether the concepts that contribute to democratic order are considered core or non-core; how these are handled will determine the future role of Orthodoxy in shaping Russian political culture. This essay does not pretend an exhaustive exploration, but points to the need for one.

Most fundamentally, Orthodoxy posits a view of reality as having a spiritual dimension, transcending the five senses but nonetheless as genuinely existent,
accessible, and relevant to human life as those experienced by the five senses. To deny this dimension of reality, as in positing ontological materialism, would be to misperceive grossly the nature of reality. The consequences of this would be invariably deleterious, and if such a misperception becomes the foundation for society and particularly for political life, the consequences are potentially catastrophic. Not surprisingly, Russian Orthodoxy held this view before the Revolution, and still holds it today. The Patriarch’s comment about Russia being a sick society suffering from "external hoops of forced statehood" reflected the typical Orthodox conviction that Soviet etatisme was politically deleterious precisely because it was spiritually so. We might note in passing that some contemporary observers of religion and politics view the "quasi-sacralization" of political power in the modern state as contributing unwittingly to the resurgence of religiosity. To the extent that such occurs, the hyperconcentration of power in the Soviet leviathan was inevitably harmful.

Orthodoxy views human nature as having several principal characteristics, each with profound social and political consequences. First, humanity was created in, and continues to exist as, the image of God. The full theological and social significance lies well beyond the scope of this essay; we need only note that in the Orthodox view, politics in general, indeed any social policy, is ideally made with reference to this concept. The purpose of human life is to reflect more fully God’s image in the personal, social, and cultural spheres—hence the Orthodox foundation for personal submission to God and to duly ordained civil authority, and the construction of a culture reflective of the divine image. This emphasis on submission, of course, need not be incompatible with a "participant" political cultural orientation; but in the Russian historical case, it does appear to present an obstacle.

The second aspect of human nature emphasized in Orthodoxy, as indeed in Western Catholicism and much of Protestantism, is the "fallen" or estranged nature of humanity with respect to divine being. One Greek Orthodox thinker has related this aspect of human nature to the "garments of skin" in Genesis 3:21. Because human beings are made in the divine image (meaning, among other things, possessive of a spiritual nature) yet also clothed in "garments of skin" (a physical body,
bounded by material and sensations), certain consequences follow for what constitutes the totality of human health, personal and social. Political authority and legitimate policies deriving from that authority are thus ultimately justifiable on theological grounds.

A third Orthodox concept that has shaped the political culture is the notion of humanity as a "communion of being," that is, there is no realization of the fully human outside a community. This is distantly akin to the Aristotelian conception of humans as social creatures for whom the "good life" can only occur in a well-ordered political community. But Orthodoxy holds rather that the essence of the communion of being is spiritual, even mystical interconnection among believers and God. From this emerged the historical Orthodox insistence on a close (ideally, "symphonic"), relationship of the church to the state.

This must have played a vital role in the Russian sense of nationhood noted earlier. The real power of this Orthodox notion of church–state harmony in Russian political culture may reside in what some see as a universal existential tug in the direction of religion-based political community.

Western social science, after a generation of identifying secularization as an almost unquestioned component of "modernization," has begun to rethink fundamentally the social and political role of religion. Indeed, the issue has become a major topic in the scholarly literature.\(^{35}\) In 1976 Peter Berger reflected on the salience of this aspect of religion in political life, undergirding a psychic search for a "redemptive community." Although not made with reference to Russia, Berger's comments are directly applicable to the defunct USSR as a failed exercise in transformation of a traditionally religion-oriented culture:

The discontents of modernity, apart from the more brutal sufferings that modernization often brings with it, are thus rooted quite deeply in the transformations of human life brought about by industrialism as well as capitalism. Whatever is "irrational" in human beings resists the onslaught of rationalization. Very importantly, whatever religious impulses exist in human consciousness suffer
profoundly from the impact of secularization—and, if not allowable as religious expressions, may seek outlets elsewhere. The loss of collective and individual security carries with it the constant threat of isolation as well as meaninglessness. In their cumulative result, these processes add up to a pervasive condition of "homelessness"—man is no longer "at home" in society, in the cosmos, or ultimately with himself.36 (emphasis added)

The religious resurgence in Russia appears related to the phenomenon Berger suggests is responsible for this existential homelessness: "modernization" qua industrialism, rationalization, and secularization. These activities, after all, were the centerpiece of Soviet policy since the Bolshevik Revolution. Indeed, much of the scholarly commentary on the resurgence of Russian nationalism has emphasized the close connections between the existential void left by profound disenchantment with Marxism–Leninism, the renewal of Russian national sentiment, and renewed vital interest in religion, particularly Orthodoxy.37

Now that both the Marxist–Leninist regime and its official ideology are gone, it would appear that the potential for Orthodoxy to be sought as such an existential reference point, if not mooring point, is likely to be great indeed. This would spawn a wide range of political consequences. What form they might take is unknown, but after considering the basic political orientation of Orthodoxy as social ecclesia, we will be in a better position to assess its future influence on Russian political culture.

Thus Orthodoxy can be viewed as having shaped the political culture through its provision of a sense of communal identity and by serving as a key conceptual source. The third major aspect of Orthodoxy that appears to have directly shaped Russian political culture was the ecclesiastical tradition of what might be termed apoliticity. Much of this was a direct result of the great schism of the late seventeenth century, wherein the Church was reduced to a clearly subordinate status by the tsar and the civil government.38 This subordination had long-term consequences for the role of the church in society and thereby the political culture.
In terms of the large-scale process of modern state formation, the net historical effect of this subordination was to concentrate state power, thereby hindering the emergence of a civic culture. The *de facto* and (post-Petrine) *de jure* subordination of the church to civil rulers was in many respects a continuation of the complex Byzantine tradition, which held as ideal a "symphonic" harmony of church and state but in practice left emperor dominant over church. This is in sharp contrast to both Roman-Catholic papal supremacy and the Protestant form of church subordination to civil authority (although of course "papal supremacy" was usually more an ideal than a reality).

Perhaps ironically, the Protestant form of church subordination was historically related to the emergence of the modern state, to the modern Western concept of citizenship, and thereby to the evolution of a modern civic culture. Peter the Great's clear subordination of church to state was modelled after the Protestant states of Europe, yet the overall political-historical effect in Russia was not to spawn a civic culture, but rather to entrench an autocratic order. Here the role played by Orthodoxy appears critical. In the process of accommodation to the Petrine order, Orthodoxy became in the final analysis a major buttressing force of the old regime.

The issue of the Old Believers is important here, but they, as other non-established religions, were not in a position to reshape the political culture directly, as Protestantism appears to have done in Western Europe. Even if they had been, the political cultural roots of Russia's political order go deeper than the schism itself: the triumph of the Muscovite tsarist ideas of Joseph Sanin and, perhaps more importantly, of the "Josephites" over the trans-Volgan followers of Nils Sorsky might be viewed as the critical turning point in Russian political evolution. Both the Old Believer schism and Peter's heavy-handed reforms might be seen as stemming from that earlier conflict. In any case, the end result was a nexus of religion and politics distinctively different from that emerging in the Western world.

To what degree did Orthodoxy then become an obstacle to the modernistic impulses that, in the West, contributed to the emergence of liberal democracy? Perhaps a more important question, has the ecclesiastical orientation of Orthodoxy
changed such that it might today, after having endured 74 years of tyrannization, no longer serve as a sociological obstacle but rather a catalyst for popular self-government?

There is a strong current in Western social and political thought that views the Protestant Reformation as a major watershed of cultural transformation. Because Russia's engagement with Europe during and after the Reformation was ambivalent and highly complex, the very question of Russia's cultural relationship to the West is crucial to its identity. Billington notes that few problems have disturbed Russians more than the nature of this relationship. Concern about it "did not begin either in the salons of the imperial period or in the mists of Slavic antiquity, but in Muscovy from the fifteenth to the early seventeenth century."39

Significantly, the abovementioned period coincides with the emergence of Protestantism in Europe. The effects of the Reformation on European and subsequently on world culture have been the subject of intense scrutiny, and while no firm consensus has been reached (and probably never will be, given the enormity of the phenomenon), several general patterns appear fairly clear. Some of these will put the Russian case in larger perspective.

Max Weber is famous for the thesis that Protestantism wrought a cultural shift in Europe ultimately responsible for the emergence of capitalism.40 While some details of this thesis are controversial, there seems no doubt that a massive cultural shift, with profound economic consequences, occurred after the Protestant Reformation.

Beliefs about the individual's role in the cosmos, relations with others, and relations with the governing authorities all changed dramatically. These are by nature political-cultural issues, but they involve most immediately the individual's attitude toward life and particularly toward work. Quintessentially Protestant conceptions of these issues, and the realization of these concepts in European history, are often viewed as the cultural foundation of capitalism. Significantly, Ronald Inglehart's exhaustive analysis of advanced industrialized democracies arrives at principally the same conclusion.41
The conclusion shared by Weber and Inglehart was not lost on Gorbachev, in his attempt to effect a mass cultural transformation in the USSR that would spur and sustain economic growth and thereafter drive the political cultural change necessary to sustain genuine democratic order. Tucker notes in this connection:

In so far as the envisioned Soviet reformation includes a drive to root out official corruption in the party-state, an appeal to original sources of doctrinal authority, and a stress on the individual's own responsibility for self-reform in work and private life, comparison with the Reformation in early modern Europe, while distant, is not altogether far-fetched. In event of success, Gorbachev's reformation would mean a pervasive system of reform of what, in this book, have been called real culture patterns, and to some extent of ideal patterns as well; in other words, a deep change of customary ways of thinking and acting in institutions and common situations in Soviet society and in the government's way of thinking and acting in internal and external policy.42

Gorbachev of course sought to engender economic efficiency via cultural transformation on the basis of non-religious grounds, although one suspects that he was aware of Weber's thesis in speaking of the "socially useful role of religion" in 1988.

This raises the question of the political consequences today of Russia's problematic relationship to the Protestant Reformation. The Reformation not only changed the political map of Europe enormously, but wrought underlying political cultural changes that are difficult to overstate. It appears to have pushed northern European culture toward popular sovereignty, toward a superfluity of the Church as a religious mediator, and toward the emergence of quintessentially modern conceptions of citizenship. The European Renaissance in the West was crucial for preconditioning these massive cultural reorientations, and significantly both Renaissance and Reformation were largely prevented from working these culturally transformative effects in Russia.
Stephen White has rightly noted the political-institutional role of Orthodoxy as it exempted Russia from Western Europe's evolution toward *de facto* (if not *de jure*) divorce of civil authority from ecclesiastical:

The religious faith of the overwhelming majority of the population, Russian Orthodoxy, was never as independent of the state as was generally the case elsewhere in Europe. The Orthodox Church, on the contrary, had been so closely linked to the state since the time of Peter the Great (and even earlier) that it has often been termed a department of government.... There was clearly no suggestion, in any of this, that the religious faith or beliefs of its citizens was no proper concern of government. Indeed, it is precisely this equation between belief, nationality, and citizenship—expressed in the celebrated formula *Samoderzhavie, Pravoslavie, Narodnost'* (Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality)—which was in many ways the most distinctive contribution of the old regime to the political culture of the Soviet regime which succeeded it. 43

This different conception of citizenship in Russia from that of the West, rooted partially in Orthodox ideas, continues, though transmuted, until today.

In any case, by the early twentieth century the Orthodox Church, particularly the upper ecclesiastical hierarchy, generally opposed the politically liberalizing currents in the country and supported the status quo. This was underscored by their response to the Revolution of 1905-6, despite the challenge of individual members of the clergy to the old regime. Christopher Read notes that there had never been a real divorce of religion from political thought, which absence continued into the twentieth century in the form of radicalized, militant atheism.44

Peter the Great established the Holy Synod in 1721 to replace the Orthodox Russian Patriarchate he had abolished in 1700 to more effectively subordinate Church to state. The *ober-prokuror* of that Synod from 1880 to 1905 was Constantin Pobedenostsev. Nicholas Zernov's description of him as one who "must be numbered among those who prepared the downfall of the Empire"45 makes eminent sense in light of Pobedenostsev's remark in 1896:
Among the falsest of political principles is the theory of the sovereignty of the people and the principle that all power issues from the people and is based upon the popular will… It is dreadful to think of our condition if destiny had sent us the fatal gift—an All-Russian Parliament! May that never be!46

Related to the legacy of apoliticity, and inadvertently spurred on by the Church’s generally reactionary political stance, was a deepening popular disaffection with Orthodoxy and an ossification of the Church itself, notwithstanding the "religious renaissance" among some of the disaffected Marxist intelligentsia described by Zernov. Among the population at large, there appears to have developed after 1905 a deepened sense of the irrelevance of the Church for life here and now, particularly in a political sense. Curtiss argues that an opportunity for revitalization was missed:

By 1907 large numbers of people had been alienated from the leaders of the Church…. One thing is certain: the ruling powers of the Church missed the golden moment for undertaking reform, and the Church was to meet its hour of trial with most of its weaknesses still uncured. When the Sobor was finally convened, it was at the most unfavorable moment that the twentieth century had yet brought to the Church—late 1917, when the Bolsheviks were about to seize power.47

But was that Sobor (Church Council) inefficacious? In terms of generating a renewed interest in Orthodox Christianity among those disaffected, it probably did little if anything. Nevertheless, convening the Council of 1917-18 and the temporary reestablishment of the patriarchate in November 1918 was significant for setting the tenor of Orthodoxy’s role in Russian life, in particular its political role:

For many of the delegates, restoring the patriarchate meant a redefinition of the spheres of sacred and secular power. The Church was a powerful institution in imperial Russia and exercised control of such crucial matters of daily existence as education, marriage, and divorce. Nevertheless, many of its members believed that the Petrine system of church government departed from the fundamental Orthodox
tenet of *symphonia* (first promulgated in Justinian’s sixth novella), which holds that sacred and secular power are inextricably connected and interdependent. Assuming the standpoint of the Orthodox believer in society, delegates worried that the Petrine autocracy violated the wholeness and integrity of individual existence.48

One might propose that even on the threshold of Soviet domination, the Church—or at least certain elements within it—were quite prepared to reorient it toward a more politically assertive posture. But in any case the subsequent application of Soviet suppression stymied such a potential evolution, at least for the time being. This raises again the question of the nature of church-state relations in pre-Soviet Russia, which should be addressed before we consider the apparent political cultural changes in Russia today and how Orthodoxy relates variously to these.

The legacy of church-state relations in imperial Russia, from the overthrow of the Mongol-Tatar Yoke until the October Revolution—indeed, until the denouement of the USSR—is highly complex and significantly variegated from era to era. Although church-state relations during this long period do not lend themselves to reduction to a set of propositions, the following general points provide a basis for exploring Russian political cultural change in the contemporary era.

First, the formal ecclesiological ideal of Orthodoxy ("symphonia," or a harmonious, complementary, and mutually beneficial relationship of church and state) was never fully realized in Muscovy or Imperial Russia, and certainly not in the Soviet era, wherein it was emphatically rejected.49 The ideal has its roots in medieval Byzantine theology, representing something of an Orthodox counterpart to the Gregorian "two swords" doctrine in the sixth-century Latin West.50

Second, from the baptism of Prince Vladimir and his subjects in 988 A.D. through the period of the Mongol-Tatar Yoke, through the election of Russia’s metropolitan by Russian bishops in 1448, to the establishment of the patriarchate in 1589, the salient features of church-state relations appear to be a reinforcement of national identity by the church and theological justification for autocratic, centralized civil governance. Contemporary anthropological research, such as Anthony D.
Smith's *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (1986), underscores the near universal significance of religion as a buttressing force of national identity; to this writer, Russia serves as a premier example. For Szeftel, the Muscovite political cultural legacy included an intimate association between temporal and spiritual power; a religious coloration imparted to every aspect of public life, blending the status to the church with that of tsar as to create the impression of diarchy; and the tsar "as a living symbol of Christian tsardom."\(^{51}\)

Third, from the establishment of the patriarchate in Moscow in 1589 until its abolition by Peter the Great in 1700, church-state relations were characterized by ongoing tension over ultimate power. The state eventually came to dominate the church after the complex whirl of events surrounding and subsequent to the great schism of the 1660s. This crucial turn has been thus summarized:

[Young Tsar Peter] was soon to complete the process of subordinating the church by abolishing the patriarchate and establishing a state-controlled synod as its ruling body. There were to be no more "Great Sovereigns" from the clergy like Philaret and Nikon, no more Great Rostovs in the world of Peter the Great, Catherine the Great—and the Great Revolution.\(^{52}\)

If these cultural underpinnings of autocratic civil dominance fed into the communist autocracy, as Berdyaev and many others have maintained, then the question becomes the degree to which the Soviet experience itself transformed both mass political dispositions toward autocratic rule, and underlying Orthodox social orientations that historically buttressed those dispositions. Apparently both have changed, and done so in a way that will alter not only the character of Russian political culture, but also the nature of church-state relations in the post-Soviet era. As we shall see, the Orthodox Church does not appear willing to reassume a supine role in the political life of post-Soviet Russia.

Fourth, Peter the Great's reforms resulted in the establishment of a Holy Synod in 1721, replacing the Patriarchate abolished in 1700. This Synod was a central
governing administrative unit, purposely reflecting a quasi-protestantized configuration of church-state relations. The Orthodox Church was deliberately and formally subordinated to the state until the time of the Provisional Government of 1917, and specifically until the Church Council, which, among other things, reestablished the Patriarchate in November 1917. Thus while the church was "protestantized" in being subordinated to a secular leviathan, there was little if any mass or popular cultural transformation as the Reformation had wrought in northwestern Europe and later North America. The historical difference in political outcome was enormous.

Fifth, the Soviet era continued and dramatically intensified the Petrine pattern of clear ecclesial subordination to the state. The specifics of the Soviet regime’s treatment of religion require no elaboration here, as scholarly treatment of the issue is extensive; in particular, Dimitry Pospielovskiy’s three-volume History of Marxist-Leninist Atheism (1987-8) and other sources noted above amply document the various repressions inflicted upon Russian Orthodoxy during this period. The specific nuances of church-state relations throughout the Soviet period are complex and variegated, as were the Orthodox Church’s didactic and political responses to the varying tactics and overarching political strategies of the Soviet regime. Those responses, though significant in shaping the political culture on the eve of perestroika, lie somewhat beyond the scope of this essay. For our purposes, it will suffice to emphasize the Church’s general posture, standing as a testimony against the officially enforced ideology; to underscore that the Church was the sole institution whose existence in Soviet society was grudgingly tolerated but whose work was persistently stymied by the political regime; and to infer from these points that once Soviet power collapsed, the social conspicuity of the Church could not fail to have political repercussions.

The Soviet regime sought fundamental cultural transformation, and this meant minimizing the role of religion at the very least, and ideally extirpating it from society. It is not surprising that the most virulent attacks on religion came when the leadership determined that religion was not withering away but rather showing
remarkable signs of endurance, e.g., with the launching of Stalin's "Revolution from Above," Khrushchev's anti-religion campaign of 1959-64, and the Brezhnev re-freeze which, regarding religion, earned from one close observer the title "the campaign that never was." Yet both the Petrine and Soviet eras are over, and with them the tendency for social and cultural elites to be estranged from popular religious life.

A significant portion of the elite stratum of Russia appears to have been increasingly drawn to religion as the "era of stagnation" proceeded. This may be seen as the watershed of a substantially new pattern of church-state relations in Russia, and of Orthodoxy's larger social role. In 1989 John Dunlop documented Russian elites' attraction to religion (particularly Orthodoxy), maintaining that it had played a substantial role in moderating the general anti-religion posture of the Soviet regime in the first years of Gorbachev's rule:

Undoubtedly, the single most significant factor dictating the change of course was the attitude of the intelligentsia, who have been Gorbachev's most fervent supporters. During Khrushchev's assault on religion, which saw the closing down of at least 14,000 churches, the Soviet intelligentsia had not, for the most part, been concerned, although there were some individual exceptions such as Boris Pasternak and Alexander Solzhenitsyn. By the 1980s, however, the mood of the intelligentsia had changed markedly....Intellectuals have not only shown a sympathy for religion but also have begun to practice it. This has been emphasized by several Russian Orthodox writers. (emphasis added)

This phenomenon suggests that the political-culturally transformative role of Russian Orthodoxy may emanate from "high culture" sources as well as the general populace. As such Orthodoxy might presumably be more intellectually sophisticated, thereby more defensible, and therefore a more powerful force in modern society than if its revitalization and resurgence were restricted to the lower classes. Nicholas Zernov's comment in 1963 on the potential of the major figures of the"Russian religious renaissance" of the early twentieth century sounds today prognostic, if not prophetic:
The Russian revolution witnessed one of the most powerful rebellions of men against their Creator, made in the name of numerical equality and compulsory uniformity, the two besetting temptations of modern men. At the time of this crisis Russia produced a number of teachers who proclaimed with courage and fearlessness the eternal truth of the Christian revelation, and demonstrated in their writings its relevance to the specific needs of our epoch. Their ideas are not known at present in Communist Russia; their voice is not heard by the nation whose faithful sons they were, but the time will come when these representatives of the intelligentsia will be able to speak, though posthumously, to their own people, and will be honored among them as their talents, labours, and sacrifices deserve. (emphasis added)

Given the intellectual power of the major figures of that Orthodox-oriented renaissance, even if Zernov is only partially correct, their "talent, labours and sacrifices" are bound to have an enormous influence on Russian culture in the post-Soviet era. Because their work so directly addressed religion and the political order, the dimension of Russian culture that might be most affected is the one that effectively silenced them in their own time—namely the political.

But there is abundant evidence that the vitality of religion today despite Soviet repressions is not merely a passing fad among intellectuals. We explore that evidence and the consequences of popular religious vitality below.

The Role of Russian Orthodoxy in the Post-Soviet Order

All evidence points to a substantial degree of vitality of Russian Orthodoxy in the contemporary era. As for public religiosity, some close observers have noted a pendulum-like pattern of attraction to religion. Further, the vitality of some of the dissent that emerged specifically from religious disaffection (and was voiced by Orthodox laity and clergy) clearly served to push the Brezhnev regime toward
political crisis, and the country toward a more pluralistic order. This appears to be a major break from the legacy of apoliticity noted above. Indeed, the apparently universal tendency of socio-economic modernization to enhance political efficacy, and thereby increase popular political involvement, may have worked a significant portion of its effect in Russia through religious channels. Further sociological research is needed to establish a clearer picture of this connection.

Religion had a peculiar place in the dissident movement of the late 1960s and onward: the movement was essentially a reaction to Brezhnev-era cultural, legal, and political "re-freeze." Robert Tucker has noted:

The dissident movement in Russia can be traced in large measure to the abandonment of regime-initiated reform under Brezhnev. So long as Russians could pin their hopes for change on the party-state's leadership, many were willing to try to work within the system and to envisage change in the system's own terms. The disappointment of those hopes after the passing of the Khrushchev era encouraged a further quest for new directions in national life.61

By the time of the collapse of the USSR it had become clear that religion, and specifically Russian Orthodoxy, represented one of these "new directions." Even in those twilight years of the Soviet regime the Church had begun to press the central government for a broader social role. These demands began around the time of the Millennium celebrations in 1988 and indeed were strengthened by that series of events. Not only did the regime acquiesce to many of the Church's demands, but Gorbachev himself began to speak in 1989 of a "socially useful role" for not only the Orthodox Church, but for religion in general.62

The socio-political role of the Church was heightened by the election of Orthodox clergy to public offices in the democratizing changes of 1989 and following. This was not only a huge step from the enforced docility of the Soviet era, but a departure from the current trend in Roman Catholicism toward clerical abstention from public office. The socio-political role of religion in Russia, and in
particular Orthodoxy, has changed so dramatically that a comparison with 1917 is in some important respects misleading. With the ideological void created by the demise of Marxism–Leninism, the Church may be in a position to exert an even stronger cultural (and thereby, political) influence than it was capable of in 1917.

The political cultural continuity of Orthodoxy reflects the totality of these consequences. This refers us again to the question of the content of specifically Soviet political culture, in the sense of the Soviet regime's preferred pattern of "psychological orientations toward things political." That pattern clashed starkly with Orthodoxy, and in some ways appeared to have the upper hand. Stephen White noted in the late 1970s that the regime had succeeded, to a degree, in inculcating the official view into the population—in other words, that the regime had brought about some measure of political culture shift:

The dominant political culture of the USSR has largely been shaped by the patterns of orientations to government which were inherited from the pre-revolutionary period [and] the official political culture, which the regime has promoted since 1917, has secured only a limited degree of acceptance. But the traditional political culture, we also argued, was strongly collectivist and welfarist in character, so that substantial prior support existed for many of the institutions and practices associated with the Soviet form of government. To that extent, we may suggest, that the regime is a stable and substantially legitimate one; there is, that is to say, a substantial degree of congruence between the political culture and the political system (although important elements of dissonance, such as religion, have clearly continued to exist).63

From the perspective of 1977, White's conclusion about the "stable and substantially legitimate" character of the regime may have been partially correct, but it clearly does not reflect the realities of the USSR by late 1991. Nevertheless, White accurately recognized religion as an important element of "cultural dissonance" between regime and populace. From all evidence of the enduring vitality of Orthodoxy from then until today, it would appear safe to conclude that the source of
that dissonance—a vibrant private, yet increasingly public religiosity—will continue to grow. However, to the degree that Russia sustains a politically pluralistic order (as it appears to be as of this writing), religious vitality will represent not so much "cultural dissonance" as a powerful public voice. In what domains might this voice ring out, and what might its content be?

First, Orthodoxy is almost certainly to continue as a normative force within Russia to a degree it could not during most of the Soviet era. Given the actual breadth of support Orthodoxy appears to have among the general population, and regardless of its particular theological and (ethical) philosophical orientations, its role may be in part as an undergirding value system, or at least a point of social-axiological reference, for the coming generations. The connection between religion and politics in mass political consciousness for the period in question was explored by two Russian social scientists on the basis of two sociological surveys conducted from July 1990 to October 1991. They note that the 1990 survey demonstrated "colossal popularity" of Orthodoxy, as well as a subsequent "sharp reduction" in sympathy for it during 1990-91, apparently traceable to perceptions of Church complicity with the by-then discredited Soviet regime. They also do not foresee Russia evolving into a country with a "religious majority" and take special note of the pendulum-like swings in popular religious orientation since the 1960s. This does not, however, necessarily mitigate the potential for profound influence upon the direction of society, and particularly of its political evolution.

Given the many trials of the Russian Orthodox Church since 988 A.D., and given the resurgence of the salience of religion in the contemporary era, one cannot easily discount Orthodoxy as an important ongoing source of political cultural orientation. The lack of democratic content, or potentiality, of Orthodoxy may continue to be as problematic for the future development of a democratic political culture as it was historically, as evidenced by the apparently systematic patterns of differing political orientations among the general population and Orthodox believers. Filatov and Furman have characterized the political consciousness of the latter as "relatively authoritarian"; indeed, their view of the possible role of Orthodoxy in the
evolution of a democratic political culture is not particularly sanguine. However, that view appears to assume that the traditional political characteristics of Orthodoxy continue, an assumption that, particularly concerning Orthodoxy’s alleged rigidity and dogmatism, might need to be reexamined.

Second, Orthodoxy is already beginning to serve as a basis for political parties, groups, platforms, and thereby, political demands. Time and time alone will tell how far these demands will extend, what measure of popular support they receive, and to what degree they are incorporated into public policy. It is certainly not out of the realm of possibility that a major Orthodox-oriented political party will emerge in Russia, as the Christian Democratic Union in post-war Germany and the Christian Democratic Party in Italy emerged from the ashes of socio-political crisis to bring certain elements of a Christian-oriented culture to contemporary politics.

Third, the overall social role of the Church is still very much open to question: classical questions of neo-clericalism are emerging with increasing complexity as Russia continues to experience, one would hope, the transition from atheistic autocracy to genuine pluralism. The post-Soviet Russian state is already facing the standard array of complex church-state issues that have long beleaguered even the most pluralistic, tolerant regimes. These include, but are by no means limited to, issues of church property, taxation, public education, and limits of free expression. The strong numerical and cultural position of Orthodoxy is certain to make such questions even more problematic.

Significantly, the eleven-point preliminary outline of the Russian Federation’s nationalities policy offered in February 1993 by Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai concluded with the principle of demanding "mandatory consideration of the complexity of Russian society’s religious makeup." Despite President Boris Yeltsin’s stated determination to forge a secular governmental system guaranteeing religious liberty and toleration, a facile realization of this principle may be particularly difficult in light of the historical and cultural role of the Church in Russian society.

Fourth, Orthodoxy appears destined to resume a political-symbolic role similar to that which it held prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, and exercised during World
War II—the symbol or living embodiment of the Russian nation. This role may include a substantive as well as symbolic dimension. Filatov and Furman's survey indicated that, even among nonbelieving urban dwellers, 61 percent believed religion is essential for the preservation (sokhraneniye) of national identity. This is likely to continue as valid despite the evident, but perhaps short-term, "sharp reduction" in numbers of individuals identifying themselves as Orthodox, or indeed even viewing Orthodoxy positively. Recent political events suggest that such a symbolic role was in fact rapidly resumed by the Church with the demise of the old order in 1991. Two events strike this writer as particularly emblematic, though naturally open to various political interpretations.

The first was Patriarch Alexii II's address at the inauguration of Russia's first democratically elected President, Boris Yeltsin, in July 1991. Beyond the symbolism of an Orthodox patriarch in effect anointing a civil ruler, the content of the address reflected the continuing political-cultural force of Orthodoxy:

You have taken responsibility for a country that is gravely ill....The 70-year destruction of its spiritual system and internal unity was accompanied by the strengthening of heavy external hoops of forced statehood. Three generations of people have grown up under conditions that have removed their desire and ability to work. First people lost the habit of spiritual labor, they lost the habit of heroic prayer, and then they lost the habit of mental labor, of aspiring toward an independent search for the truth. Finally, whether this was desired or not, the way of life that our society is now trying to get out of in fact put people out of the habit of the most ordinary labor, of diligence, of initiative....

The choice of the people has placed a heavy cross on you. You bear responsibility not only before the people but also before God. You have accepted not honor, not privileges, but responsibility. As far as the church or religious associations are concerned...we hope that the new President of Russia will promote the return of the church, its age-old sacred places, its churches and cloisters, and that Russia's participation in their restoration and rehabilitation will be provided for.
The second event is the ultimately failed coup d'etat of August 1991, which witnessed not only a break with the Russian Orthodox legacy of apoliticity, but an assertion of political-symbolic force that suggests a substantially different political role for clergy from anything since the second half of the seventeenth century. Father Alexander F. C. Webster, editor of American Orthodoxy, noted the import of the Patriarch’s actions during the events surrounding the failed coup:

Alexii quickly gathered his courage. On the third day of the coup, a second statement by the patriarch was read over the public address system at the barricades only half an hour before the coup resisters expected an armoured assault. Speaking directly to the "soldiers and their commanders" about to commit the "horrible sin of fratricide" Alexii declared that "my duty [as] Patriarch is to warn...that those who take up arms against their neighbor, against unarmed people, take the gravest sin upon their souls, the sin which excommunes them from the Church and from God."

Alexii at least questioned the legitimacy of the Soviet coup while it was still on a roll—and when his own life was at risk.

If the customary prophetic witness by Orthodox patriarchs to Byzantine emperors or Russian tsars entailed "whispering" in their ears, Patriarch Alexii broke that mold on August 21. His bold exhortation to the army of the commissars was a veritable shout.71

Not all observers share Father Webster’s positive assessment of Alexii II’s political role or even motives in these events. Perhaps the Patriarch was motivated by political calculations, and his actions were more prudential than heroic, as some have suggested; one Russian journalist has even charged that Alexii II was in fact the "agent Drozhdov" referred to in recently opened KGB files.72 Yet even if this were true, it negates neither the dramatically changed position of the Orthodox Church since 1988, nor the profoundly significant role—in particular as a symbol—it played in the political cultural transformation during the dying convulsions of the Soviet regime. One might argue that the Church’s recent influence only underscores the
need for a more thoroughly assertive role of the Church in relation to civil authority, to safeguard it from nefarious predation by the state in the future.

The current situation is perhaps reminiscent of the famous clash between the Bishop of Milan (St. Ambrose) and Emperor Theodosius over the latter’s random massacre of citizens in 390 A.D., although the larger historical pattern in Moscow after 1991 may be different. Subsequent Byzantine struggles between emperor and ecclesiastical authorities culminated in Emperor Zeno’s issuance of the *Henoticon* (482 A.D.) through the Patriarch of Constantinople Acacius, in which the emperor proclaims his right to define theological doctrine:

The reaction of Western ecclesiastical leaders to the *Henoticon* was almost instantaneous and continued for many years. They objected, of course, to its theological formulations; but even more did they oppose the idea that the emperor might legitimately overturn the decrees of a council. In the opposition of the Bishops of Rome, one sees reflected an attitude toward imperial authority which was to sharply differentiate Western developments from those of the East. In the Eastern Empire, the imperial claim to define doctrine was seemingly unchallenged; and the Church increasingly became virtually a department of state in the later Byzantine Empire. In the West, by contrast, Popes Felix II and Gelasius I took such vigorous exception to the act of Zeno that they inaugurated the long tradition which would stake out claims to a spiritual jurisdiction separate from that of loyal and imperial authority.  

Herein lies the root of the monism which had two large-scale historical results. The first was the development of a form of *etatisme* in the East with a markedly different character from the West, tending from the beginning toward an epistemologically as well as politically absolutist posture. Second, the Eastern monism effectively placed the church in a subordinate position—not, significantly, vis-à-vis the mass population or other social groups, which the Church lorded over until October 1917, but subordinate rather to the administrative state in such a manner as to preclude the Church from acting as the tutelary agency of modern democratic citizenship as it
evolved in the West. The question is whether the massive political cultural changes Russia has undergone in the post-Stalin generation will serve to transcend the monistic ecclesiastical-political legacy or will work to reestablish it, even willy-nilly, in quite another form. The enduring presence of the Church throughout the Soviet era, the activities of its leadership in the events of the failed coup of August 1991, and the evident support it has lent to the fledgling Russian democracy provide reason for hope, regardless of one's confessional orientation, or even the particular motivations of Orthodox leadership under conditions of severe stress.
Notes


Years of the Empire 1900-17 (New York: Octagon Books, 1972); and Christopher Read, Religion, Revolution, and the Russian Intelligentsia 1900-12: The Vekhi Debate and its Intellectual Background (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1980).


4. Berdyaev, The Russian Revolution, 8. The emphasis is Berdyaev's.


11. Ibid., 3-6; for a broader examination of conceptual and practical problems, see Archie Brown, "Introduction," in *Political Culture and Change in Communist States*, specifically "The Concept and Its Critics," 2-10; and "Political Culture and Comparative Communist Studies," 10-13, which addresses the problems related to the closed character of communist-ruled societies.


17. Ibid., 29.


21. Ibid., 31-3.
22. Ibid., 34.


24. Ibid. In Eastern Orthodox theology, one of the "five great divisions" of the universe is the male-female line. Thus not only the centrality of the Madonna cult in Orthodox Christianity (as in Roman Catholicism), but other significant cultural and political implications would seem to follow.


> The Russians belong to those peoples whose national characteristics and sense of unity have been shaped by their membership of the same Church. Although their geographical isolation and the calamities of their history have contributed also to their conviction that they form a community equally distinct from their oriental and western neighbours, nevertheless the decisive factor remains the orthodoxy (Pravoslavie) of their religion.


Counter-reform depicts the clergy in the era immediately preceding the October Revolution likewise as inert either to support the old regime or hasten the development of a new one:

The Orthodox clergy entered this revolutionary era wholly unprepared for struggle. Neither priests nor bishops had a coherent program, national organization, or recognized leadership. By the time the clergy attempted to create organs and mobilize adherents, their moment was past, for by then far more worldly parties, with far more worldly visions, had taken to the streets to preach a new gospel for the future.(474)


31. Billington, The Icon and The Axe, 79-84. "The political subordination of Novgorod to Moscow intensified Muscovite [religious] fanaticism while crushing out three distinctive traditions from which Novgorod and Pskov had shared with the advanced cities of the high medieval West: commercial cosmopolitanism, representative government, and philosophic rationalism."(82)


37. The literature on resurgent Russian nationalism is extensive. Writing in 1989, Roman Szporluk noted:

Indeed, there are Russian thinkers who want to explore and affirm the importance of the Orthodox religion and the Orthodox Church in the history of Russia, and who consider this spiritual aspect a formative influence on modern Russian identity. These thinkers disagree profoundly among themselves in their specific assessments of individuals and events in Russia's spiritual history, and even more profoundly on the implications of Russia's past for its present spiritual and political problems. Their ideas deserve attention.


38. See in particular Nicholas Zernov, *The Russian Religious Renaissance of the Twentieth Century*, chapters 1 and 2. Szefiel points out that the Petrine reforms of the early eighteenth century brought about, among other things, a "bureaucratization" of the Church. *Church and State in Russia*, 130-2.


42. Tucker, *Political Culture*, 156.

43. White, 34.

44. Christopher Read, *Religion, Revolution, and the Russian Intelligentsia, 1900-12* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1980), 8,13. It is worth noting that the divorce of religious from political thought in the West is widely understood as having occurred during the Renaissance—roughly contemporaneous with the beginning of Russia's ambivalent, largely isolated posture toward the West.


46. John Shelton Curtiss, *Church and State in Russia*, 42.


49. The doctrine of "symphonia" (symphony, or harmonious complementarity) between church and state was first outlined at the Seventh Ecumenical Council (754 A.D.), repeated by Byzantine Emperor Basil the Macedonian in the Epanagogue, and generally taken as an ideal form in subsequent Eastern Orthodoxy.

50. For more on Gelasius' concept of "two swords" (representing temporal and spiritual authority), see George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Henry Holt, 1954), 194-7. In general, the Eastern churches tended toward superiority of imperial, civil authority over ecclesiastical, and the Western church toward ecclesiastical superiority, although the issue remained highly contentious and central until the early modern era, when civil dominance became the norm in both East and West (for significantly different reasons).


52. Billington, 162. Igor Smolitsch Geschichteder Russischen Kirche, 27-8, in summarizing church-state relations in this period, emphasizes that the church was never completely or totally subjugated:

The effects of Peter the Great's reforms are treated in chapter 1 of the abovementioned volume, "Die Errichtung des Staatskirchentums," 57-132, and in chapter 2, "Die Kirche und der Staat," 133-356.


56. The long-term effects of the Khrushchev campaign are particularly revealing of the limitations of political coercion; see Warhola, "Central vs. Local Authority," note #13; and Nathaniel Davis, "The Number of Orthodox Churches Before and After the Khrushchev Antireligious Drive," Slavic Review, 50:3 (Fall 1991), 612-20. For more detailed treatment of the Orthodox Church’s specific responses to this campaign, and to other aspects of its


in 1990: "Asked if the following individuals would have great meaning for the peoples of the USSR in the year 2000, those polled said:

- **Jesus Christ** — 58% yes (18% no)
- **Lenin** — 36% yes (39% no)
- **Stalin** — 9% yes (72% no)
- **Gorbachev** — 26% yes (47% no)
- **Sakharov** — 48% yes (21% no)


62. For a succinct overview of these changes, see James E. Wood, Jr. "Rising Expectations for Religious Rights in Eastern Europe," *Journal of Church and State*, 33 (Winter 1991), 11-15. Significantly, the scope of religious freedom, and of social and political activity, has only increased since that publication.

63. White, "Autocracy and Industrialism, 56.

64. Filatov and Furman, "Religiya i politika," 3-12.

65. Ibid. 4,5.

66. Ibid. 8,9.


69. Filatov and Furman, 9.


72. Mikhail Pozdnyaev, "Ego Partiya," *Stolitsa*, 36, 1992:1, 3, 6-7: An interview with Alexii II was published in *Izvestia* on June 16, 1990, in which he declared:

> Even in the most difficult times, we were trying to use to the maximum those opportunities that we had. But never were we traitors to the church! We understood that our church must find its place in Soviet society. Sometimes we were looked upon as second-class citizens. Nevertheless, we did not abandon our motherland, and not one clergyman became a traitor.