The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944–1948
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The origins of the Cold War are closely interwoven with Western support for nationalist unrest in the Baltic areas and Western Ukraine.

—Pavel A. Sudoplatov, director of the Section on Diversions and Sabotage, Special Tasks Division, Soviet NKGB, Special Tasks

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In 1989, when archival discoveries were about to revolutionize the history of
the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis published a pathbreaking article entitled “Inte-
lligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins.” While Gaddis expressed serious doubts
as to whether anyone had ever established that espionage had positively affected
larger historical developments, he did render one sober and perceptive conclusion
that did not rely on unencumbered access to Soviet, American, or British archives:
espionage had heightened the atmosphere of distrust on all sides, and probably did
more to escalate tensions than to abate them. “Was it all worth it, from the Russians’
own standpoint? There is good reason to doubt whether the benefits Stalin gained
from spying on his allies during and after the war counterbalanced the problems
created for him once his indulgence in espionage became known.”1

Gaddis’s principal challenge was that it was not enough for historians or pun-
dits to show whether there was or was not espionage activity. The key issue was to
tie the clandestine world of spies, sabotage, and espionage to large-H History—to
determine whether any new information to emerge from that covert world in any
way revised or altered our perspectives on major issues. “As great stacks of books
that have been written about the history of espionage amply demonstrate, it is easy
to get so caught up in the fascination of esoteric minutiae that one loses sight of
what, if anything, it all meant. What difference did it make that the Russians spied
on their Anglo-American allies throughout the war, that they knew much of what
went on within the British and American governments during the early postwar
years, and that London and Washington failed to discover this until 1951? Is the
world today—was the world then—discernibly different as a result?”2

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the opening
of archives East and West have over the last decade deeply affected the way we
think about the early years following World War II, and certainly offer scholars
the opportunity—more than a decade later—to return to Gaddis’s basic challenge:
what effect, if any, did Soviet or Western espionage have on the early history of the
Cold War?

It should not be surprising to anyone that the first decade of the “new Cold War
history” has largely produced works where scholars have absorbed mountains of new
information by using new discoveries to buttress old perspectives. Who was at fault
according to such traditionalist adaptations of the new Cold War history? For the
most succinct version of the traditionalist view, John Lewis Gaddis himself stepped
forward with his We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, published in 1997.
On the most fundamental issue of responsibility, Gaddis did not mince words:

What is there new to say about the old question of responsibility for the Cold
War? Who actually started it? Could it have been averted? Here I think the “new”
history is bringing us back to an old answer: that as long as Stalin was running the Soviet Union a cold war was unavoidable. . . . How entire countries fall into the hands of malevolent geniuses like Hitler and Stalin remains as unfathomable in the “new” Cold War history as in the “old.” Once leaders like these do gain power, however, certain things become highly probable. . . . For the more we learn, the less sense it makes to distinguish Stalin’s foreign policies from his domestic practices or even his personal behavior. . . . Stalin . . . functioned in much the same manner whether operating within the international system, within his alliances, within his country, within his party, within his personal entourage, or even within his family. The Soviet leader waged cold wars on all of these fronts. The Cold War we came to know was only one of many from his point of view. . . . For all of their importance, one could have removed Roosevelt, Churchill, Truman, Bevin, Marshall, or Acheson, and a cold war would still have probably followed the world war. If one could have eliminated Stalin, alternative paths become quite conceivable. . . . Once Stalin wound up at the top in Moscow and once it was clear his state would survive the war, then it looks equally clear that there was going to be a Cold War whatever the west did. Who then is responsible? The answer, I think, is authoritarianism in general, and Stalin in particular.3

By the end of the 1990s, Gaddis’s own argument had become somewhat tautological. Arguing in essence that there was nothing in secret archives that could significantly alter his views on fundamental issues, Gaddis has led the charge to keep the new discoveries of the so-called new Cold War history in perspective, to remind ourselves that we were, after all, fighting a war against an implacable enemy, that Stalin was no different from Hitler, that Communism was with Fascism the principal threat to freedom and to sacred American values in the twentieth century. In short, no matter what we find in the archives, we must not lose sight of the enemy we faced.

Interestingly enough, the most succinct alternative reading of the discoveries of the new Cold War history has emerged not from the Left (which has remained largely silent throughout most of the shattering discoveries to emerge from Soviet archives in the 1990s), but from within the traditionalist Right.4 No radical revisionist himself, Melvyn P. Leffler has been among the most outspoken recent voices emphasizing the need for the United States and the Soviets to share responsibility for launching the Cold War. Leffler has challenged the so-called traditionalists who—in his view—have merely used the new evidence to buttress old, ideologically based presumptions about Soviet intentions and behavior:

U.S. words and deeds greatly heightened ambient anxieties [of Soviet leaders] and subsequently contributed to the arms race and the expansion of the Cold War into the Third World. . . . The Cold War was not a simple case of Soviet expansionism and American reaction. Realpolitik held sway in the Kremlin. Ideology played an important role in shaping their perceptions, but Soviet leaders
were not focused on promoting worldwide revolution. They were concerned mostly with configurations of power, with protecting their country’s immediate periphery, ensuring its security, and preserving their rule.\(^5\)

This suggestion that Soviet behavior was based on very real concerns about perceived threats to its own national security presents a radical challenge to traditionalist presumptions of the preeminence of Marxist (expansionist) ideology, the Soviet (or Stalin’s) elemental quest for domination, or Stalin’s megalomania (or paranoia, or both).\(^6\)

Just as research in post-Soviet archives is producing new works that fundamentally alter our old views of the Soviet threat, so too has research in Western archives given us a better sense that Western machinations were not merely conjured by suspicious and ideologically driven Soviet leaders.

Into this fierce struggle of two divergent paradigms there recently entered two books whose findings will resonate for years to come. Drawing from a meticulous reading of previously classified materials in U.S. security archives, Gregory Mitrovich has persuasively shown that U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1940s was far more aggressive than Western scholars have traditionally understood:

Containment was only the first step in a determined effort to destroy Soviet power. Recently declassified [U.S.] documents confirm that, from 1948 to 1956, U.S. decisionmakers developed a national security doctrine significantly more assertive than generally understood, a policy designed to roll back Soviet power from Eastern Europe and to undermine communist control within the USSR itself—and to do so by “measures short of war.” Through the aggressive application of psychological warfare (ranging from regular diplomacy to covert military actions) American national security elites hoped to influence the minds of the Soviet leadership and the population. They believed either they could compel the Soviet Union to abandon its efforts to subvert the nascent postwar international system, and so restore the independence of the East European states, or they could precipitate the collapse of the Soviet communist system itself.\(^7\)

Mitrovich’s book was the first serious scholarly effort to challenge the benign qualities of American containment policy, to recontextualize the early Cold War era recognizing that U.S. policymakers and military and intelligence officers believed they could pursue virtually any “measure short of war” with no fear whatsoever of Soviet retaliation that might pose a serious counterthreat to American interests.\(^8\)

Less scholarly and containing no systematic citation of many key documents, Peter Grose’s book *Operation Rollback: America’s Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain*, nonetheless presents one of the greatest bombshells to fall on Cold War history in recent years. Operation Rollback, the U.S. policy to confront the Soviets
by covert means, was initiated in 1946 by George Kennan himself. To maintain deniability and to avoid congressional scrutiny, the new program of covert operations was based neither in the State Department nor the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). “The CIA setup in respect both to personalities and organization is not favorable,” wrote Kennan. “We therefore reluctantly decided to let the CIA sleeping dog lie and recommend a separate organization which might at a later date be incorporated into the CIA.” Instead, Kennan chose to place Operation Rollback in the innocuous OPC—the Office of Policy Coordination—and financed it by the regular diversion of Marshall Plan funds, up to $100 million a year by 1951. “What is proposed here is an operation in the traditional American form: organized public support of resistance to tyranny in foreign countries. Throughout our history, private American citizens have banded together to champion the cause of freedom for people suffering under oppression. Our proposal is that this tradition be revived specifically to further American national interests in the present crisis.”

How were these seemingly private initiatives to be maintained? In the penultimate draft of National Security Council (NSC) document 10/2, dated 30 April 1948, the clandestine lines of Operation Rollback were laid out in clear terms: “General direction and financial support would come from the Government; guidance and funds would pass to a private American organization or organizations (perhaps ‘business’ enterprises) composed of private citizens of the approximate calibre of Allen Dulles; these organizations, through their field offices in Europe and Asia, would establish contact with the various national underground representatives in free countries and through these intermediaries pass on assistance and guidance to the resistance movements behind the iron curtain.”

Kennan repeatedly emphasized: “This is a covert operation . . . utilizing private intermediaries.”

The formal charter for Operation Rollback was adopted by the U.S. Joint Chiefs on 18 June 1948. However, despite staunch resistance from within military and intelligence circles, Kennan himself secretly initiated U.S. support of anti-Soviet paramilitary groups in Eastern Europe as early as 1946: “a beginning should be made to carry . . . out [support for guerrilla warfare by anti-Soviet nationalists]. It would seem advisable to start the project with these men [two thousand anti-Russian Finnish refugees] and gradually to build it up as a top-secret undertaking.”

As Grose makes clear, years later Kennan came to regret these decisions to run a covert war against the Soviets by supporting East European resistance movements. In his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 28 October 1975, the chief architect of Operation Rollback expressed profound remorse: “The political warfare initiative was the greatest mistake I ever made. It did not work out at all the way I had conceived it.”
What effect did this “greatest mistake” have on Soviet behavior? Largely completed before the publication of most of the recent scholarly work discussed above, the argument that follows refocuses the central preoccupation of the new Cold War history toward the evolution of Soviet perceptions of the Western threat. The Soviet discovery of Western support for nationalist insurgencies throughout their western borderlands—of various aspects of Kennan’s Operation Rollback—profoundly affected Soviet perceptions, provoking by 1946 an era of “heightened vigilance” against Western intrigue, a dramatic escalation of international tensions, as well as a large-scale reorganization of the Soviet secret police and the commencement of postwar repression targeted at the eradication of internal enemies.

What follows is a close investigation of one important part of that larger story: the Soviet discovery of Western covert support for West Ukrainian nationalist insurgents in 1946.

The Context: “Keeping Hope Alive in the [Soviet] Satellite Countries”¹⁴

Anti-Communist Manifesto
It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of “fair play” must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counter-espionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against us.

—Doolittle Commission, Appointed by President Dwight Eisenhower, September 1954

The transition of U.S. policy in the 1940s from “containment” of Soviet aggression to “liberationism”—rolling back and destabilizing Soviet power from within by actively supporting nationalist, anti-Soviet rebel groups operating on Soviet territory—had a profound effect on the early history of the Cold War. Somewhere between the last days of World War II and 1948, the myth was born of vast, seething unrest percolating in Eastern and Central Europe, a popular dissatisfaction which could, if properly nurtured, cripple Soviet Communism from within. Liberationism preached that “now it is time not merely to contain Communism but to begin roll-
ing Soviet power back.” 15 As Senator Robert Taft, then Republican majority leader, observed in the New York Times on 2 June 1952: “There are millions of heroic anti-Communist Russians, Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Czechs, Rumanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Latvians, who desire passionately to throw off the Soviet yoke and to achieve once more their independence and freedom.” 16

Based on the evidence of West Ukraine, there were indeed grounds to support those claims. In 1951, the CIA’s first chief of covert operations, Frank Wisner, estimated that thirty-five thousand Soviet military and Communist party cadres in West Ukraine had been liquidated by Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists/Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN/UPA) since the end of the Second World War. More recent research in Soviet military and police security files shows that over thirty thousand Soviet cadres and collaborators had been assassinated by the OUN/UPA by the end of 1945 alone, with thousands more killed or intimidated in subsequent years. A small, independent, highly clandestine nationalist guerrilla force in West Ukraine, which never exceeded thirty thousand, had managed to tie down at least two hundred thousand Red Army troops and to assassinate more than seven thousand Red Army officers during Germany’s hasty retreat from the region in 1944–1945. 17 As late as February 1947, “remnants” of these same guerrilla units were still holding their own in a covert war against at least sixty-eight thousand crack troops in Soviet special forces, plus tens of thousands of Red Army support cadres, and over sixty-three thousand local militia in specially organized Destruction Battalions. 18

Coming as they did at the dawn of the Cold War, these remarkable achievements of an indigenous underground resistance force operating within Soviet territory came to represent an irresistible opportunity for U.S. military and intelligence experts. Anti-Soviet guerrillas offered not just the opportunity to undermine Soviet power from within, but an immediate and powerful intelligence asset in its own right. The atmosphere of that era was best captured by Harry Rositzke, the CIA station chief in Munich who eventually ran operations into Eastern Europe: “Everyone thought the Soviets were plotting war and that we had to have an early warning of their plans if we were to survive. . . . It was conspiracy-time in Washington, and the CIA took the brunt of it.” In a Pentagon meeting, an influential army colonel demanded that the CIA “put an agent with a radio on every airfield between Berlin and the Urals. I agreed that we needed agents equipped with radios in various locations inside the Soviet Union if we were going to get any early warning of a Soviet attack on western Europe, but how to get our agents there? That was the hard question.” 19

The answer was to come readily by tapping into existing remnants of the wartime partisan movement, nationalist guerrilla forces involved in a deadly struggle
against Soviet hegemony in their native regions. As Evan Thomas, who was the first independent author to gain access to records from the CIA’s own files, has observed:

According to the draft of a history by the CIA’s History Staff, [covert operations director Frank] Wisner was interested in creating the “psychological fission” of the Soviet Union. “The German experience in the Soviet Union during World War II greatly intrigued the OPC. Frank Wisner, in particular, sought to learn the lessons of the German defeat in the East—a defeat he felt was due in large measure because the Nazis failed to capitalize on the anticommunist sentiment of the Russian people. Reviewing the Nazi experience on the Eastern Front, Wisner felt the U.S. ‘should stop thinking of the Soviet Union as a monolithic nation and investigate the internal strains.’”

U.S. intelligence estimates throughout the first decade after the Second World War identified a particular Soviet vulnerability to internal opposition, which—in planning and operations files—anticipated distinct U.S. advantages to follow from their exploitation. As the plans evolved, it was intended that the guerrilla forces would simultaneously serve two interests: they would become the eyes and ears of U.S. intelligence, and at the same time they would promote U.S. operational interests targeted at destabilizing the Soviet Union from within. As the text of a 1948 proposal for a Guerrilla Warfare School prepared by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated: “In order that the U.S. might prepare for and engage in the conduct of guerrilla warfare U.S. national policy and public aversion to the prospect will require modification. Greater freedom will have to be granted the armed services to engage in this type of warfare and the Central Intelligence Agencies have to be authorized to make the necessary contacts with and exercise the necessary control over foreign resistance movements.”

The CIA’s prerogative to engage in covert operations was formally granted in NSC 10/2, dated 18 June 1948. “The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and US national security, the overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supplemented by covert operations.” Noting that the CIA had already been charged with “espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad,” the text of NSC 10/2 emphasized that it was “desirable, for operational reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operations,” but rather to structure an Office of Special Projects “to plan and conduct covert operations” under the “over-all control of the Director of Central Intelligence.” Point 5 is especially enlightening: “‘Covert operations’ are understood to be all activities
which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.”

The U.S. program to co-opt nationalist rebels in a covert war against Stalin was just one of several tactics that fell under the rubric of “psychological warfare.” As the authors of JIC 634/1, “Vulnerability of Soviet Bloc Armed Forces to Guerrilla Warfare,” an analysis prepared for the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed: “An examination of Soviet Bloc military organization discloses several aspects that are vulnerable to guerrilla action.” The explicit goal of the analysis was “to select the most profitable targets for sabotage and/or guerrilla attack” inside Soviet territory or its satellites. “The estimate of psychological warfare requirements is based upon a psychological offensive to subvert the Soviet Armed Forces and to influence favorably to the Allied cause, the thought, morale, and behavior of the Russian people and nationalists of occupied countries. A psychological offensive to subvert the Red Army is considered a primary objective. This type of offensive, as attempted by the German Army in World War II, was known as the ‘Vlassov [sic] Movement.’ It resulted in a resistance movement of approximately one million people. The methods used in this offensive will be subversion by means of personal contact, leaflets delivered by bomb, by hand, and by radio.” U.S.-trained and supported guerrillas would play a primary role in the covert war with the Soviets in their own backyard, where “maximum use will be made of resistance groups and underground agencies which have been accepted by the United States.”

Like Soviet covert operations in the West, U.S. covert actions in Soviet-controlled zones of Central and Eastern Europe had a powerful effect on U.S.-Soviet relations during these early postwar years. Drawing from Soviet secret police files in Moscow, Kiev, and West Ukraine, in the pages below I will endeavor to trace the Soviet detection and response to the increasing ties between the Ukrainian nationalist underground resistance and the American and British intelligence apparatuses, and to evaluate the short- and long-term repercussions of those policies.
“A Few Far-Sighted Americans”:
The U.S. Decision to Recruit Anti-Soviet Assets

Ukrainian emigration in the territory of Germany, Austria, France, Italy, in the greatest majority is a healthy, uncompromising element in the fight against the bolsheviks. In case of a war, there can be recruited a minimum of 130,000 good, ideistically inclined soldiers with an experienced cadre of young officers.

—CIC Special Agent Randolph F. Carroll, European Theater, Region III, 1947

Some time between the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in January–February 1943 and the end of the European war in May 1945, leading members of the U.S. government forces in Europe began clandestine operations to recruit German officers and their non-German counterparts throughout Soviet-occupied Central and Eastern Europe. Postwar chaos and the monumental tasks of reconstruction had rendered the Soviet Union vulnerable, and Western experts were going to capitalize on Soviet weaknesses.

Documents released to numerous authors over the past two decades through the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act from U.S. military intelligence files in Fort Meade, Maryland, and the U.S. National Archives, establish incontrovertibly that American officers in occupied Europe began to vet German POWs from the standpoint of their usefulness vis-à-vis the Soviet threat at least as early as March 1945. The extensive research of several American investigators has already revealed that the main figures in America’s creation of these notorious “ratlines” were Allen Dulles, future director of the CIA; Gero Schulze von Gaevernitz, Dulles’s loyal assistant during the crucial postwar years, 1944–1947; Brig. Gen. Edwin Luther Sibert, Jr., future deputy director of the CIA; and Frank Wisner and James Jesus Angleton, both future directors of the CIA’s Counter-Intelligence Unit.

For months prior to the Allied victory in Berlin in May 1945, prisoners of war captured by Western allies were vetted for their usefulness as possible assets against the Soviets. The practice was so widespread that German officers and German collaborators often stockpiled strategic information prior to tactical surrender, hoping to use it as a bargaining chip with American, British, or French captors. At least as early as March 1945, Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Sibert—G-2 or chief of intelligence in Region IV, the zone in Germany occupied by Gen. Omar Bradley’s Twelfth Army—“was actively searching for former members of German Intelligence who would give him information about the Soviets.” Early interrogation reports were targeted specifically toward the possible contributions that men like Reinhard Gehlen, chief of Fremde
Heere Ost (FHO, German Military Intelligence on the Eastern Front), could make to U.S. information on the Soviets. This was reflected in the interrogators’ notes: April 1945, “Shrewd outstanding officer, not a [Nazi] Party member. Could be useful to Allies”; March 1945, “Very military, fanatically anti-Russian, but a realist.” To prevent their discovery, members of U.S. Army Intelligence actively deceived other branches of the U.S. government as well as the U.S. Allies in Europe. Captain John Boker, for instance, removed the names of Gehlen and his chief advisers from the list of prisoners in U.S. custody. This protected the new recruits from official Soviet requests to extradite them for war crimes trials in the East, but also from jealous queries of rival organizations in Britain and France and, last but not least, other American services who took the task of denazification more seriously.30 As a U.S. Army Intelligence colonel quipped, “Believe it or not, some of us are still able to put future American interests ahead of the delights of revenge.”31 By mid-summer 1945, U.S. Army Intelligence—working closely with Gehlen and his officers—had produced a 226-page, top secret report recommending exploitation of the experience and resources of “the German G-2 service in the Russian campaign.”32 A veritable mountain of classified reports summarizing German experiences against the Soviets on the Eastern Front—the “German Report Series”—would follow.33 Subsequently, a substantial part of the early foundation of U.S. postwar intelligence and covert operations against the Soviets would be built upon remnants of Germany’s wartime intelligence service, the “Gehlen Organization” on the Eastern Front.34

It was not without significance that the primary source for Gehlen Org’s information from and about Soviet Ukraine was the Foreign Center of the OUN, based in Munich, under the leadership of Stepan Bandera.35 While the U.S. government to this day officially denies any connection whatsoever to Bandera or his organization, persuasive evidence from classified Soviet secret police files and confirmed in U.S. archives tells a different story. According to documents in the formerly top secret files of the Soviet officer in charge of the Bandera investigation—then deputy chief of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Lt. Col. Ivan Serov, the future chief of the Committee of State Security (KGB) (1954–1958)—officers in American CIC (the U.S. Army’s Counterintelligence Corps) in Munich had secreted Bandera away immediately after the end of the war with Germany. This long-held suspicion was verified in a Soviet covert operation. On a night in June 1946, a Special Tasks team of the Soviet Ministry of State Security (MGB) covertly entered the U.S. occupation zone in Germany with one mission: to locate and kidnap Stepan Bandera, chief of the main branch of the OUN and the Munich-based Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, a coalition of anti-Soviet émigré groups formed in July 1945. The covert operation followed over two years of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, in which the MVD chief of the Soviet sector, Maj. Gen. A. Sidnev (in Brandenburg), had received
explicit promises from his American counterpart, Brig. Gen. Edwin Sibert, that Bandera would be apprehended and extradited to the Soviet zone as a war criminal. That June 1946 Soviet covert operation uncovered a surprising fact: “Bandera’s whereabouts were very difficult to ascertain, but we learned he lives in Gotha region [near Munich], where he is very well guarded, both by his own [security] as well as by American agents, where they occupy several adjacent villas.”

Despite Sibert’s expressed and repeated assurances that all measures would be taken to arrest and extradite Bandera, the OUN chief had been in Munich under Sibert’s protection since the summer of 1945. Research later revealed that the adjacent villas made up the complex of American-recruited units forming a rebuilt postwar Gehlen Organization: Bandera—operating under the Polish alias of Stanislaus Sitkowski, among others—was one of Gehlen Org’s major assets in the active conduct of espionage networks with hundreds of Ukrainian agents sent back under cover as repatriates into the Soviet zones.

Bandera’s direct ties to Gehlen Org were noted in a secret CIC report from Region III, dated 5 May 1947:

He [Bandera] travels often in the American zone, by crossing illegally the American-French Border at BAD-REICHENHALL. The border crossing is always done on foot through wooded areas. . . . Motor vehicles usually pick him up when he gets into the American zone. During these crossings BANDERA is guarded by a group of former German SS men who have been attached to the BANDERA Movement from a purported German underground organization that exists in BAVARIA. The German Underground, composed of former HJ [Hitler Jugend] Leaders, SS Officers and other high ranking NSDAP [Nazi Party] members, are working in close connection with the BANDERA movement, because he (BANDERA) holds excellent connections through his network of agents and informants which are spread throughout all four zones of occupied Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Russia and Poland.

The BANDERA Movement is increasing its membership and is becoming more active because of its financial strength. The main source of this financial help comes from the German Underground [i.e., Gehlen Org], which is reported as having a large sum of money and other valuables which were accumulated during the Nazi regime.

Bandera’s personal bodyguard consisted of at least ten men. As a CIC report indicated: “This group of men known as ‘The Black Hand’ are [sic] ruthless killers who intercept and liquidate persons who attempt to apprehend BANDERA.” Supported by U.S. military intelligence through Gehlen Org, Bandera “established an Intelligence School sometime in 1945, located a few kilometers from MUNICH. Numerous courses were taught at this school including: infiltration into [Soviet] installations, explosives, codes, ciphers, courier systems, organizing of informant nets, etc. Several
classes of agents and informants were graduated from the school, which operated until the end of 1946, when the Intelligence school moved to an unknown place.” Subsequent documents prove beyond any doubt that active deception was used. In a secret memorandum to the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 1951, Frank Wisner confirmed the preeminent U.S. role:

\[
\text{At the end of the last war many members of the OUN came to Western Europe to avoid capture by the advancing Soviets. The OUN re-formed in Western Europe with its headquarters in Munich. It first came to the attention of American authorities when the Russians demanded extradition of Bandera and many other anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists as war criminals. Luckily the [Soviet] attempt to locate these anti-Soviet Ukrainians was sabotaged by a few far-sighted Americans who warned the persons concerned to go into hiding.}\]

As we have seen, those “few far-sighted Americans” formed the core of U.S. covert operations in the decades immediately following World War II.

By 1947, the Munich-based Gehlen Org—relying largely on reports received from Bandera’s group, with offices nearby—was regularly providing Western policymakers with secret estimates of Stalin’s “threatening intentions” toward American and British interests in Europe, while also setting the stage for Western liberationist policies with such classified Intelligence Research Reports (IRR) as “The Nature and Extent of Disaffection and Anti-Soviet Activity in the Ukraine.”

Largely because Gehlen Org resisted revealing details about its networks to U.S. contacts, various departments of U.S. intelligence had by 1946 begun to recruit their own native agents for running operations against the Soviets. Over the course of the next few years, the United States would wean itself of its initial dependence on Gehlen Org by building its own clandestine networks in Central and Eastern Europe. In the Ukrainian community of the DP (Displaced Persons) camps throughout the U.S. occupation zone, it was widely known that the United States was seeking to recruit agents. Available U.S. documents do not indicate the degree to which this was sanctioned, or followed from unauthorized contacts made on behalf of individual agents. As a recently declassified U.S. Counterintelligence Corps report dated 10 August 1948 revealed:

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\text{It is well known that during the past two years, representatives of OUN/BANDERA have sought cooperation with U.S. intelligence agencies on their own terms. This was preceded by a lengthy surveillance by their intelligence organization of American intelligence agencies, principally CIC. Several CIC agents have personally attempted to seek close liaison with this Ukrainian group, however, with no permanent effect. In order to further these ends, it is believed that certain CIC agents have been indiscreet to the extent of revealing information to the Ukrainians or making commitments which could not be fulfilled.}\]
The author of the same report noted: “This headquarters, as well as other U.S. intelligence agencies, is employing certain members of OUN/B[ander] as individuals. It is not deemed advisable to seek their cooperation on an organizational basis for the simple reason that their motive is purely to seek support for their political group.” The report begs the question: in their subsequent response, did Soviet analysts confuse individual recruitments with a larger U.S. commitment? Did officials in U.S. intelligence delude themselves into believing they could recruit individual members of Ukrainian nationalist groups without alerting either the Soviets or the leadership of those groups?  

A top secret CIA memorandum to the NSC, dated 19 April 1948, was more forthcoming about the “Utilization of the Mass of Soviet Refugees in U.S. National Interest”:

During the past three years [i.e., since April 1945], CIA (and its predecessors) has systematically explored the potential intelligence value of the numerous anti-Communist and anti-Soviet groups in Central and Eastern Europe. Contacts have been developed with the leading groups of the mass of Soviet emigres, e.g., Ukrainians, Georgians, Balts and White Russians. Although these contacts were established primarily for the purposes of procuring intelligence on Eastern Europe and the USSR, sufficient overall information on these groups has been inevitably gathered to permit a sound evaluation of their possible value to the U.S. Government for the purposes of propaganda, sabotage and anti-Communist political activity.

This review report continued with a highly critical evaluation of the use of Soviet refugees for intelligence purposes:

a. These groups are highly unstable and undependable, split by personal rivalries and ideological differences, and primarily concerned with developing a secure position for themselves in the Western world.

b. They have been completely unable to provide intelligence of real value since they are rarely able to tap useful sources of information within the USSR, and generally concentrate on producing highly biased propaganda materials in place of objective intelligence.

c. They are almost exclusively interested in obtaining maximum support (usually from the U.S.) for their propaganda activities and insist upon the provision of substantial financial, communications, propaganda, movement and personal assistance in return for vague and unrealistic promises of future service.

d. They immediately capitalize upon any assistance which they receive to advertise the fact of official (U.S.) support to their colleagues and to other governments in order to advance their own personal or organizational interests.
e. These groups are a primary target for the Soviet MGB and satellite security agencies for purposes of political control, deception, and counter-espionage. CIA has sufficient evidence at this time to indicate that many of these groups have already been successfully penetrated by Soviet and satellite agencies.

Short of the outbreak of war with the Soviet Union, “in which case the U.S. would require the service of thousands of Soviet refugees as propaganda personnel, interpretation teams, and sabotage and espionage operations and administrative personnel,” U.S. intelligence was not prepared to enlist the wholesale support of existing anti-Soviet émigré organizations: “there will be no organized utilization by the U.S. government of large groups or the mass of Soviet emigres.” Instead, assets would be developed through “the special use of a few individuals selected from the mass of Soviet emigres.”

Among Ukrainian nationalists, the principal “special individual” would be Mykola Lebed, the leader of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR) and chief of the Ukrainian underground’s notorious SB or Sluzhba Bezpeky (Security Service). By 14 February 1947, Lebed had formally proposed a partnership: in return for U.S. support, rebel units operating in Soviet Ukraine would perform espionage, counter-espionage, intelligence, and terrorist or black operations for the U.S. government. The formerly secret text of that proposal was summarized in a report of CIC Special Agent Andrew Diakun under the heading, “CIC Offered Use of SB Intelligence Network”:

The [Ukrainian] SB would be willing to offer the CIC the use of its nets in Germany and is prepared, upon request, to send agents into Soviet Occupied Europe. In support, the SB would expect guarantee of financial aid, assistance in solving of housing and transportation problems. . . . The fact that the SB was being used by U.S. authorities would be known only to BANDERA, no more than three top agents of the SB, and the U.S. authorities making the contact. The agents in the net would continue to work as before, and would not know that their information was being forwarded to a U.S. agency.

Ostensibly made with Bandera’s approval, in fact the clandestine offer was made by Lebed alone. The move subsequently led to a rapid breakdown in relations between Bandera and Lebed, and—according to several reports—Lebed even fired a pistol at Bandera during a dispute in mid March 1947. Whatever the reasons, Lebed’s renewed contact with U.S. authorities corresponded to a dramatic split within the Ukrainian émigré community in Europe and Bandera’s subsequent order for Lebed’s assassination.

Having fled Munich for sanctuary at St. Josafat’s, the Ukrainian Catholic theological seminary in the Vatican, Lebed offered full cooperation with American
authorities. While the hapless CIC field agent whom Lebed had chosen to contact was initially unencouraging, insisting both to Lebed and to his Washington bosses that “such a proposition was highly unorthodox and in some measure far-fetched,” Lebed was successfully recruited within months, and at the beginning of December 1947 he and his family were safely smuggled from Rome to Germany in a covert CIC operation.\textsuperscript{50} From that time, Lebed and his associates in the UHVR became a key component in the OPC/CIA’s covert Ukrainian operations, both on Soviet soil and in the DP camps. Harry A. Rositzke, Lebed’s controller and former chief of America’s covert operations against the Soviets in Eastern Europe, provided the first solid verification that Lebed had worked for the CIA, describing him as “a reliable, honest operator.” When pressed to explain why the CIA had chosen Lebed in particular, Rositzke added: “You work with the ones who deliver the goods.”\textsuperscript{51}

In his original profile of Lebed to his CIA bosses, declassified in 1996 from records at Fort Meade, Rositzke was even more effusive:

\textbf{GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS}

He [Lebed] is hard and inexorable on his line but not blind in his judgment, as his political history shows. He is active and has an excellent sense for ferreting out trouble. He is incorruptible and resolute, also of high initiative and most unselfish in his job. He is further acclaimed to be one of the best anti-bolshevistic leaders of the eastern men who are working on the foundation of a newly built Europe.\textsuperscript{52}

Lebed’s recruitment corresponded to the formalization of the American government’s establishment in 1948 of a Guerrilla Warfare School and a Guerrilla Warfare Corps. That plan had been in the works since before the end of the war, but was formally proposed only in autumn 1947 in a paper prepared by Franklin Lindsay and Charles Thayer, State Department officials who had served as field agents in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II and who had close contacts with members of wartime German intelligence.\textsuperscript{53} Later, Lindsay became the chief of the CIA’s paramilitary and guerrilla operations in Eastern Europe in the 1950s, while Thayer was the first director of the Voice of America, an anti-Communist propaganda operation initially created and financed by the CIA.\textsuperscript{54}

Recent revelations from American security archives and personnel reveal the scale of U.S. infiltration operations in West Ukraine in the early postwar era. Harry Rositzke confirmed that the U.S. government was by the late 1940s supporting no less than thirty thousand anti-Soviet Ukrainian rebels in Galicia with airdrops of medical support, cash, and wireless radio transmitters: “The overall purpose of our operations was to provide an early warning system, to tip us off if there were indications of mobilization in the area. That’s what the Pentagon wanted. It was perfectly clear they [the Ukrainian rebels] would not survive.”\textsuperscript{55}
Much later, American intelligence officials praised the courage of their agents working during this era in Soviet Eastern Europe and the western borderlands:

Those engaged in secret espionage operations found their main target within months of the end of the European war: Soviet military capabilities and intentions. By 1948, as the Berlin blockade signaled the intensification of the cold war, the overriding purpose of the AIS [American Intelligence Service] was to provide the White House with early warning of Soviet hostilities, both by strategic bombers and by ground troops through Poland. . . . [H]undreds of agents were being sent in to cover military targets in Eastern Europe from bases in adjacent areas. . . .

These cross-border operations involved enormous resources of technical and documentation support, hundreds of training officers, thousands of safe-houses, and, above all, hundreds of courageous men who preferred to fight the Russians or the communists rather than linger in DP camps or emigrate to Brazil. Scores of agents paid with their lives for our concern.56

Fearing World War III was soon to come, Western intelligence operatives expended enormous resources to determine precisely the disposition of Soviet military forces. This became especially significant after the start of the Korean War in 1950, when Western governments feared a Soviet invasion of Europe was imminent. Harry Rositzke explained: “We knew what we were doing. It was a visceral business of using any bastard as long as he was anti-Communist . . . [and] the eagerness or desire to enlist collaborators [with the Germans] meant that sure, you didn’t look at their credentials too closely.” Franklin Lindsay, chief of the CIA’s paramilitary and guerrilla operations in Eastern Europe in the 1950s, added: “Was it right? That depends on your time horizon. We thought war could be six months away. You have to remember that in those days even men such as George Kennan believed that there was a fifty-fifty chance of war with the Soviets within six months. We did a lot of things in the short term that might not look wise from a long-term point of view. . . . We were under tremendous pressure to do something, do anything to prepare for war.”57

The Soviet Discovery of Western Support for Ukrainian Rebels

While it began as an earnest and well-entrenched struggle for national independence, the war between Ukrainian underground rebels and Soviet power was dramatically transformed from mid 1943. After Stalingrad, the tide of the European war had turned in favor of Soviet victory, and nationalist guerillas throughout Eastern
Europe immediately sought to realign themselves with an eye toward the inevitable fight against the re-imposition of Soviet power. Likewise, even before the end of World War II, the approaching Cold War began to redefine the contours of the Soviet perception of the Ukrainian resistance, wherein the Ukrainian underground was increasingly perceived as an extension of the Western intelligence apparatus, swallowed up as a proxy in the larger war between East and West. Solid evidence in Soviet archives, substantiated by documents in U.S. collections, reveals not only that U.S. and British intelligence were supporting Ukrainian and Polish underground rebel actions against Soviet forces long before victory over Germany, but moreover that the Soviet leadership was by autumn 1946 deeply cognizant of this support—information which had a powerful impact on U.S.-Soviet relations during the crucial years of postwar transition from 1944 to 1948.

A “Wilderness of Mirrors”: Expectations of World War III

Substantial evidence regarding Western support for nationalist guerillas in Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltics began to flow in from Soviet field agents well before the end of the war against Germany. Typical was this “strictly secret” report from Nikita Khrushchev, then General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, to Joseph Stalin in Moscow. Khrushchev’s report was a copy of a communiqué labeled “Especially Important. Top Secret” that he had received from Ukrainian Minister of State Security S. R. Savchenko on 28 March 1944:

COPY

ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT

TOP SECRET

TO THE SECRETARY OF TsK KPU[kraine]

Comrade KHRUSHCHEV, N. S.

The chief of the operational group of the Fourth Directorate of the Ukrainian NKGB “IUKHNO”, while working on the territory of Volhynia oblast behind enemy lines, has reported that Polish armed regiments known as the ZWZ (Union for Armed Struggle) were organized on the western oblasts of Ukraine and Belorussia in 1943 by the Polish government-in-exile in London and, in part, by the commandant of the Polish armed forces General [Kazimierz] Sosnkowski. [These regiments] are preparing cadres for a war with the USSR for the creation of a “Great Poland.”

These regiments have the directive, ostensibly by order of England and America, to begin a war with the USSR after the Red Army’s crushing defeat of the Germans.58
The approaching end of the Second World War was greeted throughout Central and Eastern Europe with popular rumors of an impending World War III, a war of liberation led by America, England, and a re-fortified Germany against a tottering Soviet Union.

Typical of the propaganda methods of the OUN was this case, drawn from an NKVD report in Sokol’nyky (in L’viv oblast). On 12 April 1945, at six o’clock in the evening, a band of forty to fifty Ukrainian nationalists surrounded the village of Kuhaiv. The soldiers were dressed in German uniforms and armed with German tommy guns, but they spoke Ukrainian. The soldiers took no repressive measures whatsoever. They subdued both the local party leader and a Red Army sergeant and explained their terms: Don’t bother us, and we won’t bother you. Eventually, the partisans released both men unharmed. The OUN force then seized the village soviet, and convened a meeting of all the villagers. In front of two posters caricaturing Stalin humiliated by the Ukrainians, a middle-aged soldier in glasses explained that the war would soon be over and that the OUN enjoyed the support of all the citizens of West Ukraine. “We will all soon rise up and drive away the Bolshevik plague.” He promised the day of reckoning was not long into the future and would probably come in May 1945. He spent some time discussing OUN operations against the Soviets, spoke frankly about the casualties on both sides, but assured everyone that victory would soon be theirs. Next, an attractive twenty-five-year-old woman with a short haircut spoke, addressing her appeal particularly to the women of the village. She asked that all efforts be made to assist the Ukrainian warriors in their liberation of Ukraine from the “Moscow yoke and Stalin’s butchers.” The soldiers needed food, clothing, supplies. With a resounding “Long Live Independent Ukraine!” and several choice slanders against Stalin and the Russians (which even the skittish local NKVD chief refused to repeat in a written report), the OUN force seized the village soviet’s large portraits of Stalin and Molotov and retreated to the forest.59

Such was the tone of the early propaganda war of the Ukrainian separatists, who were convinced that the Western allies would fulfill their explicit obligations and uphold the 1941 Atlantic Charter which had promised self-determination to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe after the war.60 On the ashes of World War II, nationalist rebels throughout Central and Eastern Europe fully expected a new war to break out that would crush Soviet Communism once and for all.61

But popular and widespread predictions of a Third World War to liberate the peoples subjected to Stalinist control were never realized. And with time there came disappointment and broken popular morale. With the coming of peace, the OUN found itself having to explain the cessation of hostilities in Europe, the demobilization of the Red Army from the European front, and other indications that the Ukrainian nationalist liberation movement had been forsaken by Western allies.62 A
Soviet secret police report from L’viv oblast from May-July 1945 summarized the ways in which the Soviet victory in Berlin led to a host of actions by the Ukrainian rebel underground:

In the past few days a [Ukrainian rebel] band operating in villages Zhyravka, Solonka, and Kuhai in Sokol’nyky raion has conducted meetings at which a rebel colonel in uniform delivered a report “Regarding the International Situation” and warned the peasants: “Await the signal. The Bolsheviks will be driven out of Ukraine. The Germans have capitulated with the aim of smashing the Bolsheviks. Right now there are very many armed German [soldiers] left behind in the forests [around us]. They await the signal.”

At these meetings a list of [Soviet] officials marked for extermination in the raion was read aloud. Rebels tore to pieces all slogans and posters in the school, the club, and the village soviet. They prohibited village officials from walking to the raion center.

At the end of June in village Lyshnevychi in Brody raion rebels convened a village assembly, [using their] weapons to force local peasants into the meeting. The president of the village soviet was led into the meeting with two tommy guns and seated at the presidium. . . . Speaking at the meeting, a rebel whose name was not given said: “You, peasants. The Bolsheviks and the NKVDisty, who want to build a Belomor canal with the bones of the Ukrainian people, say that the war [with Germany] is over. And this is true, but it does not concern us because we are only just beginning the true war for ‘the independence of Ukraine.’ England and America will help us. Our representatives have already agreed with England on this question, and even the Bolshevik Manuil’s’kyi has agreed to it. You should not fulfill the demands of the Soviets because anyone who works [for them] will be hanged as a traitor to the Ukrainian land. We have more power, you can see that for yourselves. Soon the Bolsheviks will conduct a grain levy. If anyone of you carries grain to the stations, then we will kill you like a dog, and your whole family will be hanged or cut to pieces. That should be understandable enough. And if you understand, then get back to your homes.”

There is no doubt that the Ukrainian rebel underground tried to undermine Soviet propaganda by disseminating rumors of developments favorable to their cause. Veracity was often sacrificed for the sake of communicating something positive to rebel soldiers in the field, whose morale waned after a string of Soviet victories. For instance, among the papers found on the corpse of guerrilla chief Ivan Havryshchynshyn, killed in December 1945, were numerous rumors reported as factual:

People coming from L’viv are saying that there is a special unit that assassimates Bolsheviks. Red Army soldiers are saying that in the East there is a lot of popular discontent with Soviet power, with the collective farms, and that there should be a revolution. People coming from Siberia say that many are dying of famine there and that there will be a change in Soviet power. People coming from Germany
say that in Germany the Soviets are robbing everything, that they take your last pair of pants and that they are torturing [people] in the camps. There has been talk [razgovory] that America is arming Germany and Japan to lead a war against Soviet power. They say that Stalin is dead, that he died badly, that Molotov has fled [the country] and that the NKVD alone remains.65

Recently discovered information also reveals that Soviet intelligence had intercepted and captured German reports regarding British support of anti-Soviet partisans in Poland and Ukraine. A German military counter-intelligence unit, FAK 305, attached to Germany Army Group “North Ukraine,” in a report dated 21 September 1944, cited an unidentified “well-informed” source, who claimed that “in April 1944 the UPA sought and made contact with the British through its leader, Maksym Ruban (real name [Mykola] Lebed),” co-leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the military branch of the OUN, and founder and leader of the Sluzhba Bezpeky, the Ukrainian rebel underground’s security police.66 Another report by the Abwehr’s Section III-East, dated 9 November 1944, noted that the British were supplying the UPA with German-made weapons captured on the Western front for use against the Soviets.67 In a “Fifteen-Day Report on UPA Activity in Enemy Territory,” various sources reported on UPA operations for the period August 1944 to January 1945. One UPA unit that had liberated several German SS officers was described as having eighteen British airplanes at its disposal and was allegedly supplied regularly by air with arms, ammunition, and provisions. The report also noted the rumor that had begun to dominate conversations all over the Soviet western borderlands: that a general anti-Soviet uprising of Ukrainians and all other oppressed national groups was set for early 1945.68

However impressive and varied the early evidence of Western support for anti-Soviet insurgents, it is interesting to note that high-ranking professional intelligence officers in Moscow were initially inclined to downgrade its importance. Far from showing the expected reflex response of condemning “foreign interventionist influence” on Soviet territory, Soviet intelligence officers initially discounted the seriousness of the allegations. No less a figure than the chief of the First Department of GUBB NKVD (State Directorate for the Struggle Against Banditry, in charge of “black operations” and which ran the spetsgruppy), Maj. Gen. A. P. Gorshkov, dismissed the claims of foreign support for the Ukrainian insurgency as nothing more than desperate rumors deliberately spread by members of the OUN to enhance their reputation and restore cadre morale. His five-page top secret report was entitled “Inquiry Regarding the Connections Between the OUN and the English.”

Following the liberation of Ukrainian territory from the Germans by the Red Army, our rapid movement toward the West, and the NKVD’s crushing defeat of the nationalist underground, the OUN leadership began to disseminate rumors
about their connections with the governments of England and America. Their goal was to fortify the declining status of members of their organization, [to encourage] UPA soldiers and [to raise] nationalist sentiment among parts of the Ukrainian population in West Ukraine. [They also sought to] provide “perspectives” on the struggle against Soviet authority following their dashed hopes on Germany.

Within the OUN, there developed a sense that England and America were most interested not in a Soviet victory over Germany, but rather in the combined weakening of both nations, after which England would invade the Soviet Union and create an “Autonomous Ukrainian Nation.” . . .

The arrested instructor of military preparedness from the OUN’s regional headquarters in L’viv oblast DIACHYSHYN Petro Moiseevych testified:

If earlier the nationalists had a hope that the Germans would smash the Red Army, while considerably weakening themselves in this bitter struggle, thereby creating [the opportunity] for the establishment of an “Autonomous Ukraine,” then now the nationalists have already forgotten the Germans, but place their hopes in their new allies—the English.

At present rumors are circulating among the nationalists with increasing intensity to the effect that after the defeat of Germany a war between the Soviet Union and her allies England and America will undoubtedly begin. Then will commence an era of nationalist revolutions in Europe, in the process of which the Ukrainian nationalists, with the support of the English and Americans, will manage to win “independence” for Ukraine, which would become a buffer between Russia and Democratic Europe. . . .

The arrested commander of an UPA unit VLASIUK Petro Pavlovych testified:

Staggered by the waning confidence in the UPA and OUN in the eyes of the peasantry and [rank-and-file] cadres in the organization, the OUN and UPA leadership have endeavored to buttress support by agitating that England and America, once finished with the war in Germany, will wage war on the Soviet Union and assist the OUN “to liberate Ukraine.”

As ideologically charged as was the atmosphere of that era, it is both curious and significant that the leading cadres in Soviet domestic covert operations did not yet legitimize charges of foreign intervention. That fact goes against the grain of traditional Western historiography, which has without exception depicted the Stalinist bureaucratic apparatus as rife with Cold War rhetoric, guided by some sort of a priori presumption about Western intervention. In a February 1946 meeting of Khrushchev with raion and oblast party, NKGB, and NKVD chiefs plus battalion commanders in West Ukraine, only one mention was made of the issue of foreign support for Ukrainian anti-Soviet rebels. The NKGB chief in Stanislavyv oblast, Mikhailov, dismissed such rumors most persuasively:
As a result of the successful running of the [February] elections [for the Supreme Soviet] throughout our [West Ukrainian] oblasts, there has definitely arisen a powerful confusion within the ranks of the OUN underground. In fact, comrades, they have lost their last hope for demonstrating a [public] show of force. One of their raion commanders [recently] assembled his officers and said roughly this: “We must hold out. Remember that we are supported, that behind us stand the English, who have told us that if we can wreck the elections, they would support us, that they would push ahead so that there would be an independent Ukraine.”

This sort of agitation and instructions among [rebel] cadres at the raion level is explained by the fact that [rebel leaders] are ready to say anything in order to raise the spirits of their own people.71

The timing of this conference is of utmost importance: as late as February 1946, the principal agents responsible for the Soviet pacification in West Ukraine generally disregarded suggestions of foreign support for anti-Soviet rebels.72

The perception would continue within the West Ukrainian secret police apparatus as late as spring 1946 that the ongoing war with underground rebels was nothing more than a war against remnants of a dying and desperate movement, waged largely with limited and myopic support of émigré groups loosely unified around Stepan Bandera in Munich. Rebel claims of foreign government support or of an impending World War III were generally dismissed as groundless.

When Rumors Become Weapons: Churchill’s Fulton Speech

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere. . . .

From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than weakness, especially military weakness.

—Winston Churchill, Fulton, Missouri, 5 March 1946

Rumors or not, the psychological will to resist among Soviet non-Russian minorities could be seriously bolstered by misinformation or deliberate disinformation
regarding Western intentions. Rumors of escalating tensions and war scares were like matches on dry kindling, and in the Soviet Union’s unstable western borderlands such rumors threatened to ignite a conflagration that would pose a serious challenge to Soviet control of the region. As a reflection of just how concerned Soviet officials were that these rumors could reinforce local anti-Soviet sentiment and render the pacification campaigns more difficult, we can look to the rather numerous top secret summaries of the popular mood preserved in the files of Soviet special forces units. Contrary to traditional Western expectations that such reports were prepared by yes-men who falsely painted a picture of widespread popular support for Stalinism, these summaries—based on interrogation and informants’ reports, and always including verbatim quotations from unsuspecting speakers in personal conversations or correspondence—contained starkly critical opinions about Soviet power in West Ukraine.73

Winston Churchill’s famous 5 March 1946 “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri, for instance, was followed up by a harsh rebuttal from Stalin himself in an interview in the 14 March issue of Pravda. Here Stalin labeled Churchill a “firebrand of war” and condemned his speech as a “dangerous act” and an inflammatory provocation “calculated to sow the seeds of discord,” an “ultimatum” directed against the Soviet Union and her allies which predicted that “war is inevitable.” “I do not know whether Mr. Churchill and his friends will succeed in organizing . . . a new crusade against ‘Eastern Europe.’ But if they succeed in this . . . one may confidently say they will be beaten just as they were beaten twenty-six years ago.”74

While in public Stalin endeavored to push Western diplomats to retract or distance themselves from Churchill’s speech, privately Soviet officials were closely tracking the impact of Churchill’s fiery words on the popular mood in non-Russian zones. This was reflected in a top secret, priority dispatch dated 21 March 1946 from T. A. Strokach, Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs, to A. M. Leont’ev, chief of the Soviet special forces charged with crushing rebel resistance. The contents of the closely typed, twelve-page summary leave no doubt that Soviet officials were profoundly concerned about the psychological boost that such a speech could bring to waning rebel morale. The memo was deemed sufficiently important that its contents were summarized in a special oral report to S. Kruglov and V. Riasnoi, director and deputy director of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, on 4 April. On the same day, Colonel Konstantinov, chief of the Special Tasks department of special forces operations inside Soviet territory, was ordered to acquaint himself with the file and to devise “appropriate operational responses,” a Soviet euphemism for brutal repressive measures.75

Strokach’s summary leaves no doubt about Soviet concerns: “The overwhelming majority of the population . . . considers Churchill’s speech to be a call for un-
leashing a new world war.” Prepared for years by the OUN/UPA to expect a Third World War, the local population was primed to interpret the speech as a rallying cry, a call to arms. Strokach offered the example of OUN commander Homin (“Echo,” alias for Mykhailo Diachenko), who announced in a specially convened village assembly in Kam’ianets’-Podil’s’k oblast in December 1945: “War between the Soviet Union and Anglo-Americans is inevitable. The start of the war is planned for spring or autumn 1946.” Homin insisted that Gen. Pavlo Shandruk, the Ukrainian commander of SS Galicia (a Ukrainian division that fought with the Germans) had built an army of one hundred thousand men in Italy with the remnants of the SS Galicia units, supplemented by Ukrainian émigrés and Ukrainian prisoners of war living in the DP camps in Western zones. Local units inside Ukraine were called upon to prepare for war.76

Throughout Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe, Churchill’s Fulton speech was like a call to arms. A Polish doctor in Szczebrzeszyn in southeastern Poland, Dr. Zygmunt Klukowski, noted in a diary entry dated 6 March 1946: “There seems to be a general feeling of excitement. People eagerly comment on the American speech made by Churchill, that war with Russia is inevitable. Everyone talks more and more about the threat of war. I have the same feeling as during July and August of 1939, when war was expected as something inevitable.”77

Under the circumstances, these stories did not seem so far-fetched: indeed, Churchill’s speech popularly legitimized the story OUN regulars had long told. This too was noted explicitly in Strokach’s report: “Considering the fact that OUN propaganda already for a long time before Churchill’s speech at Fulton had directed its efforts toward the dissemination of provocative rumors about the irreconcilable differences allegedly existing between the USSR and England, and about the inevitability in the near future of a war between the USSR and her [former] allies, it is necessary to note that this speech has still further encouraged OUN propaganda and the anti-Soviet element [antisovetski nastroennyi element].” Strokach could offer numerous examples of the ways in which the OUN had begun to exploit Churchill’s speech. The common line of the OUN/UPA was heard time after time during interrogations of captured UPA personnel: “England and America have already formed an alliance against the USSR. Soon war will begin and we will be set free!”78 Even in areas where rebel groups had little presence, there were clear signs that Churchill’s speech had hit home: “Soon will come the time when we will hang the Communists ourselves. I closely follow the newspapers and I know that England and America are preparing with all their strength [to launch a war] against the USSR. Soviet power has little time left.” “Soviet power will soon be gone since a war is beginning with England and America and they will liberate us from the Soviets.”79 There is little
doubt that cadres of the Ukrainian rebel underground—and an indeterminate part of
the Soviet population—actually believed a new world war would soon begin.

Inevitably, as the story was told and retold second-, third- and fourth-hand,
embellishments were added to adapt the tense international situation to local needs.
War was expected to break out at any moment. “If not today, then tomorrow England
will declare war on the USSR.” “There will be a war and Ukraine will be made
independent, under the protectorate [sic] of America.” “Although there is not yet a
war, there still remains at least one front that operates actively at all hours: the [war]
of the MVD. In the words of the chronicler: ‘There will come a time when each man
lives a whole kilometer from the next,’ and the American atom bomb will help us to
live this way.” “America demanded from the Soviet Union: liberate West Ukraine
from Soviet power. If [Stalin] doesn’t fulfill the ultimatum, a war will flare up with
England and America against the Russians.” It was commonly heard that riots had
started in the bigger cities of West Ukraine directly following Churchill’s speech.
Or that “the war has already begun. England and America will help us to build an
independent Ukraine. Our people must start preparing immediately!”

Inevitable too was the fact that rumors about war were mixed with other “first-
hand information” from allegedly reliable “confidential sources.” About the collapse
of the Soviet financial system: “Soviet money now has no value, so that in L’viv they
are exchanging [rubles] for dollars. So I don’t want to be paid with Soviet money
at work anymore!” About reprisals against Soviet collaborators: “Churchill said in
America that there will soon be a war of England and America against the USSR.
And that means that there will be an independent Ukraine and then we will give it
to the ones who helped the Bolsheviks!”

In the twelve months following Churchill’s Fulton speech, there was a dramatic
upsurge in the activity of Ukrainian nationalist rebels in West Ukraine, the frequency
of which grew by more than 300 percent by the end of the first quarter of 1947. This
dramatic escalation utterly repudiated Khrushchev’s earlier claims that the back of
the resistance had been broken and that all that remained was a police action to mop
up isolated remnants in outlying areas. Under a cloud of humiliation, Khrushchev
was temporarily removed from his post personally by Stalin’s order in April 1947,
while his mentor, Lazar Kaganovich, was brought in to handle the mess.

Clearly, the heightening of tensions internationally was having serious repercus-
sions on internal Soviet stability, especially in western border territories annexed
by the Soviets after August 1939. The mood in Moscow was growing ripe for a
profound revision of earlier “hasty” dismissals regarding the foreign contacts of
the Ukrainian nationalist rebels.
The Soviet “Discovery” of Foreign Intervention

During the long summer of 1946, Russian behavior became increasingly alarming. . . . Behind the expected strong language and tenacious negotiation Western observers had the uneasy feeling that the Soviet Union was initiating an offensive aimed at provoking the United States. For the first time America supplanted Britain as the Kremlin’s primary propaganda target.

—Terry H. Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944–1947*

Traditional Western historiography has presented the origins of the Cold War largely from the perspective of a unilateral Soviet escalation of tensions during the summer and autumn of 1946. As John Lewis Gaddis observed in his classic study of the origins of the Cold War: “The period of late February and early March, 1946, marked a decisive turning point in American policy toward the Soviet Union”—and in Soviet attitudes toward the United States and Britain.84

It is difficult to isolate just one factor among the numerous events of those tense days: Stalin’s “Analysis of Victory” on 9 February; George Kennan’s 22 February “Long Telegram”; the crisis in the Middle East and the war scare over Iran; Winston Churchill’s 5 March “Iron Curtain” speech at Fulton; and Stalin’s fiery retort on 14 March. Indeed, it is clear that events like these played off one another in rapid succession, so that some sort of convergence theory that emphasizes the interrelationship of several factors can perhaps best describe the uncertain, increasingly polarized atmosphere of those days. The convergence theory is best supported by the fact that no single issue can be held accountable, but rather the synergy of events together clearly provoked the crisis in U.S. and Soviet fears about a possible war over the Middle East. On 14 March 1946, for instance, President Harry Truman had initially dismissed reports of Soviet troop movements in Iran; four hours later—probably in direct response to a report in the *New York Times* with a translation of Stalin’s impassioned response to the Fulton speech—Truman told W. Averell Harriman that he feared there might be a new war.85

Whatever the causes, the escalation of tensions was indeed palpable during the war of nerves between August and October 1946. A top secret intelligence memo to President Truman in August reported that “Soviet propaganda against the U.S. and U.K. has reached the highest pitch of violence.”86 Edging toward the brink of war in Iran, the Soviets transferred eight divisions through Poland to East Germany. To underline the move to war footing, Soviet soldiers were ordered to paint slogans on tanks and railroad cars headed for Germany: “We destroyed Germany, we shall now destroy England and America,” and “Death to Anglo-Saxons.”87

Inside the Soviet Union, Churchill’s Fulton speech provoked a profound trans-
formation in Soviet perceptions of the West, an abrupt broadening and deepening of official and popular awareness of the end of Allied cooperation. “Churchill’s speech... resurrected an image almost forgotten during the war years of an old enemy, but the abstract threat of a new war found an entirely real face, one which summoned us to vigilance and preparedness for war.” Povyshenie bditel’nosti—a “heightening of vigilance”—became the Soviet watchword. State Security and Central Committee reports show that news about Churchill’s speech provoked a war panic among the Soviet population as people rushed to stockpile food and other necessities in the already strained postwar markets.88

As V. O. Pechatnov recently discovered while working in the restricted Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Stalin’s “interview” in Pravda on 14 March 1946 (evidently written entirely by Stalin himself) was just the “tip of the iceberg” in the Soviet response. From that point on, not a single conference or meeting took place in spring and summer 1946 without some mention of Churchill’s treachery. And a clear signal was sent to Soviet organs “to sharply increase work toward exposing the anti-Soviet schemes of the Anglo-Americans.”89 In a comprehensive recent study of Soviet representations of their enemies during the first decade of the Cold War, Andrei Fateev likewise identified a distinctive change in Soviet views following Fulton. In his impressive study of Soviet media during this era, Fateev persuasively showed the clear shift in orientation of Soviet propaganda toward the “new enemy”—the United States and Britain—dating from March 1946. In the archives of the state Directorate for Propaganda and Agitation (Upravlenie propagandy i agitatsii TsK VKP(b)), Fateev found numerous indications that a “psychological war” had been launched to counter the growing signs of anti-Sovietism in the West: “Soviet propagandists had been ordered to escalate the propaganda response to anti-Soviet attacks,” initially focusing on key individuals in the West, but soon attacking the Western capitalist system generally, careful to distinguish between the capitalist system and its people. This “extremely sharp reaction” to Churchill’s speech was initiated personally by Stalin and channeled through the Central Committee and a restructured Directorate for Propaganda and Agitation.90 Still, Fateev notes, there were no clearly expressed attacks against foreign or internal enemies either in the Central Committee or the Soviet press in 1946. Only in the period from autumn 1946 to spring 1947 did the Directorate for Propaganda and Agitation begin to amass official documents and letters reflecting the “state alert” identifying enemies. The official attacks against “cosmopolitanism”—against Western influence in Soviet culture—were soon followed by public Soviet condemnations of Western spies and provocations, the Soviet version of a “Red Scare” comparable to the one that would strike in America just a few years later.91

With such clear signals from Moscow, the secret police apparatus throughout
the Soviet Union’s western borderlands not wholly serendipitously began to take
note of an upsurge in foreign espionage activity. In West Ukraine and western Be-
lorussia, a flood of isolated reports began to percolate upward through the Soviet
lines of command from border troops and local police agencies:

SOFIISKII Sergei Alekseevich, born 1902, . . . voluntarily worked as an
investigator of the . . . [Ukrainian] police [during the German occupation]. Fearing
punishment, he fled to Germany. Ending up in the American Zone of occupation
he was recruited into American intelligence by the White émigré [beloemigrant]
D’IAKOV. He was assigned the task of returning to the USSR to find work in
an industrial establishment having significance in the [national] defense and to
gather espionage information.92

BRONSKI Jan Iuzefovich, born 1906, ethnic Pole . . . from 1942 until 1947 served
in the army led [by General] Anders. He completed a special course in espionage
in England. At the beginning of 1947 he and a group of other intelligence agents
parachuted from an English airplane into Polish territory. On 10 April... he headed
in the direction of the western oblasts of the U[krainian] SSR to disseminate
rumors about an alleged impending war [waged by] England and America against
the USSR and the likely defeat of the Soviet Union.93

GROKHOVSKII Mykola Ivanovych, a.k.a. LENKEVYCH Mykola Gavrilovych,
born 1924. . . . In 1947, while based in Munich, he . . . was supplied by the OUN
with false documents, [plus] Soviet, Polish, and American money, and illegally
crossed the [Soviet] border for contact with the OUN underground in the western
oblasts of Ukraine [with the task] of engaging in enemy activity. . . . While
returning to Munich, he was apprehended in the German Democratic Republic
and turned over to Soviet authorities.94

MEL’NYK, Petro Stepanovych, born 1917. . . . MEL’NYK became a member
of the Mel’nyk faction of the OUN in 1940. In 1945 the foreign headquarters
of OUN/M sent him into the territory of Ukraine in the capacity of an emissary
to establish contact with the OUN/M underground in L’viv and Peremyshl’. While
in L’viv and Rivna he set up safehouses for the arrival of [other] OUN
emissaries [coming] from abroad; established contact with the OUN rank-and-file
[in Ukraine]; and recruited new members into the OUN. In 1948 . . . he received
instructions for maintaining communications with American intelligence.95

In May 1946 English intelligence, [working from their base in] the German
zone of occupation, dropped on the territory of the USSR one PAPIN, Feodosii
Makarovich, a graduate of the school for secret intelligence agents run by
General Anders, born in 1912, native of the village of Patapavichy, Zhabchytsty
raion, Pinsk oblast, with the task of creating c[ounter]-r[evolutionary] insurgent
formations in the western oblasts of Belorussia.96
On 9 June 1947 a local MVD unit in Brest oblast, Belorussia, “arrested the border violator SHUMANSKII, Feliks, born 1919, who under interrogation confessed that he had entered Soviet territory illegally on orders from American intelligence to collect information.”

Similarly, in a report to Nikita Khrushchev dated 14 September 1946, his deputy for West Ukrainian affairs, A. A. Stoiantsev, described the expanded propaganda efforts of OUN rebels in West Ukraine:

Rebels are urgently disseminating provocational rumors among the population regarding the inevitability of a war between England and the U.S.A. against the Soviet Union. The Foreign Center of the OUN [in Munich] facilitates the transfer across the border of armed rebel groups and emissaries with directives regarding the preparation of the underground and the extension of their influence to the eastern oblasts of Ukraine.

In June of this year we have verified the [illegal] entry from abroad into Drohobych oblast of an armed band “Karmeliuk” numbering up to 80 rebels.

The armed band, “equipped with new English uniforms,” actively disseminated rumors of “the inevitability of a new war” waged by Britain and the United States against the Soviet Union. “Together with this we have received facts [confirming] the arrival in West Ukraine from abroad of emissaries of the Central Command [of the OUN/UPA] with directives to prepare the OUN/UPA underground for the outbreak of a military conflict of England and America against the USSR.”

The Soviet search for evidence of Anglo-American schemes had yielded fruitful results: an increasing frequency of foreign-based infiltration units claiming to be advance teams in the preparations for imminent war. In and of itself, such evidence was of little significance, precisely because it differed so little from what the Soviets had been hearing for the previous two years. Internal documents of the Soviet secret police in West Ukraine reflect, however, that a profound change occurred within the apparatus itself in autumn and winter 1946–1947, when the first solid evidence of foreign support was discovered. Several particularly interesting documents substantiating covert OUN connections with foreign intelligence agencies were captured on 26 January 1947 in a Soviet raid on the underground hideout of Lemish—alias of the famed rebel Vasyl’ Kuk, a leading member of the OUN’s central command structure in Ukraine. The raid took place in Pidhaitsi raion, Ternopil’ oblast—and the contents of the cache were deemed so important that they were translated and forwarded under the label top secret from MVD Ukraine Timofei Strokach in L’viv directly to Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs, Sergei Kruglov, in Moscow.

One Soviet file deserves our particular attention: “[I]nstructions about the collection of intelligence data for the Foreign Center of the OUN,” Stepan Bandera’s
postwar base in the American Occupation Zone in Munich. The title of the key rebel
document, dated September 1946, corresponds directly with the central concern of
Western intelligence agencies at that time: “Instructions for the Collection of In-
formation About the Preparedness of the USSR for War.” The instructions ordered
all OUN underground rebel units to reorient their tactics and overhaul their internal
organization in order to:

- discuss the course of Soviet demobilization and make an evaluation of
current unit strengths;
- monitor the deployment of Red Army forces in West Ukraine, with particular
attention to division titles, numerical composition, zone of deployment,
armaments, and the quality of their munitions (new or old);
- determine the size of reserves, munitions stockpiles, and transport routes
for re-deployment;
- try to determine the pace of military training, how long it takes to prepare
new soldiers;
- find out the content of ideological training, the “moral-political” level of
military preparedness to fight a war;
- monitor the construction of new air bases, or the provisioning of supply
depots, or any form of military construction;
- detect any new recruitment levies; determine the proportion of raw recruits
rejected for service, and state the reasons for their classification as unfit for
duty;
- communicate any information regarding Soviet intentions to mobilize;
- determine the productivity of strategically important industries (for instance,
the oil-refining industry), and track destinations of strategic products;
- watch out for deployment of food stores, of strategically important raw
materials (like oil), etc.;
- track the removal of any factories or industrial machinery to the Soviet
interior;
- observe the course of the consumers’ goods market, and note deficits;
- study the general population’s “psychological preparedness for war”; what
are Soviet agitators saying at meetings regarding the potential for war;
- monitor communications among Soviet officials, administration workers
and military and police officers. Be sure to indicate who (name, rank) is
speaking, where, and what was said.101
The above list constituted what intelligence and reconnaissance experts refer to as an E.E.I.—”Essential Elements of Information” targeted in covert operations. The list corresponds precisely to U.S. and British priorities after the war; yet it was seized by the Soviet secret police more than a year before U.S. support of East European guerrilla movements was formally sanctioned, and two to three years before the commencement of America’s official operations to send American-trained ethnic Ukrainian guerrillas into Soviet territory. The list demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that the cooperation of OUN/UPA forces and Western agencies began far earlier than has generally been recognized: whether formal or informal, a structure existed whereby American and British priorities were being communicated to Ukrainian rebel field units, who in turn were collecting information that was filtered back to appropriate Western agencies. It is also worth noting that the content and style of these instructions differ markedly from the standard fare of OUN/UPA communiqués: the sophisticated list of operational targets represents a distinct evolution in the Ukrainian rebel underground, its transformation from an anti-Soviet nationalist rebel force into an asset of Western intelligence.

In line with the new signals coming from Moscow, this mounting evidence of substantial Western support for anti-Soviet guerrillas in West Ukraine persuaded Soviet security officials to amend earlier interpretations which had treated these reports as mere unsubstantiated rumors and rebel self-aggrandizement. Pivotal in the change of Soviet perceptions was the assassination in an MVD operation on 26 September 1946 of the Ukrainian rebel Robert—Yaroslav Nikolaev Mel’nyk, born in 1919 in Stanyslaviv oblast—who was the commander of the OUN unit Karpatia. In Robert’s possession were found additional important documents that proved the link between the Ukrainian nationalist rebel underground and foreign intelligence services—most notably, the British and the Americans. Solid evidence that the United States and Britain were supporting anti-Soviet rebel guerrillas on Soviet territory helped to fuel an escalation of Soviet-American tensions from autumn 1946, and it was the driving force behind a fundamental reorganization of the Soviet internal police system throughout the western borderlands in early 1947.

In West Ukraine, the post-Fulton era came to a new juncture within the Soviet police apparatus in a top secret communiqué from the Soviet deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Lt. Gen. V. S. Riasnoi, to Ukrainian MVD Timofei Strokach, dated 17 December 1946: “An analysis of the OUN in connection with its [re-]orientation toward the British and the Americans.” Because of its vital importance in the early history of the Cold War, I have reproduced the complete document:
1/17430
17 December 1946

TO THE MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

Comrade Strokach
Kiev

Recently a series of documents of the OUN has been captured by the MVD of the Ukrainian SSR which substantiates the fact that the OUN underground has in the course of diversionary-terrorist and other rebel actions conducted various kinds of reconnaissance work on the territory of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR to collect espionage information.

For instance, in a directive of the commander ROBERT of the local unit of the OUN “Carpathia” from 26.9.46, seized during the liquidation of the Drohobych regional network, the OUN instructs local units to commence collecting data about the course of demobilization of the Soviet Army; the scale and type of armed force; the disposition of military units throughout the territory of West Ukraine; the political tendency and morale of [soldiers] in the Soviet Army; the status of work in military industry; the distribution and availability of provisions and reserves of strategic raw materials; and so on.

A typical document entitled “Social-Political Survey,” directed to local units of the OUN, which was seized during the liquidation of the OUN’s unit in Luts’k, stipulates that [local units of the OUN] collect espionage information regarding the Soviet Army, prisoners of war, the organs of the MVD-MGB, internal and border troops, Soviet [Communist] Party organizations, school networks and cadres, the church, factory and industrial enterprises, deportation, and so on.

The character and direction of OUN espionage demonstrates that their reconnaissance activity has been incited by foreign intelligence services.

Other OUN documents and materials [obtained] by intelligence-investigative operations of the MVD SSSR provide grounds for supposing that in its espionage the OUN presently is oriented toward the English and the Americans.

Viewed in this light, the work of the organs of the MVD SSSR to detect OUN espionage activity and to uncover OUN intelligence operations takes on an especially great significance.

I hereby order:

1. Notify all operations personnel in the organs of the Ukrainian MVD that work in the struggle against OUN rebels is simultaneously a struggle against agents of foreign intelligence services.
2. In intelligence work against the OUN underground and its armed bands, besides detecting their anti-Soviet rebel activity, pay special attention to drawing out persons engaged in the collection of various kinds of data on the orders of the OUN.

3. Activate informants through militia personnel from among local inhabitants, particularly of former members of the OUN-UPA and soldiers of the Destruction Battalions.

4. Make an inventory of all legalized rebels and members of the OUN who have resettled after legalization in oblast, raion and other industrial centers, and likewise of large populated areas and induct them into active intelligence work depending upon their skills and geographical location.

   Direct operational-intelligence measures running legalized members of the OUN-UPA toward uncovering their espionage activity for the OUN and determining links with the command centers of the OUN underground.

5. Prepare a plan for disseminating and utilizing confirmed intelligence [received] from persons who have been compromised by their past connections with [OUN] rebels, among workers in Soviet institutions, enterprises, educational establishments and other objects which attract the attention of OUN intelligence.

6. In the course of investigating the files of arrested members of the OUN, particularly [the files] of commanders, focus your attention on disclosing the espionage activity of the OUN and determining its links with foreign intelligence services.

Notify me in the usual manner of any progress in carrying out the present order.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

[Signature] /V. S. Riasnoi/104

“Work in the struggle against OUN rebels is simultaneously a struggle against agents of foreign intelligence services.” This internationalization of the Ukrainian nationalist partisan struggle against Soviet power rapidly became one of the first proxy wars in the Cold War. Official ideology in the secret police organs from this point on linked anti-Soviet guerrillas with foreign espionage. This was reflected in the MVD’s top secret annual report that summarized the Soviet “struggle against banditry” in the western borderlands in 1946: “At the end of 1946 the organs of the Ukrainian MVD captured a number of OUN documents which proved that side-
by-side with its bandit-nationalist activity on the territory of the western oblasts of the U[krainian] SSR, the OUN underground has been conducting reconnaissance work to gather espionage information. The character and orientation of the OUN’s espionage demonstrates that their reconnaissance activity has been incited by foreign espionage services.”¹⁰⁵ As events would soon show, the search for evidence of Anglo-American treachery would drive a frenzied rivalry between the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security, whose leaders—eyes set on positioning themselves for power in the post-Stalin era—battled to dominate the apparatus of the Soviet secret police. The irony, of course, was that the heightened international tensions in February–March 1946 had led Moscow to send a strong signal “to sharply increase work toward exposing the anti-Soviet schemes of the Anglo-Americans.” In their reevaluation of what had been dismissed as spurious rebel claims of foreign support, the secret police apparatus in West Ukraine was following a strictly ideological template passed down from Moscow. But in their postwar scramble to build information networks on Soviet territory, Western agencies had provided the Soviets with ample material to fuel a Soviet spy hysteria that far exceeded the worst nightmares of American McCarthyism.

Repercussions of the Link Between Partisan Rebels and Foreign Espionage Services

The shift in Soviet understanding of the links between anti-Soviet rebels and foreign intelligence services had two main repercussions. First, it led directly to a fundamental restructuring of the secret police system throughout the Soviet Union’s western republics deemed most vulnerable to foreign infiltration: by a secret resolution of the Council of Ministers of 20 January 1947 and an associated decree of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs of 21 January 1947 the Soviet counter-insurgency apparatus was transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of State Security. The elite special forces units (spetsgruppy) of the Main Directorate for the Struggle Against Banditry (GUBB) and all of their military and informational networks in West Ukraine—consisting of at least 68,582 personnel with arms, accommodations, transport, and other property and budgets; two key officer-training schools in Saratov and Sartaval; 180 slots per year in higher military education for technical personnel; the entire GUBB hierarchy in West Ukraine, western Belorussia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; and two-thirds of the remaining GUBB personnel in greater Ukraine and Belorussia (with arms, accommodations, etc.)—were trans-
ferred from the jurisdiction of the MVD to the MGB. Two GUBB directors, Apollonov and Leont’ev, were likewise transferred out of the MVD to the MGB. In West Ukraine alone, the transfer included invaluable MVD *agentura* or informants’ networks devoted to the struggle against the OUN: 680 residents, 1,920 agents, and 15,345 informants who represented the backbone of the MVD’s internal intelligence network in the region; plus 12,714 members of OUN or SB units either working as agents in place or as members of special *maskirovka* or deception units disguised as Ukrainian rebels but working for the Soviets. As Ukrainian MVD chief Timofei Strokach angrily reported to deputy MVD Ivan Serov in December 1947: “Having given away all of our personnel, our entire *agentura* and operations staff, to the MGB, the organs of the [Ukrainian] Ministry of Internal Affairs from the very first day [of the new rules] have in fact been deprived of all their strength and means in the struggle against the OUN rebels.”

Five months later, in a decree dated 23 June 1947, the new police organization for the Soviet Union’s western borderlands was adapted for the MVD/MGB throughout the entire Soviet Union: the stage was set for the modern jurisdictional differentiation between the two services, distinguishing normal crime from “political” crime, insurgency, and espionage. What did these changes mean? If the struggle against internal enemies was really in its essence a struggle against foreign enemies, it ceased to be an internal police problem and instead had become a task of the Ministry of State Security. From this point forward, special efforts would be made to coordinate domestic counter-insurgency tactics with foreign espionage.

A prime example was the Soviet sting operation to assassinate Roman Shukhevych, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, in a village outside L’viv on 5 March 1950. The operation relied for its success on both domestic informants’ networks as well as internationally coordinated deception and espionage. It began immediately following the rebels’ assassination of the pro-Soviet West Ukrainian writer Yaroslav Halan, who was ax-murdered, ostensibly by members of the Ukrainian nationalist underground, in his L’viv apartment on 24 October 1949. As a result, Pavel Sudoplatov, head of MGB Foreign Operations Special Tasks, was assigned the task of killing Shukhevych, which he accomplished in a dramatic confrontation less than four months later.

Immediately following Shukhevych’s murder, the OUN/SB in Europe exposed and assassinated Andrij Peczara in Prague. Peczara had been the communications liaison between Munich and OUN/UPA units in West Ukraine. The SB discovered that Peczara was also a Soviet double agent who had played a crucial role in setting up Shukhevych for his assassination. As an analyst from U.S. military intelligence summarized:
From 1945 to 1947 PECZARA resided in MUNICH and was a member of the SB (Intelligence Section of the OUN/B[ander])). Following an order by the SB Chief, PECZARA was given the assignment of organizing a courier route for the SB from Germany through Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine—to Headquarters UPA/OUN. . . . PECZARA was advised to contact the [Soviet] MGB in Czechoslovakia. He was given reliable EEI’s and after a short time was successful in penetrating the MGB in Czechoslovakia by giving the MGB some reliable information. PECZARA continued operating his courier route successfully until 1947. Every week couriers went to the Ukraine-UPA/OUN Headquarters and returned to MUNICH. The courier route was so perfect that the SB was amazed at the success of the operation. On previous occasions the SB had been unsuccessful in its attempts to operate an efficient courier system to the Ukraine. PECZARA was promoted and placed completely in charge of “courier routes.” He then controlled all the activities of UPA operations extending from MUNICH to UPA Headquarters in Ukraine. . . . When SB Headquarters realized that MGB was in full control of the courier route, it checked on the activities of PECZARA. A thorough investigation revealed that PECZARA was working for the MGB. After PECZARA was thoroughly interrogated [by the SB], he confessed that he had always been an MGB agent, and the SB finally liquidated him.110

The Peczara case was a classic example of how coordination between the Soviet internal police and foreign espionage networks could be used to great advantage.

The profound restructuring of the Soviet secret police was not only a reflection of the Soviet perception that resistance in West Ukraine was part of a broader Western effort to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. In the precarious balance of politics during the late-Stalin era, it was also a clear humiliation for Ukrainian MVD chief Timofei Strokach, and especially for the Soviet MVD chief Sergei Kruglov. It was also a temporary victory for Viktor Abakumov, head of the MGB, and his sometimes mentor and ally, Lavrentiia Beria.111

A second major consequence of the linking of domestic insurgency with foreign intelligence services was a rebirth of the vigilant search for internal enemies which had temporarily ceased (or abated) during the Second World War. In contrast to the MVD, which had treated criminal and political banditry as a police problem with no intrinsic ideological significance, the MGB revived the prewar practice of focusing on disaffected internal ideological enemies of the state who were deemed to represent a hotbed of opportunity for recruitment by foreign intelligence services.

In three top secret reports issued in spring 1947, which represent the cornerstone of a new era of repression in postwar Ukraine, Ukrainian MGB chief S. R. Savchenko established three things: first, that Ukraine had an enormous, indigenous, anti-Soviet element, concentrated mainly in the Ukrainian church and the intelligentsia; second, that Ukraine had a well-organized, armed, rebel underground in the OUN/UPA; and third, that these two factors together posed a serious threat to Soviet national security
because they provided an enormous pool of willing subversives and saboteurs ready to collaborate with foreign governments against the Soviet Union.

Savchenko’s fiery attack against the Ukrainian intelligentsia appeared in a top secret report to Kaganovich on 11 March 1947: “Informational Note About Anti-Soviet Manifestations in Leading Circles of the Intelligentsia in Ukraine.” He pointed to the existence of more than three hundred thousand “cultural workers” living in postwar Ukraine—people engaged in the sciences, the arts, the schools, and so on. By his estimate, more than 70 percent of these members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia had lived for more than two years under the German occupation. They were weak, undisciplined, and inclined against Soviet authority. From this Ukrainian dissident element, he argued, came the “ideologues” of Ukrainian nationalism who inspired a staunch Ukrainian dissident movement. The war against the Ukrainian insurgency could not be won, insisted Savchenko, without also removing the wide base of ideological support from which it grew.112

Attached to the same report was Savchenko’s attack against the organized opposition: “Informational Note About the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—the OUN.” The summary document contained a detailed history of the OUN, providing substantial evidence to link the Ukrainian nationalists with Germany: “the principal base from which German intelligence had drawn its cadres of spies, saboteurs, and terrorists was the OUN and UPA.”

[Foreign-based] command centers of the OUN issue detailed instructions to subordinate organizations [in Ukraine] to expand the collection of espionage information regarding political, military, and economic conditions in the USSR for their new masters—intelligence agents of foreign states.

At the present time almost all the leaders of the central headquarters of the OUN live and conduct their work in the English and American zones of occupation in Germany, mainly in Bavaria (in Munich, Augsburg, and elsewhere).113

Bad enough in and of itself, the anti-Soviet predispositions of Ukraine’s “enemy elements” became a vital issue of Soviet national security when considered in light of the official perception that the large, anti-Soviet internal element, actively supported by a large, anti-Soviet diaspora, was the prime recruiting ground for foreign espionage agencies. The missing link in the chain of subversive elements was presented in the lengthy and detailed “Report About the Extent of Enemy Elements on the Territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R.,” submitted on 27 May 1947 to Kaganovich over the signature of the deputy Minister of Ukrainian State Security, M. S. Popereka. The opening section of the report, “The Struggle Against Foreign Intelligence Agents (English and American Espionage),” for the first time laid out in vivid detail the substantial evidence of the “nefarious threat” posed by Anglo-American schemes.
The postwar period has been characterized by the intensification of subversive work of foreign intelligence services—principally, from England and America—operating in the territory of the U[krainian] SSR.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, English intelligence worked on the occupied territory of Ukraine, and particularly in the western oblasts, to establish contacts and incite activity of the Ukrainian and the White Polish nationalist underground, intending to use them for enemy work in territories liberated from the German aggressors.

At the present time both the English and the American intelligence services have considerably expanded their subversive activity, of both espionage and sabotage [against the Soviet Union].

After identifying the numerous channels available to Western agencies—using their embassies, consulates, and business concerns; maintaining communications through private correspondence; recruiting repatriated refugees from Displaced Persons camps—the report moved to the principal challenges posed by Western agents:

For subversive work in the U[krainian] SSR the English and American intelligence services utilize members of existing underground nationalist organizations: the OUN, the AK [Armia Krajowa, Polish Home Army], the NTSNP [the People’s Labor Alliance or NTS], [as well as] zionist and other [groups], which follow instructions of the nationalists’ foreign centers.

At the same time, the English and American intelligence services widely utilize in their work the agent networks of former German intelligence and counter-intelligence organs, who have been re-recruited to perform espionage and sabotage on our territory . . . for their new masters.114

The implication was clear: failure to act resolutely and immediately against real internal enemies would open the Soviet Union to another wave of sabotage and terror.

The aftermath of this “heightened vigilance” to seek out and destroy internal enemies as potential foreign spies was a dramatic escalation in the repressive measures of the Soviet secret police apparatus throughout the western borderlands. By 1947, the purge of Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian universities and research institutes and the mass arrest and deportation of tens of thousands of families of suspected rebel sympathizers would move from the provincial apparatus back to Moscow, where it served as the foundation of the Zhdanovshchina’s vicious attacks against “rootless cosmopolitanism” and kowtowing (nizkopoklonstvo) to the West in all aspects of Soviet social, scientific, and cultural life.115 In its essence, the Zhdanovshchina was a Soviet state effort to destroy the opportunities of foreign espionage services to find willing recruits among the Soviet people.
Conclusion: Rethinking Our Presumptions About the Early Cold War

In a recent book, Christopher Andrew, British espionage historian and Cambridge don, noted unsympathetically how “old suspicions” and conspiracy theories of joint Western operations against Soviet interests have persisted since the Second World War. Most Soviet intelligence and military personnel have long remained convinced that “from 1943, no later, in both London and Washington, the idea was already being weighed up of the possibility of terminating the coalition with the Soviet Union; and reaching an accord with Nazi Germany, or with the Nazi Generals, on the question of waging a joint war against the Soviet Union.”

Just as the Cold War taught Western experts and leaders alike to label Soviet defense measures as aggression, so too did their Soviet counterparts tend to suspect Western motives. Andrew adds: “Thanks to Soviet Intelligence . . . Stalin was ‘in the know’ about much that the USA and Britain thought they had concealed from him: ‘Therefore when we talk about Stalin’s distrust with regard to Churchill, at a certain stage toward those surrounding Roosevelt, not so much toward Roosevelt himself, we should pay attention to the fact that he based this mistrust on a very precise knowledge of specific facts.’”

Accepted knowledge about events fifty years ago has indeed managed to root itself in the collective memories of Cold War history both East and West. There is no better account of the shifting sands of what we knew or claimed to know during fifty years of Cold War than E. P. Thompson’s own study of the tragic fate of his brother Frank, a pro-Communist British Special Operations Executive (SOE) officer killed in Bulgaria in 1944: “A good deal of contemporary history rests upon the information of ‘people who know.’ The problem is, not that they know nothing, but that they do, in fact, know a great deal. But what they know can pass, over the years, by a process of selection, into an ideological code which presents, in the form of anecdote or fact, what they wish to be believed. If, at the same time, harder evidential material is suppressed or destroyed, the truth of a past event may become irrecoverable.” Inevitably, not just the collection of facts, but the writing of history and even the way we ask questions becomes tantamount to an act of provocation. Again, E. P. Thompson’s experience as evocative questioner is instructive: “These questions . . . remained and remain sensitive. Certain questions clearly provoked discomfort many years after the events, and these sensitivities increased rather than diminished over the years. As the Cold War developed it required on both sides a continual reprocessing of approved views of the past (or amnesia about the past) and the accretion of new dimensions of myth.”

An American historian of the
Cold War, Melvyn P. Leffler, has put the same challenge more directly: “Americans should reexamine their complacent belief in the wisdom of their country’s Cold War policies. U.S. officials acted prudently in the early years of the Cold War, but their actions increased distrust, exacerbated frictions, and raised the stakes. Subsequently, their relentless pursuit of a policy of strength and counterrevolutionary warfare may have done more harm than good.”

Contrary to long-held Western presumptions, Soviet police records in Moscow and West Ukraine make it abundantly clear that there was a distinct chronology associated with the Soviet adoption of Cold War policies domestically. Initially ready to dismiss reports of a coming war with their former Western allies as nothing more than rumors spread by desperate rebel groups, the Soviets abruptly changed this interpretation by summer 1946. As we have seen, the Soviet “discovery” of Western support of anti-Soviet, Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas corresponded not so much to the real timing of those contacts as to the post-Fulton shift in Soviet perceptions: initially, at least, the Soviet police apparatus merely “discovered” what their Moscow bosses had ordered them to find.

Cognizant of the Soviet readiness to create evidence according to need, Western scholars have long depicted the Soviet charges of Western intervention in the Soviet western borderlands in this era as self-serving fabrications. Such a wholesale dismissal of the Soviet interpretation would be unfair. In fact, as we have seen, there were genuine American and English efforts to suborn remnants of nationalist partisan groups left over from the Second World War to serve Western interests. Whatever the initial reasons for their search for evidence of “Anglo-American schemes,” by autumn 1946 the Soviet police had discovered real and substantial evidence of Western support for anti-Soviet partisan, paramilitary groups. Even if we grant the unlikely scenario that these contacts were unauthorized, wildcat operations of low-level Western intelligence agents, we cannot easily dismiss the evidence of Western intervention, even with the most creative efforts to parse words—distinguishing, for instance, low-level contacts from official and full-scale U.S. or British commitments.

However powerfully Soviet perceptions were shaped by an ideologically informed template passed from Moscow in February-March 1946, the search for evidence of Anglo-American treachery bore fruitful results with a solid evidentiary component in most of the early cases reviewed. What they demonstrated—and what I have tried to confirm or disprove through substantial research in U.S. security archives—is that U.S. and British intelligence during the first decade after the Second World War relied heavily on recruits from nationalist partisan groups. These contacts were more often than not channeled through stay-behind networks coordinated by a reestablished postwar association of veterans from German military intelligence
and counter-intelligence on the Eastern Front, or more directly through a motley of émigré and refugee groups. Mykola Lebed’s split in 1947 from Stepan Bandera’s OUN was just one of a series of moves paralleled in virtually every major ethnic group represented in the Displaced Persons camps in the Western zones.

The main problem, of course, was that there was a fundamental distinction between American-trained guerrillas dropped behind enemy lines and American recruitment of ethnic guerrilla units already in place. There is ample evidence in U.S. security files of the extreme distaste felt by many American officers who often saw through the feeble attempts of their nationalist recruits to use denunciations and slurs like “Soviet spy” to legitimize U.S.-sponsored assassinations of their nationalist rivals, or in brutal reprisals against dissenting voices from within their own ethnic groups. Add to this that the Soviets were so effective at infiltrating émigré nationalist communities that few Western plans to infiltrate agents ever succeeded. For these and other reasons, U.S. and British spymasters had already begun to wean themselves of such wholesale organizational recruitment by the early 1950s.

But by then the damage had already been done. Even if we accept uncritically the conclusions of the most recent studies of Soviet espionage in America—Weinstein and Vassiliev’s Haunted Wood, Klehr and Haynes on the American Communist Party and Venona—the worst of those findings substantiate only espionage activity: that the Soviets stole valuable secrets and that their methods tragically destroyed some of the lives of those who got caught up in the covert war. In contrast, in 1946 the Soviets discovered solid evidence of Western support for paramilitary groups who were actively conducting not just espionage (sanctioned by their Western controllers) but also terror, assassinations, diversion, and sabotage against Soviet citizens and state and party officials on a wide scale.

As we have seen, the evidence of substantial U.S. support for paramilitary operations on Soviet soil in the 1940s does far more than raise fundamental questions about culpability regarding the origins of the Cold War. The U.S. and British association with nationalist insurrectionary groups on Soviet territory—though well-intentioned and perhaps even justified under the conditions—had a powerful blowback effect in the enmity it provoked among Soviet cadres. In the short run, Western intervention provoked a dramatic restructuring of the Soviet police system and a substantial expansion of repressive measures to root out potential foreign spies. In the long run, the personnel within the Soviet security apparatus gained first-hand experience with Western subversion, experiences that would add a personal dimension to their own careers of lifetime struggle against the capitalist West.

Just a few years later, McCarthyism was born in America on far more flimsy and equivocal evidence than that presented here. Eduard Mark’s pathbreaking research on U.S. operations in postwar Rumania, work by Arvydas Anušauskas in
the Baltics, coupled with my findings in West Ukraine, establish conclusively that the United States had by spring and summer 1945 moved beyond the principles of containment of Soviet expansionism to active efforts to destabilize Soviet hegemony in the region with covert support of anti-Soviet nationalist groups under the banner of liberationism. Jeffrey Bale’s provocative findings regarding U.S. support for right-wing paramilitary groups in Western Europe lend even more credence for the emergence of a new paradigm in our understanding of the first two decades of the Cold War.

Pending further research in other parts of Eastern and Central Europe, the complete declassification of U.S. intelligence and security records for the first decade after World War II and further declassification of security files in former Soviet archives, it is perhaps too soon to judge whether the staunch Soviet response to U.S. and British espionage activity during these early postwar years was a case of excessive, even self-serving reaction against minor or even unauthorized wildcat Western operations, or a justified response to Western efforts to destabilize the Soviet Union from within. Certainly the evidence presented here suggests that the Soviets did indeed have something to be concerned about vis-à-vis U.S. threats to their own national security following World War II. And Pavel Sudoplatov’s claims, that “the origins of the Cold War are closely interwoven with Western support for nationalist unrest in the Baltic areas and Western Ukraine,” do not seem so far-fetched. This interpretation would be wholly consistent with a new view emerging among some post-Soviet scholars, a view that interprets Soviet policy and Soviet perceptions in the early Cold War as having been driven by legitimate concerns about their own national security, and not merely by Stalin’s personal foibles, Communist ideology, or traditionally presumed notions of a drive for world domination.
Notes


2. Ibid., 201.


8. Years earlier, Gar Alperovitz had argued that the U.S. decision to drop two atom bombs on an already defeated Japan was motivated more by concerns about the Soviets than in forcing the Japanese to capitulate. Taken together, the Mitrovich and Alperovitz arguments suggest U.S. policy was far more robust and aggressive than scholars have traditionally argued. See Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam; The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Pluto Press, 1994); and the documents published in *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Random House, 1996).

9. Peter Grose, *Operation Rollback: America’s Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 103, 116–18, 204, 97. Also significant in the choice to base covert rollback operations in OPC was the CIA legal counsel’s initial refusal to interpret covert operations as part of the CIA’s founding charter. On 25 September 1947, Lawrence R. Houston wrote that “ranger and commando raids, behind-the-lines sabotage, and support of guerrilla warfare . . . would be an unwarranted extension of the functions authorized. . . . We do not believe that there was any thought in the minds of Congress that the Central Intelligence Agency under this authority would take positive action for subversion and sabotage.” Ibid., 102.

10. Ibid., 98.

11. Ibid., 97.

12. Ibid., 94–95. For a summary of the opposition to Kennan’s plan, see 95, 106–07.

13. Ibid., 98.


18. Unit estimates for NKVD special forces from 21 January 1947, as indicated in Gosudartvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. R-9401 Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del SSSR, 1934–1960 (MVD SSSR), op. 1, d. 791, ll. 389–92. Destruction Battalion statistics are based on estimates as of 1 April 1946. Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh ob’edan (TsDAHO, formerly the Central Party Archives of Ukraine in Kiev), f. 1 TsK Kompartii Ukrainy. Osobyi sektor—Sekretnaia chast’, op. 23, d. 2966, l. 51.

19. As quoted in Mary Ellen Reese, *General Reinhard Gehlen: The CIA Connection* (Fairfax, Va.: George Mason University Press, 1990), 121. On the atmosphere of that era, see Steven Ross’s meticulous study of the documents of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “By mid-1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had come to a number of conclusions about the nature of the Soviet threat and America’s ability to meet it. The JCS believed that the Soviets were aggressive, and that Moscow was not simply seeking to create buffer zones around the USSR but was intent on world domination.” By March 1946, the JCS had prepared the first draft of “an operational concept of a war against the Soviet Union.” Steven T. Ross, *American War Plans, 1945–1950* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1988), 19–20. Gregory Mitrovich adds: “While the increasingly hostile postwar environment and aggressive American response heightened the risk of war, Truman administration officials discounted the likelihood of Soviet military retaliation. Underlying America’s postwar ambitions was a basic proposition: that the United States possessed substantially greater power than the USSR—what would soon be termed ‘preponderant power’—and could aggressively exploit the Kremlin’s vulnerabilities without significant fear of a Soviet military counterstroke” (*Undermining the Kremlin*, 16).

21. Numerous documents from the period indicated an insistence that intelligence and operations remain separate. In practice, however, the limited opportunities available to Western agencies necessitated a convergence of intelligence and reconnaissance assets with so-called black operations. This was a violation of traditional tradecraft.

22. Joint Strategic Plans Committee, “Proposal for the Establishment of a Guerrilla Warfare School and a Guerrilla Warfare Corps” (JSPC 862/3 Revised), top secret, 2 August 1948. National Archives, P&O 352 TS (Section 1, Case 1), RG 319, p. 46. I am grateful to Christopher Simpson for bringing this document to my attention.


27. The epigraph to this section is from an informant’s report, with recommendations for further investigation, to Commanding Officer, CIC Region IV, 6 January 1947, INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (secret), U.S. Army Investigative Records Repository, Ft. George V. Meade, Maryland, p. 1832. Hereafter cited as INSCOM, with dossier numbers. These documents were released to me following numerous petitions through the Freedom of Information Act, 1996–2000. Carroll was one of the most consistent voices advocating a closer association between the U.S. government and Ukrainian rebels. As he advised on 30 December 1946: “In point of fact, [OUN/] Banderist vitality and undercover propensities constitute a force which could be used for good if advisedly controlled.” Ibid., 2143.

Most of the guerrilla operations in Soviet Eastern Europe were run out of Munich in West Germany, built around core ratlines constructed in the Gehlen Organization, the NTS (People’s Labor Alliance), and the ABN (Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations), which was initially under the control of Stepan Bandera, chief of the ‘Foreign Center’ of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. These organizations were financed and supported variously by the United States, Britain, France, and the Vatican, as well as sympathetic émigré groups in Europe and North America.


29. Reese, *General Reinhard Gehlen*, 43. Although little is known about Sibert, CIA and KGB sources recently described his efforts as G-2 as marked by “remarkable energy and determination.” David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), 15–16.

30. See Reese, *General Reinhard Gehlen*, 198. Reese presents the fullest account of Gehlen’s recruitment and organization of an intelligence service which initially provided the U.S. and Britain with analyses of Soviet intentions and which eventually grew into West Germany’s intelligence service. See also General Patton’s account in Martin Blumanson, *The Patton Papers, 1940–1945* (New York: Di Capro Press, 1996), 734. Here, Patton refers to a letter from Sibert regarding recruitment of anti-Soviet assets from the DP camps. After a lengthy section complaining of the “Asiatic deviousness” of Russians, Patton commented on Sibert’s operations favorably: “Apparently, for the first time in his career, he [Sibert] is on a good scent.” General Patton was certainly the most outspoken anti-Soviet U.S. military officer of the era. An oft-quoted summer 1945 phone conversation between Patton and Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Gen.
Dwight Eisenhower’s assistant, is especially enlightening regarding the perceived need among U.S. military officers to resolve the so-called Soviet problem:

Hell, why do you care what the Goddamn Russians think? We are going to have to fight them sooner or later within the next generation. Why not do it now while our army is intact and the damn Russians can have their hindends kicked back into Russia in three months? We can do it ourselves easily with the help of the German troops we have, if we just arm them and take them with us; they hate the bastards. In ten days I can have enough incidents happen to have us at war with those sons of bitches and make it look like their fault. So much so that we will be completely justified in attacking them and running them out.


31. Quoted in Simpson, Blowback, 252. Cf. George F. Kennan’s remarks: “If Germany cannot be accorded reasonable confidence in these coming years, then I would know of no promising solution to the entire problem of Europe. . . . [L]et us be terribly, terribly sure that our judgment is drawn not from the memories and emotions of the past but from the soberest sort of attention to present realities.” Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), 49.

It is significant that the first clandestine aerial reconnaissance conducted by the United States against the Soviet Union occurred well before the end of the European war, on 12 February 1945. Then 1st Lt. William Yule, navigator and electronic warfare officer in the Eleventh Bomber Group of the Eighth Airforce, has confirmed that two specially configured American B17s flew out of Upper Heyford, England, on a mission lasting twelve hours and twenty-five minutes. The mission commander was Maj. Robert Franklin of West Memphis, Arkansas. The mission target was to photograph Soviet military facilities in the Baltic region and near Leningrad. Yule’s
assertions have been confirmed from his flight record book and also from copies of the classified mission record, which are still in his family’s possession. I am grateful to retired Air Force Lt. Col. Dr. Lawrence X. Clifford for sharing his notes of this interview, conducted at Yule’s home on 14 August 1991.

This information not only confirms a fundamental change in American attitudes long before the end of the European war, but also indicates that Roosevelt’s oft-cited injunction prohibiting espionage operations against the Soviets had been lifted by February 1945. In the early days after Yalta, Roosevelt, not Truman, initiated the policy of getting tough with the Soviets.

In a personal note, Eduard Mark of the U.S. Air Force’s History Support Office has informed me that U.S. spy overflights did not begin until April 1952. (E-mail, 3 January 1999.) Clifford, a former U-2 pilot himself, stands by the accuracy of his account.


33. Although Gehlen himself was in the United States until July 1946, reports of his associates from German counterintelligence on the Eastern Front established the foundation of Gehlen Org’s output during the first two years after the war. The two key associates were Maj. Hermann Baun, a Volga German who became chief of WALLI-I (and the person whom Gehlen entrusted with his own family’s safety in spring 1945); and Lt. Col. Heinrich Schmalschlaeger, commander of WALLI-III and the author of several key reports on the German use of native guerrilla units on the Eastern Front. Typical of those reports was “Operations and Experiences of Frontaufklarerung (FA) III Ost During the Eastern Campaigns,” 27 January 1947, National Archives, RG 319 Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence. Records of the Investigative Records Repository. Security Classified Intelligence and Investigative Dossiers, 1939–76, NND921046 Heinrich Schmalschlaeger, IRR Box 11, Folders 1–2, p. 1. This report was furnished by the former chief of the German Abwehr’s Lietstelle III Ost (formerly WALLI-III) and one of his former assistants. Lietstelle III was the German center for tactical counterintelligence on the Eastern Front.


34. For a provocative and well-documented analysis of the impact of Gehlen Org on U.S. planning and estimates, see Simpson, Blowback, pp. 52–65. Simpson argues that Gehlen Org was the principal factor behind new estimates of Soviet aggression: “The [Gehlen] Org became the most important eyes and ears for U.S. intelligence inside the closed societies of the Soviet bloc. ‘In 1946 [U.S.] intelligence files on the Soviet Union were virtually empty,’ says Harry Rositzke, the CIA’s former chief of espionage inside the Soviet Union. ‘Even the most elementary facts were unavailable—on roads and bridges, on the location and production of factories, on city
plans and airfields.’ Rositzke worked closely with Gehlen during the formative years of the CIA and credits Gehlen’s organization with playing a ‘primary role’ in filling the empty file folders during that period” (53).

A decade later, Harry A. Rositzke had evidently reconsidered his earlier confidence in Gehlen. In an interview with me in December 1996, he was unequivocal: Gehlen was a deception artist who had no real field assets and ran no operations of his own in Soviet territory. The shift in opinion is an important lesson for historians trying to assess the sources of U.S. attitudes regarding Soviet intentions during this era. In retrospect, Gehlen Org’s analysis may have been flimsy, but it was virtually the only Soviet “intelligence” U.S. decision-makers had to rely on at the time.

For substantiation of Gehlen Org’s efforts to recruit among members of the Ukrainian nationalist underground, see the testimony of Capt. Joseph Lazarek, the German counterintelligence specialist assigned the task of setting up Ukrainian stay-behind networks in 1943, dated 10–17 June 1946, GARF, f. R–9478, op. 1, d. 640, ll. 1–89; and the Top Secret transcript of the interrogation of Iosif Pan’kiv, referent of the SB in L’viv city and simultaneously rezident for German counterintelligence (Gehlen Org), 28 October–2 November, 1944, GARF, f. R–9478, op. 1s, d. 135, ll. 156–246.


36. “Vypiska iz agenturnogo doneseniia zakordonnogo agenta ‘Zet’,” as verified by Major Shpak, no date (GARF, f. R–9401, op. 1, d. 4152, ll. 466–466 ob.). To underline the enormous importance of the Soviet operation against West Ukrainian nationalists, it is worth noting that two main files were sewn together in the 522-page file preserved in the Special Files collection of the MVD SSSR in GARF. Entitled “Operations Documents for 1943–1950, Returned to the Deputy to the Minister of Internal Affairs Com[rade] Serov I. A. in 1953” [September 1943–September 1948], ll. 324–522 were devoted to Stepan Bandera; while ll. 1–323 were devoted to Serov’s espionage activities in postwar Berlin. Serov was throughout this period one of the most important officers in Soviet covert operations. He later became director of the KGB under Khrushchev, 1954–1958.

The timing of the covert mission to apprehend Bandera corresponded with the interrogation of a German counter-intelligence officer, Capt. Joseph Lazarek, in June 1946 (GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 640, ll. 1–89). Lazarek’s top secret interrogation transcript was evidently the keystone to changes in Soviet perceptions. Lazarek makes it clear that late in the war—soon after Germany faced certain defeat—key individuals in German intelligence on the Eastern Front had decided to continue the war against the Soviets by transferring their intelligence assets to Britain and America.

37. Secret report of CIC Special Agent Arthur R. Rozanski to Commanding Officer, CIC Region V, 5 May 1947, INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, 1919–20. The detailed report describes Bandera, a.k.a. Sitkowski, and his efforts to recruit and place more than one hundred agents in Poland through the Polish Repatriation Office at Regensburg. Bandera’s alias is sometimes
spelled Sitowski. See ibid., 1946 (10 April 1947, Secret Internal Route Slip for CIC, European Theater).

38. Secret report of CIC Special Agent Vadja V. Kolombatovic to Commanding Officer, CIC Region III, 6 May 1947, INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, 1906–09.


40. Secret report of CIC Special Agent Vadja V. Kolombatovic to Commanding Officer, CIC Region III, 6 May 1947, INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, 1908. As CIC Special Agent Earl S. Browning, Jr., indicated in a secret report to Region VI Commanding Officer on 10 December 1947: “An SB school under the direction of Major POBYHUTSCHY [POBEGUSHCHYI] is located in FINISBERG bei ANSBACH” (41).

41. As cited by Loftus, The Belarus Secret, 102–03.


43. See CIC interrogation of Colonel Dolud, a close personal associate of Ukrainian nationalist leader Taras Bulba, 13 March 1947. Summarized in a memorandum of CIC Special Agent Henry S. Plandowski to the Officer in Charge, 19 May 1947, INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, 2000–2001. U.S. recruitments within the émigré communities were not a well-kept secret. See, for instance, a revealing article in the émigré newspaper, Ukrainets’–Chas (Paris), 7 January 1951: “The High Command of the U.S. Army . . . is recruiting personnel for Counter-intelligence work. . . Especially wanted are those who have a knowledge of East European languages”(1389).

44. In a personal communication, 3 January 1999, Eduard Mark insisted that the U.S. official commitment to support American-trained Ukrainian nationalist guerrilla units for paramilitary operations against the Soviet Union did not begin until 1949. In his 1996 interview, the commander of those operations—Harry A. Rositzke—made the same claim, while also drawing my attention to the important pre-history of that official U.S. commitment which began during the war. I would emphasize the years immediately prior to the official U.S. commitment. The documents cited in this essay make it clear that U.S. agents, acting on their own or under the cloak of official deniability, were actively recruiting assets in the region. The distinction here is between U.S-run versus U.S-supported paramilitary operations.


U.S. perceptions and fears during this era of escalating tensions on both sides are effectively described in Buhite and Hamel, “War for Peace,” 367–84. Soviet fears of a U.S. preemptive nuclear strike inevitably heightened the Soviet response, both at home and abroad.

46. Even in the face of solid evidence of Western intervention, there is a tendency among scholars in the West to dismiss Soviet fears and perspectives. As Eduard Mark indicated in a personal communication, 19 December 1998: “It is important to remember that the first attempts to enter into contact with the Ukrainians came after credible information had been developed that the Soviets appeared to be planning to invade Turkey and after the President and the cabinet had decided in the famous meeting of August 15, 1946 that the US would defend Turkey. If the contacts bothered the Soviets, they had only themselves to blame” (emphasis added).

47. Facsimile copy in Donald P. Steury, ed. On the Front Lines of the Cold War: Documents on the Intelligence War in Berlin, 1946–1961 (Langley, Va.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), 111–13. This report has often been used to demonstrate the CIA’s unwillingness to utilize ethnic nationalists for clandestine operations (see Grose, Operation Rollback, 107.) I would urge caution in jumping to such a hasty conclusion: the secret CIA advisory memorandum rejects wholesale recruitment of émigré organizations, but not the use of individual members of those communities.

48. The text of Lebed’s letter and account of his subsequent contacts with Army CIC officers was released, with 90 percent of the text blacked out, to Christopher Simpson in 1986 and again to me in 1996. INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, 46–48. My request to release the full text of the agent’s report and Lebed’s original letter was granted on 8 November 1996, p. 47. The document identifies one of Lebed’s many known aliases: Anton Novak.

Soviet files confirm that the same highly clandestine negotiations had been made by the OUN leadership with the Germans in 1944: “The leadership of the OUN likewise insisted that all negotiations with the Germans be strictly concealed not only from the Ukrainian people but even from the rank-and-file members of the OUN-UPA.” Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI, formerly RTsKhIDNI), f. 81 Kaganovich, Lazar’ Moiseevich (1920–1957 gg.), op. 3, d. 128, l. 69 (Top secret report of MGB Ukraine S. R. Savchenko to L. M. Kaganovich, 11 March 1947, “Spravka ob organizatsii ukrainskikh natsionalistov—OUN”).

See also Agent Report, Special Agent CIC Region IV Michael Sydorko, 8 June 1951, 1050:
“Many Ukrainians, to cover their association with an American Intelligence Agency[,] often tell their associates that they are working for CIC. On numerous occasions the undersigned has been informed by Ukrainians who work for an American Intelligence agency that they are not to reveal what Intelligence agency they are working for, so in any conversation with Ukrainians they infer they work for CIC.” INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ.


In the early 1950s, Lebed fled Europe for the United States, where he and his inner circle settled in and around Yonkers, New York. He died in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on 19 July 1998. The archives of the UHVR are split between Lebed’s former associate Petro Sodol’ in New York city and Lebed’s daughter in Pittsburgh. Written requests by the author to review the material were unanswered or returned.

Stepan Bandera was murdered with a shot from a poison gas pistol fired by a KGB assassin, Bohdan Stashynsky, in Munich on 15 October 1959. For the full record of Stashynsky’s trial and public confession, see Danyla Chaikovsky’s, ed. Moskovs’ki vybvytsi Bandery pered sudom: Zbirka materialiv (Munich: Ukrain’s’ke vydavnytstvo v Miunkheni, 1965). Working in Soviet security files, Memorial scholars in Moscow have found the documents awarding Stashynsky an Order of the Red Banner for assassinating Bandera and another Ukrainian nationalist émigré leader, Lev Rebet (in Munich on 12 October 1957). The honor was granted for Stashynsky’s “measures toward interrupting the anti-Soviet activity of Ukrainian nationalists abroad.” Stashynsky defected to West Germany in 1961, and following his consent to cooperate with Western intelligence agencies, he was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. Nataliia Gevorkian and Nikita Petrov, “Priznat’ tselesoobraznym osushchestvlenie aktov terrora,” Moskovskie novosti, no. 35 (30 August 1992): 10.

50. Official deniability was retained throughout, as reflected in the written orders authorizing the operation, 24 November 1947: “Approval for the movement of Nikolaus LEBED and family from ROM, Italy, to the US Zone has been granted by the Office of the Deputy Director of Intelligence, EUCOM, provided that the removal is carried out discreetly and in such a manner as not to indicate that it is CIC sponsored” (36). Those orders were followed to the letter. See the detailed three-page, closely typed description of the measures taken to ensure both clandestinity and official deniability, in a classified memorandum of Camille “Steve” Hajdu, CIC Region IV, 970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, 18 December 1947. INSCOM Dossier C8043982WJ, Mykola Lebed.

On the OUN/B order for Lebed’s assassination, see the CIC files of his would-be assassin, Wasyl Gogosza: “He [Gogosza] used terrorist methods against anti-OUN/B DPs in Jaeger Kaserne [Mittenwald] and during 1947–1948 he participated in the liquidation of many anti-OUN/B personalities.” The document continued ominously: “He was the initiator of the order, which was never carried out, for the liquidation of Mykola LEBID and [his assistant, the Greek Catholic priest] Iwan HRYNOICH [Hryn’okh], former OUN/B leaders.” Confidential Agent Report of W. Yarosh, Special Agent of the 66th Detachment of the CIC in Region XII, “RE: SB
(Intelligence Section of the OUN/B),” 10 November 1950, INSCOM Dossier C8043982WJ, 144–46. Obtained through FOIA request on 10 December 1996. Following my appeal for more material, the FOIA office at Fort Meade released fifty-five additional pages of newly declassified materials which made it absolutely clear that Lebed was by 1947 an important American intelligence asset threatened by Soviet kidnap or arrest: “Although subject [Lebed] and his family now live in Rome under a cover name, their whereabouts are known and they are included in a list of more than sixty persons who are wanted by the Soviets. In the case of the subject [Lebed], it is known that he is wanted alive, and his capture by the Soviets could result in extremely serious damage within the ranks of the UHWR or of the UPA in the Ukraine, owing to his extensive knowledge of both.” There is no question that Lebed’s rescue was traded for intelligence information: “There is no doubt that Dr. HRYNIOCH [often referred to as “Agent X” in CIC files] would not hesitate to furnish this agent with all Soviet Intelligence relative to this zone, which the OUN as well as the UHWR have in their possession.” In fact, the CIC agent in charge noted that as soon as Lebed and his family were safely settled in Germany, “Dr. HRYNIOCH furnished this agent with the following reports which are being translated and processed: 1. Structure of the MGB 2. Structure of the MBP (Polish Int.) 3. Location of important military warehouses in USSR.” INSCOM Dossier No. C8043982WJ, Mykola Lebed, 28, 38–41. (CIC Region IV summary reports dated 18 December and 17 November 1947, as prepared by CIC Special Agent Camille S. Hajdu.) Obtained through FOIA request on 14 March 1997.

Because the Soviets had already filed a formal request for Lebed’s extradition from Italy, Lebed wanted to get his family out as soon as possible and insisted that they had to be moved by 3 December 1947, the last day of U.S. demobilization from Italy. As Chief of Operations Col. R. D. Wentworth wrote in a confidential memorandum, 21 November 1947: “LEBED is wanted alive by the Soviets who will undoubtedly attempt to kidnap him upon complete withdrawal of American forces in Italy” (46). The tension of the moment was reflected in a series of telegrams from Captain Hale in Rome to Hajdu on 1 December. At 1100 hours: “I AM VERY ANXIOUS TO FIND OUT ABOUT OUR LITTLE DEAL DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE THIRD OF THIS MONTH IS APPROACHING FAST DO YOU HAVE ANY GOOD NEWS KKKK A2 EXEC WAS OVER HERE FRIDAY HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO CALL MCCOY DIRECT AND GIVE HIM THE GO AHEAD. . . . IT IS FEARED THAT OUR BOY WONT HAVE A CHANCE AFTER USFA [sic] LEAVES [ITALY] BECAUSE OF THE [SOVIET EXTRADITION] LIST DO YOU UNDERSTAND KKKKK” (31). At 1700 hours, the decision not to make Lebed’s recruitment official severely hampered Hajdu’s operation at the very last minute: “THE INFORMAL CALL FROM A2 TO MCCOY FAILED TO MATERIALIZE. HIGHER HQ CANNOT SEE THEIR WAY CLEAR TO GO ON RECORD WITH ANOTHER HQ ON THE SUBJECT. HOWEVER IF ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE BY YOU LOCALLY YOU STILL HAVE AUTHORITY TO GO AHEAD. I AM SORRY BUT THAT IS THE BEST WE COULD DO. HOPE THIS DOESN'T THROW THINGS OFF FOR YOU” (32). Hajdu and his team succeeded in moving Lebed and his family to Germany on their own, ostensibly without official U.S. support or arrangements.

In a highly controversial article based on unsubstantiated interview sources, Maris Cakars and Barton Osborn have argued that Lebed was already working as an assassin for the U.S. government in the DP camps as early as 1945–1946. “Operation Ohio: A Special Win Report Detailing American-Sponsored Political Assassination and Torture in Postwar Germany,” Win
Though I have been able to verify from CIC documents that there was an Operation Ohio where suspected Soviet moles were investigated, I have not succeeded in gaining release of specific documents to substantiate directly any other aspect of the Win article. It is significant, however, that one of Lebed’s first joint operations with the CIC following his formal recruitment in 1947 was Operation Bingo, the American government’s use of Ukrainian nationalist agents in the refugee camps to find and liquidate suspected Soviet moles, 1949–1950.

51. Interview with Harry A. Rositzke, 13 December 1996. A leading expert on Ukrainian nationalist movements and a veteran of the covert war, John A. Armstrong, recalled of Lebed: “Like most conspirators and even official intelligence operatives, men like Lebed are not comfortable associates. When underground activity becomes the only feasible instrument of resistance, however, their skills and temperament become indispensable.” “Heroes and Human: Reminiscences Concerning Ukrainian National Leaders During 1941–1944,” Ukrainian Quarterly 51, no. (Summer–Fall 1995): 221. See also Lebed’s own views in Simpson, Blowback, 166.

52. Secret Memorandum of CIC Special Agent S. M. Clemens for the Officer in Charge, Region IV, dated 30 September 1948. INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, 14. While Clemens signed the secret report, he makes it clear that it was actually prepared by Lebed’s CIA controller: “AGENT’S NOTES: Subject is to be one of the men working for our organization under the control of DR. ROSE [Harry Rositzke]. The above report was submitted by the latter who is closely acquainted with the subject [Lebed]” (14) See also Rositzke’s autobiographical account: The CIA’s Secret Operations.

53. Joint Strategic Plans Committee, “Proposal for the Establishment of a Guerrilla Warfare School and a Guerrilla Warfare Corps” (JSPC 862/3 Revised), top secret, 2 August 1948, National Archives, P&O 352 TS (Section 1, Case 1), RG 319, p. 4. See also “Comments on Proposal for Establishment of a Guerrilla Warfare Group, Appendix ‘B’” (top secret), National Archives, P&O 350.06 TS through 381 FLR TS 1949 Hot Files, RG 319.


55. As quoted by Hersh, The Old Boys, 249.


57. Quoted in Simpson, Blowback, 159–60.

58. N. S. Khrushchev to I. V Stalin, 10 April 1944, TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, d. 915, ll. 1–5a. Soviet analysts should not be faulted for linking British and American intelligence assets into one monolithic whole. An article in Newsweek magazine in September 1946 declared that Anglo-American “cooperation is becoming so close that the foreign policies of Washington and London are practically identical, although the fiction of independence is still maintained” (9 September 1946, 30). See also Time, 4 November 1946, 34–35; United States News, 6 September 1946, 19; Terry H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944–1947 (Columbia:
The two key agencies of the Soviet secret police were the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the People’s Commissariat of State Security (NKGB). In March 1946, they were renamed the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Ministry of State Security (MGB). Until 21 January 1947, the spetsgruppy or special tasks units were subordinated to the NKVD/MVD’s State Directorate for the Struggle Against Banditry (GUBB). Thereafter, they were transferred to the control of the MGB until the reorganization of the Soviet police system following Stalin’s death in 1953.

The Fourth Directorate of the People’s Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) was an ultra-secret Soviet paramilitary unit which handled Special Tasks and Guerrilla Warfare. From 1945, this department was headed by Pavel A. Sudoplatov, whose recent controversial memoirs have challenged fundamental assumptions about Soviet spying in the West. See Sudoplatov’s memoirs, *Special Tasks* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1994–1995), 235, 239.

59. Derzhavnyi arkhiv L’vivskoi oblasti (DALO), f. 3 L’vivskii obkom Kompartii Ukrainy, op. 1 Sekretnaia chast’, d. 222, l. 21. For similar cases, see ll. 45–46, 51, 78, 87.

60. On 14 August 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill met off the coast of Newfoundland to issue a statement of shared war aims. Their joint resolution, which came to be known as the Atlantic Charter, was founded on one basic principle: the right to self-government. The two points of the charter especially pertinent to Eastern Europe were in paragraph 2—that the United States and Britain “desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned”—and paragraph 3—that the two nations “respect the rights of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live.” “The Atlantic Charter,” *The Public Papers and Addresses of F. D. Roosevelt* (New York: Random House, 1938–19[50]), 10: 314.


62. For instance, the August 1945 demobilization of the Red Army from Germany drove the Ukrainian rebel Mikhailo Lynda into despair. Interrogated after his surrender in August 1945 to the NKVD in Vynnyky, L’viv oblast, Lynda summarized the profound, demoralizing impact of demobilization: “The return of the Soviet army from the front to the homeland has provoked a great panic within the underground. There are urgent rumors that since the military has come home, it means that England and America will not wage war on the USSR.” TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, d. 1742, l. 308.

63. Soviet officials used the term *bandit* for all forms of armed anti-Soviet activity. To distinguish acts of political insurrection from true criminal banditry, I have translated *bandit* and *banditizm* when applied to the OUN as “rebel.” For an analysis of criminal versus political banditry, see Jeffrey Burds, “CHERNAIA KOSHKA: Banditizm na Sovetskoi territorii posle Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny, 1944–1948,” *Sotsial’naia Istoriia. Ezhegodnik 2000*: 169–190; and
64. Report of I. Bogorodchenko to Shamberg (Moscow) and Zlenko (Kiev), 17 July 1945, DALO, f. 3, op. 1, d. 212, ll. 160–67. The cited text is ll. 165–66.

65. From a top secret report of Peremyshliany raikom secretary Boiko to Ia. S. Grushetskii, 26 December 1945, DALO, f. 3, op. 1, d. 226, ll. 21–22.

66. Taras Hunczak, ed. and comp., UPA v svitli nimets’kykh dokumentiv, vol. 7 in Litopys Ukraïnskoi Povstanovskoi Armii (Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1983), 37, 226. In a letter to Christopher Simpson dated 1 March 1985, Lebed confirmed the veracity of these accounts, though he indicated a date of July 1944 for the first contacts with Western agencies. From the personal archive of Christopher Simpson, American University, Washington, D.C.

67. Ibid., 86–89, 229–30. The charges of British associations with the OUN–Banderists from the 1930s are substantiated in a recent authoritative study of British foreign operations: Stephen Dorrill, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service (New York: Free Press, 2000), 223–48. They are also confirmed in the Soviet interrogation of Captain Joseph Lazarek, the German counter-intelligence officer who organized and trained Ukrainian networks: GARF, f. 9478, op. 1, d. 640, ll. 1–89.

68. Hunczak, UPA v svitli nimets’kykh dokumentiv, 161–66, 236. In his summary, Hunczak greeted these reports with considerable skepticism, dismissing the claims as “sensational.” Allegations about British planes supporting Ukrainian anti-Soviet partisan units were repeated in documents reproduced on 193–97, 238–39.

69. Top secret, 3 January 1945, GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 381, ll. 44–45, “Spravka o sviazakh OUN s anglichanami.” In pencil across the first page of the document: “To C[omrade] Gorshkov Pl[ease] [come see me] to talk this over. [Signed] Leont’ev 3.1.45.”

70. This is not to say that the matter of foreign support for the OUN was not raised regularly. Formerly classified documents from 1944–1945 present GUBB’s investigations into the matter of so-called “‘International’ Contacts of the OUN.” The most attention is paid to evidence of German support and collaboration before and during the war (ll. 1–64), then the English (65–82), the Poles (83–92), and other states (93–148)—mainly Hungary and Rumania, and again Germany. The absence of an American section, the comparatively thin section on England, with reports written largely while the European war was still being fought, confirm my general argument that Soviet analysts perceived the rumors were based more on Ukrainian nationalist wishful thinking than on solid evidence of real Western support. GARF, f. R-9415, op. 1, d. 399 “‘Mezhdunarodnye’ sviazi ‘OUN’,” ll. 1–148.

71. Extract from “Stenogramma soveshchaniia sekretarei Obkomov KP(b)U, nach[al’nikov] oblupravlenii NKVD, NKGB, komanduiushchikh voennykh okrugov, ot 14 fevralia 1946 g.,”
TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, d. 2884, li. 58–59. N. S. Khrushchev presided over the secret meeting in L’viv.

72. American intelligence sources also reported hearing the rumors and generally dismissed them as nothing more than German provocations. An OSS report dated 11 January 1945 indicated “that a large Polish army is being recruited to fight with the Germans against the Russians, ‘to save Europe from Bolshevism.’ It seems, however, that the story is being concocted by German propagandists.” National Archives, RG226 Records of the Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch Divisions, Intelligence Reports (“XL” Series, 1941–1946), L51396, 11 January 1945.


73. In a context where merely reporting anti-Soviet views could provoke harsh repercussions, Stalinist bureaucrats protected themselves with the assertion that popular opinion by and large supported Soviet policy, while identifying dissent as the opinion of a few. Reading between the lines, bosses in Moscow could act on threats, even as officers up and down the line of command could preserve the fiction of Soviet support. The style of presentation was a common rhetorical device. In the 1930s, for instance, OGPU agents charged with reporting on the popular mood always prefaced their reports with the warning: “These samples represent atypical, extremely anti-Soviet positions.” See Jeffrey Burds and Andrei K. Sokolov, Golos Naroda/Voice of the People: Peasants, Workers, and the Soviet State, 1918–1932 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, forthcoming).

74. Stalin’s reaction was reprinted in Istochnik, 1998, No. 1, pp. 88–102. For the Fulton speech, see Randolph S. Churchill, ed. The Sinews of Peace: Post–War Speeches by Winston Churchill (London: Cassell, 1948), 93–105. See also Albert Resis, Stalin, the Politburo, and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1946, Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies 701 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh, 1988). Stalin’s fears were not without merit. Melvyn P. Leffler has demonstrated that Churchill’s speech was a well-orchestrated event planned by Truman and Churchill to correspond with a harder American line toward the Soviets. See A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), 106–10.

In contrast to my interpretation emphasizing the overriding importance of Churchill’s Fulton speech and its effects on Soviet perceptions, Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov have argued that Soviet sources throughout the West reported negative popular reactions to the speech. Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 124–25. Since the date of Zubok and Pleshakov’s source is more than five months after Churchill’s Fulton speech, Zhdanov’s reassuring 15 August 1946 profile of “Bourgeois political parties in the USA” came far too late to have allayed Stalin’s fears in March.

75. “Soobshchenie o reagirovanii naseleniia zapadnykh oblastei Ukrainy i banditov OUN-UPA na rech’ Cherchillia v gor. Fultone,” GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 665, l. 19. The path of the memo
can be followed by the notations written in various hands on the cover page of the document.

76. Ibid., ll. 19, 25–26. In a handwritten note at the bottom of l. 25, Colonel Konstantinov added a full description of everything he could learn about Homin. As of February 1945, Homin was a twenty-six-year-old former student from Volhynia. Konstantinov apparently had access to a full biography of Homin, down to a complete record of his military service in the OUN/UPA; he was the OUN/B’s chief of propaganda for Stanyslaviv oblast, 1944–1950. See Petro R. Sodol’, Ukrains’ka Povstancha Armii, 1943–1949: Dovidnyk. 2 vols. (New York: Proloh, 1994–1995), 1: 82–83. U.S. Military Intelligence files indicate that Homin’s views were based at least partially on facts. The details give us some sense of how low-level contacts could escalate into legitimate rumors. Shandruk had been chief of police for the Imperial Russian government in Poltava, Ukraine, until World War I. After 1917, he became adjutant to Petliura, then worked for Polish Military Counter-intelligence, concentrating his activities in Volhynia. “By 1937 Shandruk was working as a double-agent for both Germans and Poles. . . . After the collapse of Poland he began working for the intelligence section of the Gestapo, and was thus instrumental in the denunciation of many Polish ex-officers and partisans hiding from the Germans.” While he was commander of the Ukrainian SS-Galicia Division from 1943 to 1945, Shandruk made repeated overtures to U.S. and British intelligence: “Shortly before the German capitulation he [Shandruk] sent Colonel SMOVSKI-RAYEVSKI to establish contact with G-2 of the opposing American forces . . . for negotiations concerning a merger of forces and a continuation of hostilities against their Soviet allies.” Shandruk’s adjutant was arrested, and he was forced to disband his army. Throughout the next few years Shandruk made repeated overtures to British Intelligence, without success. In 1947, through the Ataman of the Kuban Cossacks Ivanyshyn, Shandruk proposed to recruit a Ukrainian guerrilla force of six thousand for a downpayment of a mere five hundred British pounds, but was again refused. “SHANDRUK has been more successful with American authorities, because from one agency he received a sum of 30,000 RM for the organization of an intelligence net. . . . [H]owever, the money was squandered and nothing was accomplished.” Secret report of CIC Special Agent Herbert Bechtold, Region IV, dated 2 November 1948. INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, 17–18, 1832.

77. Zygmunt Klukowski, Red Shadow: A Physician’s Memoir of the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland, 1944–1956 (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 1997), 105. In his extraordinary diary, Klukowski indicated that rumors of an impending war between the Soviets and the West began in southeastern Poland around 14 December 1944: “Our situation is terrible, almost hopeless. Terror is growing. In Zamosc, during the interrogations, the NKVD began beating the prisoners. This has never happened before. In town the news is spreading rapidly about the possibility of a conflict between America and Soviet Russia. This would be a terrible blow to us. I cannot imagine how we would be able to survive another war” (42). By March 1946, this fear of war had been replaced with a yearning for freedom. The OUN’s official reaction to Churchill’s Fulton speech was decidedly more guarded. See “Answer to Mr. Churchill,” April 1946, Arkhiv SB—L’viv (Hereafter, ASBL).

78. “Soobshchenie o reagirovani,” ll. 25, 28.
79. RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 128, l. 9, quoting an unnamed agronomist and a “kulak” in Izmailovo oblast, as cited in informants’ reports from 20 December 1946.

80. Ibid., ll. 23–24, 26–27.

81. Ibid., ll. 24, 27.

82. The Internal Troops of the Ukrainian MVD noted “a sharp increase” in rebel activity from May to August 1946, when operations were carried out by large bands of twenty to sixty heavily armed partisans. See the top secret report of Major-General Fadeev, commander of VV Ukrainian MGB, to Lieutenant-General Burmak, commander of the VV MVD SSSR, Arkhiv MVD SSSR, f. 488 Upravlenie vnutrennikh voisk MVD Ukrainskogo okruga, op. 1s, d. 227, ll. 35–52 (From the Peter J. Potichnyj Collection at Robarts Library, University of Toronto, reel 172). On the 300 percent increase for 1946–1947, see Burds, “CHERNAIA KOSHKA: Banditizm na Sovetskoi territorii posle Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny, 1944–1948.”

Churchill’s ‘iron curtain’ speech played only a partial role in the upsurge of bandit activity in Ukraine, which was concentrated in the eastern oblasts and which seemed to be driven more by the famine of 1946, the growing hardship of postwar reconstruction, and the demobilization of the Soviet Red Army.

83. Khrushchev’s removal was short-lived, and evidence from transcripts of meetings show that Khrushchev remained a close partner with Kaganovich throughout 1947. By December 1947, he returned from limbo to his position as General Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. He was removed again—this time permanently—in November 1949, following the brutal assassination of a West Ukrainian nationalist writer, Yaroslav Halan.


86. As quoted in Grose, Operation Rollback, 87.

87. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, pp. 135, 222 n. 32.


The classic work from this early period is the Soviet indictment of U.S. and Vatican intervention in West Ukraine: V. Beliaev and M. Rudnitskii, Pod chuzhimi znamenami (Moscow, 1954). The former director of the State Archive of L’viv Oblast, the late L. M. Minaeva, recalled collecting materials for the two Soviet researchers in the early 1950s (interview, July 1995).

92. RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 129, l. 11. As several studies have shown, the espionage hierarchy in Moscow was often more inclined to demand evidence of Western intrigue than to trust the reliability of any report or agent who denied the existence of such intrigues. The classic scenario of the ideologically based signals shaping raw Soviet intelligence gathering was its failure to predict the German invasion in June 1941. See the groundbreaking research of L. Dvoinykh and N. Tarkhova, “What Military Intelligence Reported: Historians Have a Chance to Analyze Soviet Dispatches on the Eve of the War,” in Bruce W. Menning, ed. At the Threshold of War: The Soviet High Command in 1941, a special issue of Russian Studies in History: A Journal of Translations (Winter 1997–98), 76–93; and Borovik, The Philby Files, 186–234.

93. RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 129, l. 12.


95. Ibid., ll. 24–25. While blacking out any reference to joint U.S. actions with the British, officers in the FOIA office at Fort Meade have released files that identify the joint role of ethnic Ukrainians run by U.S. and British controllers. The principal Ukrainian agent in the operations was Vasilii Fedoronczuk (Vasyl’ Fedoronchuk): “In October 1947, FEDORONCZUK became engaged in a program to establish an operational underground center in Turkey from which Ukrainian agents could pass to the Ukraine via the Caucasus” (Secret report from CIC Region VIII, 21 May 1948). The project was also supported by the Vatican, through the efforts of Bishop Ivan Buczko—the “spiritual leader of the Ukrainian resistance”—and the CIC’s “Agent X” in Rome, Father Iwan Hrynioch, Mykola Lebed’s close assistant, helped to secure false Italian passports.
for smuggling the agents into Turkey (secret report of CIC Special Agent William E. W. Gowen [aka Guglielmo], INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, 37–40, 1832). Referring to Hrynioch, Gowen added in his report: “Agent ‘X’ was a man of many possibilities quite apart from his contact with [blacked out, probably Lebed]” (38). On his part, Fedoronczuk—a former member of the OUN/ Melnyk faction—labeled Stepan Bandera “an overrated extremist” whose alleged Ukrainian “Army is largely dispersed and lacking all types of necessary equipment” (38). Gowen himself was a major figure in joint operations of U.S. Intelligence with the Vatican, mainly orchestrated through Hrynioch and Buczko. Gowen was also responsible for securing Spanish visas (again through Hrynioch) for the widow and son of Eugene Konovalec, former leader of the OUN assassinated in Rotterdam by Soviet agents on 23 May 1938. See Marc Jansen and Ben de Jong, “Stalin’s Hand in Rotterdam: The Murder of Ukrainian Nationalist Yevhen Konovalets in May 1938,” Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 4 (October 1994): 676–94.

Evidently, Buczko had been working as a liaison between Lebed and Shukhevych to the Vatican and British intelligence from as early as spring 1944. See GARF, f. R–9478, op. 1, d. 135, ll. 244–45.


97. Ibid., l. 241.

98. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, d. 2966, ll. 24–34.

99. From a top secret report of the deputy chief of the Second Directorate of the Ukrainian MGB, Colonel Tanel’zon, to Stoiantsev, 23 August 1946. Ibid., d. 2967, ll. 43–47.

100. Top secret communiqué of Strokach to Kruglov, 6 February 1947. The letter and documents are preserved at ASBL. Kruglov’s initials on the first page confirm he read the report. See also Sodol’, Ukrains’ka Povstancha Armiia, 1: 90–92. Kuk was captured by Soviet authorities in 1954 and held until 1960 in a KGB prison in Kiev. He was then exiled to Siberia for forced labor until his release in 1972.


102. I am grateful to Christopher Simpson for information about E.E.I.’s. While he has denied that U.S. intelligence had anything to do with Ukrainian rebels before 1947, Harry A. Rositzke confirmed in our interview that the above was a standard E.E.I., not instructions per se but ostensibly a profile for interrogators in the DP camps. This and several other captured enemy E.E.I.’s were summarized in MGB reports in Ukraine from 1947, recently transferred from the
Kremlin archive to RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 129 “Spravki, spetsial’nye soobshcheniia, dokladnye
zapiski MGB USSR,” ll. 2–76 “Spravka o stepeni aktivnosti vrazheskikh elementov na territorii
Ukrainskoi SSR,” Deputy MGB Ukraine M. S. Popereka to L. M. Kaganovich, 27 May 1947. (The summary appears on ll. 8–9.)

For biographical information, see Sodol’, Ukrain’s’ka Pavstancha Armii, 1: 103–04.

104. “O razrabotke OUN v sviazi s orientirovkoi ee na anglichan i amerikantsev,” GARF, f.
R-9478, op. 1s, d. 521, ll. 279–80.

105. Top secret report of interim director of GUBB, Colonel Poliakov, to MVD SSSR S. N.
Kruglov and V. S. Riasnoi, 21 January 1947, GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 709, ll. 1–46. The
quotation is from l. 3.

106. “Prikaz o peredache iz MVD SSSR vnutrennikh voisk v MGB SSSR.” See the text of the
top secret decree in GARF, f. R-9401, op. 1, d. 791, ll. 389–92, No. 0074/0029 and Council of
Ministers resolution 101–48 SS. The restructuring of the Soviet secret police began in occupied
Germany in September–November 1946. See the summary of the U.S. interrogation of a defector
from the MGB Operational Sector Headquarters in Germany, “Reorganization of the RIS [Russian
Intelligence Services] in Germany, 11 September 1947,” in Steury, ed., On the Front Lines of the
Cold War: “A uniform system of intelligence echelons, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
MGB (Ministry of State Security), entailing the liquidation of the old MVD (Ministry of Internal
Affairs) system, was accomplished. The reorganization was coincidental with the departure from
Germany of Colonel General [Ivan] SEROV and the appointment of his successor, Lieutenant
General KOVALCHUK” (123).


108. I have not been able to read the text of the June 1947 decree, which remains classified. The
date was found in a reference file for followup actions related to the 21 January 1947 decree, but
the document itself was missing in the appropriate volume at GARF, evidently removed by the
MVD or another agency before the multi-volume series was transferred to the archives.

Academic Press, 1990), 223; Sudoplatov’s own published account in Special Tasks, 256; and

110. Agent Report, Special Agents CIC Region XII Michael Sydorko and Anthony J. Marguriet,
19 April 1951, INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, 1053–61. See also the published account in

111. In a remarkably detailed account based on files in the KGB archives, N. V. Petrov has
contextualized the scandals surrounding the MVD’s botched struggle against banditry into a long-
standing and highly personal dispute between Abakumov and Serov. This conflict eventually led
to charges of corruption against Serov in a letter to Stalin and A. A. Kuznetsov dated 23 October 1947. Rescued only by Stalin’s personal intervention, Serov eventually succumbed to the same charges in December 1958, when he was removed from his position as director of the KGB. See “Pervyi predsedatel’ KGB General Ivan Serov,” Otechestvennaia istoriia 1997, no. 5: 23–43. The intense personal enmities in the MVD-MGB rivalries are reflected in the correspondence between GUBB, MGB, and Lazar Kaganovich, which are loaded with denunciations and counter-denunciations between the two services. See RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, dd. 128 and 129, especially the stenographic report of Kaganovich’s conference with MVD, MGB, and Communist Party personnel in a meeting in L’viv on 23 April 1947. RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 128, ll. 150–71, “Protokol soveshchaniia sekretarei obkomov i nachal’nikov oblupravlenii MGB zapadnykh oblastei USSR”; GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 801, ll. 297–99; and especially the top secret communication of Ukrainian MVD Strokach to deputy MVD I. A. Serov (22 December 1947). Report for period 11 February to 15 December 1947 “Dokladaia zapiska ob uchastii organov i voisk MVD i militsii v bor’be s uonovskim banditizmom na territorii zapadnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi SSR,” GARF, f. R-9478, op. 1, d. 1285, ll. 267–81. The tensions between the MVD and MGB were especially great at this time because of the tremendous upsurge in bandit activity that corresponded with the transfer of GUBB. See Burds, “CHERNAIA KOSHKA.”


114. M. S. Popereka to Kaganovich, 27 May 1947, RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 129 “Spravki, spetsial’nye soobshchenia, dokladnye zapiski MGB USSR,” ll. 2–76 “Spravka o stepeni aktivnosti vrazheskikh elementov na territorii Ukrainskoi SSR.”

115. This point connecting the Zhdanovshchina to the Cold War was first made by James G. Richter, “Perpetuating the Cold War: Domestic Sources of International Patterns of Behavior,” Political Science Quarterly 107, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 271–301: “Stalin’s decision [in Autumn 1947] to unleash the ideological hardliners had long-term consequences in the Soviet Union. The prewar image of capitalist encirclement again ascended to a status of unquestioned orthodoxy, while the arguments of a more moderate tendency were forced underground.” My argument extends this main point by showing a direct relationship between the Soviet discovery of Western intervention and the move to renew repression in 1947. See Werner G. Hahn, Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946–1953 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982); and Gavriel D. Ra’an an, International Policy Formation in the USSR: Factional “Debates” during the Zhdanovshchina (Hamden, Ct.: Archon Books, 1983). For a


117. Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions, 211, quoting Falin. See also Christopher Simpson, The Splendid Blond Beast: Money, Law, and Genocide in the Twentieth Century (New York: Grove Press, 1993); and Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to the United States, who reflected on his arrival in Washington: “My mind was clogged by the long years of Stalinism, by our own ideological blunders, by our deep-seated beliefs and perceptions, which led to our misconstruing all American intentions as inherently aggressive. . . . But the dogma itself was also strengthened by the permanent postwar hostility of the United States and its own intransigence toward the Soviet Union.” According to this view, Stalinism was first and foremost driven by fear, suspicion and distrust of the West. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1995), 26.

118. E. P. Thompson, Beyond the Frontier—The Politics of a Failed Mission: Bulgaria 1944 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 16, 37. Writing on the legacy of double memory of ethnic Poles and Jews regarding the events of World War II, the Polish historian Piotr Wróbel noted perceptively: “History is frequently manipulated by political regimes and national movements, but memory ‘is in reality more dangerously subject to manipulation by time and by societies.’ Our ability to remember faithfully is limited. We construct our memories by combining elements from the original material with existing common knowledge. A lot of details are lost, and new material is added. If some remembrances do not match the existing schema, we tend to alter them to make them fit. We accept ‘thematically consistent information’ more easily and, after many years, some images created through the process of suggestion become ‘as real as a memory that arose from the actual perception.’” (His quotations draw from the works of historian Jacques Le Goff and psychologist Mark H. Ashcraft.) Piotr Wróbel, “Double Memory: Poles and Jews After the Holocaust,” East European Politics and Societies 11, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 568.


120. Several dozen examples appeared in the declassified U.S. files regarding the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the OUN/SB.

Example 1: “The present policy and plans of the [Bandera] SB are to interfere with the operations of the intelligence sections of other Ukrainian groups as the only Ukrainian intelligence section. The SB plans to compromise the plans of opposition groups by informing the Soviets...
of their operations and by other such unsavory methods. . . . SB leadership at the present time is of low intellectual and moral caliber. Most of the able leaders have either emigrated or have resigned from the SB; therefore, as a result, the organization has deteriorated from a patriotic nationalistic organization to a terrorist group which hopes to become the dictatorial power in the Ukraine when it is liberated.” Confidential Agent Report of W. Yarosh, Special Agent of the 66th Detachment of the CIC in Region XII, “RE: SB (Intelligence Section of the OUN/B),” 10 November 1950. INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, 144–46.

Example 2: “[Mykola] LEBID is not popular with the mass of Ukrainians and therefore has been forced to remain inconspicuous even within the BANDERA group, despite his offices in the UHWR and the ZPUHWR. His sojourn in Italy and his recent quiet return to the US Zone show the discretion employed. . . . LEBID’s unpopularity stems from his war time UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) activities in western Ukraine. The UPA was initiated by BOROWEC (Bulba) during the last of 1941 or early [19]42 when he commanded partisans against the Germans in Volin (western part of Ukraine, just south of Galicia). About a year later LEBID was active with his own partisans in the area of the border of Galicia and Volin, and he announced that all partisans should come under his command. When this was ignored by the others, LEBID undertook to use force; some of BOROWEC’S partisans were killed, including BOROWEC’S wife. Villages that sheltered them were burned, including some Polish-inhabited villages in Galicia. A few MELNIK partisans were also liquidated. (The more prominent MELNIK followers killed were Mykola STRIBORSKI, Senik HРИBIVSKI, fnu BARANOВSKI, Roman SHUSHKOW). As a result, the Ukrainians now have difficulty forgetting the fact that LEBID killed some Ukrainian partisans who were fighting for the same cause.” Memorandum from Daniel Barna, Special Agent for the CIC, 19 April 1948. INSCOM Dossier C8043982WJ, Mykola Lebed.

Example 3: Mykola Lebed, born 23 November 1910 in Stryi, was five feet five inches tall, 150 pounds, bald, “has very piercing eyes; appears very intelligent; intelligent and adroit; energetic, decisive, excellent organizer and a specialist in conspiracy activity; known as an uncompromising fighter for a free Ukraine; loyal to the ideal of the OUN, Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists; in the struggle for a free Ukraine is very radical, possibly more so than BANDERA, Stepan. . . . From the non-Banderist camp, [Source] X-1392-IV-A reports that at the end of 1943 Subject [LEBED, Mykola] and SHUKEVITCH, Roman, known as Gen[eral] Tchupryka [Chuprinka], broke off negotiations with [other ethnic Ukrainian nationalist] democratic groups in order to carry on the Ukrainian liberation fight and engineered terroristic action against such democratic underground groups. There are also unconfirmed reports that the Subject was graduated from a German high police school in ZAKOPANE, Poland and [that he] worked for the Abwehr.” “Personality Report,” prepared by Randolph F. Caroll, CIC, Region IV, 970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, U.S. Army, 29 December 1947, INSCOM Dossier C8043982WJ, Mykola Lebed.

Example 4: “The Ukrainians hope the increasing tension between the Western Powers and the S[oviet] U[nion] will bring about a future revival of the Ukrainian resistance on the other side of the Iron Curtain. According to this, a western army marching into the Ukraine in case of war would find active support against MOSCOW by the masses of the Ukrainians.” INSCOM Dossier ZF010016WJ, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (secret), 111. (Date and author of report removed, probably October 1948.)


123. Gregory Mitrovich has argued persuasively that despite recent efforts to accelerate the pace of declassification of U.S. National Security files from before 1970—notably, Executive Order 12958, signed by President Clinton on 17 April 1995—we are unlikely to see many new documents in the near future. “American efforts to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities remain among the most sensitive materials in the National Archives system” (*Undermining the Kremlin*, 13). Moreover, especially for the period 1945 to 1950, it is likely that documentary evidence either never existed, or has since been destroyed. The compilers of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* wrote: “The documentation on this subject is fragmentary and episodic, and it appears that many early records no longer exist. Very little policy documentation on projects and operations under psychological and political warfare programs has been found, and the documents that have been retrieved tend to be random and scattered in their subject matter. In addition to the paucity of early documents on this subject, it is possible that in many instances the written record was deliberately kept to a minimum” (Mitrovich, 13).

124. Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, 249. The veracity of Sudoplatov’s account has been challenged by numerous reviewers, especially on the question of atomic spies. In my own research, I have confirmed most of Sudoplatov’s observations about West Ukraine with documents in Moscow, Kiev, and L’viv. Regardless, the issue here is one of perception: Sudoplatov was expressing a commonly held Soviet belief that the U.S. and Britain initiated the Cold War with their support for anti-Soviet guerrillas in the Soviet western borderlands. In this article, I have established that this commonly held Soviet belief was based not merely on a priori presumptions about Western behavior (which certainly played a part), but also on substantial evidence of Western intervention detected by Soviet investigators from autumn 1946.

Eduard Mark, who has enjoyed greater access to U.S. security files for this region than any other historian, concedes this point: “It is true that efforts to gain information on the Soviets predate the end of the war. I do not think, however, that this is a fact of large political significance. Everyone spies on everyone, and the Soviets, given their huge intelligence presence in this country and the UK, were hardly in a position to complain about that” (personal communication, 18 December 1998).