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THE RUSSIAN-JEWS LEADERSHIP AND THE POGROMS OF 1881-1882:
THE RESPONSE FROM ST. PETERSBURG

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THE TIMES OF LONDON, THE RUSSIAN PRESS, AND THE POGROMS
OF 1881-1882

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THE RUSSIAN-JEWISH LEADERSHIP AND THE POGROMS OF 1881-1882:
THE RESPONSE FROM ST. PETERSBURG*

The pogroms that raged through Jewish neighborhoods in cities and villages, mainly in southern Russia, in 1881-1882 were unlike any of the previous assaults experienced by Russian or East European Jewry. These violent attacks were not carried out against the backdrop of a military campaign in which the state was then engaged. Nor were the riots isolated flare-ups touched off by local tensions or points of controversy that then led to confrontations between Jews and their neighbors as had been the case on other occasions. Rather, the pogroms of the spring, summer and winter of 1881 and of the spring of 1882 moved across the countryside in discernible waves. In the first series, from mid-April through the first week of May 1881, over 175 incidents took place in both small hamlets and large cities, including the cities of Odessa and Kiev. After a two month respite, another wave of pogroms ravaged the provinces of Poltava and Chernigov with over thirty incidents being reported. Furthermore, violence against Jews broke out in Warsaw on Christmas Day 1881. Finally, the Balta pogrom of March 1882 closed out the wave of pogroms associated with the years 1881-1882.¹

These events ushered in a new era for modern Jewry not only for the Jewish community of tsarist Russia, but also for Jews living in Europe, North America, and the Middle East. The emigration of the Jews from the Empire to the West, begun in earnest after the famine of 1868-1869, increased dramatically in the wake of the pogroms of 1881. This movement of Jews which continued through the next decades brought with it far-reaching demographic shifts in twentieth-century Jewish life as it led to the establishment of a
modern Jewish community in Palestine and to the consolidation of the existing community in the United States.

However, beyond the demographic developments, the events of 1881 also had extensive impacts on modern Jewish identity and on Jewish political thought. Heretofore, many European Jews had welcomed eagerly the secular liberal ideologies that emerged in the years after the Enlightenment and looked forward to an era in which the brotherhood of man would be established everywhere. In the course of the nineteenth century, the lay leadership of modern Jewry had come to be vested in those individuals who had subscribed to this progressive outlook and pursued an accommodationist policy aimed at integrating the Jewish community within the political and social structures of the modern nation-state. In Russia, however, the post-pogrom period saw the emergence of a new type of political activist and thinker within the Jewish community. These men and women quickly rejected the liberal outlooks and identities dominant not only among Western and Central European Jewry, but also readily apparent within the ranks of the Russian-Jewish intelligentsia. In the aftermath of the riots, these individuals derived new, secular Jewish identities and formulated radical solutions to what they perceived to be the real dilemmas of modern Jewry.\(^2\)

While significant in historical retrospect and so of great interest to the historian of modern Jewry, these new ideologies were not subscribed to by the existing lay leadership of Russian Jewry, notably the Jewish "nobility" of St. Petersburg and their like-minded supporters throughout the Pale of Settlement. For this latter group, the riots did not bring with them new formulations on the immediate needs of Russian Jewry. If anything, the assaults confirmed for them the validity of their views that only full equality was the true solution to the ills of Russian Jewry. The old-line
leadership believed that only with full political and legal equality could the Jewish community secure itself against the arbitrary and capricious actions perpetrated against it by its enemies within the Russian community of peoples. Thus, the tasks facing the established leaders of the community after the first wave of pogroms were quite complex. Not only did they have to fend off an implicit challenge to their position as the acknowledged spokesmen for the community, they also had to demonstrate the correctness of their own reading of the recent events and to gain community support for their basic responses and methods of dealing with the many problems engendered by the pogroms. First of all, they had to down-play the seriousness of the pogroms and to reject the assertion that a new era in Russian-Jewish life had begun. They not only had to argue that the existing means of communication and problem-solving were still appropriate for these times, but also that those methods were still effective in redressing grievances and affecting governmental decision-making in this area. Only in this way could they continue to advocate the liberal, accommodationist course as the surest means to the resolution of the myriad of social, economic and political problems confronting the Russian Jew on a daily basis.

For a number of reasons, it is important to record and to assess the manner in which the established Jewish leaders in Russia, centered in the capital city of St. Petersburg, responded to the catastrophic events of 1881-1882. First, an exploration of this background material sheds light, from a different direction, on those alternative identities and ideologies being developed in that very same period. Second, while the pogrom experience contributed substantially to the growing fragmentation of Russian Jewry and to the erosion of its existing leadership and decision-making structures, it remains true that for the next decade and a half, at least, the titular
leaders of the past continued to hold their positions in Jewish life. Neither the Jewish socialists nor the Jewish nationalists were able to gain effective control over major segments of the community until the turn of the century. Also, in spite of their own concerted efforts aimed at revitalizing the traditional structures of Jewish religious life, the rabbinical leaders were not successful in extending their influence over the general community in more than a marginal way. Thus, the analysis presented here of how St. Petersburg Jewish leaders responded to the pogroms of 1881 concentrates not only on a much neglected topic in the study of Russian Jewry at the close of the nineteenth century, but also explores the characteristics of that group of Jews who continued to see themselves, and in turn were seen by the Russian government, as the spokesmen and representatives of the single largest Jewish community in the world at the time. However, before proceeding to that description, we should begin with a brief review of those perspectives and ideologies that emerged in the wake of the pogroms so that the ensuing focus on St. Petersburg can be understood within the context of Jewish life with all of its dynamic tendencies in the years 1881-1882.

II

Jewish thinkers who developed new ideologies after April 1881 based them on two premises. First, they contended that liberalism and its advocates grossly misunderstood anti-semitism. They argued that contrary to liberal assumptions, anti-semitism was not based on economic factors, ignorance, intolerance and/or religious indifference. Rather, they asserted that anti-semitism was an assault against all of the Jewish people—rich and poor, religious and secular, whether rooted in the traditional community or fully
acculturated. Thus, in their view, anti-semitism became a nationally-based attack that was not susceptible to the various liberal solutions developed over the years. Second, whether it was true or not that Jews could be integrated into Central and West European political, cultural and social life, the ideologues emphasized that such an integration could not be achieved in tsarist Russia. They argued that Russia always had been, continued to be, and always would be inhospitable to Jews and Jewish community life. Therefore, in order to live a secure life, Jews would have to emigrate from Russia in order to find new homes in America, the Middle East, or other locations where they would be welcomed and allowed to establish a normal communal life along modern, rational and economically productive lines.

From these starting points, the "radicals" moved off to a variety of conclusions on the nature of the Jewish community, its needs in the modern period and the means by which those needs could be realized. While not all of them came to the same conclusions on these latter points, all did subscribe to the two theses described above and began their analyses from them. In order to illustrate these general statements, let us turn to two representatives of the new ideology: Moshe Leib Lilienblum, a Hebraist who since the mid-1860s had been an outspoken advocate for major, even radical religious and educational reforms within the Jewish community; and Dr. Leon Pinsker, a staid and established member of the Odessa community active in the liberal efforts of the 1860s and 1870s aimed at bringing Russian culture to the Jewish community and in that way preparing it for the legal emancipation which was thought to be inevitable. For both men, 1881 became the critical point in their lives.

Lilienblum (1843-1910), raised and educated in the traditional milieu of Lithuania, fled that world in his early twenties for the secularized Jewish
culture to be found in the city of Odessa. Lilienblum's discomfort with traditional Judaism and its way of life, factors which led him to Odessa in the first place, was reinforced in that open and cosmopolitan city on the shores of the Black Sea. Shortly after his arrival, Lilienblum began to submit essays to the Hebrew-language Jewish press in which he pressed for immediate reforms in a number of spheres within contemporary Jewish life. By the late 1870s, Lilienblum had come to the conclusion that Russia's Jews should move to agricultural settlements within the interior of the country so as to move out of middlemen professions and to become "productive" citizens. Such a move would also, in his view, speed up the necessary process of cultural integration as the Jews would become more and more Russified in those distant settings.

What Lilienblum witnessed and experienced during the Odessa pogrom of 1881 had a dramatic and profound impact on him. In his recollections of those days, he noted how he had to take shelter in a locked basement to avoid being beaten by the rioters. He went on to indicate that the physical fears awakened in him by that episode led him both to an appreciation of and an identification with the Jewish victims of violence in the past. A second scene from those same days made an equally strong impression on Moshe Lilienblum. He recalled seeing a Russian peasant woman standing in the middle of the street shouting at passing Jews — "Get of here, get out of my home [land]." These events and personal experiences brought Lilienblum to wholly new conclusions on the state of contemporary Jewry and its immediate needs.

In August 1881, after the second wave of pogroms of that year had subsided, Lilienblum contributed an article to the Hebrew-language weekly Hashahar [The Dawn] published in Vienna and distributed widely in Central and Eastern Europe. In this essay, Lilienblum abandoned his earlier commitments
to Russia and called instead for the establishment of Jewish agricultural settlements in Palestine. However, as large numbers of Jews were then fleeing Russia for the United States and other western states, Lilienblum also noted that the settlement of North America was also an acceptable solution to the problems of Russian Jewry. However, for him a Jewish future in Russia was no longer a possibility. Emigration from Russia had become the means by which Jewish life and its future existence could be safeguarded.

Within a month, Lilienblum moved to an even firmer commitment to the Palestine option. In an article in the Russian-language, St. Petersburg-based Jewish weekly Razsvet, Lilienblum asserted that the only place to which Jews should go was Palestine. America, or for that matter any other place in which Jews would continue living as a minority in someone else's homeland as guests, was no longer acceptable to him. In this way, Lilienblum had come to identify modern anti-semitism as a national problem arising out of the condition of Jewish homelessness. He saw this anti-semitism as the most pressing of all problems facing the world Jewish community. He wrote:

Give us some such corner where we could gradually... re-settle and exist as natives; and not as strangers... that corner, in my opinion can only be Palestine. There we shall be able not only to cultivate the soil, but also to follow any other occupation or trade without exciting jealously among the nations.

Lilienblum was no longer advocating reform of Jewish life in order to make the Jewish community acceptable to the gentile world. Rather, he was now arguing that anti-semitism, based on national rather than strictly religious or even economic factors, would have to be addressed before internal Jewish rejuvenation could proceed. Lilienblum had broken completely with the liberal and radical views on the Jewish Question that he had espoused previously. He now believed that secular education and acculturation, internal social and economic reform, as well as religious reform would not lead to an amelioration
of the Jew's plight in the gentile world and to full and true acceptance. Instead, physical security and a normal existence for the Jewish people had now become the primary needs and in Lilienblum's new perspective these could only be attained in that one place where the Jew could freely say, "This is my Home."

The pogroms had converted Moshe Lilienblum into a Jewish nationalist. As a consequence, he came to identify himself fully with his people, their past and future. He stopped baiting the traditionalists and called instead for Jewish national unity. The question of internal reforms was now, for him, postponed until after the realization of the principal need — the settlement of Palestine by Jews. From 1881 until his death, Lilienblum devoted all of his energies to the cause of Palestine, seeing it not only as the secure refuge for his beleagured people but also as the location where the regeneration of the Jewish nation in the modern period would take place.

Independent of Lilienblum, Dr. Leon Pinsker (1821-1891), a life-long resident of Odessa, published a pamphlet entitled Autoemancipation (1883), in which he too came to similar conclusions. Trained in both the law and in medicine, Pinsker had been one of the active champions in the 1860s of the liberal campaign to Russify and to modernize the Jewish community. The Odessa pogrom of 1871 had shaken some of his beliefs in the efficacy of that course, but he still continued to affirm the basic tenets of the integrationist ideology of the liberal program.

The events of 1881, though, shattered Pinsker's remaining hopes and his belief in those earlier views. Now, he came to a number of radical conclusions. First, he saw the Jewish community as a national community rather than as a faith community whose way of life could be integrated within Russian national life. Secondly, he abandoned his liberal world-view with its
assumptions about the role of education in reconciling differences and in encouraging the growth of tolerance. In his very detailed analysis of anti-semitism, Pinsker argued that Judeophobia was a manifestation of a serious psychological malady. In his assessment, the Jews, a nation without a land of their own and so a nation that should have disappeared long ago, that is, a "ghost nation," triggered negative and hostile responses on the part of the people in whose national homes they dwelled. Anti-semitism with its resultant violence was, in Pinsker's view, a response to the psychological fears aroused by this "ghost nation." Hence, his solution called for the recognition of this reality rather than the pursuit of emancipation schemes that would prove to be ephemeral. In his view, normalization of the Jewish people would only occur with their settlement on a piece of territory recognized by all as their very own. In this way, the ghost-like character of the people would be reduced and perhaps, in time, be eliminated altogether.  

The responses of Lilienblum and Pinsker reflect the reactions of a good number of serious individuals throughout the Pale of Settlement who had experienced the assaults of 1881. Such responses led to the formulation of new programs, specifically emigrationist in their orientation, and to new perspectives on the status of both Russian and world Jewry and their needs in the modern world. Advocates of Jewish emigration from the Russian Empire could no longer support or continue to believe in the notion of a benevolent tsarist regime willing to extend its hand in friendship to the local Jewish community. For these people, the lesson of 1881 was that the Jews had to move from conditions of dependency to those of independence and self-determination. This point of view came to be expressed either in the kind of territorial solutions advocated by Pinsker and Lilienblum or by the mass exodus to the United States in search of immediate economic and legal
security. Clearly, what was no longer acceptable to such people was the premise that the problems of Russian Jewry could still be resolved in Russia along paths delineated prior to 1881.

III

The view from St. Petersburg was quite different. The pogroms were certainly shocking, but for the Jewish notables living in that city, they were not a watershed event. Nevertheless, those riots did pose serious problems for the Jewish leaders of the capital city. By the 1880s, the financiers, entrepreneurs and Jewish professionals, numbering about 17,250 people or two percent of the city's population—as contrasted to the 30% of the population that the Jews of Odessa constituted by the same date—had become tied intimately to both the Russian economy and to Russian culture. Actually, the success of the St. Petersburg Jews was both rapid and spectacular.

From the end of the eighteenth century through the reign of Nicholas I, Jewish communal life in the Empire had been restricted to the Pale of Settlement, the fifteen westernmost provinces of Russia and to the Congress Kingdom of Poland. However, the legislation of 1859 and 1861 permitted Jewish merchants of the first guild and Jewish graduates of higher institutions of learning to leave the Pale and to settle in the interior of the country. Taking advantage of these alleviations, a number of affluent Jewish merchants, financiers and businessmen as well as Jewish students, doctors and lawyers made their way to the capital city of St. Petersburg, tsarist Russia's historic "window to the West."

In St. Petersburg, this small enclave not only created the foundations of the local Jewish community, but by virtue of its wealth, expertise and proximity to the center of power in Imperial Russia, became the semi-official
representative for all of Russian Jewry in the eyes of the government and its various agencies. Committed to a program of modernization and Russification and convinced that such a course would ultimately lead to the conferring of full and equal rights upon Russian Jewry, the leaders in St. Petersburg sponsored a number of projects aimed at promoting such objectives for the masses still trapped in the Pale.

The St. Petersburg Jews themselves lived broad, expansive and most affluent lives at a time when hardship and deprivation characterized Jewish life in the Pale. These businessmen, together with the growing number of Jewish students, publicists and professionals who had made the capital city their home, had come to develop deep and even emotional commitments to the world of Russian culture. Russian theatre, art, music and above all Russian literature had become an integral part of their lives as they came to identify themselves with its values and orientations.

Thus, the pogroms shocked the St. Petersburg Jews and gave them cause for concern. However, in the final analysis those riots did not uproot them and lead them to radical conclusions on the future of Russian-Jewish life as had been the case for Lilienblum, Pinsker and others at the time. Instead, for the St. Petersburg Jewish leadership, the pogroms posed an altogether different set of problems which had to be addressed immediately. First and foremost, the leaders had to be certain that the pogroms were not the work of the government or of an agency that had ties to the government thereby bringing with them a new governmental policy which would reject the goal of Jewish equality within the Empire. Secondly, it was not enough to keep the government committed to this objective; it was also important to keep the Jewish community fixed on this goal. Hence, the emigrationist ideology then being proposed and activated was not only a challenge to the vision of Jewish
integration; but it could also lead Russians to conclusions that would; in fact; jeopardize the hope for civil emancipation. After all; if Jews were both talking and behaving in a way which negated the idea of Russia as their home; why then should Russians consider extending the hand of true friendship; let alone remove the many restrictions that were then circumscribing Jewish life? Therefore; the St. Petersburg Jewish leaders not only had to assure themselves of the government's good-will and continued commitment to the cause of Jewish betterment; they had also to deal with the rising tide of opposition within the Jewish community to their advocacy of a course of action which saw the problems of Russian Jewry being resolved within Russia.

An assessment of the responses of the leaders to the pogroms reflects these themes and considerations. Since there were no intitial public reactions from the capital city's Jewish leaders to the Elizavetgrad pogrom of April 15; 1881; three young men; living in the capital city and associated with the journal Razsvet; issued invitations in the name of a fictitious Jewish organization to all of the prominent Jews in the city to an emergency meeting at the home of Baron Horace O. Guenzburg; the titular head of the community. As a consequence; the Baron was compelled to convene a meeting on May 9; 1881 of the prominent Jews in the community in order to discuss and agree to a course of action. Those assembled decided that an audience with the new tsar; Alexander III; was of the highest priority.13

On May 11; 1881; five Jewish residents of the city; active in communal affairs within the Jewish community; met with the Emperor in order to request his aid on behalf of the Jewish community.14 The delegates were especially eager to hear the Tsar's own assessment of the recent disturbances. The Jewish delegates began the meeting by expressing the view that the Jews of the Pale would be more secure if the Tsar would issue a statement indicating that
the welfare of the Jewish community was important to him and that he was placing the community under his protection. The Emperor answered that he was not prepared to issue such a statement or to take any measures that would serve the purpose of singling out the Jewish community from among the various ethnic, religious or cultural groups that lived within the Empire. Alexander also used the occasion to indicate that while he did believe that the pogroms were the work of radical revolutionaries, the pattern of Jewish economic life in the countryside, especially Jewish moneylending and tavern-keeping, contributed substantially to the popular antipathy and open hostility against them. 15

Responding to this point on behalf of the delegation, Abraham Zack, a banker, agreed that Jewish economic life was certainly not diversified enough. However, he attributed this condition to the continued existence of the Pale of Settlement, an area to which Russian-Jewish life was almost exclusively confined. Zack held that the overcrowding there and the extensive competition among Jewish merchants led to commercial practices and behavioral patterns that were especially odious. In addition, Zack traced a variety of other Jewish economic hardships to the existence of the Pale as a boundary containing Russian-Jewish life. Implicitly, Zack was arguing that those aspects of Jewish economic life which seemed to be most offensive to Russians could be eliminated through the removal of the territorial restraints presently being imposed upon the Jews of Russia. 16

Alexander indicated that there were other reasons which contributed to the popular resentment against Jews. The Tsar remarked that a strong impression existed among the Russian peasantry that the Jews habitually shirked military service in Russia. Zack did not allow this remark to pass without comment as he noted that it was his impression, one that was shared by
many others; that a reluctance to send their sons to the military also existed among non-Jewish Russian merchants and townsmen.17

The Emperor terminated the interview with the statement that the Jews should submit a written memorandum on these topics as well as on other related issues to his government through the newly appointed Minister of the Interior, Count N. P. Ignatiev. The Jewish delegates then turned to the noted Odessa Jewish attorney, Mikhail G. Morgulis, and called on him to write a brief reviewing these topics as well as rebutting the continuous charge that there existed an illegal and therefore clandestine Jewish government called the *Kahal* which directed Russian-Jewish life in a manner detrimental to general Russian interests.18

This first meeting characterizes the nature of the Jewish leadership's approach to the pogroms: eager to get a reading of the government's understanding and interpretation of the riots and also hopeful of shaping that evaluation, while all the time emphasizing the need for greater Jewish-Russian interaction in order to improve Jewish life and to eliminate misunderstanding and suspicion between the two communities. The obstacles to such interaction, in the leadership's view, were the continued existence of a physical, geographical area to which Jewish life had been condemned; thus keeping Russian Jewry from growing in a natural and healthy manner; and the continued imposition on the Jewish community of legislative restrictions which kept it from evolving along those same kind of modern and progressive lines as had occurred in Western and Central Europe.

The summer of 1881 did not bring a respite for the Jews of Russia. Instead a second wave of pogroms raged through the Pale from late June through the second week of August. This round of riots made the spring disturbances appear less aberrational and no longer susceptible to simple explanations.
The initial low profile approach taken by the Jewish leadership had failed. Not only were the pogroms not going away of their own accord, but Jewish lobbying had been incapable of mobilizing the government to move against the pogrom movement, its organizers and activists. The second period of renewed violence had not only given rise to increased Jewish flight from Russia, but now that flight was being supported and encouraged by ad-hoc Jewish communities formed in the Pale as well as by the activists associated with the Jewish weekly Razsvet. Finally on August 21, 1881, the Minister of the Interior, Ignatiev, associated in the past with the xenophobic Pan-Slavic movement and never considered to be very trustworthy, called for the creation of special governmental commissions, with Jewish participation, at the provincial levels in order to examine in full the Jewish Question and to recommend appropriate action. In his instructions to the governors calling on them to establish these commissions, Ignatiev expressed views that were decidedly hostile to the Jewish community. These developments, the persistence of the pogrom movement, the rising tide of emigration which was now buttressed ideologically and supported organizationally, and the new government initiative on the Jewish Question pushed the St. Petersburg group to act.

On August 30, 1881, Baron Guenzburg convened a conference of Jewish representatives from the major Jewish communities of Russia in St. Petersburg. Of the sixty delegates to attend this eight-day meeting, fully one-third came from the capital city. Throughout the conference, the St. Petersburg representatives dominated the proceedings as they set the agenda, led the discussions and influenced the final resolutions of the meeting. The delegates, invited either by Guenzburg or by Samuel S. Poliakov, the railroad financier, discussed the following topics: the need for educational reforms within the secular and religious schools; the need for economic
diversification within the Jewish community; especially the need for more Jewish artisans and agricultural workers; and the need to increase military service by Jews within the tsarist army. Of course the delegates discussed the plight of the Jewish communities victimized by the pogroms and the new burdens being placed on the charity and welfare funds as a consequence. However, no massive fund raising was initiated at this time, nor was there agreement reached to divert monies from the newly created ORT fund to this end. In short, the delegates did not address themselves in any serious manner to the question of Jewish emigration.

The emphasis on internal reform underlines the St. Petersburg domination of the proceedings and affirms the continued validity, for the participants, of the equation that such reform would be matched by governmental concessions alleviating the plight of the Jews. Thus, we can conclude that by the fall of 1881, in spite of the pogroms and the signals of hostility emanating from the Minister of the Interior, the acknowledged Jewish leadership of Russian Jewry had not been led to re-assess its stance on what course of action was in the best interests of the Jewish community. Secondly, the implication of the meeting's agenda, with its concentration on the question of needed reforms, indicates that in the minds of some of the delegates, the flaws, anachronisms and other failures in contemporary Jewish life could indeed have been responsible for those conditions which gave rise to the recent hostility and the violence against the Jews of Russia. It should be recalled that it was at this very same time period that Moshe Leib Lilienblum ceased calling for Jewish reforms and preached instead the theme of Jewish unity.

At that same August 1881 meeting, the delegates resolved to send another deputation to the Tsar and the Minister of the Interior. The Tsar rejected that request, and the meeting with Ignatiev was both brief and cool. The
Minister told the Jews that they were not a special group within the Russian population that was entitled to self-representation. He went on to tell them that they had to work within existing bureaucratic channels and to stop trying to get to the top through personal representations to the Tsar. The meeting ended on an unsatisfactory note. Thus, by September 1881, not only had the erstwhile leaders of Russian Jewry not been able to protect their community after the assaults of that year, but they now found their position of leadership being threatened from within the Jewish community by the advocates of a new course, a course that promoted ethnic Jewish consciousness and mobilization of resources for the purpose of promoting a mass emigration of Russian Jews. As they looked ahead, the St. Petersburg leaders could not be very optimistic about the immediate future. Their best hope was that as the seasons turned and as fall moved to winter, the chances for pogrom-like activity would diminish and that with the passage of time, changes both in the Jewish community and in governmental circles would prove to be beneficial and would restore the status quo ante.

Count Ignatiev, on the other hand, did not see a need for a "cooling off" period. On October 19, 1881, he continued his offensive on the Jewish Question by creating a special committee within the Ministry of the Interior under the chairmanship of D. V. Gotovtsev. Ignatiev charged Gotovtsev to review the present status of the Jewish community and to recommend appropriate legislation so as to reduce the possibilities of future violent confrontations within the Empire. The creation of this committee rendered superfluous all existing official investigative and consultative bodies dealing with Russia's Jews and effectively established Ignatiev as the principal architect of subsequent policies in this area. The Minister's generally unsympathetic attitude toward the Jews and his striking out on his own in this area
frightened the Jewish leadership. Having no real access to, let alone influence with Ignatiev, Guenzburg and the others were now placed in the position of having to circumvent the Minister and to exercise influence in other quarters in order to negate any recommendations which they believed to be especially harmful to the welfare of the community. However, before they could mobilize their efforts, Ignatiev presented them with yet another dilemma, a direct challenge to their positions as the titular leaders of Russian Jewry.

Three weeks after the Christmas-Day pogrom in Warsaw, as the Jewish emigration movement increased its tempo, Ignatiev granted a special interview to Dr. I. Orshansky of Ekaterinoslav, a member of the editorial board of Razsvet, a delegate to the August 1881 St. Petersburg Jewish Conference and a supporter of emigration. It was in the course of that interview that Ignatiev made his oft-quoted remark that under certain circumstances "the western border was open to Jews." While this phrase has often been presented as the government's open invitation to the Jews to quit Russia, a closer reading of the full statement shows quite clearly that not only was Ignatiev not removing any of the obstacles to legal emigration; in fact, he was even increasing them. In this same interview, Ignatiev also indicated that he had no intention of expanding the area known as the Pale of Settlement; let alone eliminating it altogether. Thus, in one fell swoop, Ignatiev had severely damaged the integrationist program and the credibility of its advocates. Not only had he chosen to by-pass a St. Petersburg Jew in order to deliver his message; he specifically gave the impression that the government was encouraging emigration in order to rid Russia of its Jewish population. Many did read Ignatiev's message this way and even though it was mid-winter, the emigration of Jews did not slacken. On the other hand, those who read the
public text of the interview closely realized that not only was emigration not being facilitated, but that the hopes for accommodation and successful integration were also being dashed. Ignatiev's hostility to Jews and the Jewish community came through clearly and sharply not only in his message but in the very offensive language that he used.

The St. Petersburg Jewish notables tried to have the publication of the interview suppressed as they realized how damaging it was. However, they were unsuccessful in that effort. Simultaneously, the rabbis all over the country also realized the importance of the published interview and, without consulting the lay leadership, declared January 18, 1882 as a public fast day for Russia's Jews. Thousands of Jews flocked to synagogues on that day in order to express their solidarity with the community. Included in this mass demonstration were many young people who had managed to keep their distance from the synagogue and the organized Jewish community in the past. Clearly, this event contributed to the sense of Jewish national identity and national tragedy, a mood very much emphasized by the advocates of the mass emigration. The number of ad hoc local committees organizing and facilitating emigration increased in the weeks ahead. Finally, a direct challenge to the leadership being exercised by St. Petersburg appeared with the publication of articles critical of their efforts in both the political and philanthropic areas. The first such article scored the St. Petersburg notables for their passivity in responding to the plight of their co-religionists in the Pale. Here the author especially found fault with the leaders for not launching a massive fund-raising project on behalf of the victims of the riots. The second piece to appear in that period was even sharper and much more explicit in its criticism of St. Petersburg Jewry. The author, Y. L. Levin, associated in the past with Jewish radical movements wrote:
Who has the right to speak for the people: Only those who live the life of the people, who feel the pain and the sorrow of Jewish life directly—not those who enjoy the benefits of life.... Such "spokesmen" are inauthentic by virtue of their experiences.31

In his own effort to raise national consciousness and to initiate a new era in Jewish decision-making and political behavior, Moshe Lilienblum was also critical of leadership by the affluent and the privileged. He recalled that in the past the authentic leaders of the people had not come from Jerusalem but from small villages such as Modin (the Maccabees). So too, in the present circumstances Jews should not look to the major centers. He wrote, "Do not look... to Paris, Berlin or St. Petersburg or to grandees and their imitators, do not expect the initiative to come from them."32 True emancipation meant falling back on your own efforts and resources, Lilienblum was arguing.

The emigration question had now become the principal item on the Jewish agenda, and its growth as well as the attacks against the existing leadership and their orientation posed serious dilemmas for the St. Petersburg group. In addition to seeing organized, ideologically-motivated emigration as treasonous for its rejection of the idea of Russia as "home," the St. Petersburg group was convinced that emigration could not solve the problems of Russian Jewry. Leaving out the very important questions of cost and of destination, the critics of emigration emphasized that not all Russian Jews could or would go. That meant that the status of those that remained behind would still have to be resolved within the context of Russia and its development.33 So, the old-line leadership was prepared to support the emigration of individuals or even whole families who had become traumatized by their personal losses or experiences and could not rebuild their lives on Russian soil. However, they strenuously objected to a mass emigration built around the idea that a Jewish
life in Russia could not be lived. Their own lives, in their view, reflected a clear and constant refutation of that contention.

The emphasis on emigration during the winter of 1882 moved the St. Petersburg notables to action. First of all, they had to reassert the primacy of their integrationist ideology and the struggle for civil rights over all other proposed solutions. Second, they had to demonstrate that they still could have an impact on governmental policy and thereby beat back the rising criticism and opposition to their leadership of the community. To accomplish these ends, they resolved to convene another assembly of community representatives, at which time they would gain the support of that group for their program and for a continuation of their methods of operation.

On behalf of the group, Rabbi A. N. Drabkin, the official crown-rabbi of St. Petersburg, petitioned the Ministry of Interior for permission to hold a meeting in St. Petersburg of Jewish community representatives from around the country. Drabkin explained that the recent Ignatiev/Orshansky exchange had created quite a stir within the Jewish community and that it was important at this point to bring together community leaders from around the Pale in order to gauge the general mood and feelings of the Jewish masses. Drabkin also used the opportunity to reaffirm the continued support of the Jewish people for the crown and the country. In its reply, the Ministry approved the call for a meeting of Jewish delegates in St. Petersburg in order to ascertain current moods and views held among Russia's Jews.34

On March 15, 1882, Baron Horace Guenzburg hosted a pre-conference meeting to which he invited eighteen representatives, ten of them from St. Petersburg with the remainder coming from Elizavetgrad, Kiev, Kovno, Moscow and Vitebsk. This meeting was called to order to set the conference agenda, plan the method of selecting participants and set the actual dates for the
meeting. At that preliminary meeting, Dr. Drabkin reported on his contacts with the Ministry of Interior including his personal interview with Ignatiev two days earlier. Drabkin noted that a list of proposed delegates had previously been approved by the Ministry and that Ignatiev had agreed to the proposed date, April 8, for the beginning of the conference. In addition, the representatives at Guenzburg's home approved an official invitation to be sent to all the proposed delegates inviting them to St. Petersburg after advising them of the background negotiations that had taken place between Drabkin and the Ministry of Interior. All delegates were asked to bring with them all the information they could muster on the impact of the recent riots on their local Jewish communities. Finally, miffed by the recent criticism of them in the Jewish press, the conference organizers decided not to issue credentials to journalists in order to cover the meetings. However, Zvi Rabinowitz, the editor of the weekly *Russkii Evrei*, a St. Petersburg paper that opposed emigration and advocated the integrationist approach, represented the city of Dvinsk at the conference, and so at least one Jewish journalist attended the sessions.

Between the time of this preliminary meeting and the opening of the conference, a violent two-day pogrom (March 29-30) in which over 1200 Jewish homes and shops were attacked broke out in the city of Balta. Those disturbances spurred the flow of emigrants as people began to assume that the spring of 1882 would follow the pattern of 1881 and that a new round of pogroms had just been unleashed. Furthermore, the Gotovtsev committee was in the final stages of its work, and rumors circulated in St. Petersburg that the report would call for harsh and even brutal measures to be taken against the Jews of Russia.
Thus, the mood was grim and the atmosphere was tense and anxious as forty-six Jewish delegates, twenty-seven from the Pale of Settlement and nineteen of them from St. Petersburg assembled on April 8, 1882 in order to begin their deliberations.\textsuperscript{37} While there were three major themes on the agenda, it was the emigration question which elicited the most wide-ranging and the most emotional exchanges from the assembled delegates.\textsuperscript{38} Attending the assembly were individuals who thought that the first order of business was to extend aid to the victims; and if such aid meant support for emigration, then the conference should become involved in coordinating that emigration. Others called emigration an act of treason and rejected it unequivocally. Finally, a number of delegates tried to focus attention on the issue of equal rights for the Jews of Russia. The clearest and most articulate expression of this point of view came from Professor Noah Bakst, one of the few among the St. Petersburg Jewish leaders who was not a banker or businessman.

Noah [Nicholas] I. Bakst (1842-1904) studied Judaica at the Zhitomir rabbinical school and math and physics at the St. Petersburg University. His interest in Russian culture and especially Russian literature drew him to the prominent writers of the day, including I. S. Turgenev and N. G. Chernishevsky. In 1863, Bakst went to Germany to complete his graduate studies in physiology. He returned to St. Petersburg in 1867 and lectured at the University for a number of years before going back to Germany for an extended research trip. Bakst published studies on physiology while in Germany and returned home to assume a position with the medical faculty at St. Petersburg University.

Bakst had always been interested in Jewish affairs but became much more active in communal life after 1881. At that time, he rejected the newly emerging nationalist orientation within the Jewish community and supported
energetically the integrationist idea that was so compatible with his own upbringing and life-style. His voice was consistently and forcefully raised in favor of the extension of full and equal rights to the Jews of Russia. In his advocacy of this position and through his subsequent intensive associationship with ORT, Bakst came to influence individuals within the Jewish community as well as his colleagues in the general society, especially those who made contributions to the Russian, liberal press. 39

At the April 9th session, Bakst developed his views on emigration and equal rights before the Jewish delegates assembled in St. Petersburg. He argued that the central cause of the emigration movement was not, as others claimed, the pogroms themselves, but what lay behind the pogroms, the unique status of Russian Jewry. He said:

Tragedies can occur to any group or community within the population, but such tragedies will not lead to that group's immediate departure from its homeland. Only when [the group] sees that the tragedy... is a direct consequence of the laws of the land relating to them, then will the seeds for an emigration movement sprout. 40

Therefore, Bakst argued that it was not the pogroms but the isolated and unique status of the Jews in Russia which had to be addressed and rectified. He concluded with a call for an extension of full and equal rights to the Jewish community.

In the midst of this discussion on emigration, Samuel Poliakov reported on a meeting that he had had that very day with Ignatiev. According to Poliakov, the Minister was then considering a plan that called for the resettlement of thousands of Jews in newly acquired territories in Central Asia. There, in Ignatiev's view, the Jews would be able to make use of their commercial talents while contributing to the growth of Russian business and industry in an area very close to a British sphere of influence,
Afghanistan. Furthermore, since there was an abundance of vacant land in this region, those Jews who wished to settle on land and become directly involved with agriculture could do so. From the perspective of the Minister, a number of objectives could be realized through this plan: Jews would be removed from the Pale where their contacts with the native population had led to such tensions that violent outbursts ensued; Russian commercial interests in Central Asia would be extended and developed while British expansionism would be checked. Finally, Jews could see this as a way of quitting the Pale and becoming "productive" artisans and agricultural workers. Poliakov, the most Russophile of the St. Petersburg group, found positive features in the proposal. However, the overwhelming majority of the assembled delegates, seeing it as an expulsion order and the harbinger of what Ignatiev was preparing to propose to the Council of Ministers as a consequence of the Gotovstev report, rejected it vociferously. Dr. E. Kh. Mandelstamm, from Kiev, a supporter of emigration saw this plan as no less than a transfer of Jews from European Russia to an inhospitable area in Central Asia. Mandelstamm renewed his call for organized emigration. Other delegates, too, commented on the Ignatiev/Poliakov meeting, it being clear to everyone that Ignatiev was using the opportunity to send a message to the assembly via Poliakov. Once again, it fell to Noah Bakst to get the deliberations back to the central issues, the commitment to civil rights and the simultaneous rejection of both internal relocation as well as emigration to the West.

Bakst agreed that Ignatiev's proposal did amount to an expulsion order and it would be so viewed by the Russian people. Since the Jews would be going to Central Asia without any increase in their rights as Russians, they would be perceived as common criminals, Bakst argued. Furthermore, without rights in Central Asia, no one could guarantee that a time would not come when
the indigenous population of the area would turn to the captive Jewish population and say to them, "Get out of here—you don't belong here." Thus, turning to Poliakov and to those less hostile to Ignatiev's suggestion, Bakst said that internal population transfers without a concurrent extension of civil rights was pointless.\(^{42}\)

At the same time, Bakst rejected emigration to America as the alternative. Bakst saw such a course as both narrow and limited in its effect. Rather, the only true course was to set out on "that road to the future that would bring with it a broad and comprehensive resolution to the dilemmas of Russian Jewry." Clearly, in his own view, only the road to integration and full acceptance was the correct one.\(^{43}\)

With a stridency and an anger reflecting a willingness to contest the policies of the government, Emanuel B. Bank, a St. Petersburg attorney active in communal matters, rose to support Bakst's argument. He said:

> The fate of three million people is not going to be dependent upon the whims of one policy or another. No measures will steal from us the rights to our homeland. Even though we are one part of her [population], we are still products [of the land] and hold on to her. Of their own will, Jews will not leave here. Our [present] conditions force us to work for the extension of our civil rights.\(^{44}\)

The Bakst/Bank arguments carried the day. By a vote of thirty-four to five, the delegates defeated a motion that called for the establishment of an emigration committee; by unanimous vote, the group voted in favor of a resolution calling for full and equal rights for Russian Jewry. Furthermore, the delegates agreed to establish a special fund for the victims of the pogroms. Baron Guenzburg with a 25,000 ruble pledge and Samuel Poliakov with a 15,000 ruble pledge led the way as the delegates raised a fund of more than 60,000 rubles for relief work at this time.\(^{45}\)
The amount of money raised within Russia for relief work previously had not only been pitiful; it was even embarrassing especially in comparison to the sums being raised abroad for that purpose. Perhaps now that the well-to-do St. Petersburg Jews had been shamed into opening their purses, they were more inclined to give. More likely though, now that the representatives of Russian Jewry had rejected emigration schemes, it was safe to contribute to relief programs without fearing that the money would be used for a political objective. The delegates now applied for and received official permission to establish such a fund and to use it for charitable ends.

The delegates did spend some time discussing issues related to the Jewish image and need for internal Jewish reforms. On the whole though, those themes did not occupy the delegates in April 1882 as they had in August-September 1881. The emigration question was clearly the chief topic of the day, and the manner of its resolution was completely satisfactory as far as the St. Petersburg Jewish leadership was concerned.

The second task facing Guenzburg; Bakst; Bank; Poliakov and the others was to nip in the bud Ignatiev's expulsion idea as well as some of the other measures being contemplated by the Minister. Once more, Bakst mobilized the delegates behind a plan of by-passing Ignatiev and lobbying with other governmental personalities in order to defeat the program. As a consequence, ten deputations left the conference in order to confer with the major ministers making up the Council of Ministers as well as with the ober-procurator of the Holy Synod, N. P. Pobedonostsev. Carrying memoranda, briefs and other documents and making their own verbal arguments in favor of Jewish rights, these deputations tried to mobilize support against the impending proposals. In the final analysis, these deputations did impress people both in the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, those arms of the
Russian bureaucracy which were already sensitive to the impact that the pogroms were having abroad. Furthermore, officials in both Finance and Foreign Affairs knew how much more difficult their own efforts would be to secure foreign loans and diplomatic support in the West if it now appeared that the government itself was engaged in overtly hostile and perhaps violent actions against the Jewish community. The subsequent legislation of May 3, 1882, the so-called Temporary Laws which remained in effect until 1917, while a setback as far as the cause of Jewish emancipation was concerned, nevertheless, did mark a victory of sorts for the St. Petersburg Jewish leaders in that those laws were less harsh and severe than was the original legislative package proposed to the council by Ignatiev.48 Thus, the final shape of the legislation brought a collective sigh of relief from the Jewish leaders and the delegates still assembled in the capital city. In addition, before the end of May, Alexander III replaced Ignatiev as Minister of the Interior with Count Dmitrii A. Tolstoi.

It would be incorrect to argue that the Jewish community played any role in the ouster of Ignatiev. However, the St. Petersburg notables could certainly benefit by the impression that their influence had been a factor in that development. When Tolstoi took an especially firm stance against pogrom-like incidents and indicated that he would not tolerate such riots, the Jewish leaders again had every reason to believe that sanity was once more being restored to the realm of Russian domestic affairs. In fact, during Tolstoi's Ministry (1882-1889); only a handful of isolated pogroms occurred throughout the Empire and with the restoration of law and order; the rate of Jewish emigration from the country declined in those years. From the vantage point of the mid-1880s, the storms of 1881-1882 had been weathered.
IV

In assessing the response of the Jewish leadership to the crisis of 1881-1882 in Russia, it is clear that that response was based on an interpretation of Jewish history and its evolution in the post-Enlightenment era that was far different from the view of Jewish history developed by the contemporary Jewish radicals. The Jewish leaders in Russia subscribed to the belief that the modern period would see the full emancipation of the Jewish people throughout all of Europe. Thus, what had already happened in England and France and was then taking place in Germany would soon be realized in Russia. Believing in this "truth," the Russian-Jewish leaders conducted their lives in conformity with the progressive view that Jewish citizenship and full acceptance within the modern nation-state was inevitable. However, in order to hasten that day, Jews should prepare themselves by reforming the basis of their social and economic lives and by becoming more involved with the culture of that society in which they found themselves. Hence, the leaders rejected the emigrationist and nationalist ideologies not in order to preserve the status that they had achieved in the past two decades or through a lack of identification with the Jewish people of Russia, but because they were interested in remaining on that path which they believed led to real gains for all of Russian Jewry. The St. Petersburg Jews were not going to allow an ideology of the moment, emerging from despair and preaching separation and rejection of Russia, to supplant what they considered to be the only realistic solution to the difficulties of the Jewish masses—the extension of legal rights to the whole of the community. After all, they asked their critics over and over, how many Jews would actually emigrate and what would be the fate of the masses left behind?
Committed to the vision of emancipation and full opportunity, the St. Petersburg leaders used all of the tools at their disposal and the experiences gained in directing Jewish affairs in the past in order to affirm their perspective on the future and its demands. In this effort, they were successful. They convened "representative" conferences of the Jewish community in order to underwrite their ideology. They lobbied and petitioned government officials, using all of the arguments that they could muster in order to undermine the full thrust of the Jewish program sponsored by the hostile Minister of the Interior, and ultimately they emerged with a minor victory. As a consequence, they were able to retain their pre-eminent position with the Jewish community for the next decade and a half and were able to continue their slow and piecemeal efforts aimed at the ultimate objective, the emancipation of Russian Jewry. The road may have been longer than originally anticipated, or perhaps it had more detours in Russia than it had had in the West, but for these Jews, it was the only road to travel.
FOOTNOTES

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1. On the pathology of the pogroms see: I. M. Aronson, "Geographical and Socio-Economic Factors in the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia," Russian Review, 39 (1980), 18-31; B. Z. Dinur, "Tokhniyotov shel Ignatiev...," He'avar, 10 (1963), 9-11; and Y. Slutsky, "Hagiografiah shel pra'ot TRMA," He'avar, 9 (1962), 16-26. All dates given in this paper correspond to the Julian calendar in use in Russia at the time. That calendar was twelve days behind the Georgian calendar in use in the West.

2. These identities and ideologies together with their manifestations in Russia, North America and the Near East have been the subjects of a sizable scholarly literature that has enhanced not only our understanding of the modern Russian-Jewish experience but also the nature of modern Jewish politics. Recent contributions to this literature include David Vital, The Origins of Zionism (Oxford, 1975) and Jonathan Frankel, Prophecy and Politics (Cambridge, 1981).

3. Of course, the picture becomes that much more complex in the 1890s with the entrance of Jewish socialists and autonomists into the picture and
their commitment to solve the problems of Russian Jewry in Russia along revolutionary and radical lines.


6. In his collection, *The Zionist Idea* (New York, 1959), Arthur Hertzberg reproduces several pages from Lilienblum's diary of May 1881 reflecting the impact that those events had on Lilienblum.


8. "Obshcheevreiskii vopros i Palestina," *Razvet* 41 and 42 (1881), 1641. This essay, together with others on this theme, were collected and issued in pamphlet form under the title *O vozrozhdenii evreiskago naroda na sv. zemle ego drevnikh otzov* (Odessa, 1903).

9. On Pinsker, see the biographical sketch by B. Netanyahu in *Road to Freedom* (New York, 1944), 7-73. That volume also contains an English-language version of *Autoemancipation*, as well as some letters written by Pinsker.


11. The most significant of those projects was the creation of a society for the promotion of education among Russian Jews in 1863 under the patronage of Baron Osip Guenzburg. On the history of that organization see I. M. Tocherikower, *Istoriia obshchestva dlia rasprostraneniia prosveshcheniia mezhdru evreiami v Rossii 1863-1913 gg.* (St. Petersburg, 1913). In 1881, a second organization, this one intended to promote artisanship and agricultural skills
among Russian Jews (ORT) was founded under the patronage of Samuel S. Poliakov. On that group see L. Shapiro, *The History of ORT* (New York, 1980).

12. Sliozberg, *Dela...* I, 140-149.

13. Mordehai Ben Hillel HaKohen, "Yidishe klal asayfos," *Dos Leben* (St. Petersburg, 1905). This essay was reprinted in the author's collection of essays under the title *In mame lushen* (Vilno, 1935). All references to this essay come from the Vilno reprint. See pp. 200-201. HaKohen's account is corroborated by Ya'akov Lifshiz in his memoirs *Zikhron Yaakov* 3 vols. (Kovno, 1930) III, 12. The three men involved in this effort were M. B. Hillel HaKohen, S. Z. Lurie, and S. S. Frug.


15. N. M. Gelber reprints consular reports found in the Austrian archives in his article (in Yiddish) "Di russishe pogromen in di 80er yoren..." *Historische schriften*, edited by E. Tcherikower, II (1937); 469.


18. Morgulis's brief was presented only in April 1882 at the conclusion of the second St. Petersburg conference when a major lobbying effort was undertaken to undermine the Ignatiev proposals to the Council of Ministers. The brief can be found in its entirety in the S. M. Ginsburg Collection at the Jewish National Library in Jerusalem 4° 1281 file 14/6. Morgulis published an expanded version of this work in a collection of his essays which appeared in print in 1903. M. G. Morgulis, *Voprosy evreiskoi zhizni* (St. Petersburg, 1903).
19. B. Z. Dinur treats Ignatiev's relationship with the Pan-Slav movement and his antipathy to Jews in his article on Ignatiev's Jewish program. Dinur, "Tokhniyotov shel Ignatiev..." He'avar, 10 (1963), 12-19.


21. M. B. Hillel HaKoken, "Yidishe klat asayfoss," 206-207; Lifshiz, Zikhron Ya'akov, III, 16. Lilienblum was especially critical of the ORT money sitting idle while other Jewish needs existed. See his pamphlet O vozrozhdenii evreiskago naroda..., 36-37. See also Dinur, "Tokhniyotov..." He'avar, 10 (1963), 42.

22. Dinur, "Tokhniyotov..." He'avar, 10 (1963), 41-42.

23. G. B. Sliozberg reports on the effort by Ignatiev to solicit a bribe from Baron Guenzberg. See Sliozberg Dela...; I, 254. Lifshiz also presents information on Ignatiev's hostility to the Jewish community and on his resolve to settle the Jewish Question in a harsh and brutal manner. See Zikhron Ya'akov, III, 14-16.

24. With Ignatiev's approval, a text of the interview with Orshansky was published in Razsvet, 4 (1882), 125-126.


27. Lifshiz reports the unsuccessful effort by Guenzburg to have the Ignatiev/Orshansky interview suppressed. Zikhron Ya'akov, III, 89-90.

28. M. Ben Hillel HaKoken reports on the public fast day and the large turn-out by young, disaffected Jewish students; "Yidishe klal asayfos," 217.

29. M. E. Mandel'shtam, "Ignat'evskaia komissiia v kieve 1881g." Perezhitoe, IV (1913), 46-65 reports on the formation of ad hoc emigration committees in the Kiev region.

30. B. Brandt, "Stolitsa i provintsiiia," Razvet, 12, 14, 17 (1882).


32. M. L. Lilienblum, O vozrozhdenii evreiskago naroda..., 90-91.

33. Dinur quotes the poet Y. L. Gordon, a resident of St. Petersburg, on this point: "Emigration will not solve and will not be able to solve the problems of the Jewish masses still living in Russia." Dinur, "Tokhniyotov..." He'avar, 10 (1963), 33.

34. Hectograph copies of this exchange of letters were included in the bound copies of the protocols of the ensuing April conference. Two such copies have been preserved in archival collections at the Jewish National Library: (a) Yehuda Leib Gershon Kahanovitz archival collection (V 378) and (b) S. M. Ginsburg Collection 401281 file 14/6. Shulamit Laskov has published the documents found in the Kahanovitz collection as an appendix to her article, "A Conference of Community Delegates in St. Petersburg," Michael, VI (1980), 149-193. The Drabkin letter and ministerial response can be found on pp. 166-167 of the Laskov article. There are minor differences in the papers preserved in both collections leading to the conclusion that neither one of them is complete.

35. Laskov, Michael; VI (1980), 170-171.
36. The decision to bar representatives from the Jewish press is recorded by Mordehai Ben Hillel HaKoken, "Yidish klal asayfos," 225-226.

37. Both Dinur and Laskov gave a list of the delegates and the cities that they represented. Laskov's list is in Cyrillic; Michael, V (1980), 168-169. Diner's list is in Hebrew, and he also presents a general social and economic sketch of the representatives' background. He'avar, 10 (1963), 49-52.

38. A published report, including partial transcripts of the proceedings of the conference, appeared in Russkii Evrei four months after the conclusion of the meeting. See Russkii Evrei 30, 32, 33, 35 (1882). Appended to S. Laskov's article, "A Conference of Community Delegates in St. Petersburg," Michael, VI (1980), 172-177, is a list of the resolutions passed at the conference together with some of the appendices made available to the delegates. Dinur translated the Russian transcript from Russkii Evrei into Hebrew and appended them to the article on Ignatiev's Jewish program. See He'avar, 10 (1963), 61-82.


40. Russkii Evrei, 32 (1882), 1235-1236.

41. Ibid., 1237-1238.

42. Ibid., 1239-1241.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., 1241.


46. The Jewish press carried weekly reports of monies raised at home and abroad for relief efforts. While hundreds were being donated weekly by Russian Jews, thousands were being offered by French and German Jewry.
47. Russkit Evrei, 35 (1882); 1319-1320. Also, Lifshiz, Zikhron Ya’akov, III; 90; HaKoken, "Yidishe klal asayfos," 229. The membership of the ten delegations is a part of the record published by Laskov in Michael, VI (1980), 188. A written account of the meeting with Ignatiev on April 27, 1882 has been preserved in the Ben Hillel HaKoken Archival collection at the National Library in Jerusalem 40 1068 file 509.

48. Alexander Zederbaum reported in his Yiddish paper, Yidishes folks blatt, 17 (1882); 259 that the Jewish lobbying effort was successful in undercutting Ignatiev's proposals. I. M. Aronson also finds that the May Laws did not go as far as Ignatiev had proposed in his recommendations to the Council of Ministers on the Jewish Question. See Aronson's study, "Russian Commissions...," East European Quarterly, 14 (1980); 59-74.