AFTER THE KRATKII KURS: SOVIET LEADERSHIP CONFLICT
OVER THEORETICAL EDUCATION: 1956-1961

by

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THE CARL BECK PAPERS IN
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The nature and extent of political conflict between Soviet leaders under first
secretary N. S. Khrushchev has recently become a matter of considerable dispute.
Since the late 1960’s, Western specialists have generally endorsed Carl Linden's
conclusion that a reformist Khrushchev was locked in constant conflict with
orthodox elements in the Soviet leadership over a wide range of political,
economic, and social issues. However, a recent study of the Khrushchev and
Brezhnev regimes by George Breslauer has charged that Linden and others had
produced historically inaccurate portraits of the Khrushchev administra-

But Breslauer's study fails to provide coherent evidence to support this
dramatic accusation. In fact, it presents a one-sided conception of political life
under Khrushchev by focusing almost exclusively on his public pronouncements and
by failing to compare them in detail to the pronouncements of his political
opponents. Without such comparative analysis, it is very difficult to judge the
level of political conflict or to define the consensus which ostensibly binds the
leaders together.

Comparison of Soviet leaders' public pronouncements remains the most
effective means to examine political life at the apex of the political system.
Although these statements do not furnish evidence of the leaders' personal motives
or of the intensity of political conflict, they do indicate the leaders' own
"definition of the situation" incorporating an analysis of a particular problem and
an outline of the means to cope with it. Students of the Khrushchev regime have
used comparative analysis of leadership statements to analyze conflict over a wide range of political and economic issues. However, leadership conflict over such ideological issues as the theoretical education of party members has been ignored. This neglect seems to reflect a widespread presumption that Soviet leaders, despite their differences on a wide range of issues, share a common definition of Marxism-Leninism and therefore do not clash over the nature of official ideology or over such related issues as party members' theoretical education.

This study seeks to demonstrate how Soviet leaders clashed over party members' theoretical education in the 1956-1961 period. It focuses on the political conflict between first secretary N. S. Khrushchev and his supporters on the one hand, and M. A. Suslov (a member of the Presidium and a CC Secretary) and his allies, on the other, over three interrelated aspects of party members' theoretical education: the relationship between Marxist-Leninist theory and party practice; the nature and content of party members' theoretical education; and the relationship of theoretical study to mass propaganda designed to increase production and improve labor productivity.

Each contending ideological grouping included Presidium members, CC Secretaries, and leaders of the agitprop department of the Secretariat, which was directly responsible for all aspects of the party's "ideological work." The public dispute between the members of these groups occurred at the CPSU Congresses, Central Committee meetings, and in the pages of Pravda, Kommunist and Partiinaia Zhizn. The debate also influenced the CC decrees on "ideological work" which were issued in the 1956-1961 period. These published sources revealed that the conflict between the first secretary and his opponents was never resolved. Khrushchev proved unable to impose his own definitions for long while his opponents were sufficiently influential to publish their own views in CC journals and to have them incorporated in CC decrees and in official party texts.
Moreover, Khrushchev's opponents seemed to dominate the public discussion of party members' theoretical education whenever he was faced with concerted opposition to other aspects of his foreign and domestic program.

First secretary Khrushchev sparked the conflict over theoretical education by repudiating the Stalinist *Kratkii kurs* in his public report to the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956. The *Kratkii kurs* (the short title of the *History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)*) had been written under Stalin's supervision and had served as the basis for party members' theoretical education from late 1938 until after Stalin's death. The *Kratkii kurs* had been designed as a compact and coherent definition of official Marxism-Leninism for the new elite which emerged from the purges of the late 1930's. From late 1938 onward Stalin and his cohorts insisted that the study of the *Kratkii kurs* would allow all party members to "master Marxism-Leninism" which was considered essential for the party's leadership of the society as a whole. Study of the *Kratkii kurs* would ostensibly give party members a sense of direction and purpose, an awareness of the "laws of social development" which would enable them to find correct solutions for all practical problems. Stalin himself underlined the importance of party members' theoretical study in his address to the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) in March 1939.

If the Marxist-Leninist education of our cadres begins to languish, if our work of raising the political and theoretical levels of these cadres weakens, and the cadres themselves lose interest in the prospect of our future progress, cease understanding the truth of our cause and become narrow minded plodders without perspective, blindly and mechanically carrying out instructions from above, then our entire party and state work must languish. It must be accepted as an axiom that the higher the political level and Marxist-Leninist consciousness of workers in any branch of party and state activity, then the better the work and its results. And vice versa, the lower the political level and Marxist-Leninist consciousness then the greater the possibility of disruption and failure, of workers becoming shallow and degenerating into narrow minded plodders, or their complete degeneration.3
The use of the Kratkii kurs assured that party members' theoretical education was a sham. The text did not provide a coherent discussion of Marxist-Leninist theory. It was a Stalinist version of the party's history which glorified Stalin's pronouncements and the institutions created under his rule in the 1930's. It was never revised to deal with developments in the USSR after 1937. It included a brief outline of historical materialism written by Stalin himself, but avoided any coherent theoretical analysis of the USSR's actual political, economic, and social systems. The insistence that the Kratkii kurs was the essence of Marxism-Leninism created a vast gap between official ideology and Soviet reality.

At the 20th Congress in 1956 Khrushchev sought to close this gap by discarding the Kratkii kurs and by redefining party members' theoretical education. Khrushchev's redefinition was explicitly linked to his attempt to revitalize party officials' leadership of the CPSU and the CPSU's direction of society by giving greater emphasis to economic questions. This in itself represented a major break with the past. During Stalin's last years the powerful state structure led by the Council of Ministers had come to dominate the administration of the Soviet economy and party officials had been repeatedly warned against undue intervention in the state's economic activities. Khrushchev opposed this division of labor and sought to broaden party officials' economic responsibilities at the expense of the centralized state structure. In his report, he ordered party officials to give priority to their "economic work" (the supervision of the state's administration of industry and agriculture) and to subordinate their "party-organizational and political work" (the recruitment, assignment, education and monitoring of party members' activities throughout the system) to the demands of rapid economic development.

Khrushchev's massive emphasis on production demanded a total reorientation of theoretical education for both the party officials who directed the rank and file
and the party members who manned the complex state structure. The failure of the Kratkii kurs to discuss the Soviet economy (other than to define it as "socialist") made it useless for officials who were expected to give priority to "economic work," or to party members who were expected to provide new impetus for production in their own enterprises and farms. Khrushchev therefore not only repudiated the Kratkii kurs but also called for a massive expansion of party members' economic education and a broadening of mass propaganda to accelerate production and improve labor productivity. Khrushchev did not condemn theoretical education per se, but he did explicitly complain that "despite some progress in spreading knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, the condition of ideological work as a whole cannot satisfy us. Its chief shortcoming is that it is largely divorced from the practical work of communist construction." Khrushchev ordered the party's "ideological workers" to shift from "resounding speeches on the significance of Marxism-Leninism" to "detailed exposition of advanced experience." He insisted that Lenin had always sought to link ideological work to the solution of immediate economic problems and assailed those who had evidently criticized his neglect of theory as "dogmatists" and "pedants."

In fact, Khrushchev's approach to Marxism-Leninism reflected his preoccupation with immediate economic problems. He insisted that Marxist-Leninist theory was based on the party's actual practice and that "creative Marxism-Leninism" was developed by repudiating outmoded propositions and providing new formulations based on "life" and "reality." Khrushchev and his supporters continually characterized his own economic and administrative reforms as of immense "theoretical" significance.

The Soviet leadership's response to Khrushchev's report at the 20th Congress revealed that only a few leading officials regarded questions of theoretical education and Marxism-Leninism as within their purview. A number of Presidium
members and CC Secretaries remained silent, and the regional and local party officials tended to ignore these issues. However, those party officials who did discuss the issue disagreed; both Presidium and Secretariat were divided.

A. Mikoyan, the veteran member of the Presidium who emerged as one of Khrushchev's most consistent and articulate allies, followed the first secretary's lead in explicitly denouncing the *Kratkii kurs* and calling for the publication of new texts on both party history and the history of the USSR. In contrast, G. M. Malenkov, a Presidium member and Khrushchev's major political opponent since the 1940's, indirectly criticized Khrushchev's views on theory. Malenkov did not refer to theoretical education per se, but he contended that Marxist-Leninist theory (i.e., not practice) was the only basis for the party's activity. He sharply criticized Khrushchev's criticism of "dogmatists" and refused to endorse his attack on the *Kratkii kurs*. V. M. Molotov, the veteran Stalinist who had already clashed sharply with Khrushchev on domestic and foreign policy, focused almost exclusively on foreign policy and did not endorse Khrushchev's position on theory. In contrast, N. Bulganin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, endorsed Khrushchev's views on Marxism-Leninism. L. Kaganovich adopted a position between Khrushchev and his opponents, while A. Kirichenko endorsed Khrushchev's demand to "close the gap between propaganda and life."

The CC Secretaries were equally divided. Some CC Secretaries did not address the Congress (A. B. Aristov, a CC Secretary since 1955 and P. Pospelov, a CC Secretary since 1953), while others focused almost exclusively on economic questions in their remarks (N. I. Belyaev, a CC Secretary since 1955 and L. Brezhnev, named to the Secretariat at the 20th Congress). But Ye. Furtseva, D. Shepilov, and M. A. Suslov spoke out and clearly disagreed. Furtseva endorsed Khrushchev's conclusion that all aspects of ideological work should help to solve immediate practical economic problems, urged party members to study concrete
economic questions, and insisted that party propagandists be retrained so that they could provide economic information for others.13 D. Shepilov, a former head of agitprop was particularly outspoken in his support for Khrushchev's position.

We cannot limit ourselves simply to expounding Marxist-Leninist theory, despite the great importance of expounding it. We Communists are not passive custodians of the Marxist-Leninist heritage, we are not keepers of ideological archives. Ideological work which is not linked with the essential tasks of economic and cultural construction becomes mere Talmudic, dogmatic, repetition of known truths and principles.14

On the other hand, M. A. Suslov, reportedly responsible for supervision of all "ideological work," clearly had reservations about Khrushchev's position. Suslov insisted that Marxist-Leninist theory was not "created" on the basis of party practice but "developed and enriched" by remaining faithful to its immutable principles. Nor did Suslov endorse Khrushchev's views on theoretical education. While Suslov did recognize the need to "close the gap between life and propaganda," he did not endorse the attack on the Kratkii kurs, and he pointedly warned against any curtailment of party members' study of party history and Marxist-Leninist philosophy.15

The local party officials' discussion of Khrushchev's report seemed to indicate that they were not deeply involved in the conflict over Marxist-Leninist theory and party members' theoretical education. The first secretaries of the Communist parties in the union republics focused almost entirely on the economic development of their respective republics and gave little attention to "ideological work." While most of these officials briefly endorsed Khrushchev's demand to "close the gap between life and propaganda,"16 V. Sniechku, the first Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, who may have worked with Suslov in the Baltic during the 1940's, seemed to side with Suslov.17 None of the oblast' committee (obkom) or city committee (gorkom) officials to comment on Khrushchev's report referred to Marxism-Leninism or to theoretical education.
After the public discussion of the report on behalf of the CC and Bulganin's report on the proposed five-year plan, Khrushchev made his dramatic assault on Stalin to a closed session of the Congress. Although Khrushchev did not attack Stalin's ideological legacy per se (except for Stalin's assertion that resistance to the party increased with the movement toward socialism, the theoretical justification of the purges) his dramatic exposure of Stalin's crimes may have won him support for his views on theory and party members' education. Whatever the case, the Congress' decree on the CC report clearly endorsed Khrushchev's position. It declared that party organs "must sharply turn their attention to questions of concrete guidance of economic work and must intensify their own study of the technology and economy of industrial enterprises, collective farms, MTS and state farms in order to direct their work with a thorough knowledge of the subject." The Congress decree also concluded that "the elimination of the detachment of propaganda from the work of building communism is one of the most important tasks. The task of propaganda is not only to explain Marxism-Leninism but also to help in its practical implementation."

In the immediate aftermath of the 20th Congress, Khrushchev's definitions seemed to be the basis for policy. His discussion of party members' education evidently brought their study of party history to a complete standstill and led to a massive extension of programs of economic and technical education. Khrushchev also sought to extend his control over the Secretariat's agitprop department, which had been headed since 1955 by F. Konstantinov, a veteran Stalinist agitprop official and professional philosopher. Sometime after the 20th Congress, the agitprop department was divided into two separate departments, one for the union republics, headed by Konstantinov, and one for the RSFSR, headed by V. Moskovskii, who later publicly upheld Khrushchev's definitions. The agitprop department for the RSFSR probably fell under the supervision of P. Pospelov, a CC Secretary since
1953 and a member of the new bureau for the RSFSR created by Khrushchev after
the 20th Congress. Pospelov was a veteran agitprop official who warmly
endorsed Khrushchev's formulations and indirectly attacked M. A. Suslov.

But Khrushchev's initial successes proved to be short-lived. From the
summer of 1956 until Khrushchev overcame the challenge of the "anti-party group"
in mid-1957, the first secretary seemed unable to impose his own definitions of
theoretical education on his opponents. Public sources reveal that the definition of
party members' theoretical education became intertwined with leadership conflict
over the proper assessment of Stalin. Khrushchev's orthodox opponents were not
only unwilling to endorse Khrushchev's sharp attack on Stalin and his ideological
legacy but were also sufficiently powerful to have their views incorporated into CC
decrees dealing with Stalin and with "ideological work." This was particularly
evident in June 1956, when Khrushchev's opponents on the Presidium reportedly
played a major role in drafting the CC decree on the "cult of personality and its
consequences," the official leadership response to Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin
at the 20th Congress.

The CC decree not only muted Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin but also
included a vigorous defense of party members' theoretical education as essential
for the maintenance of party leadership. Furthermore, a detailed decree on
"ideological work" published in August 1956 incorporated orthodox as well as
Khrushchev's practicalist formulations. It endorsed theoretical education far more
vigorously than Khrushchev had done at the 20th Congress, emphasized the need
for party members to study party history and Marxist-Leninist philosophy as well as
economic and technological problems, and created a new hierarchical system of
party education designed to deal with the vast differences in party members'
political knowledge. The CC decree established political schools for those with an
elementary knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, more advanced study circles for the
discussion of current policy, seminars on party history, philosophy and a series of
discussions, seminars and consultations for those engaged in "independent study" of
various topics. The decree also established a parallel system of economic
education which included seminars on political economy and concrete economics,
special training programs for party and state officials, conferences dealing with
the "generalization of advanced experience" and new economics courses in the
evening universities of Marxism-Leninism. 26

Conflict between Khrushchev and his critics seemed to intensify after the
publication of the August 1956 CC decree. On the one hand, V. Moskovskii, the
pro-Khrushchev director of the agitprop department for the RSFSR, blamed the
"gap between propaganda and life" and party members' inadequate economic
education on Stalin's "personality cult," 27 and Pravda assailed the Kratkii kurs for
neglecting Lenin and Leninism. 28 On the other hand, Kommunist not only warned
the party against repudiating Stalin's ideological legacy, but even praised Stalin's
criticism of the "right deviation" in the party, 29 an editorial position which was
probably an indirect assault on Khrushchev.

Furthermore, Khrushchev and his supporters seemed to lose control over the
discussion of party members' theoretical education in the period from November
1956, when the USSR intervened against the Imre Nagy regime in Hungary, until
mid-1957, when Khrushchev triumphed over the "anti-party group." During this
period, when Khrushchev was faced with concerted opposition to his program of
domestic reform and to his foreign policy, his opponents were given considerable
prominence and CC publications tended to ignore his formulations and definitions.

Immediately after the USSR's intervention in Hungary in November 1956,
which was obviously a serious blow to Khrushchev's program of de-Stalinization,
M.A. Suslov was selected to give the traditional report for the leadership on the
anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. Suslov did not rehabilitate Stalin in his
address, but he did not support Khrushchev's assault on Stalin or his conception of
the relationship of theory to practice. Suslov pointedly declared that the
"immortal ideas of Marxism-Leninism" were the sole basis for the CPSU's foreign
and domestic policies.30

Furthermore, Khrushchev's public repudiation of his own anti-Stalinism in
early 1957 did not restore his control over CC publications. Pravda did publish
some essays by local party officials seconding Khrushchev's enthusiasm for
economic education,31 but it also published materials which combined orthodox and
practicalist formulations.32 In fact, in the winter and spring of 1957 Khrushchev's
opponents seemed to dominate the CC journal's discussion of "ideological work." In
mid-February, Partiinaia Zhizn warned against any "underestimation" of Stalin's
positive role and against excessive criticism of "dogmatism."33 In mid-March, the
journal charged agitprop workers with "retreating" from theory because of their
overly zealous efforts to "close the gap between propaganda and life."34 In early
May, when the anti-party group seemed to broaden its influence,35 Pravda assailed
the "narrow practicalism" of party members' theoretical education.36 Partiinaia
Zhizn gave renewed attention to the study of party history,37 while local party
secretaries complained that seminars on economic subjects had degenerated into
"production meetings."38 Finally, in mid-June, when Khrushchev was locked in
combat with the "anti-party group," F. Konstantinov, the director of the agitprop
department for union republics, warmly defended Stalin's "contributions" to
Marxist-Leninist theory.39

Khrushchev's defeat of the anti-party group allowed him to pack the
Presidium and the Secretariat with his allies. These personnel changes seemed to
have an impact on the discussion of theoretical study. In particular, after the
ouster of the anti-party group, CC journals stopped praising Stalin's ideological
legacy and ended their criticism of Khrushchev's "narrow practicalism." But public
sources seemed to indicate that Khrushchev and his supporters were either unwilling or unable to impose their own definition upon their critics. Indeed, CC publications seemed to indicate that Khrushchev may have reached a temporary compromise with his critics in the second half of 1957. CC journals balanced practicalist and orthodox formulations together, to give equal emphasis to the practicalist decree of the 20th Congress and the more orthodox views of the August 1956 CC decree; to balance the orthodox demand for study of party history and Marxist-Leninist philosophy with the practicalist demand for economic education.40

But in early 1958, Khrushchev and his allies, evidently bolstered by the leadership changes of late 1957, launched a concerted campaign to show that Khrushchev was a "creative Marxist-Leninist" and that M. A. Suslov was a dogmatic opponent of change. This became particularly apparent during the public discussion of Khrushchev's proposal to sell the agricultural machinery held by the Machine Tractor Stations to the collective farms in the spring of 1958. Khrushchev's supporters characterized this reform as the "embodiment of creative Marxism-Leninism" based on the party's practice,41 while Suslov implied that the measure had no theoretical significance whatsoever.42 P. Pospelov assailed Suslov indirectly for his failure to understand that the reform was not merely a practical measure but a "concretization of Marxist-Leninist teachings on the transition to communism."43 In April 1958, Pospelov indirectly attacked Suslov and his supporters for their "abstract" conception of the transition to communism.44

At the same time, Khrushchev seemed to make an assault on orthodox agitprop officials. In May 1958, F. Konstantinov, the director of the agitprop department for union republics, was replaced by L. F. Ilychev, an agitprop official who had served in the ministry of foreign affairs from 1953 until 1958.45 Shortly after Ilychev's appointment, the public criticism of M. A. Suslov became more
explicit. A CC decree issued in June 1958 indirectly criticized Suslov for playing a role in Stalin's bizarre assault on the USSR's leading composers in the late 1940's.46

Ilychev's appointment in May did not produce any shift in the public debate over theoretical education.47 But at the end of 1958, first secretary Khrushchev made a radical departure from his earlier position on theoretical study. His report on the proposed control figures for the seven year plan (which provided the basis of his report to the Extraordinary 21st Congress of the CPSU in February 1959) implied that the theoretical education of party members was not essential for the transition to communism. Khrushchev defined "mass work" as the focus of the party's "ideological educational work", and he did not even refer to party members' theoretical education. Moreover, Khrushchev seemed to imply that a "Marxist-Leninist" world view was no more complex than loyal support for the regime which was ostensibly "building communism" and positive attitudes towards both socialist property and work.48 Khrushchev's indifference toward theoretical education had important implications for defining the basis of party rule. Khrushchev's inference that party members needed no particular political knowledge to rule blurred the critical distinction between party and non-party personnel. This not only reflected his own growing populism and emphasis on mass mobilization in support of economic objectives, but also threatened the orthodox view that the party's rule was based on its collective knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and its capacity to put that theory into practice.

Khrushchev repeated this position in his report to the 21st Congress of the CPSU in February 1959.49 The discussion of his report seemed to reveal that he enjoyed considerable support within the Presidium and Secretariat, which overlapped considerably in membership because of the personnel changes of 1957. (Aristov, Brezhnev, Furtseva, Kirichenko, Kuusinen, Mukhitdinov, Khrushchev, Suslov and Pospelov all held positions in both leading party bodies.)
Although Aristov, Brezhnev, and Mukhitdinov did not comment on questions of Marxism-Leninism or theoretical education, Furtseva, Pospelov, Kirichenko and Kuusinen endorsed Khrushchev's views in a variety of ways. Furtseva defined "mass work" to improve labor productivity as synonymous with "ideological work" and denounced ideological specialists with "dogmatic" and "abstract" positions.50 P. Pospelov lauded Khrushchev for "closing the gap" between theory and practice which had been created by Stalin.51 Kirichenko's lavish praise for Khrushchev's views on Marxism-Leninism included a veiled attack on Suslov as a quotation monger without any real comprehension of the Soviet economy and society.52 Kuusinen coupled his praise for Khrushchev's "creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory" with sharp criticism of "dogmatism" in the social sciences (which were under Suslov's supervision).53

Suslov seemed to mute his previous criticism of Khrushchev's practicalism in the face of this assault. Suslov was hardly servile to Khrushchev; he refused to endorse the first secretary's views on Marxism-Leninism and indirectly challenged both the legitimacy of the Congress and Khrushchev's authority to speak for the entire leadership. But Suslov did not publicly defend theoretical study as he had at the 20th Congress nor did he challenge Khrushchev's argument that "mass work" was the center of "ideological-educational" activity.54 Nor did Suslov seem to enjoy any support from local party officials. A. J. Snieckhus, the first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist party, and I. G. Kebin, the first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, were the only officials to provide even the most indirect support for Suslov.55 The other local officials who commented on Khrushchev's report ignored ideological problems to focus on the economic development of their respective regions.56 Moreover, the Congress' decree on Khrushchev's report endorsed his views on mass work and totally ignored party members' theoretical education.57
Immediately after the Congress, Khrushchev's supporters seemed to launch a major campaign in support of his new definitions. L. F. Ilychev lashed out at "so-called theoreticians" who ignored production problems. In March 1959, a CC decree reiterated the conclusion that the efforts to improve labor productivity was the center of the party's "ideological-educational work." CC publications endorsed this definition without demur, agitprop officials toured the provinces to dramatize the decree's importance, and provided appropriate theoretical justification. At the same time, the agitprop departments sought to retrain propagandists in economics and technical subjects, and the CC's Academy of Social Sciences (the CC's center for training propagandists) and Znanie (the volunteer society for popular education) were ordered to give more attention to immediate production problems.

Khrushchev's remarks to a CC plenum on technological innovation in June 1959 gave added impetus to this campaign. Khrushchev once again criticized those who ostensibly "divorced ideological work from production" and repeated his plea for improved economic and technological education for party members. He also now implied that theoretical education was unnecessary because party members' participation in the process of communist construction heightened their political consciousness. In the aftermath of this plenum, Khrushchev's supporters tended to define ideological work as virtually synonymous with improved training in technology.

But Khrushchev's opponents were not easily silenced. In fact, they evidently remained sufficiently influential to have their views published in authoritative texts for party members. The new official party history published in July 1959 included many orthodox formulations. Edited by P. N. Ponomarev, a veteran agitprop and Comintern official who headed the Secretariat's department for relations with Communist parties in capitalist states, the new party history
balanced its criticism of Stalin with orthodox justifications of his foreign and domestic policies and indirect endorsement of his definitions of socialism, communism and the role of the Soviet state. The new text also defended theoretical education in terms reminiscent of the discredited *Kratkii kurs* and Stalin's remarks to the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) in 1939.67

Furthermore, the new primer, *Fundamentals of Marxism–Leninism*, edited by O. V. Kuusinen and published in October 1959, was an odd mixture of orthodox and Khrushchevian formulations. On the one hand, it incorporated Khrushchev's views that the "practical work" of building communism was the most effective means to cultivate "devotion to communist ideas," that the cultivation of proper work habits was the "pivot" of the party's ideological work, and that traditional Marxist–Leninist theory did not provide precise guidance for action.68 On the other hand, the primer provided a new textual basis for party members' theoretical study—it included sections on dialectical and historical materialism, a history of the international Communist movement, a Leninist analysis of international affairs, analyses of the political economy of capitalism, and brief discussions of socialism, communism, and the role of the CPSU.

The publication of these two new texts provided a more secure basis for party members' theoretical study, but it did not resolve leadership dispute over the "theoretical level" of party members education. In fact, in the fall of 1959, when Khrushchev clashed with his colleagues over the USSR's foreign policies toward the USA and PRC,69 leadership conflict flared anew. In the last months of 1959, the public discussion of theoretical education became particularly confused and contradictory; *Kommunist* shifted back and forth between orthodox and practicalist positions.70 L. F. Ilychev seemed to shift his position while Khrushchev was abroad,71 while agitprop conferences reaffirmed his definitions when he returned.72
This confusion was at least temporarily resolved in January 1960 when the CC issued a detailed decree on all aspects of "ideological work." This decree seemed to reflect yet another compromise between Khrushchev and his opponents, a compromise which may have been related to the weakening of Khrushchev's authority produced by the ouster of N. L. Belyaev and A. L Kirichenko from the Secretariat in early 1960. Whatever the link between these demotions and the definition of ideological work, the January 1960 CC decree seemed to incorporate contradictory orientations.

On the one hand, the decree incorporated Khrushchev's views that Marxism-Leninism was virtually identical to his own programs and policies, and seemed to carry Khrushchev's hostility toward traditional theoretical education to its logical conclusion. The decree not only repeated its usual complaint that ideological work was insufficiently related to immediate production problems, but also charged that it was far too narrow in its appeal. It therefore urged the popularization of all political and economic education and opened up the party's system of education to large numbers of non-party members. On the other hand, the decree retained the elaborate system of party education created by the August 1956 decree with its emphasis on party members' study of party history and Marxist-Leninist philosophy as well as economic questions and technical problems.

The 1960 decree seemed to end public dispute over theoretical study. CC publications gave the decree unanimous support and during the early 1960's the party educational program was broadened out to include millions of non-party personnel. But the transformation of the party educational system did not end conflict over party members' theoretical study. In fact, the "U-2" incident of May 1960 prompted a revival of leadership dispute. The American reconnaissance flights seriously challenged Khrushchev's sanguine conception of the American political leadership and provided his opponents with an opportunity to undermine
his political authority. In the months between May and July 1960, Khrushchev's Secretariat was totally transformed. F. Kozlov, a serious critic of Khrushchev's views, was named a CC Secretary, while Aristov, Brezhnev, Ignatov, Furtseva, and Pospelov were all dropped from the Secretariat.77

The dramatic transformation of the Secretariat evidently permitted Suslov and his allies to publish their criticism of Khrushchev's practicalist definitions once again. In late June, Pravda suddenly denounced party members' ostensible failure to "master Marxism-Leninism," assailed the "primitivism" of "ideological work" and demanded an immediate improvement in its "theoretical level."

In July, both Suslov and Kozlov suddenly began to play a more dramatic role in the regime's cultural policy at the expense of both Khrushchev and Ilychev.79 Discord over theoretical education seemed to become particularly intense in the summer of 1960.80 Khrushchev and his supporters convoked agitprop conferences in July and September to rally support for their definitions,81 but orthodox formulations were widely published when Khrushchev attended the UN in the fall of 1960.82

In 1961, Khrushchev and his allies launched a concerted campaign to make "mass work" the locus of the party's "ideological work." Khrushchev and Ilychev stressed this priority in addresses to party leaders in January 1961,83 and in February two CC decrees ordered local party leaders to follow suit.84 Party officials once again defined the "generalization of advanced experience" and the development of positive work habits as more important than theoretical education,85 and V. I. Stepakov, a veteran Moscow party official who had endorsed this view was made director of agitprop for the RSFSR.86 In March, P. Demichev, the first secretary of the Moscow gorkom, called for the subordination of all ideological work to the solution of production problems,87 and an agitprop conference ordered the local centers for political education to give far more attention to the "dissemination of advanced experience."88 In April, local party
officials declared their ideological work subordinate to their "leadership of the economy," and in May agitprop established a new program to train propagandists to cope with immediate production problems, and convoked yet another conference to emphasize these priorities.

But in the summer of 1961, this campaign came to a halt as Khrushchev became embroiled in conflict with his colleagues over the proper approach to the Berlin crisis. Once again, orthodox formulations on the centrality of theoretical education were published in Pravda and Kommunist. Moreover, while the draft of the new party program published in July reflected the populist orientation of the January 1960 CC decree on ideological work, the draft of the new party rules included orthodox formulations on party members' obligation to "master Marxism-Leninism." Public discussion of the two party documents dominated all "ideological work," and public conflict over ideological work seemed to subside until the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in October 1961.

The question of party members' theoretical education was not a major issue at the Congress. Khrushchev's public assault on Stalin, his revival of the struggle against the "anti-party group," the overt breach between the CPSU and the CPC overshadowed the Congress' discussion of the new party program. Furthermore, Khrushchev's brief reference to ideological work seemed to indicate that he regarded party members' theoretical education as completely subordinate to the solution of immediate economic problems. As he told the Congress:

After overcoming the negative consequences of the cult of the individual, the Party has reoriented ideological work to the requirements of life and has pursued a course of strengthening the unity of theory and practice. It has based its policy on a scientific Marxist-Leninist foundation and has subordinated all of its theoretical and ideological-educational activity to the solution of specific tasks of communist construction.

Khrushchev did seem to enjoy considerable support for his views on theory. Brezhnev, Kuusinen, and Mikoyan explicitly endorsed Khrushchev's claims to be a
"creative Marxist-Leninist" although they did not refer to party members' theoretical education. Those leaders who commented on theoretical study were deeply divided. Suslov defended the orthodox view that the party's success was based on its "loyalty to the great teachings of Marxism-Leninism," implied that Khrushchev's new detailed program was a Bukharinite heresy, defended party members' theoretical education, and consistently characterized party members' ideinost' as far more important than the cultivation of work habits. F. Kozlov was even more explicit in his support for theoretical study in his own report on proposed changes in the party's rules. Kozlov characterized Marxism-Leninism as the party's "guiding star" and insisted that party members were obliged to "master Marxism-Leninism" and make it the basis of their every day activities.

The contrast between Suslov and Kozlov, on the one hand, and L. F. Ilychev, who was named a CC Secretary at the Congress, was particularly striking. Ilychev's discussion of "ideological work" did not even refer to party members' theoretical education, and he insisted that the new party program clearly demonstrated that the Khrushchev regime was not practicalist in its orientation. Moreover, Khrushchev's public assault on Stalin allowed Ilychev and others to make indirect attacks on M. A. Suslov. Ilychev seemed to imply that Suslov was an apologist for Stalinism, was responsible for the "gap" between theory and practice, and for the virtual destruction of social sciences in the USSR. Other party officials who were named to the CC Secretariat seemed to follow Ilychev's lead in criticizing Suslov. L. V. Spiridinov, who lead the campaign to remove Stalin's remains from the mausoleum, gave particular attention to Stalin's destruction of Leningrad party leaders in 1949-1950, in which Suslov may have been implicated. A. N. Shelepin followed suit. V. N. Ponomarev explicitly condemned the Kratkii kurs and revealed that Molotov and Kaganovich had sought to prevent the publication of a new text on party history. Ponomarev's remarks
may have been directed at Suslov, who had never condemned the *Kratkii kurs*. Furthermore, D. N. Demichev reiterated his previous support for the primacy of mass political work, which Suslov had tended to ignore.

As at the earlier Congresses, the local party officials did not comment directly on questions of "ideological work." The first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist party was the only leader from the union republics to endorse the Suslov/Kozlov position. The obkom and gorkom leaders who addressed the Congress once again focused on production problems and their occasional references to education dealt with party officials economic training.

But Khrushchev was unable to impose his definitions on the party leadership. In his report to the Congress on behalf of the CC, he had insisted that the "successes in communist construction are at the same time successes in the development of theory." He had defined his own reform program as in itself as "major contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory," and he had skirted the question of party members' theoretical study. The Congress decree on his report reflected resistance to his formulations. It failed to include Khrushchev's definitions of theory and practice, and it explicitly endorsed the theoretical education of party members which Khrushchev and his closest supporters, such as Ilychev, had so carefully ignored. Indeed, after the 22nd Congress, leadership conflict over theoretical education once again became entwined with the assessment of Stalin and Stalinism. This phase of the leadership dispute, which continued until Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, is sufficiently complex to demand separate and more detailed treatment.

Khrushchev's successors explicitly repudiated his definition of Marxism-Leninism and his conception of party members' theoretical education in 1964-1965. Immediately after Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, the CC's major journals launched a concerted campaign against Khrushchev's "practicalism," and accused
him of misrepresenting the relationship between theory and practice. Sometime in late 1964 or early 1965, the separate agitprop departments for the RSFSR and the union republics were abolished and replaced by a single department for propaganda, and L. F. Ilychev was dropped from the Secretariat in March 1965. After his demotion, the new leadership sharply reduced the participation of non-party members in the program of theoretical education and reimposed a more traditional system designed to assure that party members "mastered Marxism-Leninism." Suslov and his supporters had gained their revenge.

Khrushchev's successors evidently concluded that his approach to theoretical education threatened the ideological underpinnings of CPSU rule. Khrushchev's emphasis on economic knowledge, his expansion of the party's educational system to include millions of non-party personnel, his growing indifference to party members' theoretical education blurred the vital distinction between the CPSU and the society it ruled and implied that party members did not need any special political knowledge to direct the "construction of communism." In sum, Khrushchev's orientation implicitly challenged the orthodox proposition that the party's legitimacy was based on its members' knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. Khrushchev's successors sought to bolster the ideological basis for party rule by curtailing mass political education, rebuilding a distinct theoretical educational program for party members, and by consistently stressing the difference between mass enlightenment and party members' "mastery of Marxism-Leninism."

The renewed stress on "mastery of Marxism-Leninism" after 1965 was also probably designed to restore the unity of official Marxism-Leninism which had been destroyed by the repudiation of the Kratkii kurs and by the subsequent leadership conflict over what was to take its place. In the process of searching for a replacement for the Kratkii kurs, Khrushchev and his opponents not only clashed over theoretical education but over the very nature of Marxism-Leninism. The
public debate of 1956–61 reveals that contrary to the presumption of many Western
students of Soviet politics, there was no leadership consensus on the nature of
Marxism–Leninism after the repudiation of the Kratkii kurs. Instead there were
two competing definitions which were allowed to coexist in uneasy fashion. On the
one hand, Khrushchev and his supporters insisted that his regime's policies were the
embodiment of "Marxism–Leninism in action" and that every policy innovation was
simultaneously a major contribution to Marxist–Leninist theory. On the other hand,
Suslov and his supporters charged that Khrushchev totally misunderstood the
relationship between theory and practice, and insisted that Marxism–Leninism was
a set of immutable principles which provided the basis for party practice.
Khrushchev's inability to prevent the publication of orthodox formulations in CC
journals and resolutions and in texts used for theoretical education coupled with
Suslov's inability to block the dissemination of Khrushchev's views made it very
difficult to define the boundaries of Marxism–Leninism. Party members who
sought to "master Marxism–Leninism" were faced with an ever broadening defini­
tion of official ideology. They were confronted with competing definitions of the
relationship of theory and practice, with an orthodox party history incorporating
Stalinist definitions, with a contradictory and confusing primer on the
"fundamentals" of Marxism–Leninism, with economic educational programs
described as "theoretical" by Khrushehev and as "narrow practicalism" by his
opponents, and with a new party program criticized as a Bukharinist heresy. The
de facto definition of Marxism–Leninism became so all-inclusive that it could not
be regarded as a coherent set of propositions serving as a "guide to action" for the
CPSU.

The leadership conflict over theoretical education and Marxism–Leninism has
some implications for the analysis of political groups within the CPSU. In general,
Western analysis of group formation within the CPSU has become increasingly
sophisticated. Western scholars no longer argue that all members of a particular functional group share a similar policy orientation but recognize the existence of clashing opinion groups within bureaucratic and functional groups. Unfortunately, the widespread presumption that party leaders agree on the nature of Marxism-Leninism has hampered the discussion of cleavages among the party's leading "ideological workers." Most analysis of groups in the CPSU have ignored the party's ideological workers. Some analysts, particularly those who regard the party apparatus as a monolithic functional group, have simply lumped the ideologues with the apparatus, or concluded that the party's "ideological workers" rallied behind their orthodox overlord, M. A. Suslov.

This study has shown that there were significant differences of opinion among the party's leading ideological specialists and that officials in the same functional group had different ideological orientations. For example, P. Pospelov and M. A. Suslov were members of the same political generation and had served as professional ideologues for many years, but they obviously disagreed sharply over Khrushchev's definitions. Shepilov, Ilychev, and Konstantinov had all worked in agitprop positions at approximately the same time but clearly disagreed among themselves. Kozlov and Kirichenko both emerged from the leadership of major regional party organizations to direct the Secretariat's cadres department and adopted totally different approaches to Khrushchev's definitions. Furtseva and Kuusinen came to the CC Secretariat from very different backgrounds to emerge as particularly vocal supporters of the first secretary's orientation. Obviously, the personal relationships between these officials (which remain unknown) may have played an important role in the formation of the rival groups, and many officials may have supported Khrushchev or Suslov because of varying degrees of political opportunism and careerism. But it seems equally plausible that party officials rallied to Khrushchev or Suslov because they simply agreed with their views on
Marxism-Leninism and the nature of theoretical education, i.e. that groups were formed primarily on the basis of shared belief.

Finally, the leadership conflict over theoretical education and Marxism-Leninism has implications for the ongoing debate among Western specialists over political conflict under N. S. Khrushchev. This study seems to lend support to the conception of leadership conflict presented by Carl Linden and other members of the "conflict school" who have stressed the never-ending conflict between a reformist first secretary and his orthodox opponents. Linden's critics have stressed the importance of the Soviet leaders policy consensus, but our comparison of leadership pronouncements on theoretical education seems to reveal that there was no meaningful consensus in this area. To be sure, the party's leading officials probably agreed that party members should be educated for leadership, but it is difficult to regard this as a meaningful consensus in the face of their conflict over the utility of the Kratkii kurs, over the relative importance of political as opposed to economic education, over the relative significance of theoretical study and mass work and over the very nature of Marxism-Leninism. Secondly, published sources seem to indicate that the leadership did polarize into two distinct groupings and that conflict between these groups was unrelenting. On the one hand, Khrushchev constantly sought to mobilize support for his practicalism by dramatic presentation of his own views, by attempting to reorganize the agitprop bureaucracy, by periodic agitprop conferences, and by assailing his opponents as "dogmatists." On the other hand, his orthodox opponents, while retreating in the face of Khrushchev's periodic campaigns, always took advantage of Khrushchev's difficulties, particularly in the realm of foreign affairs, to press their own formulations and to assail the first secretary as a "narrow practicalist."


16. These included V. P. Mzavandze, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party; B. F. Gafurov, first secretary of the Tadzhik party; S. A. Tovmassian, first secretary of the Armenian party; I. D. Mustafaev, first secretary of the Azerbaidzhan party; I. R. Razzakov, first secretary of the Kirghiz party; S. Babaev of the Turkmenistan party; E. T. Serdiuk of the Moldavian Communist Party.


23. The first reference to the agitprop department for the RSFSR which I have been able to find was in Pravda, April 21, 1956, p. 1. On October 23, 1956, Pravda referred to an agitprop department for the CC's Bureau for the RSFSR, p. 1. Pospelov was named to the Bureau for the RSFSR on March 14, 1956. Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR: The Struggle for Stalin's Succession: 1945-1960 (New York: 1967), p. 288.


26. This decree has never been published in full. See the summary "Ob itogakh uchebnogo goda partiinoogo prosvesheniia i zadachakh partiinykh organizatsii v novom uchebnom gody," Partiinaia Zhizn No. 16(1956), pp. 10-16. For an excellent discussion of the political education system established by this decree see Ellen Mickiewicz, Soviet Political Schools (New Haven: 1967).


31. See essays by A. Lebedev, a secretary of the Saratov obkom, Pravda, January 9, 1957, p. 2; A. Petrov, a secretary of the Leningrad gorkom, February 4, 1957, p. 2. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether or not these officials were secretaries for ideological questions.

32. See essay by L. Glebov, secretary of the Stalingrad obkom, Pravda, January 30, 1957, p. 3.


38. See essay by S. Salamakho, secretary of Minsk gorkom, Pravda May 15, 1957, p. 3.


42. Suslov had described the reform in very low key terms during his detailed discussion of Soviet agriculture in his address for elections to the Supreme Soviet, *Pravda*, March 12, 1957, p. 5.


45. The change in leadership was not publicly announced as far as can be determined. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the change occurred in early May when Konstantinov was named editor-in-chief of *Kommunist* (*Kommunist*, No. 17, May 17, 1958) after serving on its editorial board for many years.

46. On June 8, 1958, *Pravda* published a CC decree which rescinded substantial portions of the 1948 CC decree condemning the USSR's leading composers for a variety of ideological errors. Suslov had been a participant in the meeting at which the composers had been criticized.

47. Ilychev provided a detailed survey of agitprop work in *Pravda*, September 23, 1958, pp. 2-3. He gave roughly equal treatment to orthodox and practicalist formulations. On the one hand, he regarded economic education of party members as the best means to "close the gap between theory and practice." On the other hand, he stressed the importance of studying party history and reaffirmed the party statutes insistence on party members' theoretical study. *Pravda* adopted the same balanced position on September 30, 1958, p. 1.

48. *Pravda* identified Ilychev as director of the CC's agitprop department although he was subsequently identified as director of agitprop for union republics. This may indicate that the agitprop department was briefly reunified under his leadership, but this has been impossible to determine.


50. Ibid., pp. 90-91.

51. Ibid., pp. 126-127.
52. Kirichenko also seemed to imply that Suslov may have sympathized with the "anti-party group" by assailing its views on political economy. This may have been an oblique attack on Suslov's role in the assault on Vosnesenskii's work in political economy in the late 1940's. Ibid., p. 117.

53. Ibid., p. 160. Kirichenko and Kuusinen were joined by I. Kuzmin, the Chairman of Gosplan, who defended Khruschev's practicalism with a long quote from Lenin condemning "bookish knowledge as worthless." Ibid., p. 167.

54. Ibid., p. 100.

55. Ibid., pp. 164-65.

56. Ibid., pp. 73-196, passim.


61. For example, L. F. Ilychev toured the Baltic states while his deputy A. V. Romanov toured Central Asia, Pravda, April 12, 1959, p. 2.


63. An excellent survey of these efforts is V. Kuridov (Secretary of Sverdlovsk obkom) "Po delovomu rukovodit massovo-politicheskoi rabotu," Partiinaia Zhizn, No. 9(1959), p. 14-18, approved for publication April 28, 1959.

64. For the CC decrees see Vorprosy ideologicheskoi raboty (Moscow: 1961), pp. 135-139.


Ilychev now recognized that theoretical study was essential to prevent party workers from degenerating into "narrow practicalists." At the same time Partiinaia Zhizn criticized ideological workers for focusing on "concrete economic questions." "Povyshat ideinyii uroven partiinogo prosveshcheniia," Partiinaia Zhizn, No. 19(1959), pp. 3-7, approved for publication October 2, 1959.


74. KPSS v rezoliutsiakh, op. cit., Vol. 8, pp. 37-58.


76. Mickiewicz, op. cit., p. 10.


79. *Pravda*’s coverage of a meeting between the Soviet political leaders and representatives of the cultural intelligentsia gave far more coverage to the orthodox comments on socialist realism by Suslov and Kozlov than to Khrushchev’s own remarks. Moreover, L. F. Ilychev was not shown at the meeting. *Pravda*, July 18, 1960, pp. 1-2.


84. KPSS v rezoliutsiakh..., op. cit., p. 151-160.


89. See for example, F. Tabaev (first secretary of the Tatar obkom) "Propagandistskaia rabota-sostoavnaia chast' rukovodstva khoziaistvom," Partiinaia Zhizn, No. 8(1961), pp. 18-23, approved for publication April 18, 1961.

90. See the CC decree "O merakh po uluchsheniiu podbora i podgotovki propagandistskikh kadrov," Partiinaia Zhizn, No. 10(1961), pp. 29-33.


95. Ibid., p. 34.

96. Ibid., p. 74.

97. Ibid., pp. 130, 178, 138.


99. Ibid., p. 8.

100. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 181-190; esp. 189-190.


104. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 263-64.

106. See the report by V. S. Tolstikov, second secretary of the Leningrad obkom, 

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