EVOLUTION IN THE SOVIET SOCIOLOGY OF WORK: FROM IDEOLOGY TO PRAGMATISM

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Introduction

This paper will examine the history of developments in the Soviet sociology of work, focusing particularly on research on attitudes toward work. The principal object of analysis will be the developments in empirical sociological research in the USSR since 1953, with an effort to explain the origins of the concepts recently circulating in Soviet literature on work. It is also important to include a brief discussion of the views of worker attitudes dominant during the Stalin era, for these have had a strong impact on the subsequent work of Soviet sociologists. An examination of the Stakhanovite movement of the 1930s will be used to describe these attitudes.

I view this case study as useful for the understanding of the factors influencing the development of one area of the discipline of sociology. The purpose is to address the changes which this branch of Soviet sociology has undergone in recent years and to draw attention to the principal factors leading to the shift in the Soviet sociological understanding of attitudes toward work.

In addressing the evolution of the Soviet sociology of work, we can point to four types of variables which have been significant in shaping its direction. First, there are the changes in the "real" attitudes toward work among the Soviet people. Second, there are the changes in the Soviet economy and in the Soviet politics of the economy. Third, there have been changes in the policy of the Soviet leadership toward sociology in general and toward the sociology of work in
particular--changes which reflect the political developments in Soviet society. Finally, we can also point to the accumulation of information and the progress made in the methodology of the discipline. These factors in themselves prompt sociologists to revise their old concepts and develop new ones. Let us briefly examine each of these categories.

There can be no doubt that Soviet society has undergone radical transformations in the last six decades and that popular attitudes toward work have also changed. It is sufficient to mention the drastic changes in the structure of the Soviet economy, the marked increase in the level of education in the labor force, the significant rise in living standards and the growth of the mass media to suggest that, against such a background, attitudes toward work could hardly be expected to remain stable.

At the same time, throughout Soviet history the leadership has often shifted its priorities in economic policy and has stressed different approaches to stimulating worker discipline and productivity. While advancing one or another method of improving economic efficiency, the Soviet leadership has had an important impact on social scientists and economists, compelling them--directly or indirectly--to provide theoretical substantiation for a new policy direction.

The impact of official economic policy on sociological research on work attitudes, however, has been conditioned by the status of the discipline at varying moments. During periods in which the substantive autonomy of sociologists has been
negligible, they have been capable of only illustrating the wisdom of official decisions with theoretical schemes and limited data. However, when the discipline has enjoyed some measure of independence and the leadership has sought expert advice on economic matters, sociologists have had the opportunity to develop useful concepts and approaches, many of which had been formerly treated as subversive.

Finally, as with any discipline, Soviet sociology has changed over time as scholars have acquired experience, learned from past errors, become familiar with methodological developments in other countries, and generally improved the quality of their research. The fact that sociology, and especially the sociology of work, did experience a fair measure of autonomy contributed to these developments. It can be argued that the greater the autonomy of a discipline from political control, the greater will be the role of "internal" factors in shaping its development.

In general, the three "external" factors have outweighed the significance of the "internal" factor, although the role of the latter has increased significantly in the last two decades. The sociology of work is one of the few branches of Soviet sociology which has enjoyed a relatively large degree of autonomy from direct political control. Because of this, the Soviet sociology of work has undergone significant changes since the late 1950s, more so than most branches of the discipline. Soviet sociologists have had somewhat greater latitude to pursue the study of attitudes toward work in the USSR, and many (but not
all) of them have gradually moved away from the official ideological and theoretical strictures which impede the improvement of much of Soviet sociology.

This greater degree of autonomy from direct control is traceable to the ubiquitous concerns of the leadership with the state of the Soviet economy, and their need for an objective understanding of the problems facing the economy. At the same time, however, the leadership has never completely freed sociology from the performance of an ideological function.

Thus, the sociology of work has occupied a relatively favored position in the Soviet social sciences. Beginning in the late 1950s, research on work was the first field of empirical sociology permitted by the authorities in the post-Stalin period. Moreover, this branch of the discipline did not suffer from the political reaction of the 1970s to the same degree as other areas of sociology, such as the study of mass communication or political sociology.

Soviet sociologists are torn between two contradictory needs of the leadership. On the one hand, the leadership needs an accurate and objective understanding of reality in order to make effective decisions on various issues. On the other hand, the leadership wishes to suggest to the population that Soviet society functions in accord with the official interpretation of social reality, and sociologists may be called upon to provide "evidence" of this.

In analyzing the development of the Soviet sociology of work, it is possible to identify a number of different
orientations, each of which has been dominated by a specific theoretical and ideological thrust. These orientations will be labeled the pure ideological, the ideological-materialist, the materialist, the personalistic and the hedonistic. Naturally, the boundaries of these orientations are fuzzy and all five, while taking their turn at dominance, have coexisted throughout Soviet history. The pure ideological orientation, which assumed that ideological commitment was sufficient to produce diligent work, is essentially rooted in the past and will not be discussed here.

Stalin's Ideological and Political Legacy in Soviet Research on Attitudes Toward Work

Soviet sociological research on labor attitudes, as with all of Soviet sociology, began after 1953 in a society still under the spell of Stalinist ideology. From the beginning, Soviet sociologists had to take a position in relation to this ideology. One group, which can be referred to as "professional" sociologists, saw their mission in the debunking of this ideology and in the objective explanation of social behavior and mentality, as far as existing scientific methods allowed. The other group, which can be called "ideological" sociologists, sought to utilize the prestige of empirical sociology for the defense of the official ideology, assuming that the leadership preferred social scientists who would accommodate their research to propaganda functions.

The ideology of the Stalin era had a great impact on both groups of sociologists, although in different ways: the ideology was the central target of criticism for the first group and the
basic point of reference for the second. While professional sociologists devoted their energies to demonstrating the inaccuracies and distortions of Stalinist ideology, ideological sociologists sought to incorporate the ideology into the developing field of empirical social research. In order to understand the substance of this ideology and its impact on research on work, it is necessary to examine how labor attitudes were treated by the ideology as it developed in the 1930s.

The official ideology of the Stalin era, which I term the "ideological-materialist" orientation, argued that in socialist society, "when labor had not yet become the first vital need of the individual" (a development which would wait until the emergence of communism), Soviet citizens were motivated to work by three factors: devotion to communism and the Motherland; fear of punishment for violations of labor discipline; and material incentives. The official ideology proclaimed that "work is a matter of honor, prowess, and heroism" (Bol'shaja Sovetskaja Entsiklopedija 1947, Vol. 40, p. 787; see also Vol. 55, p. 76). The idealized heroes of Soviet literature in the 1930s were those motivated to hard and selfless work only by their devotion to the construction of a new society. Such novels as Shaginian's Hydro-Electric Power Station, Kataev's Time Forward, and Il'in's Great Assembly Line, illustrated this with characters totally committed to their work and to the Motherland.

Of course, official statements did not openly praise repression or the fear it engendered as a central impetus for work in socialist society. Yet these statements did point to the
harsh labor laws, especially those introduced in the late 1930s, which exposed workers to severe punishment for such small infractions as tardiness or leaving the job without permission. The article, "Labor Discipline", in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (1947) clearly informed readers that "the statute of labor discipline," which had been introduced on January 18, 1941 and was only abolished after Stalin's death, "assumes that each violation of labor discipline entails administrative punishment or trial" (Vol. 55, p. 78).

Avoidance of punishment as a motivation for good work was encouraged not only by the labor laws, but also by the possibility of being publicly labelled as a "wrecker" or "saboteur", which was a special threat to the technical intelligentsia and managers. The mass media of the 1930s were replete with articles about "enemies of the people" who, as engineers, foremen, or even ordinary workers, tried to ruin the Soviet economy with their inappropriate actions in industry, agriculture, or transportation.1

At the same time, however, the official ideology also paid considerable attention to material incentives as a motivation for work, an impetus which was considered indispensable at the stage of socialism, but which would lose its significance when the stage of communism had been reached.

As the Soviet economy entered the period of large scale industrial development, efforts were made to make the official concept of worker motivation more pragmatic. While continuing to
praise work for the sake of society, Stalin paid increasing attention to the role of material incentives (see, for example, his famous 1931 speech on the six conditions of industrialization in Stalin, 1952, pp. 366-69). Indeed, Stalin was a leader in the development of material incentives when he considered a specific branch of the economy to be of critical importance. In 1946, for example, in one stroke he more than tripled the incomes of scholars, both natural scientists and humanists, for he regarded the improvement of their living standards to be essential to the development of nuclear weapons in the face of the U.S. monopoly. Stalin was also concerned about the living standards of the party apparatus and the KGB and he introduced numerous privileges for the bureaucracy, including secret wage increases.

The official ideology of the period not only held out the normative patterns which citizens were expected to follow in their work, but also functioned—in the production of a "second reality"—to create the appearance that these patterns had become nearly universal. As in other spheres of social life, the phenomenological function of ideology was as important as the normative. By emphasizing that the majority of people followed the official prescriptions concerning work, the ideology demonstrated the success of official policy and the wisdom of the leadership. The political elite undoubtedly felt that the creation of the "second reality", in which people worked diligently and selflessly, would prompt workers to become more devoted in order to keep up with the majority of the population.
The Stakhanovite movement is of special interest in this connection because it played an important role in the Stalinist ideology, and additionally because all sociologists studying labor attitudes in the late 1950s had to take a stance toward this movement. As would be expected, ideological sociologists accepted the official descriptions of the movement. But their professional colleagues tended to reject these descriptions as an attempt to impose a distorted image of reality on the population. (It is worth noting that with the more recent appearance of a neo-Stalinist ideology in the USSR today, the Stakhanovite movement has once again become an important issue in society.)

Until the death of Stalin in 1953, official Soviet ideology presented the Stakhanovite movement in the following way. It was seen to have emerged in a period witnessing tremendous improvements in Soviet life, great advances in technological progress, and the increasing qualification of workers. The movement had been initiated by some advanced workers who were moved by the desire to accelerate the construction of socialism, and who sought to raise productivity against the resistance of conservative managers and engineers, which groups included some "wreckers" and "saboteurs." The possibility of increasing their incomes was also recognized as a motivation for some workers. The leadership took the side of these innovators from the working class, and the party headed the new movement to revolutionize the Soviet economy. This description of the Stakhanovite movement was reproduced in all official documents during its early years (1935-37) and strongly influenced all writing on the subject.
until the mid-1950s. It is worth noting, however, that even by the late 1930s, the Soviet media began to change the initial picture of the movement to adjust it to the political and economic goals of the leadership.2

The Liberalization of Soviet Society and the Stakhanovite Movement

After the death of Stalin, Soviet society entered a period of relative liberalization, with mass terror replaced by selective repression against real, rather than imaginary, opponents of the Soviet system and with the gradual erosion of the official ideology in the minds of the people. One of the most significant consequences of this was the marked reduction of the distance between "objective" reality and its representation in official ideology and social science. The leadership began to search for more realistic perceptions of social life, a circumstance which laid the foundations for the re-emergence of empirical sociology. And because the leadership was particularly concerned with economic progress, it was the field of industrial sociology, one focus of which was attitudes toward work, which first began in the late 1950s.

Studies of labor attitudes in the late 1950s and early 1960s could not have been carried out had the official ideology not softened its position toward the work motivation of the average Soviet citizen. In this context, the evolution of official attitudes toward the Stakhanovite movement was of critical importance because the image of this movement had epitomized the ideological-materialist concept of worker motivation.
Nonetheless, given the importance of the appearance of continuity in ideology to the leadership, it was careful not to simply obliterate the movement from textbooks or even adhere to the old version of the movement because this would have precluded the more realistic appraisal of labor attitudes in the post-Stalin period. Thus, after 1953, official publications began to gradually change the image of the Stakhanovite movement from that presented under Stalin.


Even more important than this decline in the importance attributed to the movement is the evolution of its description. As is normally the case in Soviet publications, changes are revealed not so much in new formulations of official ideas, but in the omission of statements which had formerly played leading roles.

For example, the concept of the spontaneous character of the Stakhanovite movement, which was central to substantiating the ideological motivation of the shock workers in the 1947 edition, disappeared completely in the 1957 edition. (The first edition
contended that it was Stalin's speech in May 1935 which pushed Stakhanov to initiate his efforts. See Vol. 52, p. 786). In addition, the 1947 edition presented the movement in a very bombastic style: "The Stakhanov movement is of world importance for it opened up the possibility for the achievement of productivity necessary for the transition from socialism to communism" and "for surpassing the capitalist countries in productivity" (Vol. 52, pp. 792-93). Yet in the next edition, the importance of the movement had been radically downgraded, and by the third edition there was no mention at all of the successes of the Stakhanovites in surpassing Western standards of productivity.

The second and third editions also completely dropped all the aspects of the pre-war image of the Stakhanovites, in which it was presented as a movement against conservative managers and engineers, as well against wreckers and saboteurs. The third edition did not mention the movement's "thrust against old technical norms" and also dropped the statistics on the spread of the movement throughout the economy.3

However, the most significant difference between the article of 1947 and those appearing after Stalin's death is the discussion of the motivation of the Stakhanovites. In 1947, the Entsiklopediia article maintains that while "labor in capitalist society has a private, personal character...other incentives to labor are endemic to Soviet society" because "work in the USSR is a matter of honor, glory, valour, and heroism" (Vol. 52, p. 787). By the 1957 edition, however, there was no mention of the
selfless motives of the Stakhanovites. The third edition also ignored the entire subject of the motivation of the movement's participants.

It is noteworthy that the low point in the discussion of the Stakhanovite movement was reached in the period immediately following the 20th Party Congress and the denunciation of Stalin's excesses by Khrushchev. Since the movement had been closely identified with Stalin, most of the publications between 1957 and 1962 nearly ignored references to it. Slutskii's book, *The Organization of Socialist Emulation in the Industrial Enterprise* (1957), for example, made no reference at all to the Stakhanovites.

Later, however, with the stabilization of the Brezhnev regime, the Stakhanovite movement was gradually rediscovered. After the ousting of Khrushchev, the journalist, Semen Gershberg (who, as a Pravda reporter in the 1930s, had been an active participant in the creation of the Stakhanovite mythology), became substantially less reserved toward the movement than he had been in the early 1960s, as can be seen by comparing his works (see Gershberg 1961, 1971).4

The Stakhanovite Movement in Soviet Sociological and Historical Literature

The Soviet intellectual community has traditionally identified the Stakhanovite movement with Stalinism. However, even at the peak of liberalism in the 1960s, they have never been permitted to completely express their views on the movement. Andrzej Wajda was only able to comment on the Stakhanovites from
Poland in the early 1980s with his film, *The Man from Marble*, a devastating account of the real mechanics and consequences of the movement. The real views of Soviet intellectuals on the Stakhanovites appeared only in samizdat literature (see, for example, Solzhenitsyn, 1974) and indirectly in literature on rural life.5

Since the reemergence of the Soviet sociology of work in the late 1950s, the majority of researchers have tended to completely ignore the movement. It is virtually impossible to find references to the Stakhanovites in the many books and articles produced since that time on the topic of worker motivation (see, for example, Iadov, et al., 1970; Ivanova, 1983). The movement has also been largely ignored in the majority of publications on the working class in general, including those which have addressed the evolution of the working class in Soviet society (see the *Social Development of the Working Class of the USSR*, edited by Klopov et al., 1977; see also Smirnov, 1979).

Even more indicative of the "conspiracy of silence" surrounding the Stakhanovite movement are the many publications on "socialist emulation," despite the fact that official statements of the 1930s proclaimed that "the Stakhanovite movement is the supreme form of socialist emulation" (*Bol'shaja Sovetskaia Entsiklopedija* 1947, Vol. 52, p. 788). The movement is also generally disregarded, or given only brief attention, in the writings referring to past periods of Soviet history (Mamutov, 1982; Kapustin, 1983; Ivanov, 1984).6
It is also noteworthy that Irina Changli, known for her ideological loyalty, edited a number of books which ignored the Stakhanovite movement (see Changli, 1976, 1978, 1979a; 1979b). Only in her book, Trud, which appeared in 1973 when political reaction was at its peak after the Czechoslovak invasion, did she discuss and praise the Stakhanovites using some of the original formulations from the 1930s. She did, however, note some of the movement's shortcomings, such as its failure to embrace all workers (p. 747). We will return later to a discussion of Changli's studies of workers attitudes.

While Soviet sociologists tended to express their opinions on the Stakhanovite movement by ignoring it, historians were unable to follow the same course and were compelled to devote some attention to it. Some, however, sought to treat the movement in a new light and remove it from its ideological underpinnings of the 1930s. It is useful in this connection to compare two editions of A Short History of the USSR, prepared by a group of historians led by A. Samsonov (1964, 1978).

The first edition in 1964 generally followed the orientation established in the 1930s, asserting that in the period of the movement's origins, "communist attitudes toward work as the source of social wealth and the might of the Soviet state spread more and more through the country, labor ceased to be only a heavy obligation as is the case in capitalist society, and turned in the consciousness of millions of Soviet people into social work, which became internally necessary a human need" (1964, p. 258). It is also maintained that "the difficulties with the food
supply, as well as with the supply of other consumer goods, were gone," which created "the conditions for the emergence of the new stage in the development of socialist emulation" (p. 259). The authors also argued that the "Stakhanovite movement spread across the country with the velocity of a hurricane" (p. 259).

Fourteen years later, the second edition of this book treated the Stakhanovite movement quite differently. The authors dropped the issue of the motivation of the Stakhanovites and abandoned such terms as "communist attitudes toward labor" when discussing the participants. Rather than arguing that problems with the food supply were eliminated, it was simply stated that the food supply "improved". The discussion of the rapid spread of the movement (the "velocity of a hurricane" had been borrowed from Stalin's speech at a conference of Stakhanovites in 1935) was also toned down, and it was simply stated that the movement had grown "with rapid strides" (Samsonov, 1978, pp. 242-44).

It is also useful to examine Ludmila Rogachevskaia's *Socialist Emulation in the USSR: Historical Essays* (1977). While she devoted a special chapter to the Stakhanovite movement, the discussion was presented with limited ideological overtones. Rather than attributing idealistic motivations to the movement's participants, she stresses instead their concern for mastering the new technology and the role of material incentives. The issue of the resistance to the movement by the technical intelligentsia, a highly sensitive matter, was almost completely avoided (1977, pp. 128-75; see also Rogachevskaia, 1984).
The Materialist Orientation

After 1953 and the subsequent changes in the country's political atmosphere, the leadership--followed by the public--began to assess the Stalinist heritage in various aspects of society, particularly the economy. With the disappearance of mass repression and the gradual reduction in the salience of the official ideology, it became impossible to organize work on the basis of patriotic commitment and fear of sanction. While the leadership did not abandon ideology as a means of control and mobilization, it became clear that the overcoming of economic difficulties would require more pragmatic alternatives. Economists, and later sociologists, were permitted to discuss relatively freely the problems of work and productivity in industry and agriculture.

Liberal social scientists, as well as writers and journalists saw their principal goal as a movement away from the notion of political and ideological enthusiasm as the basic impetus for work, which had been the official thrust of the Stakhanovite movement. Among this group, the idea of socialist emulation, particularly as the Stakhanovites had presented it, was treated as a mere ideological ritual and was ignored as a topic of serious discussion. In contrast, they argued that only real, significant improvements in material rewards would motivate the population to work effectively.

This notion was stressed particularly in connection with collective farmers. Given the constant struggle for a decent living standard among these farmers, liberal scholars became
convinced that only a systematic introduction of material incentives would yield the necessary changes in the rural economy. Monetary rewards were especially stressed, for up to this point collective farmers had been largely paid in kind, mostly with grain (Venzher, 1966).

Liberal economists and sociologists also insisted on wage hikes and the development of various bonus systems as a means of improving productivity in industry. In addition, material rewards were to be linked, they argued, not only to the volume of output, but also to its quality. Wage increases linked to tenure on the job were also advocated as a method of reducing labor turnover.

Interestingly, while rejecting ideological commitment as a principal motivator, these scholars turned to Marx, stressing the element of historical materialism which posits the primacy of economic interests in social life. It was argued that this principle applied to socialist, as well as capitalist, societies and that Soviet people, like their Western counterparts, were oriented toward improving their economic interests. In this way, material incentives could be presented as consistent with at least the spirit of official Marxism.

Under Soviet conditions, the materialist approach to worker motivation was directed in some degree against the political elite and, even more, against Soviet managers and the party apparatus. These segments of Soviet society had long criticized workers on ideological grounds, as the chief barriers to enhanced productivity, thereby relieving themselves of responsibility.
The key issues around which these struggles were waged were those of labor turnover and migration, a realm in which the notions of lazy and irresponsible workers flourished. It was in the discussions on the causes of labor turnover--about one-third of the Soviet workforce changes employment annually--that liberal scholars sought to restore the public image of such workers.

The first sociological studies of labor turnover and migration followed the materialist conception of worker motivation and rejected the idea that workers were moved simply by ideological commitment (Kaplan, 1961, 1964; Bliakhman et al., 1965; Antosenkov, 1969). Substantial quantities of data were generated to demonstrate that those who left their places of employment actually had legitimate reasons for doing so and that the majority of them should not be derided as "social parasites". Illustrating the orientation of industrial sociologists of the period, Kalmyk and Sil'chenko argued that "the desire to change one's place of employment is determined by objective factors and not by the personality of the worker, as many managers still contend" (1970, p. 168).

Since industrial sociologists promised to uncover methods of reducing labor turnover, the authorities actively supported their research in this area. Studies were carried out in nearly every large and medium-sized city and in all branches of Soviet industry, construction and transport. No less than six hundred studies had been conducted in the USSR on labor turnover by the mid-1970s.
The data from these studies all pointed in the same direction: material, rather than personality, factors accounted for most worker turnover. When job-leavers were asked why they sought new employment, 10 to 15 percent cited low wages, 15 to 20 percent indicated poor housing conditions, and between 3 and 10 percent stressed a shortage of facilities for children. About one-third of job-leavers indicated various "family circumstances" (often domestic stresses stemming from occupational factors), while the rest explicitly cited job conditions which were deemed barriers to improving their living standard (see Kalmyk, 1970; Kuprianova and Pushkarev, 1982). Taking all these factors into consideration, Kalmyk and Sil'chenko concluded that some 40 percent of workers who left their jobs were dissatisfied with their incomes, among other reasons (1970, p. 156).

Equally illuminating to public opinion and the intellectual community were the studies on migration, especially rural-to-urban movements. As with job-leavers, these migrants had characteristically been treated as violators of socialist principles. With their studies on migration, sociologists such as Arutiunian (1968, 1971), Zaslavskaia (1968, 1970), and Perevedentsev (1975) rehabilitated the public image of these individuals who had been so severely criticized under Stalin.

Much of this research focused on migrants from distant regions of the country, such as Siberia, the Far East and the North. Perevedentsev (1975) concluded that people simply did not want to stay in these regions where the climate is particularly
harsh unless they were compensated with better wages, improved supplies of food and other material advantages.

Thus for the first time since the 1920s, economic behavior was analyzed in more individual terms. It was revealed, for example, that women quit their jobs for health reasons far more frequently than men. Between age 30-49, women left their jobs for health reasons between three and four times as often as men, even though overall women were half as likely as men to quit their jobs at all (Kalmyk and Sil'chenko, 1970, p. 163; see also Korovin, 1982). It was also shown that young people were much more likely to change jobs than older workers, a pattern hardly unique to the USSR. Facing lower wages in their early years, occupying poorer housing and more likely to be unmarried, younger workers had much higher rates of turnover than their elders (Shlapentokh, 1969).

This research also found education to play an important role in turnover and migration. Although the better-educated had superior living conditions, they also had higher aspirations and greater flexibility in marketing their skills. They were therefore more likely to change both jobs and residence than workers with less education (Antosenkov, 1969).

Thus during the 1960s and early 1970s, researchers studying turnover and migration broadened their scope of investigation and increasingly discarded the official images of Soviet workers—images putatively supported by the sociology of socialist emulation. In contrast to the 1950s, investigators began to challenge the official wisdom that labor turnover was
necessarily a deleterious force in the economy. In fact, it was recognized that positive features of turnover could be identified, such as the more efficient matching of workers to jobs, a notion which challenged the dominant view that a planned economy was a regulatory mechanism superior to the market economy.

In the early 1960s, sociologists in Novosibirsk introduced the concepts of "normal" and "superfluous" labor turnover, indicating that certain degrees of job-changing were in fact far from pathological (Shiskina, 1963). By the end of the decade, other researchers suggested the ideas of "actual" and "potential" turnover, based on the discovery that as many as one-third of presumably stable workers were actually ready to quit should a better opportunity arise. Flowing directly from these developments was the concept of the propensity of a worker to quit the job. This concept involved a distinct psychological component and stood in contrast to the more behavioralistic traditions of Soviet sociology. Moreover the propensity to leave the job was found to be clearly linked to income levels: workers earning less than 60 rubles a month were found to be twice as likely to quit their jobs as those making over 120 rubles (Antosenkov 1969; Antosenkov and Kalmyk, 1970). By the later 1970s, Aseiev and Kornienko (1977) went so far as to proclaim labor turnover to be a nearly ideal mechanism of adapting workers to economic and technological change.
Revision of the Materialist Orientation

The first fifteen years of economic development after Stalin, however, did not bear out the assumptions of the materialist concept as it had been developed. After 1953 the standard of living in the Soviet Union rose significantly, but the opportunities for improved conditions did not appear to produce the anticipated results in labor productivity.

In this respect, the situation in Soviet agriculture was particularly noteworthy. In the two decades after 1954, the income of peasants on state and collective farms more than quadrupled and living standards in the countryside improved in a variety of ways. Yet increases in productivity fell far short of the growth in material conditions: agricultural output increased in this period by a factor of 2.1 (even though the 1954 level had been quite low, only 9 percent over the 1940 level). By the mid-1970s, agricultural output virtually ceased growing even as the living standards of farm workers, supported by the flow of state funds, continued to rise.

Moreover, despite increases in rural living standards, young people continued to flee to the cities at the first opportunity. This continuing process puzzled scholars who, in the 1950s, had argued that improved living standards in the countryside would stem this tide (Shlapentokh, 1982). Lagging output on the farms, coupled with the unceasing rural-to-urban migration, led scholars to question their earlier ideas about the relationship of material rewards to work satisfaction and productivity.
A variety of factors were proposed which led to a more sophisticated version of the materialist approach to work. Initially it was discovered that researchers had failed to consider the marginal utility of income in connection with agricultural living. Despite improvements in living standards, the shortage of consumer goods in the countryside meant that higher incomes could not be taken as direct indicators of economic well-being.

More importantly, analysts gradually began to recognize the importance of people's aspirations in shaping their satisfaction with their lives and their work. High aspirations meant that individuals would evaluate their jobs and lives not so much on the basis of actual conditions, but on the images inspired by comparisons with other people, both inside and outside the country. The broad increase in education contributed strongly to the heighthening of aspirations among the Soviet people after 1960, a development actually pushed further by the improvements in living standards; the recognition of improvements only generated expectations for more. Soviet scholars responded by focusing on certain Western notions, such as Levin's concept of aspiration, McClelland's research on the need for achievement, and ideas on the quality of life (see Shlapentokh, 1975).

The Personalistic Approach

Prompted by social and economic developments in society, Soviet scholars began to search for new theories to explain the economic behavior of the people and which might lead to the understanding of the incentives of higher productivity. It was
in this period that researchers began to move in a direction similar to that of some American sociologists, especially Melvin Kohn (1969), toward a focus on the content of work as the critical variable in work attitudes. Before doing so, however, it was necessary to break with the simplistic behavioralist explanations in order to introduce work satisfaction as a variable intervening between the job and productivity. Vladimir Iadov and his colleagues found it necessary to expound at length in *Man and His Work* (1967, 1970) to persuade both readers and officials that subjective variables were both essential to understanding worker motivation and compatible with Marxian theory. Defending their focus on psychological phenomena, they wrote that only "the vulgar-materialist concept ignores the relative independence of the subjective, giving rise to the mistaken judgement that the single objective criterion of the level of consciousness is actual behavior" (1970, p. 122). In this manner, the authors paved the way for the inclusion of work satisfaction in their analysis.

By introducing the variable of job satisfaction between the objective conditions of work and worker productivity, Iadov and his colleagues enhanced the sophistication of their analysis. This move proceeded from the assumption that there was a strong and direct relationship between the content of a job and the satisfaction of the worker. Moreover it made possible an approach in which different job content factors could be manipulated to generate greater satisfaction and, therefore, output.
The emergence of work satisfaction as a key variable in Soviet sociology was an enormous leap from the conservatism of Stalinist ideology. The dominant Stalinist viewpoint was that no one in socialist society had anything to be truly dissatisfied about, especially working for the benefit of the Motherland. Thus Soviet sociologists were extremely proud to be able to legitimate the concept of work satisfaction—decades after Western researchers had done so. However, while there were strong disagreements in the West as to the connections between work content, job satisfaction and productivity (see Centers, 1949; Kornhouse, 1952; Herzberg, 1957; Jencks, 1972), Soviet scholars tended to resolutely take the side of those arguing the salience of these relationships.

Work Content as a Key Variable

Having singled out work satisfaction as the major intervening variable, Soviet sociologists, led by Iadov, began to search for other factors beyond material incentives which could enhance satisfaction and, presumably, productivity. By the mid-1960s, they concluded that, of these factors, the content of work deserved special attention.

The road to this conclusion had been laid somewhat earlier when Kozlova and Fainburg (1963) had divided their sample of workers into seven groupings based on the character of work performed. Their typology came into wide use in subsequent years and was later accompanied by another scheme developed by Arutiunian (1971), which disaggregated rural workers into five categories based on the content of the job.
As noted earlier, analytical approaches based on the content of a job represented a deviation from the dominant official view of the period. The notion that work itself, rather than work for some external purpose, could be a source of personal satisfaction and could be undertaken as an end in itself was a heterodox position. Up to this point the official view was that diligent work was simply a reflection of the worker's devotion to the cause. The new approach suggested that even disloyal people could be industrious on the job, independent of its contribution to the Motherland. In consequence, a good worker ceased to be synonymous with a good citizen.

Adherents of this new approach to work frequently investigated the significance of job content by inquiring of workers whether they were attracted to the intrinsic, task content features of the job or its extrinsic, renumerative characteristics. In this focus on work content, principal emphasis was laid on the degree of creativity on the job as the key indicator of its content. Characterizing the Soviet view of creativity, Iadov defined the notion as the "search for previously unknown means of solving problems (the search for a new algorithm or the independent discovery of an algorithm)" (Iadov et al., 1970, p. 21).

This idea of creative work is similar to that elaborated by some American sociologists. Iadov et al. had even cited the commonalities between their definition and Walker and Guest's (1952) concept of "complex work." Kohn's studies (1969, 1983), while somewhat broader in their conceptualization of
"occupational self-direction", are also close to the approach of Soviet researchers. Kohn stressed that "work with data or with people...is especially likely to require initiative, thought and judgement" and he also emphasized that self-direction involved the opportunity to choose among a "variety of approaches" to the performance of a job (1969, p. 140).

Although walking the path of ideological deviations, Soviet researchers could however protect themselves by basing their theories on some of the work of the "early Marx". In his youthful writings, particularly the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx had presented his ideas on the alienation of labor under capitalism and his image of work in the coming socialist society. Here were the romantic visions of the individual freed of the bondage of necessary labor and narrow specialization, engaged in a variety of creative activities oriented toward self-development and personal growth (Marx 1956). Despite its Marxian origins, this view was employed in opposition to the official perspective, which saw individual gratification not as an end in itself but as a means for the creation of the new society.

Social philosophers had been the most active advocates of the visions of the young Marx (see Davydov's Labor and Freedom 1963, which created a real sensation in the early 1960s). In the early 1970s, despite the political reaction, some philosophers continued to advance these notions about labor and human development. In a view similar to theories of "postindustrial society" in the West, Irina Sizemskaya portrayed Soviet society
as moving under the influence of the technological revolution toward the universal "intellectualization of work," toward an economy in which more and more people would have an "independent mentality," and in which increasing numbers of workers would be more "oriented to spiritual values, creative activity, to the increase in the level of culture and intellectual contacts." Current trends were seen to be moving toward a society in which the principal goal would be "the limitless development of all essential forces of the human being, the transformation of the worker into the real subject of social production" (Sizemskaja, 1981, pp. 84-87).

While researchers oriented to the materialist approach had focused on the problems of behavior, such as turnover and migration, those adopting the personalistic approach concentrated more on the attitudes of workers, especially the young. Iadov's first study with Andrei Zdravomyslov in 1962 was a pioneering work in this respect. This research examined the attitudes of a random sample of more than 2600 workers between the ages of 18 and 30. The results presented in Man and His Work (1970), were summed up in the conclusions of the book:

The verification of the first main hypothesis shows that, under the given social conditions of the development of our society, the content of labor and the creative opportunities of work are the leading specific factors that determine the worker's attitudes toward labor, either primarily as a need of the personality, or primarily as a means of subsistence (p. 285).

While admitting that material incentives were of importance, the authors insisted that "only if the content of labor itself is
high is the (material) stimulation an effective means of forming an attitude of labor as a need of the personality" (p. 286). Among other data which supported this conclusion, Iadov and his colleagues cited the fact that only 3 percent of young, unskilled workers were greatly satisfied with their work, as against 25 percent of those engaged in more complex work (p. 289). Other statistics demonstrated that the correlation between work satisfaction and job content was significantly higher than that between satisfaction and wages (pp. 138, 162).

The methodology of Iadov and his colleagues was rapidly adopted and employed in other studies around the country. The subsequent research, mostly in the later 1960s and early 1970s, also pointed to the content of work as the dominant factor shaping attitudes toward the job (see Ivanova and Stoliarova, 1979; Dmitrenko and Kornakovskii, 1984). The emphasis on creativity was found especially in studies of professional workers, scholars above all (see Shanov and Kuznetsov, 1977; Natalushko, 1981; Kelle et al., 1978; Sheinin, 1980).

It is also notable however that the same relationships were found among collective farmers; they too appeared to be more oriented toward work content than material incentives. The majority of collective farmers in the Orlov region clearly indicated a preference for an interesting job over higher wages (Kolbanovskii, 1970), as did those in the Stavropol' region (Simush, 1965) and elsewhere.

At about the time that Iadov and his colleagues conducted their study, Vladimir Shubkin initiated a similar investigation
of the attitudes of young people toward various occupations. The results were even more striking, for they demonstrated that students in their final year of secondary school strongly preferred to enter occupations where the most creative work was possible, generally the professional occupations.

If Soviet ideologists expected support from these studies for the idea of the dominant role of the working class in Soviet society, they were greatly disappointed. The students in Shubkin's study considered the occupations of workers to be largely unattractive, giving them a preference score of 4.46 on a 10-point scale. Industrial work was evaluated only somewhat higher than agricultural work (3.75) and commerce and service work (2.63). The more "creative" occupations received the highest scores, with physicists ranking at 7.69, mathematicians at 7.50, and chemists at 7.23 (Shubkin, 1970, pp. 190-92). Other studies using similar methodologies led to the same conclusions: the occupations of scholars, writers, actors, painters and musicians, as well as those of physicians and engineers, were the most attractive for youthful respondents (Titma, 1973, 1977; Kozyrev, 1975; Chernovolenko et al., 1979; Kostiuk et al., 1980; Shubkin, 1984).

Occupational Self-Direction in Soviet Sociology

Unlike the research in American sociology, where complexity and creativity were viewed as inexorably linked to autonomy, or "occupational self-direction" as Kohn labels it, Soviet sociologists kept these variables clearly distinct. In addition,
found the correlation between work content and autonomy to be relatively low.

Alexei Tikhonov, a well-known Leningrad industrial sociologist, investigated this issue by studying over 3400 workers in the Tartar Republic oil industry in 1969-1970. He found the correlation between the complexity of work and autonomy on the job to be no higher than 0.10. Nearly one-fourth of the workers were engaged in complex work, but experienced relatively little work autonomy, while another 10 percent performed rather simple work, but were not closely supervised by their superiors (Tikhonov, 1976, pp. 42-43).

Separating the job content from worker autonomy, Soviet researchers have only rarely investigated the role of the latter in worker satisfaction. Besides Tikhonov's work, which found the influence of autonomy to be no less important than that of content, only a few scholars have seriously explored this topic and the results have been inconsistent. Iadov asked his respondents about the importance of "independence", "freedom", and the opportunity to express "brave opinions" in his study of engineers in the 1970s. But he did not discover autonomy to be of unusually high significance: while all the factors related to self-direction were highly ranked, many other factors were attributed equal significance (Iadov, 1979; see also Grigas, 1980).

The small amount of attention paid to worker autonomy in Soviet research can be traced to ideological constraints. Because the official ideology argues that all Soviet workers are
the masters of their enterprises, it is not generally wise to be too curious about the true attitudes of workers on this issue, even if technology rather than social relations plays a critical role in determining autonomy. In other words, it would be politically risky to even imply that the Soviet system itself could account for the lack of autonomy of workers.

This interpretation is supported by the fact that it is the ideological sociologists who monopolize the research on worker autonomy, using such loaded questions as, "Do you feel yourself to be the master of your enterprise?", or "How actively do you participate in the management of the enterprise?". Even these sociologists, however, have in many cases failed to elicit enthusiastic responses from workers about their participation in management. In his study of over two thousand workers in Dnepropetrovsk, Vladimir Sbytov reported that only 24 percent of his respondents agreed with the statement that "workers take part in the distribution of housing" (a most sensitive issue in the USSR). The same low proportion agreed that workers participated in "the rating of work and the setting of wages," while 29 percent agreed that workers took part in "the distribution of bonuses" and 35 percent stated that they were involved in "setting plans" (Sbytov, 1983, pp. 193-94).

In a study of Byelorussian workers carried out in the early 1980s, Galina Sokolova found that only 18 percent of the respondents participated in the eight bodies which presumably influenced the management of the enterprise. (Curiously, she assumed that no one took part in more than one of these bodies.)
Only 41 percent of the respondents expressed a desire to take part in the decision-making processes at their enterprises (1984, pp. 183-84). Another ideological sociologist surveyed workers in various cities between 1972-1976 and reported that only 58 percent felt that they were "completely or partially masters of their enterprises" (Smirnov, 1979, p. 86).

But while not prominent in official studies on work, the problem of autonomy plays a central role in private discussions among Soviet intellectuals. In their unofficial discussions on the importance of autonomy, Soviet scholars tend to approach the topic with a wider view, itself a function of the context of Soviet society. While sociology in the U.S. has more often treated occupational autonomy as a factor in the workplace, Soviet intellectuals have also grappled with the issue of autonomy from control at a wider, societal level (Sakharov, 1968).

In the Soviet context the state controls the behavior of the citizenry in all spheres of life, although the degrees of control vary. Limiting the investigation of self-direction to relations between workers and immediate superiors overlooks many other elements of the problem. Occupations such as writing or painting, for example, involve little interference from supervisors. However, researchers as well as writers and artists are generally exposed to other forms of pressure in both capitalist and socialist societies. In Soviet society, this pressure is permanent and pervasive.
Thus, when examining the issue of occupational autonomy in Soviet society, it is necessary to distinguish three levels of control. First, control may be exerted by a worker's immediate supervisor, say, the chief of a laboratory. Second, autonomy may be lost to local governmental bodies, especially party committees. Finally, workers must submit to the control of the central authorities and the official ideology. Each echelon of power makes decisions which can have direct impact on an individual worker. While patterns of control are different in the United States, professionals here too may have constraints placed upon them by patrons, bureaucratic administrators, professional associations, colleagues, or the state. Recent American research on "de-professionalization" and "proletarianization" have begun to address some of these issues in this country (see especially Derber, 1983 for a unique attempt to distinguish modes of control of professionals).

Why Do People Like Creative and Self-Directed Work?

Even if it is assumed that a strong relationship exists between the content of work (or a specific characteristic like autonomy) and work satisfaction, the question arises as to why this is the case. The work of Kohn and his colleagues suggests the connection is not simple: people are likely to value highly those occupational characteristics that are viewed to be attainable. Thus the more people have experience with and expectations of occupational self-direction, the more likely they are to value jobs which offer this characteristic (Kohn and Schooler, 1983, pp. 14-15).
Soviet researchers have also sought to address this question. Four ideas have emerged in Soviet sociology, each attempting to account for the interest in creative work. The first of these stresses the concern for self-actualization.

**Self-Actualization Theories.** This approach to the problem was the first to claim to have substantiated the connection between job content and work satisfaction. In some respects, it draws most directly from Marxian theory, for it stresses the romantic notions of the worker elaborated by the young Marx. This view of the individual as oriented toward self-development in work was especially bolstered in the USSR by the appearance of Maslow's (1954) work on self-actualization. Maslow's ideas were well received in Soviet sociology for those scholars who were reluctant to quote Marx directly, or at least too often (especially in the 1960s), could utilize Maslow's theories without fear of being accused of ideological conformity by their colleagues. Aside from political considerations, Maslow's work appeared to hold the solution to the problem of why work content was supposedly related to job satisfaction.

As a proof of his solution, Soviet sociologists referred to the influence of education on the attitudes of workers. If people with greater educational attainment appreciated creative work the most, it could be interpreted as support for this perspective over those which stress immediate work environment factors. In other words, work content becomes another intervening variable, its appreciation stemming from education and leading to work satisfaction.
Education, it is assumed, develops the various human faculties and creates new needs, among them the need for self-actualization. Iadov et al., (1970) demonstrated this idea by showing that, among Leningrad workers in the same occupation, those with higher levels of education were the most attracted to the intrinsic features of the job rather than wages.

Similarly, in a more recent study, workers were asked whether they would prefer more simple or more complex work if their wages were kept the same. While only 48 percent of those with less than seven years of education favored more complex work, over 78 percent of those with a secondary education, and more than 90 percent of those with special technical training responded in the same way (Changli, 1978, p. 188; see also Antosenkov, 1969, 1974).

Theories of Innate Capabilities. From a different angle, another argument in the explanation of why people favor creative work is rooted in the notion of inherent capacities for such work. While the ideas of self-actualization could be linked to the official ideology through appeals to the young Marx, theories which emphasize innate abilities for specific kinds of work are in more substantive conflict with the dominant ideology. The official viewpoint holds that all individuals are essentially equal in their creative capacities and differ from each other only in the specific area of their abilities. Theories of innate predispositions, however, argue that the capacities for creative work are themselves unequally distributed.
While the official ideology is inconsistent with this perspective, certain features of Soviet reality appear to be based on these premises, at least to some degree. Only a minority of young people are given the opportunity to enter professional jobs and the majority must satisfy themselves with less rewarding and satisfying occupations. The elitist educational institutions, such as the Moscow Physical and Technical Institute and Moscow University, also cream off the more talented youth by offering admission examinations a month before other schools.

Researchers advancing the ideas of innate capacities for creative work have sought to investigate various personal traits which are said to lead toward specific occupational choices. These studies normally involve the subjective assessment on the part of young people as to their capacities to master the skills to enter a particular occupation. For example, a study of Ukrainian students found that 45 percent anticipated their future occupations to be among the most prestigious, and presumably most demanding, positions. Other students reported their future occupations as less prestigious, recognizing the practicality of their choice in a position they could master. Among the most prestigious occupations, the correlation between the prestige of a position and the number of students who cited it as their choice was negative. Thus it appears that the choice of occupation for these Ukrainian students was influenced by their own evaluations of their abilities to perform the job (Chernovolenko et al., 1979).
In another survey, conducted between 1973 and 1975 in different cities, 50 to 70 percent of the respondents stated that their choice of future occupations was dictated by their assessment of their abilities and character (Rubina, 1981; Kriagzhde, 1981). Research by Zuzin (1978) compared the occupational orientations of youth who were finishing special mathematics schools with those completing ordinary secondary schools. While nearly half (49 percent) of the first group planned to enter a university to begin their careers, only 8 percent of the second group had such aspirations.

Zuzin investigated the issue further by dividing all students into groups based on the time of their decision about a career. One group had made their plans while still in elementary school; the other had made their decisions after some time in the workforce. The groups were highly correlated with levels of academic achievement. Among those who had made their plans early, three-fourths finished their university training with the top grade. In the groups of late deciders, only 39 percent achieved the highest grade.

Of course, a variety of factors enter into the decision of a person to pursue a particular occupational path. These data reflect the self-evaluation of students' abilities to master a specific set of requisite skills. But students are also aware of other factors related to occupational and university entrance, such as influential connections or even bribery. And of course, the assumption that academic performance is a direct measure of innate talents is problematic as well. This approach, however,
represents only one attempt to account for the attraction of certain individuals to prestigious, presumably creative, work. We can now turn to another perspective, one which stresses the direct role of occupational prestige in the orientation to creative work.

Theories of Occupational Prestige. In seeking to understand the attraction of people to creative, self-directed work, other sociologists have cast doubt on the direct role of work content per se. From this perspective, the appeal of such positions stems not from the intrinsic qualities of the tasks of the job, but from the extrinsic rewards accruing to incumbents of these positions, especially occupational prestige. According to this view, individuals in self-directed work, when asked what qualities of the work they appreciate the most, will name those characteristics which they consider to justify their high rewards. In contrast to the materialist approach, which stresses the salience of different extrinsic rewards, this perspective emphasizes the special role of prestige in Soviet society.

In a socialist society, where the marginal ability of money is low and the incomes of most people satisfy basic needs, other external incentives increase in importance. In this context, prestige takes on a special significance. As "prestige-mania" overcame Soviet society in the 1960s, a phenomenon even the authorities had to recognize (Shlapentokh, 1977), individuals became absorbed with the desire for prestigious consumer goods. This orientation also extended included the desire for prestigious jobs. And, as in Western societies, the greatest
prestige is normally accorded to the most creative and self-directed occupations.

Thus it is not surprising that people will be attracted to occupations which provide them with the highest prestige in society, the moreso if other privileges accrue to the incumbents. Research conducted by Vodzinskaia (1967) on the attitudes of Soviet young people toward occupations found that prestige was one of the principal factors determining the attractiveness of occupations seen by the respondents as creative ones.

In the next decade other studies sought to investigate the role of prestige in a variety of areas of social life. Balandin (1979), for example, studied a sample of workers in Perm and found a high correlation between work satisfaction and the prestige of the job (see also Loiberg, 1982). The role of prestige was found to be of special significance for intellectuals, scholars, writers and painters (Kelle et al., 1978). The results of these studies suggest that we should look with some skepticism at arguments that stress the primary attraction to complex and self-directed work among those in such positions.

The Importance of Desirable Values. While the majority of Soviet sociologists sought an explanation for the interest in creative work in factors related to the jobs themselves, some investigators were more inclined to treat the results of studies like those of Iadov, at least to some degree, as artifacts of other phenomena. Almost immediately following the re-emergence
of empirical sociology in the Soviet Union, researchers began to investigate the salience of dominant values in social behavior.

In an earlier book, *The Empirical Validity of Sociological Information* (1973), I explored the influence of values on many surveys, including those on work attitudes. Data were cited from a survey on labor turnover in Novosibirsk which showed how respondents underestimated the role of their dissatisfaction with wages as a motivation for changing jobs. For example, the proportion of job-changers whose incomes rose in their new jobs was three to four times larger than those who indicated dissatisfaction with wages as a motive for leaving (Shlapentokh, 1973, p. 99). Because a fixation on material incomes is not consistent with the dominant value system, it is likely that the importance of wages is given lower significance in surveys than is actually the case.

Other data seemed to suggest that survey respondents adjusted their answers to fit the dominant values in their social milieu. Another study showed how respondents had exaggerated the amount of time they reported spending on reading, because people who read are highly evaluated in Soviet society (Shlapentokh, 1980, pp. 82-105).

The influence of dominant values on survey respondents' reactions to questions also drew the attention of Irina Popova. In her article, "Images of Values and the Paradoxes of Self-Consciousness" (1984), Popova argued that individuals commonly employ the dominant values and norms as a means of justifying their behavior, even when they do not personally
adhere to these values. Thus, she appeals to her colleagues to be cautious when interpreting survey results which are in accord with the dominant value system.

This is an important point in addressing the issue of survey respondents' assessment of creative jobs, especially because other studies have found that the influence of the dominant value system on survey responses increases with the level of education. In other words, those with high educational levels are more likely to give responses which conform to dominant values. A similar phenomenon was found in the U.S. in Jackman's (1978) research on racial intolerance. While the more highly-educated in Jackman's study were more likely to advance ideas of racial equality than those with less education, the two groups differed very little in their behavior related to racial equality.

Thus, given that the interest in complex, creative and self-directed work is highly correlated with education (in both American and Soviet research), it is likely that at least some increment of the relationship stems from the fact that more educated people are more likely to align themselves with the dominant values in relation to work.9 Other developments in the Soviet sociology of work also tend to cast doubt on the idea that people are attracted to jobs largely on the basis of the content of work.

The Ideological Counter-offensive of the 1970s

The absence of empirical sociology during the Stalin era makes the understanding of earlier attitudes toward work more difficult. But since 1953, Stalin's successors have sought to
make the official ideology more consistent with reality and, in the process, they have enlisted the aid of certain sociologists. One effort to adjust the ideology involved the work of those researchers advancing the ideas of "socialist emulation".

The volume of research on socialist emulation was quite small during the liberal 1960s, when Soviet sociology adopted its most critical stance (Shlapentokh, 1982). But after the fall of Khrushchev and the rise of political reaction in the country, this notion became more prominent in sociological research. The leader in this area was Irina Changli, whose work reached its peak in the mid-1970s.

Changli described socialist emulation as "work moved by social and moral motives, as well as personal interests in cognition, creation and communication, i.e., work as a calling, work as an existential need" (1973, p. 37). Similarly, V. Ivanova summed up the idea by stressing that, "the striving for creative work, to work for the sake of the whole of society becomes the most important impetus for the participation of the masses in social production...[This] demonstrates the great scope of socialist emulation, the rapidly developing new forms of civic work, as well as the desire of people to work for the benefit of society without reward" (1983, p. 247). In the world envisioned by Changli and others in this tradition, socialist emulation is a means for pressing more and more people toward communist attitudes about work. Those who have adopted such attitudes become models for others who have not yet developed such attitudes toward their work (Changli, 1979).
Certainly these sociologist do not ignore the significance of other motivations to work, such as income or prestige (see Changli, 1979, pp. 52-70). Indeed, in the practical application of socialist emulation, individuals whose work behavior is held out as a model for others are also recipients of various material rewards, such as salary bonuses. But the concept of socialism advanced by these authors assumes that these factors are of only temporary importance and will gradually lose their significance when the stage of communism is reached. Even in the contemporary situation, Changli argues, such incentives are of only secondary importance and with each new stage of socialist emulation (she counted five, including the Stakhanovite movement as the third), more people will be moved by communist attitudes toward work (Changli, 1973, 1979).

Changli sought to substantiate these ideas of socialist emulation with empirical data and, together with her colleagues conducted a survey in Moscow, Minsk, and three other industrial centers in the mid-1970s. The survey instrument, however, was replete with heavily-loaded questions. For example, one question elicited responses on the impact of people's work in socialist society and offered such alternatives as "work is the source of well-being of the motherland and each citizen", "work is a factor in the formation of society, the collective, collectivism, and civic virtues", and "work is a factor in the broadening of human freedom".

Another question asked workers what influence socialist emulation had on the shaping of the human personality, and
provided alternatives like "collectivism", "honesty and fairness", "initiative and innovation", as well as heavily-loaded negative options, such as "envy", "the aspiration to be successful at any price", and "striving for fame". As would be expected, the first, more noble alternatives elicited the greatest support, while the more negative options were spurned by the respondents (Changli, 1978, pp. 182-85).

Despite the loaded questions, Changli's data include figures which clash with her optimism about the progress of communist attitudes toward work. For example, when asked what prompted them to take part in socialist emulation, one-third of the respondents cited "the desire to improve my standard of living". And no more than one-third supported officially-backed motives for socialist emulation, such as "the desire to help comrades" or "the feeling of collectivism". In fact, more than 10 percent responded that they had participated because "their bosses had urged them to do it" (Changli, 1978, pp. 173).

Between ideological sociologists such as Changli and liberal sociologists such as Iadov, there are those scholars who seek to combine political loyalty with more or less objective and pragmatic analyses. When addressing the issue of socialist emulation, these scholars tend to treat it as a conventional method of stimulating work through material and moral incentives. In an interesting blend of ideology and pragmatism, Kharchev and Odintsov praised socialist emulation as a realm of individual "self-actualization, of discovery and implementation of the individual's gifts and opportunities". Unlike Changli, they
speak favorably of the desire of people for "self-assertion, for drawing the attention of others, to stand out from the crowd" (1977, p. 10).

Similar to those who praise creative work as the principal source of gratification, Kharchev and Odintsov suggest that sociological emulation promises considerable satisfaction for those who work hard. In addition, these scholars are much more willing than ideological sociologists to stress the significance of the additional material rewards granted to those who become models for others to emulate. Emphasizing that at the current "socialist" (rather than future "communist") stage of Soviet development, rewards are distributed according to a person's contribution to society, the use of prizes and bonuses to stimulate hard work is both vital and ideologically consistent (p. 17).

In the same group of pragmatic scholars who praise the value of socialist emulation, Evgenii Kapustin criticizes those who suggest that "communist attitudes" toward work will become widespread when work becomes "the first human need." He argues for a more realistic approach which pays greater attention to material and moral incentives in the framework of socialist emulation (Kapustin, 1984, pp. 32-47).

While professional sociologists reject the notion that the societal importance of a job is the principal factor shaping the occupational choices of the majority of Soviet people, they do not deny that this is of some importance for some people. All other things equal, many Soviet people do obtain special
commitment to their occupations, and among some of them the societal importance of their work was stressed as significant. It is still clear from the interviews, however, that these individuals were motivated by a variety of factors, including the content of the work, its prestige and its material rewards (p. 239-47). Because of the difficulty in statistically separating the characteristics of jobs associated with attitudes toward work, ideological sociologists have the opportunity to use these data to seemingly confirm their ideas on the significance of the social importance of work.

Recently a new trend has emerged among ideological sociologists. This has been prompted by the new elements in the official economic strategy of the 1980s, which emphasizes the autonomy of enterprises and the work team with a single contract. This turn in policy has generated a number of publications in which the accent is shifted from the devotion of workers to society in general to their allegiance to their enterprise and work brigade.

Consistent with this approach, Vilen Ivanov, the Director of the Institute of Sociology, and his colleague, Nikolai Alexeiev, investigated the attitudes of workers employed by enterprises which had been granted expanded autonomy as a part of new experiments in the economy. The results were rather disappointing: the workers displayed general indifference to participating in enterprise management (between 40 and 60 percent were not involved) and were dissatisfied with their levels of renumeration (70 to 80 percent of engineers indicated
dissatisfaction). In this context, the researchers were forced to place their hopes in the development of new attitudes among workers toward the efficiency of their enterprises (Ivanov and Alekseiev, 1985, p. 3; see also Sarno, 1983; Klivets, 1984).

The Hedonistic Orientation

Beginning in the late 1970s, the creative concept of work began to lose its authority and draw increasingly severe criticism. The decline in the influence of this perspective on work can be attributed at least in part, to recent economic and social developments.

The foundering of the Soviet economy took on new and more obvious forms in the second half of the 1970s. The fact that the economy had been moving steadily toward a zero growth rate could not even be refuted by official statistics and the agricultural sector entered a period of almost complete stagnation. In the search for new methods of restoring economic vitality, Soviet public opinion turned toward the ideas of decentralization and the introduction of some market mechanisms as a potential solution. While such notions had been raised before in the 1960s, this time no one could realistically argue that conditions could remain unchanged (Zaslavskaya, 1984).

Addressing the problem of worker motivation, Soviet intellectuals moved from the more romantic views of creative, self-directed work toward a more pedestrian view on the nature of work in Soviet society. Few however sought to return to the older, simplistic materialist notions of the late 1950s, with their emphasis on the fundamental importance of wages. The
radical differences between the Soviet people of the 1950s and those of the 1970s were evident: the population of the 1970s was not only much more educated and urbanized, but was also more demanding, having left the sufferings of the war and the Stalin era far behind. In the 1970s, Soviet society was much more oriented toward the comfortable life.

Against the backdrop of these developments, some Soviet sociologists began to develop a new concept of work attitudes. Above all, they sought to undermine the psychological basis of the personalistic orientation. Thus they attacked the central notion that satisfaction with work content was intimately linked to worker productivity.

Even by 1976, Ivanov and Patrushev expressed doubt that work satisfaction and productivity were closely related, noting that "those who are dissatisfied with their jobs are not always the worst workers" (1976, p. 69). A few years later, Lobanov and Cherkasov (1981) joined the chorus critiquing the personalistic image of workers. Shkaratan (1982), an early advocate of the materialistic approach, also criticized the simplistic interconnection between these variables.

Vladimir Magun (1983a) struck the most telling blow to the idea that satisfaction led to productivity. In 1976 he conducted a study of over four thousand workers in Leningrad and showed through factor analysis that the sample could be broken into two groups: one in which satisfaction and productivity were positively correlated; and another in which these two variables were inversely related (also Magun, 1983b).
Having called into question the connection between satisfaction and productivity, the critics then moved to attack the next element of the romantic view, the secondary role of wages as a motivator for productive work. The two leaders in this assault were Irina Popova, a well-known industrial sociologist, and Viktor Moin. They demonstrated that the data which had provided the basis for the downgrading of the role of wages were unreliable. They concluded that:

The collected sociological information does not provide grounds for the view that work is the first basic need of the respondents and that material rewards played a significantly lower role in comparison with, say, the content of work. Our data demonstrate that information of this sort describes the value perceptions of workers about 'ideal', desirable (from the societal point of view) attitudes toward wages (Popova and Moin, 1982, p. 104).

The core of their results was a comparison of respondents' answers to questions about themselves and others. For example, when asked their reasons for leaving a given place of employment, 34 percent indicated the low level of wages as their principal motivation. However, when asked why other people left their jobs, 86 percent cited dissatisfaction with wages. When asked why they left the countryside to move to the city, only 4 percent explained their migration by the desire to increase their income; yet the same motive was attributed to other people by 29 percent of the respondents (p. 45). Thus it was concluded that the limited significance attributed to wages when questions address the respondents themselves can be traced to the dominant values and the desire not to appear too oriented toward money income.
The Growing Significance of Working Conditions

While mounting a counter-offensive for the restoration of material incentives in work, Soviet sociologists have not sought to return to the simplistic view which limited attention to wages and occasionally to housing conditions. As was indicated, the Soviet people have come in recent years to want much more than simply the satisfaction of their basic needs. With the decaying influence of the official ideology and the disappearance of hope for the "radiant future," more hedonistic orientations and the pursuit of immediate gratification appear to be the most conspicuous trends in Soviet social life (Shlapentokh, 1984).

Though restricted from directly discussing these tendencies, viewed as highly undesirable from the official perspective, sociologists have found ways to integrate indicators of this "me-orientation" into their recent work. With reference to attitudes toward work, nearly all scholars have cited the growing importance of working conditions to the Soviet people.

While representatives of the creative perspective had also paid attention to occupational conditions, they tended to stress these as factors influencing the efficiency of work and the quality of performance. Autonomy in work, for example, was viewed not as a source of immediate gratification, but as a precondition for the successful performance of creative work. Today attention focuses on working conditions largely as ends in themselves, as factors which can make the work less painful, difficult and tense, cleaner and more enjoyable. Since money does not play as central a role in the USSR as in the capitalist
countries, good working conditions are more and more preferred to a higher wage.

Magun even went so far as to introduce the utilitarian concept of the "price of activity" to refer to the costs of working as well as its benefits. In terms quite innovative for Soviet sociology, he stated that "productivity is a source not only of satisfaction, but also of the deprivation of human needs, a fact which has previously been ignored in the earlier model of the relationship between productivity and satisfaction" (1983a, p. 142). Moreover, he suggested that since the more productive workers evaluate their own efforts more highly than those of others, they are also more demanding of better working conditions. Indeed, his sample of Leningrad workers revealed that the most productive were, at the same time, the most dissatisfied with various extrinsic features of their work, such as the state of equipment and the setting of rates (1983a, pp. 142-53).

A variety of studies in the late 1970s and early 1980s showed, in contrast to earlier research, that working conditions rather than work content or income levels were emerging as factors shaping attitudes toward the desirability of jobs. Lobanov and Cherkasov compared two studies of young workers, one surveyed in 1962 and the other in 1976, and concluded that the "indicators of dissatisfaction with working conditions increased, while objectively these conditions had improved" (1981, p. 122).

Similar conclusions were reached by Loiiberg in a study of workers' attitudes in the timber industry. He found that "the
role of the content of work as a motive for the selection of the occupations drastically decreased." Loiberg also emphasized the great significance of working conditions on attitudes toward the job. According to his data, only 27 percent of the respondents considered the physical tension they experienced toward work to be "normal" (1982, pp. 32-33).

The same pattern was revealed in a survey on labor turnover among three hundred workers in a machine factory (Kamaieva, 1977). Unlike studies carried out a decade or more earlier, Kamaieva focused on the role of working conditions in shaping attitudes toward work and concluded that it was these factors which now exert the decisive influence.

Similarly, a study of Byelorussian workers carried out in the early 1980s found that "the comfort conditions at the place of job" were evaluated as "very important" by 89 percent of all workers, while only 23 percent attributed the same importance to the "diversity of work." It was also revealed that 85 percent of the workers preferred to work without great nervous tension and that 82 percent of them regarded working hours to be of great importance to them. Three percent also stressed the importance of safety at work (Sokolova, 1984, pp. 128-29). Along these same lines, Aitov indicates that "we observe more and more cases where people prefer lower-paid work to better-paid, but more difficult and unattractive work. This tendency is revealed especially strongly among young people" (1983, p. 71).

What is not altogether conclusive from this research is whether the changes in attitudes toward work represent real
changes or result from a shift in sociologists' focus their attention. It is notable that Soviet sociologists have come to address more fully the problems of manual workers, and the theme of manual work has become one of the leading topics in industrial sociology in the USSR in recent years (see Rossels, 1979; Grigas, 1980; Lobanov and Cherkasov, 1981). The apparent shift in attitudes may stem, to some degree, from more intensive examination of manual workers, who—as Kohn's research in the U.S. showed—tend to be more concerned with working conditions than task content.

Indeed, when sociologists begin to systematically look for the influence of working conditions on job satisfaction, they increase their chances of finding such influence. While in the 1960s, rural sociologists had followed the creative perspective on work and had found support for the idea that work content was of greatest significance in shaping work attitudes, attention now is directed toward working conditions. Operating from this newer perspective, researchers have found, for example, that working conditions are of primary significance for agricultural workers, whose work tends to be even more onerous and dirty than that of industrial workers.

Sergei Khaikin, in a study of collective farmers in the Voronezh region, found that working conditions were more likely to lead to dissatisfaction than work content or wages. Among farmers who were discontented with their work, he discovered that "occupational conditions" substantially surpassed the importance of income and work content in causing discontent. Using a scale
of satisfaction ranging from -1.0 to +1.0 (with positive numbers indicating greater satisfaction), respondents rated working conditions at -0.44 and the utilization of machinery at -0.42, while the diversity of work was rated at -0.11 and wages at +0.22 (Khaikin, 1979, p. 68).

Other research has pointed to the importance of the job's geographical location, since living conditions vary enormously from one region to another. In the late 1970s, a number of authors began to focus on these factors, which had largely been ignored in earlier studies of worker attitudes, having been relegated to research on migration.

Analyzing and reinterpreting eighty-four surveys of workers, including respondents from over one thousand factories, Boris Kononuik found that, among reasons cited for quitting their jobs, respondents mentioned "personal motives not linked to production activity in the factory in first place." These "motives are followed by occupational conditions, motives related to the character of the occupation, the organization of production and wages, housing conditions and facilities, and human relations" (1977, p. 38). While arguing that among the work-related factors, occupational conditions played the most important role, Kononuik also hinted that a critical cause of labor turnover lay in the standard of living in the given region.

Other factors may also be at work which could lead to the observed changes in attitudes toward job characteristics. As economic stagnation has set in, the opportunities for upward mobility by workers have begun to erode drastically. It is
important to recognize that many as 40 percent of Soviet workers still work in essentially the same jobs as their grandfathers. In this context it is possible that the diminishing probability of workers ever achieving "creative, self-directed" work may have led workers to devalue the significance of work content and focus more on working conditions as important.

The Evolution of Iadov's View

It is interesting to note that Vladimir Iadov, one of the leading advocates of the creative approach a decade ago, appears also to have begun to change his emphasis on the significance of work content in shaping attitudes. This change is of fairly recent vintage: in 1978, Iadov continued to argue that "neither high wages nor other factors can compete as work stimuli with the motivation generated by diversified labor, rich in content" (1978, p. 109).

Despite the certainty of this claim, Iadov's view appears to have changed gradually throughout the 1970s. In his second study of Leningrad engineers in 1972-73, much of his creative view still seemed in evidence. "Interesting work" was found to be an important terminal value for the respondents, taking third place behind "international peace" and "health." And when separating his respondents into groups, Iadov found that two of the largest categories included those who were quite devoted to their work as such, with creativity and related factors cited as more important than income level.

Nonetheless, there are important differences between this study in the early 1970s and the previous investigation. First,
Iadov expanded the number of work content characteristics for respondents to evaluate: In addition to creativity, he also inquired about job requirements for independence, initiative, experience, persistence, conscientiousness, assiduousness and others. Creativity lost its central position in the researcher's attention. The shift is also seen in the fact that the issue of work satisfaction, a central theme in the 1960s, receded to the background in the later study. In fact, questions about work satisfaction were posed only to a small part of the sample. Moreover, Iadov became increasingly skeptical about the relationship between work satisfaction and productivity, as is revealed in a 1974 article written with Kissel' (Iadov and Kissel', 1974).

Iadov's changing perspective is also shown in his focus on the leisure time activities of his respondents. In the 1960s, he had asked his respondents to evaluate their work content compared to their material rewards, while in the subsequent research he asked them to indicate their preferences for work time as opposed to leisure time. His results indicated that work content did not appear to have as much significance for his respondents as had earlier been the case. Only 5 percent of the respondents stated that they greatly preferred professional activity to leisure time, and 19 percent enjoyed their time after work more than that on the job (1977, p. 109).

Iadov's most decisive step away from the creative perspective of work emerged in 1982. In an article called, "Motivation of Labor: Problems and Methods of Research" (1982),
he virtually rejected the idea that the content of work was the decisive determinant of worker attitudes. Based on a comparison of the 1976 study of Leningrad workers to his earlier research in 1962, Iadov's argument appears to shift to the notion that working conditions, rather than intrinsic work content, are the most significant factors affecting work attitudes.

At first, Iadov seems to adhere to his initial perspective, indicating that "a statistically significant shift in the structure of value orientations toward an increase in the role of motives connected to work content took place" (1982, p. 33). Yet it emerges that this shift pertains only to "generalized motives;" that is, workers gave very high ranking to the importance of interesting work when the questions were phrased about work at an abstract, general level. But when asked about "concrete situational attitudes," i.e., about their actual jobs, we discover that it was "occupational conditions which grew in importance" (p. 33). In light of Popova and Moin's findings, we might even argue that the 1962 data could reveal the same patterns if it were reanalyzed in a different way.

Publications by other sociologists on Iadov's research team also suggest that the creative view of work is inconsistent with the newest data. Golofast et al., (1983) cite figures from the study which cast doubt on the connection between work content, job satisfaction and productivity. The data show that workers in extremely monotonous work are no less likely to show initiative, be disciplined, or conscientious on the job than workers in
relatively complex work, were judged to be good workers by their supervisors, 66 percent of assembly line workers were so evaluated. The authors also acknowledged that differences in work content do not appear to relate to workers' leisure and consumer preferences, in contrast to the creative view that the content of work shapes all aspects of the lives of workers (1983, p. 60).

In the revision of his own views, Iadov went even further. Establishing that workers are very sensitive to working conditions, he recognized that work content is (at least now) not of great significance. "It would be vicious, extreme, insufficient and lopsided to look for the explanation of worker motivation in the technological aspects of work," which presumably determine its task content (Iadov, 1982, p. 35). Iadov concludes, following the trends, that now the geographical location of employment, with its impact on working and living conditions, is the primary factor determining attitudes toward work: "the workers of the Lithuanian capital, with all their differences in the content of their work, turned out to be closer to each other than to workers in provincial enterprises with the same work content" (p. 35).

A New Soviet Typology: Good and Bad Workers

The various developments in Soviet society during the Brezhnev era accelerated the process of the demoralization of labor which had begun in the late 1950s as the country entered the period characterized by limited political repression and the
decaying influence of the official ideology. In this context, the Soviet leadership, as well as scholars and journalists, have begun to suggest a new interpretation to the problems of worker motivation. This interpretation is based on the assumption of two categories of workers emerging in Soviet society: while one category continues to work honestly and conscientiously, another category has apparently developed such negative attitudes toward work that they seek to minimize their contributions and often consider other activities (in the second economy, for example) as primary sources of income.

In some respects, this interpretation stems from the shortcomings of the earlier orientations to the sociological understanding of work. These approaches, which had emphasized the influence of material rewards, moral/ideological encouragement, or the task content of work, appear increasingly irrelevant to a substantial segment of the workforce. A growing proportion of workers reject the value of work as such and, under these circumstances, it appears doubtful whether any attempts to alter the characteristics of employment in any form can generate positive attitudes toward work.

Indeed, these negative attitudes toward work are seen to be so strongly rooted that they are being passed along to new generations of Soviet workers. Given the critical role of the family in the socialization process, these new generations often appear immune to the efforts of schools or the mass media to impart more positive values in relation to work and society (see Aitov's [1983] research on the impact of the family in the
development of work attitudes in his aptly titled book, *Good and Bad Workers*).

It is noteworthy that Yuri Andropov (1983) was the first Soviet leader to publicly address this problem, if in less than sophisticated theoretical terms. His spiritual successor, Mikhail Gorbachev, has also sought to draw attention to this issue with his calls for "social justice," which include appeals to halt the exploitation of committed workers by a growing group of the negligent (*Pravda*, 24 April 1985).

Among Soviet scholars, Tatiana Zaslavskaya has offered the most theoretically informed analysis of this development. She argues that certain social and historical patterns have led to the creation of large groups of unproductive, even disruptive, workers. The most productive, "social" type of worker is seen to be shaped by "firmly acquired norms of behavior in the spheres of production, distribution, exchange and consumption", resulting in the adoption of a series of desirable qualities, such as "conscientiousness," "responsibility," "reliability," and so on (*Zaslavskaya*, 1984, p. 40; see also her interview with *Izvestlia*, 1 June 1985, p. 3).

Yet not all workers are receptive to these norms of behavior, despite the efforts of the society to develop them. Immediate social circumstances, she argues, do not act alone to condition behavior, for they interact with long-term historical patterns. Hence, she refers to "the spiritual influence of older generations on the younger" and the "historical receptiveness (for positive values) of the specific traits of various
nationality groups (e.g., Russians, Georgians, Estonians, Germans), each of which somehow bears the imprint of the path of the development of the corresponding peoples over the centuries."

Such historical patterns have "great inertia and will not yield easily to the influence on the part of management organs" (p. 40).

From this perspective, then, attitudes toward work cannot be reduced to the features of the work at all, whether these are intrinsic and task-related or extrinsic (including working conditions, remuneration and so on). These factors must be seen as interacting with other variables which are largely unrelated to work. In other words, attitudes toward specific jobs are, in many respects, conditioned by attitudes toward work as such and these latter attitudes are much less open to change by altering the character of actual jobs.

The result is the creation of a large group of workers "which fails to answer not only the strategic goal of a developed socialist society, but the technological demands of contemporary production as well." This group of workers is characterized as follows.

A low level of labor and production discipline, indifferent attitudes toward the work being done, low quality of work, social inertia, low importance of work as a means of self-realization, strongly pronounced consumer orientations, and low level of morality are traits common to many workers, which have been shaped during recent five-year plans. It is enough to recall the broad scale of the activities of so-called 'pliferers', the spread of all sorts of 'shady' dealings at public expense, the development of illicit 'enterprises' and figure-finagling, and the 'worming out' of wages regardless of the results of work (Zaslavskala, 1984, p. 40).
In the past, Soviet sociologists had focused on the factors which shaped attitudes toward work before the individual actually acquired work experience. Until recently, however, discussions of socialization factors affecting work attitudes had largely addressed the processes of occupational choice (Shubkin, 1970; Titma, 1973; Kirkh, 1977). Thus Zaslavskaya's analysis of the factors related to the historical development of national groups represents a novel attempt to broaden the scope of analytical attention. To some degree, this emphasis on the role of primary socialization in shaping work attitudes is a further step away from orthodox Soviet Marxism which stresses the decisive impact of immediate social and occupational conditions.

Conclusions

This article has sought to demonstrate how the views of Soviet social scientists on worker attitudes have undergone significant change in recent years. Two factors have been important in shaping this evolution: one, the vicissitudes of the Soviet economy, coupled with the numerous failures of the leadership to raise productivity; and two, the gradual movement of Soviet analysts away from the strictures of Soviet Marxism. Released from strict ideological control, Soviet sociologists of work were able to develop a variety of innovative approaches which significantly deepened the understanding of worker attitudes.

This article has indicated five different approaches in the development of Soviet views on work. While all of these continue to exist in the current period, the dominant theme today stresses
the importance of a hedonistic orientation among workers who prefer prestigious, easy work and favorable working conditions.

With the exception of the most ideologically-oriented, Soviet sociologists today reject the idea that ideological commitment can be an adequate motivation for productive work among large numbers of people. This is not to deny that the Soviet people are indifferent to the importance of their work to society. They do wish to see their work as socially useful, but not at the expense of their own individual interests.

Soviet scholars are also aware of the limitations of the purely materialistic approach to worker motivation, which links productivity to the size of the paycheck. As living standards have increased, education has become more widespread, and access to information about life in large cities and other countries has broadened; the Soviet people have greatly expanded their aspirations and expectations and they now judge the quality of life, including worklife, by new standards only somewhat shaped by their immediate material conditions.

It has been shown that for a period, as the shortcomings of the materialist approach became more evident, analysts were drawn to focus on the intrinsic qualities of work as the dominant factor affecting worker motivation. People were principally motivated, it was argued, by the desire for interesting and creative work. Yet this approach was, in some respects, also one-sided and perhaps was an overreaction to the earlier dominance of the materialist perspective.
The difficulties facing the Soviet economy in the 1970s, particularly in agriculture, compelled observers to revise their concepts on the role of creative work content and to approach the motivation of workers in more sober ways. Rather than a return to the simplistic materialist conception, efforts were directed toward the development of a more complex approach which, while not ignoring the impact of work content, placed greater emphasis on working conditions which could make work easier, cleaner and less onerous.

More recently, other analysts have taken a longer-term historical perspective and concluded that the understanding of work attitudes requires a grasp not only of the immediate circumstances of work, but also the personal values of different segments of the population. The emergence of categories of highly productive and highly troublesome workers is of considerable significance because the differentiating values of these groups have a direct impact on attitudes toward a variety of social and political issues.

It is clear, then, that the Soviet sociology of work has made considerable progress since its emergence in the late 1950s. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Soviet leadership will be able to develop sufficient flexibility to take what has been learned and seriously integrate it into a program to truly revitalize the economy.
NOTES

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1. In the early years of the Stakhanovite movement (1935-37), the newspapers and other official publications regularly informed the population how many managers and engineers had been declared criminals (see, for example, Pravda, 7 May 1936, 22 May 1936; see also KPSS v Resolutsiakh i Resheniakh, 1953, p. 813). The headline of one Pravda article stated, "Saboteurs Prevent Us From Working Like Stakhanov" (Pravda, 3 June 1936). Citing the decline of coal production in Donbass, despite the efforts of the Stakhanovites, Pravda ended an editorial stressing, "Cleaning the Donbass of saboteurs, it is necessary to help the whole mass of engineers and technicians head the Stakhanovite movement" (7 June 1936).

As one party magazine indicated, by mid-December 1936, in the Donbass alone criminal charges were leveled against fifty-six supervisors, foremen, and others (Partiinoe stroiitel'stvo, 1935, Vol. 22-23, p. 18). In addition, in The Appeal of the Presidium of the Soviet Trade Unions, it was demanded that "trade unions give resolute rejection to all saboteurs from trade unions and managerial bodies who undermine the unfolding of the Stakhanovite movement" (Zvezdin, 1965, p. 130). Not only did party leaders such as Zhdanov and Khrushchev, but even Ordzhonikidze who directly ran Soviet industry, sought to frighten engineers and managers with accusations of sabotage. Only later, having realized the consequences of this policy, did the leadership retreat from this approach (see Partiinoe stroiitel'stvo, 1935, Vol. 22-23; Gershberg, 1971; Stalin, 1952).

2. Scholars who study the Stakhanovite movement find that there is little primary evidence of its contours other than official documents and journalistic accounts. How to deal with these accounts divides scholars. For a viewpoint which differs from my own, see Lewis Sigelbaum 1983, 1984, 1985. Some of the most illuminating evidence concerning the economic impact of the Stakhanovite movement can be seen in the changing attitudes of the leadership toward it in the later 1930s. After Stalin had accomplished his political goals in the purges, he gradually began to downgrade the role of the Stakhanovites. The shrinking role of the movement in the mass media paralleled the increase in the business-like approach to the economy. Stalin did not even mention the movement in his report to the 18th Party Congress in 1939 (Stalin, 1952). Molotov devoted only a few lines to the movement in his report on economic problems in the same year (Kommunisticheskii Internatsional, 1939, Vol. 3, p. 65). The movement also took on a low profile in Pravda's discussions of economic issues.

Just before the war, Granovskii, a prominent economist, wrote on the movement in a Pravda article, "The Reserves in the
Growth of Productivity" (3 October 1939). Yet the major thrust of his discussion was on the backwardness of Soviet industry compared to that in the U.S. In another Pravda article, a newer innovative movement was praised, in which one workers performed many jobs, but the Stakhanovites were only mentioned casually (9 October 1939).

3. It is also noteworthy that even the 1947 article was much more sober in its presentation of the movement in comparison with prewar treatments, when mass terror was at its peak. For example, the 1947 article did not mention the resistance of the technical intelligentsia to the movement, which had been a regular theme between 1935 and 1939 (see Istoriia Vsesouznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii Bol'shevikov 1938, pp. 322-24). Siegelbaum (1985) also devotes considerable mention to the struggle of the technical intelligentsia against the shock workers.

4. The fiftieth anniversary of the Stakhanovite movement spawned a large number of new publications on the subject. Some of these, in the general spirit of the revival of neo-Stalinism (see Rumer and Shlapentokh, 1985), reintroduced many elements of prewar propaganda into the analysis of the movement. Yet even the most "Stalinist" of these publications considered the ideological motives of the movement's participants to be secondary to material incentives. Kozlov and Khlevniuk, for example, impute ideological motives only to the small minority who initiated the movement and link the rise in productivity in general to improvements in material incentives. Even the social motives of the Stakhanovites were interpreted in rather modern terms, stemming not so much from orientations to selfless work for the benefit of socialist society, but from interests in self-actualization "on the basis of collectivist values and norms approved by the authority of Soviet power" (1985, pp. 55-64). In another article, printed in Pravda in commemoration of the anniversary, the author, who had been a shock worker, completely ignored the ideological impetus to work and discussed the question in relation to the improved organization of production (Shilkin, 1985). The new elevation of the Stakhanovite movement in Soviet ideology was manifested also in the publication of the memoirs of the leading Stakhanovites (Shagalov, 1984).

5. A more realistive view of worklife in the 1930s is revealed in the literature of later periods, especially in that emerging during the liberalization of the 1960s (such as Zalygin's On the River Irtysh, Belov's On the Eve, Abramov's Two Winters and Three Summers and Mozhaev's From the Life of Ivan Kuzkin). The images presented in these works suggest that, for the majority—especially in the countryside—the greatest concerns were for sheer physical survival, given the threats of starvation and repression. In the view of these writers, ideological motives for work were far from important for Soviet peasants. A few novels of the same period also provided a
similar picture of industrial workers in the 1930s (see Voinovich, 1963; Vladimov, 1983).

6. The book, *Questions of the Theory and Practice of Socialist Emulation*, edited by Eugenii Kapustin, director of the Institute of Economics in Moscow, devoted only nine lines out of three hundred pages to the Stakhanovite movement and even avoided using the term. Instead it was mentioned as an "innovative movement of the 1930s headed by A. Stakhanov, N. Busygin, M. Mazal, I. Gudov, and others" (1983, p. 157).

The lack of any references to the Stakhanovites in the book, *Socialist Emulation and the Efficacy of Production* (Abduratsov, 1983) is to some degree especially notable, because the book was published in Uzbekistan, where ideological rigidity is normally greater than in Moscow. One chapter of the book, *Socialist Emulation and the Development of Personality* (Kurmanbaev, 1983), published in Kazakhstan, did mention the name of Busygin, a famous participant in the movement, but while mentioning that he was a "shock worker" did not add that he was a Stakhanovite (p. 67; see also Kutorzhevskii and Smirnov, 1974).

It is also worth recognizing that the Stakhanovite movement has become the object of some mild criticism. For example, in the book, *Developed Socialism and the Creativity of the Masses: The Actual Question of Theory and Practice of Socialist Emulation*, the movement is cited largely as a negative example of socialist emulation because it spread unevenly throughout the economy (Smol'kov and Fedinin, 1979, pp. 27-28).

7. At the same time, other historians closer to the party apparatus, continued to discuss the movement in terms reminiscent of the 1940s. The official *History of the Communist Party* (Kukin and Nazarenko 1971) did not stray too far from Stalin's "Short Course" and suggested that the movement emerged in an atmosphere of "grandiose labor enthusiasm and creative activity of the toilers". It was also argued that the "outstanding labor achievements of the Stakhanovites set new tasks in the development of technology before the research units in factories and academic science" (1971, p. 381; see also Alekseev et al., 1973).

8. Data from the U.S., however, also showed a relatively low relationship between the substantive complexity of jobs and their closeness of supervision, a correlation of 0.24 (Kohn and Schooler, 1982, p. 1266).

9. In the light of the apparent role of dominant values, it is important to check the validity of data in research on worker attitudes. The failure to do so in Slomczynski, Hiller and Kohn's (1981) comparison of U.S. and Polish attitudes is of interest in this connection. Their research apparently fails to consider the socio-political conditions of life in a Soviet-type socialist society. The authors contend that higher social position in Poland (such as party apparatchiki, officers in the security police and army) and in the U.S. "is associated with
valuing self-direction and with holding social orientations consonant with valuing self-direction--namely a non-authoritarian, open-minded orientation, personally responsible standards of morality and trustfulness" (1981, p. 741). The authors' conclusion is surprising in light of Polish experience since 1956. The fact that many highly-placed Polish respondents highly evaluated values of self-direction is not surprising when we consider the normative pattern and ideological cliches about open-mindedness and independence that dominate the intellectual sub-culture. However, in one respect, U.S. and Polish data do differ substantially: in this country, men of higher social position had more favorable self-concepts, while in Poland the correlation was reversed. The explanation of this phenomenon proposed by the authors, which conflicts with their theory, is interesting for it is seemingly incompatible with the harsh realities of Polish life. On the one hand, the low self-concept of people in higher positions was attributed to their self-deprecation, a phenomenon extremely strange with respect to officials in a Soviet-type society. On the other hand, the fairly high self-concept of people with low occupational positions was attributed to the fact that the workers "are now held in higher social regard" and "there is every reason for them to feel more confident" (p. 742). Against the backdrop of Polish events in 1980-81, these words sound quite strange, as if the anger of the Polish working class against the dominant regime and the emergence of Solidarity can be treated as irrelevant.

10. It is curious that even Changli, a representative of the ideological approach, would provide us with data which undermine her conclusions about the growing devotion of people to communist labor. Only 73 percent of her Moscow respondents were willing to continue to work under any circumstances. For workers in Ivanovo, the proportion was 68 percent; among those in Perm, the figure fell to 62 percent and to 57 percent among workers in Erevan. Even party members were not afraid to confess their dislike for work: 20 percent of all Moscow party members did not give the expected positive responses to the question (Changli, 1978, p. 186-87).

11. In their survey of young people in Kostroma, a typical Russian city in the European part of the USSR, Shubkin and his colleagues asked respondents to rate fourteen job characteristics according to their importance in shaping their occupational choices. Among those with higher education, the "usefulness of the work to society" was ranked third in importance, and second among those with lower educational attainment (Shubkin, 1984). However, given the hypothetical nature of this exercise, respondents were not actually choosing their own futures,--it is difficult to determine how this factor actually operates in real situations, when specific choices have to be made.

12. Kolodizh inquired of students in secondary schools and their parents about their attitudes toward various issues
connected with their work. In one question, he asked his respondents to name the most important positive features of those enterprises in the city they considered desirable places to work. The conditions of work were cited by 8-9 percent of the respondents, behind such factors as "interesting work," "importance of the product," and "good organization of work," which yielded about 10 and 15 percent of the responses (1978, pp. 113-14).

13. Paradoxically, it appears that Soviet sociologists have not generally paid much attention to the role of class origin in shaping attitudes toward work, compared to American sociologists. Despite the emphasis in Soviet ideology on the "class approach" to investigation, the variable of class is not frequently included in research. This stems partly from another component of official ideology, which stresses the increasing homogeneity of Soviet society. Thus, an analysis of questionnaires employed by Soviet sociologists found that the class origin of respondents was researched in only 24 percent of all surveys, while questions of educational attainment were found in 87 percent of all questionnaires, and questions on occupation in 57 percent. Content analysis of articles published in Sotsiologicheskie Issledovanija between 1974 and 1977 found that the respondents' occupations were used to classify data in only 40 percent of all studies (Petrenko and Iaroshenko, 1979).
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