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Abstract

While scholars have intensively studied Yugoslavia’s weaknesses and dissolution (both in the interwar and post-World War II eras) from political and economic perspectives, there has been less work on the issue of cultural cohesion so crucial to Yugoslavism (the Yugoslav idea) as it was conceived and developed in the nineteenth century and elaborated upon during World War I. In particular, there has been little attempt to interrogate the long-term (1918–today) discursive construction of Yugoslav identity by means of collective memory—that is, the selectively shared stories people tell about themselves in order to give meaning to the ‘nation,’ a sense of belonging to the ‘national culture.’ And yet from the moment Yugoslavia was created, ordinary Yugoslavists began constructing the Sarajevo assassination as a heroic narrative of opposition and liberation that transcended the particularist identities of ethnicity, nation, religion, and history. How did the different Yugoslav regimes and post-Yugoslav political elites respond to these efforts to shape a collective cultural memory around Gavrilo Princip’s political murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire? What can the various manifestations of this memory and official attitudes towards it tell us about the Yugoslav national project writ large? These are the main themes addressed in my paper.
Mystification: the active means of not taking the world seriously.

—Milan Kundera

Unhappy the land that has need of heroes.

—Bertolt Brecht
Yugoslav Eulogies: The Footprints of Gavrilo Princip

Less than two years after the “war to end all wars” had finally ended, an illuminating ceremony took place in the town of Terezín, in the northwest corner of the new state of Czechoslovakia: the exhumed remains of the Sarajevo assassins were given a heroes’ sendoff; they were going home. And for the first time since King Tvrtko I ruled medieval Bosnia and Herzegovina from his heavily guarded mountain redoubt of Bobovac, home for the Bosnian people meant something other than foreign governance—an affiliated existence in a newly formed south Slavic state christened the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Gavrilo Princip and his fellow assassins may not have counted on world war when they conspired against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Yet in the end—millions of destroyed lives later—their ideals had, in a very literal sense, been realized.

Of course, the reality is always more complex than the legend allows, and the struggle for a unified south Slavic (i.e., Yugoslav) state that began in the early nineteenth century was by no means made easier by the assassination and war that heralded the twentieth. After all, many non Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia had responded to the political murder with violence against their fellow Serb citizens. And with Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, and Bosnians of all ethnoreligious backgrounds fighting in the vengeful Austro-Hungarian armies that devastated Belgrade and then slashed, burned, and raped their way through the rest of Serbia, forging political unity (to say nothing of social harmony) at times appeared pointless, if not impossible.¹ Yugoslavist agitation certainly persisted during the repressive war years. Yet what ultimately secured victory for the London-based Yugoslav Committee (Jugoslovenski Odbor, or JO) was, ironically, defeat—both that of Serbia and, in 1918, of Austria-Hungary. For Serbian prime minister Nikola Pašić, his country’s collapse in 1915 meant tempering his ‘Greater Serbia’ annexationist aims and signing on to the July 1917 Corfu Declaration, which called for the creation of “a constitutional, democratic and parliamentary monarchy.” With his army and government stranded on Greek soil and ally Russia reeling from revolution, Pašić entered into an agreement with people who espoused principles such as “national right” and “self-determination,” and who expected Croats, Slovenes, and Bosnians to be treated equally to Serbs.²

A little over a year later, however, the Yugoslavists of the JO and the Croatian Sabor (parliament) were on the defensive. As Serbian-controlled armies retook occupied territory and revolutionary movements and military mutinies gripped the
region, the Sabor ceded its power to a National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, which favored an independent south Slavic state. To be sure, this unification had different meanings for the anti-liberal Pašić and republican JO leaders, and the Council justifiably feared a state “under the aegis of Serbia.” Yet at the time, what mattered most was quelling the disorder and warding off the Italian forces striking out against envisioned Yugoslav territory. And for this, the Serbian army was indispensable. In November 1918, the National Council practically begged it to send units into Croatia. On December 1, Council leaders stood by in Belgrade as the Serbian regent Aleksandar proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

On a purely political plane, the new south Slavic state was principally a product of wartime exigency and impulse, compromise and concession. While Habsburg Yugoslavists and Serbian leaders had each sought some form of common state, they had hoped to achieve this “within the framework of their own historical agendas” rather than as the least bad alternative to either ‘Greater Serbia’ or a small, Croat-dominated ‘Habsburg Yugoslavia’. The vast majority of ordinary citizens of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, which comprised over half the new Yugoslav territory, not only had no direct say in the matter, but many had supported Austria-Hungary during the war and, thus, assumed upon its break up that the United States and/or the Corfu Declaration would protect them from Serbian dominance. Instead, as the historian Ivo Banac emphasizes, Serbian power redounded in “a unification that did not meet even the basic desire of those who wanted a federal state organization.” Serbia sacrificed its flag and name to the united state, yet all major military, government, and bureaucratic functions remained in Serb hands, resided in the Serb capital, and were reigned over by the Serb king, who swore allegiance to a highly centralizing constitution on that most sacred of Serb days—Vidovdan (June 28, 1921). “It was a beginning,” writes Margaret MacMillan, “from which Yugoslavia never recovered.”

Serbian supremacy may not have been most Yugoslavists’ ideal for nationhood, but their contribution to the construction of a south Slavic state penetrated far deeper than politics. Specifically, it was in the realm of culture that Yugoslav-oriented intellectuals articulated a national vision that blended the ethnic riches of the separate south Slavic peoples into a single, seductive Yugoslav culture. During the war, Yugoslavist newspapers, almanacs, and an exhibition of the work of the pro-Yugoslav sculptor Ivan Meštrović at London’s Victoria and Albert Museum propagated the multicultural idea abroad, while celebrations marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb and the centenary of the birth of Petar Preradović, “the Poet of National Unity,” sharpened south Slavic sensibilities.
at home. “By late 1917,” writes the literary scholar Andrew Wachtel, “it had become difficult to find a printed organ that was not in favor of Yugoslav unity.”

Wachtel’s study of how the intellectual arbiters of “Yugoslavism” (the Yugoslav idea) strove to instill the diverse South Slavs with what he calls a “horizontal sense of belonging to a single nation” is crucial for this paper. For in his consideration of such cultural processes as the codification of a shared national language and the cultivation of a Yugoslav literary, artistic, and historical canon, Wachtel reminds us that nations flourish or fail foremost as cultural artifacts rather than political acts. The war may have wreaked havoc on the ultimate (though by no means inevitable) outcome of the struggle for south Slavic unity. Yet the indispensable, “invented” ingredients of any national project—standardized print language and accompanying efforts to commonalize history and customs/traditions—remain, at bottom, cultural.

Thus the fact that the first phase of Yugoslav statehood featured a stiff tilt toward Serbian ascendancy is not the harbinger of doom for Wachtel and other scholars who study Yugoslavism that it is for MacMillan. While the polarizing politics and national tensions of the new state tended to overshadow the “far more creative ways” in which cultural unitarism developed, of equal import is that Yugoslav leaders generally left the cultural sphere alone. How else could the integralist, authoritarian Kingdom, which needed to preserve domestic, interethnic peace while also maintaining the country’s international standing, have allowed prominent celebrations of an assassination that had led to outbreaks of outright interethnic violence and would always be linked to the immediate origins of the First World War?

Of course, this question is even more complicated for the simple reason that Yugoslavia was so complicated. Not only were there two forms of government and phases of civil war over the course of the country’s less than eighty-year history, but the Yugoslav peoples were themselves marked by starkly different historical experiences and ethnnonational identities, despite their linguistic overlap. Among all of these elements, what part would invocations of Princip’s memory play in the Yugoslav historical drama that unfolded over the last century?

While scholars have intensively studied Yugoslavia’s weaknesses and dissolution (both in the interwar and post–World War II eras) from political and economic perspectives, there has been little work on this issue of cultural cohesion so crucial to the Yugoslav idea. Apart from Wachtel’s focus on high culture and Dejan Djokić’s broader collected work Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, there has been virtually no attempt to interrogate the long-term (from 1918 through today) discursive construction of Yugoslav identity by means of what Maurice Halbwachs called “collective memory”—that is, those selectively shared stories people tell...
about themselves in order to give meaning to the ‘nation’ and a sense of belonging to the ‘national culture’. The dearth of analysis on these consciously produced and propagated narratives may be because longstanding, if more localized myths such as the Kosovo Battle (1389) for Serbs and the purported Bogomil origins of Bosnian Muslims have eclipsed Yugoslavist efforts to forge a collective identity. Yet from the moment the country was created, ordinary Yugoslavists, with no backing from the government or sovereign, began constructing the Sarajevo assassination as a story of opposition and liberation that transcended the particularist identities of ethnicity, nation, religion, and history. In other words, they sought to shape a shared memory that could be meaningful to Yugoslavia’s diverse peoples, including Serbs (whose independence in 1878 preceded that of the Habsburg South Slavs), Slovenes, Croats, Dalmatians, and others.

How did the different Yugoslav regimes and post-Yugoslav political elites regard the Princip liberation narrative and respond to these grassroots and Bosnia-centered efforts to shape a collective cultural memory around it? What can the various manifestations of this memory and official attitudes toward it from 1918 to today tell us about the Yugoslav national project writ large? Generalizing about any country and its peoples is always a contested and tenuous undertaking, and all the more so with an ethnonational amalgam like Yugoslavia. I thus make no claim to argue for all Yugoslavs. On the contrary, I offer the disclaimer that my research is relatively restricted to sources from Bosnia, Serbia and, to a lesser extent, Croatia, where Yugoslavists were (for reasons that will readily be apparent, if they are not already) most actively invested in coming to terms with the Archduke’s murder.

The Sarajevo assassination was, after all, largely a local event, likely initiated and unquestionably carried out by Bosnian youth whose leading aim was to liberate Bosnia and Herzegovina from Austro-Hungarian rule. Although their weapons and training came from the secret Serb nationalist society Unification or Death (Ujedinjenje ili Smrt, also known as Crna Ruka—The Black Hand), the assassins themselves, as their trial record shows, adhered to no specific political ideology beyond the generally expressed wish that a liberated Bosnia-Herzegovina could join with other South Slavs in some form of Yugoslavist political union. They thus neither anticipated nor celebrated the international consequences of their insular actions. In fact one of the assassins, the bomb-thrower Nedeljko Čabrinović, stated that had he known world war was to result, “I would have sat on that bomb and let it blow me to pieces.”

The Sarajevo assassins were, clearly, not responsible for the outbreak of World War I. Rather their locally focused act of political protest is so absurdly dispropor-
tionate to that global cataclysm and all it gave rise to, including Yugoslavia, that the assassination epitomizes what the historian Pierre Nora calls a “founding” or “spectacular” event—one “on which posterity retrospectively confers the greatness of origins, the solemnity of inaugural ruptures.” Accordingly, Princip’s shots, just as the physical space in which they transpired, constitute a lieu de mémoire, a site of memory on which to explore how this past has been presented and construed over the course of Yugoslavia’s existence and since its dissolution.¹⁶

To return to Terezín, then, is to go back to the opening act of a great national epic which, in turn, came to define an epoch. For as chronologies of the “short twentieth century” (beginning with the Sarajevo assassination and ending with the fall of communism and breakup of Yugoslavia) attest, it was ultimately the South Slavs who would have to grapple most intimately and indelibly with the meaning of Franz Ferdinand’s political murder in the context of their common identity in a united new state.¹⁷

**Memory’s Ambivalences: The Yugoslav Kingdoms**

Even before the Yugoslav kingdom was created, Austria-Hungary was wary of efforts to memorialize the Sarajevo assassins as martyrs for national liberation. After all, the assassins themselves had built a quasi-religious hero-cult around the young Bosnian Bogdan Žerajić, who killed himself in the center of Sarajevo after failing to assassinate Bosnian Governor General Marijan Varešanin in June 1910. Žerajić’s grave had become a pilgrimage site for Bosnian youth, and Austro-Hungarian officials did not wish the same to happen with the Sarajevo assassins. Thus the unmarked Terezín gravesites of Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, and Trifko Grabež were intended to have faded out of sight and out of mind, like so many of the mass graves of the murderous century to which the murder of an Austrian archduke improbably gave rise.

It took a Czech guard at Terezín to see to it that memory was served. Like many Czechs working at the fortress prison, František Lebl sympathized with the nationalist ideals of his Slavic brethren. And like any decent human being, he was appalled by the cruel conditions in which the Sarajevo assassins had been made to live out their lethal prison terms. Consequently, when commanded on April 29, 1918, to make Princip’s remains disappear down a hole in the city cemetery, the eighteen-year-old undertook a personal protest against Austria-Hungary—stealthily mapping the burial site and, before departing to defend his thus betrayed country,
mailing it to his father in case he did not come back alive. Yet Lebl did survive the
war, and he honored his pledge to the Bosnian boys by informing the Czechoslovakian Consulate in Zagreb as to the precise placement of the graves.\(^\text{18}\) He then wrote to the Bosnian committee tasked with transferring the remains back to their native earth: “Never in my dreams,” he began movingly, “did I imagine that it would fall to me, a Czech from Roudnice, to bestow this final tribute upon Gavrilo Princip.”\(^\text{19}\)

Indeed it did fall to this one ordinary man to ensure the maintenance of a universal mainstay of national memory—the remains of the martyrs. As the anthropologist Katherine Verdery has argued, “dead bodies have posthumous political life in the service of creating a newly meaningful universe.”\(^\text{20}\) Lebl, accordingly, was richly rewarded with three thousand “fine Bosnian cigarettes” and, obviously, infinite approbation.\(^\text{21}\) The drama then relocated to Sarajevo, where fundraising began for the transfer of all the accomplices’ remains, including the plot’s leader, Danilo Ilić; two abettors hanged beside him on February 3, 1915; three peasants who died in an Austrian prison; and the original Bosnian assassin, Bogdan Žerajić.\(^\text{22}\)

Timing, of course, was crucial. In order to ensure the transfer was as well funded and fêted as possible, it was put off until June 1920—Vidovdan—when the first postwar all-Sokol jamboree was set to take place in newly independent Czechoslovakia.\(^\text{23}\) In the interim, Terezín municipal authorities, along with Yugoslav students in Prague and a Czech society formed solely to hoist a headstone for the assassins, exhumed the bodies and placed them into baroque metal coffins in a “festive” and “imposing” ceremony held on June 9, 1919.\(^\text{24}\) “The Sarajevo act,” exclaimed the editor of \textit{Večerní České Slovo} (Evening Czech Word) at the graveside gathering, “represented a purgative bolt of lightning into a stifling atmosphere,” transforming Terezín from “our mutual prison, a fortress for suffering all the evil exercised by Austria,” into “a symbol of our common liberation.”\(^\text{25}\)

The language used in Bosnian Serb Stevan Žakula’s account of the corpse transfer ceremony a year later (July 1, 1920) was no less restrained. After describing the “mission” to bring the “holy relics” of those who unified and freed the Yugoslav fatherland back to “proud Sarajevo, cradle of their deed,” Žakula unbridles his exuberance altogether:

\begin{quote}
I have had many exciting moments, but have never felt anything akin to what I experienced as I approached that draped podium with the remains of those whose manhood and devotion I so admired. That image made such an impression that even today, when I recall it, it makes my every nerve tremble. An almost unbearable sense of pain and sorrow and, at the same time, of pride and horror, was coursing through my body like the strongest electrical current. Is that you there under the crucified
\end{quote}
savior-sufferer Christ, Gavrilo Princip, marvelous shot, who with a bullet from a skillfully concealed revolver slit the throat of the 600-year old Habsburg dynasty?

This sacralized discourse paid homage to the bomb-throwing Čabrinović—“that fearless boy who plays with a fiery apple”—and the other assassins in equally embroidered idioms.\(^26\)

Interestingly, Žakula’s account of the assassins’ “return to the Fatherland” is eerily similar to the adulation that met the murdered royals’ own, unhappy journey home through Bosnia. While General Staff Colonel Paul Höger reported being moved by sights of “mute, impressive mourning” as the train transporting the bodies of Ferdinand and Sophie slipped through the summer night; Žakula marvels at the “solemn and pious” crowds that greeted the “triumphal parade of the deceased Heroes.”\(^27\) Just as black-clad peasants turned out all along the official route from Sarajevo to the sea, Žakula spies peasants kissing “like some icon” the carriage carrying the assassins’ remains. According to Ludwig Hesshaimer, “an enormous crowd” filled the hills around Sarajevo, “silently, motionlessly” watching the royal train roll out of town;\(^28\) according to Dragoslav Ljubibratić, “tens of thousands of citizens” were on hand to meet the train carrying Princip and his accomplices when it arrived in Sarajevo.\(^29\) Truly, one strains to trust Žakula’s depiction given the scene in Bosnia in late June 1914—when the bells of its capital chime cheerlessly for the slain heir and his wife, and the outbreak of virulent, anti-Serb violence makes yet more victims and “martyrs”.

**Martyr Princip: Creating and Contesting the “Cult”**

Neven Andjelic and other scholars have pointed out that the pogroms and property destruction directed against Serbs after the assassination represented something relatively new in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the first large-scale outburst of interethnic hatred.\(^30\) Since Bosnian brutality prior to 1914 was commonly of the economic or anti-imperialistic sort, the inflamed, anti-Serb feelings set loose by the assassination were not easily buried with the assassins.
themselves. The murder, in fact, stirred so much violence in parts of Croatia that military rule had to be imposed, and the Croatian Assembly was suspended due to attacks on Serb deputies and their Croat colleagues in the ruling Croat-Serb coalition.\textsuperscript{31} Despite much Croatian opposition to the empire and, especially, its overbearing Hungarian overseers, Catholic Croats stood the most to gain from the highly pious and anti-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Thus many rejected as a “perfidious fraud” the fact that one of their own—Ivan Kranjčević—was among the plotters of the assassination. Some journals even went so far as to change his name from Ivan (Croatian) to Milan (Serbian).\textsuperscript{32} As Croatian clerics lashed out at the “whole force of blood-sucking Serbs and Slavo-Serbs, who sell out our homeland,”\textsuperscript{33} Bishop Ivan Šarić’s rhyming requiem “The Martyred Archduke” delivered the maudlin lines:

\begin{quote}
He was a hero robust and strong  
Like a hundred-year-old oak in the mountain;  
Like a ray of sunlight he sliced through ice and darkness,  
He was our life and our evolution . . .

He, Franz Ferdinand, wondrous Archduke,  
Guardian angel of the Croatian people,  
Like a balm on a wound, soothing to all,  
Like a native son, dear to all Croats.\textsuperscript{34}
\end{quote}

Despite expanded opportunities for participation in political life, the new state never did solve the “Croatian question”—that is, “the majority of Croats’ refusal to accept fully the Yugoslav state centralist institutions and their determination to seek wide autonomy.”\textsuperscript{35} National identities were definitely acknowledged in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (indeed, by its very name), yet this did not squelch ethnically based dissent over issues such as land reform, Italian-Yugoslav relations, and, notoriously, Serbian suzerainty. In 1921, the Bosnian social-democratic paper \textit{Zvono} (Bell) opined, “if [the assassins] were by any chance alive, they would once again be pining and dying for the idea of social liberation.”\textsuperscript{36} Five years later, the Zagreb-based Yugoslavist journal \textit{Nova Evropa} (New Europe) pounded Pašić and his Radical Party for not upholding the Yugoslav idea for which the young Bosnians had turned to “terrorist action.”\textsuperscript{37}

The Sarajevo assassination could also spark ethno-national strife in political spheres. During a parliamentary debate on March 8, 1928, for example, Stjepan Radić, the outspoken leader of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party, used the sensitive issue of “war guilt” to vent his frustration with Serbian dominance of the south Slavic state: “I say, Serbia is not at fault [for the war]. It’s just a handful of
fanatics who are ruining everything nowadays!” Radić, who had opposed Yugoslav unity in 1918, was referring, of course, to the Sarajevo assassins. By turning their alleged guilt for the war into responsibility for the problem-ridden Yugoslav state which came out of it, his words stabbed smack into the soul of Yugoslavist pride and Bosnian self-consciousness. Amid the resulting ruckus, one representative called the conspirators “the true interpreters of the people’s aspirations,” adding, “if it were not for those ‘fanatics’ . . . we would no longer be together [in one country] today!”

These resentments were a direct reflection of the difficult conditions in the Kingdom, including a weak economy, ethnonational conflict, and even political assassination. On June 20, 1928, a Montenegrin deputy shot Stjepan Radić and four party colleagues in the National Assembly; two of them died on the parliamentary floor. Radić himself clung to life until early August, long enough, perhaps, to learn that “in more Chauvinistic Serbian circles” his assassin had become “almost as much of a hero as Gavrilo Princip.”

Then, on January 6, 1929, seeking to resolve a decade of political deadlock, King Aleksandar Karađorđević obstructed parliament, proclaimed a dictatorship, reorganized the state so as to undercut ethnonational allegiances and, in October, renamed it Yugoslavia. But the “January 6 dictatorship” and its suppression of ethnonational and regional-religious affiliations did little to alleviate tensions. Indeed, in 1934 King Aleksandar was himself assassinated by Macedonian and Croatian separatists, precipitating a tacit retreat from one-nation Yugoslavism toward much greater federalism.
Sensibly, the national government kept out of most Yugoslavist cultural matters, including efforts to elevate the Sarajevo assassins. The complex and costly transfer of their remains was a completely local, Sarajevo affair; Belgrade, it appears, steered clear.\textsuperscript{41} And while the June 1930 issue of the \textit{Berliner Monatshefte} reported that a “Serbian delegation” took part, this contention by the paper’s German nationalist staff has been fully (and fulsomely) disproven, as has British Labour MP E. D. Morel’s allegation that the Serbian government was represented at the funeral mass.\textsuperscript{42}

Despite these Western efforts to impute official Serbian support to the assassination, the truth about the remains transfer is that while Czechoslovak government officials attended the Terezín tribute, not a single statesman from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes turned out!\textsuperscript{43} Similarly, only municipal leaders supported the reburial rites in Sarajevo (on July 7, 1920). Although reported on the front page of the national newspaper \textit{Politika}, this largely local event had a predominantly Serbian bent, including a keynote address by the secretary of the Serbian society \textit{Prosvjeta} (Enlightenment), Vasilj Grđić.\textsuperscript{44}
In her study of the newspaper *Srpska Riječ* (Serbian Word), the main organ of Pašić’s Radical Party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sonja Dujmović argues that Bosnian Serb Radical leaders instrumentalized the Sarajevo assassination in order to “mobilize” Serbian national identity in Yugoslavia. In view of Serbian sacrifices in the war and Christianity’s foundational affinity for martyrdom, especially that with which Orthodox Serbs associate the Vidovdan holiday, hailing Princip was perhaps a given. Dujmović thus relates how Serbs pushed the importance of the assassination by adding Princip and accomplices to the Kosovo pantheon and effacing symbols of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Most Austrians may not have been fond of Franz Ferdinand, but the regime was rather good at “staging the past.” On the third anniversary of the assassination, a mammoth monument to the slain royals arose at the foot of the Latin bridge, directly across from the site of their demise. And one year, eight months, and seven days after that, Bosnians tore it down. As the “central symbol and icon of evil” associated with the political murder, this twelve-meter tall “visual reminder of our slavery” had to go. And so it did, along with two other Austro-Hungarian memorial markers—an ornamented steel plate pressed into the (former) Franz Josef Street on the ‘exact’ spot where the Archduke’s car fatefully stopped; and a crown-crested marble plaque affixed high up the adjacent building to signpost in the vernacular the site where the heir and his wife “died a martyr’s death by treasonous hands.”

My research to date has not managed to uncover the metal plate and marble plaque. But I did discover that the monument’s ten-meter pillars and nearly one-ton bronze medallion bearing the likenesses of Ferdinand and Sophie sat out the first Yugoslavia in the Bosnian State Museum. After World War II, one column went to
a stonecutter in Trebinje and the other to a quarry in Sarajevo. As for the sculpted medallion, it has spent the better part of the last seven decades collecting dust in the basement of Sarajevo’s Art Gallery; for a small fee, you can still see it today.\textsuperscript{50} Thus were the Habsburgs brashly banished from Bosnia, just as the Bosnian Serb poet Nikola Kašiković had predicted from his jail cell during World War I:

\begin{quote}
Their days are over, we already know it
They are nearly ready for eternal repose.
And a monument, they think, will ease the blows.
But when a Serbian commando comes to Sarajevo,
Their youthful spirits will not be calmed,
Until they blow it up with bombs.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

It may have been a Serbian army that reoccupied Sarajevo in 1918, but in 1920 placards plastered across the Bosnian capital appealed to the “patriotic duty” of all south Slav “Citizens!” to ensure the respectful reburial of “our martyrs.” In stirring, if still stereotypical nationalist language, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes alike—“our three-named nation”—were summoned to Koševo cemetery to reinter the young Yugoslav assassins.\textsuperscript{52} Similarly, articles in Yugoslavist journals such as \textit{Narodno Jedinstvo} (National Unity) and \textit{Jugoslavenski List} endorsed a memorial service for the anniversary of the “national hero” Princip’s death.\textsuperscript{53} As we will see, efforts to extol the Vidovdan legacy on behalf of \textit{all} Yugoslavs, rather than just Serbs, began with the reburial and proceeded throughout the interwar era.

The eminent “poet of patriotism,” Aleksa Šantić, dutifully did his part to inspire multiethnic nationalism in the verse he wrote for the reinterment. Avoiding Serb-centrism, Šantić presented the assassination as an emblematic act of “majesty, glory, pride and honor!”:

\begin{quote}
If a stranger comes asking you [Bosnia]:
What is the loveliest thing you possess? Proudly and cheerfully
Show him the martyrs’ bright burial mound
Like a priceless treasure of the maternal breast.

Not today, Bosnia, do not dress up in
Mourning clothes. Your children did not
Die, but instead flew to the sky, where,
They settled on the dawn’s Summit . . .\textsuperscript{54}
\end{quote}

While Šantić certainly cannot be faulted his Yugoslavist credentials, his ethical consistency may seem suspect; in 1914, he wrote the poem \textit{Naš Apostol} (Our Apostle) in remembrance of the Serbian literary critic Jovan Skerlić. A prolific proponent
of Yugoslav integration, Skerlić, who died at age thirty-six, was firmly opposed to violent means of bringing it about.55

Had Skerlić lived long enough to relish the results of his Yugoslavist yearnings, would Gavrilo Princip have become his hero? Would Jovan Skerlić, whose funeral drew thousands (including Princip, who laid a wreath)56, have used his intellect and prestige to mythologize the Sarajevo assassins as “martyrs of an enlightened nationalism and . . . fighters for social justice”? It is difficult to know. What does seem clear, however, is that there was little in the way of meaningful deliberation concerning the viability, not to mention moral suitability, of nurturing national identity based on a controversial political murder.57

Assassination was not a south Slavic invention, of course. Nor was it formally endorsed in the pre-war period by the loosely knit and largely literary milieu from which the assassins came—Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia). The Congress of Yugoslav Nationalist Youth held in Vienna on the very day of the Archduke’s death actually ratified a resolution against the use of “separate assassinations” to achieve revolutionary ends.58 And Vladimir Gaćinović, who aroused a generation with the panegyric Death of a Hero (1912) for the assassin-suicide Bogdan Žerajić, seems to have been caught completely unaware by news of the Archduke’s death. In a letter sent from France in October 1914, he wrote: “I was astonished by the Sarajevo assassination: My best friends carried it out, prepared it with the skill of Russian nihilists. But the political moment deceived them, and instead of a majestic opening act this colossal event stands as a day of catastrophe, a day of national Golgotha and martyrdom."59

Of course, Gaćinović was writing at a time when Austro-Hungarian armies appeared poised to pulverize Serbia, and he would not live to luxuriate in the liberation of his people in 1918 (he died in Switzerland under mysterious circumstances in 1917). Had Young Bosnia’s “chief ideologue” been able to go back to his freed, native Bosnia, would he too have crafted romanticized renditions of the assassination?60 Would Vladimir Gaćinović have lent his literary and political skills to such interwar sentiments as: “[the assassination] brought on one of the most horrendous epochs in human history. It does not matter that our liberty cost us so much blood”; or pronounced Princip “the most meritorious man of the modern era”? The British Balkanist Edith Durham tells of a Serbian student expressing “pity that so many people were killed [in the world war],” then adding, without irony: “but in fact [the assassination] has quite succeeded, and Great Serbia has been made.” In the interwar era, Yugoslavist rhetoric regularly and uncritically elevated the Sarajevo assassins.61

This was by no means inevitable. When one considers the nationally contested ideas of Yugoslavism (particularly Serb, Croat, Slovene, and Macedonian)
Yugoslav Eulogies: The Footprints of Gavrilo Princip

and the unpropitious wartime conditions that ultimately pushed (some would say forced) south Slavic political fates together, it was not an easy undertaking to present Princip and accomplices as heroic, supra-national freedom fighters. Perhaps that’s why Vladimir Ćorović, a renowned scholar of Bosnian Serb origins, chose not to heroize the assassins in his monumental interwar work *Istorija Jugoslavije* (History of Yugoslavia). While the ritual graveside gatherings and growing “Societies of the Vidovdan Heroes” attest to the hoped-for (and highly opportunistic) cultural and political capital of the so-called Princip “cult,” not all Yugoslavists would be persuaded the assassination made good politics. In one telling example, the Croatian writer Miroslav Krleža recalls exalting the “determination and daring” of the assassins to a physician at the outset of the war. To his utter shock (“one of my most unpleasant wartime blows”), Krleža’s countryman barked back: “What! You approve of plain murder? My dear sir, you will not get far with such Balkan methods.” To paraphrase the Italian statesman Massimo Taparelli d’Azeglio following his own country’s unification: “Now that they had made Yugoslavia, all that remained was to make Yugoslavs.”

Many marshaled the Sarajevo assassination to do just that. Indeed, the period was witness to such an immense array of accolades and epic poems singing the assassins’ praises that Princip’s accomplice (and Ćorović’s colleague in the history department at Belgrade University), Vaso Ćubrilović, told the historian Luigi Albertini: “The Serbs carry on a hero-cult, and today with the name of Miloš Obilić they bracket that of Gavrilo Princip: the former stands for Serbian heroism in the tragedy of the Kosovo Polje [1389], the latter for Serbian heroism in the final liberation.” In Sarajevo, religious institutions also got into the act—the Orthodox Archbishop held a mass in Princip’s honor; and local police reported Vidovdan worship services in the Catholic Cathedral, Evangelical Church, and both the Ashkenazi and Sephardi synagogues, the latter culminating in cries of gratitude for the “fallen fighters.”

The monarchy, revealingly, knew better than to blunder into this imbroglio. Not a single street in Belgrade or Sarajevo was named for Princip in interwar Yugoslavia. And contrary to local lore, Sarajevo’s Latin Bridge was never officially renamed Princip’s Bridge, even if many began referring to it as such. King Aleksandar may have done little to inhibit the widespread “glorification of Gavrilo Princip as a national hero and his murderous deed as a patriotic act,” as the British historian R. W. Seton-Watson pointed out. Yet neither did he embrace the Princip cult, as Seton-Watson also admitted. On the assassination’s twentieth anniversary, *Time* magazine reported that a “harassed King Alexander of Jugoslavia [sic] had harder work than ever to keep his subjects from celebrating with high glee the double murder that
freed so many of them from Imperial Austria.” And he evidently also held back when the “Organization of Vidovdan Heroes” requested His Majesty’s support for “boldly defending” their people’s heritage. The King’s curt reply: he did not know enough about them to proffer an opinion!\(^71\) Equally telling, if perhaps apocryphal, is Aleksandar’s refusal to shake hands with Princip’s father when he came to the capital to appeal for financial help.\(^72\) As for Princip’s mother, she apparently perished in abject poverty shortly before World War II.

Family of the Sarajevo assassins fared poorly in their “liberated” homeland. A Czech paper reported that Danilo Ilić’s washer-woman mother had been denied all forms of state support—she thus “suffers from hunger and begs for a crust of bread.”\(^73\) The father of bomb-thrower Nedeljko Ćabrinović was, he claimed, driven to attempt suicide by the injustices of a regime in which those who had faithfully served Austria-Hungary now fervently flew the Serbian flag.\(^74\) Ćabrinović’s sister Vukosava, hounded by authorities for her association with the conspirators, complained that her family was never left in peace from the moment of the assassination through World War II. And according to the literary/historical specialist Pero Slijepčević, even some of Princip’s friends were “under constant police surveillance and did not have complete freedom of movement.”\(^75\) Stories like these, though not fully verifiable, lend credence to the contention that the regime sought to distance itself from the Princip cult.

Less easily stage-managed by the monarchy, however, was the Pašić government’s purported role in (or at least knowledge of) the Sarajevo conspiracy—that is, the event that the rest of the world saw as directly giving rise to the war. Again, it was the guilt-ridden Gaćinović who best grasped this: “My young friend never thought that his heroic bullet would provoke the current world war. And believe me, when I read the war reports, a horrible thought goes through my mind: Did we indeed incite all this?”\(^76\) That, in fact, was the crux of concern for the first Yugoslav regime—not that Serbia had been responsible for the war (the Versailles Treaty had already unloaded that guilt on Germany), but that its trumped up, if totally unverified ties to the assassination would reflect poorly on the new south Slavic state.

Thus besides seeking to dissociate itself from the Princip “cult,” the regime directed its Central Press Bureau to monitor works judged unsympathetic to Serbs and South Slavs generally, especially when it came to the Sarajevo assassination. Censored materials included Der Schuss in den Weltfrieden by Bruno Adler;\(^77\) the historical novels Das Schicksal Europas and Apis und Este by the Austrians Friedrich Oppenheimer and Bruno Brehm, respectively;\(^78\) Rudolf Stratz’s “chauvinistic” and “pan-Germanic” history of World War I, Der Weltkrieg;\(^79\) American John Gunther’s
travel guide *Inside Europe* (which depicted Sarajevo as “a mud-caked primitive village,” hardly worth so many lives); and Erich Czech-Jochberg’s inquiry into the war guilt question (for daring to depict Franz Ferdinand as a friend of the Slavs).  

If the Yugoslav regime felt forever forced to defend itself from insinuations of official Serbian complicity in the Sarajevo plot, those Yugoslavists who cultivated the Princip “cult” put forging a common memory over confronting a complex history. The question is: Did it work? Perspective, as always, is crucial for such queries, and multinational Yugoslavia was certainly teeming with different ones. Moreover, it was mainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina that this specific memory work was performed, as it was unlikely to have the same import in, say, Catholic Slovenia or formerly Ottoman (and never Austro-Hungarian) Macedonia. Thus when the former Young Bosnian Borivoje Jevtić premiered his assassination play *Obećana Zemlja* (Promised Land) in 1936, he did so not in the new country’s capital, but rather in much smaller and less culturally resonant Sarajevo. And despite *Politika*’s appraisal of the Yugoslavist drama as “an undoubted success,” it never was staged in Belgrade, let alone in Zagreb, Ljubljana, or Skopje.

Still, cultural Yugoslavism was consequential, and if one takes the country and interwar period as a whole, there was a perceptible surge in esteem for the assassination as “the logical outcome of the revolutionary ferment among Yugoslavs.” *Politika* thus allotted sizable space in its June 28, 1924, issue to uphold the nobility of this “one small, unknown student [who] heralded the first day of a grand design.” But while *Politika* held to its Serb-centered stance, *Nova Evropa* was the organ of Yugoslavism. Founded in 1920 in affiliation with Seton-Watson’s English journal of the same title (i.e., New Europe), *Nova Evropa* was staffed by leading Yugoslav intellectuals unafraid to challenge the Serbian status quo. One contributor, for example, contended that the Unification or Death officers who armed the assassins were a multinational rather than exclusively Serbian bunch. Similarly, *Narodno Jedinstvo, Jugoslavska Pošta* (Yugoslav Mail) and *Jugoslavenska Njiva* (Yugoslav Soil) stressed the “all-Yugoslav cultural leanings” of Young Bosnia. In another polemic, Pero Slijepović assembled quotations from the assassins’ trial to prove that the accused spoke in the language of Yugoslavism rather than the Greater Serb nationalism for which they and, by implication, the Serbian state had stood accused.

Such sentiment also suffused the many articles honoring the “three shining memories” hanged for their part in the plot: Miško Jovanović, Veljko Čubrilović, and Danilo Ilić. Journals ranging from the leftist *Zvono* and democratic-republican *Slovenski Jug* (Slavic South), to *Politika, Novosti* (News), *Narodno Jedinstvo*, the (originally) Serb nationalist list *Narodna Odbrana* (National Defense) and Zagreb’s
Riječ (Word) collectively commended the “national martyrs” who strove to “lift our society out of the putrid swamp.” The media also often trumpeted the trio’s independence from Serbia and, thus, the multiple ways their actions embodied “the will and reflection of [Yugoslav] national consciousness and pride.”

Ultimately, it was the narrowed perspective of ideology that conquered all context for construing the assassination. Consequently, the role of “fate”—that “mysterious force [that] advanced the work and hand of Young Bosnia”—was frequently put forward by Yugoslav intellectuals. The art historian Dr. Božidar S. Nikolajević ascribed greater agency in the assassination to the “will of History” than human willpower: “I sincerely believe,” he wrote, “that Gavrilo Princip fired the fatal bullets while under the hypnotic spell of History.” And the Croatian politician and editor of Jugoslavenska Njiva, Juraj Demetrović, summoned the “immanent logic of history” in forging a “one and indivisible Yugoslav state.”

‘History,’ however, has typically proven less cooperative than its teleological interpreters contend. Thus as soon as one looks past the accounts of the “predetermined” Vidovdan duo, the facts in the ill-fated land tell a decidedly different story: low turnouts at commemorative events; indifference from the political caste; and little enthusiasm for any conspicuous cultivation of the Princip cult. In 1928, the Belgrade daily Vreme (Time) conceded that the commemoration in Sarajevo for the tenth anniversary of Princip’s death was “hurriedly organized” and “very modestly” conceived. Yet what made for an even more “painful impression” was that no one from the city council came to the requiem or graveside service, and the mayor drove by without stopping. In 1931, Dr. Đuro Ostojić lamented the “small number” of mourners for the three hanged conspirators, “the same ones who turn out to honor the Vidovdan heroes every year.” Three years later, on the assassination’s twentieth anniversary, Time magazine reported “Sarajevo Marks the Day Quietly.” And in 1939, the nationalist newsletter Srpski Glas (Serbian Voice) admitted that fundraising to rebuild the Princip home in Herzegovina had fallen flat. The uncertainty and anxiety concerning the place of the assassination in national memory and international awareness was clearly more prevalent than the Yugoslavist rhetoric readily revealed.

In this respect, the case of Koševo cemetery in Sarajevo is especially instructive. Before the reburial on July 7, 1920, one Yugoslavist had urged building a “national Vidovdan temple in which to sing psalms of gratitude to the martyrs.” Such a structure would replace the “temporary” grave that the British writer Rebecca West later judged “not impressive”: “It is as if a casual hand had swept them into a stone drawer.” Clair Price of The New York Times was no less perplexed to find the national heroes hibernating eternally under a “slab of concrete” devoid of any
script save the word “unity.” “On that morning,” he wrote of his June 1924 visit, “there was a large and faded wreath upon [the grave] and about it the grass in which we stood was tall and uncut.”

And so Bosnia’s “best-scented flowers” rested peacefully amid weeds until, in 1939, the president of the Serbian community of Orthodox Churches put forth funds to build a proper “memorial-chapel.” The architectural oddity that resulted, and which still stands in Sarajevo, was described by the Austrian journalist Ernst Trost as a “Temple of Serbdom.” Designed in the “old Serbian style” by the renowned Belgrade architect/academic Aleksandar Deroko, its walls are fashioned from six hundred gravestones, while its eastern approach presents a wide red cross descending to a gothic-arched mantel that envelops a marble tablet. Inscribed in the Serbian Cyrillic alphabet is a citation from *The Mountain Wreath* (1847) by the Montenegrin Prince-Bishop, Petar Petrović-Njegoš: “Blessed be he who lives forever; for he had reason to be born.” Below that, the inscriptions read: “Vidovdan Heroes,” “1914,” and then eleven names, of which Princip is the most prominent.

Inside the structure are two shelves of skeletal matter. Evidently, the memorial’s creators debated whether to divide the bones between the old and new sites, or to deepen the older grave and let the bulk of the remains rest there. In the end, the latter plan won out, which means that few know anymore where most of the martyrs’ bones actually lie. It also seems telling that the remains transferred to the new memorial arrived without ceremony and no public attention whatsoever. According to the poet Miloš Crnjanski, the Kingdom had long tried to prevent the transfer altogether.
On October 29, 1939, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the assassins’ sentencing, the dedication took place for the solid, squat mass of a building situated today near Sarajevo’s Ciglane Market. And it’s likely Serbian groups played principal parts in a ceremony allegedly attended by “conspirators’ family members, military and civilian authorities, cultural-educational institutions, . . . and churches.” In the black and white photos, well-dressed citizens stand solemnly before the memorial-chapel, which dwarfs them by its bulk. To this day, it is the largest edifice in the Orthodox section of Koševo cemetery. Yet it is also easily overlooked by contemporary Sarajevo’s mainly Muslim populace. As one reporter redolently described, “visitors are discouraged [from exploring the memorial] by a locked gate, weed-choked pathways and packs of scrofulous dogs that feed on the heads of sheep thrown at the chapel by butchers at a nearby market.” In the memorial landscape of the ex-Yugoslavia, this reality affirms what interwar arbiters of Princip’s memory were reluctant to: the Sarajevo assassination was a weak cultural glue with which to bind the Yugoslav peoples.

Other interwar commemorative projects suffered similar setbacks. “Krajišnik,” a group from Princip’s village of Obljaj (near the town of Bosanko Grahovo, in Herzegovina’s Krajina region), sought to raise a monument to their most famous son. Despite support from the assassins’ lawyer, Rudolf Zistler, nothing came of the initiative. Similarly, the Hungarian writer Olivér Eöttevényi mentions efforts to erect a statue of Princip “on the very spot,” as Politika put it, “where he launched the resurrection of his Yugoslav nation.” Yet when the Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists (Organizacija Jugoslavenskih Nacionalista, or Orjuna) began pushing the project, Borivoje Jevtić blasted it for opportunistically “feeding off of the deceased Princip.” Jevtić’s bitterness laid bare another aspect of the contested nature of the Princip “cult” when his fellow former Young Bosnian, Dobroslav Jevđević, rebuked him for opposing the plan in the pages of Nova Evropa. Less publicly, Ivan Kranjčević proposed to Jevtić and the assassin Cvetko Popović that they convene a private commemoration for the tenth anniversary rather than suffer that of the “official patriots,” who he scorned as “so many cattle who cursed or mocked Princip back in 1914.” Thus, Yugoslavist efforts to emblazon the assassination into the collective national memory encountered obstacles on all sides—from those who were never antagonistic to Austria-Hungary in the first place; those opposed to political murder on principle; and older Young Bosnians who scoffed at the politicization of an act they claimed as their own.

There are few easy generalizations about Princip’s place in interwar Yugoslavia. Without the firm backing of the King in a country that, by 1929, was in the firm grip
of dictatorship, much of the memory work was indeed tinged by Serbian nationalism. In 1932, a gathering of “nationalist youth” (the members of which all had Orthodox names) devoted itself to venerating the heroes’ grave with the same reverence that “six million grieving hearts” gave to the “Serbian Jerusalem—Oplenac” (burial place of the reigning Karadžorđević dynasty). Additionally, Serbian societies regularly used the gravesite for their activities, such as when the youth group Petar Kočić consecrated its flag there in June 1925.

Countercurrents to the cult also cropped up. An editorial in the Belgrade paper _Balkan_ decried the devastation wrought by the war through the lens of the “national crime” and “crazy assassination” that started it. After all, it bears reminding, this was still the country in which a popular Jesuit priest had worked closely with Bosnian citizens of all backgrounds to build a memorial church and orphanage for the slain Archduke and his wife.

All of this contested memory helps to explain the greatest anomaly in interwar efforts to elevate the Sarajevo assassins in the Yugoslav peoples’ collective national consciousness: why the site of the act that allegedly liberated many South Slavs remained unmarked for fully eleven years, from the end of World War I until 1930. According to one source, four stone cubes designated the spot where Princip stood until they were dug up during the paving of the sidewalk. According to other, equally imprecise information, Yugoslavs replaced the Austrian monument to the victims with a memorial to their murderer, then concealed it in the face of “hostile foreign comment.” Just when the urban renewal and/or cautious cover-up occurred is unclear, but we do know that the first actual Yugoslav memorial on the assassination site was consecrated neither on Vidovdan nor, as the _London Times_ misreported, on the anniversary of Princip’s death. Rather it was unveiled on February 2, 1930—the Sunday before the lesser-known anniversary of the three hanged assassins.

The whole affair, moreover, came off with virtually no fanfare from the government. On the contrary, three days before the dedication, Belgrade officials rewrote the plaque’s provenance, proclaiming, improbably, that Princip’s family and friends were behind it rather than Narodna Odbrana (National Defense), the Serbian nationalist organization that Austria-Hungary had implicated in the assassination and that still had ties to state leaders. In this way, the dictatorship could profess its powerlessness to impede a “private initiative,” while assuring outsiders that no government officials were attending the unveiling.

Few foreigners, however, were appeased, least of all the increasingly disillusioned Yugoslavist Seton-Watson. How, he asked in a livid letter to the _London Times_, could a government “which has shaken off all constitutional restraint, tolerates no
public criticism, and interferes at every turn with the personal liberty of the subject” be unable to prevent a handful of Herzegovinian peasants from commemorating the Sarajevo assassin? He decried the monument as “an open affront to all right-thinking people inside Yugoslavia,” not to mention her wartime allies. Winston Churchill went further, lambasting Gavrilo Princip’s “fellow-countrymen” for erecting a memorial to “his infamy, and their own.” As for the reputable Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, it branded the monument “a monstrous provocation which cannot be suffered.” Accordingly, the paper dismissed the absence of government officials at the dedication as a “trivial distinction.” For many foreigners in 1930, the Archduke’s assassination signified, as the London Times editorialized, “an act which was the immediate cause of the Great War, of its attendant horrors, and of the general suffering which has been its sequel.” Any tribute to it, under any circumstances, was an abomination.

The interwar Yugoslav Kingdom, as we’ve seen, consistently sought to distance itself from the Princip cult without repressing it altogether. The 1930 assassination-site memorial was no exception. Despite accusations of “indifference to foreign public opinion,” and all too aware that its pre-Depression debts were being called in, the regime made an earnest, if not quite exhaustive effort to limit the memorial’s impact. What Rebecca West described as a “modest” tablet engraved with words “remarkable in their restraint” was, indeed, a simple black marble plaque “placed so high above the street-level that the casual passer-by would not remark it.” From this lofty perch, golden letters tersely stated: “On this historic place, Gavrilo Princip proclaimed freedom on Vidovdan 15 (28) June 1914.”

As for the dedication ceremony, a program of speakers was called off at the last minute according to the transparently entitled article “A Quiet Ceremony,” which Sarajevo’s Večernja Pošta (Evening Post) buried on page five. Furthermore, the defensive January 6 dictatorship made the public unveiling conditional on there being no major speeches. Instead, the ubiquitous Vasilj Grđić announced that to “pay our respect to the greatest among us,” they would observe a two-minute silence. This was followed by shouts of honor, a wreath laying and, unclimactically, the “peaceful dispersal” of the crowd.

This is not, obviously, the whole story. Pictures of the event show what appears to be a substantial gathering. And an American paper reported that “the whole town turned out” and “jammed” the cafés and restaurants. Still, the Večernja Pošta judged the affair “modest and simple”; and Cvetko Popović complained that “not a single Sarajevo daily reported on this small ceremony.” Even Politika dampened the occasion by contextualizing the assassination within the “Bosnian liberation
movement,” rather than according it any wider Yugoslav significance. Princip may have “proclaimed freedom” for the South Slavs, but in their first united state neither they, nor their rulers, ever really resolved upon what this meant.

Consensus from Above: The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The Nazis and their Croatian Ustaša (Insurgence) allies were not fooled by any such official attempts to downplay the assassination in Yugoslav collective memory. Ethnic Germans from Yugoslavia removed the 1930 plaque and presented it to the Wehrmacht after the occupation of Sarajevo in April 1941. Soon after, Adolf Hitler himself viewed the memorial to a man whose action precipitated the conflict that, in turn, made the Führer’s rise to power possible. A sinister circle was closing, as “Sarajvo [sic] cleansed itself of the Vidovdan stain,” exulted an Ustaša paper. By war’s end, that “blot” had gone missing altogether, probably blown up in the final battles of the “Thirty-Years War” in 1945; or else plundered as an especially symbolic spoil. Whatever its outcome, the 1930 marker has not been seen since.

Once the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was destroyed by Fascist forces in a short war in April 1941, the national tensions that had paralyzed the state politically did not resolve themselves into a unified opposition. Rather they exploded into civil war and mass atrocities that were responsible for at least half of all Yugoslav casualties. In particular, Serbs living in the Nazi collaborationist regime of the Nezavisna Država Hrvatske (Independent State of Croatia, or NDH) suffered what scholars today call genocide at the hands of the Croatian Ustaša. They were by no means the only Yugoslav civilians subjected to murderous violence, but the fate of these Serbs, coupled with their prominent role in the partisan resistance, would lend new impetus to the Princip “hero-cult.” As one south Slavic expatriate explained: “The Germans may destroy the plaque . . . but there are many other Princips in Sarajevo.”

There were many archdukes as well. Indeed, the Sarajevo assassination provided symbolic sustenance for all sides in the three-way conflict between the Croatian
Paul Miller

Ustaša, Serbian royalist “Četniks,” and communist Partisans (led by Josip Broz Tito). While there were Četnik and Partisan detachments named for Princip, the Croatian Fascists fomented anti-Princip propaganda as part of their broader anti-Serbianism.⁷ Therefore, for example, they regularly accused the assassins of being in league with the communists. More directly, they physically persecuted the one Muslim assassin, Muhamed Mehmedbašić, and his wife.⁸ Mehmedbašić succumbed to his wounds at his home outside Sarajevo in May 1943.⁹ As for Princip’s home in Herzegovina, the Ustaša destroyed it. Interwar Yugoslavists, as we saw, had difficulties raising funds to renovate that house. Considering the interethnic violence in World War II, efforts to rebuild Princip’s birthplace, let alone to restore Yugoslavia, would appear anything but promising. Yet for almost half a century, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) achieved just that.

**Historical Inevitabilities: From Princip to the Partisans**

In a piece published in the Bosnian postwar daily *Oslobođenje* (Liberation), Marko Marković described Princip in 1914 as “handing the torch to the other Princip,” his nephew Slobodan (literally: “free”), who in August 1941 led the destruction of a German motorized column.¹⁰ For the Partisans, 1945 became the fulfillment of everything 1914 had stood for: the struggle of Bosnia’s youth for justice and freedom; liberation from the “Germanic” oppressor; and the sloganized spirit of “bratstvo i jedinstvo” (brotherhood and unity) embodied in the mixed ethnonational identities of the Young Bosnians and Partisans alike. If the first Yugoslavia was “a dungeon . . . where the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina had no rights,” then the new state would fulfill “the dream of Gavrilo Princip . . . and many others who gave their young lives for a happy homeland for all people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” “What Gavrilo Princip and his friends began on Vidovdan 1914,” proclaimed *Oslobođenje* for Vidovdan 1945, the youths who liberated Bosnia from the Germans completed. Fadil Hadžić’s popular 1968 film *Sarajevski Atentat* is centered on this very theme.¹¹

Motivated as much by their military victory as their ideology, the Partisans could not wait until June 28 to replace the 1930 memorial. On May 7, 1945, at a mass meeting in Sarajevo attended by the parliamentary president of Bosnia-Herzegovina and other dignitaries, Princip was fêted as a “great national hero and martyr, a fighter for freedom and for the brotherhood of all Yugoslav peoples.” After crossing “Princip’s Bridge,” the procession arrived at the place “where Gavrilo Princip’s bullet declared death to all who tried to enslave our people.” There, Borko Vukobrat, who
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hailed from the assassin’s hometown, unveiled a marble plaque boasting a five-pointed communist star above these engraved words: “The youth of Bosnia and Herzegovina dedicate this plaque as a symbol of eternal gratitude to Gavrilo Princip and his comrades, fighters against the Germanic invaders.”

These young communist Partisans catalyzed a resurgence of confidence concerning how to shape a collective cultural memory around the Sarajevo assassination. The sacrifice of Yugoslav youth both in 1914 and World War II—henceforth known as the Narodna Oslobodilačka Borba (NOB—People’s Liberation Struggle)—would become a key symbol of the socialist state. As early as 1946, Belgrade named a prominent street for Gavrilo Princip. Danilo Ilić and Nedeljko Čabrinović streets soon also graced the capital, along with at least two Gavrilo Princip schools. In the Bosnian city of Banja Luka, a street named for the Czech national leader and Young Bosnia hero, Tomáš Masaryk, was renamed for Princip. And while Sarajevo had a street named for the hanged leader Danilo Ilić since 1921 (except for 1941–45), Princip and Čabrinović got theirs in the socialist era as well.

Encyclopedias continued the interwar pattern of painting Princip as a “national revolutionary,” while textbooks typically touted Young Bosnia as “the most outspoken organization for national liberation at that time.” Franz Ferdinand, meanwhile, was unfavorably (and falsely) depicted as a leading figure in Austro-Hungarian oppression. As for the Sarajevo assassination itself, textbooks in the SFRJ were remarkably neutral. What’s more, they remained so well after de-standardization in the 1960s brought the schoolbooks under the sway of the individual Republics. Princip actually only began to be heroized in Serbian textbooks when Serbs turned towards nationalism in the late 1980s.

Outside the schoolroom was another story—games, comics, contests, and children’s books lionized Princip for young Yugoslav “pioneers.” In 1952, the leftist Borba (Struggle) inaugurated an annual student writing competition on “the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the battle against the occupation,” with prizes awarded every June 28. And for the fiftieth anniversary of the assassination, Male Novine (Young People’s Paper) published a long and admiring series on the courageous kid-assassins from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Although in its early years official socialist Yugoslavia embraced the Princip cult, Bosnia remained its base and Sarajevo its epicenter. The initiative for a commemorative postmark for the assassination’s fortieth anniversary came from the Philatelist Association of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The year 1954 also saw Sarajevo-based publications of a Serbo-Croat version of the laudatory Czech novel Atentát; the Bosnian Croat Ivan Kranjčević’s romanticized Uspomene jednog učesnika u
Sarajevskom atentatu (Reminiscences of One of the Participants in the Sarajevo Assassination); the first edition of Nikola Trišić’s bibliography of the assassination; a collection of writings from Young Bosnia, and a related photographic album. Thus, when it came time to respond to requests for a monument to the “martyrs,” there was no question of where to locate it. Despite the fact that the conspirators met, schemed, and obtained their arms and training in Belgrade, there has never been a memorial to the “national liberators” in the Yugoslav national capital.

With the opening of the Museum of Young Bosnia and Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo on June 27, 1953, however, the assassins did, decidedly, obtain their national pantheon. In contrast to 1930, the museum bore “official” stamps at every turn: it was the work of the Sarajevo National Committee (city council) and thus adhered to (and was funded by) the city’s museum authority; the dedication speech was delivered by Mayor Dane Olbina, who extoled the youth for “sacrifices [that] contributed to the realization of our national ideal”; and that evening, the novelist and future Nobel Prize winner Ivo Andrić, along with Princip’s fellow conspirator (and Belgrade University Professor) Vaso Ćubrilović, paid tribute.

The wording on the new memorial plaque went further than in 1930 as well—rather than commemorating Princip for proclaiming freedom in the abstract, it informed the world that, “From this place on June 28, 1914, Gavrilo Princip’s shot gave voice to the national protest against tyranny and our nations’ centuries-long aspiration for freedom.”

In further distinction to 1930, publicity for the 1953 event was widespread and conspicuous. Borivoje Jevtić’s celebratory piece in Oslobođenje placed Princip’s act among what the Austrian writer Stefan Zweig called “the stellar moments of mankind.” Another writer estimated that if one could print the names of every Yugoslav who had pilgrimaged to the assassination site, “this book would surely be the biggest in the world.” While that claim was just as surely overblown, there was now new reason for Yugoslavists and tourists alike to venture to the il-
lustrous street corner in Sarajevo: In front of the museum and embedded into the pavement just below the new plaque, were a set of footprints.\textsuperscript{162}

They were not Princip’s real footprints, of course.\textsuperscript{163} Nor can we be sure that they appeared precisely on the spot from which he shot. Yet “authenticity,” writes the museum expert Janet Marstine, is an “illusive construct,” the product of subjective decisions made by curators in the pursuit of cultural legitimacy.\textsuperscript{164} Even if the footprints only fooled the novelist Aleksandar Hemon into believing, when he was a boy, that the hot summer sun had melted the asphalt beneath the assassin, this in no way undermined their impact.\textsuperscript{165} For those footprints became the emblematic icon of the assassination, a site of memory experienced not only by Yugoslavs, but by visitors the world over. And every so often, these history hounds and/or hero worshippers sought to partake personally in the past, standing directly inside the faked footprints, forefinger cocked on a pretend pistol, while they themselves were shot—by a camera. Not only was history regularly reenacted in Sarajevo, it was rerecorded.

“In the museum,” writes Marstine, “things are more than just things; museum narratives construct national identity and legitimize groups.”\textsuperscript{166} In the Museum of Young Bosnia and Gavrilo Princip, Yugoslav legitimacy was itself on display. The exterior featured a vast relief in which the unity of multinational youth was represented by uniform, intertwined figures marching in lockstep. Inside, the visitor was greeted by assorted images and artifacts that, collectively, exalted “the language of liberty” as “the best understood language in the world.” On the center wall, emerging resolutely from the stone surface, was a massive sculpted head of Princip alongside his pithy proverb: “We have loved our people.”\textsuperscript{167} A glass case stretching the length of an adjacent wall displayed images of five of the accused assassins facing down their Austrian adversaries in the courtroom—Princip’s “wide open, passionate eyes brimming with rebelliousness.” One of the most striking exhibits was a montage by the artist Radenko Mišević depicting the black bars of a prison behind which, in jumbled Cyrillic script, was each assassin’s name. A white dove fluttered in front
of this three-dimensional, jail-like mosaic. Socialist symbolism was not, after all, known for its subtlety.\textsuperscript{168}

Rounding out this regular shrine to the revolutionaries were “authentic” items such as soil from the Terezín gravesite, Princip’s school satchel, and his mother’s apron.\textsuperscript{169} Some 50,000 people purportedly visited the museum in its first year alone, and it became a customary retreat for Yugoslav students and a ritual stopover for foreign representatives. Others often braved long lines to get in.\textsuperscript{170} The museum also proved a prudent place for the general public to pay homage to the assassins every June 28, since it lacked the sense of Greater Serb nationalism that clung to the Koševi gravesite (where city officials annually laid flowers). Besides, admission to the museum was free that day! As one Sarajevan wrote nostalgically, “To come to Sarajevo and not stand in Gavrilo’s footprints would be like visiting Paris and not climbing the Eiffel Tower.”\textsuperscript{171}

The city additionally took pride in prominent visitors to the museum. Eleanor Roosevelt’s stopover in July 1953 elicited especial satisfaction.\textsuperscript{172} Left unmentioned, however, was what the former First Lady wrote in her “My Day” newspaper column of July 21, 1953: “After lunch on Thursday in Sarajevo, we visited the rather gruesome museum which commemorates the secret society and the young man who shot Archduke Ferdinand of Austria and thus brought on World War I. He and his comrades are national heroes because it was a blow for freedom, but it is, as a museum, rather a depressing spot.”\textsuperscript{173}

Mrs. Roosevelt was hardly alone in her struggle to solidarize with her Yugoslav hosts in celebrating the assassination. Ernst Trost luridly labeled the footprints “two scars on the face of the city, banal traces of a murder, the solidified shoe size of the killer in concrete.”\textsuperscript{174} And upon seeing “all this memorializing for a band of terrorists” just months before the Yugoslav secessionary wars, the journalist Milton Viorst presciently pondered: “if there was no repentance even in Bosnia for what the assassination had produced, it was going to be extremely hard for the South Slavs to get far enough beyond violence and the small-minded gratifications of nationalism to create a responsible, democratic Yugoslav state.”\textsuperscript{175}

In the prologue of his work \textit{To End a War}, the late American diplomat Richard Holbrooke looked back leerily on his first visit to Sarajevo in the summer of 1960, when he unforgottably found himself standing inside the infamous footprints: “I can still recall my astonishment. ‘Serbian liberty?’ What was this all about? Every college student knew Princip’s act had started Europe’s slide into two world wars and contributed to the rise of both communism and fascism. How could anyone hail it as heroic? . . . I never forgot that first brush with extreme nationalism, and it
came back to me vividly when Yugoslavia fell apart.” Holbrooke was processing his false memory through the prism of Serbian aggression in the Bosnian war in the 1990s—after all, the plaque he had seen referred to “our nations’” strivings for freedom, rather than “Serbian liberty” specifically. Yet had Holbrooke’s distorted hindsights and Roosevelt’s genuine revulsion made headlines in 1960, they would not likely have altered the socialist government’s stance on the assassination. The museum and footprints, in fact, lasted as long as Yugoslavia did, despite the decentralization that started in the 1960s and the capitulation to national interests and retreat from Yugoslavism ensconced in the 1974 Constitution. And while there are many reasons for the persistence of this constructed narrative, one crucial one certainly comprises changing attitudes internationally—above all, Western respect for Tito’s war against the Nazis and his establishment of an independently oriented socialist state. Whereas in 1930 the *London Times* did not scruple to call the South Slavs “a rather primitive people, inured to political violence”; in 1965, a reporter for that same paper would write: “So much time and blood after, it seems futile to praise or blame the 17-year-old [sic] patriotic assassin.”

Where was Comrade Tito? Anniversaries and Anxieties, 1964–1991

Above all, it is ideology and state-managed cultural practice, rather than any objective approach to construing the past, that accounts for the continued acceptance of the assassins in socialist Yugoslavia. As long as the regime’s leaders controlled the construction of collective memory, Yugoslav citizens simply lived alongside the footprints, street signs, and other memorials almost as a measure of their own maturity as a united people. Symbolically, the writer Miljenko Jergović recounts an “unforgettable” experience when, as a fourth-grader, he sensed “the first sign of adulthood” upon noticing that his feet had outgrown Princip’s. And Bajro Gec, the long-time curator of the Young Bosnia Museum, told me wryly of the years he spent greeting tourists while inside feeling real unease with the official discourse. “To kill is pure terrorism,” Gec said after the destruction of his socialist homeland, adding that any association with the Black Hand left a black mark on the assassins. In another interview, he flatly stated that “[Princip] would have been firing on us from the hills” around Sarajevo had he lived during the Bosnian Serb siege of the city from 1992 to 1995.

But Gec—a Bosnian Muslim who risked his life to rescue the museum’s artifacts in the midst of the shelling—did his job dutifully and, like lots of Yugoslavs,
enjoyed a secure and comfortable, if not entirely free and prosperous life under the socialist regime. In this respect, acceptance of films that exalted the assassins, or of public funding for renovating Princip’s home in Herzegovina, is perfectly understandable. After all, even if jugonostalgija, like all nostalgias, is based upon a selective rendering of the past, its prevalence throughout the postwar (and mostly poorer) former Yugoslavia speaks for itself.\textsuperscript{180}

Communist discourse, moreover, abetted the assassins’ ascent. Veselin Masleša’s 1945 book \textit{Mlada Bosna} became almost biblical, as it justified the youths’ turn to violence in the Marxist language of historical materialism.\textsuperscript{181} Having marshaled a wealth of data on the backward and brutal nature of rural life and land ownership in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Masleša could only marvel at the Young Bosnians. “However we today judge their political work and means of struggle,” he wrote, “one thing is certain: as people and as fighters, they represent the pinnacle of what a person can give of himself.”\textsuperscript{182} Slavko Mićanović came to similar conclusions in his 1965 study \textit{Sarajevski Atentat}, which situated the assassination in Europe’s wider revolutionary fervor and defended it as “the natural consequence of the freedom struggle of a people who had long languished in slavery” and could not conceive of another way out. As he wrote: “The international constellation was such that hopes, connected with Serbia, led to some far-off and uncertain future which got lost in the fog, while the condition in their own homeland, in enslaved Bosnia and Herzegovina, could only be a source of endless suffering for them. They did not see any exit, they did not find anyone who could respond to them on the fatal question: ‘what to do?’”\textsuperscript{183} A year later, the historian Vladimir Dedijer’s monumental work \textit{Sarajevo, 1914} depicted the penurious local conditions and intractable international situation in such a way that readers found it hard not to sympathize with the subjugated Young Bosnians. His substantive and scholarly account gave these “primitive rebels” full credit for their historic role in the independence struggle, without the guilt of a sophisticated operation by heartless terrorists.\textsuperscript{184}

Important as these works were for situating Sarajevo in historical context and justifying it for a broad audience in the socialist state, they largely avoided direct confrontation with the assassination’s consequences in terms of the world war and its effect on Yugoslavia’s formation. The fact that the assassins could not be held accountable for the war’s outbreak did not automatically make their act acceptable to all Yugoslavs or, even, Bosnians. From a moral standpoint, political murder as a means to revolutionary struggle, however well-founded the cause, will always be controversial—and far more so when the victim, like Franz Ferdinand, is hardly an evil dictator, let alone even in power. Many pre-war South Slavs had, in fact, already
declared their opposition to assassination on principle. Many more, as we’ve seen, remained troubled by the way the war had foisted a Serb-centered state upon them. When viewed from a broader international perspective, moreover, the Archduke’s political murder was less associated with south Slavic subjugation than with the devastating effects of the First World War. And for most of humanity, no ideology, however much socialism may have stabilized the second south Slavic state, could uncouple this connection.

The fiftieth anniversary of the Sarajevo assassination widened this ideological impasse for Yugoslavs and foreigners alike. On the surface, certainly, the narrative of Young Bosnia’s “noble rebels” remained intact. Thus was a committee created to coordinate the commemorative program; the museum renovated; and Sarajevo spruced up in anticipation of an influx of foreigners. New works like Dragoslav Ljubibratić’s *Mlada Bosna i sarajevski atentat* (Young Bosnia and the Sarajevo Assassination) also appeared, as did 25,000 fresh copies of the museum’s guidebook (in five European languages, no less) and 30,000 picture postcards of its exhibits. The press too profited from the occasion to burnish the assassination into the collective Yugoslav consciousness, producing long installments with such tantalizing titles as “The Shots That Shook the World” and “Storm in the Balkans.”

The commemoration kicked off on the evening of June 27, with a memorial led by the recent (1961) Nobel Prize-winning writer Ivo Andrić, *Mlada Bosna* author Veselin Masleša, and, of course, Borivoje Jevtić. The next morning, a Vidođdan Sunday as in 1914, a wreath laying at the Koševo gravesite was followed by a day’s worth of dedications, including the unveiling of plaques on Ilić’s newly restored birth house (now officially adhering to the Young Bosnia Museum) and the site from which Čabrinović threw his bomb. Meanwhile, in Obljaj, the Sarajevo city museum director inaugurated a Gavrilo Princip Museum in the restored family home. The highlight of this latest memorial was the garden stone wall into which young Gavro had carved his initials in 1909. In 1964, it seemed, no stone would be left unturned when it came to commemorating the Bosnian assassins.

The foreign press, however, told a different story. A *London Times* correspondent characterized the occasion as “muted,” “modest” and, as he had been informed, meant merely “to mark” rather than magnify the assassination. Two *New York Times* reporters similarly sensed that official Yugoslavia “could not be more uncomfortable” with the anniversary activities. In fact, Sarajevo’s Communist Secretary of Information, Murat Kusturica, spent most of the day encouraging tourists and journalists just to “go home”: “You are much too serious. My son . . . does not know about Princip. About partisans, yes. They were really important. We can’t
say it didn’t happen here. But I tell you personally—*personally*—it was a mistake, not a mass movement like the partisans.”

Despite the international spotlight, Yugoslav government officials were “conspicuously absent” (*London Times*) from what *The New York Times* foreign correspondent David Binder branded a “perfunctory observance.” In the sociopsychological analysis of the Austrian writer Ernst Trost, a “guilt complex still hung in the heads of many citizens.” Be it guilt, good politics, or simple insouciance, President Tito stayed away from Sarajevo on the fiftieth anniversary of the act that allegedly liberated part of his people. In the midst of a diplomatic mission to Poland, he visited the Nazi death camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau that day instead.

Socialist Yugoslavia, like all one-party, ideologically oriented states, was masterful at the art of keeping up appearances, and the place of the assassination in its collective cultural memory proved no exception. Through the Croatian Spring in the 1960s–1970s, the collapse of the economy and further rise of autonomous movements in the 1980s, and onto the state’s brutal disintegration in the 1990s, Franz Ferdinand’s assassins held their own, even if their narrative of resistance and liberation receded in significance compared to the Second World War. Such was the sentiment that suffused the newspapers and spilled over in a series of interviews that Bosnia Radio-Television did with the aging Young Bosnians Vojislav Bogićević and Vukosava Branisavljević-Čabrinović on the fifty-fifth anniversary.

Three years later, leading historians published *Istorija Jugoslavije*, which credited Princip for bringing down “the multinational Habsburg Monarchy and its archaic institutions.” As for the sixtieth anniversary, an academic roundtable applied the strictures of Marxism to its study of Young Bosnia, highlighting the social structures that spawned the youth movement and, in turn, validated its violence. According to one researcher, this interpretation provided a powerful antidote to other, top-down, “idealistic, romantic” interpretations. It was, in short, a very scholarly way of explicating assassination.

Sometimes debate did break out over whether Young Bosnia was truly multinational or narrowly Serb-centric. Yet the assassins’ actions were hardly questioned in the public sphere, despite Malcolm Browne’s 1974 assertion in *The New York Times* that Yugoslav leaders were “clearly still troubled by the problem of whether assassination is justified as a political tool.” On the cusp of the country’s collapse, newspapers in multinational Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere in the country were still churning out uncritical articles on the political murder. And during the 1984 Winter Olympics, which many Sarajevans hoped would give their city a different image from the one in which the First World War began, the Young Bosnia Museum
remained open for business, complete with photo ops with Princip’s footprints.\textsuperscript{204} Clearly, socialists from the president of the republic down to local residents knew full well how fraught the positive narrative of the assassination was—not only in an international context, but also within politically repressed Yugoslav society itself. Few, however, might have imagined just how relevant and revealing this single cultural element of the collective Yugoslavist project would be once the state began to break up.

**War, Dissolution, and the Demise of Meaning**

Five years before the republics of Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from Yugoslavia, two radically influential works were published in Belgrade. One, the best-selling novel *A Book About Milutin*, conveys the onrush of war in 1914 from the perspective of a Serbian peasant for whom the assassination and its accompanying, grandiloquent ideology about south Slavic “brotherhood” meant nothing compared to the state’s seizure of his livestock. After all, exhorts Milutin, “oxen are oxen. . . . [But] I don’t like seeing Bosnians playing heroes in vain, killing princes and women, and then moving their butts aside while our [Serbian] peasants pay the piper.” In this prize-winning work, “Yugoslavia” is only “some higher knowledge” for kings and “teachers” (i.e., intellectuals) who never had to farm their own fields to feed their families. While his friends cheer the coming clash with Austria-Hungary, Milutin himself muses: “they had already sung about Apis and others, Gavrilo Princip too—they will sing, the rest will die.”\textsuperscript{205}

The other work was written by the “teachers” themselves—sixteen members of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU), to be exact. The 1986 Memorandum was never actually adopted by SANU and was published (in draft form) only after being leaked to a Belgrade daily. All the same, it became a key document in shaping the “profoundly anti-Yugoslav” nationalist discourse that made the violent breakup of the SFRJ “both more logical and more acceptable,” even if that were not the original intention of its authors. In fact, this frequently misread (or unread) work did not promote ethnic cleansing or Greater Serb nationalism; rather, its prescriptions for solving Yugoslavia’s political and economic problems by establishing “a democratic, integrating federalism” were “remarkably sedate” compared to concurrent language coming from Croatian and Slovenian intellectuals. What the Memorandum did, rather dangerously do, was to depict the Serbs’ situation in the increasingly confederal state as one of gross inequality and victimization, particularly for Serbs
living in Kosovo and Croatia. And it did so by direct analogy to previous suffering in the world wars: “In less than fifty years, . . . the Serbs were twice subjected to physical annihilation, forced assimilation, conversion to a different religion, cultural genocide, . . . and compulsion to renounce their own traditions because of an imposed guilt complex.” Since decentralization and the attendant retreat from Yugoslavism that started in the 1960s, the Memorandum made clear, history was repeating itself in terms of Serb persecution. It also suggested that the other Yugoslav peoples had actually conspired to keep the Serbs down, if not annihilate them altogether—claims that, the political scientist Jasna Dragović-Soso argues, “make it very difficult to envisage how a common state is possible.”

The historian Vaso Čubrilović was one of just two academicians who openly distanced himself from the Memorandum. As the youngest of the Sarajevo assassins in 1914, and the oldest member of SANU in 1986, the Bosnian-born Čubrilović was no stranger to the ethnonational issues that afflicted Yugoslavia. Indeed, at the end of World War II he had advocated ridding the new state of its non-Slavic minorities. Yet when he died in 1990, at age 93, this revered national figure, who had astutely avoided ever discussing the defining nationalist event in which he did take part, was fortunate enough to exit the scene just before ethnonationalism destroyed the country that the Sarajevo assassination had helped hasten into being. After all, and like his co-conspirators, Čubrilović was an ardent Yugoslavist—a man whose “deep faith in the creation and preservation of Yugoslavia” derived both from personal feelings and lifelong learning. Signing on to a document that so easily lent itself to intractable, interethnic infighting would have ruined him, since it would have proven the professor wrong about the very nature and innateness of the Yugoslav union he had assertively supported throughout his career.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia was ruinous and disillusioning for a lot of people. As in 1914, “higher knowledge” (i.e., ethnonationalist ideology) overran the little man (Milutin); the dangerous delusions of “Greater Serbia” or “Greater Croatia” prevailed over the everyday aspirations of those who always pay for others’ political agendas. And the cost, as usual, was calamitous—well over 100,000 people died in the Yugoslav wars of secession, while untold others lost their livelihoods. Multinational Bosnia, of course, bore the brunt of it.
Yugoslav Eulogies: The Footprints of Gavrilo Princip

Not with a Whimper, but a Mortar

As the communist catechisms that kept Yugoslavia together disintegrated in a massive explosion of nationalist energy, the carefully constructed memory of the Sarajevo assassination went up with it. During a televised parliamentary debate over Bosnian independence in February 1991, a delegate from the nationalist Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), which opposed independence, threatened his pro-Bosnian colleagues: “The future sovereign of your state would never make it past the Gavrilo Princip Bridge in an open cab.” Muhamed Čengić, the Muslim vice president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, responded that it was not Princip’s Bridge “because Princip did not build [it].” That evening, someone painted “Latin Bridge” on the Museum of Young Bosnia and Gavrilo Princip.210

The fact that the bridge was never officially renamed for the assassin notwithstanding, debate raged. Sarajevo city council leader, Aleksandra Balvanović, decreed the graffiti “distasteful” but agreed with its graphic message: the bridge should go back to its original name. Latin Bridge, she wrote, “is a peaceful name, whereas the current one reminds us of a terrorist organization and terrorist act—murder.”211 The journalist Ljiljana Smajlović rejected Balvanović’s equation of murder and terrorism, reminding readers that assassination has been part of political struggle since time immemorial, and what the “historical losers” assail as terror is “a feat of individual and national heroism” for those who benefit from this legitimate means of “realizing certain historical goals.” Ideological lines were being laid down.212

Symbols matter, as Lynn Hunt and other scholars have shown, and more so than ever in times of trial.213 SDS leaders who aimed to prevent Bosnia’s breakaway from Yugoslavia laid a wreath at the site of the signal act in its struggle for independence from Austria-Hungary.214 Later, the ex-foreign minister of newly independent Croatia, Zdravko Mršić, laid a wreath of his own—on the Archduke’s resting place in Austria.215 “Do we need a new Gavrilo Princip?” read banners in Serbian sections of Sarajevo at the outset of hostilities.216 The Bosnian Serbs who began shelling the city and sniping civilians in April 1992 answered in the affirmative. In fact, the respected German journal Der Spiegel reported—falsely as it turned out, but tellingly nonetheless—on Bosnian Serb plans to name their part of a divided capital “Principovo” once non-Serbian citizens were largely eliminated from it.217 Their leader, the poet-psychiatrist Radovan Karadžić, wrote verse venerating the “martyr”—“Right hand, condense the chaos! Soul, kill the king.”218

And so it went: “For Serbs Princip is a hero, for Bosniaks [Bosnian Muslims] and Croats a terrorist”; for “Sarajevans a terrorist, for Banja Lukans a hero.”219
During the war, a Serbian Četnik formation named itself for the assassin, while the Croatian army destroyed, yet again, his museum-home in Obljaj.\textsuperscript{220} Similarly, if less violently, non-Serbs in Sarajevo cleansed the city of all associations with the “terrorist act,” as Bosnian television typecast the assassination on its eightieth anniversary.\textsuperscript{221} The footprints vanished, and all that remains are questions concerning whether they were ripped (or bombed?) out of the pavement and tossed (or not?) into the Miljacka River amidst the shelling. By war’s end the museum too lay in ruins, though this was likely as much due to Serbian mortars as non-Serbian marauders.\textsuperscript{222}

Street names, the sphere of city councils and cultural committees, are easier to attribute. The only Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež streets to have survived are in Serbian and Bosnian Serb strongholds, including Banja Luka, Pale, Bosanska Gradiška, Derventa, Teslić, and Bijeljina. In mainly Muslim Sarajevo, by contrast, the home of the assassination’s organizer, Danilo Ilić, is again unmarked. Efforts to reinforce a strictly Bosniak identity have led even to the erasure of Young Bosnia Street and the creation of a major new one: Young Muslims Road (Put Mladih Muslimana).\textsuperscript{223}

Texts, like street names, chronicle evolving constructions of collective memory. Not far from Young Muslims Road, in Serbian Sarajevo, Milivoje Mijo Buha authored a 2006 book hailing Young Bosnia’s heroism in light of Austria-Hungary’s allegedly illegal occupation.\textsuperscript{224} As for schoolbooks, some in Croatia insist that the “legal organization” Young Bosnia had a “terrorist” wing to foment Greater Serbian ideology.\textsuperscript{225} A primary school text even accused the “secret organization” Young Bosnia of using “terrorist methods,” adding that “the investigation into the assassination proved Serbian involvement.” If the authors are referring to official Serbia, then there never has been any evidence to support this.\textsuperscript{226} Both Serbian and Croatian textbooks employ the term povod (motive) to indicate that the assassination provided Europe’s Great Powers (Austria-Hungary and Germany foremost, of course) with the pretext they needed for the war they wanted. But there they part ways, with Serbian (and Montenegrin) works shunning the language of “terrorism” to stress instead the “national-revolutionary” nature of Young Bosnia.\textsuperscript{227} Others go further, portraying Princip as a “national hero.”\textsuperscript{228} The standard text used in Serbian high schools applauds the assassin’s “fearless demeanor before the police and in the courtroom.”\textsuperscript{229}

And what of that complex, multinational piece of the post-Yugoslav puzzle in which the assassination occurred? Divided since the 1995 Peace Accords into Serbian and Bosniak-Croat “entities,” Bosnia-Herzegovina today exhibits all the signs of what one specialist called “cultural apartheid.” Its textbooks bear that out
brilliantly. While Bosnian Serbs are taught that Princip was a “hero and poet,” their Croat compatriots learn that he was “an assassin trained and instructed by the Serbs to commit this act of terrorism.” Meanwhile, Muslims place the Bosnian-born Princip in the camp of “national Serbian youth.” One primer presents the assassination as a “terrorist act” by “Serbian nationalists.” Others indicate that the murder inquiry “led to a direct connection with the official Government of Serbia,” then add, inaccurately, that Austria-Hungary accused Serbia “for that terrorist act.” A Bosniak school principal put it this way: “For us [Princip] is simply a thief who killed the monarch and his wife. Because here we don’t think of Austrians as invaders.” It’s an ironic statement considering the armed Muslim resistance to Austria-Hungary’s occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878. As in the Tito era, argues the historian Wolfgang Höpken, the “main intention” of these textbooks “is not to develop a ‘civic identity’ based on the individual’s critical examination of the past, but to supply political elites with legitimacy.”

Of course, Bosnians did not settle into neat national niches the moment Yugoslavia started to unravel. With the opening of a liberal democratic space following the war, one could also find the kind of nuanced views that were missing during the socialist era. In Sarajevo, where the assassination site still had to be sorted out, the largely non-Serbian city administration led a modest movement to replace both the Austro-Hungarian monument and the footprints—a cautious compromise in the spirit of historical remembrance and national reconciliation, not to mention tourist tender. The price tag, however, proved prohibitive, prompting a Bosnian stonemason’s proposition to Austrian officials: their government could purchase the monument’s original columns for a cool 100,000 Deutsche Marks. The Austrians balked, but so did many Sarajevans. In an avalanche of articles between 2000 and 2005, it became clear that, despite the even-handed intentions of city planners, nationalist perspectives prevailed. While the Belgrade philosophy professor Ljubomir Tadić carefully characterized Princip as a young man who sacrificed his life for the Yugoslav idea, the Muslim Board Chairman of the Sarajevo City Museum, Smail Halilović, felt “it would be sheer stupidity to commemorate the guy who led the entire world into total catastrophe.” The president of the Bosnian Green Berets concurred, likening Princip’s murder of the Archduke’s purportedly “pregnant” wife to the 9/11 terror attacks.

In early 2003, however, it still appeared that the footprints would be replaced and an unbiased “Museum of the Sarajevo Assassination” rebuilt. The plan had the support of the city council and museum board, and the assurance of mayoral assistant Ramiz Kadić that “the City did not intend to restore the ‘Gavrilo Princip Museum,’
but rather to revitalize the museum complex and show the public what actually took place." After all, he added, “This is our history. This is what Sarajevo is famous for. We have to mark the spot.”

And so, indeed, they did, “without glorification, without Satanization.” On April 6, 2003, the anniversary of Sarajevo’s liberation in World War II, the supports came off of an austere concrete tablet that reads, irrefutably: “From this place on 28 June 1914 Gavrilo Princip Assassinated the Heir to the Austro-Hungarian Throne Franz Ferdinand and His Wife Sofia.” It’s too close to ground-level to attract much attention, but does fit the “just-the-facts” approach promoted by city and museum officials. What went missing was everything that had caused the controversy in the first place—the footprints, the Austrian monument, and the museum. In interviews, the city museums director, Mevlida Serdarević, said that the museum and footprints had also been slated for dedication that day, the latter having already been recast. But somewhere between the City Administration, Bureau for the Protection of Monuments, and the Cantonal Commission for the Commemoration of Acts and Events, the approval bogged down. Of course, this did not end efforts to realize the project. As one paper put it, too many tourists were irked at having traveled so far only to find the unadorned truth served up on a drab concrete slab.

Local officials also chafed at this “Solomon’s judgement” to mark the site without the footprints, monument or, even, a neutral museum.

Since the secessionary wars, some Serbian intellectuals have sought to present the assassination in a non-ideological light, explaining its glorification as a communist carryover that would surely fade with time and national temperance. Then there are those on the right who, rather than heroize the assassins, consider the whole Yugoslavist enterprise to have been flawed. Of course, the hard Serbian right is more attuned to the ultranationalism of accused war criminals like Vojislav Šešelj, who believes the man who murdered reformist prime minister Zoran Đinđić in March 2003 merits “the same fame and glory Gavrilo Princip has in Serbian history.” Šešelj’s blasphemy made headlines, but it is the thoughtful response of the respected publicist and sociologist Mirko Đorđević that deserves attention: “Now, I am not going to lecture history, but if that guy who assassinated the prime minister in such a mean and cowardly way is a Gavrilo Princip, then ouch and woe! We haven’t yet solved the question of that Gavrilo Princip from 1914, though historians are aware that he didn’t bring us any luck, but bogged us down in a great misery, with consequences still felt today.” As if in affirmation of this Princip predicament, the editors of The 100 Most Eminent Serbs conspicuously omit the assassin. Still more conspicuous is what respected journalist Stojan Cerović had to say on the issue in the Belgrade
weekly *Vreme*. After conceding that Princip’s place in history is singular for South Slavs, Cerović added, without irony, “but who could teach children to admire murder?”

The question is crucial provided one takes into account the political nature of that murder. After all, Serbs are teaching them just that at the Gavrilo Princip Primary School in the Belgrade suburb Zemun, where the Sarajevo assassins are granted the same status as Prince Lazar and other national heroes from medieval Serbian legends. During my visit there in June 2009, I noticed this mythologization the minute I set foot in the foyer, where pupils had mounted an admiring exhibit on the assassination. In so doing, they distorted the facts in the familiar ways. Franz Ferdinand, for example, was cast as the “spokesperson for the conquering pretensions of Austrian military circles,” when in fact he was adamantly opposed to military conflict (at least until the Monarchy could be reformed internally) and, especially, to subjugating Serbia. He even wrote Foreign Minister Aehrenthal in August 1908 to express his opposition to the planned annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Alongside this false history hung romanticized reliefs of Princip, “flower of Young Bosnia.” The school building itself, by contrast, exuded an aura of disrepair, with cracks so wide one wonders how it still stands. Or perhaps the decay should be seen symbolically—that is, in light of Serbia’s last century, how is it that the Sarajevo assassination still stands for something so positive?

The Gavrilo Princip Primary School is the perfect metaphor for a persistent national “hero-cult” that, as Mirko Đorđević and others understand, makes little logical sense. Yet there appear to be no plans to alter the name, just as local groups in Serbia and Serbian parts of the former Yugoslavia still commonly call themselves after the assassin. Moreover, since the 1990s, new works have continued to interpret Princip’s act as both necessary and noble. In a 2007 *Vreme* piece that garnered gargantuan attention across the former Yugoslavia, the Paris-based Montenegrin writer Stanko Cerović tells, with the frightening clarity of a true believer, of a Gavrilo Princip who spoke “the deepest truth of the twentieth century” when,
“with a single bullet,” he negated an entire civilization. For Cerović, it is “European civilization”—the “Euro-Atlantic Cyclops”—that, in all its “greed,” “treachery,” and “rottenness,” provides the perfect bogeyman for Evil incarnate and, thus, the ultimate objective for divine destruction. And who could have been better ordained to “smash this skeleton of consciousness and history” than Princip himself—a peasant from “the poorest hovel in Europe…[who] history kissed on the mouth.”

Cerović’s mythicized ponderings on the place of Princip in the purview of the past century received much sound criticism. Yet such ideas are by no means the province of radical nationalists, enraged anti-Western ideologues, and relatives like Gavrilo Mile Princip, who writes prayerful poetry about his namesake (“my inexhaustible source of inspiration”) and has returned to live in his ancestral village. In another new hagiography, *Uspenije Gavrilovo* (The Assumption of Gavrilo), Jovan Babić lays out the assassin’s life as a religious crusade of strong against weak, manifest good versus pathological evil. One reviewer praised it as “a Serbian apocalypse of human suffering and creation . . . and the greatest monument thus far to [Princip’s] exploit and sacrifice.” So while it would be easy to dismiss the Šešeljs and “Gavrilo Princip” and “Black Hand” groups that occasionally spark violence and issue death threats against moderate political leaders, it is impossible to ignore the prevailing approval of Princip throughout most sectors and all age groups of Serbian society. Football fans may be notoriously right-wing, but when thousands of them taunt their Austrian adversaries with chants of “Gavrilo Princip” at a 2009 match in Belgrade, it’s hard not to take this as further evidence of the “hero-cult’s” resilience.

Meanwhile, Croats and, especially, Bosniaks are verily reveling in their Austrian—i.e., European—past. In spring 2006, a new museum arose on the contested premises. Renamed “Sarajevo, 1878–1918” and considered by its creators to be an objective overview of the Austro-Hungarian era in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the exhibition is more akin to the “hero-cult” in reverse. The small space once overwhelmed by the assassin’s chiseled head is today overtaken by two huge, and hugely idealized, wax figures of Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie von Hohenberg, gloriously attired in dress uniform and white gown, stepping out of city hall and into the sunlight of their last living moments. Where Radenko Mišević’s liberation montage once stood, visitors now learn of “an unusually rich period of rule that had a crucial impact on both Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole . . . contributing to Sarajevo’s Europeanization.” The assassination, in this interpretation, ended a gilded age of “tremendous development in science and the arts, and in social and political life.” Princip, in one swoop, “interrupted the city’s path towards Europe.”
This theme of Bosnia’s broken path to European integration is also at the heart of a palpably propagandistic pamphlet I found prominently displayed in Sarajevo’s main bookstore in 2008. According to its error-ridden narrative, after convening in the town hall the royal couple “returns to the car and moves towards the [Hotel] ‘Europe’” for lunch. Austria, by implication, was bringing Bosnia-Herzegovina into “Europe.” But the Serb Princip interfered, thus setting the country back a century as it still struggles today to enter “Europe” via the standards of the EU. Unfortunately for the audacious author, the lunch was not scheduled for the Hotel Europe, but rather the Konak, Governor-General Potiorek’s residence. In all my reading on the assassination, I had never before seen this mistake.263

Tourist guide Zijad Jusufović’s pseudo-history of the Sarajevo assassination is of a piece with the positive reappraisal of the Austro-Hungarian period in non-Serbian parts of the former Yugoslavia. As one Serbian writer wryly put it, “the majority of Sarajevo’s citizens today think ‘that if Princip had not killed [the Archduke], Sarajevo would certainly now be at least as advanced as Vienna.’”264 This newfound enthusiasm for the Habsburg Empire is also at odds with the enthusiasm Bosniaks largely felt for south Slavic statehood. Understandably seeing Yugoslavia as their best defense against Serbian and Croatian nationalisms, Muslim south Slavs were among both states’ staunchest supporters through the early 1990s, when Alija Izetbegović’s Party of Democratic Action (SDA) opted for independence.265 The tragic, genocidal consequences of that action go a long way toward explaining the Bosniaks’ drastic turnaround in interpreting the emancipation Princip purportedly wrought.

In an interview with an Austrian newspaper in June 2008, Samir Silajdžić, the minister-president of the Sarajevo Cantons, captured the Bosnian Muslim creed thus: “For us a great deal of the tradition of the Austrian Monarchy is being cultivated. We are proud of this period. As for the assassin Princip: He is no national hero to us, but rather a nasty terrorist.”266 Non-Serbs now sometimes even say the same of Young Bosnia, presenting the multinational (and mostly literary) youth movement as a tool of the Serbian secret service.267 The Sarajevo city government advertises this inaccuracy on its website: “Sarajevo entered into world history with a single terrorist act . . . carried out by Gavrilo Princip, as the work of a group of nationalistic and chauvinistic Serbian youth. . . . These so-called ‘national revolutionaries’ were, in fact, ordinary day laborers in the service of Serbian military intelligence.”268 Now, what could better encapsulate the essence of Yugoslavism’s collapse than this single statement on the official site of the no-longer-multinational municipality in which the assassination actually occurred?
“To the Yugoslav National Martyrs”

Ironic has an intriguing way of inserting itself into the most astonishing crevices of historical contemplation. So allow me to conclude with a particularly blatant one from the same place this paper began—the original burial site of Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, and Trifko Grabčev in Terezín, better known now by its German name, Theresienstadt. The contemporary Terezín Memorial, whose stated mission is “to commemorate the victims of Nazi political and racial persecution during the occupation of Czech lands in World War II,” is located on Principova alej—Princip’s Avenue. The street was named in 1930 to honor Franz Ferdinand’s assassin for his role in liberating those lands from Austro-Hungarian rule. Today, as the address of the Czech Republic’s national memorial for the sufferers of their brutal reoccupation by Nazi Germany, it ironically calls to mind the connection between the two world wars.

Our ongoing fascination with the Sarajevo assassination is also based in bald-faced irony: a single, sloppily planned, nearly aborted, and barely successful political murder ended in apocalypse. Clearly neither Princip and his Young Bosnian accomplices, nor their abettors in Belgrade, were responsible for the war’s outbreak. Nevertheless, untangling it from their action is untenable, even if one adheres to the retrospective and intellectually flawed notion that conflict between Europe’s Great Powers was inevitable. Sarajevo became a lieu de mémoire for the Yugoslav idea since World War I, in a roundabout and ruthless way, fulfilled the goal of countless Yugoslavists and the assassins themselves. But the assassination could just as easily be seen and studied as a lieu de mémoire for the entire twentieth century, since it spawned the crisis that culminated in “the great seminal catastrophe” of that era.

In this paper, the divisive memory of the Sarajevo assassination afforded a crucial, if contained window into the challenges Yugoslavists faced in forging the kind of meaningful, cultural unitarism necessary to sustain statehood. Yet in some ways, Sarajevo has become a sideshow compared to what World War II wrought upon ethnonational memory in the region, particularly in terms of the murderous crimes of the Croatian Ustaša, Serbian Četniks and, at war’s end, Tito’s Partisans. Correspondingly, Terezín today receives markedly more visitors than it ever did in the interwar era, though few go to pay homage to the Sarajevo assassins. One may even wonder how many realize that this notorious Nazi “camp-ghetto” was also the place Princip spent the last years of his brief life, manacled to a cold concrete wall.

The Berkeley scholar Martin Jay marvelously captured the experience of unexpectedly stumbling upon Gavrilo Princip’s prison cell during a trip to There-
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sienstadt. As he put it, this “rude intrusion” of a more distant past into the familiar Nazi narrative jolted him into an epiphany, of sorts—the Holocaust, that supposedly incomprehensible core of modern Western “civilization,” was not so unique, or distinct, after all. In fact the two world wars, through the far-off towns of Terezín and Sarajevo, were improbably yet eternally linked, and history is no more self-contained than our own, individual lives and communal identities.273

And so it was that during my own visit to Terezín in the summer 2008 I learned, with as much calm astonishment as one can muster, that Dr. Jan Levit, the eminent Prague military surgeon who regularly and, by all accounts, tenderly cared for Princip at Terezín, ended up an inmate himself, a quarter-century later, in Theresienstadt—not, naturally, for killing an archduke, but for the “crime” of having been born Jewish. On October 12, 1944, Dr. Levit was deported to Auschwitz, where he was murdered in his sixtieth year.274 There is a photo of him today in the Terezín [small fortress] museum, not far from his famous patient’s prison cell. The Czech memorial glorifying Princip in that cell has, however, long since come down.

Dr. Levit’s face, like the faces of millions of fallen in the First World War, reminds us that no amount of ideology can erase the lived reality with which we all must engage. Of course, Princip did not cause the world war any more than he single-handedly caused Bosnia to veer from its “course towards Europe.”275 But then, he could not have liberated his people either, since the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and creation of Yugoslavia occurred how and when they did only as a consequence of that war, the outcome of which was still unpredictable when Princip died in prison in April 1918.

In that sense Princip’s Avenue makes no sense, and never did after the devastations of the first of last century’s global conflagrations—the “tragic and unnecessary” precondition for what might well have been a more peaceful liberation, and
without its loathsome, long-term consequences. By much the same measure, it seems highly paradoxical, though somehow too poignant, that a forlorn and all but forgotten monument marked “To the Yugoslav National Martyrs” still stands today in Terezín’s town cemetery. After all, the highly divisive action of those martyrs, however righteous their cause, will always be associated with the millions more martyred in the world war. And, obviously, there are no longer any Yugoslavs.
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Of course, if I were to be so bold as to dedicate a mere article, then let me just end these acknowledgments with the people who matter utmost: Mom, Dad, Ellie, Bill, Ty and Ben!
NOTES


ENDNOTES


6. There was only one popular referendum on joining with Serbia—in the Slovenian border regions with Austria. The majority of Slovenes in Carinthia opted for Austria.


10. Ibid., 21.


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23. Sokol, from the Slavic word for “falcon,” was a pan-Slavic youth sports movement founded in the Czech region of Austria-Hungary. It contributed to the spread of nationalist ideology.


32. “Ciganović—‘Narodna Odbrana’—Kragujevački Arsenal,” *Hrvatski Dnevnik*, no. 151 (July 8, 1914). This article claimed Kranjčević was not a Catholic since his father had married a Vlahinja (Vlach, or Roman Christian), “who raised her children in an entirely Vlachian manner.” “Veleizdajnička parnica,” *Hrvatski Dnevnik*, no. 272, (October 13, 1914).

33. “(Povodom Sarajevskog Atentata),” *Hrvatska* (Zagreb, June 29, 1914).


36. Jovo Palavestra, “Da su slučajno živi,” *Zvono* (Sarajevo), 4, no. 9 (February
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2, 1921).


41. HaS, Gradsko poglavarstvo u Sarajevu (Gradskoj Blagajni), 24390 (July 23, 1920).

42. “Princip-Kult, auch in der Tschechoslowakei,” *Berliner Monatshefte für internationale Aufklärung (Die Kriegsschuldfrage)*, 8, no. 1 (June 1930), 573–74.


45. While Vidovdan was celebrated as a state holiday in interwar Yugoslavia, Serbs regularly used the occasion to honor the Sarajevo assassins. See: “Orthodox Vidovdan” in DABiH, Uprava Policije u Sarajevu, Povjerljivo [‘confidential’] no. 1508/31 (June 29, 1931); Sonja Dujmović, “Srpska riječ i 1914. godina—sistem nacionalne mobilizacije,” *Prilozi*, 34, (2005), 49–59. DABiH, NvNv BiH, Prezidijal 13622/18 (Sarajevo, November 9, 1918).


52. HaS, Gradsko Poglavarstvo (1920), nos. 21270, 23497, 24390, 23048.


57. Borivoje Jevtić, “Proslave: Dve Velike Svečanosti,” Književni pregled, 1, no. 1, (Oct. 1, 1923), 63. Some denied the criminality of the assassination, arguing that a blow for national liberation justifies “formal violence” in response to the violence being used against them (DABiH, Uprava Policije u Sarajevu, no. 1508/31 [June 29, 1931]: “Proslava Vidov-dana”).


59. DABiH. Pokloni i Otkupi, Box 27, doc. no. 749: Letter from Vladimir Gaćinović
Paul Miller


60. Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 204.


63. Albertini, Origins of the War of 1914, 47 (note #2); Berliner Monatshefte, 13 (April 1935), 347; “Princip-Kult; auch in der Tschechoslowakei,” Berliner Monatshefte, 8 (Berlin NW 6, 1930), 573–75.


67. DABiH, Uprava Policije u Sarajevu: Pov. nos. 1508/31 (June 29, 1931), 1900/33 (June 28, 1933), 1643/34 (June 28, 1934), 2556/36 (June 28, 1936); Pov. Dz. 2709/39 (Pov. no. 3865/39, June 28, 1939).
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69. The bridge is listed as such (“Latinska čuprija,” or “Frenkluk čuprija”) in: Hamdija Kreševljaković, *Vodvodi i gradnje na vodi u starom Sarajevu* (Sarajevo: Islamska Dionička Štamparija, 1939), 200–203. See also: Alija Bejtič, *Ulice i Trgovi Sarajeva: Topografija, Geneza i Toponimija* (Sarajevo: Muzej Grada Sarajeva, 1973), 403–4, which calls the bridge “Principov Most,” but adds that the name was “unofficially introduced sometime after 1918.” In an earlier article in *Oslobođenje* (March 27, 1966), Bejtič fell for the urban legend in which “Princip’s Bridge” was the official name. For other examples: *Oslobođenje* (June 28, 1953, 7; March 9, 1991; April 2, 1991, 10; and Dec. 3, 1994, 11); “Schüsse, die die Welt verändern. Sarajevo, 28. Juni 1914,” in Johannes Sachslehner, *Schicksalsorte Österreichs*, Band 2 (Wien: Styria, 2010): 152 [139–53]. Čuprija, the Turkish word for “bridge,” is also used in Bosnian and Serbian dialects of BCS, and in Ivo Andrić’s novel *Na Drini ćuprija*.


71. Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore (ASCG), Uprava Dvora Njegovog Veličanstva Kralja, fond #74, fascicle #345, jedinica opisa #511 (74/345/511). On the Organization of Vidovdan Heroes, see the police reports in DA, Veliki Župan Sarajevske Oblasti (VŽSO), pov. broj 1019, 666, 980 (1929); 1557 (1928). The Serb-oriented society, which the Ministry of Internal Affairs sanctioned on Oct. 10, 1928 (U. br. 42113), aimed to “awaken and spread national consciousness.”

72. Prof. Ljubodrag Dimić at Belgrade University related this story to me (Aug. 11, 2006), though I never found evidence for it. An Austrian paper alleged that Princip’s father was give a half-million crowns, and that Čabrinović’s parents also received a large sum: “Der Vater Gavro Princips: Eine halbe Million Kronen als Ehrengabe,” *Volks-Zeitung*, 65, no. 179 (Wien, July 1, 1919), 4.

73. A Czech paper first reported the state’s denial of support to Ilić’s mother: “Kod Ilićeva Majke,” *Novo doba* (Plzenj, Aug. 15, 1923). The article “Naš Sramota” (Our Shame), in Sarajevo’s *Narod* (3rd year, Oct. 18, 1923), indicated that the Sarajevo tax
office sent an executor to Ilić’s mother in order to confiscate a house tax; and that she had written the King about her situation, though never received a response and, thus, was still starving. See: Dušan M. Bogunović, Srpsko Sokolstvo i Sarajevski Atentat, svezak I (Zagreb: Hrvatska štampa Zavod D.D., 1925), 30.

74. “Izjava oca atentatora Čabrinovića,” Balkan, 12, no. 180 (July 6, 1925).


77. ASCG, 38/90/215, Ministry of the Interior, Dept. of State Security, Pov. nos. 2168 (March 20, 1931), and 5130 (Vienna, June 17, 1931). See: ASCG 38/48/106, Central Press Bureau of the Ministerial Council Presidency, Pov. no. 15 (Berlin, Jan. 9, 1931), which is more open toward Adler’s work than other reports. Bruno Adler was the pseudonym of Urban Roedl.

78. ASCG, 38/90/215. On Apis und Este, see: I no. 14435 (May 19, 1931), and the 1931 reports from: June 15, 17, Oct. 3, and Nov. 13, 17. On Oppenheimer, see 1931 reports dated April 30 and June 12, 15, 17, 20, 29. The government decided not to ban Harvard historian Sidney B. Fay’s two-volume work The Origins of the World War (1928, 1930), despite its accusation that the Serbian regime was “criminally negligent, to say the least. Not having nipped in the bud the plot prepared in their capital by one of their own General Staff officers” (62–63). But Fay also emphasized that Pašić’s government “had nothing to do with the originating of the assassination” (145). The Interior Ministry appreciated that Fay differentiated between Serbian chauvinists and the state (Pov. no. 22511, June 30, 1931).

79. ASCG, 38/90/215, Pov. nos. 38608 (Sep. 15, 1934), 6317 (Nov. 28, 1934), 55545 (Dec. 7, 1934).
80. ASCG, 38/83/208, Kk 651/35 (April 1935), and Pov. no. 2366 (April 22, 1935).

81. On Princip’s place in the Kingdom, Stephen Graham wrote: “…he has become a legendary hero in Bosnia. His remains and those of the other boys who perished with him are held in high honour. Serbia itself, official Serbia, scarcely dares to honour him, though there is no one there who considers him a criminal,” in _St. Vitus Day_ (New York: D. Appleton, 1931), 4.


87. -Ić, “Tri svjetle sjene,” _Narodno Jedinstvo_, 4, no. 21 (February 3, 1921), 2.


89. Bogunović, _Srpsko Sokolstvo i Sarajevski Atentat_, 11, 13. For other articles glorifying the hanged assassins: Borivoje Jevtić, “Priča o trojici obešenih,” _Politika_, 22, no. 6029 (Feb. 5, 1925); “Tri Heroja,” _Narodna Odbrana_, 15, no. 6 (Feb. 19,


93. Gedye, “Sarajevo Marks the Day Quietly,” *Time* (July 9, 1934), noted that while “the World Press was full of solemn editorials” on the twentieth anniversary of the assassination, “in Sarajevo survivors of the plot took their ease in the snug café of Papa Semiz on King Peter’s Street.”


98. DABiH, Pov. Dz 404/33, Uprava Policije u Sarajevu, Pov. no. 254/1933 (Feb. 3, 1933): “Parastos Vidovdanskim Herojima.”


100. In James W. Wiles’s translation (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1930), it reads: “Thrice happy he whose name rings down the years, For he had reason in this world to come.” After World War II, Vojislav Bogićević proposed building a joint crypt for Young Bosnians that would include the bodies of Vladimir Gaćinović and Muhamed Mehmedbašić. Nothing came of this initiative. See: “Zajednička grobnica za pripadnike ‘Mlade Bosne’,” *Oslobođenje*, 9, no. 1592 (Dec. 4, 1951), 2.


106. Borivoje Jevtić, “Spomenik Gavrilu Principu (Pismo ‘Politici’),” *Politika*, 22, no. 6231 (Aug. 30, 1925). In *Od Revolucionarne omladine do Orjune* (Split, 1925), Niko Bartulović argues that Orjuna has been the true standard bearer of the ideas of Princip and the other assassins (5–6, 45, 120).

107. Jevđević’s rebuttal appeared in the Novi Sad journal *Vidovdan* (Sept. 1, 1925); and on Sept. 4 in the Split journal *Pobeda*. “Šta se čuje,” *Nova Evropa*, 12, no. 9 (Sept. 21, 1925).

108. HaS, Fond/Zbirka: Ostavština (Bequest) Borivoja Jevtića, književnika i dramaturga (writer and playwright), 1900–1959, JB–50–753. On how the “nationalistic bourgeoisie” embraced the assassins after the war, but wanted nothing to do with them before or immediately after the assassination, see: Rizo Mehinagić, “Rođenje ‘Mlade Bosne’,” *Oslobodenje*, 41, no. 12939 (June 29, 1984), 11.


110. DABiH, VŽSO, Pov. nr. 1276/1925 (June 8, 1925): “Osveštavanje zastave organizacije Srpske Nacionalne Omladine u Sarajevo ‘Petar Kočić’.” Kočić was a Bosnian Serb writer active in Serbian national organizations and Young Bosnia.


112. DABiH, Andrej Rodinis, “Napretkova”—Kulturno, historijska, zbirka, analitički inventar (Sarajevo, 2004): N KHZ -6, V-5/361. Concerning these memorial structures: *Sarajevski List* (May 28, 1918 and June 28, 1918). Miloš Crnjanski, whose poem *Spomen Principu* (1918) deconstructed the celebration of Serbia’s past heroes while creating a new mythology for Princip, reproached those who glorified
the senators who killed Caesar, but not the Sarajevo assassins: Crnjanski, *Lirika Itake*, 188.

113. *Berliner Monatshefte*, 8th Year (1930), 886. The relevant piece is a German translation of the article “Das Kennzeichen der Stelle entfernt, von der aus Princip schoß,” *Hrvatski List* (Aug. 7, 1930). Passing through Sarajevo on Armistice Day (Nov. 11, 1918), ex-British diplomat Sir Robert Lockhart describes “a plaque, severely correct in language, [that] indicates as much as decency permits Serbian approval of the deed, which provoked the world war and which may one day be the chief landmark in the collapse of Europe’s world domination.” If accurate, then the plaque existed *before* the Austrian monument was removed: R.H. Bruce Lockhart, *Retreat From Glory* (London: Putnam, 1934), 300.


115. “The Serajevo [sic] Assassin: Unveiling of Memorial,” *London Times*, no. 45427 (Feb. 3, 1930), 12. Princip died on April 28, 1918. Miško Jovanović, Veljko Čubrilović, and Danilo Ilić were hanged on Feb. 3, 1915. Another explanation for the delay in marking the assassination site would be that official Yugoslav representations of the war stressed that Serbia was attacked after receiving Austria-Hungary’s impossible Ultimatum. Thus the government commemorated its victory in WWI, rather than the act that prompted the Dual Monarchy to launch a war against Serbia.


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126. Ibid.; Večernja Pošta, no. 2592 (Feb. 4, 1930), 2; Popović, Oko Sarajevskog Atentata, 240–41.

127. “Sarajevo Hails the Youth Who Began the War,” Chicago Daily Tribune (Feb. 3, 1930), 1. The Literary Digest (March 8, 1930) wrote “of merely some five hundred peasants.”

128. Večernja Pošta, no. 2592 (Feb. 4, 1930), 2. On expectations that the unveiling would be “subdued and without special ceremony”: “Liturgia,” Večernja Pošta, no. 2589 (Jan. 31, 1930), 5. On the low-key nature of the unveiling, see the letter to the editor of The Pittsburgh Press, from the Army and Navy Club in New York City on Feb. 17, 1930 (ASCG, fond #38, fascicle #61, jedinica opisa #149).

129. Popović, Oko Sarajevskog Atentata, 240.


131. Film of the plaque’s removal appears in Fadil Hadžić’s Sarajevski Atentat (1968).

132. The plaque was displayed in the Berlin Arsenal as Inventory item 41.32. According to the caption of photographs in the Bavarian State Library, Hitler viewed it in his special train (FHQ Sonderzug) on his birthday (April 20, 1941). “Why not in the Vienna Military Museum?” instead, asks the Austrian General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, who served in the Wehrmacht in World War II. See: Peter Broucek, ed., Ein General im Zwielicht: Die Erinnerungen Edmund Glaises von Horstenau (Wien: Böhlau, 1988), 97. Images of Hitler and the plaque can be viewed online at the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (http://www.bsb-muenchen.de): hoff-35336, 35337, 35114, and 34006. My thanks to Dr. Christian Hartmann at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Munich) for directing me to this source. See also: Muharem Bazdulj, “Srećan rođendan, gospodine Hitler,” Vreme, no. 1191 (Oct. 31, 2013).

133. P.P., “Sarajvo [sic] je opralo sa sebe vidovdansku ljagu,” Sarajski Novi List, no. 43 (July 1, 1941), 5. At the beginning of the occupation, the Ustaša changed
Sarajevo’s name to “Sarajvo.” My thanks to Dr. Emily Greble for this little known (and less understood!) fact.

134. Evidently, the memorial was cracked by an English Stricktrommel (Uniformen-Markt, no. 10, Jahrgang 8 [May 15, 1941], 96). My thanks to Daniel Hohrath, M.A. (Stiftung Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin) for this information. According to Cvetko Popović (Oko Sarajevskog Atentata, 241), the plaque was returned to Sarajevo after the war and placed in the Young Bosnia Museum collection. Yet this has not been confirmed, and the Berlin Arsenal has no record of the plaque leaving. In “Bilješke o mjestu Principova Atentata” in Oslobodenje (June 28, 1953, p. 7), K.M. indicates that the museum has thus far been unsuccessful in its efforts to get the memorial back from Germany.

135. Wachtel, Making a Nation, 130.


138. On the association between the assassination and communism, see: Petar Pavić, Makinacije: Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije i ‘Crne Ruke’ (Sarajevo: Studeni, 1944); and S.M. Štedimlija, Partizani o Sebi: Izvorni Dokumenti o Političkom Podrijetlu Partizana i o Njihovu Prebacivanju Iz Inozemstva Na Područje Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (Zagreb, 1944).


140. Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 212; M. Marković, “Mlada Bosna,” Oslobodenje (June 28, 1952). Slobodan Princip was later killed and honored as a Yugoslav National Hero.
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143. On the fine line between the noble, patriotic goals of Young Bosnia and terrorism, see: Nikola Babić, “Neodgovorno zalijetanje u istoriju,” Oslobođenje, 33, no. 9990 (March 27, 1976).


154. “Sarajevo—Grad bez spomenika,” Republika (Beograd), 19, no. 338 (April 22, 1952). There was a national-religious element to the Koševo cemetery commemorations. For the assassination’s 37th anniversary, the Metropolitan for the dabrobosanska diocese (which included Sarajevo) presided. See: N.H., “U Sarajevu je održan pomen Gavrilu Principu,” Politika, 48, no. 13902 (June 29, 1951).


158. “Komemorativno veče članovima ‘Mlade Bosne’,” Oslobođenje, 11, no. 2100, (June 29, 1953), 7. Other speakers included the Young Bosnians Nikola Trišić and Hamdija Nikšić, the conspirator Ivo Kranjčević, and the dean of the Faculty of Philosophy (who officiated the event). See also: “Proslava 39-godišnjice sarajevskog atentata,” Nedjeljni Sarajevski List 7 Dana, 1, no. 6 (June 25, 1953), 1.

159. Milorad Ekmečić, Mlada Bosna Sarajevo (Sarajevo: Muzej grada Sarajeva, 1964).


162. Ekmečić, Mlada Bosna Sarajevo.


170. Žugić, “Muzej Mlade Bosne.” Miroslav Prstojević, *Forgotten Sarajevo* (Sarajevo: Author, 1992, 1999), 92: “In the former Schiller’s fine foods store, a museum was opened, to which not a single visitor to Sarajevo has shown indifference.”


173. See: http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/myday/displaydoc.cfm?_y=1953&_
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179. In my last interview with Gec (June 29, 2005), he told me that it was the exchanges he had with foreigners at the museum on the morality of Princip’s act that got him interested in different interpretations of the assassination. As a Bosnian Muslim who survived the siege of Sarajevo, Gec had become disillusioned with the mythologization of the assassination. Still, he was committed to preserving this history and favored reestablishing the footprints and the Austro-Hungarian monument: “if we refuse to recognize our history and refuse to restore our monuments, it will be difficult to keep Sarajevo a multinational city” (DeVoss, “Searching for Gavrilo Princip”). Also see: George Jahn, “Serb assassin who triggered World War I—hero or terrorist?” The National (June 29, 2004).


181. Veselin Masleša, “Gdje bi bili danas (Odlomak iz knjige ‘Mlada Bosna’),” Oslobodjenje, 2411 (June 27, 1954); Todor Vujasinović, “Uz Četrdesetgodišnjicu Sarajevskog Atentata,” Pregled: Časopis Za Društvena Pitanja, 6th Year, Book 1,


189. B. Garić, “‘Mlada Bosna’ je dio opšte jugoslovenskog omladinskog pokreta,” *Oslobođenje*, 21, no. 5772 (June 28, 1964), 1, 16.


191. Mladenović indicates the museum was called “The Birth House of Gavrilo
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192. According to Gavrilo Mile Princip, there was also a “Gavrilo Princip Memorial Building” in Grahovo that had a library, movie theatre, the local radio station, a 300-person conference room, and “the most contemporary discotheque in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time.” The building, along with the memorial-museum, was destroyed by Croatian forces in 1995 (Aug. 15, 2007, interview).


198. Three recordings were made by BiH-Televizija and broadcast on June 27, 1969: (1) “Sjećanje Vojislav Bogićević na atentat 28. juna 1914 godine na Ferdinanda—govori o Čabrinoviću i Principu” (Track no. G-1687); (2) “Sjećanja O Mladoj Bosni,” Interview with Dr. Vukosava Branisavljević-Čabrinović, the sister of Nedeljko Čabrinović (Tape no. G-1523); and (3) “Naši narodi u borbi za slobodu,” interview with Bogićević and Branisavljević-Čabrinović (Tape no. G-1484).


201. Debate between Nikola Babić and Božo Majstorović: *Oslobođenje* (March 27, April 10–11, 1976).


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209. The internationally supported Research and Documentation Centre Sarajevo tallied approximately 100,000 dead in the Bosnian war alone (www.idc.org.ba).

210. M. Bekan, “Sprejom po istoriji,” Oslobođenje (March 5, 1991), 5; and Smajlović, “From the Heart of the Heart of the Former Yugoslavia.” Smajlović quotes Čengić: “…in a sovereign Bosnia the Princip Bridge would no longer bear the name of a terrorist…” This is more inflammatory than what it appears Čengić actually said (and Smajlović wrote) in the earlier article “Crno-žuta nostalgija,” in Oslobođenje (March 11, 1991), which did not use the word “terrorist.” Bekan’s article confirms the response “because Princip did not build [it].” In “Dobro došli u prošlost: Rat, laži i video trake” (Politika, Aug. 13, 2006), Smajlović writes that an explosive device damaged the memorial plaque. This is supported by Nagorka Idrizović in “Dobro došli u prošlost: Povratak Gavrila Principa, ili kako je Muzej Mlade Bosne postao Muzej Sarajevskog atentata,” NIN, no. 2714 (Jan. 3, 2003). However, a bombing was not corroborated by the stories immediately after the vandalism.


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220. On the destruction Princip’s birth home, along with most of Bosansko Grahovo, see: Slaviša Sabljić, “Zaborav stiže Đuru i Gavrila,” Politika Online (Feb. 12, 2008).


222. Alix Kroeger reports that the footprints were “ripped out” of the pavement, in “Sarajevo reinstalls memorials to the past,” BBC News Online (June 29, 2001), while Frederic Morton, in Thunder at Twilight: Vienna 1913/1914 (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001), writes: “the Muslim-dominated municipality of Sarajevo…used a jackhammer to pulverize Princip’s sidewalk immortality” (340). Morton cites no source, though echoes Marko Attila Hoare’s implication that “the Muslim-nationalist regime of Alija Izetbegović” was responsible for uprooting them (History of Bosnia, 90). Christopher Hitchens, “Why Bosnia Matters: Appointment in Sarajevo,” The Nation (Sept. 14, 1992), 238: “and the crowd had even dug up the famous two ‘footprints’…”; “Neutralität im Gedenken,” Der Standard (May 22, 2003), 2: “enraged residents again tore the memorial to the Serbian assassin out of the sidewalk”; Asaf Bečirović, “U principu Gavrilo je bio dijete ubica! Ili heroj!,” Oslobođenje (Aug. 5, 2000). Gavrilo Mile Princip told me that a Sarajevo Jew had saved the footprints (Aug. 15, 2007). In the diary he kept during the siege of Sarajevo, former mayor Dane Olbina (1948–55) laments the museum’s destruction by Bosnian Serb grenades: Dani I Godine Opsade, 484.


234. The citation is from Nedjet Nenić, the principal of Isak Samo-Kovlija Elementary School, in Ermin Cengic, “The Historical Divide,” *Transitions Online* (January 15, 1999).


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247. E. Duvnjak, “Priča o povodu za Prvi svjetski rat tek na jesen,” *Nezavisne novine*
(July 23, 2005); Majo Dizdar, *Sarajevo: Historijsko Turistički Vodič* (Sarajevo: Sejtarija, 2005), 88–89.


249. Ibid. Comment by Predrag Marković.


251. Predrag Jeremić and Zvonimir Kostić, eds., *100 Najznamenitijih Srba* (Beograd: IP Princip, 1993, 2001). Of course, as a Bosnian, Princip was a subject of Austria-Hungary rather than Serbia, though this has never stopped Serbs from claiming him as their own.

252. Stojan Cerović, “Gavrilo Princip,” *Vreme*, no. 703 (June 24, 2004). This *Vreme* is a weekly journal started in 1990, as distinct from the interwar daily *Vreme* (1921–41).


254. See, for example, the *Bilten mesne zajednice Gavrilo Princip* (Newsletter of the local Gavrilo Princip community), published in Novi Sad beginning in March 2006.


Services in B-H To Investigate Suspected Terrorist Group” (Feb. 9, 2002); “B-H Police Tighten Presidency Member Tihic’s Security After Threats Received” (Aug. 28, 2003); “‘Young Bosnia’ Claims Responsibility for Incidents in Belgrade, Kosovska Mitrovica” (Feb. 19, 2008); Livia Klingl, “Sarajewo...Zehn Jahre nach Ausbruch des Krieges und nach fast sieben Jahren relativen Friedens ist der Alltag für die Bosnier reines Überleben,” Kurier (March 31, 2002), 4; “Preventing and Combatting Terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” by Col. Dr. Alfred C. Lugert (Austrian National Defence Academy, Dec. 2002, 79–80, 90): CIAO (http://www.ciaonet.org). Morton claims Serbian nationalist groups sent death threats to Dr. Wolfgang Petritsch (“His Honor Franz Ferdinand Petritsch”), Bosnia-Herzegovina’s High Representative from 1999 to 2002 (Thunder at Twilight, 340)


262. http://h.etf.unsa.ba/vmuzej-atentata/index.html. This quote is from the museum’s website.


264. Mitrinović, “Gavrilo Princip-terorista!”

265. Djokić, Yugoslavism, 7.

266. Thomas Cik, “‘Princip ist ein Terrorist und kein Volksheld’,” Kleine Zeitung
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(June 22, 2008), 28.


270. Princip-Kult,” *Berliner Monatshefte*, 8th Year (Berlin NW 6, 1930), 573–75.


274. See also: Sava Mijalković, “Svedok njegove smrti,” *Oslobođenje* (June 23, 1974).

275. Examples of Yugoslav insistence that the assassination served as a “long awaited pretext for war,” but was not its *cause*, include: the historian Milorad Ėkmečić’s prospectus for the Museum of Young Bosnia (16); Borivoje Jevtić: “It is perfectly true that the First World War would have come even without Princip,” in “Zvjezdani čas Gavrila Principa,” *Oslobođenje*, no. 2099 (June 28, 1953), 4; Vladimir Dedijer: “to describe the Sarajevo assassination as either an underlying or an immediate cause of the 1914–18 war is to commit an enormity” (*Road to Sarajevo*, 445), among many more.