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Tragic Past, Agreeable Heritage:
Post-Soviet Intellectual Discussions on
the Polish Legacy in Western Ukraine
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No. 2403, September 2015

2015 by The Center for Russian and East European Studies, a program of the University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh

ISSN 0889-275X (print) ISSN 2163-839X (online)

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Abstract

This study examines intellectual arguments present in the public debate on the difficult history of the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands. It focuses primarily on discourses put forth by the Ukrainian (first and foremost, West Ukrainian) party of the dispute. As subordinated to the nation-centric historical accounts, but an increasingly important theme opened for multiple uses, the historical diversity of the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands has become an object of intellectual reinterpretation in Western Ukraine since the 2000s. Framing this intellectual asset in terms of multicultural heritage (*bahatokul’turna spadshchyna*) has signaled the effort of the Ukrainian intellectuals to inscribe the local—and, at the same time, transnational—past to a coherent national narrative. On the way, however, it proved to be the case that the multicultural “universes”—in particular, the Polish one—resist the seamless inclusion into the fabric of Ukrainian-centric historical accounts due to unresolved memory conflicts rooted in the events of World War II and the post-war period. One of them is the Polish-Ukrainian controversy over interpretation of the anti-Polish action of 1943-44 in Volhynia and Galicia, whose turmoils demonstrate, among other things, that a lack of mutually compatible intellectual conceptualizations of the shared past may undermine the trustworthiness of gestures of political reconciliation. Nevertheless, opening up the topic of Polish-Ukrainian violence that was suppressed during the Soviet period allowed West Ukrainian memory actors to start talking about the multicultural heritage as a public good that deserves public attention. Nevertheless, in the author’s opinion, it is still unclear whether in the near future the narratives on the dismembered Galician polyethnicity will appeal to the cultural imagination of wider audiences or will instead remain an exclusive asset of elitist custodians.
Introduction

Democratic transformations that came in the wake of the Soviet regime’s collapse entailed an examination of the difficult pasts in East-Central Europe. The history shaped by the divisive legacy of radical nationalism, Marxism-Leninism, and Nazism has been reinterpreted against the background of the European integration project, which advocates democratic values, diversity, and reconciliation. In Poland and Ukraine, passionate disputes over the shared past have been a recurrent historical phenomenon resulting from “a lack of abiding institutions on which to anchor their political personas, making them heavily reliant on their collective memories as the bases for their national identities.” Over the past two decades, political and cultural elites presumed that the conflict-ridden history of the two peoples was the most obvious (and even the only) stumbling block in Polish-Ukrainian relations. As Adolf Juzwenko, director of the Ossolineum Library in Wrocław, put it two years before Poland’s long-awaited accession to the EU, “Poles and Ukrainians are presently divided only by the history.” Almost a decade later, relations between the two countries are still far away from parity, not only in the sphere of memory politics, but in a range of crucial economic, geopolitical, and identity-related matters. Moreover, the Polish-Ukrainian memory disputes became more complex and nuanced. They might provide a clue about whose interpretations of the past will be dominant until the next major “mnemonic turn” and what intellectual legacies will reflect in posterity.

The ambition of this study is to examine in more detail the latter aspect, namely, intellectual outlooks present in the public debate on the turbulent history of the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands. I will focus on the narratives and strategies of argumentation put forth by the Ukrainian (first and foremost, West Ukrainian) party of the dispute as—unlike the Polish intellectual discourse on the shared pasts—they have drawn less attention as an object of scholarly analysis. The intellectual discourses of the Polish opinion-makers about historical relations with Ukrainians are cursorily addressed in the article’s section on turning points of the Ukrainian-Polish debates over the historical legacy of the twentieth century. However, as this extensive matter
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deserves a separate study, standpoints of the Polish proponents will not be an object of theoretical generalization.

Arguably, what deserves special attention in the recent Ukrainian debates over the contentious Polish-Ukrainian past is a novel discourse of “multicultural heritage,” where Polishness is a nodal point. The concept of heritage is inherently connected to identity and collective memory. Moreover, heritage itself is “a memory, a social construct shaped by the political, economic, and social concerns of the present.” Hence, this study has a principal emphasis on efforts to construe a multicultural heritage through negotiations, disputes, and dialogue. Given this, the scope of positions addressed in the study is limited primarily to those of the liberal and liberal-nationalist. Unlike debaters of the right and the ultra-right who also attend to ethnic diversity and memory conflicts of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, liberal-leaning discussants are prone not only to voice and impose their opinions, but also to develop and negotiate them in the context of domestic and transnational memory politics. In other words, their deliberations on the past may become a significant democratic asset and catalyzer of societal transformations. Arguably, in Eastern Europe liberal and liberal-nationalist sections of the intellectual spectrum may pattern a new type of public memory actor—addressed here as memorians—who are predisposed to bridge a gap between academic research, political pragmatism, and vernacular historical knowledge that is present in memory cultures of East-Central Europe.

This study has two primary analytical foci. Firstly, it examines arguments of liberal-leaning public actors who use the past as an intellectual resource, i.e., as a vehicle to introduce novel ideas and moral outlooks to broader audiences. Secondly, it considers obstacles and opportunities that these actors come across in their efforts to formulate their visions of multicultural heritage. In view of this, the choice of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is justified as the main methodological tool of the study. CDA focuses on the rhetorical means of presentation of socially relevant topics and on peculiarities of power relations and social hierarchies resulting in certain strategies of argumentation. This vantage point is especially relevant for memory research with its primary focus on how representations of the past are produced by historically specific systems of knowledge and power, and for heritage studies investigations into why particular interpretations of heritage are promoted, who has the power to conceive and communicate them and whose interests are advanced or suppressed. Using publications in West Ukrainian media (newspapers, magazines, media forums, blogs etc.) as primary source material, I will analyze how networks of liberal and liberal-nationalist intellectuals revisit and interpret the “dissonant heritage” of the prewar Polish population who were excised from the region. Arguably, these discursive
shifts have a potential to transform the (up until now) divided mnemonic landscape of Ukraine and pave the way for intellectually advanced visions of the past—visions that do not only ritually acknowledge and compartmentalize historical polyethnicity and cultural diversity, but make efforts to transform them into a democratic resource.

**Linking Identity, Memory, and Politics: Emergence of Memorians and Discourses on Multicultural Heritage in Post-Soviet Western Ukraine**

Over the last two years, anniversaries of several episodes from the country’s tragic past were fervent topics in Ukrainian public discourse. Among them were the events whose interpretations trigger international debates and cast a shadow on the bilateral political relations of Ukraine and Poland, namely, massacres of Polish civilians in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 1943–1944. For the nationally-aware Ukrainian politicians and intelligentsia, Volyn’ is an especially problematic topic given that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)—the core actors of the anti-Soviet nationalist movement whose symbolic and legal status is still under dispute after more than twenty years of Ukraine’s sovereignty—bear responsibility for the killings. By and large, in Ukraine the Volhynian massacres became “a theme in the discussion about evaluation of the [Ukrainian] nationalist underground.”

This trend, nevertheless, cannot deny that after the intense introduction of steadfast nationalist narratives with the advent of Ukraine’s independence, the 2000s have witnessed efforts to infuse different stories to ideologically conflicting, but uniformly nationalist narratives on the Ukrainian history prevalent among the ruling political elite and the opposition. Notably, in present-day Western Ukraine, where nationalist orientation predominates and anti-Soviet memories of national insurgency are given the upper hand in public spaces, one may observe a growing academic engagement, as well as public interest, in the so-called bahatokul’turna spadshchyna (multicultural heritage). Rediscovery of local “dissonant heritages” and historical ethnic diversity has been a trend common in the whole of East-Central Europe since 1989. Triggered by the desire to undermine a monocultural socialist vision of heritage, this trend brings to the fore the uniqueness of local and regional identities and simultaneously emphasizes the idea of openness to global cultural exchange.
Cooperation of Ukrainian cultural milieus with institutions of the EU, as well as with actors communicating the international reconciliatory rhetoric and politics of regret, have been instrumental in this process. Nevertheless, one cannot overlook the fact that in East-Central Europe, the local heritages referring to cultural diversity are oftentimes used to reinforce new national identities and dominant ideologies.

In independent Ukraine, as elsewhere in Europe, cultural landscapes and heritages have been a concern of a growing number of stakeholders and, consequently, a potential zone of conflict of private and public interests. Furthermore, pluralization of understanding and interpreting heritage has been facilitated by the fragmentation of the post-1991 intellectual field in Ukraine. By and large, these developments have been in phase with global processes of the transformation of intellectual practices.

On the other hand, efforts of various local intellectual milieus to instill a sense of their own historical legitimacy, personal autonomy, and public significance intensified in the wake of the post-Soviet sociopolitical transformations. The increasing interest in pluralistic pasts, multilayered collective memories, and national identities “assembled” from multiple cultural components may be viewed as a corollary of these activities.

Quests for useable pasts and praise of the local, subjective, and imaginative embedding of memory go in tandem with the blurring boundaries of the intellectual field and changing role of expert historical knowledge. In different parts of Europe, we observe the increasing democratization of intellectual work, which means that ‘intellectual’ does not indicate a particular social type, but rather “the capacity to make a public intervention, a capacity to which many different actors lay claim.” Also, the complexity of the present-day nexus between history and memory undermines the historian’s monopoly on interpreting the past. Over the past few decades they’ve had to compete with “interference in the historical field from journalist, judge and MP ‘intruders’.” This de-bordering of the historical field is likely to open interstitial positions that attract an array of interpreters of historical discourses enthused by the insight that nowadays “the past has ceased to be a body of knowledge and has become an issue” and “ours is an age of memory rather [than] history.”

These opinion-makers, whom one may be tempted to call memorians, readily contribute to public debates on historical topics, voice their opinion about national history, and help to revisit “repressed” collective memories. Alongside manufacturing heritages and usable pasts for their communities and audiences, they are also increasingly active on transnational arenas and play a significant role in bilateral historical debates. Memorians are closer to the cutting edge of politics than many academics. Their ability to influence public opinion and comment on current issues of significant social and political relevance brings them close to public intellectuals.
The latter, whose main faculty is “opin[ing] to an educated public on questions of or inflected by a political or ideological concern,” are usually anchored in a national academic field. Meanwhile, the recruitment base of memorians is wider. Most likely, they exert their influence on the public debate from the diffuse media space of internet forums and blogs, and recruit their participants over national boundaries. They excel with a limited scope of topics related to the past, but as they target broad, fragmented audiences with differing levels of education, this tends to have a negative impact on the quality of their discourse and intellectual arguments. Nevertheless, similar to public intellectuals, memorians—whose ranks in Western Ukraine include varying numbers of academics, journalists, concerned intelligentsia, clergy, NGO activists, businessmen and administrators—provide their audiences with a combination of information, entertainment, and solidarity. Their discourses and practices of exploring the past are thus informed by “the combination of truth claims with a public moral stance.” As will be demonstrated later, in some cases this facilitates the inclusion of religious discourse into otherwise secular intellectual debates addressing the issues of memory, responsibility, and reconciliation.

Distinguished analytically, memorians are a new type of actor in Eastern Europe who perform an important mediating function in the public space. While suppressing politically dangerous narratives and rewriting history, communist regimes failed to instill a trustworthy, comprehensive ideological narrative of the past that would bridge private experiences and institutionalized visions of the national history. This was especially true in Western Ukraine where the contrast between the Soviet historical meta-narrative and clandestine family stories (especially in respect to World War II and the years before and after it) used to be particularly striking. Although, with the collapse of the Soviet system, the dichotomy of the official historiography and personal memories was “exploded by the political pluralism,” still, narratives suggested by professional historians seem to have a minimal impact on the mass historical consciousness. With the appearance of diffuse but vocal networks of memorians intervening in public forums through popular channels of communication (the internet, daily newspapers, radio, and TV programs) and involved in exchanges of ideas over national borders, a perceivable gap between personal stories and national histories—the gap that historical expertise alone has difficulty to fill—gradually gets smaller.

One may question the necessity of analytically distinguishing between different types of mnemonic actors working with selected historical topics while constantly crossing boundaries between the intellectual, political, media, and economic fields. Nevertheless, it remains important not only to assess the “politics” of the identifiable stakeholders of the public debates on memory (e.g., analyze their resources, networks,
interests and social characteristics) but to analyze their “poetics,” i.e., discursive means, symbolic logic and aims of their intellectual participation in public discussions on the past. Intellectual discourse of this type is not only about searching for legitimizing strategies, exploitable resources, and political metaphors. When cultural opportunists reach for the past, they create discourses that “influence (if not inform) politicians’ thinking about what is (the social world), what is desirable (social goals), what is doable (pragmatic concerns), and what methods are legitimate (ethical constraints).” Their long-term objective is innovation and in particular, transformations of sociocultural imagery, as “intellectuals must communicate to their potential public something that the public does not yet know but could possibly take up.” In Ukraine, as elsewhere in post-communist societies, ideas about the changing nexus of cultural heritage, identity, memory, and politics exemplify this sort of intellectual innovation.

Among the novelties introduced to post-communist public discourse has been the concept of multiculturalism “domesticated”, by means of translating it to Ukrainian as bahatokul’turnist’. After decades of using the concept of multiculturalism for the endorsement of cultural heterogeneity and protection of the rights of minorities, Western societies critically revisit its normative claims and sociopolitical implications. Multiculturalism is presently under attack as a tool of nation-state policy that by and large denies “ambiguity or indifference, in order to create subordinate units manageable for the dominant groups of society.” It is still, however, a legitimate category of scholarly description and analysis of culturally heterogeneous Central European societies. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study I prefer to use such terms as multiculture, multiculturality, polyethnicity and ethnic/cultural diversity to reduce the connotation of a political project or ideological narrative conveyed by the suffix “-ism”.

In some respects, the rhetoric of multicultural heritage in Ukraine continues the well-known Soviet ideological discourses of internationalism and “friendship between peoples,” but otherwise this is a product of a non-Soviet cultural imagery that correlates with the growing polarization and differentiation of post-communist societies. Unlike its Western equivalent—split into several political-ideological and academic conceptualizations—ideological connotations of bahatokul’turnist’ are much more limited in public and political texts. The word is primarily used as a descriptive term referring to “the fact” of cultural diversity and polyethnicity. The normative dimension of bahatokul’turnist’ associates it first and foremost with the term tolerantnist’—another notable influence of the post-Soviet, West Ukrainian public discourses concerning relations between nations and ethnic groups. Being loosely defined and applied in various ideological contexts, these matching terms nevertheless convey the idea of a non-transformative and essentializing approach to
ethno-cultural diversity addressed both in its historical and present-day variants. Arguably, these connotations of boundedness and separate existence are also typical of the notion of heritage (spadshchyna).

In East-Central Europe, as elsewhere, the manufacturing of heritage as a cultural product, economic commodity, and political resource has not only enabling, but also constraining aspects. Inherent tensions between the cultural status and economic value of a heritage (which is especially obvious in the case when heritage is “manufactured” from the representations of otherness with undertones of oppression and political-cultural superiority—like in the case of the Polish legacy in Western Ukraine) may bring about highly contested “dissonant heritages.” Another tension of heritage stems from its anchoring both in representations of the past and in present-day values and concerns. As a consequence, the present-day pragmatic considerations may straitjacket the past and turn heritage into either a domain of national self-glorification or to a motley product of nostalgia.

Ethnic diversity is often mentioned as a hallmark of Western Ukraine, composed of several historical-ethnographic regions that in indifferent periods were intersected by the political boundaries of several empires and nation states. Multicultural legacy may be comfortably presented as an argument for attracting foreign investors, as a ticket to the European community, and as a tourist attraction, but, simultaneously, it poses a challenge to present the West Ukrainian borderlands as an organic part of an uninterrupted narrative of the Ukrainian national distinction. Both Polish and Jewish legacies of the region are marked by a tension between their contested internal cultural status and high value for external audiences. Polish legacy is of special interest, as for almost six centuries—until the outbreak of World War II—Poles maintained cultural and—with exception of the periods of Habsburg and Russian rule—political supremacy in Galicia and Volhynia. In these two provinces, Poles (together with Jews) also formed the majority of the population of historical cities. Despite their “common Slavic roots and extensive cultural cross-pollination,” throughout history Poles and Ukrainians were incessantly antagonized by social, ideological, and political inequalities. In the twentieth century, these antagonisms culminated in the massacres in Volhynia and Galicia (1943–1944).

Since 1991, Polish-Ukrainian relations at the highest political level remain amicable. Moreover, Poland has pursued policies of advocating Ukrainian interests before the European community. Simultaneously, the Polish state, in contrast to the Soviet period, actively supports its compatriots in the former Polish territories that are presently part of Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. With the advent of independence, efforts to “manufacture” heritage from cultural material biased toward the centuries-
long Polish dominance in Ukraine, has so far been most explicit and complex in Lviv, the “divided” borderland city occupying a central place in both Ukrainian and Polish cultural memories. The great majority of Poles who made up more than a half of the Lwów population in 1939, disappeared from the city as a result of World War II and several waves of postwar expulsions. Ambitions of the local elites to transform post-Soviet Lviv into a major educational center and tourist magnet, revived interest in its cultural diversity. In particular, inclusion of Lviv’s historical center to the UNESCO World Heritage list in 1998 was explained by the particular eclecticism of the urban architecture associated with “a number of ethnic groups with different cultural and religious traditions, who established separate yet interdependent communities within the city.”

Hence, visions of Galician ethnic diversity and plural pasts required adjustment to the new priorities defined not only by the ongoing Ukrainian national project but also by the ambition to create a globally inclusive, marketable image of the city and the region.

Attractive material representations of the prewar ethnic diversity could be found first and foremost in Lviv’s architectural monuments. As maintaining and systematic restoration of the unique architectural heritage proved to be a challenge in the conditions of the post-Soviet economic hardships and general disinterest of the central Ukrainian authorities to fund culture on the local level, the municipality allowed significant foreign investments in the built environment, restoration works, and commemorative initiatives in the city. An example of the latter was the renovation of the Polish military pantheon, known as the Young Eaglets cemetery, which caused an international controversy, but was eventually unveiled in 2005. Over recent years a range of other architectural monuments relating to Polish culture were restored with significant financial help of both civil and state Polish sources. The Polish Ministry of Culture and National Heritage alone has recently invested over 11.5 million hryvni (around one million USD) in a Lviv-based international restoration program.

Although timely and well-intended, the local initiatives focused on the presentation of the built environment that connotes historical presence and—especially in the Polish case—dominance of other nations in Lviv, do not necessarily signal intentions of the Ukrainian party to pay tribute to the significance of cultural contribution of the “others” or equalize their heritage with the Ukrainian national one. The well-preserved built environment is not necessarily a token of the well-preserved cultural memories about its former inhabitants and creators.

In the most general terms, vagaries of the post-1991 debates over Polish heritage in Ukraine and the difficulties of the Polish-Ukrainian historical dialogue are informed by differences between the centralized memory politics of the Polish elites, and the
more mosaic-like approach of their Ukrainian counterparts. Yet another factor that affects both political discourses and intellectual discussions on the recent past, in both Poland and Ukraine, is the normative aspects of the EU-promoted symbolic politics. The formats of the European memory regimes that build on the new normative conditionality developed by the EU and the Council of Europe are debatable in many respects. “Intensive reconciliationism,” underpinned by essentialist thinking about the nation “as a distinct body possessing a reformable moral ‘character,’” is especially vulnerable to criticism. Contradictions of the EU’s quest for “the shared past” that would balance memories of the two totalitarianisms also reverberate in the Ukrainian memory debates—in particular, those focused on the Polish-Ukrainian past.

The symbolic energy of collective memories cannot work unmediated. They require not only promotion by “memory entrepreneurs” but also a particular kind of intellectual refinement. Consequently, when approaching heritage as a discursive field inseparable from issues of historical narration and collective remembrance, it is necessary to explain how “heritage is situated in particular . . . intellectual circumstances.” In view of this, it is instructive to trace the course of the intellectual debate on one of the most volatile issues of the recent Polish-Ukrainian past. This will help us to distinguish arguments appropriated by the memorians, whose contribution to the Polish-Ukrainian historical-political debates gained prominence throughout the last decade. Ultimately, “[t]he standard for a society is not the way it resolves questions of memory and history, but the way it structures the framework for discussing those questions.”

### The Massacres in Volhynia and Galicia in 1943–1944: Controversy over Interpretations

Polish-Ukrainian antagonisms have a long history that stretches over several centuries. Collective memories and historical narratives identify two of the most significant outbreaks of violence in the twentieth century with Polish and Ukrainian national interests at stake: firstly, the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918–1919 that culminated in the memorable struggle for Lwów, ending in defeat for the Ukrainian Galician Army, which subsequently led to the inclusion of Galicia into the Second Polish Republic, and secondly, massacres of Polish civilians that took place on the Nazi-occupied Polish-Ukrainian borderlands in 1943–1944, which was followed by waves of anti-Ukrainian violence and forced migrations after World War II. Over the
past decade, the wartime interethnic violence in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia has grown to become one of the most politicized historical topics, as consensus about the number of deaths, motivations of the killings, conceptual framing, and attribution of responsibility has yet to be achieved.

A general narrative of the events is as follows: the massacres of the Polish population took place during a critical phase of World War II in the eastern borderlands of Poland. Over the centuries, the regions of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia (nowadays often referred to as “Western Ukraine”) had contradictory histories as their populations developed different political allegiances and cultural identities. At the beginning of the twentieth century, ethnic relations in the two regions were impacted by a new arrangement of the political borders, as Eastern Galicia and the biggest part of Volhynia were incorporated into the Second Polish Republic, while eastern Volhynia went to the Soviet Union. Although Poles were a demographic minority in the eastern borderlands (kresy), their territorial claim was based upon their predominance in several cities, especially in Lwów/Lviv/Lemberg, the former capital of the Habsburg province of Galicia: “Lwów stood both for an ancient Polish presence and for a recent political triumph.”

Interethnic relations in interwar Poland (in particular, between Poles and Ukrainians) grew increasingly tense as a result of the assimilation policies of the Polish government. At the same time, nationality policies of the Soviet government on the western borders of the USSR shifted from experiments with ethnically-defined territorial autonomy to repression against ethnic populations, among them Poles. During the Soviet occupation of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia in 1939–1941, hundreds of thousands of Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews were subjected to violent sovietization, arrests, and deportations, which left in its wake hatred and a determination to avenge real or imagined enemies. In contrast, the experiences of Poles and Ukrainians under the Nazi occupation were quite different in Reichskommissariat Ukraina, which included Volhynia, and Galicia, which came under the jurisdiction of Generalgouvernement. In Galicia, the Nazis made efforts to keep a “civilized” facade behind which the Final Solution and murder of the Polish intelligentsia were carried out. After the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in June 1941, the Germans struck out against Ukrainian nationalist activists, but otherwise many Ukrainians were recruited to administrative positions by the occupation authorities. By contrast, the population of Reichskommissariat Ukraina was subjected to undisguised exterminatory policies. Here, thousands of Ukrainian policemen were used to carry out the extermination of the local Jews and learned the techniques of mass murder from the Germans. As for the Poles, they played an important part in the German
administration of Volhynia. Aside from this, the demographic balance (which in Volhynia was less favorable to Poles) should be mentioned as a precondition for different patterns of the Ukrainian-Polish violence in the two regions. The death toll of the Polish population was highest in Volhynia, where the terror began in 1943 and took the most brutal forms. In 1944 it spread to Galicia.

The greatest change in the Volhynian demography was the perishing of 98.5 percent of Jews in the Holocaust. As for the Polish population of the region, by 1943 it had already been decimated from the prewar figure of 400,000 to perhaps around 200,000 people due to the Soviet deportations in 1939–1941, Soviet and German executions, transports of forced labor to Germany, and natural and combatant deaths. Against this background, it is difficult to estimate the exact number of the civilians who perished in the interethnic violence. Nevertheless, the count undoubtedly goes into the tens of thousands. When it comes to the calculation of losses of Poles in Volhynia and Galicia during World War II, figures on the scale from 40,000 to 200,000 (highly unrealistic) are mentioned. Up to present, around 42,000 victims of the massacres led by the partisan Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) are known by name. The death toll of Ukrainian civilians killed by Polish forces during World War II is approximately 15,000.

The massacres were triggered by claims of the Ukrainian nationalist forces that the contested territories of mixed Polish-Ukrainian settlements could be repossessed after the war. In prewar Volhynia, both the Ukrainian majority and some sixteen percent classified as Poles were not as inclined to nationalist action as in neighboring Galicia, but during the war, Volhynia became a bigger arena of the mass violence instigated under nationalist slogans. At the beginning of 1943, the radical wing of the underground Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists, the OUN-Bandera, called to rid Volhynia of its Polish population, which by that time was under control of the UPA. Popular support of the “anti-Polish action” may be explained by the brutalization of society, which in a short period of time experienced unprecedented terror of the Soviet and Nazi regimes, annihilation of the local elites, and radicalization of national politics. It was also fueled by the opportunity to obtain Polish parcels of land promised by a special decree of the UPA. Retaliation and instigation of anti-Ukrainian violence came, in turn, from Poles who fought in the ranks of self-defense militias, Soviet partisans, German policemen, and the military arm of the Polish underground, the Home Army.

The chief object of controversy in both political and academic debates on the Volhynian massacres has been the role, motivations, and ideological profile of the OUN and the UPA. The conspiratorial OUN, which adhered to terrorist methods
in its struggle for an independent Ukrainian state, was not a mass movement before 1939. However, during World War II, when it remained the only Ukrainian political organization in Western Ukraine, its influence grew exponentially.\textsuperscript{79} In present-day Western Ukraine, especially in Galicia, a hagiographic narrative on the subject has been established since independence under the influence of the nationalist historiography championed by groups of Ukrainian émigrés in the West. Appeal of these glorifying accounts can be partially explained by the fact that the OUN and UPA have been remembered locally as the main forces in the Ukrainian liberation movement against “the two totalitarianisms:” the Soviet and the Nazi. The crux is that, differences in attitudes and practices between its rivaling factions aside, the OUN received support from and envisioned Nazi Germany as the main ally in the struggle for independence, collaborated with the Nazis during World War II, and subscribed to the principles of so-called integral nationalism that was akin to the Nazi doctrines.\textsuperscript{80} The OUN(b) declared a Ukrainian state on 30 June 1941, after entering Lviv with the Ukrainian \textit{Nachtigal} battalion, accompanying the German army into Ukraine. The new state proved to be very short-lived, as the Nazis immediately repressed its inspirers. As the ideology and praxis of the short-lasting Ukrainian government had much in common with Nazi models, the consequences of the new rule could’ve been equally detrimental for ethnically variant populations. The last of the OUN’s “Ten Commandments” gave a clear guideline: “Aspire to expand the strength, riches, and size of the Ukrainian State even by means of enslaving foreigners.” More concretely, a plan existed to apply repressive policies to several national groups, in particular Jews and Poles. The latter ones had to be forcefully assimilated and their intelligentsia exterminated.\textsuperscript{81} Nevertheless, since 1991 the wartime declaration of the national state has been commemorated in Ukraine as a milestone in the struggle of the liberation movement for state sovereignty.

The wartime killings in Volhynia and Galicia started the chain reaction of retaliatory actions and radical solutions to the Polish-Ukrainian feuds that forever changed the ethnic composition of the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands. With reannexation of the eastern Polish territories in 1944 by the USSR, Stalin and his henchmen in Poland enforced wide-scale “population exchanges” to gain control over the borderlands, which were exhausted by the brutality of the Nazi regime and the Polish-Ukrainian massacres. In total, around 790,000 Poles were “repatriated” from Western Ukraine in the 1940s, 124,000 from the city of Lwów alone.\textsuperscript{82} Simultaneously, with the end of the Nazi occupation, the eastern Polish territories were cleansed of the Ukrainian population, as around half a million Ukrainians were forced to leave for the Soviet Ukraine\textsuperscript{83} and a further 140,000 were dispersed in Poland in the course of Operation
Vistula.\textsuperscript{84} With the extinction of the Jewish population, massacres of Polish and Ukrainian civilians and the subsequent “evacuations” and “resettlements,” the postwar Polish-Ukrainian borderland turned into a zone of “dismembered multiethnicity.”\textsuperscript{85}

With the end of World War II and the establishment of the Soviet regime in Central Europe, mentioning the Volhynia events became, in line with the official policy, a taboo on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian border. The narrative of official Soviet policy was to present the postwar socialist block as a commonwealth of brotherly people striving to build the communist future and leaving behind the legacy of conflicts inflamed by the exploitative classes. Furthermore, “Polish-Ukrainian antagonism did not go with the Soviet conceptualization of the Great Patriotic War.” \textsuperscript{86} The official Soviet narrative coded on different levels—from school textbooks to multi-volume official historiographies—focused on the monumental battle of the USSR and Nazi Germany. Explanations of the maneuvers of smaller political players and national forces in Central Europe were seen as a danger—and therefore suppressed—as they had the potential to portray the expansionist Soviet geopolitics in a negative light. Consequently, “Communist pedagogy and scholarship in Poland and the Soviet Union alike insisted that ethnic groups had always been where they now are, and that present borders reflected ancient history. …. The orthodoxy was not believed, but it did stifle historical investigation of the causes of population movements.” \textsuperscript{87} Although Polish historiography was much more open-minded in comparison with the Soviet equivalent, elucidation of the thorny Polish-Ukrainian relations in the first half of the twentieth century became a part of academic and media discussions only after 1989.\textsuperscript{88}

Despite the general practice of censorship of historical narratives, the “cleansing of memory” \textsuperscript{89} of the Volhynia and Galicia massacres, and the presentation of the radical postwar solutions that depopulated the Polish-Ukrainian borderland as a voluntary repatriation were not entirely successful. Besides, they did not have the same effect in Soviet Ukraine and the Polish People’s Republic. As public discussion of the massacres was banned, expression of the anti-Polish violence in Volhynia and Galicia saturated Polish popular culture through less direct means. Polish literary fiction of the socialist period transferred popular remembrance of the UPA-led massacres from Volhynia and Eastern Galicia to Bieszczady and Eastern Lubelszczyzna, and depicted Ukrainians mostly as irrational cutthroats and Nazi acolytes.\textsuperscript{90} In tandem with this, Polish textbooks of that period stamped the UPA as criminal bands driven by ancient animosity toward Poles.\textsuperscript{91} Consequently, the Polish official narrative was able to portray the infamous Operation Vistula as the only effective way of liquidating the UPA network.\textsuperscript{92}

Although communist propaganda managed to suppress all mentioning of wartime interethnic violence, Polish émigré milieus dispersed in the West continued
to address the topic. Awareness of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict triggered far-reaching political disputes about Poland’s prospective Eastern politics and relations with Europe. In particular, the literary political magazine *Kultura*, issued in exile by the celebrated Polish intellectual Jerzy Giedroyc, became an epicenter of the discussion about building relations of political gain with Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians despite the legacy of historical conflicts. Banned in Poland, Giedroyc’s magazine nevertheless reached its readers behind the Iron Curtain. Pragmatic-oriented reconciliatory discourse supported by *Kultura* and Polish intellectuals active in the *Solidarity* movement became a launching pad for the post-1989 disputes over Polish-Ukrainian relations in the twentieth century. Also, the dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church, the exiled Greek Catholic Church authorities, as well as the Protestant clergy played a significant role in creating the intellectual platform for revisiting Poland’s historical relations with its neighboring states and its own minorities. Primarily due to these factors, Polish intellectuals proved to be better prepared to address the difficult Polish-Ukrainian past on the national level after the collapse of the communist system.

In the early 1990s, a significant part of the Polish political elite realized that recognition of the historical wrongdoings was instrumental in demonstrating a new democratic course for Poland to the world, and for improving relations with the minorities inside the country. Collective memory was not only given credit as an anchor of sovereignty, but was also promoted as a significant geopolitical tool for the country. Along with this, rhetoric consistent with the European memory regime—focusing on victims of past atrocities and the moral transformation of national communities haunted by historical conflicts—was officially adopted. As early as 1990, and despite the controversy and protests from hardcore nationalist milieus, the Polish Senate managed to vote forward a resolution condemning Operation Vistula and promised to repair the damage to Ukrainian victims of the expulsions. The resolution paved the way for the subsequent Polish-Ukrainian reconciliatory initiatives, benefited Poland’s international image, and further influenced scholarly debates on twentieth-century history. Nevertheless, problematic aspects of this initiative did not go unnoticed. Critics have pointed out that this political act was only a half measure; by putting the blame on the communist regime, discussions about the consent and cooperation of Polish society in the expulsions were effectively closed. Equally problematic was that the Ukrainian party was expected to reciprocate and officially acknowledge the Volhynian massacres in the conceptual framing provided by the Polish politicians. While in the 1990s there was no shortage of will for a balanced Polish-Ukrainian dialogue on historical wrongdoings, memory games continued, not only due to the
inherently contradictory nature of “grammars of reconciliation,” or because of the asymmetry of Polish and Ukrainian political interests, but also due to the lack of a coherent, expressive, and convincing intellectual discourse that could be defended by the Ukrainian side.

In Ukraine, contradictory reactions to the claims of Polish actors orchestrating commemoration of the traumatic past can be partly explained by the clash of several—sometimes overlapping, sometimes mutually exclusive—trends of official Ukrainian memory politics. However, when it comes to discussions on Volyn', of note is a split between mnemonic discourses unfolding on the local level and historical knowledge available in the Ukrainian public domain. For decades, the violent Polish-Ukrainian conflicts had echoed in the local memory of Volhynians and Galicianers but had remained unknown to the rest of Ukraine; the advent of independence did not bring about a radical change of the situation.

Despite all differences, both the official Soviet historiography and the Ukrainian-centric accounts recovered in the late 1980s proved to be equally silent about the end of prewar ethnic diversity of the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands and, in particular, about the anti-Polish hostility in 1943–1944. The American historians of Ukrainian origin, Roman Szporluk and Frank Sysyn, broke the taboo in 1989. Wider audiences outside Western Ukraine learned for the first time about this chapter of Ukrainian history from another historian of the diaspora, Orest Subtelny, whose popular book Ukraine: A History, which was translated into Ukrainian in 1991, presented an account of the massacres as committed by “both the Ukrainian and the Polish armed units engaged in total butchery, which found a vent in the bloody apogee of hatred that had been growing between both nations for generations.” Still, history textbooks issued in Ukraine five years after independence contained only episodic, utterly euphemistic accounts of the Polish-Ukrainian “political antagonism,” where the word Volyn’ was never mentioned. At the time, fateful historical events brought into the spotlight were Operation Vistula and the expulsions of the Ukrainian population, i.e., the topic which, similarly to the Great Famine of 1932–1933 and the Chernobyl catastrophe, were better suited to the institutionalized post-1991 narrative of Ukrainians as a nation of victims.

On the cusp of the 1990s, the habitual Soviet practice of conveying ideological orders from above was disrupted. Consequently, Ukrainian historians began to “influence the conjuncture of the ideological market in their own right.” In the mid-1990s, and despite different priorities, Polish and Ukrainian academic historians cooperated on a large scale to elucidate the previously silenced aspects of Polish-Ukrainian historical relations. Throughout the 1990s, several authoritative Ukrainian
historians contributed to the debate on the Volhynian events in the Polish popular daily *Gazeta Wyborcza*.\textsuperscript{107} A number of international scholarly conferences and seminars devoted to the topic were organized.\textsuperscript{108} The most productive and resonant among them were the thirteen international historical seminars, *Poland-Ukraine: Difficult Questions*, held from 1996–2008.\textsuperscript{109} This bilateral forum was initiated by the Karta Center (a Polish NGO focusing on the recent history of Poland and East-Central Europe) and endorsed by veterans of the Home Army\textsuperscript{110} together with their partner organization, the Union of Ukrainians in Poland. Only a limited number of reputed professional historians were invited to take part in the research activities. The discussions between Polish and Ukrainian experts were nevertheless not free of emotions and partisanship.\textsuperscript{111} The seminars further confirmed that Polish historians were better prepared for the discussions due to the assets that their Ukrainian colleagues largely lacked, namely, endorsement on the state level, access to the archives, and acquaintance with up-to-date theoretical-methodological approaches. Nevertheless, due to the innovative methodological format of the seminars and support from private and state sponsors, 35 research problems related to the Polish-Ukrainian conflicts in the 1940s were solved, 14 volumes of academic works were published in two languages, and extensive factography was accumulated.\textsuperscript{112}

Notably, during the early stages of the cooperation, Polish and Ukrainian historians realized the necessity of identifying conceptual points where disagreements were most evident.\textsuperscript{113} Among the main points of contention were the estimation of the number of the dead, the starting point of the events, and the degree of planning and coordination of the massacres. The overall conceptualizations of the massacres either as a genocide (*ludobójstwo*) and ethnic cleansing (the definitions most often voiced in Poland)—or as wartime atrocities in the wake of a liberation struggle (nowadays, a line of argument supported by Ukrainian opinion-makers of quite a broad ideological spectrum) became dependent on the preferred answers to these questions. Unsurprisingly, evaluation of the OUN and the UPA came to the fore. Given the positivist nature of the discussion on *Volyn’,*\textsuperscript{114} a complex investigation of the sociocultural environment where the massacres took place, as well as a necessity to learn more about the victims and contextualize their relations with bystanders and perpetrators, was a peripheral concern.\textsuperscript{115} The narrow focus on political causes of the massacres and on providing an accurate number of atrocities has also obscured the issue of the quite common cases of mutual help and rescue\textsuperscript{116} that might shed additional light on the contradictory circumstances of the horrific events. Nevertheless, despite difficulties, the quest for a dispassionate account of Polish-Ukrainian violence in the twentieth century—the process informed by efforts to find vantage points and
conceptualizations that would not exclude each other—was initiated within academic circles.

The shifting political circumstances of the 2000s made a rapprochement between Polish and Ukrainian historians that began in the previous decade increasingly problematic. Polish society was successfully ridding itself of the symptoms of its socialist past and enthused by the coming accession to the EU. At the same time, the prospects of EU accession propelled a revision of Poland’s recent history in light of the “European” moral-political positions and practices of dealing with difficult pasts. The beginning of the 2000s was profoundly marked by “the painful Polish self-interrogation” over the wartime massacre of Jews by their (literal) Polish neighbors in Jedwabne. At the same time, various political forces seeking to put pressure on the EU, voiced anew the “betrayal at Yalta” in 1945 and other Polish historical grievances. As for Ukraine, its European prospects looked increasingly problematic, as its international image was damaged by the wave of scandals exposing corruption and a crisis of power at the highest political levels as well as the creeping neo-Sovietization in the public sphere. Under such conditions, two tendencies became evident. On the one hand, historical representations of the grievances of the Ukrainian nation gained new political currency. Efforts to establish the Great Famine of 1932–1933 as an example of genocide are especially instructive in this respect. However, on the other hand, a degree of liberalization of the post-1991 memory culture became evident, as the nation’s past became an “open territory” apt for multiple interpretations and uses.

Orchestration of several anniversaries relating to the shared Polish-Ukrainian past—the 60th anniversary of the expulsions of Ukrainians from Poland and of the Poles from the USSR in 2004, Volyn’ in 2003 and 2004 and the anniversary of Operation Vistula in 2007—revealed that “therapy of reconciliation and pardon” of the early 1990s began to increasingly yield an opposite format, i.e., “reopening ‘wounds’ in the name of a need for distinction.” At the time, Volyn’ became a subject of myriad interpretations by Ukrainian historians, memorians, and politicians. The majority of these interpretations have nevertheless one feature in common, namely, they suggest in different ways that responsibility for the killings of Polish civilians does not lie solely on the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Defensiveness and polyphony of the arguments suggested by the Ukrainian opinion-makers on the one hand, and the pursuit of “apology by diktat” by those Polish circles who “took advantage of the infirm position of the official Kyiv,” on the other, turned official gestures of reconciliation into a thorny enterprise.

In connection to the 60th anniversary of the Volhynian massacres, statements about overcoming past animosities were repeatedly expressed and common commemorations
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at sites of mass graves were arranged at the highest political level. In 2002, President Kwasniewski officially condemned Operation Vistula. Immediately following this, a rumor went around suggesting the Ukrainian president would respond with an official apology for the anti-Polish hostilities in Volhynia and Galicia. Nevertheless, joint commemorations of the victims of Volyn’—despite the significance of the symbolic gestures made by the Polish and Ukrainian politicians—avoided clear definitions and did not culminate in an explicit apology. The declaration of reconciliation on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Volhynian events, signed by presidents Kuchma and Kwasniewski during the commemoration of the Polish victims in Pavlivka/Poryck, was filled with formulaic narratives relating to the “European” moral-political rhetoric, but otherwise its discourse proved to be too ambiguous and euphemistic. The declaration mentioned both tragedy and crime, pointed out both Polish and Ukrainian civilians as victims, but, notably, avoided pointing out perpetrators. Definitions of the Volhynian massacres that the Polish party initially insisted on, i.e., either an ethnic cleansing or a genocide, were omitted, and the declaration did not contain an explicit formulation of an apology. Despite prudent formulations articulating respect of the victims and the Christian value of forgiveness, both presidents were criticized afterwards in their respective countries. While Kwasniewski was reproached for “appeasement” and failure to press an explicit apology from the Ukrainian president, Kuchma was accused of absence of patriotism and calculated games benefiting the Polish political elite. For many Ukrainians, the effort of the unpopular politician to speak in the name of the nation lacked both credibility and legitimacy. Nevertheless, the ultra-right political actors, such as VO Svoboda, credited Kuchma for noncompliance with the Poles.

Arguably, the 60th anniversary of Volyn’ became a turning point for the opinion-makers in Ukraine, who realized the importance of catching up with contemporary European symbolic politics and opening up public opinion on debates on the recent past; the debates unconstrained by political expediency. Unlike in the 1990s, discourse on Volyn’ at the beginning of the 2000s did not remain confined to the milieus of academics and “traffickers of trauma,” who were represented by organizations of survivors of the massacres, and resettled inhabitants of the borderland territories and their relatives. On the contrary, it ceased to be an issue of expert interest and regional anchoring, as it engaged broader circles of intellectuals and intelligentsia and, moreover, achieved widespread media attention and became a matter of national significance. Despite disappointments and confrontation, the 60th anniversary of Volyn’ revealed that denial of the massacres of the Polish civilians in Volhynia and Galicia was not a position of the great majority of the Ukrainian memory actors. At the same
time, milieus of liberal and liberal-nationalist intellectuals realized that fragmented defensive statements needed to be transformed to consistent accounts representing the Ukrainian position in the dialogue about the contentious past. The West Ukrainian intellectual Taras Vozniak formulated this task as “setting another discourse in this discussion for two societies, the Polish and Ukrainian ones.” In more general terms, Volyn’ gradually transformed from a matter of history to an issue of memory, as the engagement of politicians and memorians in employment of the sensitive topic took the upper hand over the distanced professional attitude of historians.

Historical perspectives in the Ukrainian public sphere shifted when “orange” politicians came to power in 2005. President Yushchenko’s time in the office was marked by several heated historical/mnemonic debates—on Soviet totalitarianism, the legacy of the OUN and UPA, Holodomor, the Holocaust, and the Volhynian massacres—that helped to envision the Ukrainian past in explicitly national terms and simultaneously reinforced rhetoric of the European politics of regret in public discourse. Simultaneously, instrumentalization of the contested past for political gain became a permanent trend. In many cases, the official invocations of the past failed to transgress the narrative of national victimization and accommodate Western perspectives on issues of memory and history that bring to the fore ethical choices, conscience politics, and commonality of historical values. Inconsistency and exaggerations of the Ukrainian politics of memory during this period (2005–2010) became particularly evident in view of the officially adopted glorification of the OUN and the UPA.

Discussions accompanying the 70th anniversary of the Volhynian massacres differ from the previous waves of the polemic in several important respects. In 2013, reconciliatory rhetoric and declarations of solidarity delivered by politicians, NGO activists, intellectuals, and churches were fairly disseminated in the media. However, unlike in the 1990s and early 2000s, the recent Polish-Ukrainian dialogue about the contentious past took place in a political climate where the rhetoric of necessity to make mutual concessions for the sake of political reconciliation, contrasted with the unwillingness of both elites and grassroots campaigners to devise a compromise. Correspondingly, public statements by the respective intellectuals and intelligentsia tended—in this situation—to entrench rather than mitigate the polarity of opinions.

One of the most radical opinions about what happened in wartime Volhynia and Eastern Galicia has been expressed by the Polish historian Ryszard Szawlowski, who in 2003 used the term genocidium artox, i.e., an especially cruel, barbaric form of genocide. Although this extremely loaded definition did not gain wide acclaim in Polish society, nevertheless talking about Wołyń as a case of genocide (ludobójstwo)
became common in Polish public discourse and, subsequently, was legitimized on the political level. In 2009\textsuperscript{139} the Polish parliament adopted a resolution that defined the Ukrainian-Polish conflict in Volhynia in terms of “mass murder, characterized by ethnic cleansing and features of genocide”\textsuperscript{140}—a vague and compromising but expressive formulation endorsed by reputed Polish historians. To add to this, in April 2013, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland recommended that Poland adopt a resolution qualifying the OUN and the UPA as criminal organizations that were responsible for the genocide of Polish civilians.\textsuperscript{141} In June 2013, after taking into consideration six proposed resolutions on the 70\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Volhynian events—one of which did not mention genocide at all\textsuperscript{142}—the Senate eventually voted for the resolution containing the formulation, “ethnic cleansing with components of genocide.”\textsuperscript{143}

Similar to the legislative acts on the Great Famine of 1932–1933 (Holodomor) as a genocide committed by the Stalin regime (a formulation upheld by the Sejm in 2006 but abandoned by the incumbent Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych in 2010), this resolution framed Volyn’ in terms of the normative rhetoric adopted within the Western memory regimes as its political rationale. Although adherents of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation were quick to point out the costs of this historicizing strategy\textsuperscript{144} for both Polish and Ukrainian democratic forces,\textsuperscript{145} radical reinterpretations of the conflict-ridden Polish-Ukrainian past remain an asset for both democratic and non-democratic actors. Hence, efforts to equate the ‘score’ in memory games around “two genocides”—Volyn’ and Holodomor—are likely to be perpetuated in changing political circumstances.

In alignment with the consolidation of Polish opinion, a more consequential counter-rhetoric took shape over the current decade within previously diffuse and defensive Ukrainian discourses on Volyn’. Interpretations compatible with Polish official formulations have been consistently advocated by only a few liberal Ukrainian historians.\textsuperscript{146} A position that comes closest to the “genocide pole,” but nevertheless keeps a critical distance from the idea of total extermination of a certain population as a final purpose of violence, is the definition of the anti-Polish terror of 1943–1944 as ethnic cleansing. In contrast to the interpretation of Volyn’ as a genocide or ethnic cleansing, proponents of new Ukraine-centric versions of the twentieth-century’s history often signal the difference of their position by using such terms as the ‘Volhynian events’ or the ‘Volhynian tragedy’\textsuperscript{147} and avoiding such formulations as the Volhynian or ‘Volhynian-Halician rizannya’ (butchery).\textsuperscript{148} Different formulations invoke different framings of the subject as either mutual killings in the course of the large-scale interethnic conflict of the 1940s—or, alternatively, as military atrocities of the “second Polish-Ukrainian war”\textsuperscript{149} escalated by wartime chaos. These “domino
effect” explanations do not deny the massacres of Polish civilians, but suggest an equal distribution of guilt between both sides of the conflict and recognition of the significant atrocities suffered by the Ukrainians in the course of retaliating actions. The “anti-genocidal” twist of such interpretations becomes obvious in view of a core argument voiced by opponents of the definition of Holodomor as genocide. In both cases, the focus is shifted from the ethnicity of the victims to the predominately sociopolitical reasons as the trigger of the mass deaths. The anti-Polish violence in Volhynia and Galicia is thus presented not as killings of ethnically-different civilians, but as an episode in a long historical chain of oppression and resistance, where, arguably, Polish political actors bear a significant part of responsibility.

Ukrainian politicians of the highest rank preferred not to comment on the topic of Volyn’ on its 70th anniversary in 2013 and demonstrated a striking disinterest in the commemorative ceremonies. In the summer of 2014, commemorations of Volyn’ in both Poland and Ukraine were eclipsed by the warfare in Donbass and the increasingly tense relations with Russia. Nevertheless, some publications highlighting reconciliationist arguments appeared in the Ukrainian media (in particular, in the popular all-Ukrainian internet forum Ukrainska Pravda). As discussions of the topic lost their dynamics, the prevalent interpretations underscoring distribution (and even shift) of guilt for the massacres became institutionalized in Western Ukraine. In 2013, an exhibition hosted by the Museum of Liberation Struggle in Lviv, which is a part of the Lviv Historical Museum, a state-run institution, told the story of Volyn’ in terms of “tragedy” and “armed conflict.” The presented documents emphasized injustices committed by the interwar Polish state in respect to its Ukrainian minority and thus endorsed the “domino effect” interpretation. Moreover, the exhibition laid emphasis on the recent commemorations of the Ukrainian victims of the “Polish terror” on Polish territory. As another example of this kind of institutionalization, the round table: Polish-Ukrainian Conflict of 1942-1947 as a War, organized by Lviv’s Regional Assembly in May 2013, should be mentioned. The keynote lecture was given by Volodymyr Viatrovych, a key proponent of the conceptualization of Volyn’ as an “armed conflict.” With the appointment of Viatrovych as the director of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory in March 2014, it is expected that this Ukrainian interpretation will remain dominant.

In summation, the core arguments used in the Volyn’ debate on “both sides of the barricades” may be presented in a simplified form in the table below (it should be noted, however, that in practice the “Polish” interpretations are not shared exclusively by the Polish contingent, and so is the case with some “Ukrainian” interpretations.)
Tragic Past, Agreeable Heritage: Post-Soviet Intellectual Discussions on the Polish...

### Table 1

A Comparison of Polish and Ukrainian Interpretations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Polish” Interpretations</th>
<th>“Ukrainian” Interpretations</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>State of Affairs before WWII:</strong></td>
<td><strong>State of Affairs before WWII:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful coexistence of nationalities on the eastern borderlands (&quot;myth of kresy&quot;)</td>
<td>Social polarization, discriminatory policies against the Ukrainian minority in the Second Polish Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Interpretations:</em></td>
<td><em>Interpretations:</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Crime against humanity</td>
<td>• Tragedy, tragic mistake, “evil”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ethnic cleansing</td>
<td>• Revolt of the Ukrainian peasants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Genocide (<em>ludobójstwo</em>)</td>
<td>• A consequence of confrontational policies of the Polish government in exile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Genocidium atrox</em></td>
<td>• Provocations of third parties (Soviet partisans, the Nazis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Sin” of the otherwise heroic UPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Civil “war in war,” mutual killings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Second Polish-Ukrainian War; military atrocities</td>
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On closer inspection, this mnemonic resistance\(^{157}\) of a significant part of Ukrainian academics and opinion-makers exemplifies the notion of path-dependence in their intellectual arguments. The “domino-effect” explanations are strongly influenced by the Marxist-Leninist view of interethnic conflicts as class struggle in disguise, but also used as a rhetorical tool for self-justification, voiced by leaders of the Ukrainian nationalist forces—for example, by the last commander of the UPA Vasyl’ Kuk.\(^{158}\) The
long afterlife of arguments that stress the idea of “symmetry of victimhood” and thereby diminish responsibility on the Ukrainian side—or, at least, try to counterbalance it with an anticolonial narrative—may be surely explained as a legacy of the totalitarian “culture of nonresponsibility.” However, to seek explanations in the current sociopolitical climate in Ukraine, ideas and concepts such as Michael Billig’s should be considered. In contrast to “banal nationalism”, the flag-waving rhetoric with the attitude, “my country, right or wrong” is prevalent during periods when a nation’s confidence in its own continuity is weak. As in present-day Ukraine, nation-building is definitely not a “banal” issue; a suggestion that the symbolic past of the nation contains odious episodes may be easily interpreted as a destabilizing effort and met with either explicit or disguised skepticism.

For the aims of this study, it is worth emphasizing another—though not as obvious, but nevertheless significant—implication of placing the Volhynian massacres beyond the ethnic-national frame. Efforts to disconnect the ethnicity of the victims and perpetrators from the explanations of the historical conflict (this is in fact, very obvious in the reasoning of nationally-minded intellectuals and political activists) have a lot to do with a deficient understanding of Ukrainian heritage as a condensed symbolic expression of achievements of the nation. Focus on the ethnic dimension of the massacres jeopardizes present-day efforts of the West Ukrainian elites to coin a useable past out of the selectively presented prewar legacies and to make them an important resource for regional investment activities, city-branding, tourism, and for a self-image as a “tolerant European society.” The evidence that some seventy years ago, a numerically insignificant part of Ukrainian society could mobilize their fellow countrymen to extinguish the Polish presence across a vast territory, may lead to the conclusion that the ethnic antagonism between Poles and Ukrainians is deeply rooted, drastic, and irreconcilable. This conclusion may easily destabilize elite-led projects of creating an attractive and assimilable “multicultural heritage.”

Alongside the aforecited polarized positions, another intellectual strategy addressing the “Polish theme” may be distinguished—arguably, a more transformative and morally justified one. The following chapters will explore how liberal and liberal-nationalist intellectual milieus in western Ukraine make efforts to address the complexity of Polish heritage and approach the topic of multiethnicity from the position of legitimate guardians of this heritage, who have learned the moral lesson of Volyn’.
Lessons of Effaced Cultural Diversity: the Polish ‘Universe’ of the Polish-Ukrainian Borderlands on the Pages of І Magazine

Whether the significance of the multicultural legacy is truly acknowledged in present-day Western Ukraine is a debatable issue. Both political and intellectual-academic discourses in Western Ukraine provide numerous examples of overlooking and marginalizing the present-day ethnic diversity as well as the historical polyethnicity. As the ultra-right party VO Svoboda (a political force that assumed a leading role in the radicalization of the commemorative landscape of Ukraine) gained a majority in three West Ukrainian oblasts and won 10.44 per cent of votes in the 2012 parliamentary elections, its confrontational rhetoric became increasingly accepted as part of the mainstream political discourse. However, West Ukrainian intellectual circles tend to address ethno-cultural diversity in a much more flexible and reflective manner than politicians. While the post-1991 political disputes that referred to multicultural heritage primarily tackled the physical transformations of the city, visible signs of ethnic/cultural otherness, and property claims, intellectual debates focused instead on the more subtle issues of identity management, moral revitalization, and cultural recognition.

A consistent feature of the present-day intellectual discussions coming out of Western Ukraine is the view of polyethnicity primarily as a matter of the past. However, even when safely “encapsulated” in the past, ethnocultural diversity remains a controversial topic. Some West Ukrainian intellectuals discussing the issue of historical ethnocultural diversity conclude that a seemingly peaceful but deeply conflicted coexistence of different peoples can hardly become a cornerstone for an optimistic narrative connecting the Polish-Ukrainian borderland with “Europe.” This uneasy attitude toward historical diversity may in its turn be easily projected onto contemporary ethnic relations. As a consequence, Polish communities of Western Ukraine, whose position is distinguishable in political discourses by their views on the rights of ethnic minorities, are marginalized when it comes to the formulation of broader (regional and national) cultures of remembrance. Polish-language media of the region (for example, the newspaper Kurier Galicyjski) monitor Polish-Ukrainian historical debates, commemorations, and cultural events, but preference is usually given to Ukrainians and Poles from Poland for evaluations and comments. In absence of an actor that would bridge the opinions of representatives of the two national communities, intellectual debates around the Polish legacy, despite the diversity of views, tend to result in a fractured form.
Since the 2000s, several intellectual forums based in Western Ukraine have defined the character of the intellectual debates around the Polish legacy and, more widely, about Ukraine’s multicultural heritage. It is not difficult to notice that practically all of them are located in the “capital city of Western Ukraine,” Lviv. In addition to several academic institutions with a long history, Lviv has a number of recently established independent intellectual milieus and academic arenas that are not only heavily involved in international cooperation, but also transmit the standards of “Western” academic work. Intellectual discussions about the difficult past and historical ethnocultural diversity initiated by these milieus have not only increased public awareness of the topic, but have also influenced political discourse. One of the most reputable forums of this kind is the independent magazine for cultural studies Ï, issued since the 1990s in Lviv with the financial assistance of German and Polish cultural foundations. It was founded as a part of an NGO with the same name, which aside from publishing, regularly organizes seminars open to the general public, as well as conferences and roundtables featuring selected researchers, writers, and opinion-makers both from Ukraine and from abroad. Transcripts of the discussions, information about continuing projects as well as the magazine’s issues in electronic format have been regularly published on Ï’s website in several languages, indicative that the magazine targets a transnational audience. Liberal (in some quarters, liberal nationalist) by its orientation, Ï triggered two resonant identity debates, namely, about Galicia and Ukraine as a part of Central Europe, and about Galician autonomy. The Galician multicultural environment embedded in a wider cultural and civilizational context remains, nevertheless, a conceptual core of Ï’s publications and corollary activities.

In 2003, Ï issued a special volume to draw the attention of its Ukrainian readership toward the 60th anniversary of the Volhynian massacres and to make the topic known to the wider general public. The 28th (“Volhynian,”) issue of Ï was conceived not merely as an informative selection of material and individual testimonies about the anti-Polish events, which has come to represent the erasure of prewar Galician ethnic diversity, but also to complement the sophistication of the Polish debate with Ukrainian intellectual opinion, and to formulate an intellectual platform for Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. The issue opened with two intellectual manifestos of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation: an Open Letter on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the armed Ukrainian-Polish conflict in Volhynia, signed by a group of prominent Ukrainian academics, journalists, and writers, and a letter from the celebrated Polish politician Jacek Kuron to the Ukrainian former dissident and religious philosopher Myroslav Marynovych.
The common theme of both letters is a plea for reconciliation on the basis of the universal moral values and Christian principles shared by both peoples—a foundation decidedly forgotten when Ukrainians and Poles slaughtered each other during World War II. At this point, both documents develop the argument for the necessity of seeking consensus on the basis of religious values and respect for the dead. However, alongside the appeal for mutual forgiveness underpinned both by religious ethics and universal moral principles, the Open Letter and the editorial foreword gave prominence to a number of arguments of an ethically-particularist nature.

Whereas politicians are depicted as those who instigate “manipulations of the historical memory for the sake of short-sighted political advantage,” Ukrainian intellectuals, whose collective voice is presented in the Open Letter, emerge as the nonpartisan participants of the debate who can ensure “honest and sincere dialogue concerning the mentioned events.” The intellectuals who supported Ž manifestly rejected the principle of collective responsibility and distinguished two groups of perpetrators instead. On the one hand, power ambitions of the Ukrainian and Polish nationalist forces and their armed units have been pointed out as a cause of the “fratricidal Polish-Ukrainian armed conflict in Volhynia in 1943.” On the other hand, the Ukrainian peasantry is depicted as the main implementer of the mass killings (“the peasant is often ready to wage war for land against his neighbors and, unfortunately, sometimes crosses the line.”) As a counterweight to the nationalist combatants and the barbaric peasants, the journal highlights the figure of the legendary Greek Catholic metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts’kyi, whose letters lamenting ethnic hatred open and end the “Volhynian” volume. Nevertheless, the Open Letter of Ukrainian intellectuals and the editorial foreword do not mention the controversial role of intellectuals as ideologists and legitimizers of the conflict; neither the wartime demoralization and physical extermination of Polish and Ukrainian elites was given a closer look as a factor that contributed to the escalation of terror.

The title of the issue, *Volyn 1943. Struggle for Ground*, may be interpreted in several ways. Most immediately, it may be read through the prism of the statist narrative, as the demarcation of territory was an integral part of state-building processes in Poland and Ukraine. Further into the issue, the conceptualization of *Volyn’* as ethnic cleansing is reflected in the title. However, the editorial foreword hints that the most plausible interpretation has much to do with the idea that the anti-Polish violence was the result of an uncontrolled revolt of oppressed Ukrainian peasants driven by a thirst for land. As mentioned above, this account served as a convenient excuse and was suggested as an interpretation by UPA commanders. Curiously, the Open Letter and the editorial foreword suggested different definitions of the mass killings. The editorial
foreword qualifies them as ethnic cleansing and crimes, while the Open Letter mentions a “knighthood of arms” diminished by “blind revenge” and suggests that the killings were “a tragic mistake,” a “sin,” and an unexpected outcome in the struggle for land and Ukraine’s independence. What we see here is a discursive strategy of “splitting the difference” or “above the fray” in which “a partisan of one side of a hotly debated topic professes to be navigating a middle course between extremes that he disparages for their extremism, but in fact he gives all the good arguments to his own (undisclosed) side.”¹⁷⁰ Indeed, on first glance, the representatives of the intelligentsia who signed up for the Open Letter condemn such group biases as ethnocentrism and the political radicalism of those members of the Ukrainian and Polish communities who ignited and continue to discursively perpetuate the conflict. The undersigned depict themselves as lacking these biases and championing universal principles of individual responsibility and reconciliation. However, under closer inspection it proves to be that by avoiding judicial discourse of crime and criminal responsibility, the intellectuals revealed the ambivalence of their position in the dispute. They insisted on individuality of the guilt and simultaneously emphasized the duty of cultural elites to take collective moral responsibility for the actions of their compatriots. Religious overtones of the reconciliatory rhetoric and abundant use of Christian metaphors in the Open Letter imply that the Volhynian events have been interpreted primarily through the prism of a strong, emotionally-charged group affiliation (i.e. as Christians and believers) and not from the vantage point of individual agency and secular rationality. Ultimately, the message of this document is not a categorical condemnation of the killings, but rather a formulation of possibility of collective repentance for the “sin of manslaughter.”

In summary, the intellectual position articulated in the 28th issue of Ī is a difficult arbitration between the advocacy of universal moral principles and the impulse to provide intellectual tokens of solidarity to Ī’s readership in Western Ukraine. Although nonpartisan historical knowledge is represented in the volume, the issue exemplifies a contradictory “memorian” focus on testimony and moral commentary. Notably, the universalist rhetoric of reconciliation and solidarity promoted by Ī does not directly relate to the “European memory complex.”¹⁷¹ Christian ethics and religious symbolism—and not morally justified political decisions or principles of transnational justice—have been presented as a counterweight to the narrow interests of social groups and national communities.

Discourses and lines of argumentation observable in the first “Volhynian” issue have been mostly maintained in the second volume devoted to the same theme (no.74, Volyn’ Wołyń 1943). Ten years after the pioneering issue, Ī presented the evidence reflecting the actual historical discussion structured by the arguments for and against
representations of Volyn’ in terms of genocide versus wartime conflict, where both parties bear their share of the responsibility. The volume includes contributions from several of the most authoritative Polish and Ukrainian historians specializing on the topic. Notably, however, no texts authored by the most prominent advocate of “the second Polish-Ukrainian war,” Volodymyr Viatrovych, were included. In a way, the selection of material in this volume reflects the emerging trend of viewing Volyn’ through the lens of “entangled history” that transgresses the narrow nation-oriented approach. In turn, the inclusion of “memorian” rhetoric (most obvious in the texts of Ž’s editor-in-chief Taras Vozniak and political scientist Antin Borkovs’kyi) provided continuity between the first and the second Volhynian volumes, as reconciliation, moral obligation to remember, and Christian forgiveness were repeatedly emphasized. Notably, even the second issue of Ž pointed out moral authorities mediating between polar positions and advocating universal moral principles. While the first “Volhynian” issue praised the contribution of the Ukrainian ethnarch Andrei Sheptyts’kyi, the second one promoted the legacy of the Russian writer Leo Tolstoy and the Polish political activist Adam Michnik.

Between the two “Volhynian” volumes, Ž continued to address the topic of Polish-Ukrainian relations in a changing environment. Thus, volumes no.52 (Polish Uni-Verse of Galicia) and no.57 (Estates of Fredro-Szeptycki Family), partially funded from a special program of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were conceived as a consensual representation of the Polish cultural heritage in Western Ukraine. In a way, both issues were a logical continuation of the first “Volhynian” issue, as they aimed to draw public attention to the thriving cultural world irrevocably “lost” as a result of the Volhynian bloodbath and subsequent repatriations. In the foreword, issue no. 52 is described as part of Ž’s series of “intellectual guidebooks in local history.” In line with Ž’s tradition, texts of the authors of different nationalities and representing different genres were included in the volume. The majority of the material came, nevertheless, from Polish authors and represented the memoir genre: in recollections about prominent cultural figures, and descriptions of daily prewar life. As was stated in the foreword, readers were asked to abstain from both nostalgic idealizations typical of Polish commemorative literature and from the “pseudo-patriotic” ambitions of the Ukrainian community. Instead, intellectual efforts were asked to focus on rescuing the issue of the “total forgetting [of] what Poles did to this land” and “using this inheritance for our benefit, for the benefit of Ukrainianness.”

The retrospective character of the volume resulted in an absence of viewpoints about Polish life during the Soviet period, and the contemporary realities of Polish communities in Galicia. Thereby, the “genuine” Polish culture—likewise Jewish and
Austrian culture as other components of the Galician multicultural universe—was once again classified as a “lost” prewar world having little to do with present-day Ukrainian Lviv; a distanced, closed nature of this cultural layer. Given this, a question may be: what variants of multicultural heritage are available to present-day Galicianers? In the opinion of some Lviv intellectuals, traces of the “lost Galician universes” are observable only in built environments that nowadays are populated and managed by a “mediocre” sort of people. The splendor of historical architectural monuments contrasts with the postwar way of life presented as something “banal” and “lesser.”

In line with this logic, the present-day situation was described in another issue of Ć (no.58, 2009) as “mini-” or “mono-culturality” (malokul’turnist’) or, in other words, as the prevailing lowbrow concerns and historical ignorance of postwar Galicianers. The foreword to this issue titled, Multicultural Lviv? reads as follows:

So where is the multiculture of Lviv then? The one of contemporary Lviv, not the former . . . What can Lviv propose Urbi et Orbi? Unfortunately, it proposes monoculture (monokul’turu) of not a very high level, the monoculture that matches neither cultural policies of Wroclaw, nor the noble, although gradually provincialized culture of Cracow. And we learn ourselves, as it is used to be, by emulating the simplest and therefore not the best examples.

As a remedy, Ć suggests “the modern Ukrainian culture of Lviv, the culture with organically incorporated elements of cultures of all peoples who made this city what it is now” (ibid). Notably, the “monocultural” situation of Lviv is contrasted to the favorable cultural conditions of contemporary Cracow and Wroclaw where a significant part of the Polish cultural elite moved to after World War II. Thereby, images of these cities evoke both ressentiment and nostalgia. Separated from its brightest representatives, Lviv is depicted as a city that not only “lost” its prewar ethnic diversity but, in a way, also “donated” the sophistication and vitality of its urban culture to other Polish cities and provinces.

As has been emphasized in the foreword to Polish Universe of Galicia, an important lesson of the “lost universes” is the necessity of historical testimony and transmission of collective memories for posterity. However, in the conditions of “monocultural” and even “a-cultural” (bezkul’turnoi) reality, this lesson applies primarily to small oases of intelligentsia interested in carving out the usable past—the same the category of urbanites who master belles-lettres, feel moral responsibility for their national communities, and wish to convey their interpretation of historical events to younger generations.
The network supporting \( \mathcal{I} \) is a typical example of an epistemic community that combines historical expertise, political engagement, and “memorian” concerns when addressing “dissonant heritage.” Contradictions and ambiguities of the arguments employed in the disputes over the past may attest to the interstitial quality of this intellectual milieu. When comparing the recent efforts of Lviv politicians to instrumentalize the multicultural past with an intellectual narrative on multiculture as constructed by \( \mathcal{I} \), a curious tendency is noticeable. One of the successful political strategies of dealing with sensitive issues of the “lost” cultural diversity of Lviv has been the discourse of “multicultural heritage,” conceived of as representations of (local) authenticity and (civilizational) Europeanness. At the same time, references to multiculture used by the City Council in connection with the 750\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Lviv in 2006 (in particular, the slogan “Lviv—Open to the World” and the accompanying logotype depicting towers of Lviv churches belonging to various congregations around the tower of the Lviv town hall) targeted wider audiences. This sent a message that a multicultural legacy could become a formidable democratic asset. In contrast, the narrative of the multicultural “universes” of Galicia suggested by \( \mathcal{I} \) celebrates this multicultural legacy, but simultaneously encapsulates it in the past and classifies it as an exclusive resource for narrow circles of knowledgeable, reflective individuals, primarily intellectuals and intelligentsia. In line with this logic, the uninformed public and actors with vested interests (whether they be politicians, local ethnic communities or ordinary Lvivites) should be kept away from defining and transforming this precious asset.

Another ambivalent aspect of dealing with this historical diversity is the murky topic of ethnic animosity. Simplistic representations of Galician multiculture and concerns to “make something good” of it come to the fore instead. Such easily achieved discursive harmonization ignores the inherent complexity of the multicultural heritage, whose sense is not only in facilitating solidarity, stability, and entertainment, but also in providing an epistemological and moral surplus. Value of a “manufactured” heritage does not only reflect its desired qualities, but depends on how well it represents “the whole picture.” In other words, “Behind . . . seemingly quite innocent uses of heritage for cultural inclusion and social stability may lie a number of quite misleading and possibly even pernicious assumptions . . . The past, and the heritage we have made of it, is not inevitably so all-inclusive or so harmonious.”\textsuperscript{175}
Eleonora Narveselius

Between “Anticolonial” Narratives and “Traumatization”: The Polish Legacy in the Discourses of West Ukrainian Media Intellectuals

While well-established intellectual milieus—like the one at І—find their audience primarily among fellow intellectuals, academicians and opinion-makers, other memorialists target the broader public. In Western Ukraine, popular opinion on issues of history, heritage, and collective memory is increasingly shaped by media commentators or media intellectuals.176 Presently, opinion-making attracts not only journalists but also academics, experts, political insiders, and NGO activists. Using the opportunities provided primarily by popular media and the Internet, media intellectuals deliver their message to a diverse, anonymous audience which in its turn implies “a potentially very different relationship between the parties, one where rumor and innuendo may dominate, where the force of personality, repetition and orchestration can more easily replace the force of better argument.”177 To be successful, intellectual discussions in the media do not have to be perfectly balanced, neutral, or free of bias.178 By and large, media space refracts collective memories and historical narratives through numerous lenses, ranging from “Manichean expressions of moral certitude” to “complex discourses of uncertainty and unintended consequences.”179

With the rapid growth of the internet-based media in the 2000s, the intellectual debate on the past (and on the multicultural heritage in particular) was transferred to several bigger news portals that, among other things, provide a space for bloggers recruited among the popular local opinion-makers (historians, journalists, political scientists etc.) One of the relatively recent additions of this type that stimulates debates about the Galician past is the news portal Zaxid. It was founded in 2007, allegedly in close cooperation with the center-right circles supporting the sitting mayor of Lviv, Andrii Sadovyi.180 Zaxid had strong financial support and quickly became a popular platform for liberal and liberal-nationalist discussants. In particular, the portal has regularly addressed lesser-known pages of the multicultural history of Lviv and Galicia in a special section titled My pam’iataiemo (We remember.) The list of internet resources publishing polemic articles about the history of the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands also includes the long-lived Postup and Lvivs’ka hazeta as well as the relatively new ZIK and Zbruc.

While І’s “intellectual guidebooks in local history” drew attention to Polish Lwów as part and parcel of the redefined Galician heritage, discussants accommodated
by West Ukrainian popular media address the (mis)use of the city’s Polish legacy mostly with reference to the Ukrainian project of nation-building. This part of the discussions on Polishness—attended primarily by politicking intellectuals—quickly became an arena for staging various trends evident in the Ukrainian politics of memory. Notably, the intellectual polemic about Polish Lvów initiated by celebrity bloggers has oscillated between two conceptual antipodes, namely, anticolonial rhetoric and arguments relating to the EU-promoted quest for “common remembrance.” In the former case the claim to coin a usable past for the disadvantaged “postcolonial” Ukrainian community was articulated, whereas in the latter the emphasis was laid on the mutual recognition and ethics of reconciliation.

Oftentimes, the argument about the necessity to “discover” prewar Lvów is generated by an “anticolonial” frame of mind. When the Ukrainian community strives to overcome its Soviet condition, the legacy of other “colonial” periods might be reconsidered as a material to various identity projects. Aestheticized representations of the prewar “vanished world” exemplifies restorative nostalgia typical of post-Soviet societies longing for their pre-Soviet golden ages. However, reflective nostalgia for Europe in post-Soviet Western Ukraine is even more evident in the efforts to reaccommodate the cultural legacy of the former “colonizers.” Despite constant reminders about the bad credit of the Polish political regimes among Ukrainians, the Polish legacy of Lviv serves as a reminder of civilizational, social, and national features associated with Europe in the opinion of many discussants.

In the post-socialist space, return to the national is ubiquitously presented as synonymous with a return to Europe. However, although the images of Galicia as the Ukrainian Piedmont and Lviv as the ultra-nationalist Banderstadt are persistently articulated in the Galician media, the city branding that articulates Central European and, by necessity, Polish components proves to be more rewarding:

... Polish Lviv is not only sentiments of a pedigreed Galicianer and cultured person. This is also a present-day motor of the urban tourism, and also the idea of the future development of Lviv as a “European” city. Probably, there are no naïve people who imagine crowds of tourists coming to Lviv for the sake of taking picture against the background of the Bandera monument or for the sake of a stroll along Heroes of the UPA street. Yes, both from the West and from the East guests come to look at the old “Polish Lviv.” We need to remember, appreciate and preserve it.

Commercial value of the “Polish retro” has not only been exploited by numerous tourist agencies in the city but also acknowledged in the intellectual polemic on Lviv’s restoration and branding. Contemporary Lviv is still far from the European urban
ideal, though it has been argued that this may be achieved in the future. This hope grows from the strictly pragmatic desire of contemporary Lvivites to successfully sell the image of a glorious city to millions of tourists, a city abundant in cultural and historical sites. 189

What often goes unnoticed in these accounts is that the creation of two parallel heritages—the “national” for the internal use and the “Polish” and “Central European” for the sake of external audiences—has its perils. What looks on the surface to be a peaceful coexistence of two models of cultural heritage may actually be an assimilative strategy aiming to promote a “single society narrated in different ways to different markets.” 190 Rather than possessing an immanent value for the present-day Galicianers, Polish Lwów is distanced from them both intellectually and emotionally. One of the aspects of this estrangement—as has been pointed in the polemics on the internet—is the decontextualization of the Polish legacy and the ignoring of its transformative potential. Selection of easily digestible popular references from the complexity of the Polish legacy may be exemplified by excessive interest in the subculture of the Lwów batiarzy: hooligans, masters of (often quite rude) practical jokes and core figures of the urban folklore. Andrii Pavlyshyn, a famous Lviv journalist, translator, and admirer of Polish culture, attends to this aspect when he writes: “We know preposterously little about the Polish past of Lviv. . . . In the social consciousness, the place of brilliant scholars and caring owners of the urban organism became occupied by the colorful yahoos ‘bariary’ who diminished the image of the city . . . the city of the famous university and the unique intellectual tradition to the level of the half-criminal capital of the scum of the earth.” 191

Other authors point out that despite historical tensions between the Polish and Ukrainian communities, the “vanished world” of Polish Lwów continued to benefit postwar Ukrainian Lviv. The European ambience of the prewar city left its long afterlife and provided postwar generations of Lvivites with alternatives to the “primitiveness” of “Eurasian” Soviet reality. As has been argued, “Our politeness and coffee drinking, local dialect and sentiment to batiary, as well as lots of other things that we like to contrast to Soviet legacy—all this originates exactly in the culture of ‘Polish Lwów’. ” 192

This notwithstanding, memories about a high standard of living and a superior cultural ambience of Lwów render ambivalent emotions among the West Ukrainian authors addressing the topic of prewar urban life. Viewed from the national perspective, the much admired high culture of Lwów is associated not with Ukrainianness but with Polishness. Necessity to meet and comment on this fact has been addressed with the help of several discursive strategies. Some discussants chose to reframe belongingness of this superior culture and to address it not as a national Polishness
but rather as a local (regional, borderland) urban phenomenon. Aside from the West Ukrainian media, numerous examples of this strategy could be found in the Galician political discourse. For instance, in 2011 the local Polish community was scandalized by frequent references to the “Lviv professors” in the official discourses on the occasion of the unveiling of a monument dedicated to the Polish academics executed in Lwów during the Nazi occupation. This detail was interpreted not as an effort to provide more inclusive definitions for the joint commemoration of the Polish and Ukrainian communities, but rather as unwillingness to admit the distinction of Polishness.

Another discursive strategy associated with the “anticolonial” line of argument is relativization/trivialization. Some authors pointed out that the cultural ambience of Lwów was not exceptional and, besides, it was only possible due to the existence of urban—and prevalingly Ukrainian—underclasses. In the words of a journalist,

> The majority of Lvivites consisted of working people, the urban poor, the lumpen and proletarians who populated the workers’ ghetto. …. These people did not create something exceptional at that time, and neither did their descendants, Lvivites in the third generation or something similar, create something outstanding nowadays. Folklore of *batiary*, ‘Tylko wy Lwowi’ [a popular prewar song—E.N.]—it’s lovely, it’s nostalgic, especially for former Lvivites and the present residents of Wroclaw, for example. But it is not an opera and not at all a great literature. Every city has such nostalgic motifs, all these pies with rhubarb, pastry shops, noble officers and ladies waving with fans.

As these examples demonstrate, strategies of dealing with the “Polish relics” of Lviv are informed by the ambition not only to carve a usable past, but also to create parity of the rich multicultural legacy of the region (generated, among others, by the culturally and socially advantaged “colonizers”) and the emergent national heritage.

Although Galician media intellectuals generally agree that Polish heritage of Lviv benefits tourism and, in broader terms, provides additional arguments for the development of bonds with Europe, they are also aware that celebration of the “foreign colonial” legacy might provoke undesirable contestation. Nevertheless, the Polish legacy is not only envisioned as an object of normalization and as a taken-for-granted part of Ukrainian national heritage. As discussions on the blind spots of the Polish-Ukrainian past reached the popular media, images of Polish Lwów became used not only for nostalgic retrospection but also as a source of “traumatization,” i.e., triggering “public discourses in which the foundations of a collective identity are brought up for reflection.” For some media intellectuals, the Polish component of Lviv is not only a part of the usable past or a “ticket to Europe,” but an immense loss and pain. In the opinion of Andriy Pavlyshyn, Lvivites of Polish origin, whose suffering he describes
in his essay to *Zaxid*,¹⁹⁶ have not been the only party affected by the expulsions. Its other principal victim has been the Ukrainian community. Pavlyshyn’s “traumatizing” argument is that although postwar Lvivites do not share direct responsibility for the expulsions, theirs is the guilt of amnesia that on the moral plane may be equated to a silent complicity with the perpetrators that repressed and expelled the Poles. Similarly, political scientist Volodymyr Vitkovs’kyi admits that

[o]ne cannot help feeling a huge human tragedy of the repatriations. Commemoration of their victims and telling the contemporary Galicianers the truth about those tragic events should be a moral duty of the government, NGOs, intellectuals, and churches . . . . When standing in the Feodosiya park in front of the memorial dedicated to the deportations of [Crimean] Tatars, the author felt that a similar monument lacks in Lviv in the memory of the deported Poles.¹⁹⁷

Another example of discursive “traumatization” may be found in polemics about the present-day situation of Poles in Lviv. *Ressentiment* towards Polishness may be mitigated by pointing out disenfranchisement of the present-day Polish community of the city. While Polish Lwów is associated with the European civilization and wealthy urban classes, the present-day Lvivites of Polish origin are presented as striving to overcome their cultural isolation and marginality:

According to its ethnic composition, language, culture and spirit Lviv indeed used to be first and foremost a Polish city…and we should not be afraid to say this…. ….One wouldn’t be in the Lviv Poles’ place. As an ethnic minority they are very weak. Even though today, unlike at the Soviet period, they have an opportunity to realize their rights, this does not improve the matter in a significant way.¹⁹⁸

Since the early 2000s, discursive strategies triggering the process of cultural trauma in respect to the Polish legacy have been recurring but isolated elements in the public debate in Western Ukraine. One of the reasons is that the carrier groups¹⁹⁸ who might be interested in promoting cultural trauma processes (e.g., the local Polish community, communities of the expellees, cultural-historical associations, and intellectuals milieus) are not influential enough to change the predominant popular attitudes. The Ukrainian majority continues to regard ethno-cultural diversity as something tolerable and useful, but obviously subordinated to the national frames of reference. Cultural struggles in present-day Western Ukraine, where the political scene is dominated by the right-wing actors, effectively block promoters of cultural trauma from voicing their own stories. On the other hand, there are strong indications
that in the contemporary situation in Ukraine, with its ambivalent geopolitical status and bitter absence of national consensus aggravated by the recent warfare in the east, construction of trauma relating to the populations of neighboring states is inherently problematic. Under these circumstances, even the most ethically motivated discourses of trauma can be held hostage by actors willing to use them for gaining moral high ground and provoking conflicts. So far, the West Ukrainian participants of the media-saturated intellectual debate prefer to employ “normalizing” strategies and continue to address Polishness in terms of a commercially attractive, nationally integrated heritage rather than focus on “traumatizing” aspects of the “Polish retro.”

Conclusions

Fascination with nation-centric accounts and unitary nationalist frames of reference that were so prominent in Ukraine in the 1990s, currently show signs of stabilization. Simultaneously, ethnic diversity, cultural relations over national borders, and plurality of the pasts emerged as legitimate topics of public discussions focusing on ideological outlooks, collective identities, and collective memories. Diversity and profound divisions are not only characteristics of the Ukrainian political and cultural landscape, but as was argued above, are also perennial features of the post-1991 debates on the difficult past that Ukrainians share with Poles.

Diversity of the East-Central European memory cultures calls for reflection and intellectual elaboration, the task which is often undertaken by actors speaking from heterogeneous and unstable positions. The intellectual contribution of these actors—whom I referred to as memorians—to the public debates on the contentious Polish-Ukrainian past has been one of the conceptual foci of this study. Memorians may be conceptualized as diffuse epistemic/interpretative communities and networks of various actors making regular intellectual “interventions” in the public debate on the past. By invoking political, academic, and entrepreneurial orders of discourse, memorians play an important mediating role as translators of “memory stuff” over national, occupational, and ideological boundaries. Though not necessarily possessing an expert historical knowledge and political “sense of a game,” they inject novel ideas and arguments about meaning of the past and, consequently, have a potential to transform the social imagination of their audiences.

Subordinated to the nation-centric historical accounts, but still an important theme opened for multiple uses, the historical diversity of the Polish-Ukrainian
borderlands has become an object of intellectual reinterpretation in Western Ukraine since the 2000s. Framing this intellectual asset in terms of multicultural heritage (bahatokul’turna spadshchyna) signaled the effort of Ukrainian intellectuals to inscribe the local—and, at the same time, transnational—past to a coherent national narrative. On the way, however, it proved to be that the multicultural “universes”—in particular, the Polish one—resisted the seamless inclusion into the fabric of Ukrainian-centric historical accounts due to unresolved memory conflicts rooted in the events of World War II and the postwar period. One of these unresolved conflicts is the Polish-Ukrainian controversy over the “anti-Polish violence” of 1943–1944 in Volhynia and Galicia whose turmoils demonstrate, among other things, that a lack of intellectual conceptualization of the shared past that resonate with each other rather than exclude each other, may undermine the trustworthiness of gestures of political reconciliation. Nevertheless, bringing to light the topic of the Polish-Ukrainian violence that was suppressed during the Soviet period allowed West Ukrainian memorians to start talking about the multicultural heritage as a public good that deserves public attention. While in the 1990s the multicultural heritage was viewed primarily as a matter of the past, whose relevance to the identity quests and daily concerns of the present-day population was negligible, since the 2000s it has gradually been subjected to reinterpretation. From their interstitial positions, West Ukrainian memorians (like the milieu at Ï) made efforts to turn the multicultural heritage into a transformative resource. The prewar ethnic diversity became represented as “an issue” from the perspective of the present day, addressed as something current, needed for the identity-building of Ukrainians, and at the same time as something exciting; opening the region to Europe and the world. Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether in the near future the narratives on the dismembered Galician polyethnicity will appeal to the cultural imagination of wider audiences or will instead remain an exclusive asset of elitist custodians.

As has been argued in the study, the West Ukrainian intellectual polemic addressing historical multiculture has oscillated between two conceptual poles: roughly, the national and the transnational. The “national” line of argument is underpinned by “anticolonial” thinking that strives not only to restore excluded narratives of the colonized, but to restrict the historical legacies of non-Ukrainian dominance from the vantage point of the post-1991 national order. As a result, Polish (as well as the Jewish, Austrian, and Armenian) legacy is framed as an agreeable “multicultural heritage” that may be incidentally used for various projects benefiting the present-day Ukrainian majority. Currently, these projects range from Heimattourismus to the post-Soviet revisions of Ukrainian national heritage, to branding the city for the sake of improving the business climate and large-scale visions of “opening” Lviv to the world.
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On the other hand, the Polish legacy is occasionally conceptualized with the help of rhetoric associated with the transnational politics of regret. Viewed from this vantage point, Polish Lvów may have “traumatizing” effects on the cultural imagination of the present-day Ukrainian majority. Unlike several decades ago, the “Polish component” is not suppressed in the public sphere of Lviv. Openness about the ‘golden years’ and the tragic end of the prewar Polish community inscribes the local history into the wider European context and adds nuances to the Ukrainian narratives on the recent past. “Traumatization” of the audiences with the images of the Polish prewar universe that connote irrevocable loss and tragedy, may open up the Ukrainian cultural memory to a moral transformation and help to address the problem of black-and-white stories of admirable victimhood and unstained heroism.

The main insight coming from revisiting the violently interrupted prewar multiculture is that, arguably, the hope of arriving at consensual interpretations should be left to be formulated by a non-partisan historiography. As Andreas Huyssen puts it, “the claims of closure implicit in objective fact-based historiography shipwreck on the very nature of traumatic experience, which denies reconciliation, healing, and closure.” Intellectual discussions on the multicultural heritage of the East-Central European borderlands expose multiple analytical and ideological perspectives, provide a unique opportunity to readdress “irresolvable polysemy” of the collective memories, and at the same time have a potential to hinder a definitive “closure” of the difficult past. As an object of intellectual polemic, multicultural heritage may become a transformative resource as it could stimulate social imagination, encourage novel ideas about belonging and locatedness, and change moral outlooks of different audiences. Nevertheless, the complex and contradictory nature of this resource does not exclude the possibility of skewed interpretations and uses. Oftentimes intellectuals/memorians justify their interest in ethno-cultural diversity by necessity to transform it into an accessible democratic instrument for nation-building and for developing contacts with other national communities. Meanwhile, as it has been demonstrated above, West Ukrainian cultural entrepreneurs flippantly turn multicultural heritage into an exclusive resource “for own use” and, consequently, open it up for political manipulation. Multicultural heritage runs the risk of being transformed into a comfortable solidarity discourse that either obstructs dispassionate analysis of the past ethnic conflicts, or avoids presenting the tragic episodes of the past that may traumatize the audience, who afterall, is expected to be at ease with “its promoted past and predicted future.”
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Endnotes

1. The author uses the opportunity to thank to the anonymous referees for their helpful advice and comments.


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10. See, for example, information about a recent meeting of Polish and Ukrainian representatives of ultra-right political parties during which the issues of the difficult past and commemoration were addressed. One of the points of mutual interest emphasized during the talks included necessity to keep the parity principle in commemoration of the Poles and Ukrainians who fell victims to the totalitarian regimes. The other statement was about necessity to avoid such situations, when “representatives of Poland or some other country in the European parliament – anyone except Ukrainians themselves –would judge the Ukrainian history and the Ukrainian heroes” ([http://www.international.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/novyny/023314](http://www.international.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/novyny/023314), accessed August 10, 2013). Such deliberate exclusion of the external parties from the dialogue cannot be interpreted as a desire of a constructive democratic discussion.


17. One of the most resonant was the work of the commission on monitoring school history textbooks headed by the authoritative historian Natalia Iakovenko. From 2007 to 2009, twelve professional historians from different regions of Ukraine held a series of meetings under the auspices of the Ukrainian National Memory Institute. The working group suggested the conception of “maximum detailing (*mul’typlikatsiia*) of the society,” which presupposes focusing history teaching on illuminating the motivations and mechanisms of actions of different groups in society.” More about this project see Oxana Shevel, “The Politics of

18. In particular, the local ethnic diversity is being studied under auspices of foreign and domestic institutions (the latter usually receive funding from abroad). Some of these actors, like, for example, Center for Urban History of East Central Europe (in Lviv) and Geschichtswerkstatt Europa (German program funding international projects focusing on the analysis of European cultures of remembrance) apply academic methodologies, popularize the obtained knowledge and, in broader terms, stimulate intellectual engagement with the multicultural past. The knowledge about the ethno-cultural diversity is produced not only for the interested foreign foundations and external audiences, but also targets the wider Ukrainian audience. Among the recent resonant production focusing on Ukraine’s cultural diversity and emphasizing positive aspects of cultural exchange is the textbook Razom na odnii zemli. Istoriia Ukrainy bahatokul’turna (Together on One Land. Polycultural History of Ukraine, Kyiv, 2012) written by several authoritative Ukrainian (among them, Western Ukrainian) scholars and funded by the EU. The project stands out due to its innovative methodological approach (namely, the author text is absent; readers are suggested to analyze thematic sets of historical documents instead) and elevation of the topics that have earlier been omitted in the ordinary school textbooks. One of such topics is wartime massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Galicia.


20. Jeffrey Olick discusses the politics of regret as a new principle of legitimation connecting to memories of the tragic pasts. It builds on the assumption that “the past is very much present on the public agenda, but it is more often a horrible, repulsive past than the heroic golden ages so often part of public discourse in previous centuries. Political legitimation depends just as much on collective memory as it ever has, but this collective memory is now …a matter of “learning lessons” of history more than of fulfilling its promise or remaining faithful to its legacy” (Jeffrey K. Olick, The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility (New York and London: Routledge, 2007): 122).
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29. Nora, “Recent History.”
30. Snyder, “Commemorative Causality.”


32. In post-1989 Ukraine the boundary between the political field and the domain of academic history has been quite permeable. “Contamination” of the academic history with political rhetoric and arguments has been especially obvious in respect to such contentious topic as the Great Famine of 1932–1933. See a fascinating account of political instrumentalization of the contemporary historical research in Ukraine in: Heorhii Kasianov, Danse macabre. Holod 1932–1933 rokiv u politytsi, masovii svidomosti ta istoriohrafii (1980-ti–pochatok 1990-kh). (Kyiv: Informatsiino-analitychna agentsiia “Nash chas”, 2010): 110–259.


34. See, for example, composition of authors and bloggers on the major Ukrainain “memorian” website Istorychna Pravda and Western Ukrainian portal Zaxid.net.

35. Posner, Public Intellectuals, 3, 6, 7.


37. Cohen, Politics without the Past, 4.

38. Tröbst, “‘Kakoi takoi kovior?’,” 45.


43. Giesen, Intellectuals and the German Nation, 42–43.


47. To be sure, a similar attitude is observable in Western liberal democracies where “a non-interventionist and often quite superficial multiculturalism remains the norm” (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge, Pluralising Pasts, 26).


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57. Mink and Neumayer, “Introduction,” 2.

58. Mink and Neumayer, “Introduction,” 1.


64. See more about the fate of the Polish autonomous districts on the western periphery of the Soviet Union in: Kate Brown, A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).


73. Motyka, *Od rzezi wołyńskiej*, 448.


78. For a survey of the most significant scholarly works on the OUN and UPA Bandera in both Ukraine and beyond see David Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2007)


84. Snyder, “To Resolve the Ukrainian Question,” 113.


94. Especially with election of Karol Wojtyła known for his advocacy of national rights to the pope; see Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, 100.


98. See Narvselius, “Bandera Debate”.

99. As was revealed in the course of the sociological pool organized in 2003 in Lutsk, the Volyn’ oblast administrative center, by Razumkov center (Kyiv), 41,3
per cent, i.e. majority of the respondents, presumed (incorrectly) that Ukrainians suffered the biggest atrocities in the course of the Volhynian conflict. Also, the majority (38.7 per cent) took it for granted that Poles started the conflict (Berdychowska, “Ukraińcy wobec Wołynia,” 70).


107. Contributions to the discussion in Gazeta Wyborcza were collected in the volume *Volyn’: Dvi pam’iati* (Kyiv–Varshava: Dukh i litera, 2008) published by the Union of Ukrainians in Poland.


110. *Armija Krajowa*, the Polish resistance movement struggling on the occupied Polish territories, was one of the parties involved into the Volhynian conflict.


115. Observation made by Andriy Portnov (Portnov, “Ukrains’ki interpretatsii”).
116. This gap has recently been filled by the publication of the Polish Institute of National Memory Księga sprawiedliwych, 1939–1945. O Ukraińcach ratujących Polaków poddanych eksterminacji przez OUN i UPA, opracował Romuald Niedzielko (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2007).


120. Narvselius, “Bandera Debate”.

121. Mink and Neumayer, “Introduction,” 11.


123. Wolczuk, “Poland, Belarus & Ukraine Report.”


125. A typical example of a difficultly achieved symbolic proclamation of reconciliation was official re-opening of the Young Eagles cemetery in Lviv in 2005. Agreement about opening was achieved by the national administrations
of Poland and Ukraine as early as in 1999, but was postponed several times because of stubborn opposition of the local Lviv politicians to the pressure of both Polish and Ukrainian national authorities. When it was time for the next major commemoration of a tragic episode in the Polish history of the twentieth century—namely, execution of Lwów professors by the Nazis in 1941—the event was organized on the local level by joint efforts of officials and public actors from Lviv and Wroclaw, without a notable involvement of the national authorities.


128. Wolczuk, “Poland, Belarus & Ukraine Report.”


130. All-Ukrainian association VO Svoboda (often referred to as Svoboda) is the new name adopted by Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine (Sotsial-Natsional’na partiia Ukrainy). The ideological prototype of Svoboda is the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) and, accordingly, the association focuses its efforts on uprooting of communist ideology in Ukraine and on defense of the Ukrainian nation conceived as a community of blood and spirit (krovno-dukhovna spil’nota). In 2004 Svoboda supported the “orange” president candidate Viktor Yushchenko, but anti-Semitic statements of Svoboda’s leader Oleh Tyahnybok resulted in stripping him of membership in Yushchenko’s block Our Ukraine (Nasha Ukraina). From 2006 ”Svoboda” takes part in elections as an independent party and its popularity grows drastically. Although in connection with Euromaidan and the subsequent political crisis in Ukraine Svoboda lost part of its electoral support, it is still the biggest fraction in both the Lviv City Council and the Lviv Regional Council and holds power positions in a number of other West Ukrainian cities.
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132. Follis, Building Fortress Europe, 184.


139. This occurred partly as a reaction to the official conferring of Roman Shukhevych, the supreme commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the title of Hero of Ukraine by President Viktor Yushchenko on October 12, 2007.


142. It was the project of resolution presented by the ruling party “Civil Platform.”


144. “Historicizing strategies thus conceived are aimed to win their protagonists two trophies: a status position in the international arena and greater legitimacy as patriots inside their country” (Mink, “Geopolitics, Reconciliation, and Memory Games,” 6).


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147. Among them are authoritative Ukrainian historians and researchers of the Polish-Ukrainian relations Ihor Iliushyn, Volodymyr Serhiichuk and Iaroslav Isaievych.


151. Among them is the majority of professional historians in Russia as well as representatives of such domestic political forces as the Communist Party of Ukraine and Party of Regions. See Kasianov, Danse macabre, 143-153, 224 and the chapter “Golodomor 1932–1933 godov kak vyzov dla teorii genotsyda: Intellektual’nije genealogii sovremennykh debatov” (especially pages 205–209) in: Andrei Portnov, Uprazhneniia s istoriei po-ukrainski (Moskva: O.G.I—Polit. Ru—Memorial, 2010).


153. President Yanukovych was not present during the official commemorative ceremonies in Lutsk that were attended by President Komorowski on July 14, 2013.


Even more significant in this context is the information about plans of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory and the Polish Institute of National Memory to renew discussions on the wartime events in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in the format of bilateral conferences (Tetiana Nahorna, “Prymyrytysia instorychno. Rozmova z Oleksandrom Zinchenkom,” *Zbruc*, October 6, 2014. Accessed on September 19, 2015. [http://zbruc.eu/node/27682](http://zbruc.eu/node/27682)).


161. See, for example, argument voiced by Volodymyr V’iatrovych referred in Berdychowska, “Ukraińcy wobec Wołynia,” 92.


168. This factor is discussed, for instance, in Snyder, “The Causes of Ukrainian-
Polish Ethnic Cleansing,” 233.


175. Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge, Pluralising Pasts, 53.


182. There is no consensus on the scope and nature of the Soviet colonialism and post-communist (neo)colonialism. For example, Smith et al. assume that the state of economic, political and cultural relations between Moscow and Kyiv may be aptly described in terms of “federal colonialism” (Graham Smith et al., *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 1–22). However, as Molchanov suggests, the state of affairs was not as simple as this, especially in the sphere of Soviet nationality policies (Mikhail Molchanov, “Post-Communist Nationalism as a Power Resource: A Russia-Ukraine Comparison,” *Nationalities Papers* 28, 2 [2000]). See also discussion of the issue in David Chioni Moore, “Is the Post- in Postcolonial the Post- in Post-Soviet? Toward a Global Postcolonial Critique,” *PMLA* 116, 1 (2001): 111–28.


186. John Czaplicka, “Conclusion: Urban History after a Return to Local Self-Determination—Local History and Civic Identity,” in *Composing Urban History and the Constitution of Civic Identities*, edited by John Czaplicka and Blair Ruble


189. Pavlyshyn, “Narodzheni u L’vovi.”

190. Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge, Pluralising Pasts, 75.

191. Pavlyshyn, “Narodzheni u L ’vovi.”

192. Pavliv, “Iak nam vriatuvaly ‘pol’s ’kyi Lviv?’ ”


196. Pavlyshyn, “Narodzheni u L ’vovi.”

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