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Change and Reform of the League of Communists in Yugoslavia

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The Yugoslav League Of Communists In Crisis

The Yugoslav League of Communists is currently undergoing a period of self-examination and change which may be as profound and important as the period which accompanied Tito's break with Stalin in 1948. Unlike the Tito-Stalin dispute, the current crisis in the Party does not have direct foreign policy or international security implications and does not pit a weak David — Yugoslavia — against a mighty Goliath — the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the discussions in Yugoslav society and in the Party about the proper behavior and role of the Party will have profound implications for the future development of the country and for its social stability.

In the contemporary political crisis in Yugoslavia, it is increasingly difficult to identify the contending parties. In addition, alliances and factional groups are not permanent and alternative outcomes are not easy to identify or predict. Despite these difficulties in description and analysis, it is now becoming imperative that we understand more fully the issues at hand, and that we comprehend these pressures, which to a greater or lesser extent will eventually affect ruling communist parties throughout the world. The current debates in the Soviet Union about the type and direction of economic reform which is necessary, and the relationship between economic revitalization (*perestroika*) and political liberalization (*glasnost*) provide heightened urgency to an in-depth examination of this problem.

Traditionally, Socialist and even Western observers of communist party states have accepted the Leninist-Bolshevik model of Party organization as the natural point of equilibrium for the Party organization. The period of terror in the Soviet Union, the Red Guard era in China, and the collapse of the Party in Poland are often perceived as deviant cases from the Bolshevik model of Party behavior. Democratic centralism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and a strong, disciplined communist party are usually considered more natural consequences of party rule.¹

A countervailing hypothesis to the view of natural equilibrium is that the Leninist party model is an unnatural and temporary political accommodation, and that its maintenance creates increasingly severe social constraints in the decades following the seizure of power by the party. According to this opposing hypothesis, the pressures upon the party organizations will be manifested in different ways, at different times, and in different places, and the political accommodations to these pressures will also vary according to the circumstances.

Current events in Yugoslavia tend to conform more to the alternate view of Party behavior. Within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, there have been few activities directed towards centralization, restoration of Party discipline, selection of a strong leader to replace President Tito, or other moves associated with the Leninist-Bolshevik model. In fact, many proposals to restore the Party monopoly of power are ignored or dismissed as irrelevant to the needs of Yugoslav society.² Instead, Yugoslav Party members, many of whom do not hold leadership positions, have been influential in calling for a fundamental re-examination of all Party procedures and tenets.³ It is also likely that Yugoslavia may be in the vanguard of such changes in ruling communist party states.

In short, the contemporary Party reform movement in Yugoslavia may represent an historical first: namely, the beginning of a relatively democratic, self-generated, membership-directed, and internally initiated party reform movement within a communist one-party state. Unlike other reform periods in Yugoslavia, there is no single leader today with the capacity to direct change and terminate opposition. Thus, if the movement succeeds, the party which will emerge could provide an alternate model to the Leninist authoritarian dictatorship of the proletariat.

Theoretical Issues

The debate within the Yugoslav Party has centered on five critical theoretical issues. Each of these concepts resurrects a problem supposedly resolved during the revolution, and the re-evaluation of each will have very significant policy implications. The theoretical issues are: (1) maintenance of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat; (2) choosing between a mass or a vanguard party; (3) redefinition and implementation of democratic centralism; (4) renegotiating Party-state relationships; and (5) establishing appropriate Party-societal relationships.

In the years immediately following the revolution and national liberation struggles, the necessity of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was a given. The enemies of the state, such as various fascist groups, collaborators, and the remnants of the middle and upper classes, needed to be resocialized in accordance with the ideology of the Party. Now, however, over forty years have passed since the introduction of the socialist revolution in Yugoslavia, and few vestiges of the old order remain which can threaten the values of the state. Instead, the people, and especially the Party membership, expect concrete results and expect to receive the fruits of their labors. Many have recognized that modernization has fundamentally restructured the class basis of society, but that the Party ideologists have not rethought many of their viewpoints in the past four decades. In particular, the Party debates have generated inquiry into the feasibility of defining a clear, consistent and unified class interest in a way which would have practical policy implications. Finally, some within the Party question whether or not the Party always acts in the interests of the workers/proletariat, or whether the League has been manipulated by a technocratic-bureaucratic stratum in society.

Thus, both the desirability and feasibility of the dictatorship of the proletariat, one of the fundamental tenets of the Marxist-Leninist state, are under review. It is also likely that the results of this review could substan-

tially alter the essence of the Yugoslav League of Communists as well as the behavior of other fraternal communist parties.

A second major issue under review and reconsideration in the Yugoslav League of Communists today concerns the definition of the Party. Today, the membership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia exceeds two million out of a total population of twenty-three million.⁴ Fully twenty percent of the labor force holds Party membership; and, in some industrial sectors, over half of the workers are members of the Party.⁵ Obviously, under such circumstances, the myth of the Cadre Party lacks credibility, and some adjustments to organizational reality may now be in order, particularly when the Party is not dominated by a single strong leading individual or group.

There are a series of specific problems which need to be considered if the Party acknowledges its mass character. For example: Who should be recruited into the Party? How should Party members be trained? Is Party discipline feasible, and are purges practical? How can Party members be motivated, evaluated, and rewarded? Are other mass organizations still necessary for functions other than transmitting Party decisions? And, what should be the guiding principle for resolving conflicts of interest within the Party?

Any major attempt to alter the structure, goals, values and behavior of a Marxist-Leninist party must eventually grapple with the redefinition and reformulation of the practice of democratic centralism. This concept is undoubtedly the keystone for Party behavior, and it influences all aspects of Party life.

Within Yugoslavia today, agreement about the definition and implementation of democratic centralism has broken down. This conflict has introduced a series of problematic policy questions that tend to gravitate towards establishing a new equilibrium between the democratic and centralist facets of this operational principle. On the democratic side of the balance are the following questions: What are the legitimate limits to member control of the policy and behavior of the League of Communists?

Which procedures are legitimately available to the membership to influence Party decisions? In a society led by the Party, which social activities can be considered to be outside Party channels and democratic centralism? Which are internal Party matters and subject to democratic centralism? Which social issues are properly part of the Party agenda? Which issues are not? What are the appropriate inclusionary/exclusionary principles? What are the stimuli for consensual decision-making within the Party? And, how can consensual decision-making be weakened without endangering minority rights?

In addition to the above group of problems, there are a number of issues which are affected by the centralizing aspect of Lenin's democratic centralism. One of the most disturbing issues within the context of Yugoslavia is the problem of Party unity in a decentralized and ethnically fragmented state. Under such conditions, can the Party be unified when almost no other institution of the State is unified? Second, and closely allied to this issue, is the strengthening of Party unity likely in the absence of a strong leader? Is the principle of Party discipline justifiable to groups and individuals when the ideology of the Yugoslav Party stresses its freedom to construct an alternate road to socialism? If a national Party has the right to define its own interpretation of socialism, why not individual republics, provinces, interest groups, or individuals?⁶

The transition of a communist party from a conspiratorial-revolutionary party to the party of power has always been difficult and was never discussed in depth by Marx, Engels, or Lenin. Generally speaking, the transition to the party of power is achieved through a series of *ad hoc* arrangements and accommodations to political realities. Often, over time, these jerry-built institutional arrangements develop anomalies and lose much of their effectiveness and social legitimacy.

In this respect, socialist Yugoslavia is no exception, and since the revolution, a series of fundamental problems have developed which can not be ignored. In particular: What are the limits to the autonomy of the state government? Conversely, what are the limitations of Party involve-

ment/interference with the operation of the state? Who (state or Party) assumes responsibility for governmental errors or weaknesses? How can the Party inject constructive oppositionist and/or critical elements into political life? And, how can the Party accommodate its role as a spokesperson for a unified class interest to the ideology of the state institutions which are based on a plurality of interests?

The last area of substantive debate in the movement for Party change in Yugoslavia concerns the redefinition of the League's role *vis-a-vis* society and the economic system of self-management. Who should select economic priorities, and how should they be selected? How should the conflict between equality and efficiency be resolved? What are the rights of individuals when they conflict with the rights and behavior of the collective? What role should the Party assume in regulating or controlling the market? To what extent should the Party hold responsibility for economic and social decisions? And, how should individual responsibility be determined?

Taken together, the five issue areas involve nearly all the critical aspects of political and social life in Yugoslavia. Thus, the changes and reforms of the League of Communists which are under active consideration today will determine the future viability of the Yugoslav state and society. These issues are of critical importance to this country, but if these questions remain largely unanswered, or are answered ambiguously, we can expect little more than stagnation or muddling through. We can expect a deterioration and possibly eventually a new political order in Yugoslavia. In brief, the Party in Yugoslavia is in crisis, and if the Party does not address itself to engineering an exit from the crisis, we can expect that the state, economy, and eventually the society will weaken even further.

Figure 1: Political and Policy Implications of Intra-Party Debate

Political Issues	Policy Issues
Political Recruitment Political Socialization and Legitimization	Policy Formation Policy Implementation

Political And Policy Issues

Although the five theoretical issues are very important from an ideological perspective, they have equally large practical political and policy implications. It is the thesis of this monograph that the resolution of the intra-Party debate will affect not only how the ideology of the Party will evolve, but what the Party does, how it does it, and who carries it out.

Figure 1 lists the four major practical political and policy implications of the intra-Party debates. They include: political recruitment, political socialization, policy formulation, and policy implementation. These problems determine the organizational structure of the work, and the analytical sections of this paper give specific attention to each of them.⁷

Political recruitment, like the other three problem areas, touches on each of the five theoretical issues discussed earlier. Political recruitment is a critical issue for every political party and every political system. Among other specific points, political recruitment involves an analysis of the composition of the membership and of the leadership. Its fundamental questions are the issues of identifying members, attracting potential members to the organization and retaining members in the organization. When we examine the leadership side of the issue, recruitment problems include selecting the best among the membership for leadership posts, rotating and circulating leaders/elites, and assuring adequate representation and accessibility of major legitimate social groups in the Party.

To the extent to which the Party fulfills these tasks, it has succeeded in its political recruitment goals. The socialization of the population and

Party membership to the goals of the Party, and the acceptance of the legitimacy of the system by the population and membership are necessary components for the long-term successful maintenance of the political system. If large elements of the population and/or membership reject or even remain indifferent to the goals and values of the ruling party, that party's future rests upon a shaky foundation. A large but passive membership is also a potential threat to the ruling party, and the dangers from passivity are equal to those associated with divisions and factionalization. A temporary, unstable membership is also a significant point of weakness as well as a membership which is poorly trained and ill-disciplined to help implement party policy.

From the view point of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, if Party membership is considered to be irrelevant, or if Party members are perceived to perform ineffectively, inefficiently, or corruptly, then the Party's ties to the population, its legitimacy, and its ability to direct society are correspondingly reduced. Many of the theoretical issues discussed earlier, particularly the definition of democratic centralism, are directly relevant to this point. Thus, reform and change in this area are considered to be of vital importance to the future of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

A third fundamental role for a political system is policy formulation. Modern political parties, particularly Marxist-oriented parties, cannot exist without a platform or program for action. In addition, ruling Marxist political parties theoretically represent the interests of the working class. As a result, their programs should be clear to the workers; the platforms should be relevant to the needs of the workers; and the Party's conclusions should be supported by the membership, particularly the worker-members.

A ruling Marxist political party, such as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, will experience a crisis in its identity when it reformulates its agenda to include or exclude responsibility for particular areas of social and political life. It will undergo a crisis in confidence when it inevitably

reconsiders the legitimacy of its methods to formulate its policies. It must find new answers to such problems as who can decide policy, how policy can be decided, and what criteria are appropriate for political decision-making. The choices are painful and necessarily involve a renegotiation of intra-Party relationships and redistribution of the intra-Party evaluation of power. As a result, debates about policy formulation will often become bitter and personal.

The final policy question is the issue of policy implementation. A political party, even an authoritarian party, must eventually be evaluated by the results of its policies, by its accomplishments, and by the perception of who benefits from its activities. A party, especially a ruling party, must eventually deliver on its promises in order to legitimize its rule. Failure in policy areas can easily lead to questioning of the party's right to rule and to questioning of the foundations of the political system. While complete success in policy implementation is unrealistic, utter failure or perceptions of utter failure must be strongly resisted and avoided.

It is obvious that each of these four areas -- political recruitment, political socialization, policy formulation, and policy implementation -- are of critical importance in the evaluation of a ruling communist party. In particular, Yugoslavia's solutions or attempted solutions to these problems may be suggestive of the larger pressures affecting other ruling communist parties. In this monograph, the debates within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia are examined in the context of their organizational political and policy implications, the historical environment for organizational change within the League of Communists, and the crisis besetting the Party and Yugoslav society. Finally, the work considers how the current difficulties facing the League interrelate with each other.

The Historical Environment And Traditions Of Political And Economic Systemic Change

Contrary to our static view of many other East European communist parties, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has radically changed its character several times since it has achieved power. It has proven itself to be sufficiently pragmatic and innovative to be able to survive and even prosper through reliance on its inner strengths and on its ties with much of society. The SKJ has developed and nurtured a well-earned reputation for being adaptable and responsive to new and different social situations. It has also developed a reputation for innovation and for pragmatism. Concepts such as worker councils, the right to separate paths to socialism, non-alignment, and self-management are just a few of the ideas which the Yugoslavs have developed and applied to their environment. Yugoslavia's four post-war constitutions are additional indications of the extent to which the country's political leadership was willing to adapt and to tinker with political and social institutions to create a versatile, innovative, and adaptable social system.

Many of Yugoslavia's most noteworthy social experiments are a direct outgrowth of the crises which Yugoslavia faced and overcame. They were not initially based on a well thought-out theoretical doctrine, but rather represented pragmatic attempts to survive in the face of some difficult social situations. The introduction of self-management, the embrace of non-alignment, and the redefinition of the role of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia are just a few of the *ad hoc* solutions to particular political difficulties which have now become essential components of Yugoslav Party dogma.

Milovan Djilas poignantly illustrates the haphazard, serendipitous nature of political change in the early years of the Socialist Federation in his discussion about the introduction of self-management in Yugoslavia. As Djilas writes:

The idea of self-management was conceived by Kardelj and me, with some help from our comrade Kidric. Soon after the outbreak of the quarrel with Stalin, in 1949, as far as I remember, I began to reread Marx's *Capital*, this time with much greater care to see if I could find the answer to the riddle of why, to put it in simplistic terms, Stalinism was bad and Yugoslavia was good. I discovered many new ideas and, most interesting of all, ideas about a future society in which the immediate producers, through free association, would themselves make the decisions regarding production and distribution — would, in effect, run their own lives and their own future. . . . I soon explained my idea to Kardelj and Kidric while we sat in a car parked in front of the villa where I lived. . . . Without leaving the car, we thrashed it out for little more than half an hour. . . .

Tito . . . took no part in this and knew nothing of the proposal . . . until he was informed by Kardelj and me in the government lobby room during a session of the National Assembly. His first reaction was: our workers are not ready for that yet! But Kardelj and I . . . pressed him hard. . . . Tito paced up and down, as though completely wrapped in his own thoughts. Suddenly he stopped and exclaimed: "Factories belonging to the workers — something that has never yet been achieved!" With these words, the theories worked out by Kardelj and myself seemed to shed their complication, and seemed, too, to find better prospects of being workable. A few months later, Tito explained the Workers' Self-management Bill to the National Assembly.⁸

Although many of the Yugoslav political changes were initially based on pragmatic considerations, this factor should not detract from the separate and cumulative impact of these changes on the world Communist movement and on the development of the institutional character of the Party. The concepts of national independence/self-determination, non-alignment, self-management/decentralism, and social self-management/pluralist socialism are just some of the concepts developed in this *ad hoc* fashion to cope with particular crises facing the country. Each concept is inherently important in the world socialist movement, and each demonstrates how the Yugoslav Party has adapted to change during crisis periods.

The issue of national independence/self-determination was provoked by the severe crisis conditions of the 1948 Tito-Stalin split. Soviet, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Romanian troops massed on the borders, and an unsuccessful attempt was made within the Party to break Tito's control and to place the Yugoslav organization under firm Soviet control.⁹ The crisis represented a direct conflict between the values of Communist internationalism and national sovereignty. The doctrine of national self-determination or the right of each socialist state to select its own path to socialism resulted.

Yugoslav nonalignment in the 1960s was largely defensive in character, essentially neutralist in policy orientation, and it represented an attempt to avoid entanglements with the two major blocs. By the mid-1970s, Yugoslavia's sovereignty no longer seemed directly threatened, and nonalignment was again expanded, this time to include a strong activist socialist dimension.¹⁰ According to the official history of the Party, nonalignment represents more than neutrality. Its basic feature is to change the character of international relations so that foreign policy would become an effective instrument for social progress and socialism. Yugoslavia also denies that its nonalignment is class neutral. In fact, the official view is that nonalignment is a weapon to limit imperialist (i.e., U.S.) and hegemonic (i.e., U.S.S.R.) influence throughout the world.¹¹

Thus, in a period of less than forty years, the Yugoslav Party has managed to redefine its foreign policy three times according to its national needs. It first shifted from close alliance with the Soviet Union to strict neutrality, and then from neutrality to active support of third-world liberation movements and active opposition to alliance politics. No other East European country has proven to be so adaptable in the formulation of its foreign policy.

A second major pillar of the Yugoslav political creed is self-management. Like nonalignment, self-management is a political principle which was developed out of adversity and has evolved over time. The first worker councils were formed spontaneously in late 1949 during the period

of the economic blockade of Yugoslavia by the Soviet Union and its allied nations. Economic shortages and the collapse of the five-year plan and state planning boards were largely instrumental in the decision to take this step.¹² The Sixth Party Congress in 1952 institutionalized the move and incorporated the rhetoric of self-management, anti-statism, and decentralism as Party principles.¹³

Over time, the utility of self-management has expanded from a necessary adaptation to economic hardship and method for survival in the harsh economic environment of the blockade to a pivotal principle of the Yugoslav League of Communists. As stated, during the Seventh Party Congress in 1958, self-management was to become the guiding principle of Yugoslav social and political behavior:

The League of Communists is obligated to involve itself constantly in the institutions of self-management so that they evolve to express the progressive tendencies and interests of the working people and so that every member, according to his abilities, participates in it just like a socio-political worker.

Every member of the League of Communists should be aware of the heightened importance of the independent behavior and decision-making of the individual and especially communists in the social institutions and organizations. Therefore, now, more than ever, it is necessary to secure a unanimous viewpoint of all members and organizations to this basic socio-political question.¹⁴

Socialist pluralism is the third tenet of Yugoslav socialism which differentiates this country from its communist party-ruled neighbors. Again, it was developed largely as an *ad hoc* series of accommodations to political realities in a fragmented nation and to the growth of local and regional power bases. The concept was first introduced in 1966 following the Brioni Plenum. It has become the rallying cry for attempts to democratize the political system and to reduce the influence of the secret police and later the national government.¹⁵ Following the Croatian demonstrations in 1971, socialist pluralism became heavily identified not

only with the dismantling of the federal bureaucratic apparatus, but also with the centralization of power into the hands of the republic/provincial leaders.¹⁶

In 1978, Edvard Kardelj's publication of *Directions for the Development of the Political System of Self-Management*¹⁷ gave added momentum and a distinctly humanistic thrust to socialist pluralism. The book was, in essence, an *ex post facto* explanation of Yugoslav social and political behavior. Its five principles defined socialist pluralism and included: (1) acceptance of diversity and the inevitability of conflict; (2) belief that conflict resolution must occur at the lowest possible decision-making level; (3) protection of minority rights and the acceptance of democratic procedures throughout the political process; (4) sharing of power and acceptance of democratic procedures by the League of Communists; and (5) the development of political and social tolerance.¹⁸

In contemporary Yugoslavia, there is a growing realization that all three concepts — nonalignment, self-management, and socialist pluralism — are in major need of revision, and that current applications of these ideological tenets are becoming increasingly potent obstacles to economic, political, and social reform as the system changes and seeks a new basis for legitimacy.¹⁹ Viable economic reform is constrained by the current activist interpretation of nonalignment which makes it increasingly difficult for even the more developed republics like Slovenia to attract foreign investment capital, or to participate in joint international technological ventures (e.g., Eureka, the West European computer consortium system).²⁰ Economic interdependence with the third world has proven illusory, added to Yugoslavia's debt problems, and has pushed the country into involvement in disputes for which it lacks a national self-interest (e.g., Libya and Iraq).

The current economic practices of self-management have further complicated the economic situation in Yugoslavia. It has led to the virtual extinction of the investment capital market, fragmentation of the internal market along republic boundaries, the appearance of dangerously low

liquidity levels, deterioration of worker productivity, and low capitalization.²¹ Minority interests in Yugoslavia have used pluralist socialism to prevent change, block the implementation of the economic stabilization plan, and subsidize inefficient but politically motivated economic enterprises.²² The results have been disastrous to the Yugoslav economy which now has a rate of inflation exceeding one hundred fifty percent per annum, with many of its basic industries, such as construction, at the point of bankruptcy.²³

Political reform is also paralyzed by current application of Socialist Yugoslavia's differentiating principles. Consensual decision-making and excessive political decentralization make it extremely difficult to formulate an agenda for political change.²⁴ Over-institutionalization has created bureaucratic satrapies, each of which protects its authority and fends off any attempt at political change. Tolerance of minority views has become transformed into a unit veto system, and the process of political compromise has come to a halt. As the Third Resolution of the Thirteenth Party Congress stated:

At all levels in the League of Communists, responsibility — both collective and personal — is concrete. Insufficient responsibility for failures in the conduct of current politics, for the violation of constitutionality and legality, usurpation of the rights of the working class and decision-making in its name and the monopolization of power — is one of the basic problems facing the League of Communists.²⁵

The present sense of crisis in the Yugoslav Party is not unique and has occurred several times before in its relatively brief history. During the Sixth Congress in 1952, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia changed its name to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Shortly afterwards, the League reduced its direct interventionist role in government and in the economy, relaxed the internal Party discipline which had characterized the war years and the Tito-Stalin dispute, and expelled those (e.g., Djilas)

whose policies suggested an evolution towards a Western-style democratic socialism.²⁶

During the period 1966-68 following the Brioni Plenum, the Party again took up the standard of internal reform in response to a sense of crisis in the Party. The League solidified its ideological commitment to self-management, stripped the state security organs of their power, as represented by the purge of Alexander Rankovic, and gradually encouraged the development of pluralism and Party diversity.²⁷ Kardelj characterized the changes in the following way:

The democratization of the League of Communists today is intended to create conditions throughout its entire organizational machinery that will make it possible for viewpoints to be aired, discussed, and afterwards for decisions to be taken by democratic majority, that will be observed by all communists. Herein lies the meaning of democratic centralism in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Democratic centralism should be regarded not in the old Stalinist way, in which only centralism remained of democratic centralism.²⁸

For a third time, during 1971-74, the Party underwent another major transformation. In 1971, Tito forced major personnel changes in the leadership of the Croatian and Serbian parties, but failed to abolish the practice of republic control over its cadres, or to stem the growth of legitimacy in the autonomy of the republic/provincial parties.²⁹ In addition, Party debates became more open, democratic, and more representative of particularistic republic interests; the transmission-belt relationship of the Party to the other socio-political organizations atrophied, and an almost complete separation of the Party from the government occurred.³⁰

Complementing changes within the Party, the League of Communists has gradually changed its relationship with society and with the political institutions that manage policy change. Figure 2 summarizes these changes and, as is evident compared to the pre-Brioni and particularly pre-self-management periods, the current League has dramatically

Figure 2. Changes in the Policy Role of the League of Communists, 1946-1985

Period	Policy Stage			
	Initiation	Formulation	Implementation	Evaluation
1946-53	Absolute	Absolute	Absolute	Absolute
1953-65	Strong	Strong	Strong	Moderate
1965-72	Strong	Strong	Moderate	Weak
1972-80	Strong	Moderate	Weak	Weak
1980-87	Moderate	Weak	Weak	Weak

weakened its control over policy formulation, implementation and evaluation.

Although the League of Communists has successfully overcome its earlier crises, there are some current conditions which make the present situation particularly worrisome and the outcome far from assured. First, the present period lacks a strong central leader with the power or influence to serve as the focal point for initiating change and opposing traditional forces. Second, the party is now weakened by the very reforms which it earlier sponsored. Democratization of the Party, decentralism within the League, and reduction in the scope of Party decision-making all serve to restrict the capacity of the Party to administer fundamental change. The Party now avoids factionalization by avoiding critical issues. Its republic-based power centers jealously guard their prerogatives, and increasingly larger percentages of the active membership have vested interests to protect and thus lack the revolutionary fervor of the past.³¹

Obstacles and resistance to change do not necessarily imply that change is unlikely to occur. Instead, the process and procedures for internal change within the League will tend to differ from the pattern of the past, resistance will likely stiffen and be more public, participants will vary, and new rallying calls for change will evolve. Successive sections will diagnose the crisis within the League of Communists and identify the proposals for change.

Dynamics In The Current Situation


Structure

In order to understand the change process within the Yugoslav League of Communists, it is necessary to understand the institutional structure in which the League operates, as well as the events that are impinging upon the policy environment of the Party. Structural considerations are particularly important because they can provide institutional cues to pinpoint advantages or disadvantages from particular reform efforts. The structure also filters events and may provide symbolic and other meanings to events and problems which impact upon the Party.

The League of Communists of Yugoslavia is a relatively large organization. In 1986, it officially enrolled 2,156,422 members, which is nine percent of the total population and approximately twenty-two percent of the adult population.³³ It has cells in virtually every economic organization and in the vast majority of neighborhoods. In addition, there is a large Party organization in excess of one hundred thousand members in the Yugoslav People's Army.³⁴

In recent years, the federal Party apparatus has ceded importance and authority to the six republics and two provincial Party organizations. Each publishes its own newspapers, maintains its own publishing house, operates its own research organizations, manages its own educational programs, sets its own dues structure, controls its own meeting agenda, and even adopts its own electoral rules and procedures. Intra-organizational communication is heavily centralized at the top levels, selection of federal leadership cadres is contingent upon republic/provincial sponsorship,³⁵ and inter-republic cadre linkages are very rare and limited to the Party school at Kumrovec.³⁶ Party members, and even much of the leadership, are not very aware of positions, attitudes, behavior, and events in Party organizations outside their own republic or province.³⁷ Thus, the League of Communists may be a united national organization more in name than in reality.³⁸

Figure 3. Organizational Chart of the League of Communists



Officially, the Congress is the supreme body of the League. A higher position on the chart implies institutional distance from the Congress, not greater authority or power.

The structure of the national organization is relatively simple and schematically does not vary too dramatically from other communist party organizations. Figure 3 outlines the structure.

In practice, the real authority of the League of Communists rests within the Central Committee. Unlike the Soviet model, the Yugoslav Party Secretary holds little real power. The Presidential position rotates every year on a previously agreed upon republic/provincial rotational formula. Both the President and the Secretary lack the authority to make policy, and they function largely as the symbolic representatives of the Party to other communist party organizations.

Presently, the Central Committee has 165 members, eight of whom are *ex officio* members as a result of their position as president of a republic/provincial League unit.³⁹ The remaining members are elected for four-year terms by their republic or province or by the League members in the Yugoslav People's Army. The Central Committee tends to meet every other month for sessions lasting a day or more.

Much of the work of the Central Committee is conducted by subcommittees whose members are again apportioned by republic and province. Like all Party bodies, decisions of the Central Committee are made by a majority vote following discussion. Of late, however, decisions tend to be made only after the consensual agreement of all the republics and provincial organizations.⁴⁰

A considerable amount of the activity of the Party is conducted at the level of the republics or provinces, primarily by the relevant central committees and presidencies. Compared to the national level organization, republic Party presidencies have a much more significant policy-making role than their federal counterpart. And, unlike the national organization, consensus does not seem to be the operating decision-making principle in the republics and provinces.

Some Party leaders and intellectuals have criticized the League for abandoning democratic centralism for consensus.⁴¹ Some also have suggested that the League too closely resembles a confederation of often

conflicting republic and provincial parties, rather than a single unified organization.⁴² Nearly all observers, however, are troubled by the inability of the national organization to take concrete positions or to insure that Party policy is carried out.⁴³

Analysis of Party Events

A steadily growing list of events serves to highlight the paralysis of the League and to underscore its problems. Some of these events have originated within the Party, but most are externally generated and highlight the extent to which the societal environment surrounding the Party has been remade in recent years.

The earliest rumbles of dissatisfaction within the Party surfaced during the Twelfth Party Congress in 1982. At this meeting, Rade Koncar, the son of a revolutionary hero, introduced a proposal which would superimpose a functional and organizational scheme upon the prevailing territorial organizational principle of Party membership. Koncar's expressed purpose was to encourage party unity by permitting Party units from similar economic organizations to associate together and to express their workplace interests directly, regardless of republic of origin. This contrasts with the current channeling of all communication through the medium of the republic and provincial organizational leaders. Opponents of the proposal feared that such a move represented a return to centralization of the League and to the emasculation of the republic/provincial organizations.

Although Koncar's proposal was soundly defeated at the Congress, he and others, in violation of orthodox Party discipline, pressed for a reconsideration and a rehearing of the issue. The significance of Koncar's behavior is not the breakdown in Party democratic centralism which his group's actions suggested. Its larger significance lies in the resurrection of the Party centralization thesis within the national agenda of the League following its crushing defeat at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969.

Several months after the Twelfth Congress, another event occurred which represented a distinctive turning point in the movement towards Party reform. On September 9, 1982, Dr. Najdan Pasic, a member of the Serbian Supreme Court and a member of the Party Central Committee, drafted a letter to the Party's Presidency suggesting that the Party needed to initiate a program of self-criticism and of self-generated renewal of the political system.⁴⁴ The letter pointed out the dangers to the state from continued decentralism, Party withdrawal from responsibility, and the expansion of consensual decision-making.⁴⁵ It also called for the formation of study committees which would recommend solutions for the problems besetting the League and the political system. In many ways, the letter was an admission that the Twelfth Congress, labelled the "Congress of Continuity," was less than a complete success.

Pasic's letter and the accompanying study commission would eventually set the stage for the Thirteenth Congress, and they represented the beginning of the Party reform movement. Their importance was heightened by the growing awareness that the Party republic and provincial leadership bodies, particularly in the case of Kosovo, were resisting the course set by the national party, and that the republic/provincial organizations were almost immune from central Party direction.⁴⁶ Additional concerns were the embarrassing failure of Party recommendations to be transferred into concrete action by the political leadership, and the lack of mobility from within the Party ranks to leadership positions despite highly publicized programs like the "Tito Initiative."⁴⁷

Despite numerous references to Party unity, the League's solidarity was flawed at best. Commitment to specific changes, particularly the restoration of the powers of the central authority, adoption of less paralyzing decision-making processes, and the surrender of personal powers, remained shallow and largely verbal. The Party, in other words, had become as fragmented as the society which it helped direct.⁴⁸

A major indication of the divisions within the national Party leadership was the decision of the Central Committee, following its 13th session

during the autumn of 1984, to solicit the views of its membership about weaknesses facing the League, establishment of responsibility, and proposals for renewal.⁴⁹ In one sense, this decision demonstrated a surprisingly deep commitment to democratic procedures. In another sense, the move highlighted the leadership's loss of direction and confidence.⁵⁰

The discussions were critical and involved large proportions of the membership in the debates.⁵¹ Some of the general conclusions characterized the leadership as parochial and trapped by republic interests. Others castigated much of the leadership for being careerist, short-sighted, or simply incompetent.⁵² The summary report, like many similar documents, embarrassed the Central Committee and was quickly buried and forgotten.⁵³

As time advanced towards the scheduled opening of the Thirteenth Party Congress in June, 1986, the leadership quickly began to prepare for the event, and expectations for a significant breakthrough in the Party reform effort were reasonably high. The Thirteenth Congress was labeled as the "Congress of Change" compared to the Twelfth "Congress of Continuity," and, not surprisingly, the Party leadership rallied together to present a common front.

In the period before the Congress, the public discussions about the proposed Party platform were eclipsed by the issuance of the *Critical Analysis of the Functioning of the Political System* by the blue ribbon federal commission established for this purpose.⁵⁴ Despite the League's efforts, the Party platform was virtually ignored by the press and much of the membership, and little eventful change emerged following the Thirteenth Congress.⁵⁵

Among the republic congresses which preceded the federal convention, only the Croatian gathering generated much interest beyond the local level. In Croatia, a Party decision to open up the major elected Party leadership positions to competition resulted in some surprise nominations — i.e., Dr. Stipe Suvar, a noted controversial Croatian political figure —

and some equally surprising rejections — i.e., Milka Planinc, the country's most recent prime minister.⁵⁶ The nomination process and behavior of some of the candidates, notably Suvar, were strongly criticized in the press, but the results did demonstrate a willingness for some of the leadership to eject the old guard and begin the process of reform.⁵⁷

Events within the Yugoslav Party during the past half decade have created a fundamental shift in the perceptions and behavior of the Party. There is currently a general consensus within the League of the need for change, even though there is little agreement about the particulars.⁵⁸ The Party has also appeared to lose much self-confidence in its ability to remake society which existed during the Tito-Kardelj era. Finally, the Party has appeared to be reluctant to become directly involved in the political sphere, and has assumed a more defensive posture.

Societal Changes

Coupled with changes in the Party, there have been significant changes within the general society. These include the appearance of new social movements, a resurgence in religious fundamentalism, the political stand-off over Kosovo, nationalism-separatism in the federation, an increasingly pluralistic press and intellectual climate, and a sudden avalanche of industrial work stoppages.

Until recently, many of the social movements that have washed over most West European nations did not seem to penetrate the consciousness of the Yugoslav people, nor had they claimed any significant number of adherents in Yugoslavia. In general, the League, working together with the Socialist Alliance, trade unions, and youth organizations, had managed to maintain a monopoly over organized social and political activities, and over setting the national policy agenda. In the last several years, however, the Party's monopoly over social issues and social organizations has begun to wither, and several new, loosely organized movements of people concerned about particular social issues neglected by the League have

emerged. Belgrade, Zagreb, and especially Ljubljana, have seen "happenings," teach-ins, and even marches in support of causes such as environmental protection, opposition to nuclear power plants, and even pacifism.⁵⁹ While demonstrations and student protests are not new to Yugoslavia, the recent movements have carefully refrained from making broad social and political criticisms in favor of pursuing narrow policy questions.

In Slovenia, the emergence of social movements has had a very pronounced effect, and these movements have been integrally linked to the youth in that republic. A poll conducted in 1987 in Slovenia found that seventy-six percent of the Slovenian population was aware of social movements, and forty-one percent supported one or more of these causes.⁶⁰ The Slovenian youth organization's platform called for an end to nuclear power plants within Yugoslavia, strict environmental protection, an enhancement of some specific civil liberties, and, most controversial of all, the creation of a civilian service option for pacifists to replace the mandatory national military training.⁶¹ University students in Ljubljana routinely distribute petitions on these and other issues, and they have repeatedly embarrassed the Party leadership through their refusal to confer support on what they perceive to be vestiges of the authoritarian past and the legacy of Tito worship.⁶²

The movement against nuclear power plant construction pits much of the Party leadership and the state bureaucracy who support such ventures against many of the intellectuals, youth, and the relatively powerless. Since Chernobyl, the issue has become a litmus test to prove one's independence from the conservative establishment. In addition, an extremely vocal press with an anti-establishment bias has magnified official discomfort on the issue.⁶³ If nothing else, the persistence of anti-nuclear power activity in the face of Party and official hostility indicates the extent to which the Party has lost its monopoly over the social agenda.

An increase in religious fundamentalism among the Roman Catholic and Islamic communities in recent years furthers the weakening of the so-

cial base of the Party.⁶⁴ While the social movements tend to cross republic and nationality boundaries and threaten the monopoly of the Party as an all-Yugoslav institution, the religious fundamentalists erode the party's claim to specific nationality group legitimacy. The Catholic Church's traditional publications and activities, and the religious manifestations and "miracle cures" in Croatia emphasize the extent to which the League must redouble its fight to identify with each culture in a multi-cultural environment.⁶⁵ The intense controversy over the decision of Jozse Smole, the head of the Slovenian Socialist Alliance, to broadcast a Christmas greeting on television in 1986 also indicates the extent to which the Party has not yet developed a workable strategy to maintain its cultural identification and achieve mass support.⁶⁶

Kosovo is probably Yugoslavia's most intractable social problem, and the issue which serves to highlight the incapacity of the League to achieve social peace and a true multi-cultural pluralist society.⁶⁷ The futility of the League's efforts to overcome the cumulative effects of economic underdevelopment, ethnic distrust, riots and demonstrations, and incompetent management has been a major embarrassment and threat to regime stability.⁶⁸

During the 1985-86 school year alone, 177 teachers, 26 principals, and 974 students were disciplined for uncivil behavior to another nationality group in Kosovo. In addition, instances of general inter-nationality hatred ranging from graffiti to rape and armed insurrection have multiplied. From 1982 to 1985, three thousand individuals were indicted in Kosovo and ninety separatist groups were penetrated and broken up, some with stockpiles of weapons.⁶⁹ An official investigation also discovered that the criminal justice system in Kosovo had broken down,⁷⁰ and that there was considerable evidence that the judicial system discriminated against Serbs.⁷¹

Consistently since 1985, there have been large delegations of Serbs who have demonstrated and petitioned the republic and national governments for assistance, but without apparent effect.⁷² A net result is that

many Kosovan Serbs are continuing to vote with their feet and are abandoning their ancestral homes for new residences outside this province.⁷³ In the case of Kosovo, the Party and the State have not only lost their monopoly; they have lost virtually any significant influence over the course of events.

Kardelj's vision of pluralist socialism has had at least one unanticipated consequence. Liberal interpretations of Kardelj's program helped to foster considerable diversity within the intellectual community, and it permitted the emergence of conflict between some segments of the intellectual stratum and the Party leadership. Kardelj opposed such interpretations, but was not able to halt their spread before his death. Today, Kardelj is often quoted as a defender of the status quo and is used as a brake on the spread of social and political pluralism.

In contemporary Yugoslavia, despite periodic, pious official support by the Party leadership for an open and free press and unfettered opportunities for intellectual pursuits, there are strict limits to permissible behavior.⁷⁴ The Party leadership in Belgrade, for example, has recently announced a campaign to "return a sense of responsibility" to the mass media by removing uncooperative editors and putting pressure on "irresponsible" journalists.⁷⁵ Serbia's *Knjizevne Novine* has been under harassment, and some of its contributors have been jailed.⁷⁶ There has also been considerable official dissatisfaction with the selection and behavior of the Belgrade University student newspaper editorial board.⁷⁷

The most vivid examples of intellectual pluralism running afoul of official policy concern the publication of a draft memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in October, 1986, which claimed that Serbia was a victim of discrimination by the Federation,⁷⁸ and the Spring, 1987, issues of Slovenia's *Nova Revija* whose contributors made similar charges about Slovenia.⁷⁹ In both cases, the Party was frustrated because its condemnation efforts only served to draw the attention of the public and to mobilize the intellectual community to defend their freedom of intellectual inquiry. The two examples illustrate that, although it would

be incorrect to imply that there is a strong intellectual opposition to the Party within Yugoslavia (as is the case in Poland), it may be correct to suggest that much of the intellectual community no longer perceives itself to be co-opted by the Party, and that the potential for an intellectual opposition to the League now exists.

The most worrisome issue that has transformed society and the Party's relationship to it is the precipitous increase in the volume and intensity of strikes and other industrial actions during the winter and spring of 1987.⁸⁰ Although Yugoslavia has experienced work stoppages for decades, those strikes were always of short duration, limited scope and related to local issues.⁸¹ The spring 1987 strikes, on the other hand, were the result of a spontaneous movement of labor resistance to wage controls. They were political in intent; they were opposed by the League; and they were designed to force the government to scrap its wage policy.⁸²

One strike in particular became the symbol of labor dissatisfaction with government policy and of League and union inability to control social events.⁸³ The strike at the coal mine in Labin, Croatia, lasted thirty-three days — much longer than any other strike in post-war Yugoslav history. Pleas by the Party leadership for negotiations fell on deaf ears and were ignored even by local party members.⁸⁴ The mine director even threatened to use strikebreakers with the implicit approval of the government, and within the press there was a general consensus that the government and Party had badly mishandled the situation and unmasked the frailty of the union and the League at the local levels.⁸⁵

In summary, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is faced with internal problems and a societal environment which is qualitatively different from any situation it has faced in the past. Within the Party, the League must reexamine its cadre and ideological policies; it must also reformulate its organizational processes and principles. With respect to the Party-societal partnership, the League must reconsider its expectations to

manage and direct society. Both tasks are difficult; both pose a real challenge.

Specific Organizational And Policy Issues

In addition to the general specification of the crisis facing the League of Communists in Yugoslavia, it may be useful to examine particular political and policy issues which are currently facing the League. These include political recruitment, political socialization, policy formulation, and policy implementation. Each issue area poses special problems, and a comprehensive program of Party reform would have to deal with each one.

Political Recruitment

A political party, in order to survive and prosper, must be able to recruit and retain its members. A Marxist-Leninist party is a party of the working class, and the membership presumably should be heavily biased towards the recruitment and retention of workers.⁸⁶ If the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, for instance, is not able to attract and retain sufficient numbers of worker members, then it has failed in one of its primary objectives.

In addition to attracting workers into the organization, the ruling party must remain attractive to younger members of society. If generational gaps in party recruitment efforts are permitted to form and grow, the party's future will be limited to the life span of its founding members.

The same logic is applicable to the recruitment of women. As females enter the work force in increasing numbers and as traditional role stereotypes are broken down, the contributions of women to political society and their demands upon it can be expected to multiply. The League of Com-

munists of Yugoslavia, therefore, must make additional efforts to recruit and retain female members.

In Yugoslavia, the nationality composition is especially important. In a multi-ethnic state with relatively few cross-cutting ties, the Party serves an important role in the enhancement of the unity of the state. To the extent to which a nationality perceives itself to be unwanted in the Party and becomes disinclined to join in sufficient numbers, the future integrity of the state is in jeopardy.

The League of Communists of Yugoslavia has noted difficulties in its overall recruitment efforts. There are insufficient numbers of workers, youth, women, and certain nationality groups within the Party. The trends are negative as well. Just as importantly, the party leadership, despite public pronouncements to the contrary, has a tendency to be a closed group. Party recruitment policy, in other words, is in desperate need of overhaul.

Statistics reflecting worker membership in the Party display a very worrisome trend. In 1985 in Croatia, for example, production workers were not even the single largest occupational category within the Party. Production workers contributed 31.2 percent of the total, while the category "experts" (e.g. engineers, teachers, accountants, etc.) composed 32.9 percent of the total Party membership.⁸⁷ In Zagreb, a city with a large industrialized labor force, workers and technicians composed only 31.3 percent of the membership in 1980 and 29.8 percent in 1984. In addition, the Zagreb Party organization registered an absolute numerical drop in the total number of workers who were members.⁸⁸ Zagreb's situation is not unique. Belgrade, the largest city in Yugoslavia, also experienced an absolute drop of over ten thousand members, disproportionately workers, over the past three years,⁸⁹ as well as a relative decline in worker membership.⁹⁰ While there have been several distinct worker membership campaigns over the past decades, the peaks of success have been less high and the troughs have been somewhat lower with each succeeding cycle.

Table 1. Membership in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 1968-1982

Year	Total Membership	Total Workers	Percent Workers
1968	1,146,018	358,946	31.3
1969	1,111,682	352,275	31.7
1970	1,049,184	320,574	30.6
1971	1,025,476	301,179	29.4
1972	1,009,947	294,850	29.2
1973	1,076,711	316,260	29.4
1974	1,192,466	346,904	29.1
1975	1,302,843	376,248	28.9
1976	1,460,267	430,645	29.5
1977	1,623,612	484,861	29.9
1978	1,774,624	530,409	29.9
1979	1,884,470	566,841	30.1
1980	2,041,270	613,280	30.0
1981	2,117,083	648,378	30.6
1982	2,154,627	659,000	30.6

Sources: Boris Vuskovic, "Temeljna Demografska i Socijalna Obilježja Članstva Saveza Komunističke Jugoslavije," in Marksistički Centar Konferencije SKH ZO Split, Struktura i Dinamika Članstva Saveza Komunističke Jugoslavije (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1982), 84. For 1982; Istraživački Projekti CDI, Klasno-Socijalna Struktura Saveza Komunističke Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Izdavački Centar Komunist, 1984), 533-534.

Even from a comparative perspective, Yugoslavia's performance in worker recruitment in the Party is not adequate. Overall, in Yugoslavia, workers were less than 30 percent of the entire Party membership in 1980 and 1981. This compares with 38 percent workers in Poland during the same time period — a period which was the peak of the Solidarity movement and low point for the workers' identification with the Polish Party.⁹¹

The trend towards fewer workers in the Party in Yugoslavia is not a statistical aberration. Table 1 provides some data about worker Party membership since 1968. As can be noted, the percentage of workers in the Party since 1968 has dropped in spite of major national campaigns to achieve the goal of a worker majority in the Party.

Table 2. Percent Workers in Party by Republic and Province, 1974, 1979 and 1983

Republic/Province	Percent Workers		
	1974	1979	1983
Bosnia-Hercegovina	31.3	31.6	33.3
Montenegro	26.9	25.8	28.0
Croatia	28.9	30.0	30.4
Macedonia	28.4	28.5	27.6
Slovenia	30.4	30.7	28.9
Serbia (Proper)	29.6	30.5	30.9
Kosovo	29.0	26.7	28.0
Vojvodina	36.1	36.8	35.8

Source: Boris Vuskovic, Zelko Rogosic and Stogan Obradovic, "Kretanje i Struktura Clanstva SK u Velikim Gradovima," Nase Teme, Vol. 29, No. 10-12 (October-December, 1985): 1119-1120.

Table 3. Worker Recruitment and Exclusions/Resignations, 1970-1980

As percent of LCY membership]

Year	Worker Exclusions/Resignations	Worker Recruitment	Net Difference
1970	46.6	28.9	-16.7
1971	57.5	31.8	-25.7
1972	39.3	33.8	-5.5
1973	36.7	35.0	-1.7
1974	38.6	30.5	-8.1
1975	40.5	25.5	-15.0
1976	52.7	29.9	-22.8
1977	38.8	31.5	-7.3
1978	42.1	29.8	-12.3
1979	38.6	28.4	-10.2
1980	37.9	29.6	-8.3

Worker penetration in the Party varies somewhat by republic and province. According to 1974, 1979, and 1983 data, the worker percentages peaked in Vojvodina at 36.8 percent in 1979. Table 2 presents additional details, and demonstrates that recent recruitment drives have not achieved their goals. Four republics improved their performance since 1974 and two republics and two provinces experienced negative percentage growth rates.

Retention of workers also appears to be a problem. From 1970 through 1980, the percentage of workers who had left the Party was greater than the percent who had been recruited. In recent years, through 1986, the trend has become even more pronounced.⁹² Table 3 provides the appropriate data.

A special case is the problem of peasants. Party organization in the villages is notoriously weak; many villages do not have Party cells,⁹³ and this group is heavily underrepresented in the Party general membership.⁹⁴ Thus, we can expect that Party influence in the rural hinterlands of the country is correspondingly weak.

In general, we can conclude that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is experiencing problems in successfully attracting workers, and that it is encountering difficulties in retaining the existing worker base. While there are cyclical patterns to this phenomenon, the overall trend is negative.

This conclusion does not imply that the Party is in imminent danger of collapse. In fact, changes in the social structure of society and the increase in the non-traditional labor and white collar work force may actually indicate that the Party is reaching the more dynamic stratum of society.⁹⁵ Also, the number of workers may not necessarily determine the worker character of the Party.⁹⁶

Recruitment and retention of youth (defined as less than 28 years old) in the League of Communists have also been important political problems. During the War and for some time after it, the Party was largely a party of youth. Tito who was in his early fifties during the War, was un-

Table 4. Membership in the Party by Youth for Selected Years

[As percent of LCY membership]

Republic/Province	1968	1974	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Bosnia-Hercegovina	28	32	40	41	40	36	35
Montenegro	20	26	28	35	29	27	25
Croatia	22	21	26	26	24	28	26
Macedonia	24	18	24	25	25	24	22
Slovenia	16	24	27	26	24	22	19
Serbia Proper	23	29	34	33	31	29	36
Kosovo	28	31	40	41	40	39	39
Vojvodina	24	29	30	28	26	25	22

Sources: Slobodan Bijelac and Stojan Obradovic, "Omladina u Savezu Komunista," In Marksisticki Centar Konferencije SKH ZO Split, *Struktura i Dinamika Clanstva Saveza Komunista* (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1982: 287); and Boris Vuskovic, Zeljko Rogosic and Stojan Obradovic, "Kretanje i Struktura Clanstva SK u Velikim Gradovima," *Nasa Tema*, Vol. 29, No. 10-12 (October-December, 1985): 1103-1106.

typically old for the Party and was referred to by his close associates as "the old man." For much of the 1940s and 1950s the Cominform blockade, the reconstruction process, and international tensions served as a natural recruiting devices which attracted youth to the Party. By the decade of the 1960s, however, the League realized that special efforts were necessary to keep the League constantly rejuvenated.

Trends since 1968 indicate a growth in youth recruitment through 1980 and a noticeable drop after that point. As in the case of worker members, recruitment campaigns for youth create cycles of surge and fall-off. The peaks, however, are progressively lower and the troughs establish new lows. As *Vjesnik*, the Zagreb daily newspaper, noted, the Party is becoming consistently older.⁹⁷ Table 4 gives data by republic and province for selected years from 1968 to 1983. It indicates that there is considerable variation in youth membership participation in the Party during the years, but that the drop since 1980 has been consistent and has affected each member of the Federation.

Part of the variation across years and across federal units can be explained by demographic differences across republics and within the general population structure. Much of the remaining decline, however, must be attributed to a changed attitude among much of the youth, particularly those who are working. Data from 1968 to 1980 – the period of growth – suggest that Party youth-membership was not equally distributed across all youth sectors. Membership was becoming more attractive to females than in the past, and membership gains among the student population were pronounced. On the other hand, the growth rate among working youth did not keep pace with the generation's average.⁹⁸

Additional data from 1980 to 1983 suggest that working youth are less disposed to join the Party than non-youth members, and that the unemployed youth are much more likely to be Party members than would be expected. One explanation for these data is that the unemployed may perceive membership in the Party as an asset in finding employment.⁹⁹

Public opinion surveys indicate that the recruitment problems of the League in attracting younger members may be a long-term concern, and there is a growing realization that an infusion of youth is necessary.¹⁰⁰ An extensive survey of secondary school youth in the Split region found that only 16 percent had any interest in Party membership.¹⁰¹ Another national survey of youth found enormous variation in the willingness of this population group to join the Party. In this particular survey, reportedly 72.5 percent of Kosovan youth, but only 4.5 percent of Slovenian young people would want to become Party members.¹⁰² In general, the Party faces a considerable challenge in implementing any youth recruitment drives.

Perhaps the best explanation for the increased reluctance of younger people to join the League is the organization's *de facto* discrimination against the young. As Stipe Suvar noted, "There are only 2-3 Party Secretaries of communal (i.e., county) committees who are younger than 28 in all of Yugoslavia. There is not a single member of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia or even the Central

Table 5. Women in the Yugoslav League of Communists, 1974-1983

[As percent of LCY membership]

Republic/Province	1974	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Bosnia/Hercegovina	20	26	28	28	29	29
Montenegro	19	24	25	26	26	26
Croatia	25	26	27	27	27	27
Macedonia	14	19	20	21	22	22
Slovenia	29	31	32	32	32	32
Serbia Proper	22	26	27	28	28	28
Kosovo	10	13	13	13	13	14
Vojvodina	25	29	30	31	31	31

Source: Boris Vuskovic, Zeljko Rogosic, Stojan Obradovic, "Kretanje i Struktura Clanstva SK u Velikim Gradovima," *Nase Tema*, Vol. 29, No. 10-12 (October-December, 1985): 1101.

Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia who is younger than thirty."¹⁰³ Youth in the Party, in brief, have virtually no influence, and that message seems to be understood by them.¹⁰⁴

The third social category of importance to Party recruitment efforts is the recruitment of women. Here, the League has been relatively more successful, although the percentage of women in the Party is well below their percentage of the population or even of the working population. As Table 5 indicates, there is considerable variation across republics and provinces, and the recruitment rate tends to parallel cultural/developmental levels. Kosovan women, for example, composed only 14 percent of the total Party membership in 1983, while Slovenia recorded 32 percent of its membership to be female. Slovenia, of course, is the most developed and Kosovo the least developed region in Yugoslavia.

An extremely important recruitment concern for the survival of the League is the balanced recruitment of nationalities. Generally, Serbs and Montenegrins hold membership in the Party at a rate above the national

Table 6. Nationality and Party Membership, 1971 and 1981

[As Percent of LCY membership and population]

Nationality	Party		Population		Index	
	1971	1981	1971	1981	1971	1981
Montenegrins	6.35	5.39	2.38	2.54	267	212
Serbs	49.44	47.11	41.68	38.38	119	123
Yugoslavs	3.77	6.51	1.37	5.61	275	116
Macedonians	6.23	6.68	5.61	5.87	111	114
Muslims	4.57	7.93	6.87	7.77	67	102
Croatians	17.44	14.65	22.92	20.49	76	72
Albanians	3.43	3.78	4.72	5.66	73	67
Slovenes	6.39	5.31	8.59	8.02	74	66
Hungarians	1.07	1.30	2.67	2.17	40	60
TOTAL					100	100

Source: Boris Vuskovic, "Temeljna Demografska i Socijalna Obilježja Članstva Saveza Komunističke Jugoslavije," in Marksistički Centar Konferencije SKH ZO Split, Struktura i Dinamika Članstva Saveza Komunističke (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1982), 121.

average. Slovenes, Hungarians, and Albanians take Party membership at a somewhat lower rate (See Table 6.).

These general figures provided above should not be interpreted to mean that nationalities such as Slovenes are discriminated against or hostile to the Party, or that Montenegrins are favored by Party recruitment efforts. Much of the group variation can be explained by general societal level of development. Slovenes, for example, represent a more modernized society which is more likely to place less value on political mobilization, while Montenegrins, who are less modernized, tend to appreciate and value somewhat more mass political mobilization.

If we examine intra-republic/provincial differences in nationality recruitment, we find an interesting phenomenon. With few exceptions, such as Hungarians in Vojvodina and Albanians in Macedonia, minority nationalities are more likely to affiliate with the Party than is the majority nationality of a republic or province. Thus, Serbs and Croatians constitute

a disproportionate percentage of Party members in Slovenia. Montenegrins have levels of Party membership disproportionate to their population in every republic and province outside Montenegro where they constitute a minority, and Serbs and Slovenes in Croatia accept Party membership at a rate higher than the Croats in the Republic of Croatia.¹⁰⁵

The important exceptions to this phenomenon are the two major non-Slavic nationalities in Yugoslavia – the Hungarians and Albanians. In every republic and province where these two nationalities constitute a significant minority, and in their home provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, they hold League membership at a disproportionately smaller rate. While the change from 1971 to 1981 was marginally closer to the index of equality in their home provinces, these two groups still registered only two-thirds the membership rate of the average.¹⁰⁶

The Albanian situation is the most severe example of the problem. Outside their home province of Kosovo in areas where the Albanians constitute a significant minority, this group registered significant declines in Party membership rates. In Macedonia in 1971, Albanians held membership cards at fifty-seven percent of the overall republic rate, and in 1981, the corresponding figure fell to forty-seven. In Serbia proper (i.e., excluding Kosovo and Vojvodina), the Albanian index score dropped from sixty-five in 1971 to fifty-eight in 1981.¹⁰⁷

Overall, the Yugoslav League has been relatively successful in recruiting most of the constituent nationalities into its ranks. In most republics and provinces, the League resembles a multi-ethnic organization that is especially attractive to minorities, particularly Slavic minorities. Albanians, and to a lesser extent, Hungarians, are a recruitment problem, and special efforts are needed to enhance the attractiveness of the League to these non-Slavic groups.¹⁰⁸

In summary, the League of Communists has not behaved in an overtly discriminating manner towards any particular social group, and it has made some efforts, most notably in the case of workers, to improve their standing in the League. On the other hand, the League seems to respond

sluggishly to recruitment concerns, and it has not been completely successful in matching its stated goals to political reality. It appears that the decentralization of the Party has prevented the adoption and implementation of a coherent and consistent national membership policy.¹⁰⁹

Leadership recruitment is a difficult political and policy issue facing the League of Communists today. On the one hand, the League feels obliged to implement the twin goals of leadership rotation and representation for particular social groups. On the other hand, leadership needs continuity and competence in order to maintain or enhance the organization's position in society. The problem of making trade-offs between these two incompatible objectives has recently become even more difficult. The crisis-like atmosphere facing the Party places a premium on the selection of leaders who have more experience and in whom one has personal confidence. Simultaneously, an exit from the crisis can only be achieved by mobilizing the energies, good will, and skills of the underrepresented social groups.

An examination of the leadership recruitment statistics suggests that the Party leadership has achieved neither objective, but rather has encouraged the maximum rotation of Party posts with minimum recruitment of new talent and recruitment from underrepresented social groups. For example, following the 1986 League elections, only one elected member of the Party Presidency was an incumbent.¹¹⁰ In Serbia, seventy-five percent of League officers were new to their position;¹¹¹ and in the entire nation, seventy percent of the secretaries of the basic organizations (i.e., cells), sixty-seven percent of commune committee secretaries, seventy percent of the central committees in the republics and provinces, and seventy-four percent of the Central Committee of the Federal league were not incumbents.¹¹² In general, therefore, 1986 Party elections managed to achieve very little continuity.

But this lack of continuity (i.e., absence of incumbency) does not imply that the Party is recruiting its leaders from underrepresented groups or that political novices are being selected. A study of the Croatian leader-

Table 7. Composition of Selected Leadership Bodies, 1974-1986

[As percent of all members]

Body		1974	1978	1982	1986
Central Committee	Workers	20	9	8	NA
	University Educated	75	NA	80	NA
	Youth	NA	1	1	2
	Women	11	NA	9	12
	Incumbents	NA	36	30	26
Republic Central Committees	Workers	30	27	NA	NA
	Youth	NA	6	9	12

Sources: 1974-1982: Vladimir Goati, *Savremena Politicke Partije* (Belgrade: Naucna Biblioteka, 1984), 89-102; 1986: Slobodan Bulic, "Povratak u Sadasnjost," *Danas*, April 8, 1986: 14-15.

ship, for example, found that from 1948 until the 1986 congress, only four hundred different individuals had ever been elected to the republic central committee.¹¹⁴ Evidently, much of the rotation occurring closely resembles a game of musical chairs rather than an influx of new ideas and people.

Table 7 provides data which suggest that the Party leadership is a relatively homogenous group of older, well-educated males and that this trend has been continuing for some time. The results for 1986 are particularly discouraging because in that year the League made a conscious and public effort to select more women, youth and workers into the Party hierarchy. It even justified maintaining the relatively large size of the Central Committee at 165 in order to maximize opportunities for the disadvantaged groups.¹¹⁵

In summary, recruitment policy within the League of Communists is in disarray. Neither the general membership nor the leadership have been able to realize their recruitment goals of greater access for women, youth, peasants, workers, and all nationalities. Despite enormous campaigns to rectify imbalances on both the mass and leadership levels, little has been

accomplished. If anything, the recruitment policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is an illustration of the depth of the crisis facing the party and its inability to act forthrightly and effectively for change.

Political Socialization

A major role of a political party in a modern society is to socialize its members to be effective instruments for the execution of the party's goals and objectives. Marxist-Leninist parties have additional socialization responsibilities in that they must insure that the membership is knowledgeable, disciplined, united, and active. The League of Communists, therefore, must foster an organizational climate in which the membership has adequate ideological training, participates within the organization and society, is disciplined, and expresses a common value system.

Training and development of the membership is a vital element of the socialization process for the League, and massive admissions into the party must be accompanied by ideological and practical political education.¹¹⁶ To implement this goal, the League offers a wide range of opportunities for ideological and political education for those members who are interested.

Proportionately few of the members, however, make use of the League's educational opportunities. This is illustrated by a survey of League and non-League members in Vojvodina which discovered that twelve percent of the non-Party members availed themselves of Marxist education or attended political lectures during the past five years while only thirty-six percent of the Party membership had done so.¹¹⁷ Extensive instruction is even rarer. In the period between the 12th and 13th Congresses (1983-1985) less than five percent of the membership enrolled in any of the formal Party educational programs.¹¹⁸

Research also indicates that familiarity with or interest in basic ideological problems among Party members and even their leaders is quite

Table 8. Percent of Informed Party Members and Disagreement with Party Positions

[As percent of Party Membership]

Issue	Informed Members	Opposed to Party Position
Nationalism	58	66
Bureaucratism	57	60
Technocratism	55	75
Liberalism	38	50
Anarchism	34	55
State Socialism	32	32
Egalitarianism	28	28
Unitarism	27	19
Ultra-leftism	10	35

Source: Ivan Siber, *Psihologija i Društvo* (Zagreb: Centar za Kulturnu Djelatnost, 1984), 267.

low. In Bosnia, for instance, even local Party leaders expressed little interest in ideological issues, and one study concluded that the local party functionaries have a very parochial orientation towards the League and its policies.¹¹⁹

Siber's national survey of Party members in 1982 was even more pessimistic, and found that not only did most League members fail to understand critical ideological points, they also often disagreed with the League's position on them. Table 8 lists the League's issues and provides information about member knowledge about the League's positions and member support for positions contrary to the official policy.

The lack of ideological training and preparedness is an important problem for the League. A large, nation-wide sample survey of criticism sessions of the League conducted in the summer and fall of 1984 found that ideological unpreparedness was a major concern of the active membership and accounted for thirty-seven percent of the total comments made.¹²⁰

Table 9. Attitudes of Party Members, 1976 and 1982

[As percent of LCY membership]

Attitude toward other LCY Members	1976	1982	Differences	
			Absolute	Relative
Satisfied	39.2	19.0	-20.2	-51.5
Satisfied with their personal behavior	39.2	30.9	-10.5	-21.2
Confident they will implement Party Position	21.4	10.9	-10.5	-49.1
No Comment	46.1	35.6	-10.5	-22.8

Source: Ivan Siber, *Psihologija i Društvo* (Zagreb: Centar za Kulturnu Djelatnost, 1984), 233.

This failure in Party education has had some practical consequences and has definitely affected morale within the organization. In a repeated study of League members conducted in 1976 and 1982, only twenty percent of the membership were satisfied with their Party colleagues and less than eleven percent in 1982 believed that the League was capable of carrying out its policies. Data in Table 9 show the deteriorating level of confidence.

A second important feature of Party socialization is the willingness of Party members to become involved in the organization and for its members to be active in society in general. Party members consider themselves to be the vanguard of society, and as a result, they must be active in its affairs.

Research conducted in Yugoslavia indicates that there is considerable cause for concern. In 1982, a sample of League members from Belgrade, Ljubljana, Bor, and Leskovac showed that twenty-eight percent of the respondents were passive members of the socio-political community, and less than half were intensely involved.¹²¹ Comparative data of French and Yugoslav Party members reveal that the Yugoslav organization members devote less time than their French counterparts to political activity. Twenty-six percent of French Communist Party members surveyed spent

more than three hours per week on Party matters, compared to only fourteen percent of the Yugoslav League members who did so.¹²²

Recently, data indicate a deteriorating level of participation. Research conducted simultaneously in Slovenia and Macedonia in 1985 found that forty-three percent of the members considered Party involvement nearly useless, and only eleven percent believed that their involvement had any significance in decision-making or policies.¹²³

The propensity to passivity of League members transfers over to organizations other than the League of Communists. In a survey of Belgrade trade union members, over twenty percent of those who were also in the Party denied that they were union members, and only thirty-five percent had even marginally favorable attitudes towards the union. Finally, almost no one, including Party members, wished to involve themselves in union activities.¹²⁴

Passivity is not equally distributed across all social categories in the League. Youth, women, and the less educated tend to be less involved than others. The analysis of the rate of participation of the membership in the critical discussions conducted in late 1984 demonstrates this clearly:

One of the results which was easiest to notice was that half of the participants in this discussion (49%) were members with high education. These data confirm the already noted results of empirical research which identifies the highly educated as the most involved. Among the participants in the general Party discussion 19% were communists with secondary education, 14% were skilled workers, and 4% were unskilled workers.

Relatively speaking, the most active in the discussions were Party members between 28 and 40 years of age (48%), while the rate of participation of the other age groups were less: 41-50 years of age 34%, over 50 at 14%, and those under 28 at only 4%. The noticeably lesser participation of young communists in this discussion is certainly an unfortunate finding, but it cannot be considered a surprise because most contemporary research already warns about the generally lesser participation of the young in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

An enormous percentage of participants in the discussions were men (89%). The involvement of women in the discussions (11%) was at a rate one third of their membership in the League of Communists. Also, the participation of women in the discussions varied according to the republic/province in which the discussions were held: the highest rate was in Slovenia (14%) and the lowest in Kosovo (4%).¹²⁵

A Marxist-Leninist Party such as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia officially subscribes to the necessity for democratic centralism. This implies that discussion within the Party should be open and democratic, and that once decisions are reached, all members are obligated to support the organization's position. From a perspective of the role of party socialization, democratic centralism is very important because it is the basic procedural mechanism for regulating internal Party behavior.

In recent years, difficulty in realizing democratic centralism within the Party has absorbed much of the energy of the Party, and it is now considered one of the most critical issues facing the organization.¹²⁶ The perceived breakdown in democratic centralism is blamed as the primary cause for the federalization of the Party,¹²⁷ for factionalism within the Party,¹²⁸ and many consider it to be the essential component responsible for the paralysis of the government as well.¹²⁹

Many of those who are most concerned about the problem tend to view moves to rejuvenate democratic centralism as either a threat to democracy or a license for anarchy.¹³⁰ One agenda is to promote more discipline within the Party.¹³¹ The other agenda is to encourage more democratic dialogue and express more confidence and trust in the membership.¹³²

This conflict is not purely stylistic or rhetorical for the leadership. They all ascribe at least one concrete consequence to the lack of a firm policy on democratic centralism; namely, the Party has lost more members than it has recruited during the last two and a half years. While the negative growth over the period is only approximately one percent, the image this decline creates is very negative and adds fire to the dispute.¹³³

Table 10. Party Resignation Rates by Occupation, 1969-1980

[Party Average = 100]

Occupation	Resignation Index
Peasants	153.33
Workers	142.77
Retired	120.24
Students	109.22
High School Students	105.86
Unemployed	103.90
Health Professions	80.00
Administrative Personnel	69.62
Cultural Professions	68.88
Professional Experts	56.49
Engineers and Technicians	54.98
Management	40.53
Economists and Lawyers	28.47

Source: Boris Vuskovic, "Temeljna Demografska i Socijalna Obiljezja Clanstva Saveza Komuniste Jugoslavije," in Istraživacki Projekti CDI, *Klasno-Socijalna Struktura Saveza Komuniste Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Izdavački Centar Komunist, 1984), 103.

Research and official statistics indicate that a majority of those voluntarily leaving the Party from 1982 to 1986 are workers,¹³⁴ and that the trend in worker resignation has been on the rise since 1973.¹³⁵ An analysis of Party member resignations by social group from 1969 to 1980 confirms this point (See Table 10.). In addition, it shows that workers are fifty percent more likely to resign than other groups, and that leaders were half as likely to step down as the Party average.

Reasons given for resignation from the Party vary, but seem to place considerable emphasis upon organizational weaknesses of the League. One national study identified high dues as the major factor for sixteen percent, dissatisfaction with the cell for fourteen percent, policy disagreement for ten percent, personal reasons for nine percent, repression or authoritarian leaders for nine percent, loss of confidence in the Party for six

percent, and irresponsible behavior of higher Party leaders for six percent.¹³⁶

Two related problems seem to account for much of the deterioration in the quality of Party life. One is a growing sense that the leadership is irresponsible, and the other is a significant loss of efficacy on the part of the party member. A majority of surveyed Party members in a 1986 national poll stated that irresponsible leadership is a primary factor in the crisis besetting the Party and society.¹³⁷ This is confirmed by the large scale sampling of the Party discussion in 1984. Of the 7,412 Party meetings surveyed, twenty-three percent of all discussants identified the problem of irresponsible leadership as an issue which needed attention.¹³⁸ Although these issues had surfaced in earlier periods, the breadth and intensity of these problems today is greater than in the past.

The decline in member efficacy is another clear theme that has re-emerged in recent years. The 1982 survey of League members in Bor, Belgrade, Leskovac and Ljubljana, referred to earlier, concluded that fifty-two percent of Party members feel that they have little or no influence, twenty-eight percent perceive that they have some influence, and only twenty percent claim that they are efficacious.¹³⁹ This finding, coupled with the downward trend in efficacy noted by a repeated study in Serbia in 1982 and 1985, confirms that the loss of efficacy is a major and growing problem (See Table 11.).

A final and vital criterion for successful socialization is that the members share a common set of values. The 1982 survey of League members from four cities indicates that membership in the Party is an important factor which differentiates them from other segments in society. League members, for example, tend to hold better jobs, earn more income, possess higher levels of education, are more satisfied with the social and economic systems, and are more class conscious than are the non-Party segments of society.¹⁴⁰

We can also infer that there is considerable differentiation within the League as suggested by Table 8 (the presentation of data on agreement

Table 11. Self-Perceived Influence of Serbian Party Members, 1982 and 1985

[In percent]

Influence	1982	1985
Negligible	12	34
Some influence up to the Commune Level	21	26
Some influence beyond the Commune	23	13
Not Able to Evaluate	42	33

Source: Vladimir Goati, *SKJ. Kriza. Demokratija* (Zagreb: Centar za Kulturnu Djelatnost, 1986), 94.

with League norms), and by the wide range of concerns expressed by members during the 1984 general Party discussions. Few analyses, however, compare the attitudes and values of the leadership with the general membership.¹⁴¹ This lack of information, therefore, makes it difficult to identify which, if any, of the differences within the League divide the leadership from the membership, and where the party should concentrate its socialization efforts.

The 1984 general Party discussions suggest that the complaints of the elected leaders are similar and parallel to the pattern of criticisms expressed by the workers.¹⁴² The fact that a large number of both the leaders and members of the League consider the leadership to be irresponsible is puzzling until one recognizes that much of the criticism is directed against higher levels, and that the local leadership is often more resentful of one-way communication from the top than the membership who may not be aware of the problem.¹⁴³ The intense discussions about open elections for high Party positions — a position favored by much of the Party, but rejected at the top — tends to corroborate the view that the major cleavage within the League is between the local and higher levels of authority.¹⁴⁴

In summary, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is encumbered with a full slate of problems regarding the socialization of its members. Training and education are relatively weak. Many members are inactive

or passive. Democratic centralism no longer regulates party relationships, and the Party membership does not hold a common set of values which would help differentiate it as the vanguard of society. In short, in this area, as in recruitment, the Party has serious difficulties.

Policy Formulation

A third important function for a political party is the ability to develop a coherent program and to get that program adopted by the political system. These activities, classified under the rubric of policy formulation, involve two discrete types of interaction — relationships between the League and other political organizations, and relationships between the League and the institutions involved in formal political decision-making. A major part of the effectiveness of the League, therefore, is dependent upon the ability to orchestrate successful interaction among these two sectors.

Since Brioni, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has been concerned with developing a partnership with the other organizations such as the trade unions and the Socialist Alliance, and breaking up the old pattern of using the organizations as "transmission belts" to convey the League's demands to the masses. In practice, however, this change has been very difficult to achieve and often the result varies between returning to the transmission belt function or ignoring the socio-political organizations in the policy process.¹⁴⁶

Occasionally an organization such as the Trade Union Association will act somewhat independently of the League and be accused by some League members of taking part in opposition activities.¹⁴⁵ Sometimes, those Socialist Alliance leaders who advocate a more active role are perceived to be calling for a multi-party system.

To counter these charges and to prove their loyalty to the system, the other socio-political organizations, especially the Socialist Alliance, are more loyal to the Party than the Party itself, and Party members within the

organization tend to ignore the interests of the non-Party members.¹⁴⁷ This leads to a situation where the other mass organizations lose credibility,¹⁴⁸ are ignored by the League as irrelevant,¹⁴⁹ and ultimately hinder the attempts of the League to formulate public policy.¹⁵⁰

Party dominance of the socio-political organizations is quite extensive. In 1982, seventy-eight percent of neighborhood chapter presidents of the Socialist Alliance and seventy-five percent of all commune committee members were Party members.¹⁵¹ For the Trade Union Association, seventy percent of all republic office holders and ninety-eight percent of all federal union elected officials were Party members.¹⁵² The net result is that nearly everyone perceives these organizations to be superfluous mouthpieces for the Party.¹⁵³ As a consequence, the general effectiveness of the other political organizations is hampered and another tool to assist in the formulation of public policy is lost.¹⁵⁴

A second area of policy formulation involvement for the League of Communists is through the established political channels such as the legislature and local government institutions. Without question, all the formal political institutions from the commune to the national level are dominated by members of the League. Comparative statistics from Croatia for the period 1978 to 1986 conclusively show that League members dominate every governmental level and every assembly within the republic (See Table 12.). Again, as was the case for relationships among the socio-political organizations, the Party domination of the political institutions is so complete that the autonomy of these institutions can be questioned.

Unlike the other socio-political organizations discussed above, the formal political institutions appear to have considerable autonomy from the League despite the large concentration of party members in them. In fact, there have been numerous occasions when the legislative leadership complained about the lack of a clear policy from the League, thereby demonstrating their autonomy from the Party.¹⁵⁵

Table 12. Party Participation in Croatian Legislative Institutions, 1978-1986

[Party participation in percent]

Level	Legislative Body	1978-82		1982-86	
		Size	LCY	Size	LCY
Republic	Republic Legislature	355	95.5	356	94.1
	Chamber of Associated Work	155	90.3	155	89.0
	Chamber of Communes	123	99.2	123	99.2
	Socio-Political Chamber	77	100.0	78	100.0
Regional	Communal Assemblies	1,083	85.5	1,008	81.0
	Chamber of Associated Work	520	75.7	481	71.1
	Chamber of Communes	286	91.6	285	84.6
	Socio-Political Chambers	277	97.1	242	93.4
Communal	Assemblies	11,495	66.4	11,063	65.7
	Chamber of Associated Work	5,042	56.7	4,896	57.2
	Chamber of Neighborhoods	3,866	62.5	3,748	62.6
	Socio-Political Chambers	2,587	91.1	2,419	88.1

Source: Mirjana Kasapovic, "Savez Komunistu u Politickom sistemu," in Ivan Grdesic *et al.* (eds), *Delegatski Sistem, 1974-1984* (Zagreb: Informator, 1986), 222.

A study conducted during the elections in 1978, 1982, and 1986 in Croatia suggests that the role of the League of Communists in formulating policy is gradually declining. In the neighborhood electoral process, the League was identified as the most influential group by twenty-four percent of respondents in 1978, but only twelve percent in 1986. The corresponding measure of influence for elections in the workplace recorded the League's influence to have declined from nineteen percent in 1978 to nine percent in 1986.¹⁵⁶ These data suggest that while the Party is a factor in the policy formulation process, it is not the only factor.

Additional support for the view of a less than monopolistic position of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the policy formulation process can be seen from the 1986 results of the Croatian study. Within the work organization, the socio-political organizations (i.e., Party, union, youth organization, and Socialist Alliance) rank third in influence behind

Table 13. Most Influential Groups in Nominations for Local Government, 1978-1986

[As identified by nominees; in percentages]

Influential Group	1978	1982	1986
Informal Groups in the Commune	0.4	1.8	2.2
Informal Groups in the Party Cell	3.1	4.8	5.3
Political Organizations in the Commune	35.4	14.4	16.2
Workplace/Neighborhood Political Organizations	30.5	27.6	20.5
Workplace/Neighborhood Delegate Bodies	8.9	13.7	15.7
Commune Electoral Committees	8.0	3.3	2.8
Workplace/Neighborhood Electoral Committees	7.1	13.2	16.3
Nomination Meetings	6.6	21.3	21.0

Source: Mirjana Kasapovic, *Delegatski izbori 1978-1986: Usporedni Rezultati* (Zagreb: Institut za Politicke Znanosti fakulteta Politickih Nauka - Zagreb, 1986), 190.

management and the worker councils. Within the neighborhood political institutions, the socio-political organizations rank second in importance behind citizen influence.

Perhaps the best measure of Party influence in local government affairs is the candidate's perception concerning which group was most influential in his/her nomination. Table 13 provides the information for three electoral periods, and it indicates that the combined influence of all the socio-political organizations over the nomination process is perceived by the nominees to have fallen in the eight-year period by nearly forty-five percent.

The League is now being faced with a dilemma within the policy-making process. If it seeks to dominate the policy formulation process and independently to formulate policy, it will be accused of exceeding its authority and behaving autocratically.¹⁵⁸ If it chooses to refrain from direct, overbearing involvement in policy formulation, it will still carry the onerous responsibility and the inevitable blame. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia, in other words, is faced with a critical necessity of

reformulating its role within the political system, and of developing a method that would permit the League to become more critical and even oppositional in the political institutions.¹⁵⁹

Overall, the League of Communists' involvement in the process of policy formulation is adequate under normal political conditions. But in periods of crisis, such as in 1971 and today, the League's deliberate behavior is too slow, indirect, and cumbersome. Its normally admirable policy of generating agreement among all interested groups before beginning the decision-making process serves as a crushing brake on policy formulation, and prevents change and rapid adaptation of the political institutions to crisis conditions. The League, therefore, is forced by current circumstances to re-evaluate its procedures and processes of policy formulation. This problem is compounded further today because the League cannot rely on Tito's influence and authority to restore order when the need arises.

Policy Implementation

Simply put, the process of executing decisions is labeled "policy implementation." No program, no matter how potentially beneficial, is worthwhile if it is never put into practice, and no plan is meaningful if it is simply shelved and forgotten. Therefore, the bottom line for most citizens and political observers is: can the organization deliver on its promises?

Most observers, and even Party members, would concur that policy implementation has been weak. Divisions in the Party have kept the economic stabilization plan from being implemented.¹⁶⁰ Problems are pervasive throughout society, and little action seems to be occurring.¹⁶¹ Consistently, there are calls for the League to take responsibility and do something,¹⁶² and those who are most frustrated believe that an extraordinary Party Congress or some other major symbolic act is necessary to wake the organization from its lethargy.¹⁶³

Unlike the earlier years of the decade, the current problem for the League is the lack of a consensus for change and recognition of the failure

of policy implementation. Today, most controversy centers around identifying the cause for implementation failure. One group within the League perceives that the lack of implementation is a direct outgrowth of the Party's weakness in policy formulation and/or political socialization and/or political recruitment. Each spokesperson can identify one or another weakness as a primary determinant of implementation failure. Each has his/her own discrete timetable and platform for change. This group dominates the think tanks, universities, and Marxist research centers of the country.

A second group, rapidly diminishing in size, interprets the implementation crisis as an unfortunate series of accidental occurrences. This group agrees that no major changes or reforms of the League and political system are necessary at this time. However, as the crisis worsens, this position is rapidly being modified and preempted by a minimalist change program. This group tended to dominate the constitutional revision conferences which proposed numerous but relatively insignificant changes in current operating procedures. Currently, the size and influence of this group is substantive enough to block change for the present in both the political institutions and in the Party apparatus.

An excellent illustration of this cleavage regarding change can be seen in the discussions following the publication of the *Critical Analysis of the Functioning of the Political System*.¹⁶⁴ The document provided a litany of problems, many of which have been discussed in this text. It did not provide, however, a very meaningful program for action for remedying these problems. Simply put, the federal committee charged with drafting the document could not agree on the direction for change despite considerable prodding from the Party.

In summary, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has many problems in political recruitment, socialization, policy formulation, and policy implementation. The debates within the League revolve around these failures, and we can soon expect to see some attempts to resolve them.

The problems, while acute, do not mean that the League is on the point of collapse. In fact, the vitality and openness of the debate, the relatively high degree of member involvement and participation, and the seriousness of the debate suggest that the League of Communists is intently struggling to create a new political party which can endure into the next century. To the extent to which it succeeds, the League will provide a model for other communist parties of peaceful evolution and adaptation to change.

Notes

1. See Richard C. Gripp, *The Political System of Communism*, Dodd Mead, NY, 1973.
2. A good example of this can be found in Radovan Radonjic, "Savez Komunista u Politickom Sistemu Socijalistickog Samoupravljanja," *Praksa*, 1986, No. 1: 125-135.
3. Two good illustrations of this are the interview of Tomislav Jantol, "Politika na Sudu Javnosti," in *Danas*, June 16, 1987, 10-13; and Branko Caratan, "Opasni Vidovi Podjela," in *Danas*, May 6, 1986, 22-24.
4. The most recent official count was 2,156,422 members. Source: "Za veci ugled neophodan bolji rad," *Politika*, January 13, 1987: 6.
5. See Jim Seroka and Rados Smiljkovic, *Political Organizations in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986) for more precise data.
6. An interesting discussion about this point can be found in Dragan Markovic's essay, "Borba za cistotu partije," *Knjizevne Novine*, March 1, 1987: 5.
7. The argument here is similar to the view of Michael P. Gehlen, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1969).
8. The source is Milovan Djilas, *The Unperfect Society: Beyond the New Class* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1969), 220-223. In addition, the basic outline of the story is repeated in the memoirs of Eduard Kardelj, *Secanja: Borba za Priznanje i Nezavisonst Nove Jugoslavije 1944-1957* (Belgrade: Radnicka Stampa, 1980), 132-137.
9. See Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953), 378-379.
10. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the NonAligned World* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Laurence Silberman, "Yugoslavia's 'Old Communism'," *Foreign Policy* No. 26 (Spring, 1977): 3-27 make the same point but from very different perspectives.
11. Source: Janko Pleterski, et al., *Povijest Saveza Komunist Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Izdavacki Centar Komunist, 1985), 459.

12. See Phylis Auty, *Tito: A Biography* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), 278-280.
13. Radoljub Colakovic, et al., *Pregled Istorije Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Institut za Izucavanje Radnickog Pokreta, 1968), 544-545.
14. Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, "Rezolucija i Odluka," *Sedmi Kongres SKJ* (Belgrade: Kultura, 1958), 449.
15. See Fred Singleton, *Twentieth Century Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 134-149. The Brioni Plenum was convened by Tito on his island retreat and it is considered to be the point at which the League and Tito irrevocably committed themselves to the dismantling of the totalitarian instruments of power.
16. Pedro Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia: 1963-1983* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984) discusses this thesis in depth.
17. Eduard Kardelj, *Directions for the Development of the Political System of Self-Management* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1977).
18. This is discussed more fully in Jim Seroka, "Developed Socialism in Yugoslavia: Socialist Self-Managed Pluralist Democracy," in Jim Seroka and Maurice Simon (eds.), *Developed Socialism in the Soviet Bloc* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), 79-98.
19. Dusko Sekulic, "Izmisljenja Neprijatelja," *Danas* April 28, 1987: 16-18.
20. Ronald Linden, "The Impact of Interdependence: Yugoslavia and International Change," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (January 1986): 211-234 provides a general treatment of the theme. "Izvoz sa starim masinama," *Politika*, March 23, 1987: 7 applies the problem to the case of Slovenia.
21. See the analysis in Ivan Maksimovic (ed.), *Kriza Jugoslovenskog Ekonomskog Sistema* (Belgrade: Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti, 1986).
22. This point is illustrated in considerable detail by Branko Horvat, *Jugoslovenska Društva u Krizi* (Zagreb: Globus, 1985); and Sharon Zukin, "Self-Management and Socialization," in Pedro Ramet (ed.) *Yugoslavia in the 1980s* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), 76-99.
23. Dusan Sekulic, "Ko ce Koga Likvidirati," *N.I.N.*, March 22, 1987: 9-12.

24. See the interesting analyses of Vojislav Stanovcic, *Federalizam/Konfederalizam* (Titograd: NIO, 1986); and George Schopflin, "Political Decay in One Party Systems in Eastern Europe: Yugoslav Patterns," in Pedro Ramet (ed.) *Yugoslavia in the 1980s* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), 307-324.
25. Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, "Resolutions of the 13th Congress of the LCY," *Yugoslav Survey*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1986): 14.
26. A good analytical history of this period can be found in A. Ross Johnson, *The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case, 1945-1953* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972).
27. Refer to April Carter, *Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia: The Changing Role of the Party* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982) for some well-presented details.
28. Eduard Kardelj, "Current Problems of Development and Reorganization of the LCY," June 10, 1967, reprinted and translated in "Eduard Kardelj on the League of Communists of Yugoslavia," *Yugoslav Survey*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (May, 1982): 44.
29. For more details, see Bogdan Denitch, *The Legitimation of a Revolution: The Yugoslav Case* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976).
30. See Jim Seroka and Rados Smiljkovic, *Political Organizations in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press), 45.
31. Additional information can be found in Jim Seroka, "The Succession Issue and the Yugoslav League of Communists in the Post-Tito Era," *Coexistence*, Vol. 22 (1985): 275-289.
32. The point is made in a more comprehensive manner in Dusan Bilandzic, *Jugoslavia Poslije Tita: 1980-1985* (Zagreb: Globus, 1986).
33. Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statisticki Godisnjak SFRJ 1986* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku), 115-117; and "Za veci ugled neophodan bolji rad," *Politika*, January 13, 1987: 6.
34. Gojko Stanic, "Clanstva Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije," *Jugoslovenski Pregled* Vol. 26, No. 5 (May, 1982): 147.

35. Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, "Statut SKJ," in *13. Kongres SKJ Dokumenti* (Belgrade: Izdavacki Centar Komunist, 1986), Section IX.
36. To examine the point in more depth, see Jim Seroka, "Jace Partije – Vise Demokratije," *Duga*, February 7-20, 1987: 20-24.
37. This is well documented in a Bosnian study conducted by Stojan Tomic, "Integracija Sistema Aktivnosti i Uticaja Saveza Komunist," *Praksa*, 1984, No. 6: 113-123, which indicated that one half of the leadership in the republic did not keep abreast of Party events outside their republic.
38. See the speech of Ivan Stambolic reported in *Politika*, December 13, 1986: 5.
39. Savez Komunist Jugoslavije, *13. Kongres SKJ – Dokumenti* (Belgrade: Izdavacki Centar Komunist, 1986), 261.
40. See the conclusions of the 18th Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia reported in *Politika*, August 3, 1985: 6. Refer to the discussion by Steven L. Burg, "Elite Conflict in Post-Tito Yugoslavia," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (April, 1986): 170-193.
41. The interview conducted with Dr. Rados Smiljkovic, member of the Presidency of the Belgrade Party organization is illustrative of this criticism. Rados Smiljkovic, "Politicki Zemljotresi ne Pocijnu Iznenada," *Komunist*, June 28, 1985: 10-11.
42. The factionalism was reported heavily in "U Zacranom Knigi," *Komunist*, June 21, 1985.
43. A good example of this is the interview conducted with Tomislav Jantol, "Politika na Sudu Javnosti," *Danas*, June 16, 1987: 10-13.
44. Najdan Pasic, "Zasto bih Trebalo Formirati Kompetentnu i Autoritativnu Komisiju za Proucavanje Otvorenih i Urgentnih Problema Funkcionisanja Politickog Sistema i Koje Bi bili Njeni Neposredni Zadaci," *Pismo Presednistvu Centralnog Komiteta SKJ*, September 9, 1982.
45. Refer to the Fifth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, "Jacanje odgovornost – klucni pitanje," *Politika*, December 26, 1986: 6-7.

46. The trend became noticeable in 1984 according to Vladimir Milic, *Socijalni Portret Partije* (Belgrade: Mladost, 1984); continued into 1985 as reported in *Komunist*, July 19, 1985: 11-12; and has maintained itself through the succeeding year according to data published in *Politika*, January 13, 1987: 6.
47. This is a subject of an excellent book by Vladimir Goati, *SKJ Kriza, Demokratija* (Zagreb: Centar za Kulturnu Djelatnost, 1986).
48. Refer to Radovan Radonjic, "Savez Komunista u Politickom Sistemu Socijalistickog Samoupravljanja," *Praksa*, 1986, No. 1: 125-135.
49. A good summary exists in Vladimir Obradovic, "Clanovi SKH o Zakljuccima 13 Sjednice CK SKJ," *Nase Teme*, Vol. 29, No. 1-3 (1985): 115-140.
50. See Jim Seroka, "The Interdependency of Institutional Revitalization and Intra-Party Reform in Yugoslavia," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 60, No. 1 (January, 1988): 84-99; and Steven L. Burg, "Elite Conflict in Post-Tito Yugoslavia," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (April, 1986): 170-193. Unlike Burg, I do not argue that the vacuum of power created by the withdrawal of the Party from the political system was filled by the political institutions such as the Federal Executive Council. In fact, the vacuum still remains.
51. Data can be found in Vladimir Obradovic, "Clanovi SKH o Zakljuccima 13 Sjednice CK SKJ," *Nase Teme*, Vol. 29, No. 1-3 (1985): 115-140.
52. See the interpretation of Stipe Suvar, "Sto je Pozitivnog, a Sto Negativnog Pruzila Partijska Rasprava?" *Socijalizam*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January, 1985): 46-55.
53. Savez Komunist Jugoslavije, *Nacrt Izvjestaja o Aktivnosti Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije i Radu Centralnog Komiteta SKJ Izmedu 12 i 13 Kongresa SKJ* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1986).
54. Savezni Društveni Savet za Pitanja Društvenog Uredjenja, *Kriticka Analiza Funkcionisanja Politickog sistema Socijalistickog Samoupravljanja* (Belgrade: Kosmos, 1985).
55. See Stevan Niksic, "Zamke na Zaokretu," *N.I.N.*, January 4, 1987: 6-7.
56. Slavoljub Dukic, "Sta se Dogadelo u Hrvatskoj," *Intervju*, May 23, 1986: 6-8.

57. "Otvoreno i o kandidatima za najvise funkcije," *Politika*, March 12, 1986: 6.
58. Jelena Lovric, "Komu Treba Izvanredni Kongres," *Danas*, May 12, 1987: 11-12.
59. Refer to the comments of Dr. Vukasin Pavlovic in "Ni preuranjeno etiketiranje ni nametanje rasprave," *Politika*, January 14, 1987: 6. Student demonstrations have occurred earlier, particularly in 1968. See April Carter, *Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia: The Changing Role of the Party* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982).
60. Quoted in "Svaki drugi Slovence 'za'," *Politika*, February 7, 1987: 5.
61. Discussed in "Civilni vojni rok neprikvatljiv," *Politika*, December 25, 1986: 6.
62. A report of the youth boycott of the "Tito Youth Run" can be found in "Neizvesnosti oko polaska stafete," *Politika*, March 13, 1987; 6.
63. Even the Republic Assembly of Serbia declared itself opposed to the expansion of the nuclear power system. See "Vecina protiv nuklearki," *Politika*, January 27, 1987: 5. Meanwhile, a poll from Zagreb found that 75 percent opposed nuclear power, 13 percent did not think it was dangerous, but over a third stated that they believed a nuclear power plant would be constructed despite the public's opposition. *Politika*, January 11, 1987: 7.
64. The Islamic community is particularly concerned that fundamentalism not get out of bounds. See "Ko Nas Obmanjuje i Deli?" *N.I.N.*, March 22, 1987: 20-22.
65. The Party periodically makes statements about religious tolerance, but has not developed a code of behavior for its members. See "Svaki slucaj posebna prica," *Politika*, April 26, 1984: 6.
66. Reported by Svetislav Spasojevic, "Bozic u Ljubljani," *N.I.N.*, January 4, 1987: 15-16.
67. A good analysis can be found in Mark Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (March-April, 1983): 61-74.
68. Milan Milosevic, "Drame i Obmane," *N.I.N.*, May 10, 1987: 9-11.
69. "Sudjenje u Pristini," *N.I.N.*, May 18, 1986: 15-16; "Savez Komunista ne radi po diktatu nacionalista," *Politika*, October 4, 1986: 5.

70. "Pravna nesigurnost na Kosovu," *Politika*, September 26, 1986: 6.
71. "Pasos posle krivicnog dela," *Politika*, September 2, 1986: 6.
72. The demonstrations get extensive media coverage and numerous pledges of action by the leadership. Yet as Milan Jajcinovic, "Sesto Godine Poslije," *Danas*, March 10, 1987: 7-9 notes, not much has changed in six years.
73. This is a recurrent theme in the Serbian press. For example, see "Brojke o iseljenim i povratnicima," *Politika*, November 17, 1986: 6.
74. The Presidency of the League made both points recently in "Kritika nije i sudenje stampa," *Politika*, February 6, 1987: 7.
75. In "U SK isti arsin za sve," *Politika*, February 17, 1987: 7-8 the journals *Duga*, *N.I.N.*, and *Knizevne Novine* were singled out.
76. In the spring of 1986, one contributor was sentenced to 90 days and rallied considerable support in the journalistic community.
77. Slobodanka Ast, "Sa Studentom se Nikad ne Zna," *NIN*, April 5, 1987: 5-7.
78. "Memorandum Nije nauke," *Politika*, December 19, 1986: 7-8.
79. "Neke stvari nisu za raspravu," *Politika*, March 4, 1987: 8. The headline is translated as "Some Things are not for Discussion."
80. The point was clearly made by Gojko Marinkovic, "Zivot ili Vlada," *Danas*, March 24, 1987: 7-9.
81. There is an excellent analysis by Neca Jovanov, *Radnicki Strajkovi u SFRJ* (Belgrade: Zapis, 1979).
82. The Federal Executive Council publicly stated its intention not to resign despite considerable public pressure to do so. No formal vote of confidence, however, was ever made. See "Doslo je vreme za ostavke?" *Politika*, March 25, 1987: 7.

83. See Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic, "Yugoslav Trade Unions and the Paralysis of Political Decision-Making," *Eastern European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring, 1987): 277-294.
84. Zvonko Simic, "Pouke Najduzeg Strajka," *N.I.N.*, March 17, 1987: 12-16.
85. Miro Crnjakovic and Mile Stub, "Bez Iznenadenje," *Danas* March 17, 1987: 12-14.
86. See Vladimir Milic, *Socijalni Portret Partije* (Belgrade: Mladost, 1984) for an excellent discussion about the importance of social composition to the Party.
87. Jelena Lovric, "Koliko je Partija Radnicka," *Danas*, February 4, 1986: 10.
88. Vladimir Obradovic, "Promjene Socijalno-Klasne Strukture Zagrebacke Organizacije SK," in Igor Goblin (ed.) *Savez Komunista u Velikim Gradovima i Industrijskim Centrima* (Zagreb: Centar za Idejno-Teorijski Rad GK SKH Zagreb), 123.
89. "Ko krnji ugled SK," *Politika*, December 20, 1986: 13.
90. See "Sukob ideala i stvarnosti," *Politika*, January 20, 1987: 6.
91. Vladimir Goati, *Savremene Politicke Partije* (Belgrade: Naucna Biblioteka, 1984), 78.
92. See "I broj i uticaj," *Komunist*, July 19, 1985: 11-12; and "Jednakost u zrtvovonu," *Politika*, January 19, 1987: 7.
93. "Zaboravljeno selo," *Borba*, January 28, 1986: 2.
94. "To sam imao da kazem," *Politika*, April 27, 1986: 7.
95. This is the argument of Stipe Suvar, "Problem radnicke Vecine u Organizacijama SK u Velikim Gradovima," in Igor Gobin (ed.), *Savez Komunista u Velikim Gradovima* (Zagreb: Centar za Idejno-Teorijski Rad Gradskog Komiteta SKH Zagreb, 1986), 213-218.
96. "Politicki zemljotresi ne pocinja iznenada," *Komunist*, June 28, 1985: 10-11.
97. "Sve stariji Savez Komunista," *Vjesnik*, June 16, 1986: 1.

98. Slobodan Bjelajac and Stojan Obradovic, "Omladina u Savezu Komunista," in Marksisticki Centar Konferencije SKH ZO Split, *Struktura i Dinamika Clanstva Saveza Komunista* (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1981), 297-312.
99. Stipe Suvar, "Ima li Mjesta Strepnji?" *Socijalizam*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (March, 1985): 325-335 provides the data but makes an opposite conclusion that these data indicate that the League is not used for careerist purposes.
100. "Kritikovati ali i verovati," *Politika*, January 31, 1986: 6.
101. See the interview with Boris Vuskovic, "Mladi u Zrcalu Krize," *Danas*, January 28, 1986: 23.
102. Aleksandar Tijanic, "Ovoj Zemlji je Potrebna Pamet," *N.I.N.*, May 18, 1986: 10.
103. Stipe Suvar, "Ima li Mjesta Strepnji?" *Socijalizam*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (March, 1985): 327.
104. Some data are found in "Da li je trka izgubljena," *Komunist*, February 15, 1985: 11.
105. An illuminating study was published by Boris Vuskovic, "Nacije u SKJ," *Nase Teme*, Vol. 30, No. 3-4 (March-April, 1986): 375-404.
106. Boris Vuskovic, "Temeljna Demografska i Socijalna Obiljezja Clanstva Saveza komunista Jugoslavije," in Istrazivacki Projekti CDI, *Klasno-Socijalna Struktura Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Izdavacki Centar Komunist, 1984), 114-169.
107. Boris Vuskovic, "Temeljna Demografski i Socijalna Obiljezja Clanstva Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije," in Marksisticki Centar Konferencije SKH ZO Split, *Struktura i Dinamika Clanstva Saveza Komunista* (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1982), 139-159.
108. Although no published statistical evidence was found to corroborate this point, it appears, from an evaluation of the press coverage, that since the disorders in Kosovo in 1981, many Yugoslav Albanians may not feel welcome in the Party in their home province and particularly in Serbia and Macedonia where they may be perceived as disloyal irredentists.
109. "Strategija ili monopol," *Borba*, March 8-9, 1986: 3 makes the point that the Party does not have a membership policy.
110. "Novi Ljudi Novi Red," *Danas*, June 3, 1986: 7.

111. "Dalja demokratizacija kadrovske politike," *Politika*, September 26, 1986: 1.
112. "Nema potrebnog jedinstva," *Politika*, December 25, 1986: 7.
113. "Kraj personalne unije?" *Vjesnik*, March 27, 1986: 5.
114. Stipe Suvar reported the analysis which was printed in Jelena Lovric, "Svatko iz Svoje Nade," *Danas*, February 11, 1986: 13.
115. There was an extensive debate about this subject. See "CK SKJ imace 165 clanova," *Politika*, April 1, 1986: 1.
116. The point is made in "Kriterijum kao dekor," *Komunist*, February 1, 1985: 9.
117. Dura Knezevic, "Kadrovska Politika Kao Cinilac Ostvarivanja Odnosa Izmedu Klase i Avangarde," *Opredjeljenja*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (April, 1984): 16.
118. The information was cited in Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, *Nacr Izvestaja o Aktivnosti Saveza Komunisti i Radu Centralnog Komiteta SKJ Izmedu 12 i 13 Kongresa SKJ* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1986), 76.
119. This is a major conclusion of a study conducted by Stojan Tomic, "Integracija Sistema Aktivnosti i Uticaja Saveza Komunisti," *Praksa*, 1984, No. 6: 113-124.
120. Jordan Aleksic, "Zastupljenost i Sadržaj Diskusija o Savezu Komunisti," in CDI Istraživacki Projekat, *Pracenje i Analiziranje Rasprava OOSKJ o Predlogu Zakljucaka 13 Sednice CK SKJ* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1987), 202.
121. Vladimir Goati, *SKJ, Kriza, Demokratija* (Zagreb: Centar za Kulturnu Djelatnost, 1986), 128.
122. Cited in Vladimir Goati, *et al.*, *Politicko Angazovanje u Jugoslovenskom Društvu* (Belgrade: Mladost, 1985), 286.
123. See "Zahtevi i ostvarenja," *Komunist*, November 7, 1986: 6-7.
124. Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic, "Yugoslav Trade Unions and the Paralysis of Political Decision-Making," *Eastern European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring, 1987): 277-294.

125. Vladimir Goati, *SKJ, Kriza, Demokratija* (Zagreb: Centar za Kulturnu Djelatnost, 1986), 131.
126. See Petar B. Mandic, *SKJ i Demokratski Centralizam* (Belgrade: Siro, 1983); and Prvoslav Ralic, "Neka Pitanja Jedinstva i Revolucionarnog Delovanja SKJ," *Socijalizam*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January, 1985): 3-11.
127. "Od razlika do jedinstva," *Borba*, May 31, 1986: 5.
128. "I zacranom knjigu," *Komunist* June 21, 1985.
129. "Protiv etatizma i podela," *Politika*, April 28, 1986: 5.
130. "Koliko SK veruje narodi," *Politika*, March 6, 1987: 8.
131. "Za demokratski jedinstvo," *Politika*, July 12, 1986: 6.
132. The Fifth Session of the Central Committee dealt with this theme as reported in "Jacanje odgovornost — klucno pitanje," *Politika*, December 26, 1986: 6-7.
133. "Za veci ugled neophodan bolji rad," *Politika*, January 13, 1987: 6.
134. Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, *Nacrt izvestaja o Aktivnosti Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije i Radu Centralnog Komiteta SKJ Izmedu 12 i 13 Kongresa SKJ* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1986), 80.
135. According to Ljubisa Mitrovic, "Svojevoljno napustanje Saveza Komunista od Strane Radnike i Pitanje Njegovog Klasno-revolucionarnog Identiteta Danas," *Opredeljenja*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (February, 1986): 82.
136. "Za veci ugled neophodan bolji rad," *Politika*, January 13, 1987: 6.
137. See "Kriza, uzroci i prevazilazenje," *Komunist*, May 9, 1986: 9-10.
138. Vladimir Goati, *SKJ, Kriza, Demokratija* (Zagreb: Centar za Kulturnu Djelatnost, 1986), 84.
139. See Zoran Vidojevic, *Smisao Partije* (Zagreb: Centar CK SKH za Idejno Teorijski Rad, 1986), 367.

140. *Ibid.*

141. Two typical studies are: Vladimir Obradovic, "Rasprava o Prijedlogu Zaklucaka 13. Sjednice CK SKJ u Osnivnim Organizacijama SK Zagreba i Sarajeva – Komparativna Analiza Rezultata Istrazivanja," and Bosko Kovacevic and Dragutin Miljkovic, "Ponasanje Clanova Saveza Komunistu u Opstinskoj Organizaciji SKV Subotica," in Igor Gobin (ed.) *Savez Komunistu u Velikim Gradovima* (Zagreb: Centar za Idejno-Teorijski Rad Gradskog Komiteta SKH Zagreb, 1986).

142. Vladimir Goati makes this point very strongly in *SKJ, Kriza, Demokratija* (Zagreb: Centar za Kulturnu Djelatnost, 1986), 140.

143. CDI Istrazivacki Projekat, *Pracenje i Analiziranje Rasprava OOSKJ O Predlogu Zakljucaka 13. Sednice CK SKJ* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1987); and Vladimir Obradovic, "Clanovi SKH o Zakljucima 13. Sjednice CK SKJ," *Nase Teme*, Vol. 29, No. 1-3 (January-March, 1985): 115-140.

144. See as a sample of the debate: "Ko kroji kadrovske liste," *Komunist*, February 15, 1985: 5; "Akt politicke mobilizacije," *Politika*, May 15, 1985: 8; "Neposredni izbor rukovodstava," *Vjesnik*, March 13, 1986: 4.

145. A good example is "Sindikatu ne moze biti opozicija sistemu," *Politika*, October 16, 1986: 8.

146. Jelena Lovric, "Tko Trazi Visepartijski Sistem," *Danas*, March 17, 1987: 18-19.

147. Stevan Niksic, "Front u Sistemu," *N.I.N.*, October 19, 1986: 13-14.

148. Interview with Nenad Bucin, "Kome Treba Snichodlivi SSRN," *N.I.N.*, April 26, 1987: 19-22.

149. "Izazov Centralnog Komiteta SKJ," *Komunist*, November 7, 1986: 15.

150. The problem was discussed during the Third Session of the Central Committee, "Savez Komunistu – najodgovorniji," *Politika*, October 25, 1986: 7.

151. See Jim Seroka and Rados Smiljkovic, *Political Organizations in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986): 99-101.

152. *Ibid.*, 131.
153. See Vladimir Arzensek, *Struktura i Pokret* (Belgrade: Centar za Filozofiju i Društvenu Teoriju, 1984).
154. Nenad Bucin, "Kome Treba Snichodljivi SSRN," *N.I.N.*, April 26, 1987: 21.
155. Interview with Branko Caratan, "Opasni virusi Podjela," *Danas*, May 6, 1986: 22-25.
156. Mirjana Kasapovic, *Delegatski Izbori 1978-1986* (Zagreb: Institut za Politicke Znanosti Fakulteta Politickih Nauka - Zagreb, 1986), 35-37.
157. *Ibid.*, 48-49.
158. Jelena Lovric, "Kto Trazi Visepartijski Sistem," *Danas*, March 17, 1987: 18-19.
159. Radovan Radonjic, "Diferencijacija – da, ali kako?" *Socijalizam*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January, 1985): 12-19.
160. Miroslav Stojanovic, "Opste Partijska Debata o Ulozi Saveza Komunisti," *Socijalizam*, Vol. 37, No. 7-8 (July-August, 1984): 993-999.
161. Milan Milosevic, "Dve reci jedinstva i odgovornost," *N.I.N.*, August 4, 1985: 9-11.
162. Redakcija N.I.N.-a, "Novo Jedinstvo za Teska Vremena," *N.I.N.*, June 29, 1986: 8-16.
163. Jelena Lovric, "Komu Treba Izvanredni Kongres," *Danas*, May 12, 1987: 11-12.
164. Savezni Društveni Savet za Pitanja Društvenog Uredjenja, *Kriticka Analiza Funkcionisanja Politickog Sistema Socijalistickog Samoupravljanja* (Belgrade, 1985).