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The Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR

Origin and Social Composition

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Introduction: Research Questions and Method of Analysis

A lamentable shortcoming of Soviet studies in America has been the neglect of its own history. The discipline has produced no systematic, empirically grounded, critical review of itself. To be sure, there have been periodic assessments of the field measured in terms of funding monies available, Ph.D.'s produced, and research trips abroad to Soviet archives. Such quantified examinations have been periodically supplemented by critical essays which measure the strength of the field less by numbers of research articles produced and more by the fruitfulness of the theoretical and methodological assumptions guiding research. The very few pieces in this genre have chided the profession of Soviet studies for basing itself upon Cold War political assumptions and for a political self-censorship which, until the arrival of the revisionist historians, produced a sterile intellectual orthodoxy. These provocative assessments of the relationship of politics to science in Soviet studies have been quite important for raising the question of the influence of social factors upon the practice of science and for delineating the broad contours of political influence. These accomplishments notwithstanding, the critical reviews of the field suffer from the absence of empirically detailed presentations of evidence that would support their controversial claims.

This article attempts to rectify this situation through an examination of the origin and social composition of the Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR. The Institute was staffed by Soviet faculty from the second wave of emigration and was open for twenty-one years from 1950 to 1971. Although based in Munich, the Institute was a part of the American and British Soviet studies community of scholars in that U.S. and U.K. scholars made use of it through its academic conferences, publications, and summer school. Among Soviet studies scholars writing for the Munich Institute were John Armstrong, Frederick Barghoorn, Keith Bush, Allen Kassof, Roy Laird, Philip Mosely, Richard Pipes, Peter Reddaway, and Nicholas Timasheff. The Institute also played a crucial role in the Har-
vard Refugee Interview Project during the Fall of 1950 and the Winter of 1951 because it introduced the Harvard University scientists to the general Soviet emigre community residing in western Germany and Austria.  

The question of the early history of the Munich Institute assumes additional significance for an analysis of science and politics in Soviet studies because of its longstanding relationship with the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The Institute was for twenty years under the patronage of the CIA through a “private” voluntary association of “concerned” American citizens — the Radio Liberty Committee. The idea of forming what appeared to the public as a private citizens committee as a cover for CIA purposes came from the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) which was the branch of the CIA in charge of covert operations. The Radio Liberty group funded both Radio Liberty and the Institute. It was established formally on February 8, 1951 in New York City and was originally called the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, Inc. (AMCOMLIB became its acronym). The name recalled General Vlasov’s anti-Soviet political program, KONR: Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, which Vlasov created during World War II while serving as commander of the Nazi sponsored Russian Army of Liberation.  

Ostensibly “financed with endowment funds” the Committee maintained a New York headquarters and also a European HQ at 46 Augustenstrasse in Munich. This latter address was identical to that of the Munich Institute. The Institute was covertly financed by the CIA from early 1951 until mid-1972. The credibility of the Institute was destroyed in the first days of 1971 when Clifford Case, the Republican Senator from New Jersey, revealed that the CIA paid the Institute’s expenses. Shortly thereafter, the CIA decided to withdraw support.  

The relationship of the American Soviet studies profession to a CIA funded research center raises a number of questions for historical analysis: Who were the faculty of the Institute? That is, what was the social and
political composition of the staff? What were their scholarly backgrounds? Why were they in the West? Why did they work for the Institute rather than U.S. colleges and universities? When and how did the Munich Institute emerge as a scholarly center? Did it emerge as a creation of the Soviet emigres themselves or was it the product of another party? There are other important questions: What was the effect of CIA patronage upon the writing of scholarly reports by Institute scholars? What steps, if any, were taken to safeguard the academic integrity of the Institute? These questions are answered in this paper.

My research foci— the creation and composition of the Munich Institute and the effect of CIA patronage upon the writing of scholarly reports — are addressed by using primary data painstakingly culled from a variety of sources. These data consist of correspondence, memoranda, and reports of the Harvard Refugee Interview Project, U.S. Army Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) records on selected staff members of the Munich Institute from the Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), the Merle Fainsod papers, the files of the East European Fund at the Ford Foundation, correspondence with the first emigre director of the Munich Institute and with the original Harvard contact man with the Institute and an interview with a former CIA advisor to the Institute. (The records of the CIA and the State Department relevant to the Munich Institute have not yet been declassified, and are thus unavailable for scholarly review).

Origins of the Munich Institute

The secondary literature contains very few references to the establishment of the Institute. Alex Inkeles' description of it as "composed of Soviet scholars of the wartime and postwar emigration...[which] included persons of the widest range of political and nationality affiliations that it appeared possible to assimilate and hold together in a single group" is one
of the more explicit references. The only other English language descriptions regarding the creation of the Institute are contained in the Institute’s publications such as The Bulletin and the Belorussian Review and in Sig Mickelson’s book, America’s Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. In the Institute publications the Munich Institute is depicted as the creation of eight emigre scholars on July 8, 1950. Their “basic aim... was to conduct research into the theory and practice of various aspects of the state and social order of the USSR... for the purpose of providing the non-Soviet world... with reliable information on developments in the Soviet Union.” By establishing a library, holding conferences, conducting research, distributing publications, and operating a summer school for American Sovietologists the Institute sought to realize its aims. Locating itself at 46 Augustenstrasse under its first director, Boris Alexandrovich Yakovlev, the Institute consisted of a research and secretarial staff of 12 persons and, by March, 1951, had a library of 119 books. In December of 1950 the Institute was incorporated as a German academic corporation.

The impression from the Institute’s own self-description and from Inkeles’ remarks is that the Institute for the Study of the USSR was the autonomous creation of a group of scholars motivated by a desire to provide the world with valid and reliable information about the Soviet Union. Mickelson, however, offers a contrary interpretation. He argues that the CIA’s covert operations branch, the Office of Policy Coordination, was directly involved in the Munich Institute’s creation in that the OPC provided “guidance” and “support.” What he specifically means by these words he does not say. These conflicting accounts can be checked against the available data.
Conception, Creation, Staffing, Incorporation

The Munich Institute had its beginnings in a "Russian Library" — a collection of books held by Boris Yakovlev as early as 1948. By January 1950, Yakovlev was presiding over an "International Library" under the auspices of the International Rescue Committee (IRC). Located in Munich the Library had developed a collection of books in English, Russian, and German with the aid of private persons, publishers, and American universities (Yale and Antioch College) and had plans to establish "around the library a nucleus of experts in different fields who could upon request of American scholars supply information on European problems for which source material is not easily available in the U.S." The Americans who had donated books to the library "had mostly in mind this function ..." This International Library associated with the IRC and under the directorship of Yakovlev was the organizational precursor of the Munich Institute not simply because it had a collection of books but also because it was the focus of a suggestion by IRC representative, Markoosha Fischer, that "American scholars would be able to ask for information ... from 'experts' connected with the Library." This was an idea which Harvard Junior Fellow, George Fischer (Markoosha's son), later pursued with "workaholic fervor." By July 1950, Yakovlev was able to set up a research institute with library apart from IRC assistance. This move was made possible by the support of Harvard University.

Harvard's representatives in Munich were George Fischer and Frederick Wyle. In the spring of 1950, both Fischer and Wyle were sent as scouts for the upcoming Refugee Interview Project undertaken by Harvard's Russian Research Center. Their responsibilities included establishing contacts with emigres and American authorities, looking over possible facilities for interviewing, and estimating operational costs. Wyle's role was essentially one of doing advance legwork for the Interview Project. Fischer's activities were focused on solidifying Harvard's relationship with the emigre community; his "own role was to dream up a
mutually beneficial collaboration and to make it conceivable to two very different principals who hardly knew each other.”

Fischer began his task of establishing relationships with the emigres in early March, 1950. Writing to Alex Inkeles (Director of the Refugee Interview Project) from the Imperial Hotel in London he discussed his meeting with Adam Watson for the purpose of making contacts with top British experts on Soviet refugees and his plans to meet with State Department officer, Chip Bohlen, to establish additional U.S. contacts — especially through the State Department in Germany. He was well suited for his job because he had, through his parents Markoosha and journalist Louis Fischer, “wide connections ... to Old Moscow Hands, to the U.S. field of Russian studies, and also to old Russian emigres.”

In April Fischer went to Germany where Clyde Kluckhohn (Director of the Russian Research Center) had requested that General Millard Lewis, Director of Air Force Intelligence, provide Fischer with the same facilities previously given to Merle Fainsod. While in Europe Fischer recruited Fred Wyle, a Harvard undergraduate who had studied Russian under Fischer and who was enrolled at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris while on leave from Harvard, to work on the Interview Project. Throughout the month of April, Fischer received direction from the Russian Research Center on the use of Boris Yakovlev and other emigres for establishing contacts among the Soviet Displaced Persons (DPS), on the hiring of Wyle, and on contact with State Department officers, Francis B. Stevens and Frederick Barghoorn, who were setting up their own interview project. The central fact of Fischer’s work was the establishment and solidification of Harvard’s liaison with Boris Yakovlev and the Russian Library. “Mr. Yakovlev, our Munich contact man,” had been in touch with Harvard as early as November 1949, when Harvard professor Paul Friedrich visited him to discuss the reluctance of Soviet DPs to talk about their attitudes on various sex related issues.

Fischer’s essential task was to deliver to the Russian Research Center an emigre organization which could fulfill two interrelated functions: (1)
legitimate the Harvard Project to the Soviet DPs and (2) establish a wide-ranging contact system for procuring survey research respondents. At first it appeared that the Russian Library could itself meet these goals through the addition of an “academic council” to the Library — a concept promoted by Fischer while in Munich during the spring of 1950. An Academic Council was organized and appended to the Russian Library and by June 29, 1950 Inkeles had sent to Yakovlev a first draft outlining the terms of joint collaboration. This “set-up ... of an Academic Council of the Russian Library, had not gone well,” however, and, consequently, by July 1 Fischer was back in Munich not only to arrange financial and administrative matters on the spot but also “to look into, and nip in the bud if possible, what appeared like a nascent internal quarrel in the Russian Library of Munich, the consequences of which may well have nullified this organization’s usefulness to our project.” This internal feuding had both personal and structural causes. The personal source of trouble was V. V. Pozdniakov, the former Vlasovite colonel whom Talcott Parsons, Harvard Professor of Sociology, met with in the Summer of 1948, and who had been procuring research reports on the Soviet Union for Harvard. Pozdniakov had tried to increase his personal stature in the new Academic Council thus causing other invited emigres to refuse their participation. Although Pozdniakov had a certain prestige as a “go-getter and contact man for Harvard,” this was negated by three other factors: his “difficult egotism;” his membership in Yakovlev’s political party, SBONR (Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia); and his “lack of either scholarly training or inclination.” These personality difficulties, in part, forced a reorganization of the Russian Library and its Academic Council. Pozdniakov was to be excluded from the new arrangement until “his willingness to practice teamwork is evidenced.” Apparently it never was.

The other reason for the disarray in the Academic Council was structural. Because the council had merely an advisory capacity with no executive authority and, because the Director of the Russian Library, Boris
Yakovlev, who did have executive authority, was the leader of a prominent political party, those emigres serving on the Academic Council who were not in Yakovlev’s party objected to this structuring of power within the organization. Besides this particular glitch there was the additional problem that the Russian Library had no legal standing under German law; thus it could be destroyed by the personal infighting of the emigres. This possibility created a fear at the Russian Research Center over the advisability of undertaking extensive research collaboration with concomitant financial commitments to such a potentially unstable group. An unstable organization would be a poor choice for research collaboration. These personal and structural factors put into serious doubt the wisdom of using the Academic Council of the Russian Library as an emigre liaison for the Russian Research Center. A new academic group had to be formed.

To this end George Fischer applied “strong pressure ... to create an organization which had legal standing in the eyes of German law.” As a result, Yakovlev went to a German lawyer for advice and was told that, if he wanted to incorporate a nonprofit, scientific institution under German law, it was necessary for him to have seven signatories who would administer the organization with equal rights and who would elect a Director, Deputy Director, and Secretary. With this information, Yakovlev and Fischer began searching for potential candidates. Fischer had to play a delicate and discreet role. He could not dictate to the emigres what to do for that would certainly offend their pride, yet he had to guarantee that the new academic organization was designed to meet Harvard’s needs. As he himself expressed it: “A major portion of my present stay in Germany ... was spent in speeding up and assisting — while trying not to meddle in — the selection and bringing together of such a founding group, and the taking of the necessary legal steps.... I emphasized that while Harvard or I personally had no intention of affecting individual selections, it was most important for our project to maintain a balance as regards political affiliation.” Such a balance was in part necessary for the success of the Har-
ard Interview Project because, given the intense political antagonism among emigres and the deep distrust of outsiders, an offended party might have easily sabotaged any Harvard effort to contact emigres and establish trust and rapport. But “balance” was also necessary to satisfy American authorities and sponsors. As Fischer indicated to Yakovlev in a night cable of June 12, 1950:

“Political and National Diversity of the Academic council members is main appeal of Russian Library to Harvard Columbia Washington IRC in New York. Appreciate need for administrative efficiency but if direction to be supreme over Academic Council, additions to Direction like Marchenko and Kunta appear essential to maintain appeal in America.”

Finding seven signatories who would be the nucleus of an incorporated academic institution was not so difficult — Fischer and Yakovlev simply selected individuals from among the emigre staff at the U.S. Army Intelligence schools at Regensburg and at Oberammergau. In this way they got six of their seven men: Aldan, Kripton, Kunta, Marchenko, Nieman, and Shteppa. The seventh, Filipov, was an employee of the International Refugee Organization. (See Chart 1.) These new Soviet emigre faculty not only had to have security clearances to work as instructors at the U.S. Army schools, but as civilians they also had to fill out an application for federal employment consisting of three documents: (a) U.S. Civil Service Commission Standard Form 57; (b) ETO Annex to the application for federal employment; and (c) a Personal History Statement (PHS). In essence, George Fischer and Boris Yakovlev were staffing the Munich Institute with United States government employees from Army Intelligence.

With these men assembled and agreeable, the Russian Library of Munich was redesignated as the “Institute for Research on the History and Institutions of the USSR.” Fischer was satisfied with the composition of the new Institute for it included “men of as high an intellectual stature in the Soviet emigration in Germany as could probably be found,” and, furthermore, contained “sufficiently prominent representatives of Soviet
nationality groups." Also, the members of the Institute Council represented all major postwar political parties of the second wave of emigration except for NTS (National Alliance of Russian Solidarists), a fascist oriented emigre organization. This omission was alleviated by the fact that Fischer was assured by Romanov, the editor of the NTS publication Posev, that Posev and NTS would "cooperate fully with Harvard and the Institute in connection with our project." In the end, however, NTS cooperated with neither Harvard nor the Institute.

The Munich Institute for the Study of USSR was thus assembled by July 1950 with the advice, encouragement, and management of Harvard Junior Fellow, George Fischer. In light of this account of the conception and creation of the Munich Institute George Fischer well deserves his reputation as "spiritual father" of the Institute. Yakovlev and his faculty would soon introduce the Refugee Interview Project to the population of Soviet displaced persons in western Germany and assist in the development of a contact system for procuring a sample of interview respondents. Who were the faculty of this new Institute upon whom Harvard relied? What were their scholarly backgrounds? Why were they in Germany as displaced persons? These questions may be answered by an analysis of the biographies of the Institute staff.

Social Composition of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR

A brief descriptive listing of the original eight individuals comprising the Munich Institute is to be found in the first appendix to Fischer's July 15, 1950 report. Entitled "WHO'S WHO OF MEMBERS OF COUNCIL OF INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON THE HISTORY AND INSTITUTIONS OF USSR," this appendix listed the prewar Soviet occupation, the current (1950) postwar employment in Germany, and the political affiliation of each of the eight members. It is reproduced below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Former Position</th>
<th>Present Position</th>
<th>Present Political Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALDAN, Mikhail Andreevich</td>
<td>Colonel, General Staff of Red Army</td>
<td>Instructor, US School</td>
<td>Head of SVOD military group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. FILIPOV, Aleksandar Pavlovich</td>
<td>Research Associate, philosophy &amp; psychology, Kharkov academic institutes</td>
<td>IRO Employee</td>
<td>Chairman, NOKRE, central emigre group for US Zone; Head, German section, SBSR (&quot;Melgunov Group&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRIPTON, Constantin Georgievich</td>
<td>Chief, Econ. Section, Arctic Inst., Leningrad</td>
<td>Instructor, US School</td>
<td>(unaffiliated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUNTA, Abdurachman (Aleksandr Aleksandrovlch)</td>
<td>Party official, Moscow and Caucasus; Grad., Inst. of Red Professors</td>
<td>Instructor, US School; Deputy Director of Institute</td>
<td>Leading figure in ITIFAK, central group of Soviet Moslem refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARCHENKO, Vasilii Pavlovich</td>
<td>Research Associate, Econ. Institute, Ukrainian Acad. of Sci., Kiev</td>
<td>Secretary of Institute; Lecturer, Ukrainian University, Munich; Instructor, US School</td>
<td>(unaffiliated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. NIEMAN, Yuri Mikhailovich</td>
<td>Official, Foreign Ministry; Research Assoc, USSR Acad. of Sci.</td>
<td>Instructor, US School</td>
<td>(unaffiliated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. SHTEPPA, Konstantin Feodosievich</td>
<td>Professor of History, Kiev University</td>
<td>Instructor, US School</td>
<td>(unaffiliated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAKOVLEV, Boris Alexandrovich</td>
<td>Vice Pres., Acad. of Architecture; Dean of a Moscow institute of architecture</td>
<td>Director of Institute</td>
<td>Head of SBONR (&quot;Vlasovite&quot;)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other than the information on the eight persons listed in Fischer's chart, there are additional data available on four: Yakovlev, Aldan, Kunta, and Shteppa. In the last case — that of Shteppa — the data are secondary and consist of Alexander Dallin's brief description of Shteppa's life in a book preface. With respect to the first three individuals, we have primary data in the form of United States Army Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) records. The CIC files permit a fairly thorough reconstruction of the emigres' lives in terms of standard biographical data (such as date of birth, formal education, occupational employment) and major life events (such as wartime experiences). Beginning with the Director of the Munich Institute, Boris Yakovlev, the biographies of the staff are as follows.

Boris A. Yakovlev

Boris Yakovlev was not Boris Yakovlev. Boris Alexandrovich Yakovlev was a postwar pseudonym for Nikolai Troitsky. He was born on April 20, 1903 in the village of Beshkayma in Simbirsk province. His father, Alexander, was a Russian Orthodox deacon who sent Nikolai first to village school in Beshkayma and then to church school in Simbirsk which he attended from 1913 to 1917. By 1922, young Nikolai had finished secondary school and went on the study architecture until 1926 at the Polytechnical College in Simbirsk. Between 1926 and 1930, Troitsky worked in the towns of Bogorodsk and Moscow as a technician for the Soviet Building Trust. In 1932, after attending courses at the Architecture Institute in Moscow, he was given the title of engineer-architect. Anticipating problems as the son of a former “class enemy,” Troitsky sought to conceal his family origin by changing his name to Nikolai Norman. (The name Troitsky means “trinity” in Russian. The change of identity was done officially and was published in one of the Soviet newspapers.) Troitsky's file records that he worked for a brief period (1932-1933) as an engineer
for “Narkomchos” (the People’s Commissariat for Economy) in Stalinobad and in 1934 for Narkompros (People’s Commissariat for Education) in Moscow.42

Between 1934 and 1937, his history is unclear for his CIC file offers two conflicting accounts. The “autobiography” dated June 8, 1949 and “supplements to my life story” dated January 17, 1950 modestly describe Troitsky as “the assistant of the scientific secretary of the All-Unions-Architecture-Academy.”43 But in one incompletely dated CIC interrogation and in a report of August 24, 1954, Troitsky claimed to have become in 1936 the “Vice-President of the experimental division of the Architectural Academy of the USSR.”44 Which account is true? Given the vast status difference between an assistant to the secretary and a vice-president, the question arises, if Troitsky was indeed a vice-president, why would he claim on two separate occasions to be the assistant to a secretary? Was the vice-presidency perhaps a post facto promotion Troitsky awarded himself to impress American occupation authorities? Troitsky resolved the conflict in 1988 by denying that he was a Vice-President of the Academy of Architecture and attributing this error to “incompetent translators”.45

On April 17, 1937, Troitsky’s fortunes changed dramatically for on this date he was arrested by the NKVD. He did not specify the charge to his CIC interrogators but only referred to paragraph 58 of the Criminal-Political Code. (Paragraph 58 was the article under which nearly all the purge victims were arrested. It was essentially a treason charge which accused those arrested of attempting to overthrow the Soviet State through sabotage and “wrecking”). Troitsky was kept in jails around Moscow until August 30, 1939, when he was released upon the decision of a Military Tribunal. He claimed that the accusation against him could not be proven and so he was let go. For the next two years he wrote fairy-tales for children’s magazines in order to support himself. Fearing a new arrest he joined the army in July of 1941 shortly after the Nazi invasion of June 22nd. He was placed in the “chemical platoon” of the 147th regiment and sent to the front. On October 18th he was captured by the Nazis and
became a POW in Camp Borovuha in White Ruthenia (Belorussia). One month later (November 1941) Troitsky changed his name to Nikolai Nareikis because he feared reprisals against his family. (He had a wife and a daughter in the Soviet Union.)

After more than a year as a POW, Troitsky (Nareikis) decided to collaborate with the Nazis. From May 1943 to May 1944, he worked for the Nazi Propaganda Ministry (ProMi) newspaper \textit{Za Rodinu} (For the Mother Country) in Vitebsk. He became the paper’s editor. His job was to write propaganda articles against the Soviet government. The Nazis paid him on a piece-work basis. In May of 1944, Troitsky joined Vlasov’s Russian Army of Liberation (ROA) and from May to July attended the Political School at Dabendorf. Dabendorf was an ideological training camp for Soviet POWs which had been authorized by Nazi intelligence chief Reinhard Gehlen and which was under the authority of the Propaganda Department of the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW). The purpose of the Dabendorf school was to “free” the Russian students from the strictures of Soviet ideology.

While attending political courses Troitsky “distinguished himself by his literary and organizing abilities” and so attracted the attention of the Dabendorf command.\textsuperscript{46} Because of this he was assigned to work on the editorial staff of the Vlasovite newspaper, \textit{Dobrovolets} (Volunteer), from May 1944 to April 1945. Troitsky has stated that \textit{Dobrovolets} was also controlled by the Nazi Propaganda Ministry; his articles for the paper were signed with the pen name of N. Narow.\textsuperscript{47} More significant, however, was the fact that he was selected to co-author the Prague Manifesto which elaborated the political program of Vlasov’s Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR).\textsuperscript{48} Together with two other men, Kovalchuk and Zaitsev, Troitsky (Nareikis) was ordered by Zhilenkov (the head of the propaganda section in the Russian Liberation Movement) in October 1944 to write a political manifesto for the Russian Liberation Movement (ROD).\textsuperscript{49} This was the famous (or infamous) Prague Manifesto which spelled out the philosophy and program of Vlasov’s KONR.
Troitsky’s precise contribution to the writing of the Prague Manifesto and to the ideological leadership of the Vlasov Movement is, however, unclear. Later he was issued a sidearm and wore a Vlasovite officer’s uniform but claimed that he never commanded troops. He did accompany Vlasov’s First Division on one of its marches in March-April, 1945 as a representative of the Propaganda Section of KONR.50

With the disintegration of KONR and Vlasov’s ROA at the end of the war, Troitsky fled to Munich in June 1945, and changed his name from Nareikis to Boris Alexandrovich Yakovlev. This new alias was to create considerable confusion for Army CIC agents because it was borrowed from a real Boris Yakovlev also living in Bavaria. The real Yakovlev was a Russian emigre who had fought with the White Army in the Russian Civil War (1918-1921) first under Deniken, then under Wrangel. Troitsky took Yakovlev’s name and one of his identifying documents (a letter of recommendation from the firm Wiegand and Schneider) “to avoid repatriation to Russia, which he mortally feared due to his VLAStsov Army activities ...”51 The confusion resulting from the use of the same name by two individuals living in the same vicinity was compounded by the fact that both persons had other previous identities and, further, that all of these names could be multiplied into new ones by simple spelling changes. Thus, Troitsky’s CIC alias card contains thirty-nine names — most of which resulted from variations on his various identities: Troitsky, Norman, Nareikis, Narow, and Yakovlev.52 While hiding from authorities, Troitsky found work as an engineer with the building firm of Gerasimenko and Brilkin. By mid-1948, he had taken up his other occupation of journalist and with George Fischer’s father, Louis, he soon co-authored a book on Soviet emigres entitled Thirteen Who Fled. By 1949, he had IRO sponsorship for his Russian Library and was working for Harvard as a “contact man.” One year later his Library was chosen to be Harvard’s liaison in Munich.53

Troitsky was also politically active in the immediate postwar period. As Fischer indicated in his chart of Institute personalities, Yakovlev was
the head of SBONR — an organization which developed from the wartime Vlasov movement. SBONR (Sofiuz Borby za Osvobozhdenie Narodov Rossii — Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia) was one of the prominent postwar Vlasovite organizations. It grew out of BSMNR (Militant Union of Youth of the Peoples of Russia) which itself had been formed by dissidents as a break-away from the Vlasovite "youth" organization, SMNR (Union of the Youth of the Peoples of Russia). BSMNR was founded in close contact with both Colonel Kromiadi (Vlasov's chief of staff) and "the former head of Propaganda of the First Division of the ROA, Major N. Nareikis-Yakovlev." The actual establishment of BSMNR took place on August 2, 1947 at an illegal conference in the Schleisheim Displaced Persons Camp. Troitsky gave a lecture at the BSMNR "school" in this camp on "Tasks of our Struggle." On March 19, 1948, BSMNR transformed itself into SBONR and, on August 13, 1949 at the Cafe Victoria in Munich, SBONR held its first congress and elected its first official leadership. Troitsky (Yakovlev) was elected chair of the SBONR leadership council at this time. As a leader of SBONR, Troitsky represented the organization at various conferences such as the "Congress to Defend Cultural Freedom" held in West Berlin in June of 1950. He also participated in the political conferences organized by the U. S. State Department to unify the Soviet emigration into a single anti-Soviet bloc. He thus was likely a major actor in securing the considerable financial patronage of AMCOMLIB. After ten years of postwar political work and after four years on the CIA payroll as Director of the Munich Institute, Troitsky left Germany and emigrated to the United States.

Mikhail Aldan

Mikail Andreevich Aldan was an alias for Andre Georgievich Nerianin. Other aliases used were Andrey Georgievich Aldan, Aldanow, Buslayev (Buslaev), Pokrevsky (Pokrovskij), Andrey Nirjaninow, Andrey
Nerianin (Aldan) was born in October of 1902 or 1904 (and not in 1910 as he occasionally claimed) either in Yrezan or in Bozky. As a teenager he volunteered for the Red Army in 1919 as an infantry soldier. In June 1922, he was sent to the Far East to command a Rifle and Machine Gun Platoon in a Red Army regimental training school. From the autumn of 1927 to 1929, he was in charge of a Rifle Company and in 1929 was assigned to command a Training Company in which students with advanced educational backgrounds were trained for positions as junior officers in the reserve. In May 1931, Nerianin entered the Red Army’s Frunze Academy; upon graduating in May 1934, he was assigned to the Mozyr Fortified Region in the Belorussian Military District as Chief of Operations and was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. In early 1937, he became Commander of the 154th Rifle Regiment and in December, 1937, he entered the Voroshilov General Staff Academy. Graduating in August 1939, with the rank of full colonel he was appointed as Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, Urals Military District. Upon the Nazi invasion he was sent to the front as Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, for the Soviet 22nd Army. Later he was transferred to the Assistant Chief of Staff position of the 20th Army and, when captured by the Germans in late November 1941, he was Chief of Staff.

Pondering his situation as a POW, Nerianin (Aldan) decided to collaborate. Hired by the Nazis in a consultant capacity he “was assigned an office and staff with the task of analyzing communiques from the Eastern Front.” This analytic work entailed making summaries of the military situation and predicting the outcome of operations in progress. In September 1944, Nerianin took a position as Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations in Vlasov’s Russian Army of Liberation (ROA). A Soviet file describes his work in this capacity as “chief of battle training for ROA.” One of his CIC file cards notes that he was “Head of a special Abwehr unit in the VLASSOV Army.” (Abwehr was the central intelligence
service of the German armed forces.) In May 1945, Nerianin surrendered to the Americans.

After the war Nerianin assumed various aliases and, unsure of his value to the Americans, lied about his wartime activities with the Nazis and his identity in particular in order to avoid repatriation. He was definitely a wanted man. In February 1946, Major General A.M. Davidov, the "representative of the headquarters of Soviet occupational forces in Germany for the repatriation of Soviet citizens," issued to General Truscott of the U.S. Third Army a brief list of ROA collaborators who had been confined to Prisoner of War Camp Number 431 in Platling before December 1945. On this list was one "Nirianin - Red Army Colonel" who had been the "assistant Chief of the Operations Section" in Vlasov's ROA. Davidov noted that the former Red Army officers identified in his letter had fought "against the Allied Armies on the side of the enemy and therefore in accordance with Par. 1 of Hq USFET directive dated 4 Jan. 1946 must be transferred to the Soviet Union under the guard." He closed his letter with a plea for Truscott to give orders for the collaborators to be located and repatriated. By March 7, 1946, one Lt. Col. Anthony Lobb had sent a memorandum to the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Corps informing him that the officers named on Davidov's list "had been placed on a special Third Army Wanted List."

Although the Soviets succeeded in getting his name on a special wanted list, Nerianin (Aldan) was released from a POW Discharge Center in Marburg on November 11, 1946. With the help of a forged birth certificate he substantially altered his identity. Claiming that he was born on October 24, 1910 in Bosky, Poland, he represented himself as a widowed teacher. (He had a wife and daughter in the Soviet Union.) He stated that his only connection with the Red Army was as a sergeant between 1924 and 1926. (These are obviously early dates of service relative to a 1910 birthdate but Nerianin in this particular moment was giving his birthdate as 1904. Army service in 1924 was thus more plausible. It should be remembered that in the postwar period the details of an in-
dividual emigre's identity were constantly shifting in response to his sense of danger. The degree of danger depended on several factors; the success of Soviet representatives in tracking him down, who was interviewing him, when and where he was interviewed, his ability to sell himself to American intelligence as an asset too valuable to lose. The ultimate goal, of course, was to avoid repatriation at all costs.) Regarding his wartime activities he said that he had been a "forced labor worker in Germany since Aug. 1943."68 His postwar employment record is contradictory. At one point it is stated that he had been a brick mason since December 20, 1946 for the firm Lentschitzky and Company in Munich, but on his Personal History Statement (PHS) for his October 1949 application to be an instructor at Detachment R, he asserted that he had been a farm worker since April 1945 and a journalist since November 1945 (as well as a forced laborer during the war).69 Clearly the PHS was an attempt to use his fictitious postwar identity to sanitize himself for clearance into U.S. federal employment.

Although he had escaped repatriation in 1946, Nerianin was not yet out of the woods. In 1947, he heard that Soviet agents were trying to locate him in Munich; his name appeared on a 1949 list of war criminals and collaborators prepared by Soviet Army General Chuikov and given to U.S. authorities, (See note 58.) By 1949 the CIC had established his true identity. From this we may infer two things. First, Nerianin's success in avoiding repatriation was due in part to his intelligence value for Detachment R. Indeed, when a CIC agent investigated Nerianin (Aldan) in a case of "suspected Soviet espionage in Munich," Colonel Hoffman, commanding officer at Detachment R, would not reveal Nerianin's true name to the investigating officer.70 This was as late as June 1950. Nerianin had been working for "U.S. Intelligence agencies in [the] capacity of instructor, researcher, and consultant on questions pertaining to the Armed Forces of the USSR."71 By January 1950, he was hired at Detachment R on a permanent basis "as a faculty member of the Military Department."72 On the basis of his background, Nerianin was to render information on
matters such as Soviet "command and staff planning and functions ... at Army, Front, and General Staff levels," "mobilization planning," "methods of military communications, codes and ciphers," and "the role of partisans in Soviet military effort." Second, his sanitized Personal History Statement of 1949 could not have been written for military intelligence — Detachment R had employed Nerianin two years earlier. Instead, it was likely written for whatever agency reviewed prospective federal employees. Any taint of wartime collaboration may have put his job application in trouble. In fact, his past did haunt him to some extent; although he had been working intermittently for U.S. Intelligence since 1947, the October 1949 request to employ him on a permanent basis at Detachment R was initially denied because of "derogatory" information. This information appears to have been an allegation that Nerianin was pro-communist; it did not concern his wartime activities with the Nazis. This security snag was cleared up by January 1950, and he was hired as an Instructor with Detachment R, Intelligence Division.

As regards postwar emigre politics, Nerianin was quite active. He was a member of the Militant Union of Youth of the People of Russia (BSMNR) and lectured to "leading workers" of BSMNR at DP Camp Schleisheim in 1947 during an illegal ten day course. At the December 1947 training course for BSMNR propaganda functionaries in Schleisheim, Nerianin spoke on the topic of "basic Military Training." He was also active in the emigre group AZODNR (Anticommunist Center of the Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Russia) and was instrumental in creating SVOD (Union of the Soldiers of the Liberation Movement) in late 1948. Nerianin was elected president of SVOD which was the "military mass" organization of AZODNR (from which it later defected). In this capacity he promised to "accomplish active anti-Bolshevist work." He was also a leader in SBONR, serving as a member of the Steering Council.

Although he was a prominent postwar Vlasovite, Nerianin's main work was as an employee for Army intelligence and by the early 1950s he was
brought to the U.S. for at least three and a half years (1952-1955).\textsuperscript{80} He apparently left the U.S. in mid-1955; he carried with him a permit to reenter the U.S. issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and valid until July 15, 1956. It is not clear if he ever returned the U.S.; the final outcome of his relationship with American intelligence is also not known.

Abdurachman Kunta

"Kunta" was one of several aliases for Abdurachman Avtorkhanov. Other names included Mansur Manuṣ, Bulat Bek, K. Zurowzev, Alexander Uralov, and K. Abdraschman.\textsuperscript{81} These aliases were postwar fictions designed, like those of Yakovlev (Troitsky) and Aldan (Nerianin), to confuse authorities and to thus prevent repatriation. Kunta became the most favored, most used pseudonym although he wrote books under the names Avtorkhanov (\textit{Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party}) and Uralov (\textit{The Reign of Stalin}).

Abdurachman Genasowich Avtorkhanov was born on October 25, 1908 in Nizni Naur, a small village near Grozny in the Caucasus region of Russia. His father, a locksmith by trade, and his mother were both Chechens from Grozny. From 1919 to 1924, he attended an Islamic elementary school; from 1924 to 1928, he was a high school student. As a student Avtorkhanov (Kunta) established an outstanding academic record and was recommended by his teachers for advanced study. From 1928 to 1930, he attended a preparatory school adjacent to the Institute of Red Professors (IKP) in Moscow. After completing his courses with a major in history, Avtorkhanov was assigned to Grozny of the Chechen Autonomous Republic as a Bolshevik Party official. His work from 1930 to 1933 was in the capacity of "Leader of the Organization Branch". His duties were to assign party members and workers to various jobs.\textsuperscript{82} Another part of his CIC file describes his position in Grozny as "Second Chairman and Chief of the School System for the Soviet Executive Committee."\textsuperscript{83} In 1934
Avtorkhanov returned to Moscow and attended the Institute of Red Professors which was "the advanced party school for the training of future professors in the fields of sociology and economics." While at the IKP he lectured part-time at the Bubnov State Institute of Pedagogy in 1936-37 and also served as a member of the Propaganda Group of the Party's Central Committee. In August 1936, he married Sepiat Kurbanov who bore him two daughters. He divorced his wife in 1942 in the traditional Moslem way.

Avtorkhanov had joined the Komsomol in 1924 when he was 16 years old. Two years later he became a member of the Communist Party. His relationship with the Party was not always peaceful. Writing in Pravda of June 22, 1930, he criticized aspects of agricultural collectivization. Reprimanded by the Central Committee and charged with treasonable acts, he recanted in a statement published in Pravda (July 4, 1930). In 1935 he again found himself in trouble over his criticism of the policies of the Chechen Communist Party leaders. His criticism resulted in charges against him by the Chechen party apparatus. These charges, Avtorkhanov claimed, were investigated by Yaroslavsky who decided that because Avtorkhanov was young he could be educated to see the error of his "anti-Soviet nationalism." With a "severe reprimand and warning," he returned to the IKP. In spite of his attendance at the IKP and his work in propaganda for the Central Committee, Avtorkhanov was arrested by the secret police (NKVD) when he returned to work in Grozny in late 1937. His case was not brought to trial until March of 1940 at which time he was acquitted. Initially he had been arrested in August 1937, in Moscow but was released after 24 hours with an NKVD apology for a mistaken arrest. But upon his October arrival in Grozny he was rearrested and was informed by the NKVD agent that his release in Moscow had been a mistake.

Avtorkhanov explained his political arrests as guilt-by-association. In 1936 his brother-in-law was arrested as a member of a resistance organization among Chechen farmers, sentenced to ten years hard labor, and sent
to work on the Yoga-Don Canal. Later that same year Avtorkhanov's wife went to visit her brother in prison and carried along food and clothing in a suitcase. When guards examined the suitcase at the prison gate, they found in a small pocket Avtorkhanov's Communist Party card which was forwarded to the Central Committee in Moscow. Thus linked to his anti-Soviet brother-in-law in the minds of the police, he was arrested and charged with three offenses: (1) he was an alleged member of an anti-Soviet organization; (2) he had nationalistic tendencies (as revealed by his books on the people of Caucasus); and (3) he was a British spy. In March 1940, he was tried with eleven other men and all were acquitted. In late December 1940, however, he was again arrested by the NKVD and was convicted in October 1941 of writing anti-communist books. For this he was given a three year sentence. Since he had already been in jail about 4 years merely awaiting his trials, he was told he would be released within 24 hours. Nevertheless, it was not until April 1942 that the NKVD finally let him out of prison.

By April 1942, two things had happened; the Nazis had invaded the Soviet Union and Avtorkhanov had become a committed anti-Soviet. The war afforded him the opportunity to sever his ties to the Soviet system and he made use of it. Showing his NKVD release papers to the editor of a newspaper, Avtorkhanov obtained accreditation as a reporter and thus acquired the ability to move about freely without question. This was in early July — only three months after his release from prison. Within two weeks of becoming a “reporter,” he organized five or six Chechens and together they “obtained pistols and horses and set out for the German lines.” Accepted by the Nazis as White Guard partisans, they stayed with the German forces until the retreat to Mozdok, at which time they were handed over to the German Military Police. Convincing the Germans of the authenticity of his story, Avtorkhanov was assigned with other Chechens to a program which trained them as paratroopers and guerrillas for the German advance. The project was terminated, however, and Avtorkhanov was ordered to Berlin to work as a propagandist after recruiting
a number of Chechens for the same purpose. In Berlin he worked under the command of First Lieutenant "Nakoshidze, who presently [1961] works for Radio Liberation in Munich...." 88 From January 1943 to April 1945, Avtorkhanov was a "volunteer military worker for the German Army" assigned to the East Military Propaganda Department of the German General Staff at Army Headquarters. 89 His work entailed analysis of Soviet news and propaganda and the writing of propaganda for use by the German Army in the Caucasus and Turkestan regions. In 1945, he was given the rank of Lieutenant in the German Army "to facilitate his travel while on official business." 90 In February 1945, Avtorkhanov's propaganda department was ordered to be transferred to Leipzig but the move was terminated because of heavy bomb damage to the rail lines in April.

Realizing at this point that the war was almost over, Avtorkhanov left for Salzburg with the intention of joining fellow Caucasian refugees in northern Italy. Enroute to Italy he heard that the war had ended and he returned to Salzburg. In late April or early May 1945, he destroyed his identity papers and obtained false documents which identified him as Kunta, a Turkish national. When detained by American authorities for questioning, he claimed to be "a Turkish professor ... [who] had been in Berlin as a guest." 91 When his first attempt to emigrate to France failed, he was forced to spend the better part of the next five years (1945-1950) living under the alias "Kunta" in a number of Displaced Persons Camps. During this time he was active politically. For several months between 1946-1948, he was a member of the ABN (Anti-communist Block of Nations). He also wrote articles for NTS, SBONR, and TSOPE (Central Union of Postwar Emigrants from the U.S.S.R.). From 1948 to 1950, he was a member of the North Caucasian National Committee; in 1950, he joined the Moslem Refugee Committee and became its Secretary. 92

While writing articles as a free-lance journalist in Munich for the American sponsored newspaper "Neue Zeitung," Avtorkhanov was visited by David Dallin (October 1948) who had read his articles on the Soviet Union and who now wanted to interview him. He showed Dallin a draft
of his manuscript “Reign of Stalin.” It impressed Dallin enough that he contacted the head of Detachment R, Colonel Hoffman, advising him that Avtorkhanov was an expert on the Soviet Union. Subsequently, Hoffman himself interviewed Avtorkhanov and by December 1948 “Kunta” had a position as a “Training Instructor” at the Detachment R Intelligence School in Oberammergau. When the school was moved to Regensburg in December 1949, he went with it.93

Konstantin Feodosievich Shteppa

Konstantin F. Shteppa was born in December 1896, in Lakhvitsa in the Ukrainian province of Poltava. His father, Feodosii Shteppa, was an Orthodox priest; his mother, Neolila, was from a family of Ukrainian nobility. From 1910 to 1914, he studied at the Theological Seminary in Poltava; followed by studies at the University of Petrograd (1914-1916). His academic training was interrupted by war. During World War I, he was an infantry officer in the Imperial army; during the Civil War, he fought on the side of the anti-Bolshevik White armies. He was taken prisoner in November 1920. After the Civil War Shteppa relocated to Nezhin, a town near Kiev, and returned to academic pursuits completing the requirements for the Ph.D. in history by 1927. He had been teaching at the teacher’s college in Nezhin since 1922. By 1930, he had achieved the rank of professor of ancient and medieval history at the university in Kiev and had also became a Senior Research Associate of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

During the purges of the late 1930s his past was held against him. As the son of a “class enemy” and as a man who fought against the Bolsheviks, he was marked for arrest by the NKVD. His arrest came in February 1938, and he was held until September 1939. Upon his release, he returned to writing and publishing, but had lost his allegiance to the Soviet system. When the Nazis occupied Kiev, he remained behind. During the occupation he edited a Russian language newspaper in Kiev.
for the Germans. When the Red Army approached Kiev in 1943, Shteppa fled to Germany.

After the war he took small jobs in university libraries and wrote as a journalist for the emigre press using the pen names N. Gromov and V. Lagodin. Using another pseudonym, W. Godin, he co-authored (with F. Beck) the book, Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession. In 1950, he was recruited by George Fischer to serve on the Council of the new Munich Institute. Also in this year he began work as a teacher of Russian language for the US Army at the Intelligence school in Oberammergau. Shteppa left Munich for the United States in September 1952, and from 1952 to 1955 he worked for the Research Program on the USSR which operated under the auspices of the East European fund. Afterwards he worked as a research analyst for the American Committee for Liberation until his death on November 19, 1958. One fact not mentioned in Alexander Dallin’s account of Shteppa’s life is that, after fleeing Kiev with the German forces, Shteppa lived in Berlin working as an editor in 1943-44 for the illustrated journal, Na Dosuge, which was published by “Vineta” in Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry. Vineta was the code name for a Propaganda Ministry office that composed anti-Soviet propaganda in the form of broadcasts, movies, posters, leaflets, and magazines.

Filipov, Nieman, Kripton, Marchenko

Regarding the other four founding members of the Munich Institute — Filipov, Nieman, Kripton, and Marchenko — there are fragments of data on the first three and nothing on Marchenko. With respect to Filipov a few details of his career turn up in Ford Foundation archives. In the “Report on Operations through September 30, 1953” of the Research Program on the USSR sponsored by the Ford Foundation’s East European Fund, there is a very brief discussion of Filipov. In the section entitled “Senior Fellowships” Alexander Philipov is said to have com-
pleted legal studies at the University of Kharkov in 1913 and to have subsequently studied natural sciences for the next four years in the same school. He held a research fellowship in European culture at the University of Kharkov and later became a fellow of the Ukrainian Academy of Science. “In 1942 he was appointed Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kharkov, and a year later was named Professor of Sociology at Charles University in Prague. From 1945 to 1951 he lived in Munich where he was chairman of the editorial committee of the Institute for the Study of the History and Institutions of the U.S.S.R., in addition to working as a consultant for the Harvard University Refugee Interview Project.” Because Kharkov was under Nazi control by June of 1942 and Prague was certainly under Nazi domination in 1943, this account suggests a possible collaborationist role for Filipov.96

Data on Kripton and Nieman are to be found in Merle Fainsod’s file “Defector Interviews” in his papers at the Harvard University Archives. While in Munich in the summer of 1949, Fainsod spoke with Kripton and Nieman, but only brief notes of his talks remain. All that is available on Kripton, for example, is that he was a specialist on the Arctic and a former dean of Engineering and Economic Faculty of the Leningrad Institute of Water Transport.

There is not much more on Nieman although he did correspond with Fainsod pleading for help in his quest to immigrate to the United States. Some sporadic references to Nieman occur in Aldan’s CIC file. From this latter source we learn that Nieman was an alias (his real name is unreadable on the photocopy), he was born in Tallinn, Estonia, on March 20, 1904, and he was a disagreeable employee for G-2 (i.e. U.S. Army Intelligence).97 During his conversations of July 1 and 2, 1949 with Nieman, Fainsod discovered that Nieman’s father had been a distinguished professor at St. Petersburg University in which capacity he taught Pitirim Sorokin.98 In a letter of October 31, 1949 written at Regensburg to Fainsod, Nieman revealed that he was desperate to leave Germany for the U.S. and that he ardently hoped to acquire a position at Harvard. (Indeed he
persuaded Colonel Hoffman, commanding officer of Detachment R, to send a letter on his behalf to the president of Harvard.) In this letter Nieman also revealed that his “father had been arrested in 1930, and I myself fired out of the Foreign Office, and later also arrested....” He further indicated that he was associated with the Prompartiia (the Industrial Party Affair) of 1930 and hinted that his name was among those charged with a conspiracy to overthrow the Soviet government. 

In a letter of November 17, 1949 to Fainsod, Nieman wrote again from Regensburg. He expressed his “feelings of a bitter disappointment with the Harvard University,” reiterated that he never was a member of the Communist Party and that, although he did not participate in the Vlasov Movement because of his fear for the safety of his parents, he was “with all my heart” on the side of the Vlasovites. Finally, he claimed “now I am even able to declare that since long ago I was an active member of an anti-communist movement inside Russia; enclosed is a copy of a testimony (I omitted only my old name) which reveals some of my activities in the Baltic countries.” The “testimony” referred to was not found in the Fainsod Papers. Nieman worked for Detachment R as early as July 1948 in a semi-official capacity. At one point he was released from ECIS (European Command Intelligence School) by the commanding officer, Colonel Raymond, because he was “a chronic complainer” with an “inability to get along with his immediate superior and disagreeing with teaching methods” and further he did not “get along with fellow teachers.” He was apparently rehired because Fischer listed him as an Army employee.

The review of CIC records relevant to Yakovlev, Aldan, and Kunta and Alexander Dallin’s recapitulation of Shteppa’s life permit a reconstruction of the commonalities of the biographies of half of the original founding members of the Munich Institute. A number of shared features stand out. All four individuals collaborated with the Nazi regime during the Second World War. Three of the four (Yakovlev, Shteppa, Kunta) wrote propaganda under Nazi direction. Two of the four (Aldan, Yakovlev)
were prominent figures in Vlasov's ROA and KONR. Two of the four (Aldan, Yakovlev) were leaders in postwar Vlasovite political parties. Three of the four (Aldan, Kunta, Shteppa) and six of the eight Munich Institute "scholars" (Aldan, Kunta, Shteppa, Kripton, Marenchko, Nyman) were United States government employees for U.S. Army Intelligence at the moment the Institute was established. All of the four worked at one time or another for U.S. intelligence services. (For example, after the Harvard Project departed, Yakovlev directed the Munich Institute for the CIA.) Only two of the four (Kunta, Shteppa) might possibly be considered as scholars in the usual sense of the word. The collectively common features are charted above.

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The history of the creation and composition of the Institute for the Study of the USSR is ultimately of importance for what it tells us about the production of knowledge in Soviet studies by the second wave of emigration. While it is true that the Munich Institute was never on the “cutting edge” of research in Soviet studies, it did actively associate itself with the American and British scholarly communities by hosting conferences and publishing articles by Barghoorn, Mosely, Pipes, and Reddaway among others. This associational prestige enhanced the status of the Institute’s journal, *The Bulletin*, which was published in several languages and mailed to readers and libraries not only in Western Europe and North America but also in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The Institute was an organization publishing for a worldwide audience. Its influence with this audience was boosted by the Institute’s ongoing association with several first-rate scholars of the American and British Soviet studies community.

For twenty years the Munich Institute under CIA patronage produced knowledge about the Soviet Union. What did it write? How did Central Intelligence Agency funding affect what it wrote? And how did the original circumstances of its creation and composition affect what it wrote? The answer to the first question is that the Institute wrote anti-Soviet propaganda. The answer to the second question is that the CIA demanded propaganda as a condition of funding. The answer to the third question is that the establishment of the Institute as a tool for another organization and its initial composition of political opportunists with little scholarly background made it all the easier for the Institute to become the tool of the CIA.

The evidence for the Institute’s role as an anti-Soviet propaganda mill comes from an interview with former CIA advisor to the Institute, Leon Barat. When asked what the purpose of the Institute had been, he answered that the Institute wrote anti-Soviet propaganda to dissuade
elites in less developed Third World nations from adopting a socialist model of economic development. The CIA's great postwar fear was that as nations in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America grappled with questions of industrialization and modernization, their governing elites might choose a Soviet-style economy closed to capitalist economic penetration. One method of preventing such a choice was propaganda and thus the CIA paid former Soviet citizens at the Munich Institute to write anti-Soviet articles which were published in journals targeting the ideological leaders of the Third World. In other words, the explicit purpose of knowledge production at the Institute was not scholarship. Its books and articles were written expressly as anti-Soviet propaganda and this was accomplished under the cover of academic credentials.

Of course, the question arises: How could scholars allow themselves to be blatantly used by the CIA? The CIA even stationed handlers (euphemistically called "advisors") at the Institute to insure that the proper propaganda product was delivered consistently. What kind of scholars would willingly participate in a secret scheme to mask propaganda as science? It is here that the origin of the Institute as a vehicle for the organizational interests of the Russian Research Center and its composition of nonacademic men with opportunist, collaborationist backgrounds become causal factors explaining the Institute's transformation into a CIA propaganda mill. The collaborationist biographies of the Munich Institute staff as propagandists and intelligence analysts for the Nazi regime does not prove that these men could not write dispassionate analytical research articles about the Soviet Union. Their collective biographies as collaborators, however, sensitizes us to the moral character of these men and serves as an explanatory factor in formulating an answer to the question: Why did the staff of the Institute agree to write propaganda for the CIA? The answer lies in their collaborationist past. Writing anti-Soviet propaganda was something they did to survive and, having done so during World War II for the Nazis, it was not such an odious occupation after the war.
There is another question regarding the validity of knowledge production at the Institute which must be examined. The question is this: Is it not possible that the *a priori* anti-Soviet propaganda of the Institute reflected the *realities* of the Soviet regime? In other words, in this case did not propaganda equal truth? Logically speaking, it is possible that a predetermined anti-Soviet bias reflected the realities, the truth of the Soviet historical experience. Yet, this conjunction of propaganda with truth would be a *coincidence*. The conclusions and evidence used in propaganda do not result from free intellectual inquiry, evidence thoroughly culled and assembled, and carefully reasoned analysis of such data. If the Munich Institute has provided any valid information about the Soviet Union, such knowledge is the result not of the dispassionate application of historical and sociological methods, but of coincidence and the CIA effort to provide its propaganda with a patina of scholarship.

Still another way of thinking about the intellectual integrity of the Munich Institute is to answer the following question: If the faculty of the Institute were paid explicitely to write anti-Soviet propaganda, on what grounds does anyone suppose that they would violate the terms of their contract and still be paid by the CIA? Put another way, would the CIA continue to pay for a product that was not delivered? The payment of monies by the CIA to the Munich Institute for twenty years without interruption is *prima facie* evidence that the Munich Institute *never* established any meaningful intellectual integrity as a social science research center. Finally, it should be emphatically noted that when the real sponsor of Institute research (i.e. the CIA) was revealed to the world, the intellectual-scientific credibility of the Institute evaporated - so much so that the CIA cut off the Institute’s funding and sold its library.
Conclusion

The longstanding published descriptions of the Munich Institute have claimed that the Institute was an autonomous creation of refugee scholars who were very likely social-democratic individuals. The review of primary data — correspondence, CIC files, etc. — contests the validity of these accounts in a number of respects. First, it cannot be maintained that the Institute was composed of “scholars.” Yakovlev was an engineer and journalist, Aldan was a military officer, and Kunta was more a party official than an academic. Second, the Institute was not an independent creation of the emigres — Yakovlev’s Library notwithstanding. The Institute was conceived by Harvard and its staff was selected and recruited by Harvard. Third, the Institute was not a “left-wing” organization by any stretch of the political imagination. By truncating the political spectrum so that Communists and Social Democrats were excluded and by using the old Russian monarchists as a point of reference, it was possible to label the postwar Vlasovites as “left-wing” and to successfully slip it by the reader unaware of the history of the period. Yet, in reality, the postwar Vlasovites had an ideology which was an admixture of the NTS “solidarists” (i.e., fascist) philosophy, of points taken from Nazi-sponsored courses at Dabendorf, and of some points from Soviet ideology. Which political phrases were highlighted in their pronouncements seemed to depend in part upon who their patrons were — certainly under the Nazis they were more sympathetic to some fascist ideas while under the Americans they sought to distance themselves from the NTS and to emphasize their “democratic” outlook. Fourth, it is an egregious error to omit any reference to the Institute staff’s collective wartime experiences as Nazi collaborators. This omission shields the staff from any questions regarding their intellectual integrity.

The history of the origin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR and its initial social composition tells us about some of the ways in which politics mixed with American social science during the Cold War. We can
see that the reasons the emigre “scholars” remained in the West were more complex than previously articulated. Without denying that some or even all of them may have cherished western conceptions of freedom and liberal democracy, the basic reality of their desire to remain in the West derived from their collaborationist past in World War II. Repatriation to the Soviet Union would have brought them highly unpleasant fates - ostracism, imprisonment, and possibly execution. Second, it is more understandable why the Munich Institute staff never attained the stature and scholarly eminence of the first wave of emigration and never took academic appointments at western universities. While they were undoubtedly resourceful men, they lacked the scholarly training necessary to participate in the professional academic community.

The specifics of the Institute’s early history tell also a remarkable story with respect to Havard’s Russian Research Center and permit some observations on the practice of science. By conceiving and creating the Institute, Harvard took an important step in guaranteeing the success of the Refugee Interview Project. Its action in this regard is understandable. Yet, although the behavior of Harvard personnel in creating the Institute is rationally comprehensible, such behavior was also opportunistic. It was this opportunism which resulted in a social fiction that the Institute was an autonomous creation of scholars. By establishing this fiction as a social fact, Harvard’s Russian Research Center consequently developed a vested interest in maintaining the fiction as “fact”. To do otherwise would draw attention to Harvard’s opportunism and would violate social norms of trust and reciprocity already developed between Harvard and the Institute over the course of several months of interaction. In the context of the Cold War in 1950-51, the transformation of this fiction into a fact was a political act. Harvard’s ongoing association with the Institute for a period of several months conferred upon the Institute a false cachet of scholarly status, an independence, and a respectability which the Soviet emigres had not been able to achieve on their own and which, in light of their collective biography, they probably would not have achieved. In other words, the
usefulness of the Munich Institute to the Office of Policy Coordination of the CIA was made possible in part by the fact that (unwittingly or not) Harvard’s Russian Research Center created the academic cover or camouflage for the Institute — a cover exploited by the CIA for twenty years.

In conclusion, this article adds a new dimension to the discussion of political bias in Soviet studies. Earlier discussions have focused on the intrusion of political assumptions into the choice of theoretic models used to describe and explain Soviet realities, the self-censorship of American scholars who were afraid of discrediting themselves politically, and the orthodoxy resulting from these first two processes. Such foci rivet our attention on individual scholars and the things they wrote about the Soviet Union. The new dimension added suggests that we look also at the social composition of the second wave of emigre scholars, at their relationships with the Soviet studies academic community, and at the processes by which American and British scholars created cultural fictions that served particular political purposes. Political bias in Soviet studies involved more than a scholar choosing to use the totalitarian model as an analytic point of reference. It involved the establishment by American academics of a postwar anti-Marxist ideology. This ideological bias was created by fabricating political and academic identities for the second wave of emigration and then sustaining and legitimating those identities and the “scholarship” produced by the emigres through the maintenance of an ongoing network of professional relationships between the emigres and the American and British Soviet studies communities. The ability of the Institute to maintain itself for twenty years as a scholarly enterprise without critical review was possible, in large part, because of its initial association with the Harvard Russian Research Center and its subsequent association with the Soviet studies academic profession.
Notes


9. Inkeles and Bauer, op cit, 10.


13. Correspondence of Nikolai A. Troitsky with the author, October 9, 1984; see also the letter of Talcott Parsons to Clyde Kluckhohn, August 6, 1948. *Merle Fainsod Papers*, Harvard University Archives (HUA).


18. Frederick Wyle interview, August 14, 1984, San Francisco, CA.

19. Correspondence from George Fischer to the author, *op cit.*

20. Correspondence from George Fischer to Alex Inkeles, March 12, 1950, *Papers of the Refugee Interview Project*, HUA.

21. Correspondence from George Fischer to the author, *op cit.*

22. Correspondence from Clyde Kluckhohn to George Fischer, April 3, 1950. *Papers of the Refugee Interview Project*, HUA.

23. Fred Wyle interview, *op cit.*

24. Correspondence to George Fischer from Raymond Bauer, April 17, 1950 and from Alex Inkeles, April 25, 1950, *Papers of the Refugee Interview Project*, HUA.

25. Letter of Paul W. Friedrich to Kluckhohn and to Inkeles, November 23, 1949, regarding the set-backs on his investigation of sexual attitudes and problems among the youth of the USSR using questions supplied by Alex Inkeles. *Papers of the Refugee Interview Project*, HUA.
26. Report of George Fischer to Clyde Kluckhohn, Alex Inkeles, and Raymond Bauer, July 15, 1950, regarding his work in Munich, July 1-12, and in Frankfurt, July 13. Papers of the Refugee Interview Project, HUA. Excerpts from this report were sent to Merle Fainsod by George Fischer in correspondence of July 20, 1950. Merle Fainsod Papers, HUA.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Correspondence of George Fischer to Boris Yakovlev June 12, 1950, Papers of the Refugee Interview Project, HUA.

33. Michael Aldan, U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps file, October 11, 1949, 172 and October 18, 1949, 176, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), Ft. Meade, Maryland. Instructors such as Aldan at Detachment R with a CWS 5 rating made approximately $175.00 per month in 1946, see Aldan CIC file, page 111. Detachment “R” was a training school for future U.S. military attaches to be posted in “Iron Curtain” nations; the course of study was designated as the “Russian Language and Area Training Program.” The Army exercised the “utmost care” to keep the identities and locations of its emigre instructors hidden from the Soviets, see Aldan CIC file, 155, 226. Emigre instructors were housed at Hotel Weidenhof in Regensburg.


35. For a discussion of the politics of NTS see Boris L. Dvinov, Politics of the Russian Emigration (Rand Paper P-768, October 1, 1955; Santa Monica), 113-193.


38. The description of Fischer as "spiritual father" of the Institute comes from a former American advisor to the Institute, Leon Barat. Interview with Leon J. Barat, March 30, 1984, Munich, Germany.


41. A methodological note regarding CIC data: The bulk of primary data on the staff of the Munich Institute comes from the U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) records of the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). The files are sometimes supplemented in certain cases by records from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Some FBI and INS records are withheld for reasons of security and/or privacy. There are CIA files on Yakovlev, Kunta, and Aldan but they are withheld under FOIA exemptions pertaining to national defense and the CIA "Director's statutory obligations to protect from disclosure intelligence sources and methods...." (CIA correspondence with the author, October 15, 1985.). The CIC records may be considered as primary data relative to the only other sources available; memoirs and newspaper accounts. The CIC records are to be preferred for they are intelligence files which sought to establish a complete composite of each emigre's identity. Newspaper accounts are often sketchy and memoirs are often unreliably self-serving. Indeed, Catherine Andreyev, who has read most of the emigre memoirs on the subject of the Vlasov movement, expressed these words of methodological caution: "...There is a marked tendency in some memoirs to present everything as whiter than white, with Vlasov painted in superroseate colours as a martyr...," 1987, 10. The effort to write history to justify a political cause makes many of the memoirs hazardous data.

Although the CIC files are to be preferred, they are not without their methodological problems. To begin with, they are not the complete set of primary documents vis-a-vis emigre biography — a complete set would involve birth certificates, school records, marriage certificates, army records perhaps, employment documents, and so forth. With respect to the postwar Soviet emigres residing in Germany, these primary documents are unavailable. Those that do exist as prewar documents are likely forged (e.g., Aldan's birth certificate discussed later). Given the unavailability of ordinary primary biographical records, however, the CIC files represent the best possible source. They themselves, nonetheless, do have to be read with care because the reports of various investigative
agents occasionally contradict one another with regard to particulars of name, date of birth, place of birth, prewar employment, and wartime occupation. Because so many of the Soviet displaced persons sought to avoid repatriation through the subterfuge of aliases and fictitious biographies, it took some time for the CIC personnel to sift through the confusion of biographical details. DP deceit was compounded by varying levels of political sophistication among CIC agents, the linguistic abilities of translators, the reliability of CIC informants, and phony allegations made by political rivals and/or Soviet agents. For a brief discussion of these types of methodological difficulties see the GAO Report of June 28, 1985: “Nazis and Axis Collaborators Were Used to Further U.S. Anti-Communist Objectives in Europe — Some Immigrated to the United States,” 11, 12. In addition, the CIC files are released in different degrees of completeness. Often several whole pages of a file will be exempted from release and many times those pages which are released are partially censored with deletions. It is impossible, of course, to assess the significance of the data that is expunged.

42. The organization called “Narkomchos” never existed and it is not clear what Troitsky did in 1932 and 1933. This false datum illustrates the methodological problems in reconstructing biography: errors exist in the data and their sources are unclear. Did the “Narkomchos” error result from a poor translation or did Troitsky simply lie to his interrogator?


44. Ibid, 36, 53. Page 36 is dated August 24, 1954 while page 53 only refers to January 10 with no year indicated.

45. Correspondence of N. Troitsky with author, June 14, 1988.

46. Ibid, 55. The quotation is from a statement of V. Krylov (dated January 19, 1950) on the wartime activities of Troitsky. See also the January 17, 1950 statement “In Cause of B.A. Yakovlev” by Colonel V. Pozdniakov (page 61 of Troitsky’s CIC file).

47. Ibid.


49. Catherine Andreyev, Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement, (1987), 125. Kovalchuk (a pseudonym for N. Granin) was editor of the Vlasovite paper Zarya; Zaitsev
was the senior lecturer at Dabendorf. The KNOR Manifesto was publicly presented in Prague (the only significant Slavic city still held by the Nazis) on November 14, 1944. It was published in Berlin on November 18, 1944. The Prague Manifesto was derived from two sources: NTS political philosophy through Zaitsev; and von Grote's Nazi propaganda leaflet via the Smolensk Declaration of Vlasov and Zykov.

50. B. Yakovlev, CIC file, INSCOM, 67.


52. Ibid, 01.

53. Ibid, 112. The CIC file states that George Fischer's mother appointed Yakovlev (Troitsky) to the position of director of the Russian Library. The CIC file (page 112) also indicates that an Agent Report of October 1, 1948 on the subject of Dr. Arnold Margolin "states that Boris Yakovlev was an instructor at the European Command Intelligence School at OBERAMMERGAU, and was working under MARGOLIN." Since Troitsky makes no mention of this in subsequent biographical statements to CIC interrogators, it seems likely that the Boris Yakovlev referred to in the report on Margolin was the other Yakovlev.

54. Soiuz Borby za Osbobozhdenie Narodov Rossii, 1947-1962, (1962), 23. This history of SBONR indicates no individual author. Published in Munich it opens with a full page photograph of Vlasov whose picture can also be seen prominently adorning the wall in photographs of SBONR meetings. A CIC "Personality Report" on Troitsky notes that he allegedly persuaded Kromiadi "to foster the SMNR in late 1946." The Troitsky CIC file, 176, 180.

55. Troitsky's CIC file, op. cit., 180. The lecture was given on August 13, 1947.

56. Soiuz Borby za Osvobozhdenie Narodov Rossii, passim.

57. Ibid. This was the meeting which established the CIA-funded Congress for Cultural Freedom. See Christopher Lasch, The Agony of the American Left, (1969), 61-114.

59. See Nikolas Troitsky file, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Buffalo, N.Y. The complete file could not be released for privacy reasons (i.e., Troitsky was still alive). But a clipping from the World Telegram (November 22, 1955) was forwarded; it indicates that Troitsky arrived in the U.S. on November 22, 1955. Describing Troitsky as a former "faculty member of the Moscow Architectural Institute," the article omitted reference to his collaborationist past stating simply: "Taken prisoner by the Germans he was rescued by the American Army...." The article went on to claim that in 1954 "a spectacular attempt was made by the Russians to kidnap him ..." thus prompting him to find a more secure environment than Munich in which to live. It was to Troitsky's great benefit to hire himself out to the State Department and the CIA and to thus secure the reward of American emigration because, in applying for entry into the U.S., the Displaced Persons Commission found him "ineligible for emigration to the United States under the provisions of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948." See Troitsky's CIC file, 162. The denial, signed by Donald W. Main, the senior officer for Area 6, and directed to the director of the Resettlement Center at Funk Kaserne, is dated February 14, 1949. The E.C. number on the file (E.C. #5434) confirms that Troitsky is the subject under consideration and not the real Boris Yakovlev. After his arrival in America, Troitsky eventually settled down in Vestal, N.Y. living (appropriately enough) at 605 Harvard Street.

60. Michael Aldan, CIC file, 73, 77, 152. See also page nine of the "List of war criminals and persons who collaborated with the enemy, in the U.S. Zone of Occupation in Germany" attached to the April 30, 1949 letter of General V. Chiukov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Occupation Forces and Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, to General Lucius Clay, U.S. Military Governor. Robert F. Kelley Papers, Georgetown University. Aldan's U.S. government files are voluminous and range through at least four agencies; CIC/INSCOM, FBI, INS, and CIA. The data used here are primarily CIC/INSCOM records amounting to several dozens of pages. Yet these released files are only a portion of Aldan's CIC file for, in addition to some information being sanitized from these files, the Army also withheld 58 pages of hardcopy records and approximately 500 pages of microfilm records in their entirety because they are currently classified Secret. The FBI released 11 heavily censored pages of the 28 it reviewed; much of the file had to be reviewed with the CIA and it was the CIA which prohibited the release of most of Aldan's file.

61. Soviet General Chiukov in "List of war criminals ..." op. cit., claimed 1902 - Yurezan (Cheliabinsk District) while Aldan's CIC file states October 24, 1904 and also October 24, 1910 - "Bozky near Grodno (now Poland)." The 1910 date is extremely improbable in light of Aldan's participation in the Russian Civil War.


64. Aldan CIC file, *op. cit.*, 72.


72. Aldan's relationship to U.S. intelligence agencies as described in that section of his file drawn from the report entitled "Foreign-Born Contract Employees in G-2" gives his date of hire on a permanent basis as January, 1949, *ibid.*, 226. This is incorrect and probably reflects a simple clerical error for other portions of his CIC file reveal a request from October 1949 to employ Aldan permanently at Detachment R. He was not cleared until January 1950. See note 74 below. (G-2 was the designation for the Intelligence Division of the U.S. Army.)


74. The approval came from the Intelligence Division at the Headquarters of the European Command. It was dated January 9, 1950. Aldan was to be paid in U.S. dollars rather than Deutsche Marks. See Aldan CIC file, 166, 167.

75. *Soiuz Borby za Osvobozhdenie Narodov Rossii, passim.*

76. Aldan, CIC file, *op. cit.*, 150.

78. Ibid, 138. See also B.L. Dvinov, Politics of the Russian Emigration, 1955, 274.

79. Dvinov, op. cit 274 (SVOD and SBONR shared leadership and membership although they each insisted on separate organizational identities.)

80. Aldan’s CIC file, 241-247. Living at 1501 Key Boulevard, Apt. #2, in Arlington, Virginia, Aldan was, in 1954, earning $4,757.00 as a “writer.” While in the USA he also decided to marry at the end of 1954, Hedwig Rosa Riesinger, his German girlfriend of many years.

81. Abdurachman Kunta (Avtorkhanov) CIC file, INSCOM, 601. Kunta’s four volume CIC file comprises 946 pages which primarily consist of CIC personnel security background investigations. INSCOM released 41 pages. Several of these pages consist of the biographical report based on Kunta’s CIC lie detector examinations of November 28 and 29, 1961 in the offices of Detachment R, Hawkins Barracks, Oberammergau.

82. Although he was only 22 when selected for his work, Avtorkhanov maintained that Chechen was a “backward region” with few literate people. He was thus one of the very few well educated Chechens. (He also pointed out that he was initially chosen for advanced study because of the consideration given to his ethnic group by the Soviet government in its effort to raise educational standards.) See Kunta CIC file, 309.

83. Ibid, 262, 263. This file is dated 1965. It is not possible on the basis of limited information in the released files themselves to determine which title is more correct.

84. Ibid, 267.

85. Ibid, 263, 765. Another part of the file states that he worked for the propaganda group in the Comintern, not the Central Committee, from 1933 to 1937.

86. Ibid, 879. This specification of charges was in a January 1951 report. The story about his anti-Soviet brother-in-law appears in a March 1955 report. The 1951 report also contains Avtorkhanov’s admission that he had a Trotskyite friend, Jivrian Eschba, who was a member of the Soviet trade agency, Amtorg, in the United States. His 1961 file expanded on the details of Eschba’s relevance to his troubles with the Soviet secret police. Upon his 1942 release from prison, Avtorkhanov heard that Eschba with the Soviet Embassy in London had identified Avtorkhanov as an espionage agent in a confession relating to his own (i.e., Eschba’s) arrest on spy charges. Avtorkhanov admitted to CIC agents that
he knew Eschba and spoke with him several times but claimed that neither were spies and that Eschba would have implicated Avtorkhanov only while under duress, (ibid, 313). The released portions of the CIC file do not discuss Eschba’s transfer from Amtorg to the London Embassy nor his possible Trotskyite connections.

87. Ibid, 313.
88. Ibid, 314.
89. Ibid, 637, 640, 767.
90. Ibid, 767.
91. Ibid, 314.
92. Ibid, 637.
93. Ibid, 637, 768. The fortuitous meeting with David Dallin led to a long, secure postwar career for Avtorkhanov - Kunta. Employed as a faculty member with Detachment R well into the 1960s he had become Chairman of the Political Department by April 1965. In this capacity he lectured on “History of Russia and the USSR Since 1800,” “Communist Doctrine and Ideology,” and “The Communist Party.” See his CIC file, 263.

94. This account of Shteppa’s life is taken from Alexander Dallin’s foreward to Shteppa’s posthumous publication, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, (1962).


96. See note 40.
97. Aldan’s CIC file, 72, 204.
98. Defector Interviews file, Correspondence, Merle Fainsod Papers, HUA.

99. Correspondence of Ivar Nieman to Merle Fainsod, October 31, 1949, Merle Fainsod Papers, HUA.

101. Correspondence of Ivar Nierman, November 17, 1949, *Merle Fainsod Papers*, HUA.

102. Aldan CIC file, 204.

103. Interview with Leon J. Barat, March 30, 1984, Munich, Germany. Leon Barat was one of the CIA’s on-site advisors to the Institute.