The Public Politics of Aleksandr Nikolaevich Yakovlev, 1983-1989

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During the first five years of his reign as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC/CPSU) M.S. Gorbachev has changed the structure of authority in the USSR's political system. He initially regarded the interlocking directorate of Politburo and Secretariat as the final source of authority and the ultimate driving force for his program of reform, the CC/CPSU as a miniparliament for the discussion and elaboration of his proposals, and the CPSU's apparatus of full time officials as the major instrument to assure the program's implementation. Gorbachev's initial definition seemed to be the logical expression of his own experience as a party official who became General Secretary only after an extensive career as a regional party leader, a Secretary of the CC/CPSU with a functional specialization, and considerable experience as a member of the Politburo.

But Gorbachev almost immediately encountered resistance to his objectives at all three levels of this traditional structure. Within the Politburo-Secretariat directorate serious conflict developed over the range and scope of perestroika which was most dramatically expressed in Ye. Ligachev's orthodox criticism of some, ¹ but not all, aspects of Gorbachev's program, on the one hand, and the expulsion of the "radical" B. Yeltsin from the Politburo, on the other. Furthermore, resistance to Gorbachev's suggestions became increasingly explicit at the periodic plenums of the CC/CPSU. In January 1987, the CC/CPSU evidently refused to endorse Gorbachev's efforts to force local party officials to face elections in their local party committees. At the June 1987 plenum the General Secretary voiced his exasperation and frustration at growing resistance and ideological confusion in the leadership, and in October 1987 the CC/CPSU condemned Yeltsin's assault on perestroika and strengthened the hands of Gorbachev's opponents. In February 1988 the CC/CPSU seemed so deadlocked between the proponents and opponents of reform that critics of perestroika sympathetic to some of Ligachev's views felt free to make a vicious assault on Gorbachev's program and his supporters in the CPSU.
As resistance to Gorbachev's program grew in 1987-1988, he became increasingly critical of local party officials for their perennial interference in the state's administration of social and economic policy, and he urged them to turn to "political leadership" of party members throughout the entire system. This orientation, which placed great faith in officials' power of persuasion and ideological influence, left them with few concrete functions other than personnel management and the repetition of an increasingly revisionist official ideology.

Sometime in the spring of 1988, evidently distressed by the surge of opposition to his program, the General Secretary shifted from overt criticism of party officials' behavior and beliefs to the establishment of an alternative system of authority. Gorbachev decided to democratize the state structure by transforming the moribund Supreme Soviet into an indirectly elected representative institution with broad but ill-defined legislative authority. At the same time Gorbachev sought to broaden his own constitutional executive authority by assuring his election as the powerful Chairman of the new Supreme Soviet.

The elections to the Congress of Peoples Deputies, which selected the Supreme Soviet from its own membership, dealt a major blow to the traditional distribution of authority. Although party officials were able to control the nomination process for many deputies, some important but unpopular local officials were rejected by the electorate. Moreover the electoral campaign itself revealed growing hostility to the Gorbachev leadership and the CPSU as a whole. In addition, the first sessions of the new body led to the formation of an increasingly vocal opposition and to a growing conviction that the Supreme Soviet could replace the CC/CPSU as the country's real parliament. In the latter part of 1989 Gorbachev evidently concluded that these new legislative structures could not respond quickly and effectively to the series of strikes, nationalist upheavals, and profound economic difficulties which plagued the USSR. In early 1990 he had himself elected to the new executive position of
President of the USSR which would give him the necessary authority to deal with these problems. (See Postscript)

Throughout this dramatic period of transition, Gorbachev's own public pronouncements provided a coherent sense of his own shifting objectives, but they did not reveal the extent of the leadership's response to his initiatives. This study attempts to demonstrate that it is possible to infer the leadership's response to Gorbachev's program from the public commentary and activities of one of his key lieutenants, Aleksandr Nikolaevich Yakovlev, a Secretary of the CC/CPSU and Politburo member who served as a major spokesman for the Gorbachev regime in the 1985-1988 period. Yakovlev's public commentaries and activities have been largely ignored because Western analysts have presumed that Yakovlev was and is the eminence grise of the Gorbachev regime and that this private position was far more significant than his public role. Western journalists have described Yakovlev as the "mid-wife of glasnost," the "major force" behind Gorbachev's "new thinking" in international relations and "arguably the second most important force in Gorbachev's effort to reinvent socialism." While it is impossible to determine the accuracy of this interpretation, Western academic analysts seem to have accepted it without demur.

Whatever Yakovlev's private role, his public statements and activities provide a sensitive barometer of the "balance of forces" between the supporters and opponents of various elements of Gorbachev's reforms. Yakovlev did not provide uniform and enthusiastic support for perestroika and glasnost which might have been expected from the so called "mid-wife of glasnost." In fact, in the years between 1985 and the reorganization of the Secretariat in the fall of 1988, Yakovlev's public commentary varied. Sometimes he was an ardent and enthusiastic public supporter of Gorbachev's initiatives and acted as the General Secretary's emissary to local party leaders and important intellectual groups such as social scientists or editors. However, during some critical periods in the process of reform, Yakovlev remained silent and at other times he seemed to en-
dorse the views of Gorbachev's critics by lumping them together with pro-Gorbachev formulations. Moreover, he sometimes emerged as more radical than the General Secretary, particularly after the reform of the Secretariat in the fall of 1988.

What accounts for this variation in public support of the General Secretary? Circumstantial evident suggests that Yakovlev's public support for Gorbachev's program varied in response to the extent of leadership opposition to the reform program at a particular time. Yakovlev vigorously endorsed Gorbachev's orientation only when the General Secretary seemed to be riding the initial wave of support which followed his new initiatives in public policy. Yakovlev's response to the General Secretary's own temporary retreats strongly suggests that these shifts were produced by opposition within the leadership. Yakovlev not only followed the General Secretary's leads, but also seemed to be strikingly responsive to the views of the General Secretary's critics.

Yakovlev's responsiveness to discord in the leadership had considerable political significance in its own right. In the atmosphere of glasnost and growing political discord, the variation in his public support not only reflected the balance between proponents and opponents of reform, but simultaneously played a role in determining that balance. In particular, the public orientation of Gorbachev's lieutenants played a significant role in the General Secretary's efforts to extend his authority and capacity to implement his program. Throughout his reign, the General Secretary has sought to retain (and regain) the momentum of reform with dramatic public announcements of new initiatives. Yet, as noted above, the implementation of reform has been periodically slowed by opposition and skepticism at all levels of the CPSU. As a consequence, Gorbachev has been constantly engaged in efforts to mobilize support for his program against such resistance. In this context, consistent and enthusiastic public support from his lieutenants can only foster this mobilization process and help to keep the various skeptics and opponents off guard and at bay.
Conversely, any slackening of key lieutenants' public support seems to encourage bolder criticism of reform and slow its implementation.

On a more general level, the variation in Yakovlev's public support for reform reflected his bureaucratic role as a full time party official trained to act as a spokesman for the regime. Over the years, the party leadership's commitment to direct all spheres of social and economic life had produced extensive specialization within party officialdom demanding specialized training and producing specialized career paths and patterns for party officials. Yakovlev's entire career and his public commentary, at least up until the reform of the Secretariat in the fall of 1988, seemed to reflect this specialization in the extreme. Yakovlev had been trained as a propagandist and spokesman for the leadership on both American foreign policy and various domestic cultural-ideological matters, and he essentially continued to serve in this capacity for General Secretaries Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev.

This study of Yakovlev's career begins with a rather abbreviated discussion of his role as a spokesman for the regime as an official in the propaganda department of the CC/CPSU in the 1960s until his appointment as the USSR's ambassador to Canada in 1973. During his decade of service in Canada, Yakovlev published virtually nothing (as far as can be determined from standard Soviet bibliographies). Hence, no effort has been made to deal with this aspect of his career. The bulk of this study focuses on his role as spokesman for the Soviet leadership in the period between his return to Moscow as the Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR's Academy of Sciences (IMEMO) in late 1983 and the reform of the Secretariat of the CC/CPSU in the fall of 1988. The concluding section of the study deals with his major public comments in the period between the reorganization of the Secretariat, which led to his appointment as the Chairman of the new Commission on International Policy, and Gorbachev's election as President of the USSR in early 1990. In March 1990 Yakovlev was appointed to Gorbachev's new Presidential Council.
Circumstantial evidence suggests that Yakovlev was exceptionally dependent upon Gorbachev's personal favor throughout the 1983-1988 period. First of all, Gorbachev reportedly played a key role in Yakovlev's appointment as director of IMEMO in late 1983. For the next two years, Yakovlev served as a leading spokesman on American foreign policy for Andropov and Chernenko. Shortly after Gorbachev was named General Secretary in March 1985, Yakovlev was named the director of the CC/CPSU's propaganda department. In the fall of 1985, he was also named to the Soviet Union's delegation to the first summit conference between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva.

As director of the propaganda department (which was subordinate to the CC/CPSU's Secretariat) Yakovlev became increasingly involved in the growing public debate over perestroika between Gorbachev and Ye. Ligachev, who had been CC/CPSU Secretary since late 1983 and a full member of the Politburo since 1985. Evidence of conflict between Yakovlev and Ligachev over ideological matters first became public at the 27th Congress of the CPSU in March 1986. Yakovlev was promoted to the position of Secretary of the CC/CPSU at this Congress and in the fall of 1986 joined the USSR's delegation to the summit conference in Iceland between Reagan and Gorbachev.

The failure of this summit conference to reach agreement on arms control evidently was a considerable setback for Gorbachev and temporarily checked the pace of internal reform. However, in early 1987 Gorbachev made a series of important initiatives in both domestic and foreign policy which restored the momentum of reform and evidently had a dramatic impact on Yakovlev's position within the leadership. He was named a candidate member of the Politburo at the CC/CPSU meeting in January 1987. In the following months he emerged as an ardent and sophisticated public supporter of reform at home and "new thinking" in international relations and seemed to eclipse Ligachev as a spokesman on ideological and cultural policies.
In June 1987 the CC/CPSU convened to approve basic changes in economic administration. Although Yakovlev was named to full membership in the Politburo at the CC/CPSU plenum, this promotion was followed by a decline in his public support for Gorbachev's initiatives. Critics of the dangers of glasnost and democratization seemed to become more outspoken in the months after the CC/CPSU meeting in June, but Yakovlev did not respond to these arguments in public. In fact, he did not speak publicly from the spring of 1987 until he emerged in November 1987 to brief media officials on Gorbachev's report on the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution.

Yakovlev's public support for Gorbachev's priorities reached its lowest point in his briefing on the CC/CPSU plenum of February 1988, where the critics of perestroika seemed to enjoy considerable authority. Moreover, in the months after this meeting, when these critics seemed to become particularly outspoken, Yakovlev played a secondary role in the regime's public response. In fact, Yakovlev did not reemerge as an ardent public supporter of Gorbachev's program until after the 19th Conference of the CPSU when Gorbachev seized the initiative with a new program for radical political reform.

At the end of September 1988 Gorbachev totally reformed the Secretariat by creating six new functional commissions to supervise and coordinate its various departments and to grant members of the CC/CPSU a larger role in policy making between plenums. Yakovlev's appointment as the chairman of the commission on international policy significantly changed his role in the leadership. He no longer briefed subordinate officials on the leadership's positions, he did not clash publicly with Ligachev (who was named chairman of the new commission on agriculture), instead he emerged as an increasingly outspoken social democrat, a supporter of the new legislative-representative institutions, and an ardent advocate of political liberty.
Yakovlev’s career in the 1980s was a logical outgrowth of his earlier career as a party official in the 1960s and 1970s. In contrast to Ye. Ligachev, who had an extraordinarily broad background in different sectors of party work, Yakovlev was trained as a propagandist specializing in foreign affairs and continued to serve in that capacity throughout this career. After working in the regional party apparatus in the 1950s, Yakovlev attended the CC/CPSU’s Academy of Social Sciences, the party’s leading internal educational program for propagandists from 1956 to 1960, spending the 1958-1959 academic year as a graduate student at Columbia University in New York City. Upon graduation from the academy in 1960, Yakovlev entered the propaganda department as an instructor and reportedly rose quickly to become the director of its radio-TV department sometime in the mid-1960s. His career was evidently not hampered by the ouster of N.S. Khrushchev as First Secretary in October 1964. Since he was named first deputy director of the propaganda department sometime in 1965 and held this position until 1973 when he was named ambassador to Canada.

Yakovlev’s writings on American foreign policy consistently reflected the state of Soviet-American relations at the time of publication. His first prevailing work, an analysis of American social scientists’ conception of American foreign policy, was published in July 1961, just before the sharpening of the Berlin crisis seriously undermined the tentative improvement in Soviet-American relations prompted by Khrushchev’s congratulatory telegram to President Kennedy in early 1961. Yakovlev charged that American analysts simply provided a variety of “theories, ideas, and doctrines” which rationalized the “aggressive aims of American imperialism.” While he did recognize that many American specialists questioned key elements of official ideology and praised individual works for their candor and directness in criticizing American policy, he essentially argued that American social scientists had become apologists for aggression abroad and repression at home.
Yakovlev continued to deal with these themes once he had become a leading official in the propaganda department in 1965 and his treatment of the USA directly reflected the dramatic shifts in Soviet-American relations during the 1965-1973 period. In the 1965-1968 period, when these relations were soured by the USA's military attacks on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the USSR's military intervention against the reformist Dubcek leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Yakovlev provided sharply orthodox (but unusually well informed) attacks on American foreign and domestic policies. For example, in late 1965 Yakovlev published a lengthy pamphlet which represented the USA as the greatest threat to world peace for all of humanity, blamed the American government for virtually every conflict in the world, charging that it engaged in vast anti-Soviet and anti-Communist propaganda to prepare the American people for war against the USSR. A more detailed monograph, published in 1967 and based in part on his earlier work, reiterated the thesis that American political analysis of international politics was but a thinly veiled rationale for the American government's efforts to achieve "world domination." A third study, entitled Pax Americana and published in mid-1969, was a more popularized critique of American ideology which traced the aggressiveness of American foreign policy to the messianic impulses of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

But later that year Yakovlev was evidently obliged to change his position in response to significant shifts in Soviet-American relations. The clear deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the spring and summer of 1969 evidently convinced the USSR's leadership that it was essential to improve relations with the USA, despite its actions in Vietnam. This shift in orientation demanded at least a partial repudiation of orthodox definitions of the USA, and Yakovlev was apparently obliged to follow suit. A collection of essays on the USA published under his editorial direction muted the usual savage assault on American policy in Vietnam and did not portray the USA as an immediate threat to the USSR's national security. Finally, the subsequent fundamental improvement in Soviet-American
relations in the early 1970s appears to have led Yakovlev to jettison, at least temporarily, his orthodox views on the USA. In fact, the summit conference between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev in the spring of 1972, which marked the beginning of detente between the USSR and the USA, clearly made traditional orthodoxy obsolete. A few months after this summit conference the propaganda department issued a new basic text for political education under Yakovlev’s editorial direction which simply discarded the assaults of American “imperialism” and lauded the new cooperative relationship between the USA and USSR.11

In the early 1970s Yakovlev seemed to turn from an analysis of American foreign policy to articles about the role of the proletariat in the USSR and abroad. The reason for this shift in focus is not clear but it may have reflected Yakovlev’s identification and support for the orthodox position of M.A. Suslov, the powerful CC Secretary and Politburo member who both supervised Yakovlev’s propaganda department and was deeply concerned with the international Communist movement. Whatever Yakovlev’s exact relationship with Suslov, some of his writings seemed inordinately obsequious towards Suslov’s “brilliant discussions” of the international communist movement.12 Yakovlev’s status in the leadership improved considerably at the 24th Congress of the CPSU in March 197113 and after the Congress he emerged as a particularly vigorous advocate of orthodox formulations on the proletariat’s revolutionary role at home and abroad.14 In this context, he sharply assailed Western “apologists” and socialist “revisionists” for denigrating and ignoring the overriding importance of class conflict between proletariat and bourgeoisie, attacked the Chinese “dogmatists” for portraying the peasantry rather than the proletariat as the social class most interested in social transformation, and vigorously insisted that the working class maintain the leading role in both the USSR and revolutionary movements abroad.15

But the most important article published in the 1970s by Yakovlev was not his defense of proletarian hegemony, but his scathing orthodox assault in November 1972 on the growing expressions of Russophilism which had
appeared increasingly in both official and unofficial publications since the late 1960s. Alexander Yanov’s study *The Russian New Right* concluded that Yakovlev had been opposed to the growth of Russophilism from its inception, particularly its expression in the Komsomol journal *Molodaia Gvardiia*, and was responsible for *Kommunist’s* sharp criticism of this ideological orientation and changes in *Molodaia Gvardiia’s* editorial board.  

Whatever Yakovlev’s exact role in these earlier efforts to limit and counter Russophilism, Yakolev’s lengthy assault in *Literaturnaia Gazeta* (November 15, 1972, 4-5) denounced the Russophiles’ glorification of the Russian past and the “Russian spirit” as anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist. Yakovlev charged that a wide range of writers and publicists had rejected the USSR’s socialist values for a romanticized and ahistorical conception of the Russian past, overlooked the brutality and backwardness of the Tsarist Russian Empire, romanticized the peasant patriarchal society destroyed by the development of socialism, and ignored Lenin’s “dialectical” conception of the peasantry as both exploited and brutish in spirit. He harshly attacked the modern defenders of Slavophilism who had forgotten its “reactionary nature” and assailed Solzhenitsyn’s positive portrayal of some elements of the tsarist order in his novel *August 1914*. Yakovlev criticized both the Russophiles (and to a lesser extent their counterparts in non-Russian segments of the USSR) for totally ignoring class conflicts and the social transformations carried out under CPSU leadership in their uncritical enthusiasm for all expressions of the so-called “national spirit.” In sum, Yakovlev simply provided a spirited and effective defense of the orthodox official conception of the USSR as a massive advance over the Russian Empire.

Shortly after the publication of Yakovlev’s essay, the official campaign against Russophilism was reportedly cut short, and he was named ambassador to Canada in 1973. Alexander Yanov has concluded that Yakovlev’s critique of Russophilism so angered its proponents in the leadership that he was sent into exile for his views. Yakovlev remained in
Canada until 1983 when Gorbachev, touring the country as the head of a Supreme Soviet delegation, was reportedly so impressed with Yakovlev that he had him named director of IMEMO. As a result, Yakovlev resumed his former position as one of the regime's leading commentators on American foreign policy, but his position in the leadership was now vastly improved. In 1973, before his appointment (or exile) as ambassador to Canada, Yakovlev had been a high ranking member of the Secretariat's apparatus but evidently did not have a powerful patron in the top political leadership. Thus, when he returned to Moscow in 1983 Yakovlev had no position in the party's apparatus but he had an immensely powerful patron in the vigorous and influential Gorbachev. Indeed, it is at least plausible that Gorbachev had named Yakovlev to the position to assure that he had his "own" specialist on the USA. Despite his powerful position as a CC Secretary and member of the Politburo, Gorbachev had no formal education in foreign affairs and Yakovlev's appointment may have been designed to establish an independent source of advice for the increasingly influential Gorbachev.

1983-1985

Whatever the relationship between Gorbachev and his protege at this juncture, the fall of 1983 was hardly conducive to the development of "new thinking" in regard to international politics. Yakovlev's appointment coincided with a particularly tense period in US-USSR relations. In the summer of 1983 General Secretary Andropov had charged that President Reagan's verbal assaults on the USSR and his support for development of the Strategic Defense Initiative had led to an "unprecedented confrontation" between the USA and USSR. Furthermore, the Soviet airforce's destruction of a Korean civilian airliner in September 1983 so intensified the hostility between the Soviet and American leaderships that Andropov concluded that it was impossible to improve relations with the
USA because of its “militarist course” and aspiration for world domination. 21

In this grim context, Yakovlev's published commentary on American foreign policy was little more than an elaborate gloss on Andropov's orthodox assessment. Yakovlev portrayed the Reagan administration's ostensible drive for world domination as a function both of the President's own belligerent outlook and the long standing American tradition of expansionism. He attributed the USA's aspirations to its immense power, its long standing cult of “force and violence,” the overall profitability of “imperialist adventures” for its ruling class, and the society's lack of direct experience with war which undermined internal resistance to continued adventurism. 22

In December 1983 Yakovlev claimed that the Reagan administration's policy was essentially the latest and most dangerous manifestation of a deep rooted American messianism which had developed in the nineteenth century and emerged as particularly dangerous in the immediate aftermath of World War II. 23 Yakovlev charged that the Reagan administration had created a virtually “totalitarian” state based on racism and greed, which openly sought confrontation with the USSR because of its “paranoid hatred” of the Soviet system. 24

Yakovlev also blamed the Reagan administration for the collapse of the Soviet-American negotiations on arms control in November 1983. While Yakovlev seemed to argue against “overestimating” the American threat to the USSR, 25 in early 1984 he declared that the Reagan regime was controlled by the “most bellicose and reactionary part of the imperialist bourgeoisie” which sought the destruction of the socialist world. 26

After Andropov's death in February 1984, his successor as General Secretary, K.U. Chernenko, made a serious effort to reduce the high level of tension between the superpowers. Although he was sharply critical of the Reagan administration's policies, he also repeatedly called for improved relations with the USA in his public pronouncements throughout
1984. In the midst of Chernenko’s efforts, Yakovlev’s major study of American foreign policy was published. This study had obviously been written in 1983 at a time of immense tension in Soviet-American relations, and not only elaborated on his previously published criticism of American society and foreign policy, but also portrayed the Reagan administration as the most extreme and dangerous manifestation of traditional American messianism.

The response to Yakovlev’s tirade suggested that at least one segment of the leadership did not regard this orthodoxy as appropriate for the current efforts to improve relations with the Reagan regime. In particular, Izvestiia’s review, while endorsing the overall characterization of the American administration, clearly implied that Yakovlev had underestimated the breadth and extent of American public’s opposition to the administration’s “adventurism,” a conclusion which implied that the administration was capable of changing its policies. However, the text was republished at length in Moskovskaia Pravda in November/December 1984 which seemed to imply that within the USSR’s leadership there was still authoritative support for Yakovlev’s orthodoxy.

Whatever the extent of leadership support for Yakovlev’s positions, Gorbachev dramatically demonstrated his own faith in his protege by making him a member of the Supreme Soviet delegation which Gorbachev led to the United Kingdom in December 1984. Gorbachev’s conciliatory remarks on international politics in Great Britain reflected the dramatic improvement in US-USSR relations which had developed by the end of 1984. This shift was dramatized by the conference between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko (January 1985) which led to a resumption of the arms control negotiations.

The January 1985 conference evidently obliged Yakovlev to modify, at least in part, his orthodox conception of the Reagan regime. In February 1985 Yakovlev served as the editor of a scholarly symposium marking the 40th anniversary of the Yalta Conference of 1945. This volume included an introduction by Foreign Minister Gromyko stressing the need to use
existing opportunities to foster Soviet-American cooperation in preventing the outbreak of war and ending the arms race.\textsuperscript{32} In this context, Yakovlev grafted a more conciliatory approach to the USA onto an orthodox assessment of American policy. On the one hand, he argued that both the American and British ruling classes had attempted to use German fascism as a weapon against the USSR before the outbreak of World War II and he continued to criticize the American leadership's striving for world domination. On the other hand, he declared that the USA and USSR could cooperate in 1985 as they had in 1945 and quoted Gromyko's statement of support for negotiated settlements of outstanding disputes.\textsuperscript{33}

Shortly after the conference on Yalta, Yakovlev discarded his orthodox view that the Reagan regime perceived itself as only facing significant resistance to its aggressive foreign policy from the USSR. Yakovlev now asserted that the Reagan regime had become aware that its conflicts with the USSR could \textit{not} be resolved by military means, and that its "cavalry charge" approach had frightened both American voters and its allies in Europe. Yakovlev now claimed that there was an "anti-militarist" tendency within the USA whose challenge to the "militarist tendency" produced "zig-zags in policy as in the past," and insisted (as Gromyko and Chernenko had before him) that even rhetorical shifts in American policy could reduce Soviet-American tension and hopefully open the path to normalization of relations.\textsuperscript{34}

1985-1989

With Gorbachev's selection as General Secretary after Chernenko's death, Yakovlev began to provide authoritative elaborations on the new General Secretary's own comments on foreign affairs. In fact, Gorbachev's first detailed comments on international politics in the spring of 1985 seemed to indicate that he initially shared Yakovlev's views on the USA. In his brief remarks to the CC/CPSU in March 1985, Gorbachev had explicitly
called for the restoration of detente with the USA, but his report in May 1985 marking the 40th anniversary of Germany’s defeat in World War II included a strikingly orthodox view of the the Reagan regime.

Gorbachev not only charged that the USA had persistently used its vast economic power and its nuclear arsenal to pressure the USSR, but he also defined American militarism as a “permanent negative feature” in international politics. He insisted that the “aggressive aspirations” of the American elite caused it to seek military superiority over the USSR, accelerate the arms race and extend it into outer space, use “state terror” against the Nicaraguan regime and support the war against the legitimate regime in Afghanistan. Gorbachev assailed the American leadership’s belief that it had a unique mission which allowed it to disregard the interests of other states, and lashed out at the USA’s alleged support for the Federal Republic of Germany’s “revanchism.”

Yakovlev’s gloss on Gorbachev’s address, published in June 1985, was even more orthodox in its assessment of the Reagan regime. Yakovlev assailed the Reagan administration for “whitewashing fascism” at the time of the anniversary of its defeat, for its “holy war against communism, desire for world domination and messianism,” and for a policy of confrontation with the USSR. Yakovlev also implied, in an essay published in SSh A, that the USA had become virtually a fascist state and sought to achieve “social revenge” by ostensibly supporting the FRG’s revanchism against the GDR. Most strikingly, Yakovlev clearly implied that the cooperation between the USA and Germany against the USSR had begun soon after the Bolshevik revolution and flourished after World War II, and that the American leadership used the slogans about the “Soviet threat” as the Nazis had done in the 1930s. While Yakovlev recognized that European political leaders resisted American efforts at domination, he represented German-American cooperation against the socialist bloc as a grave source of danger.

In August 1985, a revised version of Yakovlev’s major study of American foreign policy was published. While its overall characterization
of the Reagan administration remained orthodox, it also included certain new themes and formulations which appeared briefly in Gorbachev’s own subsequent analysis of the Reagan administration. In particular, the revised edition recognized that the Reagan administration had adopted a more conciliatory policy toward the USSR, but interpreted this shift as a tactical response to the growing anxiety of the USA’s European allies and the American electorate over the regime’s “adventurism,” rather than a fundamental change by a “new Reagan”. In discussing the USSR’s proper response to this shift Yakovlev concluded:

As we see it, in the concrete context of the mid-1980’s, the point is not whether or not to believe the American administration. What is more important is that every effort should be made to take every opportunity to improve and normalize international relations. Even purely tactical steps taken by the USA administration to restrain the hysteria reigning in American foreign policy could help if not to considerably improve US-USSR relations, that at least for a start to bring down the level of enmity and thereby ameliorate the political climate in the world.

Yakovlev also argued that the US-USSR negotiations on arms control, which had resumed as a result of the conference between Gromyko and Schultz in January 1985, could generate a logic of their own which would force the Reagan regime either to give up its efforts to achieve strategic superiority over the USSR or recognize its own insincerity. While Yakovlev concluded his study with the declaration that the USA used “militarism and war” to achieve its foreign policy objectives, he argued that the leadership would be obliged to improve relations with the USSR even though it was “contrary to the intentions and goals of American ruling circles.”

In November 1985 Gorbachev and Reagan met for the first summit conference in Geneva. Yakovlev, who had been named head of the propaganda department sometime in the summer or fall, was a member of the USSR’s small delegation. Gorbachev’s commentary on the summit revealed that he still shared, at least in part, Yakovlev’s orthodox view of the Reagan administration. In his press conference immediately after the
summit, Gorbachev declared that he and his colleagues had been well aware that the USA was a "fully militarized state," but that the USSR had taken initiatives in regard to arms control in order to foster "any chance" of improved relations. Furthermore, Gorbachev's report to the Supreme Soviet in November also presented the USA in orthodox terms. He charged that the Reagan regime had sought to achieve military superiority over the USSR by a program of massive rearmament, the placement of "first strike missiles" in Europe aimed at the USSR, and the development of the SDI, but had been "forced" into a more "realistic position" by the USSR's consistent "firmness" against the USA.

Yet it must be emphasized that Gorbachev did move beyond these orthodoxies to a far more optimistic appraisal of future Soviet-American cooperation. Gorbachev now declared that the "interdependence and interconnection" between the USA and the USSR were as significant as the differences between the two states and adopted a far more positive view of the Reagan regime than Yakovlev had ever done in public. Gorbachev now clearly implied that President Reagan was a "realist" who recognized the legitimacy of the USSR's security interests as well as the dangers inherent in continued efforts to achieve strategic superiority and whose personal participation in the process of problem solving was a positive step forward. While it is possible that Yakovlev may have inspired this significant step in Gorbachev's "new thinking," Yakovlev's public record does not support this conclusion. While he had been willing to endorse the major principles of peaceful coexistence as the basis for Soviet-American relations, he himself made no public reference to the significance of "new thinking" in international relations until March 1987.

In the interim, Yakovlev, as head of the propaganda department, increasingly clashed with Ye. Ligachev over the direction of ideological and cultural matters and the mass media. Ligachev had far broader experience as a party official than Yakovlev. He had served in the propaganda and personnel departments of the CPSU's Bureau for the RSFSR under Khrushchev and as a regional first secretary from 1965 until 1983,
when he returned to the Secretariat as the director of its cadre department. He was named a CC Secretary in late 1983 and promoted directly into the Politburo shortly after Gorbachev was named General Secretary. Ligachev’s authority in the leadership was ill-defined and in constant flux (despite many Western analysts’ insistence that he was virtual second in command as “second secretary”), but he clearly regarded himself as an authoritative spokesman on ideological and cultural matters. His ongoing commentary on Gorbachev’s major pronouncements revealed a growing anxiety over the potentially disruptive impact of glasnost on the morale of Soviet citizens. He periodically endorsed the media’s exposure of shortcomings, but also repeatedly urged media officials to continue to mobilize Soviet citizens around the regime’s immediate objectives and to expose the various horrors of “bourgeois” society and ideology.48

During the first months of Yakovlev’s tenure as head of the propaganda department, Ligachev seemed to retain considerable authority in ideological matters. In particular, Ligachev seemed to set the tone for a series of CC sponsored conferences on ideological questions convened in the winter of 1985-1986, which Yakovlev did not even attend.49 The first public indication of Yakovlev’s challenge to Ligachev did not appear until the 27th Congress of the CPSU in February/March 1986 when Yakovlev reported for the commission charged with preparing the Congress resolution on the new party program.50 Furthermore, at the Congress Yakovlev was promoted to the position of CC Secretary, which at least partially closed the formal gap in rank between himself and Ligachev, and appeared jointly with Ligachev at Gorbachev’s briefing for media officials immediately after the 27th Congress.51 While this joint appearance implied that the two Secretaries shared authority over the media in some fashion, their subsequent public appearances suggested that they had become engaged in constant jostling for authority over various components of “ideological work.”

During mid-April both Secretaries attended a CC sponsored conference on the theatre, but the media coverage of the meeting implied
that Ligachev was to be regarded as the ranking official; his rather orthodox formulations on cultural life were given wide coverage while Yakovlev was merely listed as a participant in the meeting. June proved a hectic month for both officials. Yakovlev presented the major report (alone) at a CC sponsored convocation of journalists, but the text was never published. In contrast, Ligachev gave the major report at a CC sponsored conference on the campaigns to raise labor discipline and eliminate alchoholism, appeared jointly with Yakovlev at Gorbachev’s conference with leading writers shortly thereafter, and presented a major report on educational reform later that month. Furthermore, his report to social science educators at higher education institutions in September 1986, which outlined his reservations about glasnost in some detail, was given wide coverage.

But Yakovlev clearly enjoyed far greater authority than Ligachev in dealing with foreign affairs. In the spring of 1986 Yakovlev alone joined Gorbachev for a detailed interview on a wide variety of international questions with a visiting Algerian journalist, participated in an important conference dealing with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (along with Minister of Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze and Secretaries Dobrynin and Medvedev), and in October was named to the USSR’s delegation to the summit conference between Reagan and Gorbachev held in Iceland.

The failure to reach agreement on arms control measures at this summit conference seemed to stimulate the resurgence of more orthodox influence at the apex of the CPSU at the end of 1986. The selection of Ligachev to present the report on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution in early November, the convocation of a CC conference focusing on the questions of labor discipline, alchoholism, and unearned income which seemed to be dominated by Ligachev and others skeptical of various elements of reform, and a concerted assault on “American imperialism” in the journal Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn reflected this shift.

This resurgence of orthodox influence seemed to influence Yakovlev’s writings on both domestic and foreign affairs. His report to a CC spon-
sored conference on Soviet music held shortly after the summit conference was a strange amalgam of orthodox and reformist formulations. On the one hand, he explicitly opposed any effort to ban Western popular music or to label popular music as “low culture,” as officials such as Ligachev would probably have preferred. On the other hand, he assailed any “blind imitation” of Western mass culture, which he characterized as “ideological-psychological aggression” designed to dehumanize the masses, and insisted that Soviet music, as well as other cultural pursuits should foster ideinost, patriotism, proletarian internationalism, and civic spirit among Soviet youth. 59

Yakovlev also reverted to an orthodox portrayal of the USA. In a complex essay dealing with the “inter-imperialist” contradictions between the USA, Western Europe, and Japan published in the CC’s theoretical journal Kommunist, he gave particular attention to the American government’s efforts to mobilize the European states against the USSR (as well as its efforts to undermine their economic and political power) and claimed that strategic parity had thus far been successful in blocking the efforts of the “most militarist circles of the American oligarchy to restructure the world in its own interests.” 60 Yakovlev also charged that the USA’s SDI was a “first strike weapon” designed for use against the socialist bloc and to slow the USSR’s internal development by forcing it into a costly arms race (a reference to Gorbachev’s own irritated outburst after the collapse of the summit) and clearly refused at this juncture to characterize President Reagan in positive terms. 61

But in early 1987 Gorbachev took a series of initiatives in both domestic and foreign affairs which checked the resurgence of orthodox strength and restored the momentum of reform. In the process, Yakovlev’s role in the leadership was dramatically transformed. He was promoted to candidate membership in the Politburo at the CC/CPSU plenum of January 1987 and he emerged, at least temporarily, as a vigorous, forthright, articulate and sophisticated supporter and spokesman for Gorbachev’s “new
thinking" in international politics and democratization and \textit{glasnost} at home.

Gorbachev's dramatic report to the CC/CPSU meeting in January 1987 (ostensibly concerned with problems of personnel management) marked a fundamental shift in the direction of \textit{perestroika}. Gorbachev, while not mentioning Stalin by name, made a fundamental assault on the entire theoretical and practical legacy of the Stalinist system, attributing his predecessors' wide ranging errors to their continued devotion to the definition of socialism developed in the 1930s and 1940s with its "absolutist" view of the institutions created at the time and its "oversimplified" approach to virtually every problem and policy in the USSR. Theoretical rigidity, argued Gorbachev, had perpetuated outmoded methods of economic administration, led to excessive rigidity in regard to various types of property, such as cooperatives and farmers' auxiliary farming, and failed to introduce genuine socialist democracy. Gorbachev also charged that his predecessors' failure to improve the standard of living, to prevent the growth of social dislocation, consumerism, and corruption, and their indifference to social problems had created a massive gap between the real world faced by Soviet citizens and the world of "phony well-being."\footnote{\textsuperscript{62}}

Gorbachev's comments on "stagnation" in the social sciences and on cultural policies, as well as the need for thorough democratization of party and state provided the specific ideological framework for Yakovlev's pronouncements in the first half of 1987. In his discussion of social sciences, Gorbachev charged that his predecessors' immense rigidity had forestalled "objective scientific analysis," produced useless "scholastic theorizing" and prevented the advancement of new ideas. His comments on cultural policies were equally blunt. He assailed the widespread mediocrity of cultural productions, criticized the various creative unions for their failure to support genuine talent and their "administrative interference" in cultural life. Finally, insisting that "democratization" of both economic and political institutions was the key to further progress in all
spheres, Gorbachev called for the election of the leadership for economic enterprises, the introduction of multiple candidates for the selection of deputies to the various Soviets, and, most controversial, the election of party officials by their respective party committees. At the same time, Gorbachev urged party officials to limit their constant interference in the state’s economic administration and to give more attention to such elements of “political leadership” as personnel management and “work with people.”

Gorbachev did not deal with foreign policy in his report to the CC/CPSU in January 1987, but the following month he made a significant change in his stance toward the USA. In the months after the failure of the summit conference in October 1986, the USSR’s leaders had insisted that the negotiations over arms control deal with all levels of weaponry as a single “package.” But in February 1987, he suddenly announced that it would be far more fruitful to begin separate negotiations over intermediate range missiles in Europe and thereby cleared the way for the subsequent US-USSR treaty on the dismantling of these weapons.

Yakovlev’s position in the leadership improved dramatically during these months. After his promotion to candidate membership in the Politburo in January 1987, Yakovlev appeared jointly with Ligachev (for the first time since the previous June) at Gorbachev’s briefing for media officials in mid-February. Shortly thereafter, he was named to the USSR’s delegation to the Soviet sponsored forum on a nuclear free world along with Dobrynin and Medvedev. Most important, in March and April of 1987, Yakovlev made a series of public reports which unequivocably supported both Gorbachev’s formulations on “new thinking” in international relations and his views on cultural liberalization and democratization.

Yakovlev’s first major assignment in foreign affairs during this period was as the leader of a Supreme Soviet delegation to Spain. Yakovlev’s address to the Spanish parliament (as summarized by Pravda in early March 1987) explicitly declared that the Soviet leaders’ “new thinking” should be the basis for action in Europe and elsewhere. Yakovlev focused
on the USSR’s relations with Spain and the elimination of nuclear weapons, particularly in Western Europe, but his address was not particularly critical of the USA. Needless to say, he represented the USSR’s offer to engage in separate negotiations on Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) as a major step toward regional disarmament.67

At the same time, Yakovlev seemed to have emerged as a far more authoritative public spokesman for the regime to the mass media. Yakovlev had shared authority with Ligachev in this sphere in the immediate aftermath of the CC/CPSU meeting of January 1987, but on April 1, 1987 Pravda revealed that Yakovlev (alone) had presented the major report to a CC sponsored conference of media officials. Moreover, he now seemed to be more permissive than the General Secretary in his discussion of the role of the press. In mid-February, Gorbachev had balanced his endorsement of glasnost with positive references to editorial partiinost to assure accurate reporting, but Yakovlev’s criticism on the misuse of the press by groups or individuals did not refer to partiinost as an antidote.68

Shortly afterward, Yakovlev emerged in a new role as emissary for the General Secretary to local party organizations. In an address to the CC of the Tadzhik Communist Party in early April (which was republished in Partiinaia Zhizn), Yakovlev lashed out vigorously against local party officials’ failure to implement existing decrees, their pro forma support for reform, their unwillingness to limit their perennial intervention in the state’s administration of the economy and to give sufficient attention to the elements of “political leadership” as demanded by Gorbachev. In addition, he criticized officials who represented themselves as the only “legitimate spokesmen” for the system’s interests, who opposed extension of labor collectives’ authority, who still used administrative pressure in economic affairs because they did not understand how to use new “economic levers,” and who repressed discussion at party meetings, in and at the work place, the media and political and economic educational programs. He was particularly sharp in his attack on those “appanage princes” who had held power far too long, and sought to limit reform by
merely “doling out” democracy and ignoring pressing social problems. Democratization, argued Yakovlev, would eliminate such extensive bureaucratic resistance. While Yakovlev also assailed existing “ideological work” and called for a more truthful portrayal of Soviet reality, he did not seem willing, at least in such an audience, to fully endorse Gorbachev’s indictment of the Stalinist past. In the published text of his report, Yakovlev adopted a more positive view of the past by asserting that the socialism established in the USSR had brought equality and freedom for all and had created unprecedented spiritual and moral values. 69

However, Yakovlev proved far less cautious in his remarks to representatives of the local intelligentsia in Dushanbe a few days later. Drawing on Gorbachev’s report to the CC/CPSU in January 1987, Yakovlev launched a full scale assault on “dogmatism” as the ideological orientation of those who opposed reform. In the process, he defined the objectives of the USSR’s cultural and intellectual life in strikingly humanistic terms. Yakovlev essentially dismissed the concept of state controlled culture and urged that technical industrial problems be subjected to a “humanist” review process to assure that social needs were not neglected. Most startling, Yakovlev declared that society was in such constant flux that all social knowledge was “non-axiomatic,” a conclusion which implied that virtually all existing official Marxist-Leninist propositions were open to question. Yakovlev acknowledged as much by calling for a “new theoretical approach” to all elements of domestic life to be based on analysis of perestroika in action. 70

Yakovlev elaborated on his critique of dogmatism in a lengthy and detailed report to social scientists assembled by the USSR’s Academy of Sciences in mid-April. 71 Yakovlev lauded social scientists for their positive role in helping to create the intellectual context necessary for the selection of Gorbachev and subsequent reforms, but the bulk of his report was critical. He reprimanded social scientists for their dogmatic opposition to specific advances such as cybernetics and mathematical modeling in economics as well as their “mindless” support for centralized economic
management despite its increasingly obvious shortcomings. He also criticized their unwillingness to endorse and support new approaches to private and cooperative property and their ideological rationalization of the entire period of stagnation.  

Yakovlev urged social scientists to discard their traditional role of justifying the status quo and give up their euphemistic portrayal of the USSR and its problems and provide realistic and "truthful" appraisals of both the past and present. He heaped particular scorn of the ideological legacy of the Brezhnev era (which had repeatedly emphasized the growing harmony and uniformity of Soviet society, rather than the growing complexity of the USSR) and urged greater attention to "non-class" conflicts growing out of professional, cultural, linguistic and age differences in the system. Insisting that "contemporary socialism must first get to know itself," Yakovlev encouraged his fellow social scientists to deal with real problems in the USSR rather than simply comment on leadership pronouncements and revise interpretations of the past.  

While Yakovlev once again insisted that social knowledge had become "non-axiomatic," much of his report was a spirited defense of the General Secretary's axioms. Yakovlev vigorously defended Gorbachev's major innovations in economic policy — a more positive attitude toward cooperative and private economic activities, a system of family contracts in agriculture, a "new economic mechanism" based on increasingly autonomous self-financing enterprises, a wage system which rewarded merit and productivity, and the rigorous state inspection of products to assure higher quality. Yakovlev also endorsed the major elements of Gorbachev's "new thinking" in international relations. While Yakovlev seemed to give a bit more emphasis to the existing contradictions between the socialist and capitalist blocs than did the General Secretary, he ultimately stressed the collaborative elements of the relationship between the two systems.  

Most important, Yakovlev did seem to move beyond Gorbachev's definitions in his enthusiasm for democratization. Yakovlev declared that socialism could not simply be equated with the mere socialization of the
means of production. Genuine socialism could flourish only "when the working people in fact have the decisive role in the administration of production and other social matters, when the collectives themselves decide the acute questions of economic and social development." In the same vein, Yakovlev argued that it was now essential to shift from a system of power "for the people" to one which granted genuine power to the people themselves.

Yakovlev’s three major reports in April 1987 (to the CC of the Tadzhik party, to the Tadzhik intelligentsia and to the social scientists) provided a comprehensive picture of radical change in Soviet society. The assault on party and other local officials, the praise for a more humanistic conception of cultural life, the plea for a new analytic role for social scientists and the establishment of democracy based on a system of self-governing collectives all added up to a coherent conception of radical change in the entire system, a system freed from the bureaucratic and insensitive dominance of irresponsible party officials.

But soon after this extraordinary burst of activity, Yakovlev essentially disappeared from public view from May until early November 1987. Moreover, he did not provide enthusiastic support for radical change until after the CC/CPSU plenum in July 1988 had approved the reforms adopted by the extraordinary 19th Conference of the CPSU in June 1988. In short, Yakovlev simply stopped his vigorous public support for radical change for more than a year.

While the reasons for this shift are far from clear, public sources suggest that it may have been linked to the growing criticism of democratization and glasnost within the CPSU around the time of the CC/CPSU plenum of June 1987. Gorbachev’s report to this plenum focused primarily on the proposed reform of the state’s administration of the economy and the regime’s increasingly explicit concern with the improvement of the population’s standard of living. In the process, however, Gorbachev rather ruefully recognized the growth of resistance to reform at all levels of the society. He noted that many members of the working class resisted
efforts to link their wages to increased labor productivity, that many party organizations were “out of touch” with the masses, and that the reforms had already produced such ideological confusion that some members of the CPSU were doubtful about the very need for perestroika. Nonetheless, he insisted that the leadership itself was unified around the fundamental elements of reform. 78

Subsequent developments indicated that the resistance was all too real; in the aftermath of the CC/CPSU plenum, criticism of various elements of reform became increasingly explicit. For example, in early July, Ligachev strongly defended orthodox conceptions of state-directed cultural life and outlined the dangers of cultural liberalization in terms which contrasted dramatically with Yakovlev’s definitions provided in April 1987. 79 Whatever Yakovlev’s personal view at this juncture, his public response to this wave of criticism was striking. Although he had been promoted to full membership in the Politburo at the June plenum of the CC/CPSU, he did not continue the vigorous defense of radical reform which he had expressed so clearly in April 1987. 80 While Yakovlev’s silence may have been prompted by Gorbachev’s temporary withdrawal from leadership in the summer and early fall of 1987 when he went on an extended vacation, it probably also reflected the revived authority of Gorbachev’s critics. During Gorbachev’s absence, both Ligachev and Chebrikov, the head of the secret police, forcefully expressed their reservations about various elements of perestroika, and Yakovlev made no effort to respond. It is possible that he may have accompanied Gorbachev to help him write his book on perestroika which appeared at the end of 1987. But, for whatever reason, Yakovlev did not provide public support for Gorbachev’s program until after the 19th Conference of the CPSU in June 1988.

In the interim, Yakovlev changed his public role. He no longer acted as the General Secretary’s emissary to local party organizations or critical groups such as social scientists, but adopted a more limited role as Gorbachev’s chief briefing officer for media officials. The reason for this
shift is not clear, but public sources suggest that it may have been linked to the crisis in the leadership sparked by the criticism of perestroika from the “left” by B. Yeltsin, the head of the Moscow gorkom and candidate member of the Politburo at the CC/CPSU plenum of October 1987.81

Yeltsin’s impatient insistence that perestroika had not yet really produced positive changes for Soviet society seemed to place the General Secretary on the defensive. Gorbachev was already under assault from “conservatives” who feared that the proposed democratization, particularly the election of party officials by their respective committees, would undercut officials’ leadership of the CPSU and hence undermine “party leadership” of the society as a whole. From the fall of 1987 until the spring and summer of 1988, when Gorbachev launched a new and even more radical program of political reform, the General Secretary himself sometimes retreated from vigorous and specific support for reform by adopting a centrist position denouncing criticism from both “left” and “right” and temporarily endorsing some orthodox positions.

Gorbachev’s centrism was particularly evident in his discussion of Stalin’s role in his extraordinary report in November 1987 on the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. His own implicit assault on the theory and practice of Stalinism in January 1987 had accelerated debate and conflict between those who sought an unvarnished evaluation of the Stalinist past as an integral element of perestroika, and those, like Ligachev, who explicitly and repeatedly warned that such negative assessments of the USSR’s past would seriously undermine faith in the CPSU and destroy the society’s morale.

Gorbachev’s own detailed discussion of the various phases of Stalin’s regime was a compromise between these two extremes. On the one hand, he not only sharply condemned the purge of the CPSU in the 1930s (as Khrushchev had done in 1956 and 1961), but also made an unprecedented attack on the immense human costs of the collectivization of agriculture in the early 1930s (which Khrushchev had carefully ignored). On the other hand, he did not mention Lenin’s well-known “testament” of 1923 which
had urged the CPSU to replace Stalin as General Secretary, lauded Stalin for his leadership of the CPSU in the 1920s against the dangers of Trotskyism, defended the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 and praised Stalin's leadership of the USSR during World War II.82

In the process of his lengthy report, the General Secretary lashed out at the opponents of reform. His sharpest attack was directed against the defenders of the *status quo* who not only ostensibly sought to disguise their selfish interests behind an ideological facade, but also sought to stir opposition to reform within the working class. Gorbachev also made an oblique reference to Yeltsin's criticism at the CC/CPSU plenum of October (he did not name Yeltsin), condemning those whose zealously caused them to be dissatisfied with the pace of reform and who did not understand that it was impossible to “skip stages and do everything at one stroke.”83

Yakovlev reappeared in public to conduct a press conference on Gorbachev's report. His own remarks are difficult to interpret unambiguously. He sometimes merely echoed Gorbachev's centrism, but at times he seemed to be receptive to a more orthodox position. In particular, he bracketed his praise for a full and honest appraisal of the USSR's past with an indirect attack on those who sought a genuinely open and free discussion of the entire Soviet period. Most puzzling, he characterized conservative criticism of *perestroika* as a “natural” development which would pass away with time, which was hardly Gorbachev's view.84 Whatever the reasons for Yakovlev's position, it was hardly a ringing defense of radical reform.

In all fairness to Yakovlev, however, the General Secretary also seemed to retreat from vigorous advocacy of reform in the fall of 1987, particularly after the expulsion of Yeltsin from the Politburo and leadership of the Moscow *gorkom* on November 11, 1987. Gorbachev adopted a moderate definition of *perestroika* in his report to a leadership conference on the need to reform the CPSU (November 21, 1987). He avoided overt references (at least in the published text) to the most con-
troversial elements of reform and provided little guidance in his definition of the party’s role other than to repeat his previous criticism of party officials’ excessive intervention in state administration. While condemning the results of “dogmatic thinking” in his review of the USSR’s history, he portrayed conservatism and “artificial avantgardism” as “inevitably and ultimately allied” and gave particular stress to the value of organization, discipline, and responsibility for the success of reform. He also was far more critical of the press than previously and urged greater cooperation between local journalists and regional party officials to improve press coverage of significant developments.\textsuperscript{85}

At first glance, Yakovlev appeared to do little more than follow Gorbachev’s moderate lead. His briefing for media officials and cultural workers on the November conference reiterated Gorbachev’s formulation that conservatism and vanguardism were equally dangerous to the process of reform, criticized the tendency to adopt extremist positions on policy matters, and urged the cultivation of a “common sense” approach to the complexity of social reality. But he also moved beyond Gorbachev’s critique of vanguardism to assail “social demagoguery” which ostensibly disguised the “selfish aspirations” of various groups and individuals behind a facade of support for reform.\textsuperscript{86}

Almost immediately after this briefing, Yakovlev accompanied Gorbachev to Washington, DC as a high ranking member of the USSR’s delegation to the third summit conference between Reagan and Gorbachev.\textsuperscript{87} But Gorbachev’s success in achieving the historic agreement to destroy existing IRBMs did not provide him with sufficient authority or leverage to overcome the power of perestroika’s domestic critics. This was particularly evident at the meeting of the CC/CPSU in February 1988 on the issue of educational reform which was addressed by both Ligachev and Gorbachev. Ligachev’s report on the details of educational reform which was addressed by both Ligachev and Gorbachev. Ligachev’s report on the details of educational reform combined generalized support for perestroika with a vigorous plea for orthodox political education to counter the ideological laxity of Soviet youth and a sharp assault on those who sought to move beyond Gorbachev’s
"balanced" view of the Stalinist era. Most important, Gorbachev seemed to make considerable concessions to orthodox opinion in his own rather lacklustre report. He acknowledged that the introduction of cooperatives, private economic activity, the leasing system in agriculture, and greater autonomy for enterprises had actually created significant ideological and organizational confusion. The latter was actually the orthodox critics' major complaint. He also expressed irritation with the working classes' continued attachment to wage leveling, which he denounced as a "petty bourgeois view which had nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism." Finally, his discussion of international relations and their impact on internal development was surprisingly orthodox.

Gorbachev charged that the IRBM treaty had actually produced a "consolidation of reactionary forces" in the USA, that the Reagan regime had reverted once again to anti-Communist and anti-Soviet propaganda, and that "radio voices" sought to sow dissension within the USSR by inaccurate reports of struggles within the leadership. Most surprising, Gorbachev declared that the USSR's "new thinking" on international relations was grounded in Lenin's theory of imperialism and that imperialism could hardly be conceived of as "good." While he balanced this with repeated references to "universal human values" as the basis for "new thinking," the reference to Lenin's theory of imperialism in these terms was a striking reversion to orthodoxy.

The public coverage of this CC/CPSU meeting suggested a significant gain for those skeptical of certain elements of perestroika. Pravda's coverage of the meeting seemed to give virtually equal weight to the two major reports by Gorbachev and Ligachev, and Yakovlev's bizarre briefing to ideological officials seemed designed to disguise the evident gains made by Gorbachev's critics rather than defend the General Secretary's program.

Almost immediately after this CC/CPSU meeting, the Soviet leadership was faced with the unprecedented challenge of Armenian nationalist demands that Nagorno-Kharabakh, a largely Armenian enclave within the
Azerbaidzhan republic, be joined to the Armenian republic. At this juncture, the critics of perestroika decided on a frontal assault for various aspects of reform. On March 13, 1988 Sovetskaia Rossiia published a scathing letter (ostensibly from a teacher in Leningrad named Andreeva) which assailed those who sought an unvarnished interpretation of the Soviet past, implied that the proponents of reform were the virtual or actual descendants of “counter-revolutionaries” (or of Jewish origin), condemned the loss of direction reflected in the establishment of a variety of alternative political groupings, and quoted directly from Ligachev’s report to the CC/CPSU meeting in February 1988 (without attribution) to support this critique.

Many Western analysts have concluded that Ligachev either inspired or supported this assault. Whatever his actual role, the Gorbachev leadership was slow to respond on a public level. It was not until early April that Pravda editorially defended a critical orientation toward the Stalinist past as essential to prevent its reappearance. Western journalists have concluded that Yakovlev was the author of this rejoinder. Whatever his private role, he did not play a significant public role in the leadership’s counterattack on this orthodox revival. This role fell to C.P. Razumovskii, the CC Secretary responsible for personnel and a candidate member of the Politburo since February 1988. Razumovskii’s address on April 22, marking the anniversary of Lenin’s birth, provided a forthright, coherent, vigorous and detailed defense of Gorbachev’s program of political and economic reform. It was only after the publication of this effective rejoinder that Yakovlev addressed a CC sponsored conference of leading writers and historians in support of perestroika. Yakovlev’s low profile during this episode may have been puzzling and disappointing to those in the leadership who regarded him as a particularly sophisticated and articulate defender of Gorbachev’s program. It does seem rather odd that Yakovlev was not mobilized for public action at a critical juncture of this sort.
In early May, Gorbachev himself revived the faltering drive for political reform. In an address to a conference of the country's leading editors on the forthcoming 19th Conference of the CPSU, Gorbachev discarded his earlier assaults on "vanguardism" and once again identified conservatism and dogmatism as the major obstacles to reform. He not only overtly referred in detail to the controversial elements of his program, but advanced the radical conclusion that the "deformation" of socialism in the USSR had produced widespread "alienation" which could be overcome only by thorough democratization.

Gorbachev also dealt with the expression of orthodox criticism with great subtlety. He assailed Sovetskaia Rossia for its innuendoes about the "counter-revolutionary" backgrounds of reformers, but was conciliatory towards those who feared that reform might endanger the basis of socialism, recognizing the need for more stress on positive aspects of the USSR, emphasizing that he did not endorse pluralism of views beyond a socialist framework.97

In the months before the 19th Conference of the CPSU in June, Yakovlev made no comment on the proposed reforms (which were initially outlined in the CC/CPSU's May "theses" on the conference) but acted as a public counterweight to Ligachev, who also remained silent on the proposed changes. Both officials were present at Gorbachev's briefing for editors (along with the entire leadership), and they were assigned virtually identical roles in dealing with the thorny questions of relations between the Armenian and Azerbaidzhani republics. Ligachev and Razumovskii were dispatched to Azerbaidzhan to supervise changes in the local party leadership, while Yakovlev and Dolgikh were sent on the same mission to Armenia.98 Both men played similar roles at the 19th Conference of the CPSU in June; each served as a presiding officer for sessions of the Conference and as Chairman of one of its commissions on significant elements of reform.99

Gorbachev's opening report to the Conference called for a fundamental change in the distribution of power in the USSR's political system. His
earlier periodic discussions of democratization had rather vaguely urged an extension of authority for the soviets and the election of party officials by their respective committees rather than their appointment from above. The CC/CPSU’s May “theses” had called for the transformation of the Supreme Soviet into a powerful representative and legislative body. Gorbachev’s own report to the Conference also called for the indirect election of a powerful chief executive (Chairman of the Supreme Soviet), with extraordinary authority over domestic and foreign policy. This new political structure would reduce the relative authority of the CC/CPSU and provide Gorbachev with an effective means to bybass party officials in the development of perestroika. Indeed, in his report Gorbachev implied that party officials were a major source of conservativism, bureaucratism and dogmatism which hindered the implementation of reform.  

In the complex and often stormy discussion of Gorbachev’s report, many regional party officials expressed their misgivings about various elements of reform. Some expressed outrage at the media’s unrelenting criticism of party officialdom; others charged that glasnost had stimulated the growth of anti-party sentiments and the loss of direction and control by the CPSU. Others such as Ligachev staunchly defended the regional party officials as the major and legitimate source of direction for the party as a whole. Yeltsin repeated his criticism of perestroika from the “left” and prompted Gorbachev in his own concluding remarks to once again criticize Yeltsin’s vanguardism.  

Yakovlev did not address the Conference, but his briefing on its proceedings for media and cultural officials in mid-July 1988 was extremely responsive to the views expressed by anxious regional party leaders. His discussion of Gorbachev’s radical proposals to shift authority to state agencies was extremely vague and totally ignored their impact on the authority of party officials. Most important, he declared that the “major task of the day” was to “safeguard society from the dangerous sorts of extremism from whatever quarter” (a formulation which had not appeared in either of Gorbachev’s addresses to the Conference) and recognized that
the very rapidity of reform had helped to create a framework for irresponsible efforts to sow national and social discord in various parts of the USSR.

Yakovlev repeatedly stressed the need to cultivate patriotic sentiments and a broader sense of "responsibility" at all levels of society. In the process, he charged that the public criticism of officials' misuse of power had led the population to the totally incorrect conclusion that the authorities were essentially repressive. Yakovlev not only condemned this dangerous "legal nihilism," but urged the mass media to support the enforcement of state discipline (as well as to continue to defend individual rights) and the avoid "maximalist" and "unrealistic" positions in their analysis of Soviet life.102

It is impossible to determine the reason for Yakovlev's strong responsiveness to the views of Gorbachev's critics at this juncture. He may have felt that a conciliatory orientation was needed to heal the potential fissures of the CPSU. However, this centrist approach was immediately jettisoned by Yakovlev once the CC/CPSU approved the proposed reforms at its plenum in July 1988. In August, with Gorbachev once again clearly in the ascendancy, Yakovlev resumed his role as a vigorous and forthright emissary for radical reform. In an address to Latvian Communists he discarded his earlier sharp assault on the media and his references to the dangers of "extremism" and argued that the process of reform was impeded by the legacy of the Stalinist past. At the same time, he vigorously and explicitly endorsed the controversial elements of economic reform (the use of family contracts and various other leasing arrangements in agriculture, the creation of cooperatives and tolerance of individual economic activity) as the most effective means to merge social and individual interests. In fact, in his enthusiasm for these reforms Yakovlev moved beyond the position of the General Secretary by declaring that the "ideology of the proprietor" should dominate the coming period of reform.
Furthermore, in dramatic contrast to Ligachev who had warned of the grave dangers of overreliance on market mechanisms in an address earlier that month, Yakovlev waxed enthusiastic over the “socialist market” as a “self-regulating mechanism” which would help immensely to determine and meet the society’s various needs and requirements. Yakovlev also differed sharply with Ligachev over the controversial question of nationality policy. While Ligachev was unwilling to criticize past policies and was implicitly critical of the regime’s rather confused response to the crisis created over the status of Nagorno-Kharabakh, Yakovlev acknowledged that the central regimes’ economic and social policies had often been insensitive to the non-Russians in the USSR. At the same time Yakovlev warned against any “exaggeration” of the importance of nationality and drifted off into the usual euphemisms used by the entire central leadership in its discussion of nationality policy.103

Yakovlev’s address to Lithuanian Communists a few days later added little to his previous discussions of internal policies. Yet his discussion of foreign affairs seemed to indicate that he had become even more revisionist than Gorbachev in the analysis of international politics. Gorbachev’s report on the 19th Conference of the CPSU in June had balanced his enthusiasm for cooperation between the USSR and the outside world on a wide variety of issues with the blunt conclusion that the USA continued to be a military threat to the USSR. In contrast, Yakovlev made no such reference to the USA in his extremely optimistic appraisal of the international situation, and he implied that Marxists had always valued the protection and advancement of basic human values, the basis for “new thinking” in international relations, above all else.104

The following month Yakovlev’s position in the leadership was dramatically transformed by a significant reform of the CC/CPSU’s Secretariat. On October 1, 1988 Pravda reported that Yakovlev had been named the chairman of the Central Committee’s new commission on international policy, one of six functional commissions established at the time. Yakovlev’s appointment, and the simultaneous appointment of
Ligachev as chairman of the new commission on agriculture and V.A. Medvedev as the chairman of the commission on ideology, clearly shifted the locus of Yakovlev's responsibilities. He no longer briefed media and cultural officials on important party meetings and decisions, or clashed overtly with Ligachev over ideological and cultural matters, but gave more attention to questions of foreign policy. In November 1988, he, together with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Prime Minister Ryzhkov, met with members of the FRG's delegation to the USSR, and travelled to Eastern Europe later that month. (In late November 1988 the membership of Yakovlev's commission on international policy was made public. Although it included a significant number of CC/CPSU members concerned with foreign policy, public sources suggest that it did not come to play a significant role in the development of the USSR's foreign policy.) Yakovlev himself continued to play an active role in foreign affairs, accompanying Gorbachev on his trip to the UN in December 1988.

Most significantly, his subsequent public comments on domestic developments indicate that he had freed himself from the restraints imposed by his role as a leading spokesman for the top leadership. From December 1988 onward, Yakovlev emerged as a non-Leninist social democrat who regarded democratization and the extension and protection of individual liberty as the most important objectives of perestroika. For example, in an address in Perm in December 1988 Yakovlev insisted that the CPSU would retain its vanguard role only by pressing for further democratization. He attacked the anxieties and fears within the CPSU spawned by growing pluralism of opinion and portrayed "freedom of thought" as a paramount human value to be defended and extended in the USSR. At the same time, he provided particularly vigorous support for "market socialism." Yakovlev urged the CPSU to follow Lenin's injunction to "learn to trade" (made during the difficult days of the New Economic Policy) in order to develop agriculture and small-scale industry, while curtailing bureaucratism. Most strikingly, he now declared that
cooperatives were the best means to “harmonize” personal and social needs and the only way to assure that workers were really paid according to their social contribution.  

In February 1989 Yakovlev retreated temporarily from his enthusiastic endorsement of market socialism, but he did not modify his vigorous support for further democratization. Speaking in Georgia on the eve of the elections for the Congress of Peoples Deputies Yakovlev insisted that Soviet citizens should judge the regime’s policies solely in terms of their contribution to democratization and the prevention of any return to authoritarianism. In the process of defending the regime, he optimistically insisted that perestroika, while faced with a wide range of difficulties and problems, had created a new moral climate in the country and a new type of citizen no longer willing to simply take orders from above.

Yakovlev also gave considerable attention to foreign policy in his address. He gave particular stress to the formulations of the 27th Congress of the CPSU concerning the dangers of nuclear war, the futility of a policy of confrontation, and the growing significance of general human values in the conduct of foreign affairs. Nonetheless, his discussion of Western foreign policy reflected the continued influence of orthodox views about Western “imperialism.” He noted that as yet there had been little change in Western official thinking about international politics. Western leaders, he noted, had not yet understood that policies based on military force had become obsolete, continued to limit trade with the USSR, promoted modernization of nuclear weapons, and were hesitant in their responses to the USSR’s efforts to reduce international tension. However, Yakovlev did not urge the USSR to adopt a confrontational response. He insisted that perestroika had created a new basis for extending the USSR’s authority in international relations and that such initiatives as Gorbachev’s address to the UN in December 1988 had immense impact on international politics.

But with his election to the Congress of Peoples Deputies in May 1989, Yakovlev again turned his attention to domestic developments, repeatedly
insisting that democratization and the protection of individual liberty were vital for humanistic socialism. Yakovlev reportedly emerged as the most popular member of the Politburo elected to the Congress and he immediately praised the election process as a major step toward democratization of the political system and as a bulwark against the return to authoritarianism. Henceforth Yakovlev gave little attention to the CPSU's role in the system and focused instead on the need to both foster social attitudes and create state institutions which would advance and protect individual freedom in a more humane socialist system. In mid-June Yakovlev stressed the need to cultivate a sense of civil responsibility to assure that the USSR made a successful transition from an "autocratic and authoritarian" to a "civic society." Later that month, he praised the Congress for effectively overcoming the previous "psychology of self-disparagement" which had slowed reform, and he applauded the deputies for their honest and courageous appraisal of the country's problems. At the same time he discussed the need for "responsible" criticism which would help to foster the "moral public opinion" essential for a genuinely democratic state. He moved far beyond his previous position in his conceptualization of the political significance of a "market socialist" economy. Yakovlev essentially argued that a mixed economy provided the only viable social-economic basis for a democratic order, insisting that the market not only solved important economic questions but also was the "economic basis for democracy" providing both collectives and individuals with a range of economic choice.

Yakovlev also declared that the creation of the Congress had established "mutual ties" between the society and the regime which were previously lacking. Moreover, while recognizing that the encouragement of criticism had allowed for the growth of social pessimism, masochism and nihilism, he declared that any administrative limitations on free speech would undermine perestroika and the growing "mutual ties" between the regime and society.
Yakovlev’s most explicit defense of individual liberty came in his extraordinary address in July on the two hundredth anniversary of the French revolution. Yakovlev began his remarks with a vigorous defense of the “great principle of freedom of thought” and proceeded to portray the major elements of the Enlightenment’s democratic theory as essential for the USSR. He clearly implied that the USSR should adopt the concept of separation of powers between legislative, executive and judicial branches. He spoke positively of the idea of legislation based on “utility,” the French physiocrats’ notion of an economy based on individual initiative rather than governmental interference, a legal system based on the presumption of innocence and the “natural and inviolable rights of man” outlined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. 117

Yakovlev used a discussion of the role of violence in revolutionary transformation to assess the Bolsheviks’ use of terror in the revolution and civil war and its subsequent impact on the entire system. While he claimed that Lenin was aware of the terrible dangers of using “unjust means” to achieve “just ends,” he also argued that the Bolsheviks’ romanticization of violence as a means to build a new social order had laid the basis for Stalin’s despotism and allowed unsavory elements to dominate the system. In the process of his discussion of revolution, he claimed that the conception of violence as the “midwife” of positive social change (without identifying this as Marx’s own formulation) had completely discredited itself, and he urged a non-violent path for revolutionaries everywhere as the only possible basis for international relations.

Yakovlev’s brief discussion of the USSR’s current problems was especially frank. He not only recognized that many had lost faith in socialism, but regarded this as a legitimate response to the dogmatism, statism, and indifference of previous regimes. He concluded that only a “revolution in consciousness” could restore the system’s vitality, but said nothing about the CPSU’s role in the process. Instead, he insisted that the new Congress of Peoples Deputies “may and must become a fundamental turning point” in the ongoing transformation of the political system. 118
But Yakovlev’s views, while supported by some segments of the Soviet intelligentsia, were not endorsed by the top leadership of the CPSU. Pravda’s version of his address on the anniversary of the French revolution indicated that orthodox elements in the leadership retained sufficient authority to censor his remarks. While Pravda did report Yakovlev’s criticism of the Bolsheviks’ misplaced enthusiasm for violence, it did not publish his conclusion that various elements of enlightenment thought should be the basis for Soviet practice, or his view of the Congress of Peoples Deputies critical role.

Most important, Yakovlev proved to be out of step with the General Secretary. In mid-July, approximately a week after Yakovlev’s address, Gorbachev summoned all of the CPSU’s first secretaries to Moscow in response to the nation-wide crisis created by a surge of miners’ strikes in early July. Gorbachev’s report on the need for reform in the CPSU included many formulations favored by the more orthodox regional leaders of the party. In particular, Gorbachev balanced his insistence that party leaders focus on “political leadership” with a reaffirmation of their responsibility for economic affairs. He gave far more attention to the needs and aspirations of the working class in his discussion of the “healthy forces” in society than he had in the past. Furthermore, Gorbachev sharply criticized cooperatives which ostensibly violated the USSR’s “social policy” in a variety of ways. He also muted his enthusiasm for the role of the “market” in the economy, and urged the party’s ideological workers to work out a new model of socialism as a beacon for the future. At the same time, however, he grimly acknowledged that the CPSU’s leadership had virtually run out of new ideas for implementing reform and transforming the party.

In this context, Yakovlev temporarily stopped commenting on the country’s internal policies and turned his attention to his role as director of the CC/CPSU’s commission on international policy and his newly acquired position as Chairman of the Congress of Peoples Deputies’ Commission on the Nazi-Soviet pact. In a lengthy interview on this
commission’s progress, Yakovlev balanced his sharp attack on Stalin’s alliance with Hitler with a quasi-orthodox attack on the Western democracies’ anti-Soviet stance and an insistence that the exposure of the pact and its secret protocols did *not* change the status of the Baltic republics within the USSR. At the end of September he represented the CPSU leadership at a conference of his counterparts in the Communist parties of the socialist bloc, and in November he headed a Supreme Soviet delegation to Japan in an effort to improve Soviet-Japanese relations.

Yakovlev resumed his discussion of internal transformation at a press conference in Japan. While Yakovlev did not refer explicitly to enlightenment thought, he insisted that a fundamental democratization of the political system was the only possible way to solve the USSR’s immense problems. Yakovlev recognized that Soviet Union was in a complex and difficult transition period, but he argued that the intense political debate and conflict between the various political orientations which had sprung up in the country (Yakovlev described them as left, conservative, moderate, and extremist) was akin to the political discourse of the soviets in 1917 and would lead invariably to fundamental democratic transformation. Yakovlev concluded that this political pluralism (hinting that it might lead to a multi-party system) would produce a democratic socialist system based on a separation of powers and maximum self-government, and would assure genuine individual freedom and “humanistic” social relations.

In addition, Yakovlev elaborated on his earlier contention that the development of such a democratic order was dependent on the creation of a mixed economy. This would demand, in Yakovlev’s view, the total destruction of the old command system, the development of a wage policy based on individual productivity, the elimination of Soviet citizens’ excessive dependence on the state for goods and social services, the recognition of a “free market” (the meaning of which was not clarified), the establishment of free competition between different types of ownership, and
the cultivation of personal initiative and enterprise. In his discussion of economic change Yakovlev sharply criticized those members of society who expected the state to provide the “promised good life” and insisted that all progress was ultimately dependent on individual effort.125

Upon his return to the USSR, Yakovlev discussed the obstacles to democratization in an address to the Komsomol higher school. He argued that many favored democracy “in the abstract” but resisted it when its full implications became apparent and that the existing political mechanisms themselves hampered democratic reform. Most striking, Yakovlev sharply criticized what he called the “spiritual dependency” created by previous regimes’ attempts to build society on the basis of some predetermined “truth.” Yakovlev charged that this dependency fostered mass passivity and a widespread tendency to look to the center for a more coherent conception of socialism, and a theory of “party or ideological work in new conditions.” Yakovlev insisted that perestroika could not proceed in such a fashion, but only on the basis of “initiative and independence.”126

Yakovlev’s consistent refusal to discuss the CPSU’s role in assuring reform set him apart from other leading officials such as G. Razumovskii, the director of the CC/CPSU’s Commission on party construction and cadre policy,127 V. A. Medvedev, the chairman of the Central Committee’s Commission on Ideology,128 and the General Secretary himself. Two days after the publication of Yakovlev’s report to the Komsomol higher school, Pravda published a lengthy statement by Gorbachev which sought to demonstrate that his regime did have coherent objectives and had not lost its sense of direction as many Soviet critics charged. Gorbachev did, however, incorporate some of Yakovlev’s conclusions into his own essay, particularly Yakovlev’s critique of those who sought a rigid “truth” as the basis for action. Yet Gorbachev held to the more orthodox view that his leadership acted on a Leninist analysis of existing reality and turned to Marxism-Leninism in the development of guidelines for the future. Furthermore, Gorbachev did not endorse Yakovlev’s repeated emphasis on the importance of individual action and initiative, insisting that the fate of
*perestroika* was largely dependent on actions of the CPSU, the “political vanguard” of Soviet society.\(^{129}\)

In his discussion of the CPSU, Gorbachev reverted to the view that its officials should provide “political” and “moral” leadership rather than “issue commands” to other agencies in directing the process of reform. At the same time, Gorbachev’s conclusions on the future of “one party rule” were very tentative. While he argued it was still essential to consolidate the “healthy forces” in support of *perestroika* against “populist demagoguery, nationalist or chauvinist currents or unruly group interests,” he also hinted that the CPSU would not only work to further pluralism but also might give up its monopoly of state power.\(^{130}\)

With the publication of Gorbachev’s elaborate and often contradictory manifesto, Yakovlev again turned away from public discussion of internal affairs to focus on problems of foreign policy. In early December 1989 he attended the summit conference between Gorbachev and President Bush in Malta\(^{131}\) and shortly afterwards met with Communist leaders from Czechoslovakia visiting Moscow.\(^{132}\)

### Conclusion

In the fall of 1988, when Yakovlev had been named chairman of the CC/CPSU’s Commission on International Policy, it seemed at first glance as if his career had come full circle. In the late 1960s and early 1970s he had emerged as an authoritative and articulate spokesman on American foreign policy for the CPSU’s top leadership, and he regained that role in 1983 after a decade of service (or exile) abroad. After his promotion to head the Central Committee’s propaganda department sometime in the second half of 1985, he played a number of significant roles in the Gorbachev regime. He served as a special personal adviser on foreign affairs to the General Secretary, he then became increasingly involved in the General Secretary’s efforts to curb Ligachev’s authority over ideological
and cultural policies, and after January 1987, he emerged as a vigorous advocate for Gorbachev's program. But from the spring of 1987 until shortly after the 19th Conference of the CPSU in June 1988, he proved unwilling or unable to fulfill this role in the face of serious opposition at the apex of the CPSU. During this critical period, his public comments seemed to reflect the conflict over perestroika rather than serve as an instrument for its extension. With the reform of the Secretariat in the fall of 1988, Yakovlev, while retaining his special role as adviser to Gorbachev on foreign affairs, initially served as a major spokesman for the regime in this sphere.

But by the end of 1988, Yakovlev had advanced beyond this role to emerge as a forthright proponent of broadened individual liberties under a more humane socialist system. By mid-1989 he had moved beyond the General Secretary's vague formulations on the need for socialist democracy to argue that the democratic theory of the Enlightenment was not merely the basis for "bourgeois democracy," but should become the foundation for policy in the USSR. Most striking, despite clear disagreement with other leaders of the CPSU in the second half of 1989, Yakovlev's entire approach to his opponents seemed to change. He did tone down some of his formulations, but in contrast to an earlier period, he was now unwilling to endorse the views of his critics. Most important, when faced with opposition he temporarily stopped public discussion of domestic developments and focused instead on his functional responsibilities in foreign affairs. Yet after a few months of silence, he returned to internal matters with his own distinctive voice.

While it is far easier to describe this ideological independence than to explain it, it may have been linked to the dramatic changes in the context of his political career created by the reorganization of the Secretariat in late 1988 and the foundation of the Congress of Peoples Deputies the following year. Until late 1988, the Politburo-Secretariat directorate had been the center of political authority and Yakovlev's public pronouncements seemed to be governed by a set of informal rules associated with
political strife within the leadership of the CPSU. While Yakovlev had sometimes championed democratization with great vigor during the 1986-1988 period, public sources suggest that orthodox elements in the leadership not only had the power to muzzle Yakovlev’s support for Gorbachev when the General Secretary was faced with serious opposition but also to convince Yakovlev to make temporary public concessions to the opposition’s position.

However, with the reorganization of the Secretariat in late 1988, the establishment of the Congress of Peoples Deputies and Gorbachev’s assumption of a new state executive role as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the Politburo-Secretariat lost its undisputed role as the governing center of the entire system. At the same time Yakovlev assumed new responsibilities. His appointment as Chairman of the CC/CPSU’s Commission on International Policy not only gave him a new congenial functional role, but also at least partly freed him from the constant internal strife over domestic political development. His selection as deputy to the Congress of Peoples Deputies was probably even more important in providing the basis for his independent ideological orientation. The creation of the Congress of Peoples Deputies fostered a sharp surge of political pluralism, both within and outside the new legislative body. During the extraordinary first session of the Congress many deputies who were members of the CPSU spoke freely with scant respect for “party discipline,” while in the society at large there were open and vigorous expressions of nationalist and separatist sentiments in the borderlands, the revival of various strands of Russian nationalist ideology, and the creation of vigorous political clubs and electoral coalitions which produced a heady atmosphere of political pluralism. Before 1988, Yakovlev had defended democratization when the primacy of the General Secretary had permitted it. Yakovlev’s consistent defense of democratization in 1988-1989 suggests that in the context of broader pluralism, Yakovlev transformed his admonitions about freedom of thought into his own personal ideology.
Postscript

In the first months of 1990, in the face of staggering problems of nationalist discord and economic dislocation, General Secretary Gorbachev convinced a majority in the Congress of Peoples Deputies to elect him as the first President of the USSR. The minority who opposed his election were rightfully concerned about the immense concentration of executive authority in the President’s hands. Henceforth President Gorbachev could rule by decree, declare various states of martial law and emergency with relative impunity, act as the undisputed Commander in Chief of the Armed forces, appoint the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (and obviously influence the choice of other Ministers as well), and dominate the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies and the Supreme Soviet with his power to set the agenda and to veto legislation. This reform shifted authority away from the Politburo, the CC/CPSU, and the Council of Ministers, and toward the President of the USSR and his advisory Council appointed in March 1990.

Yakovlev was named to this Council which included key party and state officials responsible for foreign affairs, internal security, and economic planning along with individual writers, deputies, and economists who were evidently selected as representatives of the major ideological tendencies of the day. A few months later at the 28th Congress of the CPSU in July 1990, the composition and function of the party’s leading organs were totally transformed, and Yakovlev (along with his colleagues) lost his position in the Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee. Freed from these responsibilities, Yakovlev retained his post in the President’s Council where he will probably press for the continued democratization of the USSR rather than revert to his earlier public role as the chief spokesman for the country’s chief executive.
Notes


5. Knizhka partiynogo aktivista (Moscow, 1989), 17. This publication is an official party handbook on the CPSU.


11. A. N. Yakovlev (red.), Osnovy politicheskikh znanii (Moscow, 1972), 346-348.

13. Yakovlev may have been named acting director of the propaganda department at the Congress. He was named to the Congress’ commission dealing with proposed changes in the five year plan and the CPSU’s Inspection Commission. See Current Soviet Policies, Vol. VI (1973), 174, 195. He also discussed the Congress’ impact on ideological work. See A. Yakovlev, “*XXIV S’ezd KPSS, problemy ideino-vospitatel’noi raboty.*” Kommunist, No. 10 (1971), 40-56. Approved for publication July 7, 1971.

14. In fact, Yakovlev seemed to be more orthodox than General Secretary Brezhnev whose support for these formulations seemed particularly lack-lustre. *Current Soviet Policies, op. cit.*, 28.


18. Yakovlev was dropped from the editorial board of *Kommunist* in mid-July 1973. Compare No. 10 (July 9, 1973) and No. 11 (July 26, 1973).


22. Although Yakovlev assailed the regime for ostensibly supporting “fascist” and “terrorist” regimes abroad and for saturating Europe with “first strike weapons” for use against the USSR, he still seemed to believe that the “madman” in power might be restrained, *Izvestiia*, October 7, 1983, 5.

23. Yakovlev argued that President Truman had artificially generated a fear of the “Soviet threat” to provide an ideological cover for American expansionism and had con-
cluded that the arms race would help to weaken the USSR, the major obstacle to American aspirations. Yakovlev also charged that President Kennedy had shown American belligerence in the crises over Berlin and Cuba. See A. N. Yakovlev, “Rakovaia urokhol imperskii ambiitskii v iadernyi vek,” MEMO, No. 1 (1984), 3-13. Approved for publication December 15, 1983.

24. Yakovlev charged that the Reagan administration had never really been interested in negotiations over Euromissiles and charged that the American government’s lies about the Soviet threat were similar to Nazi tactics. See Komsomolskaia Pravda, December 25, 1983, 1.

25. Ibid., 3.


28. A. N. Yakovlev, Ot trumena do reigana, Doktriny i realnosti iademogo verka (Moscow, 1984). Approved for publication, August 14, 1984. The following quotes should capture the flavor of Yakovlev’s analysis. “Under President Reagan the messianic aspirations of the ruling forces of the USA assumed a particularly blatant, aggressive character which represents a real danger to humanity. The policy of violence overseas, raised to a state principle in international relations, is a direct continuation of the cult of violence within the country”, 82. “Of all the American administrations since the end of World War II, perhaps none has done more for the revival of American imperial messianism and its practical realization than the current Reagan regime. The most orthodox conception of world domination lies at the basis of its foreign policy”, 326. “Reaganism in its foreign policy decisions is based on the long standing tradition of the idea of messianism, on the instinctive loyalty of the financial oligarchy to a policy of world domination. Both American claims and policies assumed a particularly dangerous character at the beginning of the 1980’s,” 326-327.

29. Izvestiia, October 14, 1984, 5. The reviewer pointed to American Communist leaders' emphasis on such popular resistance to the administration.

31. Pravda, January 9, 1985, 4-5.


33. Ibid., 6-17.


36. Ibid., 203-204.


38. Yakovlev did not directly label the Reagan regime as fascist, but claimed that in the USA in the 1980s and in Germany in the 1930s there was an “intertwining of the most extreme militaristic, aggressive and chauvinistic lines of development of contemporary capitalist society.” A. N. Yakovlev, “Oпасная ось американо-западногерманского милитаризма,” S Sh A, No. 7 (1985), 3-4.


40. “There is certainly nothing new about the aggressiveness of American foreign policy.... However, history has not yet probably witnessed a level of escalation or recklessness in Washington’s foreign policy comparable to that characteristic of the American administration’s activity in the 1980’s. Having inherited anti-Sovietism as a inbuilt component of USA foreign policy, the present administration has boosted it to a hysteria.” A. N. Yakovlev, On the Edge of an Abyss: From Truman to Reagan, The Doctrines and Realities of the Nuclear Age (Moscow, 1985), 97, approved for publication August 16, 1985.

41. Ibid., 95.

42. Ibid., 400.

43. The delegation included Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, the USSR’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, his deputy G. M. Korneyenko, A. Dobrynin, the USSR’s ambassador to the USA,
Zamyatin, the head of the Secretariat's International Information Department, A. M. Aleksandrov, Gorbachev’s personal side and Yakovlev as head of the Secretariat’s propaganda department. Pravda, November 20, 1985, 1. The first public reference to Yakovlev’s promotion which I have found was in Pravda, September 5, 1985.

44. Pravda, November 22, 1985, 1.

45. Pravda, November 28, 1985, 1.

46. Ibid.

47. Yakovlev’s predecessor as the head of the department (B. I. Stukhalin) may have been an ally of Ligachev. They had worked together in the agitprop department of the Bureau of the RSFSR in the early 1960s. See Rahr, op. cit. (1984), 126, 207.

48. Harris, op. cit.

49. In October 1985 Ligachev gave the main report to a CC sponsored conference of media officials on the importance of the CC/CPSU meeting of October 1985. In November, he addressed the party group in the Ministry of Radio and Television and in early 1986 he gave the main report on educational reform to a CC sponsored gathering of education officials. Ibid., 17.

50. In contrast, Ligachev spoke for the commission charged with preparing a resolution on Gorbachev's report on behalf of the CC/CPSU, an assignment which reflected his broad but ill-defined authority in the leadership. Neither report was published. Pravda, March 2, 1986, 3.

51. Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika (Moscow, 1987), 215-218.

52. Ibid., 225-228.

53. Ibid., 231-235.

54. Ibid., 257-258.


57. The delegation included Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, A. F. Dobrynin (named a CC Secretary responsible for foreign affairs at the 27th Congress), A. S. Chernyayev, Gorbachev's assistant and S. F. Akhromyev, the USSR's First Deputy Minister of Defense, Pravda, October 11, 1986, 1.

58. Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika, op. cit., 268-269.

59. Ibid., 262-265.


61. Ibid., 15-16.


63. Ibid., 334.

64. Pravda, March 1, 1987, 1, Gorbachev subsequently revealed that he had made this compromise as a result of his conversations with the delegates to the International Forum on a Nuclear Free World held in Moscow in February 1987. See M. S. Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World (New York, 1988), 139.


67. Yakovlev did criticize those “abroad” who misrepresented the USSR’s entire reform program as an outgrowth of its weakness and charged that the summit conference in Iceland had collapsed because of the American commitment to SDI. Yet his discussion of the Reagan administration was low-key and depersonalized. Pravda, March 11, 1987, 4. Yakovlev’s new authority in foreign affairs was reflected by his appearance at a state dinner for Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom with Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and Ryzhkov (Chairman of the Council of Ministers), Pravda, March 31, 1987, 2.

69. A. N. Yakovlev, "Glavnye v perestroike segodnya-prakticheskie dela i konkretnye rezultaty" (address to the CC of the Tadzhik Communist Party), Partiinaia Zhizn, No. 10 (1987), 7-16. The republication in the CC's major internal journal for party officials implied that Yakovlev's views had universal application.

70. Gorbachev had not criticized "dogmatism" per se but had explicitly assailed those who had represented existing structures as immutable dogmas. Yakovlev's remarks were summarized in Pravda, April 19, 1987, 3.

71. His report was summarized in Pravda April 10, 1987 and published in fuller form in Kommunist in May 1987. A complete text has never been published.


73. Ibid., 20, 10.

74. Ibid., 17-18.

75. Ibid., 15.

76. Ibid., 16.

77. He continued to play an ill-defined role in foreign affairs, attending a state dinner in mid-May for the Prime Minister of France. Pravda, May 15, 1987, 1. But he did not participate in what must have been a particularly important CC sponsored conference on economic management convened on the eve of the June meeting of the CC/CPSU. The conference seemed to indicate that the leadership's group dealing with economic issues included Gorbachev, Ligachev, Zaikov, Ryzhkov, Yeltsin, Sliunkov, and Talizyn. See Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika (Moscow, 1989), 171.


79. See Harris, op. cit., 32-33.

80. Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika (1988), 31. Furthermore, the reference to his foreign policy activities seemed to reflect a loss of status despite the promotion. For example, when the President of the Federal Republic of Germany visited the USSR in
early July there was no public reference to Yakovlev’s role in the negotiations with the visiting Foreign Minister. *Pravda*, July 19, 1987, 1.

81. The most complete discussion of the “Yeltsin affair” appears in Sewryn Bialer (ed.), *Politics, Society and Nationality Inside Gorbachev’s Russia* (1989), 91-118.


87. Yakovlev’s status in the delegation was very high. The official joint communique on the conference ranked him after Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. See *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika* (1988), 290. He was ranked the same way at the conference of the Warsaw Pact later than a month. *Ibid.*, 301.


90. See *Pravda*, February 18, 19, 20, 21, 1988.

91. Yakovlev’s summary did not even mention Ligachev’s report, and focused instead on practical questions of educational reform and totally ignored Gorbachev’s lapses into orthodoxy. *Pravda*, February 27, 1988, 2.

92. The Soviet leadership continued to discuss nationality problems with the euphemisms of the past. See for example the first CC sponsored conference on this clash. *Pravda*, March 19, 1988, 2.

93. Harris, *op. cit.*, 37, 55.

94. Keller, *op. cit.*, reports that a well placed party official told him that Yakovlev was the author of *Pravda’s* rejoinder.

96. His comments were never published. See *Pravda*, April 28, 1988, 2; April 29, 1988, 3.


99. Ligachev was chairman of the commission responsible for the Conference’s resolution on the “struggle against bureaucratism,” while Yakovlev chaired the commission responsible for the resolution on glasnost. *Pravda*, July 2, 1988, 12.


106. The new journal of the CC/CPSU, *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, which began publication in early 1989, seems to indicate that the commission did not meet frequently nor deal with immediate problems of foreign affairs. Yakovlev was on the journal’s editorial board along with Gorbachev, Medvedev and others.


108. In mid-November Yakovlev was named the chairman of the Politburo’s own commission investigating past repressions in the CPSU. This may have heightened his concern with individual rights. *Pravda*, November 11, 1988, 1.


118. Ibid., 4.


120. Pravda, July 12, 1989, 2.


122. Pravda, August 18, 1989, 1-2

123. Pravda, October 6, 1989 reports the Politburo’s approval of Yakovlev’s participation.


125. Ibid.
126. *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, November 23, 1989, 2. It is impossible to determine whether or not the Tass version published here is complete.


130. *Ibid*.
