THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S MUSLIMS:
DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE

by

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One of the foundations of the communist claim to legitimacy in Yugoslavia is the assertion that the party has been able to do what none of its predecessors could do: regulate inter­nationality conflict and thereby maintain political stability. Over the years, nationalist movements among one or another of the country's constituent nationalities have seriously challenged that claim. At no time, however, has the communist regime faced such a challenge from a movement based on Islam as a religious, cultural, or political force for mass mobilization. The absence of such a challenge can be explained in part by the successful integration -- some might say cooptation -- of part of the Islamic population through mechanisms of control, and timely concessions amounting to a policy of accommodation. However, that absence can also be explained by the fact that that part of the Islamic population which has mounted a serious challenge to the regime has done so on an entirely different basis.

In this article, I identify factors that facilitated the successful integration of part of Yugoslavia's Islamic population, and factors that have made the integration of its "other" Muslims more difficult. In this way, I intend to demonstrate that adherence to Islam as a religion, or the existence of an Islamic cultural heritage does not by itself represent a barrier of political integration in a multinational state, and that successful integration ultimately depends on a broad range of
social, economic, and political factors, each of which may or may not be present among part or all of any Islamic population.

Origins of Islam in Bosnia

Islam came to the lands presently known as Yugoslavia primarily as the result of Ottoman Turkish conquest in the late fourteenth to early sixteenth centuries. Some Muslim and Bosnian historiography, and especially more recent work, emphasizes evidence of the pre-Ottoman origins of Islam in Bosnia and, in fact, the entire Balkan peninsula. However, the spread of Islam to Bosnia and the other regions of present-day Yugoslavia can fairly be said to be primarily the result of the extensive conversion of the native population to Islam following the Turkish occupation, and the later natural growth of this population. The in-migration of Islamic peoples from other areas of the Ottoman Empire appears to have contributed only a very small proportion of the growth of Islam. Relatively small numbers of Turkish, Albanian and Spanish Muslims settled in Bosnia and the other occupied regions, but "there was no widespread colonization by ethnic groups from the East."

Prior to the Ottoman conquest, the native Slavic population of Bosnia was divided into groups adhering to Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and an independent (heretical?) Bosnian Christian church--sometimes referred to as the "Bogomil Church." Both Western and Yugoslav historians have generally agreed that the adherents of the Bosnian church converted to Islam en masse, providing the bulk of the early Islamic population. In this way,
it is suggested, the native Slavic feudal nobility of Bosnia was able to retain its position and, importantly, its control over the land. Some Yugoslav treatments of the Islamization of Bosnia, however, suggest a different process. They suggest that the conversion of the native Slavic population was a gradual process resulting from the urbanization of the population and expansion of internal trade and communication networks associated with Ottoman rule, which brought peasant masses into, or into contact with the cities, where Islam was strongest. And a more recent Western interpretation tends to support this view. Regardless of the speed of conversion, however, it is certainly the case that a large proportion of the native Slavic population was Islamized during the four centuries of Ottoman occupation, and that Islamization was for the most part peaceful and voluntary.

During the period of Ottoman rule, the organizational bases of the Muslim community in Bosnia and the other occupied region did not differ significantly from those of other districts of the Empire. The construction of Islamic religious institutions was financed by charitable endowments (in Arabic, waqfs; but in Serbocroatian: vakufs) established by wealthy Muslim governors. As a result, a large number of mosques, tekijas (tekkes in Turkish), and libraries were built in Bosnia, primarily in the cities. By the nineteenth century, an extensive system of elementary and intermediate religious schools, mektebs and medresas, was established on the Turkish model. The language of instruction in these schools was Turkish, rather than Serbocroatian.
While the Islamic religious schools were based on the Turkish model, the practical religion of the broad masses of the population was a mixture of Islamic, Christian, heretical Christian, christianized pagan and pagan beliefs and practices. Even a recent official publication of the Islamic religious leadership of Bosnia and Hercegovina acknowledges that, while Bosnian Islam "is explicitly Orthodox (and) Sunni," it "contains many syncretistic characteristics;" and devotes a separate chapter to "Slavic-Bogomil-Islamic Syncretism." As a result, a gulf developed between the educated Muslim urban intelligentsia and the Muslim peasantry.

The urban intelligentsia developed a Turkish literature and culture which included the use of an Arabic script for the Serbocroatian language. But this culture did not extend beyond the urban intelligentsia. The language and literary culture of the vast portion of the Muslim population remained Serbocroatian—in a dialect using both the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets. It was, in fact, this dialect that Vuk Karadzic, the creator of the "standard" Serbian literary language, chose as a model for the creation of a literary language that he hoped would be used by, and thereby unite the South Slavic peoples.

Bosnian Muslim historians argue that, over the centuries, a distinct "oriental-Islamic cultural heritage" developed in the territories occupied by the Turks. This common heritage was shared even by the Christian population, and was "reflected in the adoption of Turkishisms and Arabisms in the Serbocroatian language, the style of dress in the region, its art and
architecture, and even in the vocabulary and practice of the
Christian churches." The common cultural development of the
Muslim and non-Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina during
the period of Turkish occupation, it is argued, built upon their
shared historical memory of a common, pre-Ottoman past, their
shared pre-Ottoman customs and beliefs, their common Slavic
origins and language, and their extensive "geographic
interpenetration." The latter, especially, gave rise to "a cult
of good neighborliness;" that is, a cult of the komšiluk." However, as one Bosnian Muslim historian has observed,
"despite the numerous elements that connected the peoples of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, there built up among them, we would
say, only a common feeling of homeland which however, never
developed into the idea of a Bosnian nation". Society remained internally differentiated on the basis of
religion. Even in the development of resistance to Turkish rule,
Orthodox and Catholics found common cause with and support from
their co-religionists in Serbia and Croatia, leaving Muslim
opponents of Turkish rule isolated. Even the elevation of some of its members to high office in
the Ottoman Empire did not reduce the local attachments of the
Bosnian Muslim population. By the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries, the local authority and autonomy of the
Bosnian Muslim nobility had increased dramatically. When the
Ottomans attempted in 1831 to impose reforms designed to reduce
that autonomy, the Bosnian Muslim nobility formed a resistance
movement and demanded more rather than less autonomy for Bosnia
within the framework of the Empire.
Yet, while the Muslim nobility insisted on politico-administrative autonomy, both it and the broad masses of Slavic Muslim population identified closely with the Empire as the protector of the Islamic faith. The Slavic Muslim population of Bosnia and Hercegovina called themselves "Turčini" ("Turks"), a term which they understood to mean "adherents to Islam." For "Turks" in an ethnic sense, they used the terms "Turkuši" ("Turkics") or "Osmanlija." This close identification was reflected in the repeated participation of Slavic Muslims in the suppression of anti-Turk revolts by other peoples of the area, and placed the Muslim community in an exposed position when control over Bosnia and Hercegovina passed from the Ottomans to the Austrians.

The Bosnian Islamic Community under Austrian Rule

The Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina and the Ottoman retreat from the Balkans was a crucial development in the history of the Muslim community, for it accelerated the differentiation of Bosnian Muslims—including the Muslims of Hercegovina—from Muslims elsewhere in the territories that would later become Yugoslavia. The Bosnia Muslims were now cut off from the other Slavic Muslims in the Novi Pazar district, in Macedonia, and in Montenegro, with whom they had shared a common identity as "Bosniaks" ("Bosnjaci") based on "their ethnic and confessional connectedness." They were also divided from the non-Slav Muslim populations of the later Yugoslav lands; primarily the Albanians and Turks in the areas now known as Kosovo and Macedonia. This
had the additional important consequence of insulating the Bosnian Islamic community from the influence of the Sufi orders that were particularly widespread and active among Albanian Muslims, who remained under Ottoman rule. This separation of the Bosnian community, and the social and political changes in it that took place during the period of Austrian rule, hastened the development of what at least some Muslim historians in Yugoslavia call an "ethnically distinct" Bosnian Muslim community.17

With the transfer of the region from Turkish to Austrian control, elements of the oriental-Islamic culture of Bosnia began to give way to the culture of Western European civilization. While this process unfolded most rapidly among the Christian Slavs, even according to a recent official publication of the Islamic religious hierarchy in Bosnia, "this statement also is valid today for the Bosnian Muslims." However, there can be no doubt that "the occupation deepened the cultural differentiation" of the Bosnian Muslims, who retained far more of the oriental-Islamic culture than either the Serbs or Croats.18

By the time of the Austrian mandate and later annexation, both Croatian and Serbian nationalist movements had grown quite powerful. To counteract their growth, the Austrian authorities attempted to create a territorially-based Bosnian "national identity." However, while the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims did share some sense of a particular Bosnian identity and Austrian efforts thus met with some positive response, it never developed into a truly "national" idea. The Bosnian population remained
divided into distinct ethno-national communities that were defined in large part by religion.

The suppression of armed resistance by Muslims to the establishment of Austrian power in Bosnia, proselytizing activity by Catholic clergy, the unsuccessful attempt by the Austrian administration to create a false "Bosnian nation," and especially Austrian intervention in the administration and disposition of funds from the vakufs strained relations between the Austrian authorities and the local Muslim population. As part of a general effort to gain greater control over all three religious communities and thereby insulate the local population from outside influences, the Austrian authorities created the position of "Reis-ul-ulema," or Supreme religious leader of the Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina. This was a salaried position paid by the Austrian authorities. At the same time, they created a new authoritative religious body to advise the Reis (a four-member ulema medzlis). The latter body was given control over the provincial vakuf commission also established by the Austrian authorities the following year. These actions, and the gradual centralization of vakuf administration under state control, and re-direction of vakuf monies toward the support of reformed Muslim education, alienated even further the local Muslim population; and especially the local Muslim elites whose wealth and power was based in large part on their autonomous control over the vakufs and the monies they generated. As a result, a resistance movement
aimed at achieving religious, educational, and cultural autonomy for the Muslim community soon developed.²¹

The movement for Muslim religious and cultural autonomy was led by the Mufti of Mostar, and supported by the Muslim elite of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Petitions calling for the establishment of Muslim religious, educational, and cultural autonomy were submitted to the Austrian authorities, but to no avail. On the contrary, the actions of dissident Muslims prompted a period of harsh, repressive actions on the part of the authorities. This repression did not, however, prevent the emergence of an even more organized movement in 1906.²²

The Muslim National (or, alternatively, People's) Organization (Muslimanska narodna organizacija) was formally established in 1906, but in actual fact represented a continuation of earlier efforts. Although under the control of the Muslim landlord elites, this new political party quickly assumed the task of representing the entire Bosnian Muslim community in negotiations with the Austrian authorities. Even the government-appointed members of the formal Islamic hierarchy recognized the legitimacy of this new force. The Austrian authorities, however, continued to frustrate Muslim demands. For they were unwilling to certify, either the formal authority of the Sheikh-ul-Islam in Istanbul over Bosnian Islam as asserted by the Bosnian Muslims, or the limited sovereignty of the Sultan over the Bosnian lands that was implied by it.²³ Negotiations between the Muslim National Organization and the Austrian authorities were concluded only after Austria's outright annexation to Bosnia and Hercegovina in
1908. With the question of political sovereignty over the province no longer at issue, the Emperor in 1909 decreed a statute for the autonomous administration of Islamic religious affairs in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Under the complex provisions of this statute, supreme religious authority was vested in an ulema-medžlis, composed of the Reis-ul-ulema and four other members. The Reis himself was to be elected by the Austrian Emperor from among three candidates proposed by a Muslim nominating body, or "curia." The Emperor's choice became Reis only after receiving authorization from the Sheikh-ul-Islam in Istanbul. Six muftiates were established in Mostar, Sarajevo, Travnik, Banja, Luka, Bihac and Tuzla. Each Muslim community, or đëmat, established its own local medžlis to oversee religious affairs in its area. Religious functionaries became salaried officials paid out of Austrian state funds. Educational and cultural affairs, as well as the vakufs, were placed under the administration of a separate agency whose members included representatives of both the Islamic religious hierarchy and the local communities. By 1912, local branches of this agency were active in fifty-one cities and towns throughout the province.

The movement to secure religious, cultural, and educational autonomy developed at the same time that important changes in the nature of Muslim self-identification were taking place. Under Austrian rule, to identify oneself as a "Turk" was perceived by others -- and especially by the authorities -- as an indication of political opposition to Austrian sovereignty over the
province. Thus, the intellectual and cultural elites of Bosnia's Muslim population began, at about the same time that they became involved in the movement to secure religious concessions from the Empire, to describe themselves and their confessional brothers not as "Turčini," but rather as "Muslimani"; that is, quite literally, as "Muslims." To a certain degree, they had no other choice. For at precisely this time both Croatian and Serbian nationalisms were gaining strength and becoming more aggressive. Each was exerting pressure on the Muslim population to declare itself as part of the Croatian or Serbian nation, respectively.

The existence of an independent and vigorously nationalistic and expansionist Serbian state exercised a significant attraction for some Muslims. A small number of intellectuals and some leaders of Muslim cultural educational organizations began to identify themselves as "Serbs of the Muslim faith" or "Muslim Serbs," but this was primarily a reflection of their political attraction. The "Croatian orientation" among Bosnian Muslims during this period, on the other hand, was in large part the result of the increasing education of Muslim children in Serbocroatian, sponsored by the Austrian regime but administered by Croatians from the Empire and by Zagreb-educated Bosnian Muslims. The declaration of Croatian identity by Bosnian Muslims, therefore, reflected a primarily cultural attraction. Nonetheless, all sources agree that the identification of Bosnian Muslims with either the Serbian or the Croatian nation remained limited. And even those Muslims who did identify with one or the
other nation never were fully accepted as equal members; for the
national identity of both Serbs and Croats remained tied to their
respective churches. Consequently, the development of the Muslim
community proceeded for the most part "analogously to and together
with corresponding tendencies among Bosnian Serbs and Croats,"
rather than as part of either one. "In all areas of public life,
wherever the national division of Serbs and Croats came to
expression, the Muslims also appeared as a third factor."29

The period of Austrian rule thus saw, in addition to the
establishment of a semi-autonomous indigenous official Islamic
religious hierarchy, a dramatic expansion of the secular,
cultural-educational bases of the Bosnian Muslim community.
Numerous cultural societies, reading clubs, and economic and
political organizations were established by Muslims.30 Bosnia
became, in a large part, a "divided society:" Serbs, Croats, and
Muslims each could live their lives wholly within the framework of
Serb, Croat and Muslim organizations. There can be no doubt that
the development of such parallel organizations hastened the
transformation of the meaning of self-identification as a "Muslim"
from the narrowly religious to the national.

The Bosnian Islamic Community in the Inter-War Period

The division of Bosnian society along confessional lines
continued under the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes that
would later become Yugoslavia. Indeed, "even where
differentiation on a national basis did not have any rid of
reason, there appeared separate Serbo-Croat-Muslim
Separate sports societies, student organizations, newspapers and magazines, and even banks and credit societies were established in addition to the already-existing educational-cultural organizations. Even more important, this division extended to the political party system with the establishment in 1919 of the "Yugoslav Muslim Organization," a party that rapidly won broad mass support among Bosnian Muslims and came to defend their broader communal interests.

The division of Bosnian society was reinforced by the very character of the new state. Major religions were granted official status under the Kingdom and subjected to official control. Certain civil functions in the realm of family and educational affairs were delegated to the officially-sanctioned religious hierarchies. The close correspondence between religion and nationality meant that relations among the religious communities, and between them and the state were determined in large part by the fact that the new state was clearly under the political domination of the Serbs, and that Serbian nationalism became even more aggressive during this period. Conflict and hostility between Serbs and non-Serbs increased, and Muslims in particular came under extreme pressure to declare themselves as Serbs and thereby support the existing political order. As a result, "Yugoslavism" as a movement to unite all the South Slavic peoples on the basis of their common heritage, which prior to 1918 had had significant support among the South Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and some support in Bosnia and even Serbia, was soon discredited.
Bosnian Muslims, indeed all Slavic Muslims in the new state, came under substantial and competing pressure from Serbian and Croatian nationalists during the inter-war period. This took the form of open political pressure to support the Serb-dominated regime or join the Croatian opposition, pressure to "Serbianize" or "Croatianize" Muslim culture, economic discrimination and discriminatory welfare policies directed against the Muslim community, and even open violence against Muslims. Manifestations of extreme intolerance toward Muslims extended even to those individuals who in fact declared themselves as Serbs or Croats.

The pressure of these conditions led to greater social and political cohesiveness in the Muslim community of Bosnia. In the words of one Bosnian Muslim political scientist: "Every attack on the Muslims, in whatever dimension and in whatever manner stimulated among them a need for self-defense, which they could accomplish only by stronger mutual attachment and the creation of still stronger unity." Indeed, it was the difficulties experienced by Muslims in the first months of the new state's existence that led to the formation of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, and it was the continuing pressure on the Muslim community that prompted it to more intense political activity.

The Yugoslav Muslim Organization was not, at first, conceived as a party of the Muslims as a national group, per se. Indeed, in the political debate over the constitutional order of the new state, the party advocated a "unified state" but with "wide autonomy" for the provinces in their "existing geographic
boundaries." It explicitly opposed autonomy for "tribal" groups.\textsuperscript{36} The party leadership was composed mainly of individuals who personally identified with either the Serbian or Croatian nation.\textsuperscript{37} Instead of "Muslimness," they advocated Yugoslavism; "not as a national orientation, but rather as a necessary practical policy."\textsuperscript{38} And to the extent that they defended the distinctly religious rights of Muslims, they appear to have done so primarily in order to mobilize mass support and, of course, to protect the autonomy of the vakufs that provided them personally and their party with "significant material resources."\textsuperscript{39} Nevertheless, political realities compelled the party to "orient itself all the more toward the struggle for the political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Muslims. . . . "\textsuperscript{40} And in this way, it became a \textit{de facto} national party, and \textit{de facto} proponent of Muslim ethnic distinctiveness, if not outright nationality.\textsuperscript{41}

In the narrowly religious realm, however, the defense of the Islamic community fell to the formal religious hierarchy. After 1918, the formal religious hierarchy in Bosnia and Hercegovina remained essentially unchanged from the organization established in 1909, except for the addition of Croatia and Slovenia to the administrative purview of the leadership in Sarajevo. Islam in Serbia (primarily Kosovo and the territories adjacent to Bosnia) and Macedonia was organized under a supreme \textit{Mufti} in Belgrade, and several regional muftiates and local muftis. Islam in Montenegro was organized under a single \textit{mufti} in Stari Bar. Up to 1930, therefore, the defense of Muslim religious interests was divided
among several regional leaderships, with the most powerful of these -- by virtue of the sheer size and political importance of its community -- based in Sarajevo. In 1930, however, new government legislation -- part of a series of laws passed by the newly-declared Royal Dictatorship that established state-sanctioned formal hierarchies for the major religious communities in an effort to bring them under closer supervision and control -- reorganized the Islamic religious hierarchy. It established a "Supreme Council of the Islamic Religious Community," headed by the Reis-ul-ulema and was located in Belgrade, as the unified leadership of all adherents to the faith in the country. Two regional leaderships subordinate to the Supreme Council were established in Sarajevo and Skopje. The Sarajevo leadership supervised muftiates in Mostar, Sarajevo, BanjaLuka, and Tuzla (the pre-1930 muftiates in Bihac and Travnik were eliminated). The Skopje leadership supervised muftiates in Prizren, Skopje, Bitolja, Novi Pazar, and Plevlje.42

In 1931, the territory under the religious administration of Sarajevo encompassed 1,120 mosques with an imam (religious functionary), 311 "main" imams, 51 teachers in 22 medresas, and 70 shariat judges. The territory under the religious administration of Skopje encompassed 1,131 mosques, 419 main imams, 20 teachers in 17 medresas and 38 shariat judges.43 Parallel to this official hierarchy, there was during this period a relatively widespread network of Sufi organizations. A 1934 evaluation of them published in the journal of the official Supreme Council noted that there were "a considerable number" of tekijas -- the residences
of the shaykhs (in Serbocroatian, "sejhs") who headed these organizations, or tariqas (in Serbocroatian, "tarikats")—in Yugoslavia; the majority of them in the territories subordinate to Skopje (with most concentrated among the ethnically Albanian Muslims in Kosovo), and only 18 in the territories subordinate to Sarajevo, half of them in the city of Sarajevo itself.44

The attitude of the official hierarchy toward those Sufi tarikats appears to have been quite hostile. They characterized the tarikats as engaging in religious activity that was "completely alien to Islam." While acknowledging the potentially positive role of the tekijas and the "sejhs," the author of the review published by the official Islamic leadership noted that "when we look . . . at the situation in the majority of tekijas in our country, we simply must be astounded." Although they received support from vakufs intended to finance the educational and religious instructions of Muslims, he complained, in "some places" the "sejhs" were nothing more than "parasites." Not only was there practically no instruction of children in writing or in shari'at regulations in these tekijas, but there was open encouragement of hostility toward individuals "who know Islam," toward the medresas, and toward shari'at regulations. Moreover, these tarikats "think that . . . they themselves, although completely uneducated, have achieved the real truth and genuine understanding." The author of this review urged that the "sharpest measures" be undertaken against the Bektashiya (Bektashiyah) tarikat, which he characterized as an "extreme Shiite" order with vestiges of pre-Islamic Christian practices, to
which "the majority" of Albanian Muslims belonged and which was active in Albania and the "southern regions" of Yugoslavia -- presumably Kosovo and western Macedonia (then "southern Serbia").

Although some Bosnian Muslim historians suggest that the inter-war period saw a strengthening of the "sympathy" of Bosnian Muslims for Albanians and Turks, based on "the feeling of a similarity of fate," the marked differences between the Islamic communities under the administration of Sarajevo and Skopje appear not to have been eliminated as the result of organizational unification in a Supreme Council. In the words of a Muslim historian and proponent of an ethnically distinct Bosnian Muslim nationality, that unification "did not have deeper implications." There were simply not "any kind of close connections" between Bosnia and other Muslims. "Moreover, there are numerous historical examples of an intolerant relationship [in Bosnia] toward Albanians." As a result, their common adherence to Islam "did not have any kind of influence in political life, either."

Not even the secular political activity of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization could bridge this gulf. The party did show concern for Serbocroatian-speaking Muslims in Montenegro and the Novi Pazar district, but was unable to take effective action. These territories were considered by Serbian nationalists to be part of Serbia; and the Serbian-dominated government in Belgrade prohibited the cultural arm of the party from operating outside
Bosnia. At the same time, the Muslim population of these territories was subjected to the crudest forms of pressure to "Serbianize", or leave. The Yugoslav Muslim Organization showed far less concern for non-Slav Muslims Kosovo and Macedonia, primarily Albanians and Turks. The differences between the community in Bosnia and those elsewhere could only have been reinforced by the transfer in 1936 of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Religious Community, and the office of the Reis-ul-ulama, from Belgrade to Sarajevo. This strengthened still further the long-standing domination of the official religious hierarchy by ethnically Slav, Serbocroatian-speaking Bosnian Muslims and emphasized the "double" minority status of Yugoslavia's non-Slavic Muslims.

The Islamic Community Under Communist Rule

The communist regime in Yugoslavia was established as the result of a war of resistance to foreign, primarily German, occupation that was at the same time a communist revolution. The inter-war regime had succumbed to gradually increasing internationality hostility and concomitant political deadlock, and the war and occupation unleashed a fratricidal conflict of immense proportions in Yugoslavia, primarily between the Serbs and Croats, but involving all the peoples in the country. In response to these conditions, the Communist Party, under the leadership of Tito, adopted a strategy of encouraging peaceful, or "brotherly" relations among the peoples of Yugoslavia and enforced it among the ranks of the Partisans. In this way, the communist resistance
movement provided a haven for all peoples from ethnically-motivated persecution and attack and directed their hostility outward; that is, toward the foreign occupation forces. To win mass support for this struggle, and for the overthrow of the old regime, the Communists granted important, even if in the main symbolic, concessions to the national aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples, including the adoption of a federal formula for the organization of the post-war socialist state.

For the Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the communist leadership seemed to promise full recognition as a separate national group. Indeed, as one Bosnian Muslim political scientist has demonstrated, pronouncements of the communist leadership and the policies they followed during the war clearly implied such status in fact, even if it was not made explicit. But it seems certain that such pronouncements were the reflections of a general effort by the communist leadership to enlist ethnic group sentiments in support of the revolution and did not represent a clearly thought-out plan for dealing with the "Muslim question." They did, however, also reflect a willingness on the part of that leadership to concede to, or even encourage the aspirations and demands of ethno-national groups where such action might be expected to enhance rather than detract from communist power. In this sense they presaged the formal political, legal, and ideological recognition of a separate Muslim national identity that would come later.

The precise nature of self-identification among Yugoslavia's Muslims remained unclear at the beginning of communist rule. The
1948 census indicated a total of 1,036,124 Muslims of Slavic origin in the country. Over 78 percent of these, or 808,921, were located in Bosnia. Of the Muslims of Slavic origin located in Bosnia, over 89 percent, or 788,403, declared their nationality "undecided Muslim" in the census, while just over 8 percent (71,991) declared themselves as Serbs and less than 3 percent (25,295) declared themselves as Croats. This distribution reflected the long-standing reluctance of Bosnia's Muslims to declare either Serbian or Croatian nationality. In contrast, however, over 83 percent of the Muslims of Slavic origin in Serbia declared Serbian nationality; over 70 percent of those in Croatia declared Croatian; and, over 95 percent of those in Macedonia declared Macedonian. These data suggested striking differences in self-identification even among Yugoslavia's Slavic Muslims; but they gave no indication about its non-Slavic Muslims. 51

The 1953 census provided a more detailed picture of the Muslim community, and it revealed sharp differences between Slavic and non-Slavic Muslims, and even among Slavic Muslims. 52 This census recorded both the nationality and the religion of the population. It revealed that there were 2,090,380 individuals who considered themselves adherents of the Islamic faith, and that 1,008,768, or over 48 percent, were non-Slavs. Of these non-Slavic believers, Albanians and Turks in Serbia proper, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia accounted for 955,042, or almost 95 percent. Both these national groups were almost entirely Muslim, with the exception of a large minority of Roman Catholic Albanians in Montenegro. Yet each retained its distinct non-Slavic national
identity. Among Slavic Muslims, however, national identification varied from region to region. A large proportion of believers in Croatia declared Croatian nationality, a large proportion of the Slavic Muslims in Macedonia—where Albanians and Turks accounted for almost 92 percent of all Muslims—declared Macedonian identity. In Bosnia, however, an overwhelming proportion—over 93 percent—of those who declared themselves adherents of Islam were also recorded in terms of nationality simply as "undetermined Yugoslavs." Thus, "Muslimness" in Bosnia seemed to be coincident with national separateness; but not with any category of nationality then available. Elsewhere, however, "Muslimness" did not seem to preclude identification with another nationality; particularly in the case of Albanians and Turks, two non-Slavic nationalities in a South Slavic state. Thus, if the new communist regime were to grant distinct national status to the "Muslims" of Yugoslavia, there was good reason to do so for Bosnian Muslims, and perhaps even to include Slavic Muslims in other regions who identified with them. But that identity could not be expected to appeal to the adherents to Islam among the non-Slavic nationalities that already enjoyed official recognition.

The establishment of a communist political system had important, and immediate consequences for the Islamic religious community. The strict separation of church and state established by the new regime meant that civil functions heretofore performed by the various religious hierarchies now were taken over by the state. It also meant the end of the shariat court system, the obligatory religious surtax, and the obligatory
religious instruction in basic and middle schools that had existed under the old regime. The establishment of compulsory public education meant that the mektebs and medresas lost their secular educational functions and that Muslim children would now be enrolled in Serbocroatian language schools and receive the same education as non-Muslims. As a result, the mektebs practically ceased to function as educational institutions. But Bonsian Muslims began rapidly to overcome the relative "backwardness" characteristic of their community that had been the product of poor secular education. The commitment of the new regime to at least formal equality between the sexes meant not only the outlawing of the veil, but also the encouragement of greater participation by Muslim women in society, including public education.

The early years of communist power also saw the forced closing of mosques and other institutions of the religious community. In the words of a recent publication of the religious leadership in Sarajevo, "certain more significant objects... became part of the common cultural heritage of the Yugoslav community of nations and nationalities, became cultural-historical monuments, and the wider social community took on alongside the Islamic community, part of their protection, placing them under the protection of the state." In addition to the conversion of mosques into museums, or "cultural-historical monuments," other religious institutions were simply closed. Thus, in 1952, the tekijas, of the Sufi tarikats in Bosnia were ordered closed. Other buildings of the Islamic religious community were seized and
converted to other public functions. Thus, for example, the
building housing the Gazi Husrefbeg medresa in Sarajevo was given
over to Sarajevo University. At the same time, and even more
important, the nationalization of land and economic enterprises
carried out by the communist regime claimed a great part of the
sources of income of the vakufs. This, of course, substantially
reduced the resources under the control of the religious
hierarchy. These measures, however, were manifestations of the
broader secularization and socialization policies of the new
regime, rather than of any specifically anti-Islamic campaign.
Indeed, Islam and the official Islamic religious hierarchy were of
far less interest to the new communist regime than the Catholic
and Orthodox Churches — with which it was locked in political
combat. 58

The Organization of the Islamic Community

The organization of the official religious hierarchy remained
essentially unchanged in the post-war period from that which had
existed earlier. The individuals who staffed the hierarchy,
however, did change. According to a later summary of events in
these years published by the central religious leadership, a new
group of "patriotic and progressive Muslim religious and secular
intelligentsia" began to participate in the work of the religious
community. 59 Following the adoption of a new constitution for the
Islamic Community in 1947, a new Reis-ul-ulema was elected. He
presided over the community during the period in which the
measures described above were adopted. Under his leadership, a
new organization of religious functionaries was created in 1950 "to help in explaining the usefulness of these laws" to the masses of believers and to help in ensuring their implementation. Beginning in 1957, however, the activity of the official leadership began to turn away from the implementation of state regulations and toward the development of the community itself.

This change was made possible in part by the adoption in 1953 of a federal law defining the "legal position" of religious communities. While this law established restrictions on the use of religion or religious organizations "for political goals," it also specified the scope of permissible religious activity and thereby formally sanctioned specific forms of religious activity. Far more important for the activation of the Islamic religious leadership, however, was the election of a new Reis in 1957.

The election of Hadži Sulejman ef. Kemura, heretofore the Director of the Gazi Husrefbeg medresa in Sarajevo, as Reis-ul-ulema in late 1957 marked an important change in the religious hierarchy. The new Reis was determined from the outset of his incumbency to ensure that religious instruction was expanded, and supported by the production of new Islamic textbooks and by the improved preparation of new religious cadres. Substantially younger than his predecessor, the election of Kemura was followed by the widespread appointment and election of new, younger officials "in all other functions in the hierarchy." The new Reis reorganized the Supreme Islamic Council by introducing the office of religious-educational administrator and by establishing his own
personal cabinet, or staff. In 1958, four regional Islamic
Councils with authority over both spiritual and material affairs
were established -- for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and
Slovenia, with headquarters in Sarajevo; for Serbia (including
Kosovo) with headquarters in Priština; for Macedonia, with
headquarters in Titograd. A similar consolidation of functions on
the local level soon followed with the establishment of local
"committees of the Islamic community."62

The organizational structure of the Islamic Religious
Community established during the late 1960s remained essentially
unchanged when a new constitution was adopted by the Community in
1969. And the Community continues to be organized in this way
today. The official hierarchy is headed by the Reis-ul-ulema, who
is defined as the "supreme spiritual leader and religious
representative" of the Community and is responsible for the
overall supervision of Islamic religious affairs in Yugoslavia.
Based in Sarajevo, the Reis is elected by a special electoral body
composed of the members of the Supreme Assembly, the presidents
and members of the four regional Islamic Councils, the muftis, and
the directors of the religious schools. The Reis is at the same
time president of the Supreme Islamic Council of the Islamic
Religious Community, which is located in Sarajevo and "represents
the religious unity" of Yugoslavia's Muslims. The Supreme Council
exercises "general supervision over the entire religious life,"
"gives obligatory interpretations on religious questions," and
regulates the religious schools, press, and functionaries of the
Community. The other members of the Supreme Islamic Council in
addition to the Reis are the presidents of the four regional Islamic Councils and six members elected from out of the Supreme Assembly. The Supreme Assembly is composed of 35 members elected by the regional assemblies for four-year terms—thirteen from Sarajevo, twelve from Priština, seven from Skopje, and three from Titograd—at least one-third of whom must have religious training. The Supreme Assembly performs largely administrative functions, but is formally responsible for the supervision of the spiritual work of the Reis and the Supreme Council as well. 63

Below this level, the hierarchy remains today divided into the four distinct regional organizations established in 1958, each headed by an Islamic Council. Members of the regional Islamic Councils are elected by their respective regional assemblies and serve as their "executive organs" for four-year terms. The president and "a certain number" of members of each such council are required to have religious training. These religious councils exercise supervision over "all spiritual and material affairs of the Islamic community;" administer the financial affairs of the community, including vakufs over a certain size; control the construction and maintenance of Islamic institutions; and perform a variety of other administrative tasks.

Within each of the regions, there are a number of muftiates, established by the regional assembly with the advance agreement of the Supreme Council. The muftis, known until 1969 as "main imams," are defined as "the chief spiritual personage" in their respective areas, and must have at least a higher theological education and five years experience in religious services in the
Community to qualify for appointment. The muftis oversee all aspects of spiritual life in their respective areas, which usually encompass several local "committees."

The local "committees of the Islamic community" are the basic organizational units of the hierarchy. They are composed of from five to fifteen members, depending on the size of the particular community, at least one-third of whom must have religious training. In some areas, the regional Council appoints a number of members of these committees (in Bosnia, it appears to be the case that all the members of these committees are appointed by the Islamic Council, and this may be the case elsewhere, as well). In every case, the regional Council appoints a cleric who serves as religious-educational administrator and member of the committee. These committees oversee all religious questions in their respective areas, including the organization and conduct of religious service, the construction and maintenance of mosques, and the maintenance and protection of cemeteries. They are assisted in these tasks by "mosque-committees," whose members they appoint. It is the religious-educational administrator appointed by the regional councils, however, who organizes and supervises all religious activities, especially the work of all clerics, within the jurisdiction of the local committee.

The territorial jurisdiction of each local "committee of the Islamic community" may encompass one or more džemats, or congregations. Each džemat may be served by an imam, or bula, and a muezin. The muezins of major mosques may be appointed directly by the regional Islamic Councils.
Islamic Religious Activity

Simultaneous with the reorganization of the formal hierarchy, the new Reis sponsored "a series of crucial decisions that forcefully set in motion the development and the pace of development of our religious life." The most important of these was the decision to require the introduction of "appropriate" religious sermons in "our national language" -- presumably, this would vary from region to region -- during major holidays. This change is reported by the official leadership to have resulted in a massive increase in the number of such sermons delivered, as well as "an awakening of Islamic consciousness" among the masses. And this was, in fact, reflected in the findings of an empirical study of religious practice in Hercegovina conducted by a Yugoslav sociologist. He reported increasing religious-pastoral activity by Muslim clergy during the early 1960s, and widespread participation in the observance of religious holidays. During 1963, over 80,000 believers in Hercegovina attended a variety of mass religious meetings, over ninety private homes were "transformed" into places of worship for holidays "in order to make possible the still more massive fulfillment of collective religious rituals," and for ramazan alone 133 homes were converted to places of worship and attended by an average of fifty believers; all this in addition to the 61 mosques and nineteen
mesdžids (mosques without a minaret) in regular operation in the area at the time.65

Of the 156 Muslims he surveyed for his study, over 55 percent (86 individuals), were found to be "traditional believers." Just over seven percent (eleven individuals) were found to be "vacillating believers" and little more than one percent (two individuals) were found to be "theologically convinced believers." Atheists comprised 36.5 percent (54 individuals) of those surveyed. The total proportion of "believers" among Muslims, 63.5 percent, compared favorably to that among the Orthodox surveyed in this study (42.1 percent), but fell short of the proportion among Catholics (77.4 percent).66 The population of Muslim believers, however, became very active in support of the official religious community during the 1960s.

One manifestation of this support was "the widespread benevolent competition among congregations for the restoration and construction of mosques damaged or destroyed in the war," which began during this period.67 Whereas in 1954 only 817 of the 1,022 mosques in Bosnia and Hercegovina were in working order,68 by the end of 1968 there were 999 working mosques, 25 of them restored in the previous year. In addition, there were 346 mesdžids, 62 other religious institutions, and 51 turbets.69 This renovation and repair of existing facilities and construction of new ones has continued in succeeding years, so that by 1978 there 1092 mosques and 569 mesdžids in this republic.70

Such activity appears to have proceeded at a similar pace in the other regions. Individual reports in the official journal of
the Supreme Islamic Council on the openings of new or reconstructed mosques and mešhâds during the 1960s suggest activity throughout all the territories, and are reflected in the increased numbers of such institutions reported by each of the regional councils throughout the 1970s. All this expansion has been funded almost entirely by the voluntary contributions of believers.

The official Islamic leadership was also very active during the 1970s. One of the most important developments during this period was the opening in Sarajevo in 1977 of the Islamic Theological Faculty, the construction and operation of which was financed primarily through the institution of the zekat. 71 Up to then, the Gazi Husrefbeg medersa in Sarajevo had been the primary source of clergy for the Bosnian Islamic Community. This medersa, founded over 450 years ago, is under the direct administration of the Islamic Council of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia and Slovenia. It is a middle-level Islamic religious school, offering a five-year course of study for students who have completed their mandatory basic, or elementary, secular education. As a result, the educational level of the Islamic clergy generally has been low. Moreover, the medersa has not proven to be a reliable source of clergy. Although the total end-of-year enrollment during the late 1960s and 1970s varied from a low of 222 to a high of 303, not all graduates of the medersa entered the Islamic clergy. In 1972, for example, none of the 54 graduates became imams. Most went into the army, or on to university faculties. 72
With the opening of the Theological Faculty, the official hierarchy had hoped to establish a more reliable source of highly-trained and politically reliable clergy. The Faculty, under the direct administration of the Supreme Islamic Council, offers a four-year course of studies, including four years (eight semesters) of Qur'an, hadis, and fikh, and two years (four semesters) of usuli-fikh and akaid. Secular studies include four to eight semesters each of philosophy, ethics, sociology, economics, history, religion (comparative religion and the psychology of religion), culture and civilization, literature, and languages (four years each of Arabic and English). Two semesters of study of the social and political order of socialist Yugoslavia are also included. Present enrollment in the Faculty is about 16 to 35 students per class year.\textsuperscript{73} The Reis reported in 1981 that the Islamic leadership had thought it "would be in a position to accept only the best clergy from the medresa, with an entry exam covering several subjects." He acknowledged, however, that "we have been forced to abstain from all limitations [on enrollment]. It is characteristic that the best [students] do not come to us." Moreover, in recent years, an increasing number of clergy have taken employment on the administrative staff and in the official bodies of the Islamic Community in the cities, or in an instructional-pedagogical capacity in the medresas, rather than becoming imam to a local Muslim congregation.\textsuperscript{74}

In another effort to provide improved religious training and education, the community has also been sending students to universities in various Islamic countries in the Middle East and
Asia. In 1969, sixty students (including several women) were reported to be studying abroad. In 1978, the number of such students were reported to be "about 150." Yugoslav Muslim students have received subsidies from the host governments for study at higher religious educational institutions in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Sudan. However, in mid-1981 the Reis reported that upon graduation the majority of these students are employed as translators by various Yugoslav enterprises doing business in the Arab countries in which they studied and do not return to Yugoslavia. Thus, efforts by the official hierarchy to improve the quality of the clergy appear to be failing.

The Bosnian Islamic Council has been the most active in the publishing field. In recent years it has published six editions of the Qur'an (totaling 40,000 copies) and a number of other secular and religious books and pamphlets. These include a secular history of Islam and Muslims in Bosnia and Hercegovina and several pamphlets instructing readers on how to fulfill various obligations of the faith. Since 1978, the Council has also published a monthly "journal of Islamic, theology, and information" called Islamic Thought (Islamska Misao). The Bosnian Council also distributes some literature on Islamic topics and on Arabic language and literature from Islamic countries is the Middle East.

The activities of the Islamic Councils in Pristina, Skopje, and Titograd are far more limited. The Council in Skopje was reported in 1978 to be preparing the publication of a new journal
to be published in Macedonian, Turkish and Albanian. This Council is also supervising the construction and preparation for operation of the Isaberg medresa in Skopje.\textsuperscript{77} However, data on the number of operating religious institutions in Macedonia suggest something of a decline in the activity of the community of believers in this republic, or at least of activity under official sponsorship. The number of operating mosques declined from 404 in 1973 to 372 in 1978, and the number of meşədzıds declined from 39 to 19.\textsuperscript{78} The Council in Priştina has published several Albanian-language texts and pamphlets. The association of imams for this region publishes an Albanian-language quarterly journal that includes translations from the official gazette of the Supreme Islamic Council and from the bimonthly newspaper of the Yugoslav association of imams.\textsuperscript{79}

This Council also operates the Alaudin medresa in Priştina, a middle-level Islamic religious school attended by students from Macedonia and Montenegro as well as Kosovo, in which instruction takes place in the Albanian language. This medresa offered a four-year course of study until 1970 when a fifth year was added to the curriculum. Since then, total end-of-year enrollment has varied from 181 to 197 students. One difficulty reported in this medresa as recently as 1975 was a shortage of textbooks in Albanian. As a result, "much time is lost in the writing of textbook material by dictation of the instructors".\textsuperscript{80} Given the limited scope of Albanian-language Islamic publishing activity reported above, this is likely still to be a problem at present.
Not all religious activity during this period was sponsored by or even in support of the official hierarchy, however. Although the tekijas of the Sufi orders were closed down in Bosnia by official decree in 1952, the tarikats themselves were not prohibited and, in fact, remained active. At the time of their closing in 1952, there had been seven tekijas in operation, three of them in Sarajevo. Some of these tekijas reopened again during the 1960s as centers for religious instruction, for the study of the Qur'an, and for the performance of dhikr. Members of the Nakshbandija order gathered on occasion at mosques in other Bosnian towns, as well. But the tekijas in Sarajevo were once again closed down by the official local "Committee of the Islamic Community" of Sarajevo in 1972, despite protests and appeals by their representatives voiced directly to the Reis. Those tekijas outside Sarajevo were treated as mesdžids by the Islamic leadership.

The closing of the tekijas and the obvious hostility of the official hierarchy did not, however, diminish the vitality of the Sufi orders in Bosnia. Members of the tarikats traveled freely to Kosovo and Macedonia where the tekijas had never been closed down by the Islamic authorities and had always been far more numerous. There, too, the tarikats became more active during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1971, the şeyh of the Rufaija tekija in Prizren led an effort to establish an Association of şeyhs and an organization of Islamic dervish orders in Yugoslavia. Representatives of tarikats in Bosnia participated in the work of the "initiative committee" that prepared draft
statutes of the Association. Although both the Supreme Islamic Council in Sarajevo and the regional Islamic Council in Priština refused to recognize the Association or to endorse the establishment of a Federation of Islamic Dervish Orders, that federation was nonetheless established in 1974. Headquartered in Priština, the Federation of Islamic Dervish Orders (Savez Islamskih derviških redova--SIDRA) was reported by the official Islamic leadership in Priština to be active in "all of Yugoslavia."\(^{83}\)

Negotiations between representatives of the official hierarchy and representatives of the tarikats and tekijas in Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia appear to have continued during the 1970s, and there were signs of an emergent accommodation between them. The President of the Islamic Council of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia, and the President of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia both engaged in contact and communication with representatives of the Bosnian tarikats. These resulted in 1977 in a formal agreement on coordination between the Bosnian hierarchy and the tarikats, including the establishment of a "Tarikat center" in Sarajevo. At the time, tarikats were active in twenty-three mosques, twelve mesdžids, five tekijas and one private home in Bosnia.\(^{84}\)

The SIDRA in Priština was informed of this agreement by the representatives of the Bosnian tarikats. The latter took the position that "it is inconceivable to us for the tarikat to be separate from the Islamic community," and emphasized "that the Islamic dervish orders cannot be an autonomous religious
community, outside the official Islamic Community in Yugoslavia." The President of the SIDRA met this news with great skepticism, and "expressed doubt that the Islamic Community will legalize the tarikat."85 To a certain degree, this has proven true, as the Bosnian leadership continued to express hostility toward what the President of the Islamic Council in Sarajevo called "destructive Sufi orders" and "unIslamic tarikats" -- as opposed to "positive Sufi tarikats that [are] completely normally included in the work of the Islamic Community, [and] contribute to its work and advancement."86 But there is strong evidence to suggest that the relationship between the official Islamic hierarchy and the Sufi orders, and between the official hierarchy and the communist regime is far better -- that is, less antagonistic -- in Bosnia than in Kosovo or even Macedonia.

The Political Context of Bosnian Muslim Identity

Differences between the situation in Bosnia and the situation in Kosovo and Macedonia can be attributed in large part to the differing political contexts in which each of these Muslim communities finds itself. Inter-nationality relations have been one of the most important, and most explosive, issues in Yugoslav politics. The 1960s and early 1970s were a time of increasing nationalism among the peoples of Yugoslavia and a time of increasing conflict between the nationalities. The main nationality conflict in this period was between Serbs and Croats. Bosnia, as we noted earlier, has historically been a political battleground, and Bosnian Muslims have historically been
the subject of struggle, between Croatian and Serbian nationalists. Clearly, the activation of the Muslim religious hierarchy and the increased support for it from the Muslim masses evident in Bosnia at this time was at least in part a response to the threat to Muslim individuality posed by Croatian and Serbian nationalism. Indeed, the Yugoslav sociologist cited earlier concluded from his study of religion in Hercegovina in the early 1960s—despite his own belief that Muslims "are without distinct national individuality"—that, in contrast to the situation among Catholic and Orthodox respondents in his survey, Muslims "have a consciousness in which the national and the religious are often interwoven and reinforce each other (more explicitly than among other [groups]). Because of that, [an individual] sometimes adheres to this confession not from religious motives, but out of the desire to establish his own national distinctiveness, [his] individuality." This tendency, he found, was stronger among Muslims living among Croats and Serbs.

The communist leadership recognized the potential benefits of extending recognition to the Bosnian Muslims as a separate national group during the war—when inter-nationality conflict threatened to destroy the society they hoped to rule. As inter-nationality relations became more tense and threatened once again to destabilize society, the communist leadership returned to the strategy that had brought it success in the war. Recognition of the Muslims as a distinct group began with the 1961 census, for which the authorities accepted "Muslim" as an "ethnic"—but not a "national"—category. Thus, individuals of Slavic origin who
reported their nationality as "Muslim" were recorded as such; those Slavs who were of the Islamic faith but identified themselves as members of another nationality were recorded as members of the other national group. As in the past, Muslims of Slavic origin who declared no specific nationality were recorded as "Yugoslavs, undetermined" and non-Slavic Muslims--primarily, Albanians and Turks--were recorded as members of their respective non-Slavic nationalities.

Although the 842,247 individuals who declared themselves "ethnic Muslims" certainly represented the largest proportion of the total Muslim population in Bosnia, the results of the 1948 and 1953 censuses suggest that significant numbers of individuals who declared other Slavic nationalities--primarily Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Macedonian--might also be considered "Muslims," and that not all those who were recorded as "Yugoslav-undetermined" were Muslims. The proportion of Serbs and Croats who might also be considered Muslim by virtue of their religion declined from the 1948 to the 1953 census. If we use the proportion of self-declared Serbs and Croats who in 1953 also reported that they were adherents of the Islamic faith to estimate the number of Muslims among them in 1961, we find an additional 65,528 individuals. If we apply the same formula to the Montenegrin, Macedonian, and "Yugoslav" populations, we estimate 262,014 additional Muslims among them. Thus, there may have been as many as 1,169,789 "Muslims"--ethnic and confessional--in Bosnia in 1961. And, whereas Muslims "in an ethnic sense" comprised only 25.7 percent of the population of the republic while Serbs
constituted 42.9 percent and Croats 21.7, the Muslim population broadly conceived as above may have constituted as much as 35.7 percent.\textsuperscript{90}

Official recognition of Muslims as a separate "nation", as opposed to only an "ethnic group", came with the adoption of a new constitution for the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1963. That constitution introduced "Muslim" as a national category equal to the categories "Serb" and "Croat." In this way, the governmental leadership of the Bosnian republic introduced an important change in the formal status of Muslims in Bosnia and Hercegovina, if not yet in all of Yugoslavia. Clearly, this change could not have been implemented without the approval of the party leadership. However, that leadership, which had required Muslims in the party to declare a different nationality throughout the 1950s,\textsuperscript{91} was not prepared to make its support for the separate national identity of Muslims explicit until 1968.\textsuperscript{92} By then, the potential political benefits of extending such recognition were manifest.

By 1968 the conflict between Serbian and Croatian nationalisms was reaching serious dimensions and was of increasing concern to the party leadership in Bosnia. Croatian and Serbian nationalists were active inside Bosnia and were posing an immediate threat to social and political stability in the republic and, together with their counterparts in Croatia and Serbia, a more remote, but still-real threat of its dismemberment. By expressing its support for the existence of a distinct Muslim nation at this time, the Bosnian party leadership can be seen as
attempting to defuse the competition for Muslim allegiance between Serbs and Croats and, by doing so, mobilizing the political support of the Muslim cultural, intellectual, and even religious leadership. For separate national status meant, in the context of emergent personnel policies, the allocation of an equal share of positions in the state and party bureaucracies of the republic, a fact not lost on the leaders of the Bosnian Muslim community.93

By elevating the Muslims to the status of a distinct nation at this time, the Bosnian party leadership also could expect to gain certain benefits in the broader context of elite politics. The late 1960s were a period in which inter-regional economic and political conflicts, reinforced by inter-nationality tensions, were resulting in a substantial increase in the power of regional leaderships to affect central decision-making. At the same time, representation of the nationalities was an important consideration in ongoing negotiations over formulas for participation in central decision-making bodies in the state and the Party. As a result, the Bosnian party leadership could claim a greater number of positions for its cadres in the central hierarchies by advancing the cause of Muslim nationhood. Even more important, while it remained clearly illegitimate for regional representatives to advance explicitly, nationalist arguments or positions, it was perfectly legitimate for them to advance purely regional economic or political interests. And while it was difficult for the representatives of the national republics to separate one from the other in their arguments, it was far easier for the representatives of a genuinely multinational republic to do so.
Consequently, the Bosnian leadership could advance its own interests more vigorously than the 'leaderships of the other republics in a period of rising nationalism, as it did during a dispute in 1967 over aid to the underdeveloped regions. For it could not be accused of nationalism by either the central leadership or other regional leaderships.

Recognition of the Muslims as a separate nation also was facilitated by the existence of an active Muslim intellectual elite supportive of and loyal to the existing political order. These intellectuals advanced a secular national identity that not only did not challenge the system, but actually was built in large part upon the principles of equality already embedded in the party ideology. At the same time, this identity was authentic, in the sense that it reflected genuine sentiments among the Muslim masses, and was endorsed by the official religious hierarchy. Even more important, the concept of Muslim nationhood they developed did not challenge the identities of other nations or pose any threat to the authority of other political units in the Yugoslav federation, for it was carefully circumscribed to include only Serbocroatian-speaking Slavic Muslims primarily those in Bosnia and Hercegovina and the old sandžak of Novi Pazar (now divided between the Serbian and Montenegrin republics) and a small minority in Kosovo.

The concept of Bosnian Muslim national identity was developed by a number of scholars, not all of whom agreed on any single definition of that nation or its "ethnogenesis." Indeed, many of them openly polemicized with one another. One of the most
important examinations not only of the origins and determinants of Bosnian Muslim nationality, but also of the character of Bosnian Muslim national feeling, is to be found in Muhamed Hadžijahić's study, *From Tradition to Identity: The Genesis of the National Question of the Bosnian Muslims*. Hadžijahić argues that the national attachment of Bosnian Muslims "is of a different quality from the feeling of solidarity with [other] Muslims in the world or even with [other] Yugoslav Muslims for whom Serbocroatian is not [their] mother tongue. . . ." This feeling of national distinctiveness "has shown stronger cohesive force" for the Bosnian Muslims than identification with either the Serbian or the Croatian nation, and "has been manifest in institutionalized forms. . . analogous to the situation among Serbs and Croats." One of these has been, of course, Islam and the Islamic religious hierarchy in a fashion analogous to Catholicism and the Catholic Church among the Croats, and Orthodoxy and the Orthodox Church among the Serbs. Thus, while "it is necessary to distinguish the feeling of membership in the community of Bosnian Muslims from the feeling of Islamic membership," it is also "necessary to keep in mind that in practice one and the other feeling are often intertwined."95

The Political Context of Muslim Identity Outside Bosnia

None of the positive political incentives for advancing the concept of a distinct Muslim national identity present in Bosnia were present in the other areas of Muslim settlement. In fact, elsewhere there were strong disincentives not only for such
recognition, but for any concessions at all. In the province of Kosovo, the establishment of communist power in Yugoslavia brought repression of the Albanian national minority at the hands of a Serbian-dominated political apparatus, and especially the secret police. Rising nationalist sentiments among Yugoslavia's Albanians in the 1960s culminated in large-scale riots and demonstrations in the fall of 1968 in several cities in Kosovo and western Macedonia, where Albanians constitute a large proportion of the population. The demonstrators raised extreme nationalist demands, including the separation of Kosovo and other ethnically-Albanian territories from Yugoslavia and their incorporation in a "greater Albania." The provincial communist political leadership, although ethnically Albanian was of necessity clearly hostile to these demands. Given the priority among Albanians of national consciousness over any identification with the broader community of "Muslims" throughout Yugoslavia, reflected in the small number of individuals in the province who identified themselves as "Muslims in the ethnic sense" in comparison to the number who identified themselves as Albanian in the 1961 census, any attempt to "split" the ethnically Albanian population by appealing to a sense of Muslim identity would have been futile; especially in view of the circumscribed definition of that identity already established by Bosnian intellectuals.

Moreover, in the wake of the events of 1968, the provincial leadership was likely to be suspicious of any organizations outside its control. Given the close association between religion and nationality among the Albanians of Kosovo, it is not
surprising that the official religious hierarchy repeatedly reported during the late 1960s and early 1970s that local political authorities in the province were hostile to religious activity and had actively opposed the expansion of religious instruction, the construction of new mosques, and even the participation of believers in the hadj.97 This, despite the fact that neither Islamic clergy nor Islamic religious organizations are reported to have played any role in the 1968 events.

In Macedonia, where the Muslim population is composed almost entirely of Albanians and Turks and there is only a small number of Slavic Muslims, the majority of Slavic Muslims declare their nationality as "Macedonian" (95 percent in 1948 and almost 89 percent in 1953). Only 3,002 individuals declared themselves "Muslim" for the 1961 census.98 Given the pressures of Bulgarian claims that the Macedonian nation is an artificial creation of the Yugoslav party leadership, and the pressure of Albanian nationalist-separatist activity in the western territories of the republic, there is little incentive for the Macedonian leadership to dilute the national identity of the Slavic population by encouraging Muslim national consciousness among those Macedonians who adhere to Islam. Indeed, there is strong evidence that that leadership actively discourages it.

Bosnian Muslims and the Communist Party

The Bosnian party leadership survived the crisis in internationality relations that culminated in the purge of the Croatian party leadership in December 1971 and purges of the party
leaderships in Serbia, Vojvodina, and Macedonia during 1972 and 1973 relatively unscathed, and continued to mobilize Muslims into political life in the republic. Despite a decline of almost nine percent in the size of the Bosnian party from 152,232 Communists at the end of 1969 to 138,833 at the end of 1972, the number of party members who declared Muslim nationality increased steadily from 39,505 to 51,901 raising the proportion of Muslims in the party from 26 to slightly over 30 percent. These figures, however, may underrepresent the actual number of Muslims. For almost 5 percent of the membership had declared "Yugoslav" nationality at the end of 1968, "Yugoslavs" were not reported as a separate nationality category, making it difficult to estimate the number of additional Muslims in the party. Most of the decline in party membership during this period was attributable to a drop in the number of Croats from 17,130 (11.3 percent) to 15,259 (11.0 percent) and a drop in the number of Serbs from 84,257 (55.3 percent) to 73,612 (53.0 percent). The overall size of the party began to increase once again in 1973, and both the absolute number and the proportion of Muslims in it continued to increase steadily.99

By the end of 1977, the Bosnian Party had a membership of 256,250 Communists, of whom 86,551 (33.8 percent) declared Muslim nationality. This still left Muslims underrepresented in comparison to the 39.6 percent of the population of the republic that declared Muslim nationality in the 1971 census. Croats, too, remained underrepresented in the party with only 11.9 percent of the 1977 membership (30,391 members) in comparison to 20.6 percent
of the 1971 population. Serbs, in contrast, remained strongly overrepresented, comprising 47.2 percent of the party membership (120,889) in comparison to 37.2 percent of the population.100

The Bosnian party leadership also appears to have extended at least some support to the official Islamic religious hierarchy in Bosnia. The Bosnian government provides some direct financial support to the hierarchy through its Commission for religious questions. This was reported in 1977 to have amounted to "about 10 percent" of the total budget of the community.101 The government also provides subsidies to the hierarchy for the preparation, publication, and distribution of a catalogue of the 13,000 Arabic, Turkish, and Persian manuscripts in the Gazi Husrefbeg Library, and the Library's Yearbook. In addition, the Bosnian republican government and the city government of Sarajevo have each agreed to finance one-third of the enormous cost of restoring the monumental Gazi Husrefbeg Mosque and surrounding buildings, leaving the Islamic Religious Community to pay for only one-third.102 The cooperative relationship between the official religious hierarchy and the political leadership in Bosnia appears to be facilitated by members of the secular Muslim intelligentsia, many of whom play an active role in Bosnian political life and at the same time appear to maintain contact with the Islamic hierarchy. Indeed, the present President of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Community, Hamdija Ćemerlić, is a former Minister of Justice in the republican government, Dean of the Law Faculty and Rector of Sarajevo University.
Demography and Identity

The Muslim identity advanced by the Bosnian Muslim intelligentsia with the support of both the communist political leadership of the republic and the official Islamic religious hierarchy was granted a status equal to those of the other nations in Yugoslavia in both the 1971 and 1981 censuses. At the same time, the category "Yugoslav" was retained -- although it was distinguished from the listing of ethnic nations and nationalities and was therefore of uncertain status. Thus, ethnic Slavs who adhered to the Islamic faith or had an Islamic cultural heritage, but chose not to declare "Muslim" or some Slavic nationality could still declare themselves "Yugoslavs" as they had done in earlier censuses. However, the regional distribution of "Yugoslavs" in the 1971 and 1981 census is so radically different from that recorded in the 1961 census, and the increases in their number has been so dramatic, that individuals who declare themselves "Yugoslavs" can no longer be assumed to be primarily Muslims.

Whereas the "Yugoslavs" recorded in the 1961 census were concentrated primarily in the Bosnian republic (275,883 or 87.0 percent of the total), those recorded in 1971 and 1981 were spread out over several of the republics. In Serbia proper, for example, the number of "Yugoslavs" leaped from 11,699 (3.7 percent of the total) in 1961, to 75,976 (27.8 percent) in 1971, and to 272,050 (22.3 percent) in 1981. In Croatia, the number of "Yugoslavs" leaped from 15,559 (4.9 percent) in 1961, to 84,118 (30.8 percent) in 1971, and to 379,057 (31.9 percent) in 1981. Similar increases were recorded in Vojvodina, Slovenia, Montenegro and Macedonia.
Thus, while the number of "Yugoslavs" in the Bosnian republic increased from 43,796 (16.0 percent of the total) in 1971 to 326,280 (26.8 percent) in 1981, this cannot be interpreted as a process limited to the Bosnian Muslim population.

Indeed, the precipitous decline in the number of "Yugoslavs" in Bosnia from 275,883 in 1961 to only 43,796 in 1971 suggests that with the creation of a separate national category for Muslims, the response "Yugoslav" began to lose its attractiveness to Slavic Muslims as a means of asserting a distinct identity, and that by 1971 the declaration of "Yugoslav" identity had become a "political" response, conditioned by the intense inter-nationality conflicts dominating the political life of the country at the time the census was taken. The large increases in the number of "Yugoslavs" recorded in areas outside the Bosnian republic in 1981 can be attributed to individuals switching from "Muslim" to "Yugoslav" identity. However, they were apparently not alone in this. The number of Serbs and Croats in Bosnia actually declined between 1971 and 1981; Serbs from 1,393,148 to 1,320,644 and Croats from 772,491 to 758,136. It is very likely, therefore, that in Bosnia the category "Yugoslavs" comprises individuals of various Slavic backgrounds.

There can be no doubt, however, about the identity of those individuals who declared Muslim nationality in recent censuses. As shown in the following table, their numbers increased from 1,729,932 in 1971 to 1,999,980 in 1981, an increase of 15.6 percent during a period when the population of the country as a whole increased by 9.3 percent. Muslims now constitute 8.9
percent of the total population of the country. They are concentrated in the Bosnian republic, where they constitute almost forty percent of the population. There are sizable communities in neighboring Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia, although these constitute only a small proportion of the population in these regions. The number of individuals who declared Muslim nationality in Macedonia increased sharply in 1981, although, here, too, they are only a small proportion of the population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>percent of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>population</td>
<td>all Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>3,231</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>18,457</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>3,491</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>1,482,430</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>124,482</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>26,357</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>70,236</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>1,248</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1,729,932</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Nacionalni sastav stanovnistva po opštinama Statistical Bulletin No. 1295 (Belgrade, 1982), passim

As in the past, it appears that Albanians continue to identify more strongly with their own non-Slavic nationality than with the broader Muslim nationality with which large numbers of Slavs of Islamic heritage identify. The number of ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia increased from 1,309,523 in 1971 to 1,730,878 in 1981. This represents a 32.2 percent increase over ten years, which far exceeds the growth rate of all other nationalities in the country and appears to be almost entirely the
result of natural increase. Most of Yugoslavia's Albanians are concentrated in Kosovo, where they number 1,226,736 an increase of 33.9 percent over the 1971 population of 916,168. At present, Albanians constitute 77.4 percent of the population in that province. In contrast, only 58,562 individuals in Kosovo declared Muslim nationality in 1981.

Recent census data on the large Albanian minority in Macedonia also suggests the weak attraction of Muslim nationality for ethnic Albanians of Islamic heritage. Their number increased from 279,871 in 1981 to 377,726 in 1981, a 35 percent increase. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the dramatically increased number of "Muslims" recorded in this republic in the 1981 census and displayed in the table above can be attributed to ethnic Albanians declaring Muslim nationality. Rather, it would appear to be the case that either ethnic Slavs of Islamic heritage who had declared some other nationality in 1971, perhaps Macedonian now declared themselves "Muslims," or members of some other Islamic group had switched identification in large numbers.

One such other group may be the Turks. In 1971, 108,552 individuals in Macedonia declared Turkish nationality. In 1981, however, that number declined to 86,691. This would account for more than half the total increase in the number of "Muslims" in this republic in 1981. Indeed, a similar decline in the number of individuals declaring Turkish nationality and increase in the
number of those declaring "Muslim" nationality occurred in neighboring Serbia proper in 1981.

This suggests that Yugoslavia's Turks may be identifying with the broader, heretofore exclusively Slavic, "Muslim" nationality to an extent that its Albanian population appears unwilling to do. But there is little basis for believing the "Muslim" identity that has been developed in Bosnia and has contributed to the political integration of the Bosnian Muslims will become any more attractive to Yugoslavia's ethnic Albanians in the future.

Yugoslavia's Other Muslims

The Albanian and Bosnian Muslims of Yugoslavia are divided by more than their ethnicity, language, culture, and territory. They are, in a sense, also divided by their religion. Islamic religious activity in Kosovo is dominated by the numerous Sufi orders that have long operated among the Albanians. According to the Director of the Alaudin medresa in Priština, eight different Sufi orders were active in Kosovo in 1978, operating 33 tekijas in seven cities and towns. The orders were: the Bektašija, the Ruffaija, the Kaderija, the Sa'dija, the Nakšbandija, the Halvetija, the Sinanija, and the Melamija. There were six tarikats and fourteen tekijas in Đakovica alone, and eight tekijas in Prizren. Additional tarikats and tekijas operated in Orahovac, Peć, Kosovska Mitrovica, Gnjilane, and in the Priština area. With a few exceptions, the members of these tarikats do not participate in prayers or other religious activities organized under the auspices of the official hierarchy,
and do not observe the tenets of orthodoxy. They do not, for example, observe the fast of Ramadan and they make free use of alcohol. As noted earlier, the practices of these orders are sometimes infused with vestiges of pre-Islamic Christian practices and practices derived from Albanian national customs. The Bektašija in particular have been characterized by one Islamic scholar as "the furthest removed from orthodoxy, caring little for the obligatory law of Islam." Yet these tarikats were reported in 1978 to have been gaining strength in Kosovo. As a result, "a great gulf" has been created between these orders and their members and the official hierarchy in Kosovo, and, by implication between them and the Bosnian-dominated avowedly Orthodox leadership in Sarajevo.

The religious leadership in Sarajevo has shown some concern to incorporate Albanian believers more fully into the activity of the official hierarchy. The new Reis elected in 1975, following the death of Sulejman Kemura, has issued his menšuras in Albanian, as well as Serbocroatian, Arabic, and Turkish, and he has authored an Albanian-language ilmihal for the Islamic Council in Priština. Under his leadership, the funds collected in the territory of the Priština council for the construction of the Theological Faculty in Sarajevo were allocated first to the operating costs of the Alaudin medresa in Priština. Only the funds that remained after the needs of the medresa had been satisfied were allocated to the Faculty.

But Reis Hadžiabdić is a Bosnian Muslim. Formerly the main imam (Mufti) of Travnik and then, for ten years, President of the
Islamic Council of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia, he is the product of an Islamic tradition and culture that is quite different from and unsympathetic to that of the Albanian Muslims. Moreover, there is persuasive evidence that there are clear limits on the length to which even he is prepared to go. The entrance examination for the new Theological Faculty under this direct supervision, for example, while not as competitive as had been hoped, is administered in Serbocroatian (there is also an Arabic exam), and the language of instruction is Serbocroatian. This probably excludes the vast majority of potential Albanian candidates from enrollment, as secular elementary education for Albanians in Kosovo is conducted in Albanian and the Alaudin medresa does not appear to offer Serbocroatian language instruction.

It would thus appear that there seems to be little prospect of the central Islamic hierarchy, located in Sarajevo and dominated by Bosnian Muslims, winning the allegiance of the broad masses of Albanian believers in Yugoslavia.

Even more important that these religious differences, however, is the fact that secular national identity appears to be a far stronger and more widespread affective force among Albanians in Yugoslavia than attachment to Islam. Following the openly nationalist demonstrations in 1968, nationalist groups and underground nationalist organizations remained active in Kosovo throughout the 1970s. In spring 1981, a series of mass, sometimes violent, demonstrations on a scale far surpassing the events of 1968 shook the province.\textsuperscript{108} As in 1968, the most extreme demands
of the demonstrators called for the separation of ethnically Albanian territories from Yugoslavia and their incorporation into a "greater Albania." The demonstrators also denounced the obvious material inequalities in Yugoslav society, the failure of the provincial economy to develop sufficiently rapidly to prevent massive problems of unemployment, and the alleged exploitation of Kosovo and Albanians by the other regions and peoples of Yugoslavia. The Serbian minority in Kosovo was the target of particularly virulent attack in the slogans raised by demonstrators, and even, in some cases, of direct assault. Not even the use of police and military troops to quell the province succeeded in suppressing nationalist unrest among Albanians, manifest in continuing demonstrations and a host of smaller-scale incidents throughout the rest of 1981 and 1982. Their discontent may be explained partially in terms of stimulation provided, out of irredentist ambition, by neighboring Albania. However, the discontent of Albanians in Kosovo is better explained in terms of the social, economic, and political problems of the province.

Kosovo is the economically most underdeveloped region in Yugoslavia. The problems of development common to most such regions are intensified in Kosovo by an extraordinarily high rate of population growth that tends to negate the social effects of even successful investment. Moreover, expanding opportunities for higher education in all fields in Albanian-language institutions has given rise to a new generation of Albanians who are developing relatively high expectations but, given their over-concentration in fields of study that provide few of the skills most appropriate
for employment in a developing economy, cannot find employment in Kosovo. And, given their linguistic and cultural isolation from the other peoples of Yugoslavia, their opportunities for employment in other regions are limited. Indeed, embittered Albanians in Kosovo protest that they are a non-Slavic people trapped in a South Slavic state.

Perhaps the only major cultural characteristic Albanians share with a substantial number of other Yugoslavs is their Islamic heritage. But most other Yugoslav Muslims are Slavs, the character of Islam among them differs significantly from that among the Albanians, and they do not share the Albanians' sense of alienation from the regime. Both secular Bosnian Muslim intellectuals and the official religious leadership of the Islamic community appear to be hostile to extreme nationalism of the kind present among Albanians in Yugoslavia today. Indeed, the Reis has reported that "not a single religious functionary of the Islamic Community in Kosovo, not a single student of the Alaudin medresa in Priština," participated in the nationalist demonstrations in Kosovo.¹⁰⁹ And there has been no attempt by the authorities to attribute unrest there to agitation by Muslim clergy -- official or unofficial -- as part of their widespread and vigorous campaign to discredit the demonstrators and the sources of their discontent.
Conflict and Cooperation: Yugoslavia's Muslims and the Communist Regime

Some Bosnian Muslim historians attempt to root the possibility of the Bosnian Muslims toward extreme nationalism in the very character of Islam itself. Hadžijahić, for example, citing a 1940 speech by the Islamic theologian Mehmed Handzic on the theme "patriotism, nationality and nationalism from an Islamic perspective," argues that Islam is a universal rather than national religion, and therefore only "tolerates" nationalism as long as it does not engender "harm and injustice" to others or to their religious attachment. He emphasizes, however, that "Islam sharply condemns extreme nationalism and tribal fanaticism." But a more persuasive explanation of its sources can be found in the long experience of Serbocroatian-speaking Slavic Muslims as targets of the competition between Serbian and Croatian nationalism and their prejudices toward Albanians. Moreover, the Bosnian Muslims have historically been quite successful in advancing the interests of their community through negotiation and accommodation with alien authorities, rather than confrontation.

As a result, the Bosnian Muslim leadership—secular and religious—is likely to remain cautious in its relations with the communist regime. The President of the Islamic Council of Bosnia, for example, is careful to acknowledge that the present number of mosques, mesdžids, and other religious institutions is "completely satisfactory" before going on to report on plans for continued expansion of the Community. Where the construction of Islamic institutions is politically sensitive, as in Zagreb (where plans
to construct an impressive mosque in Zagreb inevitably engender memories of the last mosque in the city, a symbol of the relationship between the Muslims and the Croatian quisling state during the war—the interpretation of which remains hotly disputed in political polemics even today, the Islamic leadership manifests a very cautious approach. Indeed, in referring to Muslims living in non-Muslim areas, the official leadership uses the term "diaspora." In this way, they help insulate the construction of Islamic religious institutions in Slovenia (where a masjid was recently established in Ljubljana), Vojvodina (where mosques have recently been established in Novi Sad and Zrenjanin), and Croatia (where mosques have recently been established in Dubrovnik, Rijeka, Pula, Sisak, and Osijek) from suggestions that this activity is evidence of a "militant Islam." Indeed, the attitude of the present official hierarchy in Sarajevo is captured perfectly in a historical reflection on the experience of Bosnian Muslims under Austrian rule by the Muslim historian Muhamed Hadžijahović, in an official publication of the Islamic Council of Bosnia. "The optimal solution," he argued, "surely was to accept from this civilization that which was best and most positive, and at the same time to preserve the best and most positive in the existing cultural heritage and civilization. Complete alienation from the achievements of the new civilization meant . . . genuine stagnation and decline."113

This attitude has paid handsome benefits to the Bosnian Muslim community in the form of political support for the assertion of distinct ethnic identity, expanding opportunities for
the participation of the secular Muslim intelligentsia in the political hierarchy, official tolerance of widespread Islamic religious activity among the masses of believers, and the consequent institutional growth of the formal Islamic religious hierarchy. As a result, the Bosnian Muslims, unlike the Albanians of Kosovo and western Macedonia, have achieved a high level of integration into the Yugoslav political system and are not likely to challenge the communist political order directly as long as the benefits derived from this process continue to accrue. Even more important, they are unlikely to be sympathetic to disintegrative nationalist demands by the Albanians, not only because they do not share in that identity but also because it is the complex politics of multinationality at both the federal level and the republic level that has permitted them to make these advances. Any movement to establish ethnic "purity" therefore represents a direct threat to their political status. Thus, the Muslims of Yugoslavia are divided into two distinct communities: one which, because of the peculiar circumstances of its existence, shares many common characteristics with the non-Muslim nations of Yugoslavia and has established a cooperative and beneficial relationship with the communist regime; and another which, because of the multiplicity of the minority statuses of its members, does not identify with and is not integrated into either the other Muslim community or the communist regime that rules over both of them.
FOOTNOTES


5. Fine, The Bosnian Church.


8. Islam i Muslimani, pp. 81-90.


10. Islam i Muslimani, p. 56.

11. Hadžijahić, Od tradicije do identiteta, pp. 84-85.

12. Ibid., p. 88.

13. Ibid., pp. 43-46.

15. Salim Ćerić, Muslimani srpskohrvatskog jezika (Sarajevo; Svjetlost, 1968), pp. 119, 122-23, and Hadžijahić, Od tradicije do identiteta, pp. 69-70.

16. Ibid., pp. 22, 100.

17. Ibid., p. 119.

18. Islam i Muslimani, p. 57.


22. Ibid., pp. 163-66.


25. Bosanski Glasnik (Sarajevo, 1911), pp. 275ff.


27. This is best reflected in the emergence of a host of "Muslim" (Muslimanska) cultural and political organizations during the period.


29. Ibid., p. 123.

30. Ćerić, Muslimani srpskohrvatskog jezika, pp. 169ff.


32. Atif Purivatra, Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija u političkom životu kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1974), passim.

34. Ibid., pp. 548, 558, 569-70, and Hadžijahić, **Od tradicije do identiteta**, p. 233.


37. Purivatra, **Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija**, p. 574.

38. Ibid., pp. 546 ff., and Purivatra, **Nacionalni i politički razvitak**, p. 167.


40. Ibid., p. 545.

41. Ibid., pp. 553-54.

42. **Islam i Muslimni**, pp. 150-51.

43. Ibid., p. 130.

44. **Islam i Musliman**, p. 81, and Mehmed Handžić, "Pitanje tekija u Jugoslaviji" **Glasnik Vrhovnog Islamskog Starješinstva** [Henceforth: Glasnik] 42, (1979), pp. 263, 272-73. (Note that this is a reprint of an article originally published in Glasnik in 1934.)


46. Čerić, **Muslimani srpskohrvatskog jezika**, p. 167.

47. Hadžijahić, **Od tradicije do identiteta**, pp. 119, 120, 121.
49. *Islam i Muslimani*, p. 152.
54. Ibid., p. 159.
56. *Islam i Muslimani*, p. 159.
60. Ibid.
63. This and the following description of the organization of the Community is based on the constitution of the Community as a whole, the statute of the Bosnian Community, and various internal
legislation of the Islamic Community collected in Starjesinstvo Islamske zajednice Bosne i Hercegovine, Hrvatske i Slovenije, Zbirka: Propisa islamske zajednice i pozitivnih propisa koji se odnose na rad vjerskih zajednica (Sarajevo, 1979).


66. Ibid., p. 136.


68. Islam i Muslimani, p. 159.


74. Ibid.


76. Islam i Muslimani, pp. 163-64.


82. Hadžibajrić, "Tesavuf, tarikat i tekije," pp. 274-75.
83. Ibid., and Glasnik 38, 5-6 (1975), p. 296.
84. Hadžibajrić, "Tesavuf, tarikat i tekije," pp. 275-76.
85. Ibid., p. 276.
87. Ćimić, Socijalističko društvo i religija, p. 125.
88. Ibid., p. 258.
89. Ibid., p. 125.
92. Purivatra, Nacionalni i politički razvitak, p. 128n.
93. Hadžijahić, Od tradicije do identiteta, p. 223.
95. Hadžijahić, Od tradicije do identiteta, pp. 117, 82, 121.


100. Ibid.

101. Islam i Muslimani, p. 163.


103. Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Nacionalni sastav stanovništva, p. 5, and Idem, Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama Statistical Bulletin No. 1295 (Belgrade, 1982), p. 7. The analysis of 1971 and 1981 data that follows is based on the final data reported in the second of these two publications.

104. Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Nacionalni sastav stanovništva, pp. 7-11.


109. NIN, 2 August 1981.


111. See, for example, Fuad Muhić, "Islamske institucije i nacionalizam," *Socijalizam* 21, (1979), pp. 11-37.


113. *Islam i Muslimani*, p. 118.