Viktor Bortnevski

White Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence during the Russian Civil War
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No. 1108, August 1995
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ISSN 0899-275X

*The Carl Beck Papers*
Editors: William Chase, Bob Donnorummo, Ronald H. Linden
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Counter-Intelligence followed the troops. That institution has never been used so widely as in the last Civil War. It was organized not only by high staffs and military governors, but by almost all military units, political organizations, the Don, Kuban and Terek governments... even ... by the Propaganda department.... It was a fashion, a sickly mania produced by mutual distrust and suspicion, which spread throughout the country.

General Denikin ¹

Introduction ²

The activity of various intelligence and security institutions during the Russian Civil War is a complex and understudied topic. It is difficult to find any other period in modern Russian history before 1992, in which so many independent or autonomous authorities engaged in espionage and counter-intelligence. The Red and White Armies each organized and operated large counter-intelligence operations during the civil war. Yet the history of intelligence and counter-intelligence during the Russian Civil War has not yet been written. For many years, Soviet historians were not interested in presenting or allowed to present a balanced evaluation picture of such White activities. A favorite subject in novels and movies was the victory of honest and gentle "Chekists" over "White bandits," who never even came close to victory. Since the opening of the relevant archives, other issues and interests have taken priority causing this topic to remain under-researched.

Without denying the limited value of Soviet historiography, the publications of Bolshevism’s opponents in exile shed little light on this issue. They did not present many details about their intelligence operations and remained virtually silent about the secret connections of White agents in Soviet Russia. Naturally, White memoirists had a very important reason to keep quiet about the latter: they did not want harm
to befall their brothers-in-arms in Soviet Russia or their family members. Nonetheless, some very important documents were deposited in the Russian Foreign Historical Archive in Prague for safekeeping until the "final victory over the Bolshevism". These materials as well as documents housed in private archival collections in the U.S.A. and France provide the sources for this study which seeks to convey the dimensions and nature of White intelligence and counter-intelligence in Soviet Russia during the Civil War.³

White Military Rule: Army, Society and Administration during the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920

This research focuses primarily on the South region of Russia, which provided the main battlefield during the Civil War and where White military rule existed in what we might call its classic form. To appreciate the importance of intelligence to the Whites, it is essential to first examine the structure of their intelligence and counter-intelligence institutions, and the role of those institutions' in the White military-political system from the end of 1917 to the beginning of 1920. To do so requires that we first examine the pre-revolutionary intelligence services so as to appreciate the ways in which the Whites’ intelligence operations derived from those of the tsarist era.

Like other Great Powers, pre-revolutionary Russia did not have a unified system of intelligence and counter-intelligence. After failures in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the Imperial government sought to bolster and coordinate its intelligence operations. A Special Section (Osoboe deloproizvodstvo) of the Central Board (Glavnoe upravlenie) of the General Staff was created to coordinate the recruitment and operation of secret agents, and the Board’s Statistical section (Statisticheskoe deloproizvodstvo) was charged with systematizing information provided by intelligence agents. Two special meetings of senior adjutants of the
military intelligence sections were held in 1908 and 1912. Their purpose was to design better ways to coordinate central and local intelligence services. In the field of counter-intelligence, the participants decided to strengthen the powers of the General Staff of the Russian Army to oversee such operations at the expense of security sections (*okhrannye otdelenia*). From 1908, counter-intelligence in peacetime was carried out by senior officers of the Police Department (*Zhandarmskoe upravlenie*) and the Border-guard Department under the supervision of senior adjutants of the military districts. In 1909, a Special Inter-departmental Commission headed by the Director of the Police Department was organized in an effort to improve counter-intelligence activities.

During World War I, counter-intelligence sections (*kontrrazvedyvatel'nye otdelenia*) were established as Special sections (*Osobyе chasti*) of the staffs of the Supreme Commander, Front Commanders, and Army Commanders. Although the reforms that began in 1908 enhanced Russian counter-intelligence efforts and no doubt contributed to the unmasking of foreign agents, the expansion of intelligence and counter-intelligence efforts during the war fueled a widespread anti-espionage paranoia throughout Russian society.  

Shortly after the Bolsheviks seized power in November 1917, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander in Mogilev came under Red control. As a result, the anti-Bolshevik military movement, which soon developed in South Russia, had to organize its intelligence and counter-intelligence services without any formal connections to the existing system. However, the Volunteer Army did benefit from the experience of many prominent Generals, including the former Supreme Commanders Mikhail Alekseev and Lavr Kornilov, as well as some qualified General Staff officers and regular Army officers with intelligence experience and capabilities. It was these personnel who helped to establish new intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.

Even before the Bolshevik seizure of power, General Alekseev had formed an extensive underground officer organization which became the embryo of the Volunteer Army apparatus that was headquartered in southern Russia. It must be
stressed that, in setting up their intelligence and counter-intelligence institutions, the Volunteer Army's Command could not rely on the Russian army's existing intelligence apparatus since it was under Bolshevik control. For this reason, the Whites' intelligence network reflected the lessons learned during the previous decade and was driven by the necessity to maintain regular connections with the anti-Bolshevik political activists in Moscow and Petrograd.

White Counter-Intelligence Organization

For most of the first year of the Volunteer Army's existence, there was no organizational and bureaucratic separation between its intelligence and counter-intelligence activities. Both focused their efforts on supporting the Army by any means: recruitment of officers, Cossacks and other citizens (at that time on a volunteer basis); obtaining reliable information about political and military events in various regions of Russia (including the central and local Soviet administration and the Red Army Command); maintaining friendly relations with Allied representatives; and, of course, identifying the Bolshevik's strategic and tactical military plans and operations.

In reality, all these functions were often carried out by the same persons. Some leading White officers were ordered to various cities and territories where they generally operated without any financial and organizational support from headquarters. The information they obtained was often determined not by their personal skills and capabilities as intelligence operatives, but by chance.6

In November 1917, nine representatives of three liberal anti-Bolshevik organizations established the "Moscow Center". Originally headed by the Kadets, it turned increasingly to the right and was renamed the Right Center. This Center had its own military staff, which included a counter-intelligence department headed by Captain (later Colonel) Rodion Mergin, and was responsible for sending officers to
the Volunteer Army in the Don region and for obtaining secret information from well-placed informants in the nascent Soviet administration. Curiously, at that time, Captain Rodion Mergin was not formally a member of the Volunteer Army and later had to solicit letters of recommendation that confirmed his intelligence activities in order to be promoted. 

Vasilii Vitalievich Shulgin, a famous right-wing politician, backed the Volunteer Army from its birth. While living in Kiev, he renewed the publication of his newspaper *Kievljanin*, the office of which became the center for Russian military officers who wished to join the Volunteer Army. About fifteen hundred officers did so during its first two months; however, there is no evidence how many of them actually managed to reach the Don region where the Army was stationed. Arrested by the Bolsheviks, Shulgin spent some time in prison. Because of his consistently pro-Allied views, he was forced to cease publishing his newspaper and turned to underground activity. Shulgin’s secret organization was named *Azbuka*, because the pseudonyms of its members corresponded to the letters of Old Russian Alphabet. The organization provided intelligence information about the situation in Kiev and Ukraine to the Allied missions, the Volunteer Army Command and the Right Center, sought to influence the Volunteer Army, and helped the Russian officers to reach its forces. *Azbuka* also maintained close links with French intelligence in Kiev, French representatives in Jassy, Romania, and the British mission in Moscow. In Moscow, British representatives acted as coordinators between the *Azbuka* and the Right Center. It should be mentioned that the *Azbuka*, in carrying out its various intelligence functions, had no formal affiliation with the Volunteer Army. After moving to Ekaterinodar in early August 1918, Shulgin repeatedly sought such affiliation but, as we will see, did not succeed. 

Some very respectable intelligence and counter-intelligence work in the Don region was carried out by N. F. Sigida, a former Second Lieutenant in the Imperial Guard. Upon reaching Taganrog after his escape from Bolshevik Petrograd, he received a secret order from the Volunteer Army Staff to infiltrate the Red Army. After Taganrog fell into Bolshevik hands, Nikolai Sigida remained there and
eventually became a member of the Collegium under the Military Commissar; specifically, he was in charge of military operations against the Volunteer Army. He was assigned to this high position on the strength of the recommendation of his former university classmate, Evgenii Bolotin, a finance commissar of the Don Sovnarkom (Council of People's Commissars). Sigida tried to use all opportunities in order to sabotage the Bolsheviks' regional military administration. He proved to be very successful in manipulating jealousies and engendering squabbles among Soviet functionaries, and in encouraging their inclinations to drunkenness and a dissolute life. "We did not have any real administration, because nobody could administer," he wrote in his memoirs which were deposited to the Russian State Historical Archives in Prague, "Everything administered itself.... The most effective 'lighting rods' in that situation were alcohol and women. It is hard to imagine that these two temptations could have been more popular in any other time. It was possible to do everything using that bait.""10

As a member of the Collegium, Sigida regularly attended Don Sovnarkom meetings in Rostov, where he had regular contacts with influential Bolsheviks including Fedor Podtelkov, Alexei Avtonomov and Sergo Ordzhonikidze. As he later wrote, "Our razvedchiki [the intelligence officers—V.B.] enjoyed unlimited access. The secret organization of Colonel Orlov and the local intelligence network set up by the Volunteer Army placed their members among all Soviet institutions. Our intelligence had eyes and ears everywhere, beginning from the local militia posts to the People's Commissar and, thanks to their work, was always fully informed about events. Our agents occupied positions from the ordinary militiaman to the People's Commissar himself."11

After being arrested by the Bolsheviks shortly before the German occupation in the spring of 1918, Sigida escaped and joined the detachment of Colonel M. G. Drozdovskii which marched through Taganrog en route to Volunteer Army headquarters. Despite the Drozdovskii detachment's openly pro-Allied orientation, its intelligence service (razvedyvateln'yi punkt) maintained informal, mainly personal, connections with German commanders in Ukraine, due primarily to their common
anti-Bolshevik views.\textsuperscript{12} The strength of this common bond is clear from the fact that Drozdovskii ordered Sigida to leave his detachment so as to help the Germans maintain civic order in Rostov. He supplied Sigida not only with a staff and arms but also with signed blank warrants to arrest and search the residents of Rostov. At this time, Sigida ceased his intelligence activity and began to engage in counter-intelligence activities, most of which centered on political affairs rather than on military counter-intelligence directed against foreign spies. But his powers extended beyond those of normal political counter-intelligence work since his new position empowered him to search, arrest, investigate, adjudicate, and even execute suspects. The granting of such wide-ranging powers soon became a common feature of the White counter-intelligence services. Like his counterparts in the Cheka, Sigida viewed his treatment of enemies of the Whites as merciless but just:

I received information about all detainees in Rostov not later than fifteen minutes after their arrival in prison. This included the names of the prisoners and the reasons for their arrest. After receiving this information, the prisoners were brought before me and were asked to provide the names of persons relevant to their cases—these included witnesses for their defense, because we always had witnesses accuse them....The relevant investigation did not take more than twenty-four hours; after this interval, the prisoner, whatever his standing, was either freed and furnished with appropriate documents, or was executed (shot). We did not have any other form of punishment, but proceeded with the investigation very carefully....The severity and haste with which the judgment was carried out was based on the following considerations: First, a harmful situation will never turn into a beneficial one; second, everyone having taken one eye must pay with two; third, the best medical treatment is a surgical one. These were the principles upon which our actions were based, since those who have tasted power will always strive to achieve it and, having attained power, will revert to their old days.\textsuperscript{13}
Nikolas Sigida’s unrestricted counter-intelligence activities in Rostov ended in late May 1918. Because of complaints from left-wing, non-Bolshevik intellectuals, the German Commandant of Rostov officially deprived Sigida of the right to shoot suspects, but at the same time confirmed his unofficial status: "I do not intend to interfere in your affairs. Do it, but be cautious, that’s all." 14

The Volunteer Army also created a network of Centers which played a considerable role in intelligence and the counter-intelligence activities in 1918-1919. On 21 May 1918, General Alekseev approved the creation of a plan to organize Political Centers of the Volunteer Army in the major cities of Russia. As proposed by General M. I. Shtengel, the purposes of the Centers were to publicize the slogans of the Volunteer Army, to enlist new officers and soldiers, and to conduct political and military intelligence. The order officially creating the Volunteer Army Centers was signed on 10 October 1918. It confirmed their staffs, including the heads of counter-intelligence operations and the intelligence agents. The Centers’ Commanders were official representatives of the Volunteer Army Commander-in-Chief in their respective areas. Over the course of the next few months, Centers of the Volunteer Army were established in Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, Chernigov, Poltava, Nikolaev, Kherson, Mogilev, Kislovodsk, Tiflis, and Sukhum as well as in the Crimea and Siberia. Most of these Centers were linked to the Army Staff through secret officer organizations and were headed by high ranking military personnel, including three full Generals, six Lieutenant-Generals, one Vice-Admiral, twelve Major-Generals and fourteen General Staff Colonels. Among them were some well known White Army officers: Bredov, Neniukov, Lomnovskii, Shilling, Shteifon, Bode, Agapeev, von Lampe, Lebedev, and Flug among others. In spring 1918, all reports from the Centers were personally processed by a Chief of the Army Staff and his close subordinates, and later also by the Military-Political Department, the Political Chancellory of the Special Council, the Intelligence Section (Razvedyvatel’noe otdelenie) and the Special Unit (Osobaia chast’) of the Commander-in-Chief Staff. 15
General Shtengel himself became the head of the Taganrog Center, which administered the territory from Berdiansk to Taganrog. To carry out his mission, he often relied on the Union of Army Invalids and the Cooperative Saving Bank society (with 54 local branches) through which he procured financial resources. Through these two organizations, Shtengel communicated with various political parties and groups. Twice a month he sent political reports to the Special Section (*Osobaia chast*) of the Volunteer Army Staff, which was in charge of counter-intelligence.\(^1\)

From spring 1918 until autumn 1919, the Kiev Center operated in widely varying conditions during alternating periods of attempted governance by the Hetman Germans, Ukrainian Directorate, and Bolsheviks. During the last several weeks of the Hetman rule, the Center even functioned legally and was allowed to coordinate the activities of various organizations working for the Volunteer Army. The Center’s Political Department was then based in the Shulgin’s *Azbuka* and a commander of its Kiev branch, Colonel Bartsevich, served as a department head within the Center. It was the Kiev Center that initiated the formation of the National Union (*Natsional’noe Ob”edinenie*), which included a wide spectrum of anti-Bolshevik politicians ranging from Mensheviks (the *oborontsy* faction) to Octobrists and Nationalists. At the same time, the Center carried out its intelligence activity on a strictly conspiratorial basis. Its agents worked in various administrative and military institutions, had access to secret, encoded documents and provided very skillful sabotage of Soviet policy. Some of the Center’s agents managed to obtain prestigious positions in the Red Army Command and the intelligence information that they gathered contributed to Volunteer Army victories. The Kiev Center also tried to support and coordinate the activity of other Centers of the Volunteer Army in the Ukraine. However, it had many problems in communicating with the Volunteer Army Staff in Ekaterinodar and often did this indirectly through Odessa.\(^1\)

The Kharkov Center was successful not only in providing valuable secret information, but also in organizing the anti-Bolshevik putsch on the eve of the city’s liberation by the Volunteer Army. The head of the Kharkov Center, Colonel Dvigubskii, served as a deputy to the Red Army’s Commander of the Ukrainian
Front, Antonov-Ovseenko, and presented his reports directly to Lev Trotsky. In this capacity, he was sent to inspect the military administration in Odessa and the Crimea, and there obtained valuable intelligence information. In an effort to divert the attention of the Red Army Command from the Donbass region, where the Volunteer Army was experiencing difficulties, Dvigubskii took measures to provoke "the revolutionary march" of Soviet troops to Romania. Among his counter-intelligence activities were his facilitating articles in the press about "the world revolution" and "the class obligations of Russian proletariat," fostering disagreements among local Bolshevik and Red Army leaders, and presenting the plan of advance on Romania that was adopted by the Red Army High Command. During the Romanian campaign, he did all that he could to prevent Bolshevik success. He apparently played a role in the resignation of Antonov-Ovseenko. As soon as the Bolsheviks retreated from Romania, Colonel Dvigubskii was appointed as head of the Kharkov Center of the Intelligence section of the Armed Forces of South Russia Staff.

During the first year of the Civil war, the Volunteer Army’s intelligence operations became stronger and more sophisticated, and eventually were incorporated into the Army’s military staffs, either as departments (otdely), sections (otdeleniia) or units (chasti), depending on the kind of the military formations. The most important of the intelligence organizations were the Intelligence Section of the Volunteer Army Commander (Commander-in-Chief), and later (from 1919) the Intelligence Section of the Armed Forces of South Russia Commander-in-Chief Staff. According to official regulations, they were in charge of gathering information about planned military operations and the views of the enemy’s military commanders and political leaders as well as the attitudes of residents in various locales.

Although various White organizations charged with gathering intelligence formed early in the Civil War, no special institution for counter-intelligence was organized during first few months of the Volunteer Army’s existence. Nonetheless some counter-intelligence functions were carried out by different means. The case of counter-intelligence activities in the Kuban in the spring of 1918 is illustrative. The Volunteer Army’s occupation and assertion of control in the Kuban necessitated
establishing networks to provide information on opponents of the Whites, on supporters of the recently deposed Soviet administration, and the existence of any conspiracies. Under these circumstances, military counter-intelligence, previously directed against foreign spies, became transformed into a kind of internal political police and incorporated into a system of military dictatorship. As before, the Counter-Intelligence unit was an institution of the General-Quartermaster Board of the Commander-in-Chief Staff. And at the lower levels the counter-intelligence services were organized by and under the supervision of the Chiefs of Staffs and the Quartermasters of the respective military formations.

In the spring of 1918, at the time of the Second Kuban March, the Military-Political Department of the Volunteer Army was organized. Although subordinated to General Alekseev, it was not a part of the Commander's Staff. According to the signed agreement that created the department, Alekseev, who was based in Novocherkassk, was in charge of the Volunteer Army's political, civilian and financial affairs, while General Denikin, who stayed with his Staff on the front line, exercised military command. In practical terms, however, the lines of demarcation were often blurred. In its effort to fulfill its duties, the Military-Political Department, headed by General Staff Colonel Ia. M. Lisovoi, not only requested secret information from the Volunteer Army Centers and some counter-intelligence institutions, but often interfered in the affairs of the Commander's Staff. After the formation of the Special Council (Osoboe soveshchanie) and the death of General Alekseev, the Military-Political department was dissolved on 11 October 1918, and its responsibilities were divided between the Commander-in-Chief's Staff and the appropriate departments of the Special Council.

The system of rule established by General Denikin was a pure military dictatorship. Its civilian administration was organized according to the military rules, and heads of the regions usually had full military powers—beginning with the system of military governors and their deputies for civilian affairs to the working out of regulations for governors-in-chief (glavonachalstvuushchie oblastei), governors (nachal'nosti gubernii) and district chiefs (nachal'nosti uezdov). Although one might
expect such a system to lead to the consolidation and simplification of the state apparatus, such was not the case. Rather the system spawned a huge bureaucracy and fierce rivalries among officials. This was particularly true for intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.

As mentioned above, counter-intelligence units were incorporated into the Quartermasters’s boards of military command staffs; intelligence units were usually incorporated into special departments. Paralleling this system was the so-called Osvag (Osvedomitel’noe agenstvo, the Information Agency of the Foreign Affairs Department, later called the Information Section and the Propaganda Department of the Special Council) which had a wide-ranging information gathering network (over 10,000 officials in 1919) and close working relations with the intelligence and counter-intelligence organs. The Osvag had its own Secret Section or the Bureau of Secret Information (sekretnoe otdelenie or biuro sekretnoi informatsii) which carried out political intelligence and counter-intelligence operations. Its agents collected confidential information about various political parties and groups as well as about the attitudes of their leaders and other governmental and military officials. They also tried to make prognoses of the current situation. These activities were similar to those of the Special unit (Osobaia chast’) of the Commander-in-Chief Staff which was in charge of some aspects of military propaganda, collecting intelligence information from the liberated areas, spreading disinformation about the Red Command, and compiling the latest front news for the media.

While such overlapping jurisdictions and responsibilities were common in areas controlled by the Whites, they also occurred "[outside the [Volunteer] army territory," where the general supervision of intelligence and counter-intelligence activities was the responsibility of the General Staff Unit (later Department) of the Military and Naval Board (Voennoe i Morskoe upravlenie) of the Special Council. However, the Naval Board also participated in its supervision.

Counter-intelligence officials also crossed paths and, in many cases, clashed with local police or the gendarmerie of the State Security Institution (Gosudarstvennaia strazha) within the Interior Department of the Special Council.
In September 1919, the State Security Institution had twenty brigades with 77,393 men—about half the size of the Volunteer Army. District police officers (pristavy) operated in uezdy, while guards and village elders operated in volosti. River, port and fortress brigades, as well as criminal and investigative units, were also organized. During these years of political, military and economic chaos, it was often difficult to delineate ordinary criminal activities from the underground activities of political opponents. This situation was reflected in the organization of agencies charged with dealing with crime. The Criminal Investigation Boards (Ugolovno-rozysknye upravleniia), which were under the governors' protection, were in charge of investigating ordinary crimes and political crimes. Former deputies of District Court Prosecutors usually headed these Boards, although former "respected and energetic" gendarmerie or counter-intelligence officers could also occupy these positions after leaving military service. While drawing a clear line between ordinary crimes and political crimes often proved difficult, efforts were made to bestow privileges on those officials engaged in political or "state-criminal" investigations.

Competing Counter-Intelligence Services

This paper focuses on only Volunteer Army institutions and the territory of the Armed Forces of South Russia. But in reality, residents as well as civilian and military officials of the lands occupied by the Whites dealt with various authorities, including various and competing counter-intelligence services. The Cossacks of the three Southern Cossack hosts (voisko) (the Don, Kuban and Terek hosts) had their own counter-intelligence and informative services, which were subordinated to their Atamans, governmental organs and local authorities. The first of these were formed as early as 1917. As a result of the unstable political situation in the Ukraine, Crimea, Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia, intelligence and counter-intelligence activities in these areas often overlapped or came into conflict. In Kiev, under the
Hetman rule, there were 18 different intelligence and counter-intelligence organizations, which "were mainly interested in watching each other". The special sections of the pro-Denikin volunteer detachments had no direct connections with the Volunteer Army Staff. In Odessa, many independent services operated under French occupation: the International Informative Bureau headed by Lt. Colonel Tishevskii; the Information Bureau of General K. I. Globachev; the Information Bureau of newspaper employees; the counter-intelligence service of the Russo-German Union of Monarchist-Christians (led by Captains Vachnadze and Vinogradov); the counter-intelligence services of the Volunteer Army Command in Odessa; the staff of General A. V. Shvarts; the Ukrainian Directorate forces, to name only the leading ones. 30

The counter-intelligence unit of the Armed Forces of South Russia Staff dealt with the respective institutions of the Cossack Voisko Governments (whose territories were outside the direct rule of General Denikin and enjoyed their own self-administration), the counter-intelligence of the Don Army Staff (whose Commander was reported to General Denikin as well to the Don Ataman), the counter-intelligence units of local military administrators, and many other similar organizations. According to a report to General Denikin: "It seems that any administrator, occupying even a secondary position and having control over secret amounts of money, establishes his own counter-intelligence service. The functions of these counter-intelligence services are extremely varied. Disturbing each other, all these institutions frustrate a proper organization of the national order and welfare. They undermine any authority of the power as well army personnel." 31

Documents of two competing counter-intelligence services—the Armed Forces of South Russia Command and the Kuban Cossack Voisko—provide insight into the relations between such institutions. Their talented agents enjoyed access to highly sensitive documents about the military-political situation in the White South and the many conflicts between the different anti-Bolshevik forces. These documents also provide valuable insights into the tragic events of the Cossack self-administration in the Kuban—the Kubanskoe deistvo (the Kuban action)—in November 1919. 32
Several reports, covering the period from May to October 1919, provide details about the meetings of Rustambekov, the Azerbaijani representative under the Kuban Government, and such leading members of the Kuban Voisko Rada as Riabovol, Sultan Shakhim-Girei, Ivan and Petr Makarenko, Omelchenko and Bezkrovnyi. All of them agreed to coordinate their efforts to oppose Denikin's rule, to inspire anti-Denikin uprisings in the Caucasus, and to attack the rear of the Volunteer Army at the height of the latter's advance toward Moscow. They hoped to rely on the Ukrainian troops of Simon Petliura, on Green military formations, and even on links with the Bolsheviks. "Your main mistake is your war against the Bolsheviks with whom it is easier to come to terms than with the Volunteer Army," Rustambekov argued. Meanwhile, Bezkrovnyi stated: "It seems to me that the Bolsheviks, being in such critical situation, will agree to many concessions at the expense of saving Great Russia and Moscow. And we should use the moment." Finally, P. Makarenko said: "We must use defeats of the Volunteer Army on the front line....We can help the Bolsheviks by organizing some small mutiny."

At the same time, Kuban secret agents informed their superiors about underground officer organizations which planned to overthrow Cossack administrative institutions. According to documents of the military organization headed by Colonel Kartashev, which had a wide underground network of small, conspiratorial officer groups, their main goal was: "In the case of a parliamentary victory of the samostiiiniki [the defenders of full Kuban sovereignty—V.B.] over the state-minded people who insisted on the platform of the United, Great and Indivisible Russia, to intervene by military force and to prevent their final victory."33

**Counter-Intelligence Personnel**

Many opponents of Bolshevism occupied important positions in Soviet military and administrative institutions, and many of them actively tried to sabotage Bolshevik
policy. Of course, it does not mean that they were "white agents" or even had any connections with the anti-Bolshevik underground groups and intelligence services. But some of them did have such connections and it was the function of the Volunteer Army Centers to organize such people in various institutions for coordinated activity, including gathering intelligence. Two interesting episodes of the intelligence activity in the Bolshevik hinterland suffice to illustrate the nature of the Centers’ efforts and activities. The first involves an agent who was sent to Moscow directly from the Volunteer Army Staff; the second involves a group of Odessa teenagers who volunteered to coordinate their independent activities with the Whites.

The Volunteer Army sent its agent Arkadii Borman to Moscow in March 1918. His mother, Ariadna Tyrkova (Williams), a member of the Kadet Party Central Committee, was a high school friend of Nadezhda Krupskaia, Lenin’s wife. Owing to his amazing connections and extraordinary abilities, Borman managed to occupy important positions at the highest level of the Soviet administration. He became head of the Foreign Trade Department and the acting Deputy People’s Commissar of Trade. Borman participated in Lenin’s Sovnarkom meetings and was a member of the Soviet delegation during the negotiations in Kursk and Kiev regarding the border with Ukraine. Later, in the twenties in Paris, Arkadii Borman completed a manuscript about his mission and deposited it to the Russian Foreign Historical Archives in Prague. But he neither disclosed any technical secrets nor provided professional details about his positions in the Soviet administration. Nor did he mention anything about this remarkable episode in his life in his book, published in Washington, D.C. in 1964, or in his unpublished memoirs, written in the 1950s and deposited to the Bakhmeteff Archive of Columbia University. Soviet publications also remained silent about Borman. Only The Red Book of VChK, published in 1920 and re-printed in 1989, alluded to it: "they [counter-revolutionaries—V.B.] have an informer in the Kremlin, in the Sovnarkom circle...."36

According to Borman, his was not too difficult or dangerous mission because "the Cheka has not yet completed its network over the whole of Russia and acted gropingly...the chekists mostly were involved in arrests of innocent people, but their
real enemies traveled in comissars's trains, occupied important positions in People's Commissariats and military staffs. "In his everyday work, Arkadii Borman was very close to such important Bolshevik leaders as Khristian Rakovskii, Dmitrii Manuilskii, Iurii Larin, Leonid Krasin, Mikhail Bronskii and others, and was even personally introduced to Lenin. His manuscript provides invaluable information about Kremlin life and Bolshevik policy-making, about the real panic in the leadership during the Left SR mutiny on 6 July 1918, and the Allied landing in Archangel in early August 1918. It is the only document about the Sovnarkom meetings on 2-3 August 1918 at which Lenin announced that Soviet power was in hopeless situation and declared that it was necessary "to bang on a door," to increase the terror against the bourgeoisie.

At the end of August 1918, Arkadii Borman, suspecting his possible arrest, fled Moscow; in December 1918 he illegally crossed the Finnish border and never returned to Russia. We can only imagine the value of the information sent by Borman to the Volunteer Army Staff. Unfortunately, we do not have precise evidence about what information he provided, how he maintained his connection with the Intelligence section, or about his fellow agents, direct patrons or subordinates.

Unique information about the anti-Bolshevik underground in Odessa is contained in the manuscript of G. Belyi written in Sofia, Bulgaria and deposited in the Prague Archives in 1928. On 26 March 1919, as soon as the Bolsheviks entered the city after the scandalous evacuation of French troops, the Odessa partisan detachment was formed. At that time, it consisted of only two high school friends—Zhorzh Belyi and Nikolai Fesenko. They decided to sabotage Soviet institutions, to assassinate commissars and Cheka officials, and to gather intelligence. One week later their detachment had 28 members. They were well armed young people, most of whom had previously participated in two secret organizations: the Secret Brotherhood of Satan (satanisty) and the Union of Russians (Soiuz russikh liudei). The first organization, which existed from 1915 until 1917, was not interested in politics but rather staged strange mysterious ceremonies and rituals including suicides. The second organization, which existed in 1918, was avowedly
anti-semitic. Members of the Union of Russians helped link the Odessa partisan detachment with the counter-intelligence center in Novorossiisk and through it with the Commander-in-Chief Staff. The Odessa partisan detachment, which was divided in three groups, successfully assassinated several Cheka and Soviet leaders in the city. They also had regular meetings with the counter-intelligence people from Novorossiisk, from whom they received secret information, new instructions and requests. After the arrest of several members, G. Belyi and N. Fesenko moved from Odessa and joined the 39th Soviet regiment, commanded by the prominent Odessa criminal, Mishka Iaponchik, and staffed mostly by Jews. Using forged identification cards, they soon held positions as company commanders and completely disorganized this regiment. Returning to Odessa after the Volunteer Army’s return, the two teenagers tried to continue their intelligence and counter-intelligence activity, but encountered resistance owing to White bureaucracy and mass corruption.

The mysterious assassination of Colonel Kirpichnikov, the head of the counter-intelligence department of the Novorossiia regional command staff (located in Odessa) has been mentioned in various published historical sources. But the memoirs of G. Belyi is the only document that provides details about this important event. It was carried out by the former members of the Odessa partisan detachment headed by Belyi. The detachment presented to Kirpichnikov’s office much information about famous Bolshevik activists living illegally or even legally in Odessa. But arrests did not follow; on the contrary, some of the partisans’ relatives were arrested. The reason for this lay in the corruption of Kirpichnikov, who was irresponsible and willingly took bribes. Finally, on the night of 14 January 1920, Colonel Kirpichnikov’s car was stopped by six men in military uniform and G. Belyi shot him.

Kirpichnikov was not the only corrupt and unsavory member of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services. Although there is much evidence that Bolshevik agents worked in White counter-intelligence organizations and White agents worked in the Cheka institutions, it is really impossible to gauge accurately the level of corruption and duplicity within the various counter-intelligence services.
In this regard, it is interesting to note the case of General K. I. Globachev, a former head of the Petrograd Security section (*okhrannoie otdelenie*): "A very unworthy type of political and criminal investigative agent [who] is produced by the officer cadre thrown on the street. This type does not have any ideological orientation and in most cases is a professional soldier. Later this individual is transformed into a counter-intelligence officer for the White movement and into a *chekist* [Cheka officer] for the Reds. His absolutely unprincipled character allows [him] to serve either side and to sell out the less dangerous and profitable one. They are so-called double agents. As a result, entire contingents of the counter-intelligence officers have been created, who only disgraced counter-intelligence organs of the White movement during the Civil war." This assessment is confirmed by various people. One young junior officer, P. I. Kuznetsov, reminisced that "the Civil War changed the outlook of many and gave rise to a special type of officer, who could only be inspired in those cruel times in which all humanity recedes and only animalistic instincts surface, and in which both sides try to outdo one another in brutality."  

General K. I. Globachev, a person highly qualified in political investigation, served in counter-intelligence positions in Kiev in 1918 under Hetman Skoropadskii, as head of the State Security Department (*Derzhavna Varta*), and as head of the counter-intelligence unit in the pro-Denikin volunteer brigade of General Kirpichev. But his efforts to secure a similar position in the Armed Forces of South Russia were rebuffed. Although he received several very prestigious offers in the autumn of 1919, he rejected these. Finally, in late 1919, he agreed to head the Odessa Naval district’s counter-intelligence operation. In January 1920, he replaced the assassination Colonel Kirpichnikov as head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Novorossia region troops Commander Staff, but it was only for the final ten days before the evacuation of Odessa.
The *Azbuka*: A Case of Volunteer Intelligence

Any survey of the White’s intelligence and counter-intelligence operations in South Russia would not incomplete without a discussion of the *Azbuka*. Given that a general review of its activities can be found in Peter Kenez’s book, this examination will focus on the attempts of Vasilii Shulgin and his fellows to incorporate the *Azbuka* into the Volunteer Army administration.

The *Azbuka* was organized by V. N. Shulgin in Kiev as an independent institution. It recruited agents from among military officers, and sent them to the Volunteer Army, and gathered intelligence from various parts of the country. But the *Azbuka* did not have sufficient resources to continue this work after the removal of its main section to Ekaterinodar. On 5 September 1918, Shulgin presented a proposal to the deputy Chairman of the Special Council and deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army, General A. M. Dragomirov, a personal friend of Shulgin’s and a co-founder of the *Azbuka*. Because at that time his organization received financial support from the National Center and from some private resources, he did not request money. Yet he did request that Dragomirov give all *Azbuka* members the status of the Volunteer Army employees with a length of service dating from the start of their work in Abzuka. This was especially necessary for the officers who needed to prove continuity of service.

Shulgin’s request was approved but because of bureau interference the *Azbuka* members were granted only the status of the Army reserve personnel. Eight months later, Shulgin presented to the Duty General (*Dezhurnyi general*) of the Commander-in-Chief’s Staff a request in which he discussed the mistake and submitted a corrected list of the *Azbuka* members. After waiting for more than a month, he submitted another request in which he stressed the secret nature of *Azbuka* activities and the necessity to follow the rules of conspiracy which did not allow the use of regular correspondence and identification documents. Shulgin requested
confirmation of the *Azbuka* seal and letterheads as well as free train tickets for official missions of the *Azbuka* agents. General Denikin denied the request. A month later, Shulgin sent a new letter asking for the exclusive right to compile and to keep personal files of the *Azbuka* members who were waiting for promotion, but who could not be mentioned in regular staff orders. General Lukomskii, the acting Chairman of the Special Council, refused to approve this request and ordered that all documents which listed officers be attached and distributed among the Staff according to established procedure despite their highly sensitive nature.47

Several other attempts to incorporate the *Azbuka* into the Army Staff system and to supply it with very modest amounts of money were also rejected. General Denikin wrote in his comments for a budget draft: "I regard it is absolutely impossible to have such huge expenses for the Ekaterinodar Center...."48 But it is odd even to compare financial claims of the *Azbuka* with those of its "competitors." In February 1919, the *Azbuka* requested 750,000 rubles, but received only 120,550. At the same time, the *Osvag* received 25 million rubles for the first quarter of 1919. In June 1919, the *Azbuka* received 500,000 rubles instead of 750,000 requested; after that it received nothing except 75,000 rubles in December 1919 to cover liquidation expenses.49 As a rule, the *Azbuka* agents worked without pay or awards, yet they provided the Commander-in-Chief with important information from various parts of the country. Unlike other secret services of the White South, there were no accusations against the *Azbuka* members of corruption, bribery, robbery or using their job for personal gain. The last attempt to legalize the *Azbuka*’s status took place in November 1919, and was also unsuccessful due to routine bureaucratic reasons. The head of the Award Section of the Commander-in-Chief’s Staff, Colonel Iatsenko, approved a proposal to promote the *Azbuka*’s agents to new ranks, but unrealistically insisted on a list of required documents. At that time, the *Azbuka*’s agents lived in Taganrog, some of them with their families; many were starved, wore old and ragged clothes, suffered from various diseases, and occupied excessively crowded apartments.50

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Until now, precisely who worked in the *Azbuka*, except for Vasilii Shulgin and a handful known associates, has remained a mystery. Using various documents from archives in Russia, the United States and France, the author has been able to compile a list of agents serving in the *Azbuka* during its existence (from late 1917 to late 1919). The list consists of 110 family names (20 of them also with their pseudonyms) and includes one General, 16 Colonels, 18 civilian officials and 11 women. Most of them, irrespective of their rank, operated as regular couriers who routinely (and illegally) crossed front lines, in some cases dozens of times, with extremely sensitive information. Others served in the *Azbuka's* secret, information, evacuation, communication and photography departments, as well as in its branches in such cities as Kiev, Odessa, Ekaterinodar and Taganrog.

The *Azbuka* was rejected by Denikin's administration, and failed to compete successfully with the intelligence, counter-intelligence and the *Osvag* institutions in influencing Denikin's policy-makers. The routines of bureaucratic correspondence and red tape, as well as the jealousy of the other secret services, proved to be much more important to this outcome than did the great respect for the *Azbuka* within high governmental circles and the existence of personal ties to its leadership.

**Unrealized Projects of Reorganization**

The High Command of the Volunteer Army and the Armed Forces of South Russia was fully aware of the problems connected with its counter-intelligence activities. The necessity of reorganizing them was indisputable. But as General Denikin candidly noted:

> It was necessary either to abolish the whole institution and to let power be blind and unprotected in conditions of espionage, unrest, treason, Bolshevik agitation, and an organized work of disorder, or to undertake a complete replacement of the counter-intelligence cadre.\(^5^2\)
Completely replacing the cadre would have been too disruptive and damaging. Hence efforts to reform counter-intelligence operations were initiated.

Among the various projects to reform the counter-intelligence service presented to the High Command of the White South, the proposal of A. A. Khvostov, entitled "On measures to reinforce a struggle against internal Bolshevism," is noteworthy. Completed in Rostov on 8 September 1919, the report contained several original and constructive suggestions. Khvostov's evaluation of the counter-intelligence service was harsh: "The institution of counter-intelligence in its present condition is a wholly unsatisfactory one. It terrorizes potential supporters of the Volunteer Army, and it is not sufficiently energetic in its primary duty—to detect the Bolsheviks." He stressed the questionable ethics of many agents, their unfamiliarity with routine problems of political investigation, their political illiteracy, their reluctance to cooperate with local administrations, and the lack of real command and control of the higher institutions over their subordinates. He considered that the most efficient way to improve the situation was to unify all political investigations into a single institution based on the respective services of the Military, Interior and Propaganda Departments. He suggested that a special political investigations board, incorporated either in the Interior or the Military Departments, be established. Regional organs of that board at the government and district level would coordinate their work with local administrative and judicial authorities, and hire qualified staff from former police departments, procuracies, and criminal investigation boards. It was also proposed that means be devise to increase combat officers' interest in counter-intelligence efforts within the military, primarily at the corps and division level. A special staff of the inspectors-instructors would be instituted to oversee operations. In his conclusion, Khvostov stressed that everything depended on the leadership. Only if somebody at the top "will understand the real threat and will act energetically without any delay would this purpose be achieved rapidly and successfully. But if it is examined in the usual routine office style, it would be better not to begin at all."53
But in fact, "the usual routine office style" was the traditional approach of Denikin's administration. For many reasons, his military dictatorship should not be considered a genuine totalitarian regime. Although High Administration had to satisfy both "conservatives" and "liberals," General Denikin failed to satisfy either. The local administrations were not adequately linked to the Center and they often acted contrary to general policy. A lack of any effective system of supervision, disastrous problems with administrative personnel, a yawning gap between the front line and the hinterland—all contributed to widespread corruption and gave free reign to Bolshevik agents everywhere, particularly within the counter-intelligence service. The few palliative measures that were taken only further worsened matters. For instance, in 1919, all officials of the Odessa counter-intelligence section were fired on three separate occasions, but soon after almost of them were restored to their former positions! All the officials of the Port of Odessa counter-intelligence group were arrested in October 1919 for bribery. Because people like the aforementioned Colonel Kirpichnikov were common features in the counter-intelligence community, corruption continued unchecked.

On 15 September, 1919, General A. S. Lukomskii, Chairman of the Special Council under General Denikin, presented a comprehensive report about the counter-intelligence service. Like Khostov, his final conclusions were also harsh: "A multitude of counter-intelligence organs creates an unimaginable mess in the secret service and reduces the total activity of all counter-intelligence to zero." His report went on to detail many instances of corruption, bribery, senseless brutality, and use of counter-intelligence resources for personal needs. Without suggesting any serious constructive measures, Lukomskii urgently requested that Denikin abolish all illegal and self-instituted counter-intelligence operations, and prohibit any counter-intelligence activity without the permission of the High Command.

There were many objective and subjective reasons to explain why almost nothing was done in order to reorganize counter-intelligence. But perhaps the most important was that the High Command's counter-intelligence services, in addition to all their defects, were involved in a widespread anti-Denikin conspiracy coordinated
by the Anonymous Center. For example, General Lukomskii's report was prepared not primarily to improve the counter-intelligence service, but rather to limit the intelligence resources of his political opponents inside the High Command and the Special Council.

The Anonymous Center: The Unknown Conspiracy against General Denikin

Documents about the so-called Anonymous Center are located in the manuscript collections of General A. I. Denikin and Colonel V. M. Bek in the Bakhmeteff Archive at Columbia University. Many of the relevant papers were prepared by L. A. Zubelevich, the head of State Guard Civilian Branch. This file includes interrogation reports, confiscated letters, diaries, and other documents.

The conspiracy to oust the Commander-in-Chief and some of his close subordinates was first detected when the 23-year-old head of the Osvag secret information service, Lt. Captain Anatoly A. Patsanovskii, was arrested at the end of November 1919. A search of his office yielded surprising information and triggered new arrests, new searches and new interrogations. Step-by-step, the conspiracy in the heart of the Denikin High Command emerged.

Patsanovskii served in the Information Bureau under the Chairman of the Special Council, General A. M. Dragomirov. In December 1918, he was sent from Ekaterinodar to the Crimean-Azov corps staff (later the Crimean-Azov Volunteer army) as a counter-intelligence officer. He worked under the supervision of the head of the counter-intelligence unit and a well-known expert in military intelligence, Staff General N. S. Batiushin, who temporarily took the pseudonym of "Petrov". In April 1919, as soon as the Reds had returned to the Crimea, Patsanovskii returned to Ekaterinodar and became the head of the secret information bureau in the Osvag. In a short time he acquired great influence, especially after the mysterious poisoning put
Colonel V. M. Bek, head of the Osvag’s Information Service, out of commission for four months. Patsanovskii ignored Iu. N. Shumaker, the acting head of the Information Service, and presented his reports directly to the Osvag head, K. N. Sokolov, or to General A. S. Lukomskii, acting Chairman of the Special Council. After his recovery, Colonel Bek returned to his position but was unable to subordinate Patsanovskii. They clashed on several occasions. Finally Lt. Captain Patsanovskii was uncovered as a very close subordinate of General Lukomskii. Osvag’s secret information bureau turned out to have been serving the political needs of Lukomskii. Not only did it carry out political intelligence, it did so in the service of the pro-German monarchist conspiracy against General Denikin and his Chief-of-Staff General Romanovskii. Patsanovskii’s real patron proved to be a retired General Batiushin who was one of the leaders of the Anonymous Center—a secret underground organization with a central council and local branches. The legal political base for the Center was the monarchist Union of Russian National Communities (Soiuz russkikh natsional’nykh obshchin), which attempted to influence the Special Council’s members and the High Command. General Batiushin, who was slated to be an Interior Minister of the future government, played an active role in the Anonymous Center as well as in the Union which proposed replacing General Romanovskii with General Lukomskii as General Denikin’s closest advisor, or even dismissing Denikin himself. The conspiracy’s ultimate aims were to sever ties with the Allies and to ask for German help to restore the monarchy. 57

In the hopes of getting Colonel Bek to join the conspiracy, Patsanovskii told him that many leading members of the White movement were part of the conspiracy, persons such as: Generals Dragomirov, Kutepov, Timanovskii, Mai-Maevskii, Vrangeli, Iuzefovich, Slashchev; Admirals Neniukov and Bubnov; Sokolov (head of the Osvag); General Salatko-Petrishche (chairman of the Judicial-Investigation Commission of the Commander-in-Chief Staff); Colonel Riasnianskii, head of the Intelligence unit of the Commander-in-Chief Staff; State Councillor Orlov, head of the Counter-Intelligence unit of the General Staff Special Department of the Special Council Military Board; and others. 58 Colonel Bek himself would be appointed as
Propaganda Minister if he participated in the conspiracy. Presumably not all persons mentioned by Patsanovskii in his talk with Colonel Bek were active and conscientious conspirators.

Colonel Bek did not reply to this offer. As a result, he was removed from his position to a symbolic one, a member of the Propaganda Department Council, and put under permanent watch. He decided to present his secret report about the conspiracy to General Romanovskii and Colonel Kovalevskii (head of the Special unit of the Staff). But it was very difficult for Colonel Bek, even with the help of French military mission representatives, to receive a hearing. The conspirators had excellent connections and good reputations. Fortunately, there was clear split in the organization after 13 November 1919, when Grand Duke Nicholas requested that all of them obey General Denikin.59

L. A. Zubelevich’s investigation brought to light considerable evidence about the participation of the Propaganda Department and officials of the Commander-in-Chief Staff in the conspiracy. Nearly all of the known conspirators were either transferred to other positions or dismissed and arrested. Nobody was executed. No details were published in press. The investigation did not extend to the front-line military personnel, probably because it was clear to General Denikin that noisy purges at a time of military defeats would hurt the Army, which had no possibility of replacing purged officers with equally qualified ones. Perhaps General Denikin also trusted that the Grand Duke’s request would be followed. Whatever the reason, the Commander-in-Chief did not act decisively on the problem of the right-wing opposition, but only temporarily side-tracked it. Later General Denikin was again confronted by the conspiracy and, after new military defeats and the catastrophic evacuation of Novorossiisk, was ultimately forced to step down.

There is insufficient evidence to ascertain how widespread the conspiracy was in Army Command.60 But one thing is very clear—various counter-intelligence and intelligence services of the Commander-in-Chief Staff and the Special Council were involved in conflicts and conspiracy, instead of coordinating their efforts to defeat
their joint enemy. These squabbles strongly benefited the Bolsheviks, separatists and nationalists who opposed the Whites during the Russian Civil War.

State Councillor Orlov (head of the counter-intelligence unit of the General-Quartermaster Board of the Armed Forces of South Russia) cared less about improving his organization than enhancing its size. He had considerable experience in anti-Bolshevik underground activity. In Petrograd from February to October 1918, he headed the secret intelligence bureau, organized in cooperation with French and British military mission officers and General N. N. Iudenich who lived there illegally. The Orlov bureau consisted of about 80 agents who served in various Soviet institutions and obtained valuable secret information for the Allies. In addition, over 800 Russian and Polish officers were sent from Petrograd to support the Allied intervention in Northern Russia. After escaping Petrograd during the Red Terror, Orlov continued his activity in Odessa and later became a chief of Denikin’s counter-intelligence. In that capacity, and despite many other pressing concerns including organizational problems, complaints and reorganization projects, Orlov proposed creating a Central International Bureau charged with collecting information about people connected with the Bolsheviks. The Bureau was to work in connection with its respective foreign counterparts, which he held should be formed by the Paris Peace Conference. Orlov enclosed a detailed description of the projected staff which included a head, two deputy heads, 13 foreign representatives, 7 translators, 10 investigation officers, an attorney and guards. He included recommended salaries (in French currency) for each. He also proposed organizing special sections of the Bureau, staffed by experienced Russian officials in the participating countries, the functions of which would be to register all persons coming from Russia and to observe Bolshevik or pro-Bolshevik activity. The special sections should work under the cover of private firms or trade companies. What happened to Orlov’s fantastic project? It was spiked by the Denikin bureaucracy, as were many others, including more realistic and reasonable projects.
Conclusions

This study of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services of the White South from late 1917 to early 1920 permits several conclusions.

During the first few months of the Volunteer Army, there was no separation between intelligence and counter-intelligence activities. The most important early goals were to provide reliable connections with the anti-Bolshevik politicians, especially in Moscow and Petrograd, and to attract new volunteers from different parts of the country. Brave individual operations without any strategic coordination characterized this first period.

The formation of the territory of the Volunteer Army after the Second Kuban March and subsequent victories required that military administrative institutions organize counter-intelligence organs directed not against foreign spies, as during the World War I, but against internal opponents. In sum, that they be given the functions of political police. From the summer of 1918 to the summer of 1919, the intelligence service was based on connections provided by the Intelligence Section of the Commander-in-Chief Staff and a network of the Volunteer Army Centers organized outside the Army’s territory.

General Denikin’s military dictatorship was a far cry from a totalitarian regime and did not bring about any real consolidation of the state apparatus. Unbelievable chaos, a huge bureaucracy, widespread corruption, and fierce competition among officials with different subordinations characterized his government and weakened its intelligence and counter-intelligence services. All of these defects were magnified by rivalries with security institutions of the Cossack and newly independent regional governments.

The anti-Bolshevik orientation of the intelligence and counter-intelligence institutions was distracted not only by excessive attention to various rival anti-Bolshevik forces, but also by the participation of security services in the competition for influence over the Commander-in-Chief and their conspiracies to oust him. The story of the Anonymous Center shows how active such agents were in
informing on each other instead of consolidating their anti-Bolshevik activity. This resulted in a considerable rise in the number of Bolshevik agents, provocateurs, corrupted elements and desperate adventurers among the counter-intelligence services’ ranks.

The only positive features of the intelligence and counter-intelligence operations in the White South before the rule of Vrangel from March 1920 can be attributed to the very professional activities of brave individuals. One significant reason for the poor record of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services is that they did not use the institutional bases constructed and experiences learned by the Imperial Russian government which had had relatively well-organized intelligence and counter-intelligence services. One is struck by the fact that the Whites were not able to take advantage of the conditions inherent in a military dictatorship, with its supposed control over the state apparatus and security services, to effectively gather and beneficially employ sensitive information. On the contrary, the numerous defects of the White military administration in South Russia had a strong negative impact on their intelligence and counter-intelligence services.
Notes


2. With gratitude I acknowledge the generous research support from the International Security Program at Yale University, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies (The Woodrow Wilson Center), Centre for Russian and East European Studies (University of Toronto) and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. This paper was written while the author was a Hoover fellow in 1994/95. I am also grateful to David H. Schimmelpennick (Yale University) for his help in the preparation of this publication.


12. It is impossible to find any evidence about it in the printed memoirs of the Whites, including several books about the Drozdovskii soldiers. But detailed information is available in the manuscript of Colonel Petr Koltyshev "Pokhod drozdovtsev lassy-Don," which he did not intend to be published and was deposited in the Prague Archive in the 1930s (GARF. f. 5881, op. 2, d. 417). Thanks to Mr. Nicholas Rutych, a friend of Colonel Koltyshev and an editor-in-chief of the Society of Adherents of Russian History (Paris), I have utilized also a final version of that work revised by the author shortly before his death in 1988.


15. Ibid., p. 134-137; Archive of St. Trinity Monastery (Jordanville, NY, USA), ROVS Collection, box 1 (Papers of the Volunteer Army Command); Society of Adherents of Russian History (Paris, France), Collection of the Volunteer Army and the Armed Forces of South Russia Staffs, Collection of the National Center.


17. Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Stanford, CA, USA), P.N. Vrangel Collection, box 148.

18. Bortnevski(i), "Iz dokumentov belogvardeiskoi kontrrazvedki 1919 g.,” pp. 150-172; GARF, f. 439, op. 1, d. 108, ll. 16-27;

19. Vechernee vremia, 16 November 1919, pp. 2-3; Archive of St. Trinity Monastery, ROVS Collection, box 1 (Papers of the Volunteer Army Command); Society of Adherents of Russian History, Collection of the Volunteer Army and the Armed Forces of South Russia Staffs.


22. Archive of St. Trinity Monastery, ROVS Collection, box 1 (Collection of Papers of the Volunteer Army Command).


24. Kenez, Civil War in South Russia, 1919-1920, p. 71-78. For information about relations between the Osyag and the intelligence services see: Bortnevski(i), "Iz dokumentov belogvardeiskoi kontrrazvedki," pp. 340-348.

25. GARF, f. 446, op. 2, d. 3, l. 63; Bakhmeteff Archives of Columbia University, A.I. Denikin Collection, box 29 ("Kontrrazvedka, Osyag"), pp. 10-12; Ibid., V.M. Bek Collection, box 1 ("Osyag").
26. *Vechernee vremia*, November 16, 1919, p. 2; Society of Adherents of Russian History, Collection of the National Center.

27. Archive of St. Trinity Monastery, ROVS Collection, box 2 (Papers of the Armed Forces of South Russia Command).


29. Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, P.N. Vrangel Collection, box 130.

30. Bakhmeteff Archives of Columbia University, A.I. Denikin Collection, box 2; Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, P.N.Vrangel Collection, box 163; Society of Adherents of Russian History, Collection of the National Center.

31. GARF, f. 446, op. 2, d. 3. ll. 65.


33. Archive of St. Trinity Monastery, ROVS Collection, box "Osobyе bumagi" (Special papers).

34. It is now located in Moscow: GARF, f. 5881, op. 1, d. 81 (Arkadii Borman, *V stane vragov*), 95 pp.

35. Arkadii Borman, *A.V. Tyrkova-Villiams po ee pis'mam i vospominaniam ee syna* (Washington, 1964); Bakhmeteff Archives of Columbia University, A.A. Borman Collection, box 1 (Borman A. *Vospominaniia o strashnykh godakh [1917-1918],* 274 pp.).

36. A.A.Velidov, ed., *Krasnaia kniga VChK,* vol. 1 (Moscow, 1989), p. 120.

37. GARF, f. 5881, op. 1, d. 81, l. 42.

39. GARF, f. 5851, op. 1, d. 704 ("Vopominaniiia Zhorzha Belogo, 'V morshchinakh revoliutsii," 70 pp.).


41. GARF, f. 5881, op. 1, d. 704, ll. 1-2.


44. Bortnevski, "White Administration and White Terror," p. 365. General A.I. Denikin himself confirmed that he could not risk following the advice of his General-Quartermaster, Iu. N. Pliushchevskii-Pliushchik, whom Denikin instructed to hire former members of the gendermerie corps to serve in counter-intelligence positions. He was content to hire unemployed judicial officials, but this did not solve the problem. Denikin, Ocherki russkoj smuty, vol. 4, p. 95.


48. Ibid., p. 176.
49. Kenez, p. 68.


52. Denikin, Ocherki russkoi smuty, vol. 4, p. 95.


54. S. M. Ustinov, Zapiski Nachal'nika kontrrazvedki (1915-1920g.), pp. 84-90.

55. GARF, f. 439, op. 1, d. 56, l. 65.

56. Ibid., ll. 66-68. On 28 May 1920, General P.N. Vrangel, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia, issued secret order no. 3248 about judicial responsibility for a self-organizing of counter-intelligence organs. At that time the legal counter-intelligence was called the observation organs (nabliudatel'nye organy).


60. As General Salatko-Petrishche reminiscenced in emigration, the key problem was the conflict between Lukomskii and Romanovskii, who was continuously advised by Special Council member N.I. Astrov. Ibid, p. 34.

61. Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, P.N. Vrangel Collection, box 163.