"Stormy Petrels"

The Socialist Revolutionaries in Russia's Labor Organizations
1905-1914

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Shortly after the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) had shocked the Social Democrats (SDs) with an excellent performance in the Russian Empire's proletarian curias during the 1907 Second Duma elections, Lenin wrote:

The SRs are conducting no solid . . . permanent serious organizational work among the proletariat, and are functioning on the run . . ., "manufacturing" resolutions at meetings during moments of high spirits, utilizing every upswing of mood to "railroad through" their mandates by means of bombastic and efficacious "revolutionary" phrases and speeches. They are not capable of solid and stubborn work among the proletariat. . . . [They] are "stormy petrels" (burevestniki).1

Lenin's harsh evaluation was not unique. Social Democrats often denigrated SR activities among the proletariat, whom the SDs, as Marxists, claimed as their exclusive constituency. In 1902 Iskra described the worker-oriented Petersburg SR Committee as "half-mythical" and Martov wrote that the SRs were neither socialist nor revolutionary; he and other SD contributors to the multi-volume Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale XX-go veka, which appeared between 1909 and 1914, expressed their view of SR efforts among workers by maintaining virtual silence on the subject.2 After the revolution, SD labor activists such as S. A. Lozovskii and P. A. Garvi portrayed the trade union and cooperative movements as almost exclusively SD in orientation.3

With a few notable exceptions, both Soviet and non-Soviet historians concur in the view that SRs devoted little energy to the workers' cause and enjoyed few successes in that milieu. Soviet historiography portrays the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR) as consisting primarily of members of the intelligentsia and as devoting its efforts chiefly to the peasantry and to terrorism.4 Although Western historiography provides much the same picture, several Western historians have provided a more accurate account by demonstrating that numerous SR cadres were of proletarian birth or employment.5 In addition, three historians — Manfred Hildemeier, Christopher Rice, and myself — have recently documented actual SR involvement in the workers' movement between 1900 and 1907.6
Although this represents a welcome beginning, many areas of the SRs' worker-oriented activity remain to be investigated. This study has the goal of providing information on one such area: the SR role in the birth and development of Russia's legal labor organizations between 1905 and 1914. On this question Soviet and most non-Soviet historians experience a meeting of the minds: the SRs either failed to involve themselves in the formation and administration of labor organizations or, at best, played a brief and insignificant role in them. For example, Hildermeier, after portraying a lackluster SR effort between 1905 and 1907, writes that the SRs then "abandoned the legal labor organizations to their Social Democratic competitors." To be sure, V. Bonnell, an expert on the history of Russia's legal labor movement, offers a rather different view: she repeatedly notes SR interest in proletarian institutions, and states that the SRs "presented the Social Democrats with their major political adversaries in the organized labor movement." But Bonnell adduces little factual evidence on the SRs. Although Rice offers a quite positive evaluation of SR accomplishments among workers between 1905 and 1907, he feels that after 1907 their efforts either slackened or were no longer rewarded with much success. Thus neither historian offers a serious challenge to existing interpretations about long-term SR involvement in labor organizations.

A year after Lenin used the "stormy petrel" epithet, SR leader Victor Chernov told the SRs that the government had already swept away much of the organization inside Russia, cancelling the unexpectedly great gains registered by the PSR during 1905-1907 among the proletariat (and among other segments of Russian society). Hildermeier has examined weighty evidence showing that during 1906-1908 local SR organizations reported that they were not as powerful as the SDs in the newly born labor unions and that by 1908 their local committees were succumbing to incessant police attack. Contemporary publications of the PSR also contained reports supporting a negative interpretation of the SR role in the labor movement. For example, in 1910 A. Kerensky complained in Znamia truda that, in contrast to great SD efforts, SR work in cultural-
educational societies, peoples' universities, and workers' clubs, was "paltry" (*nichtozhnyi*). A rough consensus on this matter seems to exist. Nevertheless, the impression created by these sources is misleading. We know from Rice and Bonnell that, at least at first, SRs displayed an active interest in the labor organizations. Similarly, maverick SD labor activist V. Sviatlovskii recalled that the SRs had "entered directly into the labor union movement." Their statements can serve as starting points for my analysis.

Before offering evidence from a wide range of sources, I would like to address the question of why two diligent historians of the PSR, Hildermeier and Rice, reached conclusions on the post-1907 era at odds with mine. The key is the nature of the SR archives at the Amsterdam Institute for Social Research, upon which both historians rely heavily. Hildermeier's published analysis of this collection reveals that, whereas it includes numerous reports from local SR committees between 1904 and 1908, its materials on the SRs after 1908 focus primarily on ideological debates among the party leaders. Following the logic of the data he examined (SRs weaker than SDs in the labor movement through 1907; local organizations under heavy police attack by 1908; and no data on local organizations after 1908), Hildermeier plausibly concludes that numerous local party organizations expired without having made a significant impact on the legal labor movement. In his version, more pressing matters such as Azef's treachery, the debate over terrorism, policy toward the peasantry, and sheer survival now preoccupied the PSR. Thus he maintains that the SRs "abandoned" the legal labor movement. Having utilized the same data, Rice reaches similar conclusions.

Regarding the extent and permanence of damage inflicted on SR organizations inside Russia after 1907, numerous sources suggest that SR committees, as well as those of other parties, sometimes survived even the most severe government assaults or revived after a period of inactivity. One of the characteristics of the era between 1905 and 1914 is that SDs and SRs were able to utilize existing labor organizations, which they had
helped create and in which they filled numerous administrative positions, in order to carry on party business when official committees did not exist. The unions, cooperatives, clubs, and insurance funds were instrumental in the survival of socialist party organizations, albeit on a more moderate scale than previously, in many cities. When historians exclude the SRs from the labor groups, they deprive them of a place in the revolutionary history of the era.

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The thesis of this study is that the SRs had a significant role in the birth, development, and administration of Russia's legal labor organizations between 1905 and 1914, a corollary of which is that they had a lively role in the revolutionary movement. To prove this thesis, I must answer three questions: (1) What policies did the PSR articulate toward the labor organizations between 1905 and 1914? (2) To what extent did party activists at all levels follow party injunctions? And (3) how successful were they? I will devote some space to the first question, by far the greatest amount to the second, and, toward the end of the paper, will offer an estimated answer to the third.

Policy

From the outset the PSR spoke out unstintingly in favor of unions and other labor organizations. In May 1904, prior to the birth of labor unions in Russia, the SRs published a program that supported the "organization of trade unions," which should assume an increasing role in the running of factories. The First SR Congress (December 1905-January 1906) endorsed a program for workers that called for the eight-hour day, a minimum wage, state insurance, and the organization of labor unions. In the First Duma (spring 1906), the SRs (who despite their official boycott had several delegates in the Duma) proposed legislation on unions; after the
Duma enacted the government-sponsored March 1906 law authorizing unions, the SRs called on party members to form non-partisan unions under the new law. In mid-1906, the first issue of the Petersburg SR Committee's newspaper *Trud (Labor)* carried a major article entitled "The Basic Tasks of the Union Movement"; meanwhile, the Volga Regional Conference in July 1906 recommended "intensive involvement of SRs in labor unions."21

By 1907, when union activity had reached a high pitch, SRs at all levels repeatedly raised the union question. The SR faction in the short-lived Second Duma offered a revised draft for union legislation that guaranteed full freedom for the organization of trade unions in order to "protect, strengthen, and develop ... [workers'] economic and closely related social and political interests."22 The Third Council of the PSR (spring 1907) passed a lengthy resolution that both outlined practical measures for union work and defined party relations to unions. In advance of a proposed national congress of trade unions, the SR Central Committee issued a circular with guidelines for the party's union activists. In July of 1907, the central organ of the PSR, *Znamia truda*, had a lead article on the party's position in the rapidly growing union movement; shortly thereafter the SR Petersburg Committee set up a Union Bureau to handle union and cooperative affairs in the capital.23 Along with union questions, party leaders began to address the role of artels (producers' cooperatives) and consumer cooperatives in the labor movement.24 In the provinces, the Third Siberian Regional Conference and the Nizhnii-Novgorod Provincial Congress passed detailed resolutions on labor unions; and the Simferopol Conference and the Tauride (Crimean) Regional Conference met specifically to discuss the union movement. The Tauride Conference established a Regional Union Bureau to coordinate both union and cooperative activities throughout the Crimea.25

During October 1907, the Okhranka (Tsarist Secret Police) reported that the SRs and SDs were instructing their members to "penetrate" unions and other legal organizations for revolutionary goals.26 This raises
the important questions of what the SRs proposed for labor organizations and how they wished the party to relate to them. At first, SR resolutions promoted labor unions in general terms as one of the ways workers could carry on the class struggle under exploitative conditions. By 1906 and 1907, SR commentators noted tendencies in many unions toward "professionalism," "legalism," and "economism" (respectively, a narrow focus on each union's problems and functions, an unwillingness to go beyond legal means, and an exclusive emphasis on workers' economic problems), all fostered, they thought, by powerful Menshevik and Syndicalist contingents in the unions.

SR leaders at all levels spoke out forcefully against these practices. In July 1907, *Znamia truda* labeled "incorrect" the tendency of the union movement to divert itself from the "political struggle of the working class" in favor of "mere economic struggle"; a few weeks later the paper scorned the Menshevik tendency "to limit the unions to an economic struggle during the capitalist regime."27 The Siberian SRs conceded that "cruel capitalist exploitation" forced workers to unite into unions to defend their professional and economic interests, but hastened to warn against a "caste mentality" and "shop egoism." The economic struggle, they claimed, was intertwined with the all-important general political one; party members should enter trade unions in order to move them toward political issues. Nizhnii-Novgorod SRs found the political indifference of labor unions "harmful" and spokesmen in Simferopol vowed to struggle against "conservative tendencies" in the unions.28

Although the SRs wished labor organizations to engage in politics, they upheld as inherently valid the economic and cultural goals of legal organizations. Thus, on the first point they agreed with the Bolsheviks, on the second with the Mensheviks, and, by combining the two views, with neither. On the crucial question of official union alignment, the SRs also diverged sharply from the Bolsheviks, who wanted to subordinate independent labor groups to their own organizations and policies. The SRs regularly insisted that unions adopt no particular party program.29 Their
stance on union neutrality, shared by the Mensheviks, could guarantee the SRs a place in organizations where they were in a minority; they came close, however, to violating their own doctrine on party neutrality when they used their great influence in the railroad, postal-telegraph, and teachers' unions to have these organizations, which were formally non-partisan, adopt programs modeled on the SR program. Many SR activists openly endorsed a position on labor organizations that called for their formal political neutrality, coupled with internal "party" direction.

Nevertheless, the SRs usually adhered to their official doctrine on party neutrality and felt that their stance was virtually identical to the program of the 1907 Congress of the Socialist International at Stuttgart, which called for union autonomy and for unions to involve themselves in the political struggle. Although this claim drew a scathing reply from Lenin, the SRs had a point when they noted that they were closer to the International on this matter than were either the Mensheviks or the Bolsheviks. The SR support for non-partisan unions did not prevent them from advocating that party members join unions, enter their administrative bureaus, maintain cells in the unions, and pursue party and revolutionary goals on the basis of those cells — all of which (paradoxically?) should not detract from the legitimate economic and cultural endeavors of the individual unions. By 1907, the SRs had also begun to apply this mode of operating to the rapidly growing network of cooperatives.

If SR pronouncements through the end of 1907 reveal a definite preoccupation with the labor movement, the party's post-1907 statements suggest that its interest intensified. During 1908-1914, party papers and journals such as Znamia truda, Revoliutsionnaia mysl', Zavety, Sotsialist-Revoliutsioner, and Izvestiia zagranichnoi organizatsii sots.-rev., printed innumerable editorials, articles, and party resolutions on labor questions, as well as a mass of reports on individual unions, cooperatives, clubs, and insurance funds, all of which SR writings now referred to almost in one breath.
Between 1908 and 1911, the SRs recapitulated their earlier programs, albeit in greater detail and with more sophistication. Two themes formed the cutting edge of SR policies toward the labor movement: how best, in the face of Stolypin’s repression, to utilize labor organizations for the interests of the party and of the working class; and how to achieve a better position in them vis-a-vis the SDs. Since Menshevik SDs, with their reformist views, predominated in many organizations, the two problems were opposite sides of the same coin.

In early 1908, the SR Central Committee wrote a draft resolution for the upcoming Fifth Party Council that espoused intervention in all worker organizations in order to "strengthen the forces of revolution." When it met in the spring, the Fifth Council affirmed the Central Committee’s position and proposed a mode of party organization gauged to promote union activities: each city should be split into districts and sub-districts; and sub-districts were to have worker cells on the basis of profession. The PSR Central Committee should create a Worker Commission for union and cooperative affairs and each city committee should establish a "center" for local labor activists (such as the Petersburg and Crimean Union Bureaus). The Fifth Council also analyzed the cooperative movement at length, proposed a similar line of policy toward it, and made a new invidious comparison between producers’ cooperatives (artels), which it viewed as promoting a petty-bourgeois mentality among workers, and consumer cooperatives, which could protect workers from economic exploitation.

Numerous party spokesmen joined the chorus in favor of labor organizations; on the left V. Chernov spoke on the issue, as did members of the right-wing Pochin (New Beginnings), a group formed during 1908-1909 by a small but influential contingent of party leaders, who, much like the Right Mensheviks, wished their party to renounce illegal revolutionary activity in favor of reformist policies. SR conferences and committees in Petersburg, Khar’kov, Odessa, and Baku issued programs on the labor movement. With their huge proletarian constituency, the Petersburg SRs
displayed special concern about the union question. During the winter of 1907-1908, the Petersburg Committee worked out secret plans, to be committed to memory by party activists, for drastically increasing the SR presence in local unions. The mid-1908 Petersburg Conference produced a detailed program based directly on this plan: in the conference’s view union work ran parallel with party work "in leading the working class toward socialism through organized class struggle"; to help create an identity between party and professional-economic goals, SRs should assume administrative posts in all labor organizations. At the First All-Russian SR Conference in August, a representative of the Petersburg Committee spoke urgently of the need for the PSR to take a "most active role" in the union movement.37

Party leaders constantly reverted to the problem of what to do about SD (primarily Menshevik) influence in the labor movement. In 1910, Kerensky found SR efforts in cultural societies much inferior to those of the SDs. That same year, B. Voronov wrote two articles that accused the party press of failing to analyze labor questions; the SR labor program, he claimed, "existed only in the brains of party activists" so that they had to use SD literature when they approached workers. In 1911, an activist from the south complained that, unlike their SD counterparts, members of the SR intelligentsia failed to enter unions, cooperatives, and educational societies.38 (Evidence showing heavy SR involvement in all aspects of the labor movement suggests that such exaggerated self-criticism probably had the goal of spurring greater diligence in the face of stern SD competition.)

Between 1912 and 1914, SR policy makers turned their attention to new labor-related problems. In 1912, the government tied the selection of national and city insurance councils to the Fourth Duma elections, which the SRs on principle boycotted; and, by 1913, the Bolsheviks were gradually supplanting the Mensheviks as their chief SD competitors. The SR press devoted greater attention to the insurance funds than before. A consensus arose among party leaders that, regardless of problems with the
insurance councils, SRs should remain in the movement, since, they thought, the funds could bridge gaps opening up between factory workers and labor unions, some of whose leaders had grown apart from the proletariat. Although some SR activists doubted the usefulness of participating in the funds, party spokesmen consistently advocated full involvement. After a new round of elections during 1914, party leaders responded to continued minimal SR representation in the insurance councils by urging renewed efforts to have SRs elected into them. 39

The spirited, if belated, post-1912 expansion of Bolshevik efforts in the legal labor movement created a genuine crisis for the SRs. As late as mid-1913, SRs were still discussing how to overcome persistent "legalistic" and "economist" (Menshevik) tendencies in many labor groups. 40 The Bolsheviks’ dizzying ascent to preeminence in many organizations by late 1913 ensured an end to the reformism that SRs found repugnant. However, the Bolsheviks also set out, with some success, to subordinate unions and clubs to their own organization and program, thereby threatening to submerge the SR presence in the labor organizations in a way the Mensheviks, with their non-partisan approach, never had. The SR press, which from early 1913 until mid-1914 included a workers’ paper in Petersburg, aired this problem fully. Party leaders constantly reiterated the need for aggressive counter-measures in all labor organizations. 41

Thus, between 1905 and 1914, the PSR never wavered in its original policy of publicly promoting labor organizations and urging SRs to join them. Party leaders always countered doubts about legal work with arguments about the inherent value of such work and about the opportunities it offered for furthering party and revolutionary goals. With this in mind, the PSR’s labor programs outlined not only modes for operating in legal groups, but methods for creating illegal worker organizations when needed. Furthermore, despite Voronov’s remarks about the alleged failure of SRs to write about labor questions, SR papers, journals, brochures, and proclamations regularly devoted more space to workers’ affairs than to any other topic, including the peasant question. 42 At least
as regards the printed word, the SRs could accurately claim that the labor organizations were "institutions which we propagandized and helped make important."43

In summary, the SR program for unions and other labor groups consisted of the following planks: labor unions and other organizations could protect the interests of workers; SRs should create, join, and administer labor organizations; these organizations had both economic-cultural and political goals; SR members of labor groups should take special care to insure political activism in them; worker organizations should be officially non-partisan. As a rule, their outlook led in practice to somewhat closer cooperation with Bolsheviks than with Mensheviks in labor organizations.

Activities

To provide an orderly account of what SRs actually did in labor organizations, I will divide the 1905-July 1914 decade into three periods (the same ones used by Soviet historians and by Bonnell): a) 1905-1907, the era of freedom when most unions, cooperatives, and workers’ clubs were born; b) 1908-1911, the Stolypin era, when the government suppressed many labor unions, some of whose functions were assumed by a growing network of cooperatives, clubs, and insurance funds; and c) 1912-July 1914, when, despite the government’s continued and even intensified attack on the entire workers’ movement, labor unions and other proletarian organizations flourished almost to the degree they had in the 1905-1907 era, only to fall victim to ruthless police onslaughts in the first half of 1914 or at war’s outbreak.

1905-1907

Of the various political groupings, the Mensheviks had the prime role in creating Russia’s first labor unions between 1905 and 1907. Although
Bolsheviks also helped form some unions and, in certain areas, Anarchosyndicalists and Bundists forged the way in organizing various trades, it was the SRs, who easily occupied second place (though considerably behind the Mensheviks) in the birth of Russian unions.

In early 1905, the SRs took the lead in organizing the railroad and postal-telegraph unions and, a little later, the merchant marines, which gave them a near monopoly in the vital communication and transportation fields. The railroad and postal-telegraph unions were formally non-partisan, and SDs and Kadets (members of the liberal Party of Peoples' Freedom or, as they were also called, the Constitutional-Democrats), as well as non-party people, joined with the SRs to form and administer these unions. Locals of the railroad union (and presumably of the postal-telegraph union) sometimes had SD leadership. Much to Lenin's chagrin, however, SRs predominated in these unions nationally. As for the merchant marines, SR activists single-handedly created the Volga and Caspian unions, which became adjuncts of the PSR, and SRs cooperated with SDs to organize the Black Sea union.

Historians rarely mention the merchant marine unions and sometimes downplay the significance of the railroad and postal-telegraph unions. In the latter respect they follow closely the attitudes of contemporary SDs, who criticized these two unions for being "party," i.e. too closely aligned with the SRs, and for combining both white-collar and proletarian elements. Soviet histories claim that the more highly educated clerks and office workers dominated these unions and slighted the workers' interests. In a variant of this view, Bonnell claims that most railway laborers disliked the railroad union because of its clerical elements and that, as a result, its Moscow and Petersburg branches recruited few blue-collar railroad workers. Notable exceptions to the predominant historiographical tendencies are Henry Reichman's new book on railroad workers and Soviet historian I. Pushkareva's study of the same topic.

Although the railroad and postal-telegraph unions were of an unusual type, many of the criticisms leveled against them are unconvincing and in-
consistent. Bolsheviks always tried to tie labor organizations to their program and committees; and numerous labor organizations had SD *intelligenty* as administrators. Furthermore, SDs of both factions organized white-collar or clerical unions, which then took their places as full-fledged labor organizations. Along with white-collar employees, the railroad union succeeded in organizing tens of thousands of proletarian employees — including train crews, linemen, and workers in the railroad depots and workshops. As time went by, workers received ever greater representation in the administrative apparatus, including in the union’s Executive Committee (*Vikzhel*). By October of 1905, *Vikzhel* fell under the sway of worker SRs (*rabochie esery*) such as Ukhtomskii, Tatarinskii, Bednov, and Pechkovskii, who pushed it to proclaim the October general strike, in which postal-telegraph workers also played a key role. The SR orientation of these unions has obviously not appealed to SDs and Soviet historians; more perplexing are the attitudes of some Western historians.

In the realm of purely "proletarian" unions, the SR record is equally significant. A mystique has always surrounded metal workers, whom socialists viewed as being the most advanced proletarians. St. Petersburg’s huge contingent of metal workers formed their city-wide union surprisingly late, in 1906, several months after most other trades. Some early commentators felt this resulted from the metal workers’ preference for unions organized according to craft (e.g., turners, cutters, etc.) or by factory. Recently, Gerald Suhr has suggested that metal workers, concentrated as they were in very large plants, were already well organized and therefore needed unions less than other types of workers. Regardless of the reasons for the delay, the process of metal workers’ union formation is of interest. In July 1905, a series of meetings attended by representatives from various metal-working plants and from the Menshevik and SR committees produced a widely-distributed charter for a city-wide union, but no union. In October and November 1905, when pressures to unionize were at a peak, metal workers in several ship-building plants, where SRs were especially powerful, created an SR-oriented ship-builders’ union, which, ac-
cording to Bulkin, later served as the "prototype" for the Petersburg Union of Metal Workers.\textsuperscript{50} Despite their key involvement in the early steps, the SRs found themselves in a secondary position when, in the spring of 1906, Petersburg metal workers finally formed their city-wide union. During much of 1906-1907, Mensheviks dominated the union and only two SRs, Volkov and Karlovich, entered the administration.\textsuperscript{51} Memoirs suggest that the SRs had a somewhat stronger presence in the district unions. They tended to dominate the Moskovskii and Nevskii District locals; additionally, in 1907 an SR, S. Gusev, became secretary of the Petersburg District union and the SRs shared influence with the Mensheviks in the Vasilevskii-Island District union.\textsuperscript{52} After taking steps to improve their status in the metal workers' and other unions, in late 1907 the SRs won eight places in the SDs' nine in the metal-workers' board of administrators, almost equalling the formerly predominant SDs.\textsuperscript{53}

The most literate and best paid of the Russian proletariat, the printers, occupy second place in historiographical prestige after metal workers. Historians usually assert that Mensheviks enjoyed an exclusive position in printers' unions, whereas the actual situation in Petersburg and elsewhere was comparable to that in the metal workers' union. By early 1905, Bolshevik, Menshevik, and SR circles operated in Petersburg typography plants. In the spring, printers elected a "tariff commission" to negotiate salaries with plant managers. Under the chairmanship of SR binder P. I. Bogushevich, the tariff commission not only fulfilled its assigned task, but worked out plans for a printers' union which took shape during the summer of 1905. Simultaneously, the SR Kharitonov helped organize and chaired the lithographers' union, which a few months later merged with the larger printers' union. The binders, led by SR Bogushevich and several SDs, entered the printers' union at once; Bogushevich became secretary of the printers' union and was a long-time member of the editorial board of the union newspaper. The chairmen and a majority of the administrators of the union were Mensheviks, but the SRs were a live-
ly force, with many important positions in the union.\textsuperscript{54} Besides their activity among metal workers and printers, the Petersburg SRs also joined with SDs (usually Mensheviks) to organize the sewing-machine operators, some leather-working trades, and trolley operators.\textsuperscript{55}

In Moscow they organized the unions of tavern employees, floor-layers, and chimney sweeps, a short-lived commercial clerks' union, and the large boot- and shoemakers' union. Although the SRs had a big following in Moscow's huge Prokhorovskai Textile Mill, they had few adherents in many smaller textile concerns; consequently, they were considerably weaker than the SDs in Moscow's textile union, which they nonetheless helped construct. SRs in Moscow also had a hand in organizing unions of boxmakers, printers, wood-cutters, workers in precious metals, tea packers, dyers and dressers (a textile subgroup), and bakers. Several SRs were on the board of the union of workers in precious metals; SR M. E. Lazarev was vice-president of the bakers' union; and the union of workers and low-level employees in city administration adopted the SR program.\textsuperscript{56}

Beyond the two capitals, the sweep of SR activity in the founding of proletarian and artisanal unions between 1905 and 1907 is truly surprising. In Astrakhan, SRs founded unions of masons, carpenters, and freight-handlers; Baku SRs cooperated with Bolsheviks and Mensheviks to set up the oil workers' and machinists' unions.\textsuperscript{57} In Briansk (an industrial suburb of Ekaterinoslav), SRs organized and led the machinists' union; they were the major influence in the organization of the Iaroslavl textile workers and the Kazan leather workers.\textsuperscript{58} In Kiev, they founded the construction workers' union and helped organize bakers and candymakers; in Nizhni-Novgorod, they founded the millers' and helped found the commercial clerks' unions; and in Odessa, they founded the construction workers' union.\textsuperscript{59} SRs helped organize the metal workers in the factories around Perm, although the SDs had a greater role.\textsuperscript{60} In Riazan, SRs founded all the unions; in Simferopol, they organized turners (metal workers) and office workers; in Tsaritsyn, sawyers, tailors, commercial clerks,
longshoremen, and others; in Voronezh, they were the chief influence in the formation of the office workers’, barbers’, printers’, and metal workers’ unions. In Yalta SRs founded the longshoremen’s and four other of the city’s eleven unions. In 1902, Zhitomir SRs founded the first printers’ union, which police broke up the following year; in 1905, the SRs cooperated with the SDs and the Bund to set up a new one.

Besides these, SRs organized various labor unions in Saratov, Vilno, Penza, Kishinev, Poltava, Tver, and Samara. They organized artisanal trades such as blacksmiths, boot- and shoemakers, hat-makers, joiners, and tailors in Simbirsk, Astrakhan, Minsk, Vologda, Riga, Tula, Nizhni-Novgorod, Tsaritsyn, and Omsk. SRs also organized local railroad and postal-telegraph unions in numerous localities across the Empire and set up merchant-marine locals in Riazan, Saratov, Astrakhan, Tsaritsyn, Nizhni-Novgorod, and Baku. In light of this information, the claim made by the SR Second Duma deputies at the 1907 International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart that SRs had taken part in the organization of not less than one-third of Russia’s labor unions does not seem unreasonable.

Of course, the role of the SDs and especially of the Mensheviks had been considerably greater, an unwelcome circumstance that inspired the PSR to conduct even more intense propaganda among workers. Between 1905 and 1907, the PSR’s status among workers had steadily improved (SRs received much heavier support from workers during the 1907 Second Duma elections than they had in elections to the 1905 soviets); by 1907, the SRs could claim exclusive or significant influence in a wide range of unions in the two capitals, as well as in lesser cities and towns. In Petersburg they began to win places in formerly SD bailiwicks such as the bakers’, construction workers’, and tailors’ (sewing-machine operators’) unions. The SR Turusov became secretary of the construction workers’ union, which, according to an SD memoirist, shifted its loyalty back and forth between the SDs and SRs. The tailors’ union, which in 1905 had a bureau of six SDs and two SRs, began to shift its allegiance to the SRs and by mid-1907 had elected a governing board of six SRs and three SDs.
Mensheviks dominated the leather workers' union, but SRs and Bolsheviks maneuvered for predominance in small related groups such as the brief-case makers', luggage-makers', and trunk-makers' unions. Bonnell's study and other sources indicate that by 1907 SRs predominated in the following unions: precious metals, textile workers, lithographers (who, after joining late, quickly split off again from the printers), blacksmiths, watchmakers, candymakers, tobacco workers, marble workers, cabmen, tailors, and longshoremen. Other Petersburg unions commonly described as SD-dominated — metal workers, printers, bakers, construction workers, and shoemakers — had considerable or growing SR influence.

In Moscow unions, the 1905-1907 years witnessed rapid progress for the Bolsheviks at the expense of the Mensheviks, whereas the SRs made relatively small gains. Fragmentary information reveals that SRs were a minor presence in the metal workers' union, a somewhat larger one in the bakers', printers', and textile workers', and a major one in the bootmakers', chimney sweeps', floor-layers', and tavern employees' unions, as well, of course, as in the large railroad and postal-telegraph unions. The Omsk SRs had strong influence in the candymakers', bakers', butchers', and commercial clerks' unions and, along with smaller contingents of Syndicalists and SDs, had formed the office workers' union, which by 1907 was the largest and best organized in Western Siberia and which carried on widespread work in popularizing unionism in that part of the empire. In Irkutsk they had close ties with several artisanal unions and with the printers (the bureau of which had six SDs, four SRs, and three non-partisans); and in Tomsk SRs dominated the service personnel at educational institutions, the commercial clerks, and the trolley drivers. Except for railroad and postal-telegraph unions, most other unions in Siberia were SD-oriented.

By 1907, SRs had significant, and in many cases predominant, influence in an enormous array of labor and artisanal unions from one end of the Russian Empire to the other: Minsk, Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Ufa,
Ekaterinburg, Perm, Viatka, Orenburg, Tula, Kursk, Simbirsk, Penza, Briansk, Tsaritsyn, Astrakhan, and Tiflis, to name a few places. In Baku, by fall of 1907 the SRs in the oil workers' union began a struggle against the powerful Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, which ultimately greatly increased SR influence. In Odessa, where SD influence was quite strong in many unions, SRs dominated the unions of furniture-makers, construction workers, and, as in Petersburg, the lithographers.

Already in 1905, in many cities representatives of various unions began to meet together on a city-wide basis to discuss matters of mutual concern. This quickly led to the formation of central union bureaus in Petersburg, Moscow, Khar'kov, and a little later, in Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, Kazan, Simferopol, and elsewhere. The 1906 legislation that enfranchised unions decreed the official status and functions of central bureaus in Moscow, Petersburg, Ekaterinoslav, Khar'kov, and several other cities. Some already existing bureaus did not receive legislative approval, in which cases they operated illegally, as in Odessa and Kazan. Although the central bureaus were formally non-partisan, they naturally took on the political coloration of the delegates sent by the individual unions, which meant that the central bureaus were overwhelmingly socialist with an SD tilt. Most bureaus invited representatives from local SD and SR committees and sometimes even from smaller parties.

In the Petersburg Central Bureau of Unions, which began to function in November of 1905, Feit and Avksent'ev officially represented the PSR; according to early reports, the SRs comprised roughly 25% of the bureau and the SDs 75%, whereas only SDs sat on the Bureau's secretariat. The Moscow Bureau grew out of the administrative board of the Museum of Labor, which consisted of SDs and SRs. In late September and early October 1905, the administrators of the Museum called a series of meetings aimed at creating a central union organization; delegates from all Moscow unions, including the railroad and postal-telegraph unions, and some delegates from unions outside the city attended. In late October, the first meeting of the Moscow Central Bureau of Unions took place with
representatives from all local unions, the Museum of Labor, and the SD and SR parties. In its early sessions, the bureau, which had an SD majority, debated whether or not to admit delegates from the railroad union and from the PSR and decided affirmatively in both cases. One SR, Petrov, belonged to the Bureau secretariat and when, in June 1906, the police raided a session of the Moscow Central Bureau, they arrested a number of SR members, including P. Borisov and L. Denisov.

Information on other central bureaus reveals a similar picture: SDs were in the majority, but SRs usually took part both as union delegates and as representatives of the PSR. When the SDs in the Kazan Central Bureau attempted to bar SR committee delegates, the SRs in the bureau easily passed a resolution that rejected the SDs' exclusionary tactic. When SDs took over the secretariat of the Simferopol Bureau, the SRs retaliated by persuading the Simferopol Conference of Unions to pass a resolution limiting the power of the secretariat and vowed to increase their presence in the Bureau so that they could enter the secretariat. The Khar’kov Bureau won some notoriety by excluding SR party representatives.

When the central bureaus arose in the fall of 1905, they immediately undertook to convene national union conferences and congresses. In addition, during 1905-1907 regional union conferences took place and some unions organized national gatherings of their own professions. As in the central bureaus, SRs participated, sometimes in the face of pointed SD opposition. A September 1905 conference of twenty-six Petersburg unions at one point passed a Bolshevik-sponsored resolution to exclude SR orators. The First All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions, which met in Moscow in late September and which consisted mostly of Moscow union delegates, had the full participation of both SD and SR representatives; SR-dominated unions, such as the railroad workers and postal-telegraph workers, also attended.

The Second All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions, which met in Petersburg in February 1906, violated rules agreed upon at the First Conference when it excluded the railroad and postal-telegraph unions and at-
tempted to bar representatives from the PSR. When delegates voted on the question of party representatives, the SRs not only failed to get the required majority, but got fewer votes than the Bund and the Polish SDs. Nevertheless, out of concern for what this decision "would lead to below" (na nizakh), the conference leadership decided to include SRs, a sign of awareness that the PSR had wider support in rank-and-file membership than indicated by the conference's almost completely SD make-up. The Menshevik participant Kolokol'nikov later admitted the abnormality of the situation in which the conference rejected participation by the railroad and postal-telegraph unions (representing tens of thousands of workers from all over the Empire) and allowed local Bundist unions from Vil'no to attend with two delegates. 83 Subsequently, national general union bodies, such as the standing commission for the convening of a congress of unions, had full SR representation. 84

As regards other union conferences between 1905 and 1907, SDs at times attempted to exclude SRs and occasionally succeeded, as happened at the 1906 Siberian Union Conference. More typically, SRs participated in these gatherings and used them to propagate SR thinking on the union movement; at the national conferences of printers, office workers, and commercial clerks the SRs introduced resolutions. When they were in the majority, such as at the various railroad and postal-telegraph conferences, they allowed other parties to participate fully, but arranged that the conferences pass programs very close to that of the PSR. 85

As the year 1907 drew to a close, the harsh Stolypin repression had already wrought drastic changes in the way socialist parties and labor organizations could operate. Now faced with new and hazardous problems, SR leaders were aware that they had not overcome the SD lead in the labor movement. Without deep commitment, they might be expected to abandon the cause. Indeed, just at that time, Lenin offered the opinion that the SRs were not seriously dedicated to the proletariat, a view historians have, in effect, confirmed. 86 Yet, if the PSR's activities through
1907 are any indication, they took workers seriously and would not likely cease their efforts to organize them.

1908-1911

The entire 1908-1911 era was one of deep reaction and repression, a situation that complicates attempts to reconstruct the record of what socialists did in labor organizations after 1907. Across the Empire police destroyed SD, SR, and other radical party committees or harassed them into a truncated and hazardous existence. Proud denizens of the public realm since 1905, socialists once again had to plunge into the obscurity of the underground. Those unwilling to make the descent (the so-called Liquidators) converted to reformism. The government even turned sharply against many of the legal organizations it still officially sanctioned, especially the unions, so that by 1908 or 1909 many cities with previously thriving union movements had not a single union. Unfortunately for historians, the worker clubs, schools, cooperatives, and insurance funds that helped fill the gap bequeathed to posterity even sketchier records of their activities than did the parties and labor unions.

Nevertheless, existing evidence suggests that in many urban areas SR strength and influence in labor organizations reached a peak precisely during the 1908-1911 years, when, ironically, most commentators grant them no role whatsoever. In St. Petersburg, the SRs' growing strength in the metal workers', bakers', and other important unions for the first time placed them in a position to challenge SD hegemony. In the metal workers' union, by late 1907 the SRs had pulled almost even with the SDs. SR administrators had still not received adequate training, and several were guilty of absenteeism, circumstances that led to a fiasco in the 1908 elections, when the SRs lost many places in the board. But during that very period, the Petersburg SR organization had launched a campaign to train activists in a more sophisticated approach to union work, with the
result that by July 1909 the SRs won their first majority in the metal workers' bureau, taking nine of fifteen places.\textsuperscript{87}

In the following years (1909-1912), hefty SR strength in the metal workers' union coincided with a new liveliness in the union's affairs. In 1910 the worker-SR Zatonskii (Batrak) chaired the union, the only member of his party to do so; other chairmen during this era were Menshevik workers, including the popular Gvozdev. SRs and Mensheviks shared power in the bureau, with SRs often in the majority; SR Volkov became secretary and Piskarev and other SRs held important positions. According to the SD Bulkin, for the first time the rank-and-file took over the union; union administrators were all workers (albeit members of parties) with several years' union experience, rather than \textit{intelligenty} party activists. The new leadership ended a slump in union membership by lowering union dues so as to allow low paid workers to join. The union newspaper, in which Zatonskii was especially active, appeared much more regularly than before, published numerous articles by workers, and enjoyed increased circulation. The union increased unemployment benefits, led strikes, and engaged in political work, all of which drew police scrutiny and arrests.\textsuperscript{88} The SRs played a distinct role in these significant developments in a union often held to be the most important in Russia.

From 1908-1912, the SRs and Bolsheviks carried on a struggle for predominance among the sewing-machine operators (tailors). By mid-1907, the SRs had broken the earlier Menshevik hold by winning a sizable majority in the bureau, although the chairman and secretary were still SDs. Bolshevik success followed quickly on the heels of SR advances, so that by early 1908 the bureau was half Bolshevik and half SR. When the police shut down the union shortly thereafter, experienced workers, including the Bolsheviks Sharov, Pirigov, Pusev, and Bogdanov and the SRs Kitavin, Bazarov, Gerasev, and Toltakin quickly reopened it, once again with roughly equal Bolshevik-SR leadership. In 1909, a new group of SRs, including Depo, entered the bureau, shoving out most of the SDs. The Bolshevik Gruzdev recalled that for a time his party simply "gave up." Just
a year later, however, after a struggle characterized by skulduggery in the union halls (at one election SRs cut Bolshevik names out of the ballots) and fisticuffs in the streets, the Bolsheviks took seven out of eleven places in the bureau. Over the next two years (1910-1912), Depo led the SRs in a continual see-saw battle with the Bolsheviks; in 1912, the tailors’ bureau again had an equal SR-Bolshevik slate.89

The status of the SRs improved or remained significant in other unions. The SD activist Sher later claimed that during 1909-1910 "the SRs dominated the bakers"; the SRs in this union were especially radical and the union newspaper (one of the few to appear in this era) had, according to Sher, an apocalyptic tone: "With a deep groan, moans the land. Russian blood is flowing!"90 The SRs and Bolsheviks waged an indecisive battle for control of the vehicular frame-makers’ union (ekipazhniki), a union of skilled metal workers engaged in the construction of frames for autos and trucks.91 Memoirs, usually of SD origin, indicate that SRs and SDs jointly administered the unions of joiners, rubber workers, and trolley drivers.92 Finally, the Okhranka reported in 1909 that SRs predominated in the unions of cabdrivers, candymakers, watchmakers, wallpaper-hangers, blacksmiths, lithographers, and textile workers.93

In late 1909, in 1910, and again in 1911, SRs reported increased activity and strength in many Petersburg unions; their Union Bureau having been arrested in 1908, they set up a "Workers’ Center" in 1909 to coordinate widespread SR union activities.94 By 1909, the SRs finally had enough clout to place two delegates in the secretariat of the Central Bureau of Petersburg Unions.95 In his memoir about Petersburg unions, the Bolshevik Khoniavko remarked about this era that "the Mensheviks enjoyed no influence ..., whereas much more often one met SRs, who ... managed to split [the workers’ movement]."96 Perhaps prematurely, in 1909 the Bolshevik Gusev wrote to party leaders that in Petersburg "there is a notable tendency back toward the SDs from the SR radicals, the pure professionals, etc."97 Similarly elliptical but revealing comments appear in Soviet histories as well.98 Petersburg Bolsheviks had especially good
reason to recall the SR presence in the union movement of the Stolypin era because at the time SRs and Bolsheviks, who had similarly militant, anti-Menshevik stances on the role of unions, formed a block in the metal workers', textile workers' and other unions.\(^9\)

The sparseness of information on Moscow unions may in part reflect the fact that, as Bonnell contends, these organizations suffered more during the Stolypin reaction than did their counterparts in the capital. In general, Moscow unions eked out a bare existence or expired. SRs remained active in the tailors’ and printers’ unions.\(^{100}\) In 1911, the Moscow Okhranka noted that the SRs and SDs were planning to create an illegal Moscow union bureau, suggesting a definite SR role in Moscow’s union movement.\(^{101}\)

For Baku, deep in the south, evidence is more abundant. Prior to 1908, SRs had a modest presence in the big SD-dominated oil workers’ and machinists’ unions, as well as in several smaller unions. SRs also maintained a separate base in the Caspian Merchant Marine Union, which functioned as a virtual adjunct of the PSR; this illegal union, with over 1,000 members during 1907-1908, organized strikes, won concessions from management, issued its own newspaper, and engaged in political work.\(^{102}\) In late 1907, SRs in the oil workers’ union, with 8,000 members the largest in the area, confronted both of the SD factions over union tactics. By 1908, the differences among Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, and SRs had resolved themselves into three different positions on a proposed "legal" conference of elected representatives of oil workers with oil producers regarding salaries: the Mensheviks, who brought the machinists’ union into the affair as well, wished to attend without preconditions; the Bolsheviks only with preconditions; and, suspecting bad faith, the SRs, plus the Armenian populist Dashniaks, wished to boycott. When the matter was put to a vote, Baku workers handily approved the Bolshevik plan for a conference with guarantees. When the conference took place in 1908 and quickly degenerated into management versus union squabbling, the
police, ignoring the guarantees, arrested the entire corps of SD union activists, just as the boycotting SRs and Dashniaks had predicted.\textsuperscript{103}

This denouement substantially improved the standing of the SRs, so that during the 1909 reelections to the oil workers’ bureau (minus the incarcerated SD activists), they won a majority of places, even though their erstwhile allies, the Dashniaks, had defected to their own union.\textsuperscript{104} With their merchant marine union, their superior position among the oil workers, and their substantial presence in other unions, the SRs could lay claim to be the leaders of the Baku union movement.

Nevertheless, a year later SRs had resigned from all legal unions in Baku and maintained their presence and leadership role only in the illegal seamen’s union. According to the SRs, the police, with the aid of swarms of provocateurs, watched the legal unions so closely that any political activity — the \textit{sine qua non} of SR union involvement — inevitably sparked wholesale arrests. In Baku, as in the Urals, the SRs were mostly workers; thus they always lacked trained activists and propagandists, who were usually \textit{intelligenty}. Unwilling to expose their few activists, the SRs turned away from the legal unions, which they said by then "existed only on paper," and concentrated instead on illegal party activities, on the merchant marines’ union, and on a newly-founded workers’ cooperative. Local workers frequently asked the Baku SRs why they had left the unions, to which they insistently (and perhaps somewhat defensively) replied that the police had reduced the machinists’ and oil workers’ unions to pitiful remnants fit to engage only in the mildest reform work. Both unions eventually closed their doors; the SRs claimed that several surviving small unions were covers for illegal unions they had set up. The police, of course, did not spare the merchant marine union: on one day of September 1910 alone, police picked up over fifty SR merchant marine activists, and they attacked again in 1911 with equal ferocity. But in each case the union survived, reestablished its paper, and during 1910-1912 remained, for all practical purposes, the only mass labor union in the lower Caucasus.\textsuperscript{105}
A survey of other urban areas shows intense SR efforts in an admittedly difficult realm of activities. In 1908, the SRs reported a high level of party activities in the railroad locals of Irkutsk, Tomsk, and Omsk. During 1908-1910, Znamia truda repeatedly noted SR efforts in metal workers' and other unions in the Urals, especially around Perm, Izhevsk, and Zlatoust, although SDs still had a lead. When the Mensheviks insisted that the unions stick to economic matters, this aided the SR cause in several unions at the huge Motilovskykh Plant near Perm. In Viatka the SRs could not crack the SD kernel in the unions; the local artisanal union had no SRs at all. SRs had continued to operate in Simferopol unions until police closed them down during 1908-1909. In Kiev, the SR organization revived after police attacks in 1907; during 1908-1909, party activists reported successful work in unions, several of which had exclusive SR influence. In Khar'kov many workers and some party activists were indifferent to the unions and, as of 1908, SRs focused their efforts on the railroad local. Between 1908 and 1911, the party press noted SR activities in eight Astrakhan labor unions and in several unions in Bakhmut (Ekaterinoslav Province). In Novorossisk, where unions were under police attack, some local activists wished to abandon union work, but the SRs remained in the Black Sea merchant marine union and several others. In 1909, an SR in the Odessa Central Union Bureau advocated illegal political actions in the unions, as a result of which the infamous Odessa police chief, Tolmachev, arrested not only the SRs, but even the Right Mensheviks (Liquidators) and closed down all Odessa unions; in 1910, the SRs reported that Tolmachev had again foiled their attempts to set up a union at a large plant in Odessa.

If the Stolypin era was a difficult one for the union movement, it was the heyday of other types of labor organizations, including cooperatives. A few worker consumer cooperatives had existed before the 1905 Revolution, but the 1905-1907 era of freedom provided the environment for the birth and growth of the mass worker cooperative movement, which continued unchecked through the 1917 Revolution. In Petersburg, workers in
the SR-dominated Moskovskii District founded the first cooperative in 1906; a few months later, Syndicalists founded a cooperative, *Trudovoi soiuz* (Union of Labor), which in 1906 and 1907 enjoyed extensive growth and served as a model for worker cooperatives throughout Russia. Other worker cooperatives appeared in Petersburg, in Moscow, and then in many cities, reaching a total of over 100 by 1914. Both Petersburg and Moscow had associations that coordinated cooperative affairs around the country. From 1906 on, SR programs and propaganda promoted worker cooperatives as necessary and desirable for the proletariat under exploitative capitalist conditions. Thanks to its close association with rural cooperatives, the PSR had the necessary skills to function well in the urban movement.

SR delegates to the 1907 Stuttgart Congress of the International reported that SRs had founded a railroad cooperative in Astrakhan. The SRs soon became the leading political element in a huge nation-wide network of railroad cooperatives, whose assets surpassed those of all other Russian cooperatives combined. The Petersburg SR paper *Trud* noted the entry by 1908 of numerous party activists into the capital’s cooperatives. A group of SRs and SDs from the Voronezh office workers’ union helped establish the cooperative *Samopomoshch* (Self-help). In 1909, after the Baku SRs left the oil workers’ and machinists’ unions, they founded the worker cooperative *Trud*, which quickly grew to over 1,000 members and became, for a time, a center for political activity with its own newspaper, *Trudovoi golos* (Voice of Labor); by 1910, police began to arrest the *Trud* leadership and eventually shut down its various outlets, which had served as meeting places for workers and socialists. From Petersburg to Baku, from Minsk to Irkutsk, SR activists entered, and in many areas dominated, worker cooperatives. Both Bonnell and Salzmann, the historian of the Russian cooperative movement, note prominent SR involvement in the workers’ cooperatives, and the police felt that the SRs dominated the cooperative movement as a whole.
If socialists entered the unions and cooperatives at least in part for revolutionary purposes, this was equally the case for the workers' clubs, schools, and cultural-educational societies that proliferated in Russian cities after the 1905 Revolution. Presumably, the Sunday and evening schools of the pre-1905 years and the short-lived workers' clubs of 1905 were the seedbeds of the post-1905 movement. The new openness of the 1905-1907 era confronted socialists with the vast educational and cultural needs of workers, many of whom literally demanded enlightenment. Labor unions and cooperatives almost immediately began to set up libraries, organize courses and lectures, and establish drama theaters; SR circles at many large factories created lending libraries for workers. The creation of separate societies dedicated to educational tasks was the next logical step.

The first schools, clubs, and societies originated in Petersburg. In 1906, in the Narvskii District, near the Putilov and other large plants, a circle of SDs and SRs set up a school for workers, which fell under the control of SR E. Flekkel, one of the founders and the school's long-time directress; from the outset Flekkel set as her goal to provide an education for revolutionary-minded workers, regardless of party. Late in 1906, the same group of SDs and SRs, including Flekkel, established the (First) Narvskii Society of Education; workers who graduated from Flekkel's school went to this club, in which SDs predominated, but in which SRs had an active role. At the same time (fall of 1906), the SR Maria Chekhova and several other activists founded the Moskovskii District Society of Education. Within the next year or so, roughly fourteen societies were born, covering most of the districts of the capital; others followed during 1908-1909. SDs predominated in eight of the societies founded in this period (1906-1909), SRs in six, and the origins of others were either mixed or unknown. Since the education offered in the societies was outright socialist, and since revolutionaries even used the premises for party work, police closed some societies, which were soon replaced by new ones. The Petersburg societies of the 1906-1911 period closely associated with the
SRs were the Narvskii School (founded in 1906), the Second Narvskii Society of Education (1908), the Aleksandro-Nevskii Society for Education (1907), the Nekrasov Educational Society (1907), the Moskovskii District Educational Society (1906), and the Women's Mutual Aid Society (1907). Other well-known societies of the period (the First Narvskii Educational Society and "Science") had SR input, although SDs may have predominated.\footnote{115}

The SR societies were well-run and effective. Flekkel's school in the Narva District, which survived until the February Revolution, educated hundreds of workers and had a very interesting history, as recalled by various memoirists. Alexander Kerensky had a hand in founding the Nekrasov and Aleksandro-Nevskii Societies; both societies lasted several years, grew in membership, and took part prominently in Petersburg workers' affairs. I. Levin, the early Soviet specialist on the clubs and societies, noted that the Second Narvskii Society, founded in 1907 by E. Flekkel, her husband Boris Flekkel (city architect, university lecturer, and SR activist), and the prominent SR Snetkova, offered a uniquely systematic course of studies, whereas other clubs, including those run by SDs, offered interesting but haphazard instruction.\footnote{116}

In Moscow the club movement began only in 1909 and was less developed than in the capital, although ultimately a number of clubs came into being. Also important in workers' education were the famous Prechistensky Courses, a worker-oriented peoples' university, that had started its activities in the last century. SRs and SDs participated in the Moscow clubs and schools, as they did in several clubs in Riga.\footnote{117} During 1908-1909 the Baku clubs "Science" and "Knowledge-Power" were founded by SDs, but many SR workers went there. After the demise of the SR-oriented cooperative \textit{Trud}, the club "Science" grew rapidly and became, until the police shut it down late in 1910, the most lively center for revolutionary propaganda and meetings in Baku. The Baku SRs, whose forces were depleted by arrests, vowed to overcome their deficiencies in the club movement by training new cadres from the intelligentsia
but, as they had to admit, found this easier said than done.\textsuperscript{118} In Voronezh, SDs and SRs founded a Peoples’ University (\textit{Narodnyi universitet}), which soon fell under exclusive SR influence and, according to an SD memoirist, issued its own newspaper and carried on lively revolutionary work.\textsuperscript{119} In Omsk the SR-led office workers’ union supervised extensive cultural and educational endeavors. In 1908, Simferopol SRs founded a school of self-education for advanced workers. When in 1908 police closed down the unions in one provincial capital, they were replaced by Sunday schools, with former SR union activists as teachers and former union members as students.\textsuperscript{120} The evidence for Petersburg and elsewhere suggests that Kerensky’s complaint about alleged SR neglect of workers’ clubs and schools was simply inaccurate.

The last network of labor organizations to come into existence under the March 1906 labor legislation were the insurance funds, most of which appeared during 1908-1909. Each insurance fund or, more accurately, sickness fund (\textit{bol’ничная касса}), was associated with an individual plant; the workers themselves made small monthly contributions and elected their own fund officials. Additionally, workers elected city-wide and national insurance councils.\textsuperscript{121} Activists in the funds — as in the clubs, cooperatives, and unions — were mostly socialists. SRs became involved in and led individual funds in numerous cities. Activists from the PSR led the campaign to set up the funds in the Donbass region. In Petersburg, SRs were active in and, at times, led insurance funds in such plants as Putilov, Novyi Lessner, and Aivas.\textsuperscript{122} The Soviet historian Stepanov has noted that during the first phase (1908-1912) of the insurance movement SRs had "significant representation" on the National Insurance Council and in the Riga and Petersburg councils.\textsuperscript{123} The impression that SDs dominated the insurance funds arises from circumstances pertaining to the second phase of the movement, to be discussed presently.

Despite the harshness of the Stolypin era, a few left-oriented conferences and congresses did take place between 1908 and 1911. At the 1908 Congress of Cooperatives, sizable SD and SR delegations represented the
worker segment of the cooperative movement. Likewise, Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, and SRs formed the workers’ delegation at the First All-Russian Women’s Congress in December 1908 and all three introduced resolutions. In advance of the late 1909 First Congress for the Struggle Against Alcoholism, the Petersburg Inter-Club Commission, which consisted of SDs and SRs, held a series of meetings to prepare for the congress itself. At the preparatory meetings, conflicting SR and SD views emerged about the proper function of the congress: the SDs (evidently predominantly Bolsheviks) wished to blame worker alcoholism entirely on the capitalist regime and thus utilize the congress solely for propaganda, whereas the SRs were quite willing to condemn capitalism, but also wished to stress practical measures for combating alcoholism, for which they felt workers should share the responsibility. A rather fierce SR-SD struggle occurred both at the preparatory meetings and at the congress over this and other issues.124

1912-July 1914

Although the 1912-1914 period, the last of this study, confronted the PSR with problems of some magnitude (exclusion from the insurance councils and the rise of the Bolsheviks) in their dealings with the workers, it did not lack accomplishments for them; even where they suffered defeats, this was not for lack of interest and effort. A change of atmosphere in Russia beginning as early as 1910 created the potential for progress in agitating and organizing workers. For the first time since 1907, mass demonstrations of students and workers had occurred on Nevskii Prospect, first to commemorate the death of SR terrorist-hero Sazonov and then, on a grander scale, for Tolstoy’s funeral. In 1910, most SDs still doubted the wisdom of demonstrations, but the SRs, whose influence in Petersburg’s unions and clubs was at its apogee, successfully urged students and some workers into the streets.125 Even so, Cossack whips, police batons, and tsarist army bullets still sufficed to hold the
workers in line. By a cruel twist of fate, army bullets — those that slaughtered hundreds of striking men and women workers at the distant Siberian Lena Gold Fields in the spring of 1912 — finally impelled the workers back into the revolutionary movement.

The rise in the revolutionary movement between 1912 and the outbreak of the war in July 1914 provided socialists with opportunities, but also with hazards. An as yet unflinching government met opposition with provocation, arrests, and brute force. The socialist press of the era clearly revealed the toll of party personnel and of labor activists; literally hundreds of labor organizations all over Russia opened and closed and then reopened, usually in a slightly altered guise, in a bizarre and desperate ritual that sent thousands to jail and to Siberia. The government, which before 1912 had kept firmly in control, now, despite constant repression, seemed less able to do so. As the months and years passed, the situation in the labor movement more and more closely resembled 1904-1905. The SR press, including a new workers’ paper in Petersburg, constantly stressed the necessity for party members to maintain and improve their positions in the labor organizations, especially at a time of rising revolutionary sentiment.

In the Petersburg union movement, the SRs entered the period in good order. Problems had arisen only among the metal workers, where by early 1912 remarkably heavy arrests of SR and Menshevik worker-leaders had ended the three-year era of rank-and-file union control. According to Bulkin, a group of traditional Mensheviks stepped into the vacuum, although a few SRs remained in the metal workers’ bureau. In 1913, the Bolshevik Petersburg Committee, wishing to improve the Bolsheviks’ status in the labor movement, targeted several prominent organizations, including the Petersburg metal workers’ union. At the same time, the Bolsheviks introduced an innovative approach: during elections to the bureaus of various organizations they offered Bolshevik-sponsored slates, equipped with distinct programs, whereas in the past Mensheviks, SRs, and Bolsheviks had put up candidates as individuals. Although the rank-
and-file did not always endorse the Bolshevik slates *en toto*, the tactic was an effective one, especially since the programs associated with the Bolshevik slates fit the increasingly radical mood among workers. During 1913, Bolsheviks gradually replaced the Mensheviks and SRs in the metal workers' union bureau. In early 1914, the police repeatedly arrested the Bolshevik-dominated bureau and in the spring permanently closed the Petersburg metal workers' union. The SRs experienced a similar crisis in the vehicular frame-makers' union, where they had been a force since 1910; between 1912 and 1914, the Bolsheviks effectively took and maintained control of the bureau and, in June 1914, even managed to expel from the union the chief SR leader, Vorontsov.

The bakers' union, which police had shut down after a lengthy period of radical SR leadership, reopened again in 1913 under joint Bolshevik-SR leadership, the former having an edge. During the fall of 1913, police again closed the bakers' union, after which a new union with a predominantly SR bureau quickly replaced it. Since the bakers were one of the Bolshevik-targeted professions, a sharp struggle ensued, leading to re-election during the winter of 1914, in which the Bolsheviks offered a slate of party candidates. In this case, the bakers placed an additional Bolshevik in the bureau, but left several SRs in it as well. This situation prevailed until, a few weeks later, new arrests drove the union into the underground, where it functioned at first with a joint SR-SD leadership and then later with SR leadership.

Among tailors (the third union selected by the Bolsheviks), the results were worse for the SRs. In the fall of 1912, SRs and Bolsheviks were on equal footing in the union's board, but by 1913 the Bolsheviks had moved into the lead. The SRs chose to fight over the issue of the so-called *kvartirniki* (home workers), a very large group of women who survived by taking in sewing. The SRs, who had a strong following among the *kvartirniki*, urged the union to open its doors to these poor exploited female workers, whereas the SDs opposed the idea since some of the *kvartirniki* used hired help, which made them, in effect, petty-bourgeois exploiters.
Whatever the merits of the case, the SRs could not induce the union to admit the *kvartirniki* and, when re-elections took place in early 1914, the Bolshevik list passed entirely, evidently signifying a complete Bolshevik takeover. The early Soviet historian Shatilova cautions, however, that at this very time an SR became editor of the union newspaper, signifying a compromise arrangement with still lively SR elements in the union. The wave of Bolshevik influence that swept over the Petersburg union movement in late 1913 and early 1914 spread beyond the targeted institutions, but not with uniform results. In May 1914, office workers, who were operating under a predominantly Bolshevik administration, became dissatisfied with the Bolshevik editorship of the union newspaper; the union bureau voted six to four in favor of an SR resolution that expressed dissatisfaction with the paper for being too partisan, poorly printed, and uninteresting. Within a month, new elections removed the Bolsheviks from control of the union. Grumblings and revolts occurred in other Bolshevik-dominated organizations, such as the commercial clerks and the construction workers, as well as in the large insurance fund at the Putilov Plant; the result was that by June 1914 these groups had scheduled re-elections as well; the SR press characterized as "unfriendly" all of these election campaigns — which turned on charges of partisanship, poor leadership, and declining membership.

With the outbreak of the war, the government closed most of the unions, prematurely ending the various struggles for union control, but developments among leather workers, as among office workers, suggest that Bolsheviks were by no means invincible. In January the membership of the union finally rejected the long-time Menshevik leadership in favor of a predominant group of radical SRs, with leftist SR M. Bol'shakov as chairman. Somewhat contradictorily, the election charter requested that the union paper be published in a "consistently Marxist spirit" (a code phrase for "Bolshevik spirit"). Chairman Bol'shakov and union paper editor Sviatitskii, an SR activist, failed to abide by this charter, prompting a Bolshevik-led revolt. At a specially-scheduled meeting in May the Bol-
Sheviks laid down their charges, countered by Bolshakov’s favorable data on union membership, newspaper circulation, and other accomplishments during the SR tenure, as a result of which the members resoundingly approved the SR leadership.135

The struggle for influence among workers also took place in the clubs, many of which the police shut down even before the war’s outbreak. When police closed the SR-led Second Narvskii Educational Society in mid-1914, this caused a crisis not only for the SRs, but for the Bolsheviks, who had been using the club premises for their district committee meetings; the Bolsheviks then had to negotiate with Flekkel in order to utilize her SR-oriented school for this purpose, to which she agreed. With the closing of the district’s clubs, Flekkel’s school became, in effect, the "Third" Narvskii Educational Society.136 Probably the most famous club during 1913-1914 was "Science and Life" (Nauka i Zhizn’), which a group of SDs and SRs founded in 1913 to replace several organizations recently closed by the police. By fall the club had come under SR control; the director was the leftist SR A. Semin (later exposed as a provocateur). "Nauka," as the club was called, offered a wide schedule of activities and quickly developed a large membership of male and female workers (metal workers, printers, bakers, textile workers, etc.). Consequently, the Bolsheviks targeted it as one of the organizations they wished to control.

The perfectly legitimate strategies successfully used by the Bolsheviks in the "Nauka" struggle are of interest, since they probably shed light on some of the other take-over episodes as well. Bolsheviks began to agitate for re-elections late in 1913. Meanwhile, they encouraged Bolshevik workers to join the club and arranged a large Bolshevik turnout for the election meeting in January 1914. The SRs, relying on the obvious recent success of the club to carry them through, made no special plans. To their amazement, the huge rambunctious crowd at the meeting elected a Bolshevik to direct the club and placed a number of Bolsheviks in the club’s administration. As yet, however, the victory was not complete: a Menshevik became assistant-director and the former chairman, the SR Semin,
became club secretary. During yet another round of elections a few weeks later, the club chose an entirely Bolshevik slate of administrators, but shortly thereafter the police shut down most Petersburg workers' clubs, including "Nauka".\(^{137}\)

In July 1914, Lenin asserted that the Bolsheviks very nearly dominated all the Moscow and Petersburg unions, a claim that Bonnell warns was exaggerated.\(^{138}\) Little or no information is available on many Petersburg organizations. Furthermore, the Menshevik vs. Bolshevik vs. SR dynamic that operated in most organizations constitutes a complicating factor in evaluating influences (most studies emphasize the Menshevik vs. Bolshevik struggle alone). SD activism among workers, dating in general from the 1890s and in the labor organizations from their 1905-1907 inception, signified that SRs would always have a hard time creating a permanent predominance in many branches of the labor movement: too many dedicated SD activists with effective programs and too many SD workers were in the field. Also based on long and serious involvement, SR successes often relied on splits in the SD camp, such as had occurred between roughly 1908 and 1912, when the so-called Menshevik-Liquidators warred on approximately equal terms against Party-Mensheviks (those who favored continued illegal party work) and Bolsheviks; in an advantageous swing position, SRs wielded maximum influence. When SD forces tilted strongly to one side or the other — as toward the Mensheviks during 1905-1907 or toward the Bolsheviks during 1912-1914 — the SRs' light could appear dimmer than it was.

The Bolshevik tactic of offering slates further obscured SR influence; if a simple majority in an organization voted for such a slate, it created a misleading appearance of absolute support for one party. Furthermore, the Bolshevik-sponsored slates were not what they at first seemed. The Bolsheviks knew that workers felt that inter-party polemics and rivalries merely detracted from the more serious problems of worker survival and empowerment. In a very sophisticated move, the Bolsheviks constituted their slates of Bolsheviks, Party-Mensheviks, and other non-aligned SDs
who shared opposition to the reformist tactics of the formerly powerful Right Mensheviks; in the radicalized atmosphere of 1912-1914, such tickets could unify most SDs and attract wide support from workers. This signifies, as both Bonnell and G. R. Swain have argued, that when unions or other labor groups voted for such tickets, they were not necessarily giving unqualified support to Bolsheviks or to the entire Bolshevik program per se. Unquestionably, Bolshevik influence waxed greatly: even in the mixed slates, Bolsheviks took the most important positions. But the impression that the Bolsheviks utterly vanquished Mensheviks or SRs in their former citadels requires qualification. The SRs and Mensheviks had the potential for recovering their former positions and the tide of popularity could turn back toward them as quickly as it had turned against them. Thus, when new Bolshevik officials demonstrated inexperience or extreme partisanship, as they often did, pressures for new elections could build up very quickly.

When Bolsheviks did supplant SRs in labor groups, the operative element was not any great difference in radicality or dedication to revolutionary political activity but, as far as evidence reveals, superior Bolshevik tactics. Other factors also played a role: Bolsheviks created momentum in their belated, and therefore novel, onslaught on labor organizations; their concept of subordinating labor organizations to Bolshevik revolutionary committees had a directness well-suited to the angry mood of many workers in 1913 and 1914; and, lastly and most importantly, workers could, for whatever reasons, simply change their allegiance from Mensheviks (1905-1908) to SRs (1909-1911), from SRs to Bolsheviks (1913-1914), again to SRs and Mensheviks (1915-July 1917), and back to Bolsheviks. (Recently, Vladimir Brovkin has even suggested that by summer of 1918 the Mensheviks and Left SRs had recaptured predominant worker support.) On an imaginary graph, the stately waves created by these shifts suggest something as yet mysterious about the political consciousness of the Russian proletariat. But we won’t crack the riddle until we consider the full range of evidence.
In June of 1914, the journal *Sovremennik* (The Contemporary), edited by the famous memoirist Sukhanov, who was then converting from the SRs to the Left Mensheviks, estimated that one-third of the Russian proletariat "followed" the SRs. This reasonable estimate drew a furious rebuttal from Lenin in which he claimed, among other things, that virtually all labor organizations in Russia had endorsed Bolshevik policies. As in other cases, Lenin's polemics need not be taken literally. A survey of SR activities in labor organizations around the Russian Empire during the 1912-1914 period does not reveal how often Bolsheviks ousted SRs, but it does firmly suggest a PSR that maintained its vital nationwide interest and involvement in the organized labor movement.

As usual, details about party affiliations in Moscow labor organizations are scarce; Bonnell believes that the Bolsheviks enjoyed some success in increasing their influence in Moscow unions, but less than in the capital. During November 1912, a group of SRs and Mensheviks reopened the Moscow tailors' union, the second largest in the city. They dominated the union bureau until early 1914, when Bolsheviks achieved a majority, followed in July 1914 by the election of a bureau consisting of ten Bolsheviks and one SR. SRs had places in the bureau of the commercial clerks' union and in the Moscow Central Association of Consumers' Cooperatives. For whatever light it may shed on the period in question, the SRs were quite active in a variety of Moscow labor organizations during the war and, according to D. Koenker, in the spring of 1917 had predominant support from tram drivers, workers in precious metals, chemical workers, and metal workers and had considerable support from printers.

In Riga SRs dominated the leather workers and were active in the educational society "Obrazovanie" (Education); when the Bolsheviks adopted a domineering attitude in the club, the Mensheviks and SRs began to patronize the society "Ogon" (Fire). During 1913-1914, the PSR in Minsk was active in several unions, cooperatives, and an educational society. Late in 1913 several Kiev unions held a joint meeting, including SDs and SRs, to work out tactics for withstanding police attacks.
and carrying out strikes. Ekaterinodar SRs, many of whom worked in the local insurance fund, led workers from several unions (mechanics, printers, and leather workers) in a strike for May Day 1914.\textsuperscript{144} The Okhranka reported that in 1912 the SRs had reopened the railroad union in Khar’kov and through it were carrying on agitation among office workers and doctors, as well as in workshops and factories in the area. The Soviet historian Pushkareva notes that between 1912 and 1914 SRs revived numerous railroad locals throughout Russia.\textsuperscript{145}

In Chernigov, SRs and SDs reestablished a number of unions during 1911-1912, and the SRs dominated the leather workers. An early Soviet source claimed that SD and SR workers’ papers from Petersburg during 1913-1914 spurred the growth of labor organizations in Rostov-on-the-Don, Bakhmut, Mariupol, Taganrog, Kiev, Khar’kov, and Odessa.\textsuperscript{146} The SR-oriented Black and Caspian Sea merchant marine unions issued newspapers, led strikes, and carried out both economic and political activities. In 1913, the two unions merged into a single Black and Caspian Merchant Marine Union, which operated under SR auspices until the outbreak of the war.\textsuperscript{147}

At a 1912 party conference, the Baku SRs decided not only to continue their activities in the seamen’s union, but to participate fully in other unions (printers, commercial clerks, office workers, dockworkers, oil workers) that had begun again to function. Later the Baku SRs affirmed the correctness of that decision, noting that these unions had played a major role in a strike during the summer of 1913. In late spring of 1914, several unions organized a general strike that lasted several months; secretary of the oil-workers’ union, Valikov, was one of several SRs on the joint SD-SR strike committee. Police displayed special alarm because Valikov and other members of the Baku strike committee advocated spreading the strike to the merchant marine union in order to tie up shipping throughout the south of Russia; Valikov and other SRs on the strike committee, the police noted with foreboding, had party ties with the merchant marine union.\textsuperscript{148}
In the final two years before World War I, the PSR experienced difficulties in the important insurance fund movement. Their boycott of the Duma prevented them from taking part in the 1912 elections to the national and city insurance councils, which the government tied to that year’s Third Duma elections. For the first time, the councils consisted entirely of SDs, eliciting the response from Znamia truda that SRs should make the best of it by continuing their involvement in the local funds. Meanwhile, both SD parties used their positions on the councils as bases for the publication of national insurance newspapers, whereas the PSR, whose press did report extensively on the insurance movement, published no such paper. A change of rules allowed the SRs to participate in the April 1914 insurance council elections, but, after a two-year absence from the limelight, they did poorly. The SR workers’ press then urged intensified efforts to ensure greater popularity for the party’s insurance program in the future. Various sources indicate that the SRs remained active in insurance funds across the country.  

Success

The evidence presented in this study suggests a long-term SR involvement in the Russian organized labor movement distinctly greater than historians have realized. Local party activists obeyed the repeated injunctions of high-level SRs to enter and, where possible, lead legal labor organizations. SR otzovizm (recallism, i.e. recall party activists from legal organizations) in the Urals, in Moscow, and in some Petersburg districts constituted only a minor element in the SR failure to overtake the SDs in the labor movement. As SRs often admitted, the wide scope of SD activities was the chief obstacle.

An attempt to quantify SR influence in labor organizations, even for Petersburg and Baku where the record is relatively complete, is mere guesswork. A guess of "one-third" has the merit of appearing twice in the historical record: in 1907, the PSR informed the International Socialist...
Congress that it had aided in the creation of roughly one-third of the labor unions; and in 1914, Sukhanov estimated that one-third of the proletariat was under SR influence. Leopold Haimson notes an upsurge in SR influence in late 1913 and early 1914, which, he suggests, threatened to make them, rather than the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks' chief competitors in the labor movement. An appropriate preface to this remark might be that prior to 1912 the SRs, rather than the Bolsheviks, were the Mensheviks' chief competitors in the labor organizations; and during 1913-1914, the SRs almost certainly put up a more lively struggle against Bolshevik hegemony than did the Mensheviks. SRs had a firm hold on the status of chief competitor.

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One or two final questions remain. If the SRs did not predominate in the labor movement, what difference did they make? Is the record of SR involvement merely a piece in an historiographical puzzle?

Some Bolshevik memoirists, followed closely by many Soviet historians, have created the impression that the 1913-1914 Bolshevik rise to prominence in the labor organizations hinged on a struggle against Menshevik-SR reformism (even more misleadingly, others entirely omit the SRs from the equation). This version distorts the realities in the labor movement both before and after 1912. The PSR was so dedicated to political work, along with economic-cultural efforts, that it repeatedly spelled out practical measures to ensure the survival of illegal unions when police destroyed legal ones. This advocacy of political activity lay at the base of the Bolshevik-SR block in Petersburg unions between 1909 and 1911 and the joint issuing of proclamations by the Petersburg committees of the two parties during the spring of 1914. The war the tsarist regime levied against SR organizations suggests its special wariness of the PSR's militancy. Despite their rare use of terrorism after 1907, SRs arrested between the 1905 and 1917 revolutions — a higher proportion of whom were workers than among arrested SDs — consistently received
longer sentences than SDs and were far more likely to be sent to Siberian katorga (hard labor). Of equal interest, the government repressed the 1913-1914 SR workers' papers at much higher rates than the Bolshevik and Menshevik papers.

When the Bolsheviks stood aside from or were not strong in the organized labor movement, the SRs shouldered the chief burden of fighting the powerful reformist tendencies of the Right Mensheviks (Liquidators). Thus the SRs made an identifiable contribution to the organized labor movement. They not only aided in the 1905-1912 construction of a network of worker organizations, but helped lay the groundwork for and directly participated in the subsequent radicalization of these same organizations. The SRs were doubtlessly stormy petrels, but they were also busy beavers, quite willing to toil perspicaciously in the labor movement and elsewhere to overthrow Russian tsarism and capitalism.
Notes


3. S. A. Druzdo-Lozovskii, Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia i professional'nye soiuzy (Moscow, 1918); idem, The Role of the Labor Unions in the Russian Revolution (New York: Union Publishing Association, 1920); and idem, Profsoiuzy i oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia (Kharkov: Ukr. biuro VTsSPS, 1924); P. A. Garvi, Zapiski Sotsial-Demokrata (1906-1921) (Newtonville: Oriental Research Partners, 1982).

4. K. V. Gusev, premier Soviet historian of the PSR, provides this interpretation, which is virtually unchallenged in Soviet historiography; see K. V. Gusev, Partiia eserov (Moscow: Mysl', 1976).


7. This historiographical position is deeply rooted in early SD commentaries such as those of Lozovskii and Garvi mentioned in note 3 above; for others, see "Vechera vospominanii," Materialy po istorii professional'nogo dvizheniia v Rossii (henceforth, MIPDR), 5 vols. (Moscow: Istprof VTsSPS, 1924-1927), 4: Ozol, 9 ("As for the SRs, there
were [only] individual comrades [in the unions]."; Kolokol'nikov, 14 ("Virtually no SRs were in the trade union movement."); and 18 ("Mensheviks and Bolsheviks worked in the unions. There were almost no SRs."); Riazanov, 31 ("The SRs were in only one union. Among the workers, there was not a single SR"); and Rozhkov, 60 ("we had no SRs in the union movement.").


10. For instance, Rice writes that support "for the PSR from among the cadre proletariat was largely a temporary phenomenon." ("Land and Freedom," 103), by which he apparently means that after 1907 SRs, for whatever reason, lost much of their worker support, a contention, by the way, of many contemporary SDs. Since Rice's various studies do not extend beyond 1907, he may not be as familiar with the sources of the post-1907 era as with those of his period of concentration. Perhaps his book on the SRs and workers between 1905 and 1907, which is soon to be published by St. Martin's Press, will offer a reinterpretation of this issue.


13. Among the SR papers and journals of this era are: Znamia truda (henceforth, Z. T.); Zavety; Revoliutsionnaire mysli; Letuchii listok; Trud; Vestnik zagranichnoi federatsii grupp partii sots.-rev. (henceforth, Vestnik); Pamiatnaia knizhka sotsialista-revoluiutsionera; Sot-
sialist-Revoliutsioner, Trudovoi golos; and the various Mysl' newspapers (1913-1914) from Petersburg.


17. Reflecting his view of the party, the chapters of Hildermeier's book (Sozialrev. Partei) that cover the post-1907 years provide almost no data on the activities of SR organizations inside Russia.

18. The SR periodical press (see note 13 above) is the best source. Published police reports, memoirs, and various other SR publications are also useful.


29. Z. T., 8 (December 1907): 8; 9 (January 1908): 13; Bonnell, Roots, 250. During 1905-1907, the SDs' thinking about labor organizations evolved in a way similar to that of the SRs (see Bonnell, Roots, 152-60).

30. Spokesmen at a Nizhnii-Novgorod conference urged all SRs to enter unions, cultural societies, and cooperatives in order to use them for "party goals"; see Z. T., 2 (July 12, 1907): 22.

31. Z. T., 8 (December 1907): 9.


35. Pamiatnaia knizhka, 1 (1911): 20; Izveshchenie o V-m s"ezde, 16-17; Izveshchenie tsentr. kom., 4.

36. Chernov urged SRs to use "unions, clubs, cooperatives, and educational societies as fields of propaganda" (Hildermeier, Sotsialrev. Partei, 319). Another leader, A. Volin, wrote that work in legal organizations "constituted the peaceful struggle, that helped prepare the way for the overthrow of autocracy" (Revoluiusionnaia mysl', 3 [September 1908]: 5-7). For the Right SR support of legal organizations, see Hildermeier, 328.

37. Z. T., 18 (June 1909): 16; 19 (July 1909): 17-18; 25 (January 1910); 27 (April 1910): 28-9; 28-9 (May-June 1910); 49 (February 1913): 2-5; Revoliutionnaia mysl', 5 (July 1909):
tei, 330.


40. Z. T., 42 (April 1912): 2, 16; 47 (December 1912): 9-12; 49 (February 1913): 2-5; Trudovoi golos, 7 (March 31, 1913): 3.


42. Between 1907 and 1914, the central party organ Znamia truda contained sixty-five worker-oriented editorials and major articles, of which twenty directly concerned labor organiza­
tions. Znamia truda also reported on and often reprinted SR proclamations from all over the Empire, of which ninety-six addressed workers; fifty, the peasantry; forty-one soldiers; and twenty-one, the intelligentsia. SR leaflets to workers originated in Petersburg, Moscow, Baku, Kiev, Zabaikal, Zakavkaz, Narva, Iv'ev, Briansk, Odessa, Minsk, Voronezh, Kharkov, Omsk, Umansk, and Sormovo. For a count of leaflets in Revoliutsionnaia Rossii (1900-1905) with similar results, see Melancon, "Socialist Revolutionaries from 1902," 46n.

43. Vestnik, 10 (March 1909): 19; the author of this article also complained about the at­
ttempts of SDs to "stamp their seal" on labor groups.

44. On the railroad union, see I. M. Pushkareva, Zheleznodorozhniki Rossii v burzhuaz­
no-demokratischeskikh revoliutsiiakh (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), 150, 194, 202n; Henry Reich­
complained that the SRs had "stamped their seal" on the railroad union.). On the postal­
 telegraph union, see I. K. Milonov, Kak voznikli professional'nye soiuzy v Rossii (Moscow: 
Izd-vo VTsSPS, 1929), 170-71; 1905-1907, 676; Engelstein, Moscow 1905, 175; Rapport du 
parti socialiste revolutionnaire de Russie du congrès socialiste international de Stuttgart (àout 
1907) (Gand: Le Bigot, 1907), 152; and Bonnell, Roots, 137n. The SRs Parfenenkov and 
Akimov were, respectively, president and secretary of the postal-telegraph union.

45. 1905-1907, 576; Rapport, 80-1; Trud, 16 (August 1907): 7-9. When arrests broke up 
the original Volga Merchant Marine Union (which was non-partisan but SR-dominated), 
two organizations replaced it: an SR illegal union with branches in Saratov, Kazan, Riazan, 
and Nizhni-Novgorod, and a legal SD-dominated union. According to Trud, the SD union 
quickly perished, while the SR illegal organization thrived, an assertion borne out by other 
evidence.

46. P. Kolokol'nikov ("Vechera vospominanii," MIPDR 4: 17) claimed that most workers 
wished to leave the SR-dominated railroad union. Other Soviet authors portray railroad 
unions the SDs created during 1905-1907 as worker-oriented and as successful; Pushka­ 
reva (Zheleznodorozhniky, 125-7) shows, however, that these unions died out quickly. 
Bonnell confirms this and notes that the SD unions attracted mainly white-collar workers; 
see Bonnell, Roots, 137-8, 153-4). Engelstein reports the SRs as the predominant force in 
the national railroad union (Moscow 1905, 101-2, 237), but emphasizes SD (especially Bol­shevik) activities in the Moscow union during the fall of 1905 (98-104, 187-92).

47. By their choice of subjects, both Pushkareva and Reichman obviously confirm the 
importance of the railroad union during 1905. Although Pushkareva focuses on the SD 
and especially the Bolshevik role in the union, she provides pointed detail about the SRs 
(see references in note 48). Reichman emphasizes the SD role among the industrial seg­ 
ment of the railroad union, and suggests that SRs did better among white-collar 
employees, engine drivers, and railroad telegraph clerks; on the whole, he fully portrays 
the SRs' participation in the union, including their activism during the fall of 1905 (see, for 
example, Railwaymen, 198-201; 250-1; 272-4).

48. Pushkareva, Zheleznodorozhniky, 150, 194, 202n; Slusser, "Moscow Soviet," 38; V. N. 
Pereverzev, "Pervyi vserossiiskii zheleznodorozhnyi s'ezd 1905 g.," Byloe, 4 (1925): 40-1. 
Ironically, the only Bolshevik in Vikzhel was a clerk. For an especially telling account of 
the role of the postal-telegraph union in the October strike, see Maevskii, "Massovoe dviz­ 
henie," 114; typically, this SD writer fails to mention the SR orientation of the union.
49. J. Sanders ("The Moscow Uprising of December, 1905: A Background Study," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1981) and Slusser accurately describe the railroad union and its role. Some authors either underestimate the importance of the railroad union or slight the role of the SRs in it. See, for example, J. Keep, The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 178-9, 220-1; and S. Harcave, The Russian Revolution of 1905 (London: Collier-McMillan, 1970), 184; W. Sablinsky ("The All-Russian Railroad Union and the Beginning of the General Strike in October 1905," in Revolution and Politics in Russia: Essays in Memory of B. I. Nikolaevsky, ed. by Alexander and Janet Rabinowitch [Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1972]) focuses on the SDs and argues that the SRs in this union rejected political actions in favor of economic ones; as noted, Engelstein may have overemphasized the SD role in the union, at least in Moscow during the fall of 1905. Perhaps these historians have relied too uncritically on tendentious SD and Soviet commentaries.


53. Z. T., 49 (February 1913): 2-5.


59. 1905-1907, 285-7; "Vechera vospominanii," *MIPDR* 4: 47; *Rapport*, 64.


63. S. Ainzaft, "Ocherki professional'nogo dvizheniia v Zhitomire (1902-1917 gg.)," *MIPDR* 1: 94.

64. Derenkovskii, Tiutiukin, "Rabochii klass," 87.


66. *Rapport*, 80-81, 99-100; *Trud*, 16 (August 1907): 7-9; Z. T., 8 (December 1907): 16.
67.  *Rapport*, 248-52. Early Soviet sources sometimes referred gingerly to SR union support. In 1925, Kolokol'nikov and Rapoport made unflattering, but revealing comments on this subject (*1905-1907*, 720-22). SD union activist A. Gudvon posed a controversial question: how many SDs vs. SRs were in the unions? He answered that "no historian had examined the problem" and implied that roughly half as many SRs as SDs had been in the unions ("K voprosu o kolichestvennom sostave professional'nykh soiuzov v 1907," *MIPDR* 2: 167).

68. Among the many SR 1905-1907 workers' papers that issued a flood of articles and information on labor groups were: *Syn otechestva* and *Trud* (Petersburg), *Golos rabochego* (Moscow), *Golos truda* (Kiev), *Molot* (Baku), *Sormovskaiia gazeta* (Nizhnii-Novgorod), *Izhevskii rabochii* (Izhevsk), and *Molot* (Tashkent); the Petersburg SRs also briefly issued a special union newspaper, *Professional'noe dvizhenie* (see Hildermeier, *Sozialrev. Partei*, 233, 248-9, and *1905-1907*, 720-2). Soviet authors Derenkovskii and Tiutiukin ("Rabochii klass," 87) note the popularity among workers of SR papers such as *Trud* and *Golos rabochego*.


72. See remarks of Nikitin in "O dvizhenii sredi moskovskikh rabochikh metallistov; vospominaniiia starykh rabotnikov," *MIPDR* 1: 151; Milonov, *Kak voznikli*, 109-35; Bonnell, *Roots*, 167. SR-Maximalism, an extremist tendency that rejected legal activities, had a strong hold over worker-SRs in Moscow and doubtlessly helped prevent the SRs from assuming a position in the local unions commensurate with the party's actual influence. During 1906, some Maximalists left the PSR to form the Party of SR-Maximalists, which suffered a quick death. Strong Maximalist tendencies within the PSR helped lay the groundwork for the Left SR Party of 1917-1918.

74. Data on the places mentioned in the text can be found in: Z. T., 5 (August 1907): 13-14; 7 (October 1907): 14-16; 8 (December 1907): 12-15; Rapport, 76, 91-101, 110-12, 129; S. Zalkind, "Vospominaniiia ob Urale (1903-1906 gg.), proletarskaia revoliutsiia" (henceforth, P. R.), 16 (1923): 133; A. S. Il’in, Zlatoustovtsy (Rostov: Rostovskoe kn. izd-vo, 1967), 79 (Il’in notes that the Zlatoustov SRs were all workers, and names Filatov, Golender, Komarov, Diatlov, Perevalov, Kalinin, etc.); F. Popov, *Khronika revoliutsionnykh sobytii v Samare, 1902-1917* (Kuibyshev: Kuibyshevskoe izd-vo, 1936), 175.


admitted that this was a gathering of SD union activists, rather than a union conference. SRs (Z. T., 8 [December 1907]: 7-9) claimed that it was simply an SD attempt to tighten control of the union movement.

84. 1905-1907, 175-231; 447-500, 723; Profsoiuzy SSSR, 172-74.

85. MIPDR 4: 283; Profsoiuzy SSSR, 91; Kolokol'nikov, "Otryvki," MIPDR 5: 131-33; Pereverzev, "Pervyi zhelezno-dorozhnii s"ezd," 40-66; V. Sviatlovskii, "Pervye konferentsii i s"ezdy professional'nykh soiuzov (1905-1907 gg.)," Arkhiv istorii truda v Rossii, 9 (1923): 8-9; Z. T., 2 (July 12, 1907): 21; 5 (August 1907): 2, 14; S. Ainzaft, "Popytki vserossiiskoi tsentralizatsii soiuzov pechatnikov v 1905-1907 gg.," MIPDR 1: 28; F. Bulkin, "Soiuz metallistov i departament politii," K. L., 5 (1923): 258-66. Among others, the SRs Klimov from Moscow and Petelin from Nizhnii-Novgorod attended the commercial clerks' conference; the Petersburg SRs Kharitonov, Lvov, and Bogushevich attended the first printers' conference; and in 1907 the All-Russian Central Bureau of Printers' Unions had SR members.

86. Within a few years of Lenin's remarks, the Menshevik P. Maslov claimed that worker support for SRs plummeted after peaking during the 1907 Second Duma elections (see reference in note 2 above); when Soviet historians address the matter at all, they concur, as, evidently, do Hildermeier and Rice (see notes 8 and 17 above).


96. Khoniavko, "V podpol'e," 162.

97. Sotsial-Demokrat, 6 (June 4, 1909), cited in Ocherki istorii leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS, 1883-Oktiabr' 1917 gg. (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1962), 272. By "pure professionalists" Gusev may mean either Anarcho-Syndicalists or non-partisan union activists.

98. Barchugov, Revoliutsionnaia rabota, 205; M. V. Dzhivers, Volneniiia peterburghskikh rabochikh nakanune mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Izd-vo Vser. obshch. polit. i ssyl'n. pos., 1926), 3. According to Dzhivers, after 1910 "the influence of the Anarchists, SR-Maximalists and other extreme left tendencies melted away. The workers' movement returned to the flag of revolutionary social-democracy." Bonnell argues that the Stolypin era was the high point of Menshevik influence, to which SRs and Syndicalists offered only slight competition (Roots, 349).


101. Profsoiuzy SSSR, 251-53. SRs seem to have enjoyed increasing influence among Moscow workers throughout this period; one SD recalled a large group of SRs at the big Guzhon metal plant by 1910, whereas earlier there had been none (Istoriia proletariata SSSR, 9 vols. [Moscow: Izd-vo Kom. Ak., 1930-1931] 5:207).

103. S. Ordzhonikidze, "Bor'ba s men'shevikami (1907 g.)," in *25 let Bakinskoi organizatsii bol'shevikov* (Baku: Izd-vo "Bakinskii rabochii," 1924), 45; Bagirov, *Iz istorii bol'shevistkoi organizatsii Baku*, 93-4; *Profsoiuzy SSSR*, 202; Larin, *Rabochie neftianogo dela*, 98-140.


118. Z. T., no. 31 (October 1910): 25-8; no. 45 (September 1912): 23-8; Stepanov, "Kritika V. I. Leninym," 29; M. Moskalev, *Russkoe biuro Ts. K bol'shevistskoi partii 1912 g.-mart 1917 g.* (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo polit. lit., 1947), 49.


121. For an account of the insurance fund movement in its 1912-1914 phase, see M. Korbuts various articles: "Strakhovaia kampanii, 1912-1914 gg.," *P. R.*, no. 23 (1928); "Strakhovannye zakony 1912 goda i ikh pravlenie v Peterburge," pt. 1, *K. L.*, no. 25 (1928); pt. 2, no. 26 (1928); and "Bolsheviki v strakhovannoi kampanii i bor'ba s Men'shevikami,"


124. Barchugov, *Revoliutsionnaia rabota*, 254-99; *Ocherki istorii leningradskoi organizatsii*, 294; *Z. T.*, no. 23-24 (December 1909): 29-30. Other national gatherings with worker delegations (i.e., socialist party delegations) were the Congress of Peoples' Universities (1908), the Congress of Physicians (1909), and the Artisanal Congress (1911). SRs attended the first two as part of the workers' delegations, but boycotted the last as "petty-bourgeois" (Bulkin, *Na zare*, 232-3; Gruzdev, *Trud i bor'ba shevinkov*, 75).


126. At Lena soldiers massacred roughly 300 unarmed men and women workers, providing potent ammunition to radicals and causing an enormous furor in all segments of Russian society; it was a turning point in Russian history, after which the old regime stumbled from tragedy to disaster until its final downfall in February 1917. For a synopsis of the effects of the Lena massacre, see Leopold Haimson, *The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1917,* Part One, *Slavic Review*, vol. 23, no. 4 (December 1964): 620-9.


139. For arguments about the likely intentions of workers when they voted for Bolsheviks in labor organizations during 1913-1914, see *ibid.*, 398, 428, 435-8; and G. R. Swain, "Bolsheviks and the Metal Workers on the Eve of the First World War," *Journal of Contemporary History*, no. 2 (May 1978): 133-65. The historical record is not bereft of indications
that the Bolshevik advances, although impressive, were transient in nature. My study of the SRs during the World War suggests that, after the dust had settled from the year-long orgy of repression that accompanied the outbreak of hostilities, the anti-war SRs and the Mensheviks had the greatest popularity in Petersburg and other urban centers and dominated most of the surviving legal and illegal unions, workers' cooperatives, and insurance funds.


141. Bonnell, Roots, 399-400.


143. Stepanov, "Kritika V. I. Leninym," 29; Pireiko, "Rabota 'Russkogo kul'turnogo tsentra'," 256-8; Novov, "Organizatsionnaia rabota," 244.


149. B. Danskii, "Pravda' i rabochaia strakhovaia kampaniiia 1911-1914 gg.," *P. R.*, no. 102-3 (1930): 171-7; Menitskii, *Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie*, 41-3; *Mys'l truda*, no. 1 (20 April 1914): 1-2; no. 4 (27 April 1914): 3; no. 6 (1 May 1914): 3; no. 9 (9 May 1914): 3; *Zhivaia mys'l truda*, no. 1 (1 June 1914): 4; no. 3 (15 June 1914): 3; (see also note 124). By 1914
there were over 4,000 insurance funds in Russia. In the summer of 1914, SRs won a victory at the capital’s Aivaz plant when the SR-Menshevik insurance fund ticket defeated the Bolshevik slate: *Zhivaia mys’ truda*, no. 3 (15 June 1914): 3; and *Ocherki istorii leningradskoi organizatsii*, 399.

150. Haimson, "The Problem of Social Stability," 653. Regardless of the exact figures, the SRs were certainly an important force; in 1913 Lenin called them "one of the main tendencies splitting the workers' movement" (quoted in Gusev, *Partiia eserov*, 77.)

151. Despite its overwhelming dedication to illegal activity, the PSR had reformist elements. After some intelligently left the party in 1906 to form the very moderate Popular Socialist Party, a more serious movement within the PSR began during 1908-1910 when several very prominent SR leaders, including Sletov, Argunov, and Voronov, started the *Pochin* (New Beginnings) group, which espoused limiting the party to legal activities. Sharing much in outlook with the Menshevik-Liquidators, *Pochin* adherents, mostly intelligentsia, were known as SR-Liquidators. Menshevik-Liquidators, however, became extremely powerful among SDs, even in the party’s labor contingent, whereas the PSR staunchly rejected the positions of *Pochin*, which had minuscule following in the SR worker milieu.

152. N. N. Shcherbakov, "Chislennost’ i sostav politicheskikh ssyl’nykh Sibiri (1905-1917 gg.)," in *Ssyl’nye revoliutsionery v Sibiri (xix v.—fevral’ 1917 g.),* pt. 1 (Irkutsk: Irk. Gos. unta, 1973), 199-242; "Pamiat’ o Iakutskoi politicheskoi ssylke," *Katogra i ssylka*, no. 2 (1925): 71-8; "Spisok katorzhannik osvobozhdennykh iz Shlisselburgskoi kreposti revoliutsiei 1917 goda," in *Na voliu iz tsarskikh iurem. Sbornik vospominanii* (Moscow: "Priboi," 1927), 54-8. In two samples — one from Siberian exile and the other from Siberian katorga — there was a total of twenty-seven SDs, of whom seven were workers (25.9%), and forty SRs, of whom thirteen were workers (32.5%).

government reserved its worst for SRs. In 1908, Stolypin referred to the SRs as "the most malicious internal enemy of a great Russia" (quoted in M. Vishniak, "Avksent'ev," Novyi zhurnal, no. 34 [1955]: 289). In 1912 and again in 1914, the tsarist secret police recalled SR militancy with alarm: Menitskii, Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie, 365 ("we saw that in 1904-05 all militant elements entered precisely into its [the PSR's] ranks"); and Korbut, "Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie," 348-9.
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