In the Line of Fire: The Soviet Crackdown of Hungary, 1956-58
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About forty years ago, the first major anti-Soviet uprising in Eastern Europe—the 1956 Hungarian revolt—took place. Western observers have long held an image of the Soviet Union as a crafty monolith that expertly, in the realpolitik tradition, intervened while the West was distracted by the Suez crisis. People also believed that Soviet repressive organs worked together efficiently to crack down on the Hungarian "counterrevolutionaries." Newly released documents from five of Moscow's most important archives, including notes of key meetings of the presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) taken by Vladimir Malin, reveal that the Soviet Union in fact had difficulty working with its Hungarian allies. If Washington's problems with Paris and London during the simultaneous Suez crisis stemmed from the Allies' bellicosity and obsolete colonial ambitions, Moscow's problems with Budapest stemmed from the pro-Soviet Hungarian leaders' failure to fight resolutely. In this study I will examine the implementation of the Soviet decision to intervene militarily (October-November 1956), and the ensuing period of normalization. I will show that the Soviet army did not always perform well during the first intervention (October 24), although its performance improved in the second intervention (November 4). Even the "normalization" process proceeded more slowly than the West knew, due in part to the persistence of small-scale fighting and the passive resistance of the Hungarian population; disagreements between the Kádár and Khrushchev regimes about the pace and scale of mass arrests and deportations; and the lack of coordination between the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in carrying out the arrests.

Background

In his "Secret Speech" at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev not only exposed Stalin's crimes, but he also created a public image of himself as a patron of "different paths to socialism" that would later prove hard to uphold. All over Eastern Europe, the "little Stalins"—the Rákosis, Novotnys, and Bieruts—watched fearfully, wondering how far "destalinization" would go. Meanwhile, their opponents, who had criticized Stalinist policies, suddenly gained in popularity. The Hungarian leader Imre Nagy was one such critic. Nagy—a reformer—had served as Hungary's prime minister from July 1953 to March 1955, but in the spring of 1955, he was dislodged by the hardline Stalinist Mátyás Rákosi, who had been forced to cede that post to Nagy in mid-1953.
Social pressures continued to build in Hungary under Rákosi's leadership. Rákosi, Stalin's "best disciple," had conducted the 1948–1949 anti-Titoist campaign more zealously than party leaders in the other "peoples' democracies." Several hundred thousand Hungarian Communist officials and intellectuals were sentenced to death or life imprisonment after 1949, when Foreign Minister László Rajk and other prominent figures were tried and executed.4 Approximately 350,000 were purged in 1948–1956.5 Most of them were accused of being agents for Tito, the Yugoslav leader, who was called the "chained dog of Western imperialists." When Khrushchev succeeded Stalin, however, rapprochement with Yugoslavia became a key component of Soviet foreign policy. Rákosi's reputation in the anti-Titoist campaign resulted in his dismissal in July 1956; he was replaced by Ernõ Gerõ. (András Hegedüs remained prime minister). László Rajk was reinterred on October 6, 1956, in Budapest before a crowd of several hundred thousand people—an event often described as the "dress rehearsal of the revolution."

By late October 1956, popular unrest in Hungary eluded the control of either the Hungarian government or the Soviet Union. The most intense phase of the revolution lasted about fourteen days. On October 23 in Budapest, several hundred thousand people (many of them students) held a demonstration to publicize their sixteen-point resolution and to show solidarity with Poland (where, in June, an industrial strike originating in Poznan turned into a national revolt, leaving fifty-three dead and hundreds wounded). Authorities of the Hungarian Workers Party (HWP) initially tried to prevent the demonstration, but failed. The Hungarian students began to march early in the afternoon: one group started out from the Faculty of Arts and the Petöfi monument, and a second group from the Technical University to the Bem monument (commemorating General Josef Bem, a hero of the Polish revolution of 1830 and the Hungarian War of Independence of 1848–1849, who was of Polish origin and an idol of the Hungarian poet Sandor Petöfi). The students demanded that Gerõ resign in favor of Imre Nagy.

At precisely 8 p.m. (10 p.m. Moscow time), Gerõ delivered a harsh speech, stressing friendship with the Soviet Union and denouncing the "nationalistic demonstration." (Gerõ had been in Yugoslavia from October 15 to 22 to hold negotiations with Tito and other senior officials and had returned to Budapest just hours before).6 Angered by the speech, demonstrators stormed the central radio studio of the Hungarian broadcasting network. Fighting broke out at other locations in the city and continued throughout the night. In cities throughout Hungary (Gyõr, Miskolc,
Debrecen, Esztergom, Zalaegerszeg, and others) thousands of demonstrators called on the government to resign. Despite his attempts to establish control, Gerő could not stop the growing unrest.

The Hungarian government called in Soviet troops (Gerő contacted the Soviet attaché, who passed on the request to Yuri Andropov, the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary). As we know now from Vladimir Malin's recently declassified notes, the CPSU presidium met in Moscow on October 23 from shortly after 10 until 11 (Moscow time). This meeting had been scheduled to address other issues, but the agenda was hastily altered to include the crisis in Hungary. As a result of this meeting, Marshal Georgii Zhukov issued orders for the mobilization of five Soviet divisions.

At 7 A.M. on October 24 a Hungarian radio broadcast announced that the HWP Central Committee, at an all-night sitting, had recommended that Imre Nagy become prime minister, replacing András Hegedüs. Gerő would continue as first secretary of the party. Other Hungarian "Stalinists" would remain in top government posts.

The Soviet deputy premiers, Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov, arriving on October 24, scolded Gerő for unnecessarily antagonizing the Hungarian population during his October 23 speech and ordered him to resign immediately. Two hours earlier, a massacre had occurred at the parliament building: a crowd of twenty-five thousand unarmed people had gathered and about two hundred thirty-four were killed. János Kádár, a younger "home Communist" with a reputation as a centrist, replaced Gerő as first secretary.

A ceasefire was called on October 28, and the violence gradually subsided by October 30. Soviet troops began to leave Budapest. During the CPSU presidium meeting in Moscow on October 28, Khrushchev pointed out that there were "two paths" the USSR could take, one "the peaceful path, the path of troop withdrawals and negotiations," and the second one "the military path, the path of occupation." Although he and his colleagues knew that the situation in Hungary was getting worse and the people were becoming more and more "anti-Soviet," all of them—except Kliment Voroshilov, perhaps—agreed on October 28 that they should adopt the peaceful path and support the Nagy government.

On October 30 at 2:30 P.M. Budapest time, Nagy formally announced the establishment of a multiparty state, with full participation by the Smallholders Party, the National Peasant Party, and the Social Democratic Party, as well as the Communists.
On the same day, the Soviet government published the "Declaration on the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and Other Socialist Countries." The Soviet leaders wrote the declaration to "save face," extract themselves from an "onerous position," and end the bloodshed. It expressed the USSR's willingness to discuss with satellite countries the issue of Russian troops stationed on their territory and propounded the basic concept of "national communism." The USSR even acknowledged that it had committed "violations of the principle of equality in relations between socialist countries."\textsuperscript{15}

The following day, November 1, Nagy and other members of his government noted during a meeting of the Hungarian cabinet that "Soviet troops have left Budapest," but other "troops are continuously crossing the eastern border, military moves have been registered around Budapest, and Czechoslovak regiments are stationed at the Czechoslovak border."\textsuperscript{16}

Khrushchev and his colleagues apparently realized that the October 30 declaration had come too late to satisfy the Hungarian people. Moscow's words could no longer control the actions taken either by the masses or the Nagy government. Pessimistic cables and phone messages poured in from Mikoyan and Suslov, warning that the "political situation is not getting better; it is getting worse." They feared that "the peaceful liquidation" of the resistance was impossible and that Hungarian army units, if ordered to suppress the rebellion, would join the insurgents. If that happened, "then it [would] be necessary for Soviet armed forces to resume military operations."\textsuperscript{17}

Meanwhile pressures were building in Hungary for neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Béla Kovács, for example, gave a speech to that effect on October 30.\textsuperscript{18} Imre Nagy also raised these issues (specifically, the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungary) with Mikoyan and Suslov, who then reported to Moscow. Khrushchev hastily called an emergency meeting of the CPSU presidium on October 31 to reevaluate the decision (not to use force) made the previous day.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, as the new documents reveal, the decision to invade Hungary was made on October 31: Marshal Zhukov was again "instructed to work out a plan of measures and report on it."\textsuperscript{20} Nagy's stated wish to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact was probably a key factor prompting this decision.\textsuperscript{21}

During the night of November 3, sixteen Soviet divisions, including two air force divisions and some armored divisions, crossed the border into Hungary. Early
in the morning of November 4, Imre Nagy and his supporters, including Pál Maléter, József Szilágyi, Miklos Gimes, Géza Losonczy, Ferenc Donáth, Zoltán Szántó, Zoltán Vas, Sándor Kopácsi, Zoltán Tildy, Miklos Vásárhelyi, Szilárd Újhelyi, Gábor Tánczos, Sándor Haraszti, Ferenc Jánosi with their families, sought refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy, but they were abducted by Soviet troops on November 22 and transferred to Romania. The Soviet leaders installed János Kádár as the new prime minister. Imre Nagy and several others were hanged on June 16, 1958, in Budapest.

The total number of Hungarian casualties is estimated to have been 21,728: 2,502 dead and 19,226 wounded. Close to 200,000 refugees fled across the Austrian border. During the "normalization" process, more than a thousand Hungarian citizens were deported to a prison in Uzhgorod and Stry' (Ukraine).

"Antisovietchina": Hungarian Communists as an Endangered Species

This section will examine the treatment of "loyal" citizens during the uprising (Communists who remained loyal to the Hungarian and Soviet parties), the behavior of the Hungarian army, the mistakes made by Soviet planners in the October 23 intervention, and their corrections in the November 4 intervention.

One can deduce from the above description of events that the initial Soviet intervention on the night of October 23–24 had not solved the main problem, the popular agitation against the Hungarian Communist regime. Instead, it exacerbated tensions, which coalesced into a frenzied desire for revenge." The Hungarian leaders most responsible for the unjustified repressions in the late 1940s and early 1950s were whisked away to the Soviet Union, where they stayed for the duration of the October-November events or, in the case of the former first secretary, Mátýás Rákos, for life.

But the loyal Hungarian Communists less culpable for past atrocities were trapped. Their plight is an important aspect of this historical period. Most Western scholars have viewed these events from the perspective of the Hungarian freedom fighters, basing their accounts on eyewitness reports by foreign journalists or citizens in Hungary at the time, and on interviews with refugees who left in the two months following the Soviet crackdown. Reports written by Soviet diplomats who had conversed with Hungarian Communists loyal to the USSR remained classified...
since early 1992, after the demise of the Soviet Union. The many references to the plight of the loyalists suggests that protection of these Hungarian Communists was a compelling secondary motive for the invasion in the minds of Soviet presidium members. (Certainly, maintaining the post-World War II status quo in Eastern Europe—not permitting Hungary to leave the Warsaw Pact—motivated Soviet leaders the most). According to the Malin notes, Molotov actually said, "We must look after the Hungarian Communists," during the October 28 presidium meeting. Even if the Kremlin leaders were not genuinely concerned about the safety of loyal Hungarian Communists, they probably realized that Western leaders now had a powerful theme to exploit in their anti-Soviet propaganda—the USSR's failure to protect fellow Communists from lynch mobs.

In the days following the initial intervention, the Hungarian Communists became scapegoats. In some cases, they could not even find weapons with which to defend themselves and to fight the "counterrevolutionaries." (Although the Soviet army was able to suppress the revolt without arming these loyalists, doing so might at least have improved the USSR's image as a champion of foreign Communists). Of course, from Moscow's viewpoint, the decision not to arm civilians was completely logical, since it would have been hard to tell precisely who was loyal to Moscow (and later to the new Kádár regime) and who was not. If the pro-Soviet Hungarian leaders had issued a weapon to anyone who professed loyalty, they would probably have ended up arming many of the defectors.

To understand the political and socioeconomic impact of the revolution on Hungarian Communists, it is useful to look at particular individuals from a variety of vocations and geographic regions. The following section will focus on artists, musicians, and employees of cultural institutions in Budapest; party functionaries and security agents in cities such as Csepel, Miskolc, and Győr; chairmen of cooperative farms in the countryside; members of the Central Committee of the HWP itself; and scientists and scholars from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Soviet diplomats conversed most often with pro-Soviet Hungarians who voluntarily visited the Soviet Embassy in Budapest.

Sándor Ek, a Hungarian artist and old Communist in Budapest, was eager to help put down the October 23 uprising, which he described as "an orgy of nationalist intoxication." On October 24 government officials announced that a "counterrevolutionary uprising" was taking place and summoned all members of the Partisans' Union. More than one hundred bellicose members gathered. Boris Gorbachev, second
secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, reported Ek's remarks: "They phoned the Central Committee, which promised to give them weapons. The members of the Partisans Union waited all day; however, the weapons were never distributed. On the next day, the same story was repeated. The Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party and the government did not want to distribute weapons even to old Communists. After October 25 the union no longer convened; many old Communist-undergrounders were disappointed by such actions of the Central Committee and of the government. In several days the white terror against Communists began." Comrade Ek reported that his name appeared on the list of those who were to be "destroyed" (unichtozhenyi). Ek "was threatened with violence on the night of November 3–4 [on the eve of the second Soviet intervention]. He guarded the door all night, armed with a pistol."

Mikoyan and Suslov reported the Hungarian leadership's irresolution on October 24 in their first telegram to Moscow after their arrival in Budapest. The Hungarian comrades, they said, had decided to provide weapons to pro-Soviet factory workers, but "they didn't carry out [the decision] because they couldn't deliver weapons at the factories, fearing that the opponent would intercept them." Mikoyan and Suslov told the Kremlin that they would make sure weapons were delivered "today, with the help of our armored personnel carriers." In Budapest, institutions promoting ties with the Soviet Union were attacked—especially ones that were housed in buildings that had belonged to non-Communist political parties before the Communist seizure of power. The Hungarian-Soviet Society (HSO) is one vivid example. István Hidvégi, former director of the foreign department of this society, told Gorbachev that a group of armed insurgents plundered its headquarters on Semmelweis Street in the last days of October. They burned Russian and Soviet books, photo displays, and other material. The HSO regional offices in Budapest were also looted. The anti-Soviet Smallholders Party, Hidvégi said, took over the rooms of the headquarters and district offices. These party leaders, all armed, confiscated lists of the home addresses of HSO activists. In Gorbachev's words: "The party leaders divided up the list of HSO members' apartments among their people, went to each apartment, and evicted the tenants and their families. Soviet troops, arriving on November 4, stopped this violence. Many workers of the HSO were ferociously beaten."

The Institute of Cultural Ties (ICT) of Hungary was also "ransacked by the insurgents." One institute employee, István Monori, told Gorbachev that "during
the days of the White Terror," the leaders of the National Peasant Party occupied the ICT building, which had once belonged to them. Among the party leaders were insurgents armed with submachine guns and grenades. They burned the institute's newspapers, journals, and books, but did not get the documents, which were locked in steel safes. The "bandits" tried unsuccessfully to open the safes by shooting at the locks with their submachine guns.33

In other Hungarian cities as well, after the October 23 intervention, many people suspected of being Communists were hunted down and persecuted. As KGB Chief Ivan Serov reported to Moscow: "The situation in several cities can be characterized in the following way: the population has been mobilized against the Communists. In several regions the armed people search in the apartments of Communists and shoot them. In the factory town of Csepel (near Budapest) there were 18 Communists killed. The bandits check the buses traveling between cities; prominent Communists are pulled out and shot."34

According to Colonel Starovoitov of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Border Guards in the Szabolcs region in eastern Hungary, insurgents "liquidated" the entire staff of the regional administration of the Hungarian Ministry of Internal Affairs (Belugyminiszterium or BM) in the city of Miskolc. The rebels summoned the commander of the regional administration to negotiate with them; they seized him, tied his neck to a car with rope, and dragged him through the streets of the city. BM officers were also killed in the city of Győr."35

As this example shows, the October 23 intervention was a catalyst for the creation of revolutionary councils and for uprisings throughout Hungary. János Ambrus, later a secretary of the new Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) under János Kádár, told the Soviet diplomats, S. S. Satuchin and M. I. Petunin, in Budapest: "[V]arious kinds of 'revolutionary' committees and councils that sprang up after October 23 summoned the population of the region to continue the struggle 'for the achievement of national independence,' demanding the withdrawal of Soviet Army units and the return of Imre Nagy to government leadership."36

Colonel Starovoitov described how the uprisings spread progressively throughout Hungary: "On October 23, 1956, the uprising began in the city of Debrecen; on October 25 in the city of Miskolc; and on October 26 or 27 (they don't remember exactly), the insurgents from the indicated cities began to enter the Szabolcs region to organize an uprising there. . . . On October 27 the insurgents came to the city of Nyiregyhaza, released prisoners from the jails, and began the uprising in the city. . .
On October 28 a large meeting of at least 7,000 people was arranged in the square, and elections to the 'workers' council' began.37

Meanwhile, in the western part of Hungary, according to András Takacs, a member of the Győr Regional Executive Committee of the HSWP, the commotion began a bit later. Takacs told Petunin about the events he had witnessed, beginning on October 23. He said that until October 25, Győr was peaceful. "In the second half of the day, on October 25, a group of about five hundred to six hundred people, mainly youth, surrounded the regional committee of the party and gave a list of demands to the secretaries of the regional committee. [T]he first demand was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. Then this crowd went to the prison with the purpose of freeing the prisoners, but the guard opened fire and did not permit the prison to be demolished." On October 26, Takacs continued, a "mighty demonstration" took place. All the party leaders from the Győr city committee fled to Czechoslovakia. Takacs remained, but had to live in friends' apartments until the Soviet troops arrived. Had he returned to his own apartment, he would have been beaten to death, he said.38

The violence also spread to cooperative farms. Almost half of all cooperatives collapsed: 1,926 out of 3,926. According to Magyari, the Hungarian deputy minister of agriculture, there were several cases before November 4 in which former landowners and kulaks "took back their estates." While the majority of productive cooperatives continued to work normally, he said, "the counterrevolutionary elements in the countryside tried to liquidate the productive cooperatives and steal cooperative property. They chased and sometimes killed the chairmen of the cooperatives, the Communists, and social workers in the village. For example, in the Michurin cooperative farm in the region of Dendes, they burned the farm animals and fodder, stole much cooperative property, and beat the chairman of this cooperative fiercely."39

Given the violence against Hungarian Communists and the Soviet troops' failure to protect them, many formerly loyal Hungarians from every walk of life, not surprisingly, became deeply despondent and turned against the USSR. János Ambrus stated that "in the first few days after October 23 the party organizations everywhere collapsed. The leaders of the party organizations as well as the economic leaders of a majority of the enterprises demonstrated together with the dissatisfied elements, supported their demagogical demands, and became in essence preachers of antidemocratic slogans. In this way, they compromised themselves and definitively destroyed their own authority."40
Some former HWP loyalists supported the demonstrators even before the violence and the Soviet troops' failure to protect HWP members. When Sándor Ek arrived at the Higher School of Fine Arts on October 23, where a student meeting was in session, planning the demonstration of solidarity with Poland, he saw two Central Committee members among the students: Lajos Nemes and Agnes Kenyeres. Ek was "startled" by the fact that Kenyeres, the deputy director of the Central Committee Department of Science and Culture, was "completely under the influence of the student slogans and excited to the extreme." She allowed herself to make "counterrevolutionary" attacks against the government.41

Scientists and scholars, of course, also soured on "friendship with the Soviet Union," especially after the second military intervention. Tivadar Siklós, director of the Foreign Department of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, told L. S. Yagodovsky of the Consular Department in the Soviet Embassy in Budapest that his department "is besieged by many scholars who say they need to go abroad, either to meet with some colleague or to attend some conference." They all just want to travel to the West, he told Yagodovsky. "But the department refuses to grant foreign passports, pleading a lack of funds (sredstv), or the need to wait for the government's instructions, or various other excuses." Siklós said many of the Hungarian scholars who received their education in the USSR remained loyal to Moscow and to the new Kádár government, although there were some exceptions. Yagodovsky wrote: "Siklós mentioned his old friend, a candidate of science [Ph.D.], who attended graduate school at Moscow State University, and who was appointed the director of the first Hungarian atomic reactor. When Siklós returned from Berlin, where he was during the Hungarian events, the first thing he did was contact this old friend, since he had always known him to be a real Communist. However, as it turned out, this comrade's disposition had changed drastically, and now he spoke, in Siklós' words, 'worse than [Radio] Free Europe.'"42

The defections extended to the realm of fine arts. The director of the Budapest Theater of Operetta, Margit Gáspár, was unceremoniously sacked. "A meeting of theater employees took place in the first days after the fascist uprising," she lamented to Gorbachev. "They unanimously dismissed her, rejected the Stanislavsky system, threw out of the repertoire all Russian and Soviet works, and added to it a number of Western and old Hungarian operettas." During the most recent events the artists were "gripped by an anti-Soviet poison," she said. Unable to "live in such an at-
mosphere," Gáspár stated her intention to emigrate with her husband to the Soviet Union or the German Democratic Republic.43

Pál Fehér, manager of the music section of the Hungarian-Soviet Society, also visited the Soviet Embassy on his own initiative. He too lost his job—not because he was sacked, but because the entire society had collapsed. It formerly had branches not only in Budapest, but also in the regions of Baranya, Somogy, and Zala, with a membership of at least thirty thousand in each regional branch since 1952.44 The musicians may have wanted to leave both because of the violence and discrimination against Communists and the Soviet failure to protect them. "Among the musicians, especially the great ones, there is a potent longing [tiaga] to leave Hungary for the West," he said. "The director Somogy, the violinist Zaturecszki and many others have already left; the director Ferencsik also is getting ready to leave. There was already a shortage of artists and musicians in Hungary," Fehér said. "Now it will be felt all the more."45

Given a little more foresight, Soviet diplomats such as Yuri Andropov, Vladimir Kriuchkov, and others in Budapest could have advised Moscow of the need temporarily to arm loyal Hungarian citizens in case of an emergency, perhaps to form some kind of Hungarian Communist militia. The situation for these citizens was indeed unpleasant, although they also had a strong incentive to exaggerate their woes in order to catch Soviet diplomats' attention.46 Nevertheless, Soviet authorities could have offered greater protection. Judging from their reports to Moscow, they had long known about the latent anti-Soviet sentiment, rising in a slow crescendo among the Hungarian population at least since Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" in February 1956.47

Hungarian leaders, however, were too indecisive, and attacks on Hungarians loyal to Moscow continued during the last days of October 1956. This indecisiveness in turn complicated the Soviet envoys' belated attempts to rescue the loyal Hungarians and restore order. As telegrams such as the one on October 24 from Mikoyan and Suslov indicate, however, the Hungarian leadership as a whole was apparently amenable to the Soviet envoys' desires and suggestions.48

The Military Interventions

Although the Soviet Special Corps (Osobii Korpus) stationed in Hungary under the command of Gen.-Lt. P. N. Lashchenko, was aware of the rising temper of
the population, the October 23 demonstration "surpassed all expectations." There were no Soviet troops actually in Budapest, but parts of the corps were located in Székesfehérvár, Győr, Szombathely, Kecskemét, Szolnok, Szeged, Debrecen, and Pápa. In several of these cities, minor threats and attacks on Soviet troops by Hungarians had already occurred.49

In addition, the Soviet Embassy in Budapest often briefed the Special Corps about the current situation.50 The Soviet consulate in Győr was another potential source of information before it was closed in July 1956.51 Thus, the Special Corps was reasonably well informed about the growing crisis and yet caught off guard by the events of October 23-24.

Soviet troops crossed the Hungarian border at 2:15 A.M. on October 24 at Chop, Beregovo, and Vylolok. According to the Soviet military plan, codenamed "Volna" (Operation Wave), the 128th artillery division and 39th mechanized division, originally outside Hungary, were used to put down the uprising.52

Apart from the fact that the first intervention did not solve the original political problem in the country, it was not executed as swiftly as it might have been; isolated groups held out against the Soviet army for weeks. According to Evgenii Ivanovich Malashenko, who headed one of the operational groups of the Special Corps headquarters at the time, Moscow instructed him in July 1956 to draw up a military plan for the "restoration of order" in Hungary. In his account, Malashenko describes several obstacles the Special Corps faced. First, the senior Soviet representative in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, Gen.-Lt. M. F. Tikhonov—the one most responsible for providing the Special Corps with data about Hungarian troops—was quite ignorant. He "couldn't answer a single one" of Malashenko's questions and "asked that [he] come back in two or three days."53 Second, until July 1956 the Soviet army did not have a plan for conducting operations in Hungary. Operation Wave was drawn up hastily ("in several days"), based on the plan drafted by the Hungarian General Staff for joint actions of the Hungarian army, security organs, and police. Third, the Hungarian troops turned out to be unreliable, so the Soviet plan had to be changed to exclude joint operations with Hungarian forces.54 On October 23, when shooting began at the Radio Building, Hungarian troops initially rushed to the scene to reinforce the Hungarian secret police (ÁVO) who were guarding it, but after hesitating a moment, they sided with the crowd.55 According to the U. N. report written a year later, the Hungarian army as a whole collapsed from the day of the uprising, and "certain units fought on the side of the insurgents." "There was
no single instance recorded of Hungarian troops fighting on the Soviet side against their fellow-countrymen."

Although individual accounts differ on the degree of insubordination of Hungarian military personnel, all observers and scholars agree that the Soviets viewed them as unreliable. According to Malashenko, only "one of the Hungarian tanks accompanying the Soviet tanks to the Radio Building deserted." Mikoyan and Suslov, however, acknowledged that by October 24 at least one whole Hungarian "battalion mutinied," defeating Hungarian state security personnel, who "put up a violent resistance to the insurgents" and might have won the battle otherwise.

Soviet forces also were not always reliable, according to some reports. There were cases of Russian soldiers fraternizing with Hungarians and, according to CIA Director Allen Dulles, some reports of alleged desertion of a Russian tank crew.

Despite its untrustworthiness, Soviet military and political leaders continued to believe, even during the height of the crisis, that the Hungarian army and security forces could "take care of things themselves." General-Lieutenant Tikhonov allegedly said that the Russians did not need to help the Hungarians who having strong security organs, police, and army, could "restore order" themselves. During the October 23 emergency presidium meeting, Mikoyan apparently "expressed doubt about the sending of troops," asking, "What are we losing? The Hungarians themselves will restore order more boldly on their own. We should try political measures, and only then send troops." Mikoyan and Suslov as late as October 24 thought it safe to rely more on Hungarian forces. They wrote to Moscow confidently:

Due to the fact that a turning point in the events has occurred, it has been decided to use Hungarian units more boldly for patrolling, for detaining suspicious elements and people violating the state of emergency, and for guarding important installations (railroad stations, roads, and so on). The Hungarian comrades, especially Imre Nagy, approved the use of more Hungarian military units, militia, and state security units in order to lighten the burden of the Soviet troops and to emphasize the role of the Hungarians themselves in ending the riots.

They seemed to think the Hungarian comrades were too pessimistic. "We had the impression that Gerő especially, but the other comrades as well, were exaggerating the strength of the opponent and underestimating their own strength," Suslov and Mikoyan wrote. "We heard the preliminary reports of the Soviet military command
and the command of the Hungarian armed forces, which—after closer familiarization—turned out to be rather exaggerated in a pessimistic way."62

The Hungarian army and security organs could not restore order, however, and it was the Soviet leaders who were too optimistic. Isolated skirmishes continued until about October 30, after the October 28 ceasefire. If the numbers of Marshal Zhukov are correct, there were five Soviet divisions mobilized for the attack (Operation Wave) in Hungary: 31,550 military personnel, 1,130 tanks, 615 weapons and mortars, 85 antiaircraft weapons, 380 armored personnel carriers, 3,930 motor vehicles.63 In Budapest itself, according to one report, there were about 6,000 men, 290 tanks, 120 armored personnel carriers, and 156 guns. Even then there were not enough troops to both "search and destroy the enemy" and reinforce the guard at key military objectives in a city of more than a million people.64 On October 27, János Kádár asked whether more Russian troop reinforcements could be sent to Hungary.65

Other weaknesses in Operation Wave included instructions given to both Soviet and Hungarian troops in Budapest and other Hungarian cities not to open fire first on the insurgents;66 and the failure of the Soviet army to "isolate the battlefield" by blocking all roads leading into Budapest.67

Compared to Operation Wave, the second Soviet intervention, begun at 6:15 A.M. on November 4 and codenamed "Vikhr" (Whirlwind), was smoothly executed, in a purely military sense, because the Soviet troops had learned from their mistakes. In contrast to the five Soviet divisions (31,500 men) stationed in Hungary on October 23–24, Operation Whirlwind employed almost 60,000 Soviet soldiers and officers.68 Soviet forces immediately closed borders and roads so insurgent groups could not enter from other cities, as they had in late October. The insurgents thus now had no way of receiving reinforcements, whereas almost eight extra Soviet regiments arrived to put down the "hotbeds of resistance" in Budapest alone.69

Earlier restrictions, such as shooting only in self-defense, did not hamper them, and they no longer planned joint actions with the Hungarian armed forces. By October 30, Mikoyan and Suslov had had second thoughts about the reliability of the Hungarian army. "We will succeed in quelling [the uprising]," they assured Moscow:

There is just one fear: the Hungarian army has occupied a wait-and-see position. Our military advisors say that the relation of the Hungarian officers and generals to Soviet officers in the past few days has become worse. There is
no trust as there was earlier. It is possible that Hungarian units sent against the insurgents could join these other Hungarians, and then it would be necessary to undertake military operations once more.\textsuperscript{70}

Soviet troops, therefore concentrated initially on disarming the Hungarian military. By early morning on November 5, they had disarmed the administrative and corps units of two infantry corps, the units of five infantry divisions, two mechanized divisions, five antiaircraft artillery divisions, two tank regiments, three antitank fighter guards, as well as the entire Hungarian aviation force. (Meanwhile, other Hungarian tank divisions were fighting alongside the Hungarian resisters near the Corvin Theater).\textsuperscript{71} By November 9, Moscow felt confident enough to permit Kádár to carve out of the remnants of the Hungarian army two divisions of loyal Hungarian Communist fighters in order to "hungarianize" the conflict.\textsuperscript{72}

The Soviets performed adeptly on the political front as well. Fresh troops had crossed the Hungarian border as early as November 1. After several phone calls to Andropov that day for an explanation, Nagy finally summoned him to a 7 P.M. session of the Hungarian Council of Ministers and demanded a public clarification.

Nagy in a rather nervous tone informed all those present that earlier that morning he asked the Soviet Ambassador about the report that Soviet troops had crossed the Hungarian border and were penetrating into the heartland of the country. He, Nagy, "demanded" an explanation of this. . . . He said that, since the Soviet government has not yet stopped the movement of Soviet troops and has not explained its actions satisfactorily, he proposes to confirm the decision made that morning to renounce the Warsaw Pact and declare the neutrality of Hungary.\textsuperscript{73}

Andropov earlier that day told Nagy that the Soviet government was ready to negotiate a partial troop withdrawal; he suggested that two delegations be appointed, one to discuss political, and the other technical questions, connected with the withdrawal. Although Nagy went ahead and announced Hungarian neutrality on the radio at 7:45 that evening, he agreed to the negotiations, the so-called Mixed Commission.\textsuperscript{74} By the afternoon of November 3 an agreement seemed to be near.

As long as negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops continued, Imre Nagy would not take concrete defensive measures against the Soviet tanks in Hungary, which by November 3 numbered in the thousands. He feared that any aggressive move by Hungarian forces would destroy the possibility of a Soviet withdrawal.
Meanwhile, the Hungarian delegation (composed of Pál Maléter, Ferenc Erdei, Miklós Szucs, and István Kovács) had reconvened at 10 p.m. on November 3 at the Soviet headquarters in Tököl on Csepel Island. According to the UN report, Serov interrupted the negotiations at midnight. The members of the Soviet delegation (Generals Malinin, Cherbanin, and Stepanov) were allegedly as surprised as the Hungarians. Marshal Ivan Konev, commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, had summoned Lashchenko, commander of the Special Corps, to Szolnok on November 2 and given him an assignment: to crush the counterrevolution at 5:00 a.m. on November 4. The U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Charles Bohlen, however, soon figured it out. "Soviet press today contains no reference to any mixed commission," he wrote in a telegram to Secretary of State Dulles on November 4 at 12 noon. "Mixed Commission is little more than [a] device to gain time for preparations [for] armed action in Hungary." On the other hand, military commanders like Malashenko claim to have been ignorant about the negotiations.

By October 30–31, 1956, it was clear that the United States would not interfere in Hungary; another crisis had temporarily split the Atlantic Alliance and diverted the world's attention. Soviet leaders could not have been so sure of these two factors when they launched Operation Wave on October 23. The CPSU and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had received various reports from their diplomats abroad about the possibility of a war over the Suez Canal. For example, Andropov wrote the following to N. S. Patolichev, the deputy minister of foreign affairs on September 21:

Our Hungarian comrades have conveyed to us the following information. In connection with the issue of the Suez Canal in the missions of the Western states in Budapest, there is talk mainly about the possibility of a war arising because of the Canal, and preparations for one may be underway. For example, the French envoy in Budapest Voucœur thinks it urgent to consider the possibility of a war over the Suez Canal, but he notes that it is difficult to predict events.

On Wednesday morning, October 24, while Operation Wave was already underway, Secretary of State Dulles was in President Eisenhower's office, discussing a piece of intelligence received by the State Department at 4:27 that morning. A member of the British Cabinet had resigned, saying Britain's "use of force" against Egypt would be a "great blunder."

Thus Washington's attention began to shift toward Great Britain, France, the Israelis, and the Suez Canal. The British and French were American allies who
could—and should—be scolded, whereas the Russians, were too dangerous to fight with, Eisenhower thought. He had not ruled out the possibility that the Kremlin would use nuclear weapons. "With the deterioration of the Soviet Union's hold over its satellites, might not it be tempted to resort to extreme measures, even to start a world war?" he wrote in his memoirs. Thus, on the evening of October 27 in Dallas, Texas, Secretary Dulles gave a speech promising economic aid, but emphasizing: "We do not look upon these [East European] nations as potential military allies." On October 29, Dulles cabled Ambassador Bohlen in Moscow ordering him to repeat these words personally to Khrushchev, Zhukov, and others. On the same day, Israel dropped bombs over Egypt, and the Suez crisis had begun.

Despite the factors working in their favor, Soviet forces faced new obstacles. The Hungarian armed forces fought back this time. At first, as during Operation Wave, Imre Nagy forbade the Hungarian army to resist Soviet troops. He gave explicit orders not to open fire on Russian tanks, because he expected a positive result from the ongoing negotiations with the Soviets. Only when he first lost contact with the Hungarian delegation at Tököl near midnight on November 3, and then, at 4 A.M. on November 4 received news that Kádár had established a pro-Soviet government at Szolnok, did Nagy decide not to forbid the Hungarian forces from fighting. He never officially authorized them to fight, however. In his last address to the Hungarian people, on the radio at 5:20 A.M. on November 4, he announced, "Today at daybreak Soviet troops attacked our capital with the obvious intention of overthrowing the legal Hungarian democratic government. Our troops are in combat [emphasis added]." In truth, Hungarian troops had not yet begun to fight, and Nagy never explicitly ordered them to do so.

In the face of armed resistance, despite the quantitative superiority of Soviet troops, Operation "Whirlwind" took considerably longer than Marshal Konev predicted. As Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs: "Konev at that time commanded the troops of the Warsaw Pact and I asked him: how much time would he need, if we were to instruct him to restore order in Hungary and crush the revolution. He thought and then said, 'Three days . . . No more is needed.'" In actuality, the fighting did not end until around November 12, or eight days. Not immune to a Clausewitzian "fog of war," the Soviet side also had unforeseen difficulties and incurred many casualties, though not as many as the Hungarians. First, they had to request reinforcements. According to Malashenko, "the division unit headed by General Abaturov bore especially heavy losses. It had to fulfill the most complicated tasks, and in the center
of the city—where the armed groups were the most concentrated. In the first few
days they [Soviet troops] did not always very skillfully organize military operations.
Units of the 7th and 31st guard air-landing division had 85 killed, 265 wounded,
and 12 who disappeared.  

By November 6, 377 Soviet soldiers had been killed. Marshal Zhukov reported on November 9:

According to preliminary data, the losses of the Soviet troops in the period of
military operations from October 24 to November 6, 1956, consisted of 377
people killed, and 881 people wounded. Of these, 37 officers were killed, and
74 officers were wounded. Soviet troops disarmed about 35,000 Hungarians.
A large quantity of weapons, military equipment, and ammunition was seized
in the course of battle and taken under guard as a result of the disarmament
process. An inventory of this equipment continues.  

There was a total of 669 Soviet deaths for the entire period of the military
operations in Hungary. According to Zhukov, there were 58,821 Soviet soldiers in
Hungary. Of those, 7,349 were officers with 85 killed, 138 wounded, and 2 missing.
Of the 51,472 sergeants and soldiers, 584 were killed, 1,402 wounded, and 49 missing.  

Another complication was the lack of communication between Soviet troops
on the one hand and Soviet diplomats and pro-Soviet Hungarians on the other. On
November 4, Andropov, for example, sent a telegram to the Central Committee of
the CPSU: "With Kádár, Apró, and Münnich, we have no communication. In general,
the absence of communication among our friends was felt very strongly today. . . .
[T]here was [also] no regular communication with the headquarters of our troops
in Tököl."  

Information remained a primary concern for Andropov, because Russian
language documents and news about Hungary were destroyed. In December, the
embassy, had to appeal to the home country for information about the very coun-
try to which it was supposed to be providing information. In a telegram to I. K.
Zamchevskii, director of the Fifth European Division of the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Andropov wrote: "I request that you send to the Soviet embassy in
the very next diplomatic post all TASS material concerning the events in Hungary
from October 23 to the present. The indicated material is essential for the practical
work of the Embassy, since the majority of the dossiers and other documents were destroyed."^89

Zamchevskii then immediately wrote to Patolichev, the deputy minister of foreign affairs: "In connection with the events which occurred in Hungary, we have stopped the publication of all informational materials in Russian. . . . [A] critical need has arisen in the Embassy for the publication of a daily bulletin in Russian with a digest of the Hungarian press for the Soviet institutions in Hungary, as well as for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Soviet Union and other organizations in Moscow."^90

One other phase of Operation Whirlwind did not go as planned. The KGB officers K. E. Grebennik, P. I. Zyriianov, and A. M. Korotkov were supposed to arrest the "Nagy group," but the Hungarians escaped to the Yugoslav Embassy at 6 A.M. on November 4. ^91

Tito offered to receive them in Yugoslavia. Andrei Gromyko and János Kádár did not think this a good idea. Gromyko wrote to Kádár: "We are fully in accord with your reply to our ambassador that Nagy and the others hiding in the Yugoslav embassy should in no way be transferred to Yugoslavia, since they were the organizers of the counterrevolutionary demonstration (vystuplenie), and that you cannot allow (dopustir') the existence of two Hungarian governments—one in Hungary, the other in Yugoslavia."^92 Eventually, of course, the Soviet leadership solved that problem, too. On November 17, Soviet presidium members Mikoyan, Suslov, and A. Aristrov secretly suggested to the CPSU Central Committee, unbeknownst to Tito, that they "provide for the arrest of Nagy and his group as soon as they are released from the Yugoslav Embassy, demand that Nagy sign a declaration in which he admits his mistakes, and send him and his group to Romania."^93

Apparently, the Romanians (and probably the Russians) did not think Tito would mind too much. "We didn't think the Yugoslavs would raise a fuss (podnimut shum) about the transfer of Imre Nagy and his group to Romania," wrote V. Nikolaev "However, as you know, they appealed with notes of protest to the Soviet and Hungarian governments. It is possible that this issue can be presented at the United Nations and so on. We think we ought to be ready for any kind of speeches and conversations in connection to Imre Nagy."^94
"Normalization": Peace Reigns?

If you were a Soviet citizen, picking up your morning issue of Pravda on November 6, 1956, this is the TASS report from Budapest you would have read, under the headline "About the Situation in Hungary:"

The Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government of Hungary enjoys the broad support of the national masses. According to the reports from the provinces, order and peace is established [vodvoriaiutsia]. The workers' councils of Szombathely, Nagykanizsa, Szolnok, and other cities declare their support for the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government. In many cities industrial enterprises have started to operate; public transport has been put into action. In a number of regions railroad operations have been restored.

Two days later, on November 8, you would have spotted the following article, similarly titled:

The situation in the country with every hour takes on a more normal character. Peace reigns in the capital as in the majority of regions in the provinces. Government institutions are taking measures for the provision of uninterrupted supplies for the population.

Articles on Hungary in Pravda, Izvestia, and other newspapers in the first few days of November 1956 were invariably located on the last page, dwarfed by voluminous diatribes against the "imperialist aggression in Egypt" (Ruki Proch ot Egipta! [Hands off Egypt]), and gala commemorations of the Great October Revolution on November 7.95

In truth, the situation was anything but halcyon in Hungary in late 1956. Normalization proceeded much more slowly than the West believed, due in part to the persistence of small-scale fighting; the passive resistance of the Hungarian population (including demonstrations, strikes, and sabotage); fuel shortages; Hungarian resentment of Soviet advisors; the security vacuum that resulted from the dissolution of the secret police; disagreements between the Kádár and Khrushchev regimes about the pace and scale of the mass arrests and deportations; lack of coordination between the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in carrying out the arrests; and lack of prison space.
Unlike the newspapers, KGB Chief Serov did not conceal these problems in his top secret reports to Moscow. He pointed out that the revolutionary committees were stockpiling weapons for a second attack; the majority of enterprises were not working; the local organs of power were barely operating; the workers' councils created under Nagy were "under the influence of provocateurs"; the printing offices were refusing to print pro-Soviet newspapers; and students were spreading leaflets and "agitating among the workers." Losses in retail and wholesale trade from plunder allegedly amounted to 1 billion forints. Out of that sum goods costing 550 million forints were stolen, and equipment costing 450 forints was destroyed, according to the Hungarian minister of trade.67

Kádár himself had told Andropov on November 9: "[N]ormal life in Hungary is returning slowly. So far there are no ties with the periphery or with enterprises. A significant part of the workers would like to start working again, but they fear revenge from the bandits." Mikoyan and Suslov shared Kádár's opinion. On November 13, they wrote to the Kremlin from Budapest: "The process of normalization is going a lot more slowly in Budapest, where at the present moment there is still no normal life. . . . Many factories still are not working. . . . Among [the workers] is now a very strong chauvinist and anti-Soviet mood." Their anxiety was contagious. "Like you, we are worried about the slowness of the restoration [nalazhivanie] of normal life in Hungary, and especially in Budapest," wrote the CPSU Central Committee members to Kádár.68

The military skirmishes did not abate until about November 12, and even then "small bands" of insurgents roamed at large, needing to be "liquidated." Three CPSU presidium members reported: "After November 12, our troops were no longer conducting any military operations. There were only separate brigades in the provinces, and our troops are pursuing small bands of insurgents with the goal of liquidating them. In Budapest itself there were no armed demonstrations, even by single individuals."69

When the military phase was over, a new set of problems arose for the Soviet army and the KGB, further thwarting their "normalization" efforts: the passive resistance of the Hungarian population. The workers used new, political methods against the Kádár government. "Having lost the opportunity to lead a struggle against the government by military means," Mikoyan, Suslov, and Aristov complained on November 22, "the reactionary forces are using new methods in their counter-revolutionary goals, above all strikes and sabotage. Last week the reaction tried to
attract in a general strike the majority of blue and white collar workers in the main branches of industry and the railroads.\textsuperscript{102}

On the day of this telegram, November 22, an "hour of silence" was announced, to commemorate the Hungarian uprising. In Serov's words:

[L]eaflets appeared, in which it was written 'All, who are against the Kádár government, must not come out on the street from 2 to 3 P.M. on November 23; the empty streets will show Kádár and our well-wishing friends—the Russians—that they are not wanted here.' As a result, almost the entire population of Budapest deserted the streets, which were empty from 2 to 3 P.M. Inhabitants, who were in the streets at 2:00 P.M. suddenly went into buildings and the courtyards of the buildings and stood there until 3 P.M.\textsuperscript{103}

Moreover, as of November 22, there was an acute shortage of fuel and electrical energy in Hungary. Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov reported to Moscow:

"The coal mines in the country that produced up to 80 thousand tons of coal in a 24-hour period in normal times, now are producing only 2–3 thousand tons. The majority of mines work at only 10 to 15 percent of their capacity. There are almost no supplies of coal in industries and on the railroads. Despite the daily requirement in electrical energy of 900 megawatts, only 300 megawatts are produced."\textsuperscript{104}

Even when the economy began to improve and the majority of workers returned to the factories, pro-Soviet Hungarians were surreptitiously squeezed out of jobs, or at least harassed, as late as July 1957. The novelist and playwright Béla Illes, for example, had a talk with Soviet diplomat L. F. Ilichev, in which he warned that "there is still a very strong anti-Soviet mood in Hungary among all types of people: intelligentsia, peasants, workers, and even in the Kádár government." Illes recounted his experience of arriving at a Hungarian radio station, ready to expound on Soviet literature and being asked to extemporize on French literature instead.\textsuperscript{105} Due in part to the instability of the political climate, the Central Committee of the HSWP delayed judicial proceedings against Imre Nagy and his group until April 1957.\textsuperscript{106} (The court trial did not take place until June 1958).

Clearly, Moscow had a serious problem: how could order be reestablished in Hungary? In the months following the intervention, the Soviet leaders took several measures. They shipped essential goods and resources (such as coal) to Hungary.\textsuperscript{107}
They invited delegations of Hungarian students, workers, and party officials to the USSR. They arranged scholarly exchanges between the Soviet and Hungarian Academies of Sciences. They built monuments in the USSR honoring foreign Communists (including Hungarians) who participated in the 1917 October Revolution. They influenced the Kádár government to dismiss all those officials who had "displayed instability, hesitation, or an openly counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet disposition."\[108\]

There were at least four major phases of the Soviet normalization effort: the dispatch of advisors, mass arrests and deportations, restructuring the Hungarian security organs, and "legitimizing" the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary.

**Soviet Advisors in Hungary**

In the two months following the second intervention on November 4, the Soviet presidium sent more than seventy advisors and three Central Committee members to Hungary. As the problems of normalization grew more complex, more advisors, from different fields of expertise, were dispatched.

In the first week following the crackdown, on November 10, Moscow decided to send Suslov and Aristov and a small group of economic workers to Budapest. By November 12 Suslov and Aristov had arrived; Malenkov arrived on November 15.\[109\] To help Serov process more quickly the cases of the prisoners held in the Uzhgorod and Stry' prisons, the KGB sent "two groups of qualified investigators" to Ukraine in mid-November.\[110\] On December 8, the presidium instructed presidium members M. Z. Saburov, A. Aristov, and Nikitin to study the issue of sending to Hungary a "group of workers to help the Hungarian comrades in economic work."\[111\]

A week later, on December 14, the presidium decided to send three groups of specialists to Hungary. The first group consisted of experts "in the fields of coal, economic, and financial affairs." The second group were "40–50 people . . . to be sent to Hungary for 2–3 months as deputy military commanders for economic and political issues" in accordance with "the request of the commander of the Southern group of troops."\[112\] In the third group were eighteen people from the KGB and five from the Ministry of Internal Affairs who were to assist the Hungarian security organs in the "struggle against the counterrevolution."\[113\]

From the perspective of the new Kádár government and the Soviet leadership, these advisors were helpful in eventually putting down the revolt. Indeed, the
Hungarian "comrades" needed all the help they could get. In the first months after the November 4 intervention, Kádár relied completely on Soviet assistance. Nagy had disbanded the Hungarian security agency (ÁVO), and what few security agents there were had been lynched, went into hiding, or fled Hungary altogether. Kádár literally had no security police to protect his new regime. Even when most of the street fighting ended, the regime still had to deal with widespread passive resistance, such as the call for everyone in Budapest to remain indoors for one hour on November 23. On December 4, women from all parts of Budapest—about twenty thousand—marched silently to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier on Heroes Square. And on December 11 and 12, a general strike was launched in which work in all factories stopped, except for electricity, gas, water, and milk.

The Soviet advisors did not always improve the situation in Hungary, however. Their presence in some cases tended to arouse indignation among Hungarians who considered themselves more knowledgeable about conditions specific to their country. Nevertheless, helpful or not, the dispatch of these advisors and other measures taken by the Soviet authorities illustrate the difficulty and protracted nature of the normalization process in Hungary, as manifested in every major sphere of activity. The large number of Soviet advisors sent to Hungary also reveals the extent to which the Kádár regime depended on Moscow for its survival.

Mass Arrests and Deportations

As soon as the last "hotbeds of resistance" were "liquidated," one of the first major tasks of the Soviet army and the KGB was to confiscate weapons, in order to reduce the chances of another armed uprising. But it was difficult to know who even had weapons. One Soviet counterintelligence officer, Captain Zylygostev, for example, who participated personally in the detentions of insurgents, told M. N. Kholodkov, the deputy minister of internal affairs of the USSR, that "in a number of villages he found himself in situations whereby anarchy reigned in these populated points, and it was impossible to find out from anybody who among these local residents participated in the counterrevolutionary demonstrations." Serov complained to Khrushchev: "The data that we have testifies to the presence of even more weapons among the population. However, the voluntary surrender of these weapons is proceeding slowly. Weapons are given up only after the agency establishes the presence of weapons and a search is conducted." According to one source, Soviet autho-
ties searched apartments for pictures and films taken of the revolution, in order to identify the participants in the street fighting.\textsuperscript{117}

The KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs initially resorted to mass arrests. KGB documents recently declassified from the CPSU Central Committee archive reveal the numbers of people detained, arrested, and deported during the month of November (documents pertaining to arrests made in later months, unfortunately, are still classified). As of November 7, between four and five thousand people had been detained. It is now known that the people arrested were sent to prisons in Ukraine (Uzhgorod, Strý', Dragobych, Chernovtsi, and Stanislav).\textsuperscript{118} By November 10, 500 people were detained while trying to escape to Austria, 3,733 people were arrested, and more than 700 of them were sent to the prison at Chop (Chop was a city in the USSR closed to all foreigners, including the Hungarian ambassador to the USSR, János Boldoczki).\textsuperscript{119} During the second intervention, from November 4 to November 11, a total of 4,056 people were arrested.\textsuperscript{120} According to another source, in three years (1957–1960) 13,000 people were interned for varying lengths of time in newly constructed concentration camps in the Hungarian cities of Tököl and Kistarcsa. Between December 1956 and summer 1961, approximately 600 people were executed, 75 percent of whom were men in their twenties.\textsuperscript{121} While Soviet officials were involved in arresting, detaining, and deporting Hungarians, they probably transferred the prisoners to the Hungarian authorities for actual trials and sentencing.

As the number of people arrested increased, the likelihood that they had been involved in the "fascist orgy" (razgul) decreased. In his report for November 15, Kholodkov wrote: "Among the people who arrived are a significant number of members of the Hungarian Workers Party, soldiers in the Hungarian army, and students. Also [there are] sixty-eight people who are underage, born between 1939 and 1942, of which nine are little girls." By November 15, there were 846 people in the Uzhgorod prison, "including twenty-three women."\textsuperscript{122}

Two Hungarian officers wrote indignantly to the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs in mid-November 1956: "Comrade Chief! Excuse me for the trouble, but we were forced to resort to this method of communication with you. . . . [W]e have been identified as guilty people, without any official investigation, and have been treated like fascists for four days now. The most terrible thing is that we—officers and Communists—are being held with this scum (chern') and forced to listen to dirty stories about the counterrevolution." "We are convinced," they wrote, that "it doesn't even make any difference" to 'our Soviet comrades' who, on what street, and

25
when [people] are caught. It does not even matter [to them] whether or not a person participated in the counterrevolutionary uprising."\textsuperscript{123}

As during the earlier phase of the military intervention, the Hungarian government, now led by János Kádár, at first failed to cooperate with Soviet security organs. Kádár tried to persuade Serov to let up on the arrests, which were having a boomerang effect.\textsuperscript{124} The workers were becoming even more stubborn. He reported to Serov what the representative of the Szolnok region had told him. According to Serov, Kádár said: "[W]hen they arrested forty people in the region, representatives of the workers came and said that they would not begin to work until the arrested people were freed. In other regions there were rumors that six thousand people were arrested in Szolnok . . . . You must consider that the mood among the masses in Hungary plays a large role. The Soviet comrades and our [pro-Soviet] Hungarian security agents can arouse indignation among the masses."\textsuperscript{125}

In a later conversation with Suslov and Aristov, Kádár said that "the Soviet military authorities are arresting people in the provinces who are not really enemies of the people, but only people who showed political instability [neustoičivost']. . . . It is necessary to search for the real organizers of the insurgency, and, above all, in Budapest." Kádár added, "Unfortunately, such individuals as General [Béla] Király, [commander of the Hungarian armed forces], [József] Dudás, the former chairman of the so-called national revolutionary committee, and others are still in hiding."\textsuperscript{126} This softness shown by Kádár initially confirmed the Soviet leadership's earlier fears that he would not be a reliable postintervention quisling. Indeed, they had nearly called off Operation Whirlwind at the last minute, because of doubts about his reliability.\textsuperscript{127} But after Imre Nagy was deported to Romania, Kádár became much more resolute.\textsuperscript{128}

Ferenc Münnich, Hungarian minister of social security and minister of the armed forces, also pointed in alarm to the link between the mass arrests and the strikes. Serov wrote: "Yesterday Münnich again raised the question: shouldn't we stop the arrests in the regions, since the workers in response are striking (bástuiut)? They are especially dissatisfied that the arrested people are being sent to Siberia (the BBC broadcast this)."\textsuperscript{129}

Because of the excessive arrests, the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB created new problems for themselves. The prisoners did not have proper identification with them, further delaying their cases. The Soviet organs were overworked and understaffed. Kholodkov told Minister of Internal Affairs Dudorov it
was urgent that "responsible and competent workers (maybe even Hungarians)" be sent immediately to help "process the cases more quickly," since there were only eight KGB officers assigned to this task.\textsuperscript{130}

A bureaucratic dispute developed between the KGB (under Serov) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (under Dudorov and Kholodkov), begun when Kholodkov wrote a memorandum to his superior, Dudorov, who then forwarded it to the Central Committee of the CPSU. Kholodkov wondered if perhaps "there may be unjustified arrests," given the fact that people such as Rudolf Földvári (a former member of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party, and first secretary of the Borsod regional committee), György Vig (a lieutenant in the Hungarian army and a translator for one of the units), András Sebok (the principal doctor of a Hungarian polyclinic), and scores of adolescents under the age of seventeen were being arrested.\textsuperscript{131}

In response, Serov wrote to Khrushchev, justifying himself: "In my own opinion, we should not make any concessions to the insurgents. Experience shows that the least concession you make, the more demands and threats they make. The arrests are being made only when there is concrete data about the accused's hostile activities, confirmed by evidence." He went on to argue that Rudolf Földvári did indeed deserve to be arrested because he "proclaimed the so-called Revolutionary Committee and conducted a malicious propaganda against the USSR. . . . He himself spoke on the radio, justifying the counterrevolutionary actions of the insurgents." (In the end it was decided that Földvári is "the type of person who will serve any authorities," and he was released).\textsuperscript{132}

In a further attempt at self-justification, Serov gave a reason that could easily support the opposite of what he intended: These people are guilty; they just refuse to confess. "The experience of the investigatory work shows that at present the active enemies and organizers under arrest persist for a long time and do not admit their guilt. Even those arrested persons who were caught at the scene of the crime with weapons in their hands deny their guilt. This is how we can explain the declarations of innocence by the arrested persons, as described in Kholodkov's note. We organized a second careful check . . . of the arrested people who are in the Uzhgorod and Stry' prisons. For this purpose the investigatory administration of the KGB sent two groups of qualified investigators to the spot."\textsuperscript{133} Then he attempted to shift the blame to the Soviet army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He explained that it was the Soviet military units that had sent prisoners to Chop and to the camps of the ministry "without permission from us [the representatives of the security organs] and
without any evidence on these individuals [about their guilt]." He continued: "the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Uzhgorod accepted sixty-eight students from a trade school in Budapest. According to Konev's orders this group of teenagers was sent back to Budapest and freed."134

The Soviet authorities in Hungary and Ukraine were faced with another, more tangible problem; they were running out of prison space. On November 14, Serov discussed "the absence of enough prisons . . . where interrogations can be conducted," saying "we have in mind transporting the prisoners to a building close to the Soviet-Hungarian border."135

With the prison shortage in mind, Mikoyan, Suslov, and Aristov on November 26 came up with a more draconian plan for breaking the insurgents' spirit, so they would surrender their weapons and stop inciting otherwise peaceful citizens to rebel, overtly or covertly, against the Soviet Union. They told János Kádár it was necessary "to select from those arrested . . . five to seven people, and in the interests of deterring the counterrevolution . . . try them and shoot them [emphasis added]. Comrade Kádár agreed with our suggestion, and said that it is necessary to do this," they informed Moscow.136 Perhaps in connection with this plan, eight people in an unarmed crowd were massacred in the city of Eger, northeast of Budapest.137

**Restructuring the Hungarian Security Organs**

In the period between the two Soviet interventions, the Hungarian government made key decisions that resulted in a security vacuum and contributed to the slow pace of "normalization."

The insurgents seized their first weapons from the ÁVO in late October, probably stimulated by their conviction that ÁVO agents opened fire first on unarmed demonstrators on the fateful night of October 23.138 On October 28, Serov had reported to Moscow:

"In many regions local organs and party workers dispersed and then began various 'revolutionary' national and other committees, which are beginning their activities by disarming the security organs. For example, the revolutionary committee of Miskolc organized a meeting in front of the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and then forced the workers to surrender their weapons and tortured those who protested. On the same day, a battalion of internal troops was dispersed . . . by this revolutionary committee."139
Apparently because of the "witch hunt" against ÁVO employees that began after the first Soviet intervention, the Nagy government decided to disband the agency on October 29.\textsuperscript{140} The new minister of internal affairs, Ferenc Münnich, held a meeting on the evening of October 28 in which he assured employees that (in Serov's words) "a special court will be organized, which will be authorized to condemning those persons responsible for hanging Communists and attacking government and public institutions." He said the "workers honestly carried out their duty in the struggle with hostile elements." Nevertheless, he "announced that the state security forces would be disbanded, and that a single police force would be created instead." As Serov reported, Münnich appealed to everyone to remain on the job (ostavatsia na svoikh mestakh). After this meeting, the "moral of the employees deteriorated." "Several of them left work and never returned."\textsuperscript{141}

When the "counterrevolution" was crushed after November 4, many former ÁVO employees joined in the mass arrests of "fascist bandits" with a vengeance. Now it was their turn to disarm those who had first disarmed them. Kádár warned Serov about the danger of this. Serov reported to Moscow:

"Kádár said that reactionaries are being arrested by former employees of the security forces (organy), those whom the government laid off (raspustilo). It is not advantageous to us for the employees of the security forces to participate in the arrests. . . . Further, Kádár said that in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Budapest, where a number of security agents were concentrated, an unhealthy situation was created, since among these employees are individuals who worked in the forces under Rákosi and played a negative role. Thus he thinks that these employees should be immediately removed and given some other work to do. Moreover, he thinks it expedient to disband the guards since there are dishonest people [there]."\textsuperscript{142}

Unlike Serov, Kádár did not believe the mere fact that some individuals were "caught with weapons in their hands" was a sufficient reason to arrest them. For, as he pointed out, "it is written in the declaration of the government that those who give up their weapons [and] stop their resistance will not be punished. The Hungarian government should not take revenge on these citizens and display cruelty to them."\textsuperscript{143}

On November 4, the CPSU Central Committee had sent a telegram to Nikolai Firubin, the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade, instructing him to warn Edvard Kardelj, the vice premier of Yugoslavia, that, as far as the presence of Imre Nagy and his
group in the Yugoslav Embassy was concerned, there could be "excesses with them, not just on the part of the reaction, but also on the part of the revolutionary elements. In this regard, bearing in mind that the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government does not have at present [any] security organs, it would be expedient to give Nagy and his group to our troops for transfer to the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant government in Szolnok [emphasis added]."\textsuperscript{144}

By the time Kádár and the Soviet authorities were ready to start "restoring order" in Hungary, practically no Hungarian security forces remained intact. ÁVO agents had resigned; fled to Czechoslovakia, Romania, or the USSR; or been tortured and hanged, resigned.\textsuperscript{145} In his letter to the CPSU Central Committee, István Kovács (former first secretary of the Budapest city committee) wrote: "After November 4, many thousands of employees in the security forces were dismissed from their jobs and left out on the streets. They can't find new work, and they are being hunted down."\textsuperscript{146} Many disguised themselves at first by wearing police uniforms. The "Rákosit" (leaders of the defunct HWP) exiled in the USSR complained about the "victimization" (travlia) of these security agents.\textsuperscript{147} "It is true that before 1953 a very serious violation of laws was committed by separate security organs," wrote Ger, Hegedüs, and Kovács in a letter to the CPSU central committee. "However, those who did commit such violations have long been banished from the security organs. . . . [T]he greater part of the . . . security organs consists of workers devoted to the people's democracy . . . but they are portrayed as eaten up by the antisocial elements (ikh otdaiut na s"edenie antinarodnym elementam)."\textsuperscript{148}

The Soviet leadership took action in at least three areas for the purpose of filling the security vacuum and restoring order in Hungary. First, on Serov's recommendation, Kádár and Münnich "requested" that the Soviet presidium "give its consent" to sending advisors to work with Hungarian state security, police, and border guards. By December 3, there were nine advisors for the "security of the center"; eight "in the periphery organs of state security (in the committees)"; two for the border guards; three for the "police militia"; and one for "special technology."\textsuperscript{149}

Second, the Soviet authorities decided to restructure the Hungarian security forces completely, including "the secret service, counterintelligence, and other services, both in the center and in the peripheral areas (na mestakh)." This reform was undertaken apparently because of the mutual animosity between the Hungarian insurgents (and population) and the security agents. "[W]e prepared the following documents for a paper for Kádár. . . . [O]nly a small number of employees will be
publicly acknowledged as security agents, and the rest will work incognito. This is done in order to hide the real number of forces, since there is such deep hatred of the employees of the security forces." Serov also "included a suggestion for organization of the police forces" and "prepared a structure for the border guards" in Hungary.\textsuperscript{150}

Third, the Soviets discharged Hungarian security officials who conducted themselves "suspiciously" during the October-November "events." For example, they replaced Pocze, head of the Main Administration of the Police, because he "supported the insurgents in a number of cases" and at the present time is "idling." As Serov wrote, "incriminating data on Pocze was reported to us by Münich... Kádár gave his consent to replace Pocze."\textsuperscript{151}

**Legitimizing the Presence of Soviet Troops in Hungary**

Another primary reason why "friendship and cooperation" between the Soviet Union and Hungary (as worded in the October 30 declaration) could not easily be "strengthened," let alone "normalized," was the very fact of the presence of Soviet troops on Hungarian soil. It incensed every sector of the Hungarian population: factory workers, students, the intelligentsia, and so on. At the time of the first intervention, Ernő Gerő told Mikoyan and Suslov over the telephone: "[T]he arrival of Soviet troops in the city has a negative effect on the disposition of the inhabitants, including the workers."\textsuperscript{152}

"Withdrawal of Soviet troops" was at the top of the list of workers' demands when they went on strike. Pull out your troops, and then we will give up all our weapons and go back to work. The Soviet authorities said: Give up all your weapons, go back to work, and then we'll withdraw our troops. "Full order" (polnyi poriadok) must be restored first. As one Hungarian cynic quipped, "The Soviet troops will leave Budapest quickly, when rocks bloom on the roads" (kak tol'ko rastsvetut na mostovykh kamni).\textsuperscript{153} It was their recognition of this stalemate that first prompted Mikoyan and Suslov on October 30 to conclude that probably the only solution was to apply military force. "The insurgents declare that they will give [their weapons] up after the Soviet troops leave Hungary. Thus the peaceful liquidation of this hotbed is almost out of the question."\textsuperscript{154}

Indeed, the mere sight of Soviet tanks enraged Hungarians, reminding them of a number of unresolved issues which had been percolating since early 1955. The tanks
also reminded them of their inferior status. Hungarian troops were not stationed in the USSR, so why should Soviet troops be in Hungary? Journalists were especially preoccupied with the "problem of relations between the USSR and other countries" in the summer preceding the revolution. Two in particular, Lorant (reporter for the newspaper Népszava) and Király (editor of the journal Csillag) spoke on June 17, 1956, with V. N. Kelin (attaché of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary). According to Kelin, they told him:

"People think that if one proceeds from the principle of full equality of nations and sovereignty of states, then there should not be such a situation whereby the USSR is the leading [country] in the socialist camp and all the others are supporting countries. In posing this question they cite the sayings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. This problem troubles the Hungarians a lot more than Hungarian-Yugoslav economic relations."\(^{155}\)

The Hungarian populace had specific grievances against Soviet troops as well as political objections to their presence. In one case, on December 21, 1955, in the city of Sarbogard, József Res was fatally shot during shooting practice by Soviet military units. Res, a Hungarian, was building a wall with other workers in the vicinity. Soviet headquarters immediately helped the family by paying 6,000 forints for the funeral. But when Res's widow, who had two children, asked for a pension to compensate for the loss of her husband's income, she was told that "the Soviet legal system does not provide for the granting of a Soviet pension to a Hungarian citizen," although the military authorities agreed that it was their fault that safety measures were not taken.\(^{156}\)

In the winter of 1955, some Hungarian citizens began to express directly their dislike of the Soviet Special Corps, which was stationed at various points in Hungary. As General-Lieutenant Lashchenko informed Ambassador Andropov (who forwarded the message to the deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, V. V. Kuznetsov), "Lately a series of attacks and beatings have been inflicted on completely innocent soldiers of the Soviet army by Hungarian citizens." He went on to describe how six Soviet soldiers on three different occasions were beaten with knives and rocks on their way home in the evening. In each case, Hungarian legal authorities did not hold the perpetrators ("hooligans") accountable. He then told the story of the Soviet military official, Maj. A. N. Pliukhin, who was run over by a Hungarian truck driver.\(^{157}\)
Andropov suggested to Kuznetsov that "the Hungarian comrades" be informed about the facts in Lashchenko's note and reminded of "the necessity of conducting political-educational work among the population [to explain] the presence of Soviet military units in Hungary." He also suggested that the unit develop "ties with the local Hungarian population by setting up concerts, movies, and collective meetings with the local inhabitants," inviting them to sporting events, and periodically offering help to the local cooperatives and state collective farms during the hay cutting (senokos), the grain harvest, the repair of agricultural machines, and so on.\textsuperscript{158}

On November 30, after the second Soviet intervention, Hungarian officials drew up a document containing "recommendations" for the "realization" of the Soviet declaration of October 30. Among the seventeen "sore points" in Soviet-Hungarian relations discussed were: the frequency of "accidents" caused by Soviet troops, and the lack of any agreement about compensation (including pensions) to Hungarian citizens (e.g., spouses of the deceased) for loss of income; and the need for a separate agreement defining the purpose, "distribution," "quantity," and length of stay of Soviet troops in Hungary, "as is stipulated, for example, in the Soviet-Polish declaration."\textsuperscript{159}

The Hungarian leaders, as well as the population, also had grievances. The Soviets told them which military supplies to buy from other socialist countries—whether or not the Hungarians wanted them, needed them, or could afford them. For example, on February 9, 1955, in Moscow the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia signed an agreement whereby Hungary would purchase from Czechoslovakia, at a cost of approximately 98,100,000 rubles in the period from 1955 to 1957, tanks, airplanes, motors, and spare parts for the tanks and airplanes of Soviet manufacture. The USSR pledged to provide credit to Hungary for a ten-year period to cover two-thirds of the cost of this military equipment.\textsuperscript{160} As part of the long-term contract, the Hungarians agreed to purchase 400 T-34 tanks from Czechoslovakia. Hungary bought 100 of them, but refused to buy the other 300, pleading lack of funds and claiming the tanks were outdated. On February 27, 1956, Soviet presidium members Anastas Mikoyan and General Klementi Voroshilov had a talk with Mátyás Rákosi (then the first secretary of the HWP), complaining that Hungary had "violated its end of the three-country deal" and "placed the Czechoslovak comrades in a difficult spot" because "they already began to carry out the order for production." Besides, Voroshilov protested, these T-34 tanks are indeed modern, "even more modern than
the type of tanks that the Americans and English have in their armies at the present moment." Rákosi backed down. Curiously, no Czechoslovak representatives attended these "negotiations."\textsuperscript{161}

A series of talks between Soviet and Hungarian delegations on military issues did in fact begin in the winter of 1957 and continue into the spring.\textsuperscript{162} The agreement finally reached on April 26 defined the "legal status of Soviet troops in Hungary," as well as the quantity, composition, and exact location of the troops. The document merely emphasized that the Soviet troops were stationed in Hungary "temporarily," in accordance with the Warsaw Pact (viz., the Soviet-Hungary friendship treaty of February 18, 1948); they would remain there as long as the aggressive North Atlantic bloc (NATO) existed, which had "numerous troops and bases near the borders of the socialist countries."\textsuperscript{163}

**Conclusion**

The Soviet intervention on November 4, 1956, was not the smooth, well-planned operation that Eisenhower and Dulles believed it to be, nor the swift passification claimed by the USSR. Although Soviet troops performed better in the "line of fire" on November 4 than on October 24, the November events were only the prelude to a long, arduous process of normalization in Hungary. Whether or not, as Dulles once said, the Soviet military intervention was "not quite as bad" as the British and French intervention in Egypt, the Soviet leadership had to work hard to heal Hungarian-Soviet relations. The mere presence of Soviet troops evoked memories among Hungarian leaders and citizens alike of past mistreatment. The more advisors the Kremlin sent to remedy the situation, the more irritated the Hungarians became. Even when the situation became outwardly calm, Hungary was not completely subdued; through "Kádárization," Hungary managed to develop its own brand of national communism. The nationalist flame was never extinguished, as proved by Hungary's independence today.
### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AVP RF</td>
<td>Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation]</td>
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<td>CC</td>
<td>Central Committee (of any party)</td>
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<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
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<td>SUA</td>
<td>Statni ustredni archiv (Central State Archive), Prague</td>
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<tr>
<td>TsAMO</td>
<td>Tsentral'nyi Arkhiv Ministersva Oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense]</td>
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<td>TsKhSD</td>
<td>Tsentr Khraneniia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii [Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents]</td>
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<td>op.</td>
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<td>p.</td>
<td>papka [Folder]</td>
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<td>per.</td>
<td>perechen'[List]</td>
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<td>por.</td>
<td>portfel'[Portfolio]</td>
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Notes


2. These are: (1) the former top-secret working archive of the Communist Party's Central Committee, called the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents (TsKhSD); (2) the Archive of the Russian Foreign Ministry (AVP RF); and (3) the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History (RTsKhIDNI); (4) and the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). (5) Vladimir Malin, the head of the CPSU CC General Department during the entire Khrushchev period, took extensive notes of all presidium meetings, although verbatim transcripts were not kept in the 1950s. Russian archival authorities released the Malin notes pertaining to the Hungarian uprising in mid-1995 to a Russian historian, Vyacheslav Sereda, and to Hungarian scholars at the 1956 Institute in Budapest, who had exclusive access to the material until the spring of 1996, when the full set was published in Hungarian translation. See Vyacheslav Sereda and Janos M. Rainer, eds., *Döntés a Kremlben, 1956: A szovjet pártelnökség vitái Magyarországról* (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1996). The Russian version was published as "Kak reshalis voprosy Vengrii: Rabocheie zapisi zasedanii Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, iyul'-noyabr' 1956 g.," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* (Moscow), no. 2 (1996): 73–104, no. 3 (1996): 87–121. Malin's handwritten notes are now available to all researchers in TsKhSD, f. 3, op. 12, d. 1005–06. They are cited below as Malin, "Working Notes," with the date of the presidium meeting.

4. Tibor Mérany, a noted Hungarian Communist writer who later supported Imre Nagy after 1954, wrote: "Obviously the idea for the trials and trial staging was conceived by the Russians during their battle against Tito and Yugoslavia. [But] it is equally certain that Rákosi and his crew were the most brilliant of the stage directors, since they outstripped their Polish, Bulgarian, and Rumanian colleagues. Intent on gaining the attention not only of Stalin but also of international opinion, they made a complete success of this spectacle. . . . [T]he methods of the Hungarian Gauleiters proved to be the best of all because they were the simplest." Tibor Mercay, *That Day in Budapest: October 23, 1956* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), 114. See also Váli, *Rift and Revolt*, 62: "It [the Rajk trial] was the most grandiosely staged trial of Stalin’s reign, inside or outside Russia. Whereas the prewar rigged trials in the Soviet Union had served internal Soviet politics, the Rajk trial was intended to bear fruits in the foreign field and have an impact on international events to come."

László Rajk (1909-1949) was a leading functionary of the underground Communist Party before 1944. He was Rákosi’s minister of the interior from 1946 to 1948 and then foreign minister. His show trial in September-October 1949 marked the beginning of the anti-Titoist campaign. The three other high-level victims of the purge trials in 1949 were György Pálffy, Tibor Szőnyi, and András Szalai.


6. Gerő had unwisely decided to extend his stay, taking a vacation on the Yugoslav coast. He had previously planned a vacation right after the July 18 plenum at which Rákosi was dismissed, but Mikoyan advised him against it, saying "it is incomprehensible" why Gerő "had decided to take a vacation right after the Central Committee plenum, expecting as they did an attack on Gerő as the new First Secretary. This can only facilitate the attack on Gerő and ruin [provalit] him." Gerő then said he would not take the vacation "earlier than two months after the plenum." TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 2, l. 56: "Report of Mikoyan from Budapest," July 18, 1956. Gerő was in the Crimea for most of September and the first week of October. He told Andropov that he was not at all sure whether "things would be okay" while he was gone. *Ibid.*, f. 5, op. 28, d. 394, l. 256: from the diary of Andropov, "Notes of a conversation with Ernő Gerő," Sept. 27, 1956.

7. SUA, f. 07/16, svazek 3: "Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rjina 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Maďarsku" (Account of a Meeting at the CPSU CC, October 24, 1956, on the Situation in Poland and Hungary). Initially, when Andropov was contacted by the Soviet attaché, he telephoned the commander of Soviet troops in Hungary, Gen.-Lt. Pyotr Lashchenko. Lashchenko said he needed explicit authorization from political leaders before he could execute orders. Andropov then cabled Gerő's appeal directly to Moscow. See also Fyodor Lukianov, "Khrushchev Kolebalsya, No
Andropov Nastaival," Izvestiia, July 24, 1992, p. 6. In his recently published memoir, Vladimir Kryuchkov claims that Andropov, despite numerous appeals, refused to forward to Moscow the request for Soviet troops to be sent to Budapest; thus Gerő brought the matter directly to Khrushchev. See Vladimir Kryuchkov, Lichnoe delo, 2 vols. (Moscow: Olimp, 1996), 1:53. Kryuchkov's assertions are unsupported with evidence. He served in October 1956 as press attaché in the Soviet embassy and later followed in Andropov's footsteps at the KGB.


10. Interestingly enough, as the Czechoslovak communist leader Antonín Novotny's report of the October 24 meeting of East European leaders reveals, Khrushchev actually suggested that the Hungarian authorities lie about the timing of the October 23–24 meeting. He wanted them to claim that the plenum was held after Soviet troops entered Budapest. (The HWP Central Committee met at 10:22 p.m. on October 23, whereas the Soviet troops began to arrive at 2 a.m., and some divisions from Romania arrived only at 12:00 noon on October 24. The Hungarian leaders did not make this claim until several days later.) See "Zprava o jednani."

11. Bad weather forced Mikoyan's and Suslov's plane to be diverted to an airport ninety kilometers north of the capital. Thus Mikoyan, Suslov, Malinin, and Serov arrived rather late in Budapest. The four men traveled to Budapest in a Soviet armored personnel carrier, accompanied by tanks. They quickly began sending reports back to Moscow. See TsKhSD, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, ll. 1–7: "Shifrtelegramma" [Ciphered Telegram] from Mikoyan and Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, Oct. 24, 1956 (Strictly Secret).


14. The National Peasant Party was renamed the Petöfi Party on November 1, 1956. Other non-Communist parties soon sprang up, including the Hungarian Independence Party, the People's Democratic Party, the Catholic People's Party, and the Catholic National Association. Nagy also announced the establishment of an "inner cabinet" of the national government consisting of Zoltán Tildy, Béla Kovács, Ferenc Erdei, János Kádár, Géza Losonczy, and Anna Kéthly (from the Social Democratic Party). That same day, a revolutionary national defense council of the Hungarian armed forces was set up, which supported the demands of the revolutionary councils of the working youth and intellectuals and called for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest and their withdrawal from the entire territory of Hungary.
15. See "Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i dal'neishem ukreplenii druzhby i sotrudnichestva mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami," Pravda (Moscow), Oct. 31, 1956, p. 1, or the CPSU presidium decision to issue the declaration in TsKhSD, f. 3, op. 64, d. 484, ll. 25-30: "Vypiska iz Protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozenii v Vengrii," (Strictly Secret). Khrushchev said: "Politically this is beneficial for us. The English and French are in a real mess in Egypt. We shouldn't get caught in the same company. But we must not foster illusions. We are saving face." See Malin, "Working Notes," Oct. 28, Oct 30, 1956.


18. Kovács's speech at a meeting of the Independent Smallholders Party in Pécs was reported in the first issue of the revived party newspaper in Budapest, Kis Újság, Nov. 1, 1956, p. 2. He was the secretary general of the Independent Smallholders Party until February 1947. From February 1947 until the fall of 1955, he was imprisoned in the USSR. He was a member of Imre Nagy's cabinet from October 27, 1956, and a state minister, November 3–4, 1956.

19. Malin, "Working Notes," Oct. 31, 1956. "Only Saburov seemed to disagree with the ideas expressed at this meeting. He said, "After yesterday's session this discussion is all pointless. It will vindicate NATO." Khrushchev and his other colleagues believed it would be a mistake to withdraw Soviet troops from Budapest and Hungary as a whole, because—in Khrushchev's words—"it will help the Americans, English, and French—the imperialists."

20. Malin, "Working Notes," Oct. 31, 1956. Protocol No. 49 encompasses both this session and the October 30 session. Point 6 (from October 31) covers the decision to invade, whereas Point 1 (from October 30) covers the "Declaration on the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and Other Socialist Countries." Point 6 of Protocol 49 reads: "Poruchit' Zhukova razrabotat' sootvetstvuyushchii plan meropriyatii svyazannikh s soobstiyami v Vengrii, i dolozhit' TsK KPSS." TsKhSD, f. 3, op. 64, d. 484, l. 41: "Postanovleniye Prezidiuma TsK KPSS: O polozenii v Vengrii. Vypiska iz protokola No. 49, P49/VI ot 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.," (Strictly Secret).
21. On the other hand, as early as October 30, Nagy was aware of the new Soviet troops entering Hungary, as the cable from Mikoyan and Suslov to the CC CPSU on that day indicates. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 12, l. 2: "Informatsiya Mikoyana i Suslova ot 30-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g." (High-Frequency Transmission, Strictly Secret). Nagy had written and spoken often about Hungarian neutrality in earlier years, especially when he was demoted from his post as prime minister on April 14, 1955. See his book, *On Communism: In Defense of the New Course* (New York: Praeger, 1957).


25. Stetson Kennedy, an émigré American writer in Budapest and "friend of the Soviet Union" told a Soviet diplomat that he had observed "such wild excitement of the crowd only during racial confrontations in the United States." He wrote: "The crowd, in which there were many women, completely lost reason. It was in a state of mass psychosis. The main direction of this rage was anti-Soviet and anti-Russian." AVP RF, f. 077, op. 37, por. 10, p. 188, l. 248: from the diary of B. V. Gorbachev, second secretary of the Soviet Union Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with American émigré writer Stetson Kennedy," Dec. 8, 1956.

26. These include, for example, Mátyás Rákosi, Ern_Ger_, Joseph Révai, András Hegedűs, and István Kovács. Rákosi left Hungary for the USSR after the July Plenum, 1956, when he was demoted as first secretary. He lived in Moscow, was then exiled to Krasnodar, Tokmak (Kirghizia), Arzamas, and finally to Gorky, where he died in 1971. For a recent account of Rákosi's years in exile, based on new archival documents, see V. L. Musatov, "Istoriya odnoi ssylki: 'Zhitie' Matiasa Rakoshi v SSSR (1956–1971 gg)," *Kentai* (Moscow), no. 6 (November-December 1993): 72–81.

27. See, for example Endre Marton, *The Forbidden Sky* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), and Zinner, *Revolution in Hungary*. In raising this issue of the plight of Hungarian loyalists, I do not fall victim to Soviet propaganda. Not surprisingly, official Soviet writers in the late 1950s and 1960s exaggerated the theme of violence against pro-Soviet Hungarians during the Hungarian "counterrevolution." Certainly more Hungarians were killed by the Soviet army than were pro-Soviet Hungarians by popular mobs. (According to Zhukov's report, there was a total of 669 Soviet deaths for the entire period of the military operations in Hungary. See TsKhSD, f. 89, o. 2, l. 9–11, Information by Zhukov, "Data About the Losses of the Soviet Troops on the Territory of Hungary in the period of the 1956 Events.") In contrast, an estimated 2,502 Hungarians were killed by Soviet forces. See Gosztonyi, "Az 1956-os forradalom számokban," *Népszabadság* (Budapest), Nov. 3, 1990, p. 3.
28. Malin, "Working Notes," Oct. 28, 1956. Since Hegedüs, Gero, Bata and a few other hard-line HWP officials were flown to Moscow on October 28, it is possible that Molotov was referring to them, rather than to lower-rank officials.

29. Such references should be treated with due caution by scholars, and should be corroborated with more reliable published sources. Party officials regularly paid lip service to the fate of party loyalists. Indeed, the Soviet diplomats stationed in Budapest may have been inclined to exaggerate the danger to the Hungarian Communists as a way to prove to Moscow that they, the Soviet representatives, were being sufficiently "vigilant" in this country rebelling against the Soviet Union. Only a very small Soviet elite were ever trusted to go abroad; once obtaining this privilege, they felt the need to prove they had not "gone native." Likewise, pro-Soviet Hungarian officials may have been inclined to give alarmist reports to the Soviet diplomats at the Embassy in Budapest, because it was they who felt most threatened by the rising popular discontent. Their jobs depended on Soviet power propping up the regime. Most important, since the party was the key link between the two regimes, and since Soviet officials were socialized as nomenklatura members to regard the well-being of party members above others, this emphasis on the Hungarian loyalists came naturally to them.

Reflecting on the "mistakes" of the Rákosi and Gerő governments, Sall (Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires) pointed out that the Hungarian leaders were unaware of the real disposition of the Hungarian population. These leaders had lived in the USSR for 20-30 years. They—and Soviet Embassy officials—spoke mostly with "Soviet emigres to Hungary who speak Russian," and pro-Soviet Hungarians like Altomare, Minister of the Food Industry, and others. "The workers of the embassy [i.e., Soviet diplomats] created the impression among Hungarians that it is impossible, useless, and even dangerous to speak openly with them, because bringing them bad news is regarded as sedition [kramola]." TsKhSD, op. 28, rolik 5195, d.479, ll. 1-2, from the Diary of K. A. Krutikov, "Notes of a Conversation with Sall, the Chargé D'Affaires of Hungary in the People's Republic of China," December 17, 1956.


31. Ibid., f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d.5, ll. 1-7: "Ciphered Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan and M. A. Suslov from Budapest to the Central Committee of the CPSU," Oct. 24, 1956.

32. In another conversation with Gorbachev on December 12, 1956, Hidvegi specifies "the morning of October 30" as the exact time of this event. See Ibid., f. 077, op. 37, por. 10, p. 188, d. 036, l. 257: from the diary of Boris Gorbachev, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, Dec. 12, 1956. Incidentally, the Communist Party and Social Democratic Party were forcibly merged in the spring of 1948, thus completing the power seizure in Hungary. See "Notes of a Chat with Khidvegi."

34. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 11, l. 2: "Information of Serov to Mikoyan and Suslov about the situation in Hungary on October 29, 1956." There is some confusion as to whether "the employees of the BM" represent a different body from the ÁVO. Probably BM and ÁVO are one and the same security organ, simply being referred to differently in the Soviet, Hungarian, and American accounts.


36. AVP RF, f. 077, op. 37, por. 10, p. 188, l. 266: from the diary of Satuchin, first secretary and M. I. Petunin, second secretary, "Notes of a conversation with the Secretary of the Temporary Executive Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party of the Fourth Region of Budapest, János Ambrus," Dec. 17, 1956.

37. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok 17, l. 4: "Notes of Kirichenko with enclosed reference report by Starovoitov, the Commander of the Second Section of the Headquarters of the Administration of Border Guards of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Southwest Military Region," Nov. 1, 1956.

38. AVP RF, f. 077, op. 37, por. 10, p. 188, l. 242: from the Diary of M. I. Petunin, "Notes of a Conversation with a Member of the Győr Regional Executive Committee of the HSWP, Comrade András Takács," Nov. 29, 1956.


43. *Ibid.*, l. 236: from the diary of B. V. Gorbachev, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, "Notes of a Conversation with Margit Gáspár, Former Director of the Budapest
Theater of Operetta."

44. *Ibid.*, op. 36, l. 1: from the diary of V. M. Baskakov and V.N. Kazimirov, "Notes of a Conversation with the Secretaries of the Regional Organizations of the Hungarian-Soviet Society, Comrades Felvegi (Baranya), Endredi (Somogi), and László (Zala)."

45. *Ibid.*, op. 37, por 10, p. 188, l. 237: from the diary of B. V. Gorbachev, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, "Notes of a Conversation with Pál Fehér, Former Director of the Music Section of the Hungarian-Soviet Society."

46. It should be noted that Soviet diplomats conversed most often with pro-Soviet Hungarians who visited the Soviet Embassy in Budapest on their own initiative. Reflecting on the "mistakes" of the Rakosi and Gero governments, Sall (Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires) pointed out that the Hungarian leaders were unaware of the real disposition of the Hungarian population. These leaders had lived in the USSR for twenty to thirty years. They—and Soviet Embassy officials—spoke mostly with the "Soviet émigrés to Hungary to speak Russian," and pro-Soviet Hungarians like Altomar, Minister of the Food Industry, and others. "The workers of the embassy [i.e., Soviet diplomats] created the impression among Hungarians that it is impossible, useless, and even dangerous to speak openly with them because bringing them bad news is regarded ad sedition [kramola]." *TsKhSD*, op. 28, rolik 5195, d. 479, II. 1–2: from the diary of K. A. Krutikov, "Notes of a Conversation with Sall, the Chargé d'Affaires of Hungary in the People's Republic of China," Dec. 17, 1956.

47. After the Twentieth Congress, there was talk about how "the cult of personality is not over in Hungary." Pressure rose for Rákosi to admit his past mistakes and to rehabilitate unfairly repressed individuals. See *AVP RF*, f. 077, op. 37, por. 7, p. 187, l. 170. Anti-Soviet sentiment was also evident in Petofi Circle discussions. See, for example, *TsKhSD*, rolik 5169, f. 5, op. 28, d. 394, II. 112–19: from the diary of Andropov, "Notes of a Conversation with András Hegedüs," June 26, 1956.

48. *AVP RF*, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, l. 7: Ciphered Telegram of the CC CPSU Presidium Members A. I. Mikoyan and M. A. Suslov from Budapest, Oct. 24, 1956: "We have the impression that all the Central Committee members with whom we met related well, in a friendly manner, to our appearance at such a time. We said the purpose of our arrival was to lend assistance to the Hungarian leadership in such a way as to be without friction and for the public benefit, referring especially to the participation of Soviet troops in liquidating the riots. The Hungarian citizens, especially Imre Nagy, related to this with approval."


50. AVP RF, f. 077, op. 37, d. 18, p. 188, l. 19: "Lashchenko to Andropov." Military officials also advised the Moscow leaders. Marshal Ivan Konev was commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact and assumed direct command of Soviet military operations in Hungary in November 1956. General Mikhail Malinin was one of Konev's top aides during the invasion and the first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff. As the Malin notes imply, Soviet leaders in Moscow frequently consulted Malinin in the weeks before the invasion. Malin, "Working Notes," Oct. 30, 1956.

51. AVP RF, Guidebook [Putevoditel'], vol. 1, "Hungary."

52. TsKhSD, f. 89, per 45, dok 7, l. 1: "Notes of Perevertkin (Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs)," Oct. 24, 1956.

53. Ibid., Malashenko asserts: "Many Hungarian soldiers took part in the struggle with the armed insurgent groups and helped our troops. The Hungarian army as a whole did not go over to the other side and did not fight against the Soviet troops." Malashenko, "Special Corps," January 1994: 35. This contradicts other versions. Mikoyan and Suslov wrote in an October 24 telegram: "The comrades express the opinion that the Hungarian army conducted itself poorly." TsKhSD, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, ll. 1-7. "Ciphered Telegram from Mikoyan and Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, Oct. 24, 1956 (Strictly Secret)." Another source claims that the Hungarian army basically collapsed and was useless to the Russians. See United Nations Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (New York: 1957), ch. 5, p. 28.

54. UN Report, ch. 5, p. 28.

55. Ibid., ch. 2, p. 6. ÁVO is the acronym for Állam-Védelmi Osztaly (Department for the Defense of the State). The acronym was later officially changed to ÁVH, but the old name (ÁVO) was more commonly used.

56. Ibid., Mikoyan and Suslov noted in their October 24 telegram, however, that Hungarian patrols were on the streets together with the Soviet troops. This information has not been verified. See AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, ll. 1–7. Ciphered telegram from A. I. Mikoyan and M. A. Suslov from Budapest to the Central Committee of the CPSU, Oct. 24, 1956.

57. Malashenko, "Special Corps," October 1993: 28; ÁVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, ll 1–7. Ciphered Telegram from A.I. Mikoyan and M.A. Suslov from Budapest to the Central Committee of the CPSU, Oct. 24, 1956.

contacted the new Hungarian revolutionary councils, denying all intention of interfering in Hungarian affairs. See J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 171. Declassified documents in TsAMO include the Soviet defense ministry's complete list of Hungarian army units that took the side of the insurgents. See TsAMO, f. 32, op. 701291, d. 17, ll. 33–48.


61. AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, ll. 1–7. Ciphered Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan and M. A. Suslov from Budapest to the Central Committee of the CPSU, Oct. 24, 1956.

62. Ibid.

63. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 6, l. 1: Report of Zhukov on Oct. 24.


65. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 9, l. 3: Information from Mikoyan, Oct. 27, 1956.

66. Malashenko, "Special Corps," October 1993: 28. Of course, on October 24, in Pest, the Russians did more shooting than either the pro-Soviet Hungarian patrols or the Hungarian insurgents. "[T]o solitary shots we replied with salvos." AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, ll. 1–7. Ciphered Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan and M. A. Suslov from Budapest to the Central Committee of the CPSU, Oct. 24, 1956. On October 30, Mikoyan and Suslov wrote: "The new minister of Internal Affairs [Ferenc Munnich] sent 100 fighters, who met more than 200 people, but did not open fire, because the Central Committee advised not to spill blood. That was late at night. Imre Nagy was sleeping in his apartment, and they apparently did not want complications with Nagy, fearing that opening fire without his knowledge would be an occasion for the weakening of the leadership." TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 12, l. 1: "Information of Mikoyan and Suslov," Oct. 30, 1956. On October 24 as well, Mikoyan and Suslov wrote: "One of the most serious mistakes of the Hungarian comrades was the fact that, before 12 midnight last night, they did not permit anyone to shoot at the participants in the riots." AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d.5, ll. 1–7. Ciphered Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan and M. A. Suslov from Budapest to the Central Committee of the CPSU, Oct. 24, 1956.

In the Szabolcs region on October 26–27, local Hungarian authorities were instructed not to shoot. As Colonel Staroivoitov, a commander of the Border Guards of the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported: "Entering the region, they [the counterrevolutionaries] began to summon the youth to join the uprising, to destroy the stars, monuments, and obelisks commemorating the soldiers of the Soviet Army, and to free all the criminals from the prisons. All of this was done without
the slightest resistance on the part of the local authorities. It occurred because the government had issued an order to open fire on the insurgents only if they opened fire first. Owing to this, the insurgents, without even using weapons, went to the jails, disarmed the guards and freed the prisoners." TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 17, l. 4: "Notes of Kirichenko with enclosed reference report of the chief of the second staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs border troops of the South-West Region in Connection with the Crossing over onto the Territory of the USSR," Nov. 1, 1956.

67. In his October 29 telegram, Serov informed them: "There are some smaller groups that came to Budapest from other cities. The Soviet military command is taking action to liquidate them." TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 11, "Information from Serov about the situation in Hungary on October 29, 1956." See also UN Report, ch. 2, p. 6.

68. According to Zhukov, there were 58,821 Soviet soldiers in Hungary. Of those, 7,349 were officers with 85 killed, 138 wounded and 2 missing. Of the 51,472 sergeants and soldiers, 584 were killed, 1,402 wounded and 49 missing. TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, ll. 9–11: information by Zhukov, "Data About the Losses of the Soviet Troops on the Territory of Hungary in the period of the 1956 Events."

69. "For the purpose of preventing the penetration of Hungary by the hostile agency and the escape of the resistance leaders from Hungary," Marshal Zhukov wrote, "our troops have occupied the Hungarian airports and solidly closed off all the roads on the Austro-Hungarian border." TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 23, l. 1, "Information from Zhukov to Mikoyan and Suslov on November 4, 1956, on the Situation in Hungary as of 12 noon November 4, 1956." See also Malashenko, 30, 37.

70. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 12, l. 2.

71. Ibid., dok. 26, l. 1: "Information from Zhukov on the Situation in Hungary at 9 A.M., Nov. 5, 1956."

72. Ibid., dok. 34: “Draft of a Telegram to Andropov from the CC CPSU,” Nov. 9, 1956.

73. AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, ll. 17–19: "Telegram of the Soviet Ambassador Andropov from Budapest," Nov. 1, 1956.

74. UN Report, ch. 2, p. 9.

75. Ibid., ch. 7, p. 45. Since this report is largely based on interviews with refugees-who could not have been eyewitnesses of these negotiations—the view that the Soviet delegation itself was surprised is probably only a rumor.
76. Iene K'erkei, "Kto byl togda komandirom: Ob Osobom Korpuze i odnoi osoboi strannoi state" [Who was the commander then: About the Special Corps and one especially strange article], *Most* (Budapest), 1992, no. 1–2: 42. (The journal *Most* is a collection of essays written by Hungarian scholars, but translated into Russian for the Russian reading public).

77. Telegram from Bohlen to Dulles, "Regarding Bohlen's Belief That the Soviet-Hungarian Commission to Negotiate the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops Is a Sham," Nov. 4, 1956, 12:00 noon (Moscow time), No. 1048, National Security Archive, Washington D.C.


79. TsKhSD, rolik 5169, f. 5, op. 28, d. 394: "From Andropov to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, N. S. Patolichev," Sept. 21, 1956.


84. Already by October 27, as reported by Hungarian Politburo member Antal Apro, there were about three thousand wounded Hungarians in the hospital, 250 of whom died. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 9, l. 3: "Information of Mikoyan from October 27, 1956."


86. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 36, l. 1: "Information from Zhukov on the Situation in Hungary as of November 9, 1956, 9 A.M."

87. TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, ll. 9–11: information by Zhukov, "Data About the Losses of the Soviet Troops on the Territory of Hungary in the period of the 1956 Events."

88. AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, por. 5, p. 6, ll. 20: "Telegram from Andropov to the CC CPSU," Nov. 4, 1956. Kadar and Munnich, in fact, did not arrive back in Budapest from Szolnok until 6:10 A.M. on Nov. 7. See TsKhSD, f. 89, o. 2, d. 3, l. 27: "Information from Zhukov to the CC CPSU."

89. AVP RF, d. 170; "Referentura po Vengrii" [information on Hungary] (Questions of the Press), Telegram from Iu. V. Andropov to I. K. Zamchevskii, Dec. 4, 1956. The telegram does
not say how these documents were destroyed, i.e., whether the Soviet Embassy was attacked or whether the Russians shredded documents themselves as a precaution.

90. Ibid.


93. Ibid., d. 5, l. 3-4: "Information from Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov from Budapest," Nov. 17, 1956.


95. British and French paratroopers landed at Port Said early in the morning of Nov. 5, 1956.

96. TsKhSD f. 89, per. 45, dok. 41, ll. 1-2: "Notes of Serov on November 11, 1956," to the CPSU (Khrushchev).


98. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 34, l. 5: "Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador Andropov in Hungary to Malenkov, Zhukov, Aristov, Pospelov, and Gromyko," Nov. 9, 1956.

99. Ibid., dok. 43, l. II.

100. Ibid., dok. 39, l. 2: "Excerpts from Protocol 54 of the CC CPSU Presidium Session."


102. Ibid.


104. Ibid., dok. 49, l. 5: "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov," to the CC CPSU Presidium, Nov. 22, 1956.

105. Ibid., dok. 73: from the diary of L. F. Ilichev, "Notes of a Conversation with Hungarian

107.  TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 28, rolik 5195: "Notes of a Conversation with the Deputy Secretary of the United Nations Phillippe de Seine, and the Representative of the International Red Cross, Meyer." See also TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 58, ll. 1–6: N. Ivanov, Head of the Department on Economics in Europe, "Reference About Free Aid Given to Hungary by Other Countries."

108.  TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 28, rolik 5195, d. 479: "Notes of a Conversation of Ambassador Andropov with the Hungarian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Karoly Szarka," Jan. 29, 1957. This "shuffling of cadres" (*peretasovka kadrov*) applied, for instance, to the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where diplomats to the USSR, China, France, Belgium, Austria, the United States, etc. were all replaced.

109.  TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 39, l. 1: "Excerpts of Protocol 54 of the Central Committee Presidium Session on November 10, 1956." The economic workers were told "to help restore order" in the railroad system, newspapers and radio, provision of goods, and overall management of the economy in the city of Budapest. They were "located unofficially" in Hungary, and told to act strictly in accordance with Kadar's instructions only.


114.  *Ibid.*, dok 76, ll. 2–3: Protocol 116 of the CC CPSU Presidium session on October 11, 1957, to Suslov, Beliaev, Pospelov, Furtseva, and the Secretary of the CPSU Khrushchev. Enclosure: From the diary of V. S. Baikov, Advisor of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the Director of the Department of Party and Mass Organizations of the CC HSWP, member of the Hungarian CC HSWP, József Sándor," Sept. 16, 1957: "Recently a Soviet delegation of economic planners came to Hungary, continued Sándor, to give us a consultation for preparation of the three-year economic plan to develop the country. . . . It is possible to ask our Hungarian economists: why, indeed, do we need Soviet specialists to look for Hungarian

49
resources? We have enough economic specialists who are scholars and professors from academic institutions and research institutes, who study the economy of our country."


116. "Ibid., dok. 42, l. 1: "Notes of Serov to the CPSU (Khrushchev), Nov. 13, 1956."

117. László Zalai, "Glazami prostovo vracha" [Through the eyes of an ordinary doctor], Most, 1992, no. 1–2: 43.

118. TsKhSD, f. 89, por. 45, dok. 46, l. 2: "Notes by Dudorov, Ministry of Internal Affairs, USSR," Nov. 16, 1956.


120. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 42, l. 1: "Notes of Serov," Nov. 13, 1956.

121. "Skol'kikh liudei zatronuli repressii?" (How many people were repressed?), Most, 1992, no. 1–2: 54. The number of executions given here may be too high; the Institute for the History of the 1956 Revolution in Budapest estimates the figure at about 350.

122. TsKhSD, f. 89, por. 45, dok. 46, l. 2: "Notes by Dudorov, Ministry of Internal Affairs, USSR," Nov. 16, 1956.

123. "Ibid., l. 7.

124. In late November, however, Kádár became tougher in his position on the arrests. In a speech at a workers' council, he allegedly said: "Among the demands that are constantly repeated is the demand to stop the arrests. The arrests will not stop! The arrests will continue in the future! And if it is necessary, then they will become even stricter. ... Let the murderers stop their banditism, stop frightening the miners and workers, and then we will stop the arrests." Ibid., dok. 52, l. 4, "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, Aristov, Nov. 26, 1956.

125. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 39, l. 3: "Excerpts from Protocol 54 of the CC CPSU Presidium Session of November 10, 1956."

126. "Ibid., dok. 43, l. 6: "Telegram of Suslov and Aristov of November 12, 1956."

127. See AVP RF, f. 2, op. 1, d. 259: "Stenographic Account of the June 1957 CC CPSU
Plenum." Also published as "Posledniaia 'antipartiinaia' gruppa" [The last anti-party group], Istoricheskii Arkhiv 3–6 (1993), 1–2 (1994). See also TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 1, l. 4: "Telegram from Andropov in Budapest to the CPSU (Moscow)," April 29, 1956. "Rákosi noted that he [Kádár] over the course of many years has shown himself to be an unstable person. . . . It is advisable to have a talk with the Hungarian comrades, candidly expressing our fears in connection with the decision to include Révai and especially Kádár into the Politburo [emphasis added]."

128. On the day of Nagy's abduction from the Yugoslav Embassy, Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov also wrote: "Kádár has begun to understand better the need to conduct a harder line in the struggle with the reaction." TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 49, l. 9: "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov," Nov. 22, 1956.

129. Ibid., dok 42, l. 3: "Notes of Serov on November 13, 1956, to the CPSU (Khrushchev)." Apparently this was simply a rumor; the prisoners were not sent to Siberia, but to various camps in the Soviet Ukraine.

130. Ibid., ll. 4–5.

131. Ibid., dok. 46, l. 4: "Notes of Dudorov," Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, Nov. 16, 1956. The arrested people asked Kholodkov, "How did we-Hungarian citizens-end up on Soviet territory?" Assuring him that they had not acted against the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Party (under Kádár), nor against the Soviet troops, they demanded that their cases be processed more quickly, that their relatives in Hungary be informed of their fate, and that they be permitted to read Hungarian newspapers (Ibid., l. 3).

132. Ibid., dok. 42, l. 2: "Notes of Serov of November 13, 1956, to the CPSU, Comrade Khrushchev"; dok 48, l. 1: "Notes of Ivan Serov to the CC CPSU (Khrushchev)."


134. Ibid., l. 1: "Notes of Ivan Serov to the CC CPSU (Khrushchev)."


136. Ibid., dok. 52, l. 6: "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov," Nov. 26, 1956, to the CC CPSU.

137. For the event in Eger see RFERL News Briefs, Feb. 7–11, 1994, pp. 17–18.

138. F. "Referentura po Vengrii," op. 37, por. 10, p. 188, d. 036, l. 255: from the diary of N. Sudarnikov, advisor of the Soviet Embassy in Peking, "Notes of a Conversation with the Trade


141. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 11, l. 3: "Telegram of A. I. Mikoyan from Budapest to the CC CPSU with a Report from I. A. Serov," Oct. 29, 1956.

142. Ibid., dok. 39, ll. 4–5: "Excerpts from the Protocol 54 of the CC Presidium of the CPSU, with enclosed letter from Ivan Serov to the CC CPSU (Krushchev), " Nov. 10, 1956.

143. Ibid., 1.2.

144. Ibid., Excerpts from Protocol #51 of the CC CPSU Presidium, Nov. 4, 1956. In fact, on November 5 around 3 p.m. Soviet tanks fired on the Yugoslav Embassy, resulting in the death of Milovanov, the cultural attaché. AVO RF, f. 077, op.37, p. 188, d. 18, l. 38. (In another document the date and time of this event is given as November 6 at 12:45 p.m. [TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 29, l. 1: from the diary of Shepilov, "Copy of the Notes of the Conservation with Veljko Mićunović, the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR"]).

145. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 11, l. 3: "Telegram of A. I. Mikoyan from Budapest to the CC CPSU with a Report from I. A. Serov," Oct. 29, 1956. See also AVP RF, f. "Information about Hungary," op. 37, por. 10, p. 188, l.242: from the diary of M. I. Petunin, "Notes of a Conversation with Member of the Gyor Regional Executive Committee of the HSWP, Andras Takacs," Nov. 29, 1956.

146. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 64, l. 6: letter of Istvan Kovács to the CC CPSU (Krushchev), Jan. 10, 1957, "Request for a Reception to Discuss Hungarian Matters."


149. Ibid., dok. 60 l. 7: Protocol 64 of the CC Presidium Session of December 14, 1956, "The Issue of the Committee of State Security."

150. Ibid. dok. 53, l. 3 "Notes of Ivan Serov," Nov. 27, 1956.

151. Ibid. dok. 17, l. 3: "Notes of Kirichenko with Enclosed Report by Colonel Starovoitov":

52
[The] commander of the militia of the Hungarian People's Republic Pocze [sic] opposed decisive measures against the individuals occupied in hostile activities against the democratic structure of Hungary."

152. AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, l. 1: "Ciphered Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan and M. A. Suslov from Budapest to the Central Committee of the CPSU," Oct. 24, 1956.

153. Ibid., f. "Information on Hungary," op. 37, por. 10, p. 188, l. 275: from the diary of V. A. Kriuchkov, third secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with Secretary of the Union of Journalists, Ferenc Vadas, and the Secretary of the Organization of the HWSP of this Union, Roza Peti [sic]," Dec. 18, 1956.

154. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 12, l.2: "Information of Mikoyan and Suslov," Oct. 30, 1956. Although Mikoyan signed this telegram with Suslov, he was against military intervention—according to the Malin notes and Khrushchev's memoirs. See Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 122–23. Also Malin, "Working Notes," Oct. 26, 1956, d. 1005, ll. 53 [versa], 62 [versa]. During this meeting Bulgarin reportedly said that Mikoyan "[is] maintaining an improper and ill-defined position, and is not helping the Hungarian leaders put an end to their zig-zags." Molotov agreed with Bulgarin saying, "We must set certain limits and instruct Comrade Mikoyan how to act." Zhukov said, "Mikoyan is acting improperly; he's pushing us toward capitulation." Kaganovich and Malenkov also agreed. Khrushchev said, "Mikoyan is acting as he said he would. . . . [He] supported a position of non-intervention."


156. Ibid., f. 77, op. 37, d. 18, l. 25: From General-Mayor Sokolov to the Director of the Fifth European Division of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aug, 7, 1956.

157. Major Pliukhin, completely sober, was walking across the intersection of Rákosi and Beloiannisz streets in the city of Székesfehérvár. A Hungarian truck, appearing out of nowhere, ran over Pliukhin and killed him. It was discovered that the Hungarian truck driver: (1) was breaking the speed limit; (2) failed to beep his horn to alert Pliukhin; and (3) had defective brakes. Nevertheless, the chief of the Department of Supreme Procurator of Hungary, Endre Szenvedi, sided with the Hungarian truck driver against the Soviet military officer. Szenvedi concluded that it was Pliukhin's fault, because he was "intoxicated." AVP RF, f. 77, op. 37, d. 18, p. 188, ll. 16—20. Note from Ambassador Andropov in Budapest to V. V. Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, with enclosure from Lashchenko, the Commander of the "Special Corps," to Andropov, May 18, 1956.


162. On January 29 and 30, 1957, the Soviet delegation, headed by Marshal Konev, met with the Hungarian delegation, led by Ferenc Münnich, minister of the armed forces of Hungary. Apparently, the conditions of the Hungarian army was discussed more than the presence of the Soviet army in Hungary. "At the January meeting the military staff and number of troops of the Hungarian army" were discussed, as well as the "weapons system," "antiaircraft defense measures," and "military advisors" in the country (*Ibid.*, op. 38, por. 14, p. 193, I. 3: From the Ministry of Defense General Staff, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, V. D. Sokolovskii, to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, N. S. Patolichev, Feb. 26, 1957). As for the presence of Soviet troops, Sokolovskii wrote to Patolichev, "We think the issue about the legal status of the Soviet troops, temporarily located on Hungarian territory can by examined later after a significant improvement of the situation" (*Ibid.*). Another round of talks took place in Moscow on March 20-28, 1957, about the status of Soviet troops, "temporarily" stationed on the territory of Hungary (*Ibid.*, I. 8: From Marshal G. Zhukov and A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the CC CPSU, April 26, 1957). An agreement was drafted by April 26, and completed in Budapest (*Ibid.*, 11. 11–20, "Resolution of the CC CPSU about the conduct of talks with the Hungarian Government about the Conclusion of an Agreement about the Legal Status of the Soviet Troops in Hungary").