Poland, Ukraine, and the Idea of Strategic Partnership
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Both Ukrainian and Polish policymakers have come to use the term strategic partnership to characterize the relationship between their two countries. Teodozii Starak, an adviser to the Ukrainian Embassy in Poland, has stated that strategic partnership "means that both [Ukraine and Poland] demonstrate coordinated stances and support each other in the most important political areas." However, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma also regularly uses the term to characterize his country's relations with Russia. In addition, Ukrainian officials have labeled China, the United States, Germany, and Bulgaria as Ukraine's strategic partners. The use of the term with reference to Russia—with which Ukraine throughout the 1990s has had serious political differences—or Bulgaria or China, which are not priorities for Ukrainian foreign and security policy, appears to strip it of any significance; the term implies, at best, a goal, or, at worst, a public relations effort.

The term nonetheless suggests some criteria by which we might evaluate the Polish-Ukrainian relationship. It presumes the partners share strategic foreign policy and security policy goals and that they will cooperate to attain them. Equally important, if strategic partnership is to have any significance, it must also mean that neither partner will undertake any action whose effect is to reduce the security of the other or impede it from attaining the goals to which the partnership is dedicated.

By these criteria, Poland and Ukraine, though their relationship has made remarkable progress in the 1990s, do not yet share a strategic partnership. Ukrainians seemed to begin applying the term to their relations with Poland in early 1993; yet even earlier they expected such a partnership from Poland in everything but name. Poland, however, has had other aims, the pursuit of which at times has undermined its relationship with Ukraine: joining European and trans-Atlantic institutions; placating Russia, which regards Ukraine as lying within its sphere of interest; and currying favor with Western countries, which initially had been dubious of Ukraine's drive for independence and later were distrustful of Ukraine for its apparent reluctance to turn over its strategic nuclear weapons to Russia.

Historical memory of ethnic and territorial conflict between Poles and Ukrainians, especially those living in western Ukraine, has also impeded the
emergence of a strategic partnership. Equally important, such a partnership has been hindered by the stagnation of economic reform and pervasive crime and corruption in Ukraine, which make it hard for bilateral economic relations to reach their full potential.

I will begin this discussion with a concise treatment of the historical aspects of the Polish-Ukrainian relationship, particularly events in this century, because they will establish the legacy that Polish and Ukrainian leaders confronted in the 1990s as they set out to build a bilateral relationship. I will then turn to an analysis of developments in this decade, showing that although Poland and Ukraine have built a bilateral relationship that in most respects can serve as a model for other such relations in the region, Warsaw and Kiev cannot yet claim a strategic partnership.

A Brief History

The Polish expansion into what is today Ukraine began under Kazimierz the Great (1310–1370). Poland’s move to the east signified more than just an attempt to expand the boundaries of the state: the Poles proclaimed themselves the buffer of Western Christianity, representing their move as a crusade against the schismatic Orthodox population. Thus originated the Polish feeling of cultural superiority over the Ukrainians that persisted well into the twentieth century.

Other Ukrainian lands were under the aegis of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However, in 1569, as a means of pressing the Lithuanians to accept a federation (rather than simply a royal union) with the Kingdom of Poland, the latter annexed all Ukrainian lands that had been part of the Grand Duchy. Over the next two generations, the nobility in Ukraine became Roman Catholics, and hence Poles. The peasantry remained Orthodox or, after the Union of Lublin in 1596, Greek Catholics.

The rebellion of Ukrainian cossack Bohdan Khmel’nytsky changed the course of Ukrainian-Polish relations. The insurrection, which erupted in 1648 as an effort to gain autonomy for Ukrainian lands, ended in a complete break between
Khmelnitsky’s forces and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. When he sought Muscovy’s help the result was the Pereiaslav agreement, according to which left-bank Ukraine plus Kiev became part of Muscovy. That agreement was also the beginning of the end of the Commonwealth, which ultimately disappeared in 1795, with its third partition. Most of the Ukrainian part of the Commonwealth fell to the Russian empire; a small but significant part—Galicia—went to Austria.

Paul Robert Magocsi traces the emergence of a distinct Ukrainian national identity in the Russian Empire to the universities of Kiev and Kharkov in the 1840s. He writes that in Austrian Galicia the Ukrainian national awakening was triggered by the educational reforms of Empress Maria Theresa in 1777 and Emperor Joseph II in 1781. The rise of a Ukrainian national consciousness is a classic example of what Ernest Gellner has termed “Habsburg nationalism.” In this form of nationalism, the power-holders have access to the central high culture and “to the whole bag of tricks which makes you do well under modern conditions.” The powerless (here, the Ukrainians) lack education but share a folk culture that can be turned into a new rival high culture by the “intellectuals-awakeners” of this ethnic group. This group, according to Gellner, then seeks its own state to sustain and protect the new, or newly reborn, culture. Joseph Rothschild, however, argues that the issue is more than culture. He locates the source of ethnic conflict between the power-holders and members of the new rival high culture in “perceived ethnic inequalities and inequities in access to, and possession of, economic, educational, political, administrative, and social resources.”

The Russian autocracy regarded the emergent Ukrainian identity as a threat, and throughout the rest of its existence sought to suppress that threat. In Austrian Galicia, however, nationally conscious Ukrainian intellectuals had much more freedom in the second half of the nineteenth century to cultivate a Ukrainian national identity. But the Poles in Galicia viewed a Ukrainian identity both as a menace to their continued cultural, economic, and political (on the local level) domination of the region and as an obstacle to their plans to restore a Polish state from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The Poles even accused Vienna of “inventing the Ruthenians” as a
counterweight to Polish influence in Galicia. Religious and social differences further complicated relations. Poles were Roman Catholics and tended to be members of the nobility or the middle class. Ukrainians in both the Habsburg and Romanov empires were either Greek Catholic or Orthodox and largely members of the peasantry. There were no crosscutting cleavages that might have mitigated the impact of these differences.

After World War I, Poles and Ukrainians fought over ethnically mixed areas. Poles ultimately gained control over western Ukraine, but in so doing weakened the Ukrainian nationalist forces and thus aided the Bolsheviks in their efforts to incorporate Ukraine into Soviet Russia. The Poles in spring 1920 concluded an alliance with Ukrainian General Symon Petliura against the Bolsheviks; Warsaw’s goals were to enhance Polish strength in the war against Soviet Russia and to create a Ukrainian buffer state between Poland and Russia. According Orest Subtelny, the Poles expected a “ground swell of peasant support” for Petliura, but it did not materialize. He was personally popular among the peasants, but that popularity could not overcome the peasants’ distrust of his Polish allies. The Poles abandoned Petliura in their peace talks with Moscow. The Riga settlement, which ended the war, left more than five million Ukrainians in the Second Polish Republic.

The fundamental conflict continued into the interwar period. West Ukrainian society, superbly organized into a series of cooperatives, associations, and unions of various kinds, exhibited a basic hostility to the Polish state. The regime, for its part, tried to Polonize west Ukrainian lands, harassing and attempting to break up the ethnic-Ukrainian organizations.

The west Ukrainians took their revenge on the Poles in 1939–1941. There was violence directed against Poles even before the Red Army entered any given west Ukrainian area. According to Jan T. Gross, “ethnic hatred . . . filled the vacuum created by the collapse of the Polish administration with blood.” Of course, the new Soviet administration also encouraged the west Ukrainians to get even with the Poles for the wrongs these people had experienced during the interwar period (and before). In 1942–1943, the Polish Home Army and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
fought for control over western Ukraine; tens of thousands of civilians on both sides
died in the fighting, though the Poles suffered more casualties than the Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{13}
The conflict continued into the postwar era. In 1947 Polish military forces, with
assistance from Soviet and Czechoslovak troops, forcibly resettled 150,000 to
250,000 Ukrainians from southeastern Poland to the western and northern parts of
the country, in what is known as Operation Vistula (\textit{Akcja Wisła}). The Polish
communist regime claimed the operation was undertaken to eliminate the base of
support for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and to retaliate for the wrongs done to
Poles in western Ukraine during the war, but the real reason was to make Poland an
ethnically pure state. The regime allowed no more than two or three ethnic-Ukrainian
families to settle in any one location to facilitate their assimilation into the Polish
majority.

The Soviet and Polish communist regimes exploited this legacy to try to
ensure that the populations of both Poland and Ukraine looked to Moscow for
protection against the other. Teodozii Starak, Ukraine’s envoy to Poland in 1992,
recalled that education from kindergarten onward instilled anti-Polish attitudes in
Ukrainian youth. Ukrainian schoolchildren read how “Ukraine was always on the
verge of destruction and the Poles were always just about to eat us up, were it not
for the goodness of Moscow, which saved us.”\textsuperscript{14} The propaganda of People’s Poland
depicted Ukrainians as bandits and murderers, which only reinforced preexisting
negative stereotypes.\textsuperscript{15}

But Polish émigrés associated with the Paris-based journal \textit{Kultura} in the
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were rethinking their native land’s relationship to
Ukrainians, as well as to Lithuanians, Byelorussians, and Russians; articles in
\textit{Kultura} changed the course of debate over Poland’s relationship to its eastern
neighbors. Until then two schools of thought had dominated noncommunist Polish
thinking about the east. One, promoted by the political heirs of the early twentieth
century political theorist and statesman Roman Dmowski, advocated the pursuit of
a condominium with Moscow whereby Poland would regain its sovereignty but leave
its eastern neighbors to their own fate. A second, advocated by the political heirs of
Józef Piłsudski, prescribed an alliance of the empire’s subject peoples—with the proviso that after the overthrow of Soviet power Poland would regain those Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian territories it had held during the interwar period.

Juliusz Mieroszewski, a political writer for *Kultura* from 1949 to 1976, took a third approach. Against the followers of Dmowski, he argued that Poles must work together with these peoples—Poland’s eastern neighbors—who seek independence and who know they cannot negotiate that independence with the Soviet authorities. Against the followers of Piłsudski, Mieroszewski contended that Poles must renounce any territorial claims in the east: “We, as Poles, do not demand anything for ourselves—we do not demand the return of Vilnius and L’viv, in the deep conviction that L’viv must belong to a future independent Ukraine and Vilnius to a future independent Lithuania. In other words, we support the right to independence of Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Byelorussians.”

Mieroszewski’s writings had a profound impact on the thinking of Poland’s anticommunist opposition in the late 1970s and 1980s; articles in such underground publications as *Głos*, *Obóz*, and *Nowa Koalicja* drew extensively from *Kultura*. For example, Jacek Kuroń, Antoni Macierewicz, and Adam Michnik, all of whom were to attain positions of power and influence in the Solidarity governments and Sejm in 1989–1993, wrote in *Głos* in 1977 that the “guarantee of Poland’s sovereignty is the sovereignty of nations lying between [it] and Russia.”

Ukrainian émigrés were at first distrustful of such overtures as appeared in *Kultura*, but the émigrés came largely from western Ukraine, which points to the regional divisions in Ukrainian society and their impact on the relationship with Poland. Though west Ukrainians look to West and Central European countries for cultural, political, and economic models, it is precisely in the Galicia region, as well as in the western oblasts of Volhynia and Rivne, that distrust of Poles is deep-rooted. These anti-Polish sentiments reduced the likelihood that, at least at the formative stages of the Polish-Ukrainian relationship in the late 1980s and early 1990s, west Ukrainians would see in Poland a partner for Ukraine.
According to Sherman Garnett, however, the ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians from the east, not the nationalists of western Ukraine, "played a preponderant role in the founding and running of the Ukrainian political system." On the one hand, Ukrainians from the east, as well as from the southern and central regions of the country, might have been expected to pursue a foreign policy oriented toward Moscow. After all, present-day Ukrainian territory east of the Dnipro River, plus Kiev, came under Russian sway in 1654, with the rest of what Garnett terms central Ukraine, as well as Volhynia and Rivne, having been annexed from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the partitions. (Exclusive of Volhynia and Rivne, areas in central Ukraine acquired by Russia during the partitions were under continuous Russian control for two centuries or more.) Thus it is in the oblasts long under Russian hegemony that Ukrainians most likely to perceive themselves as "younger brothers" to the "elder brother" Great Russians are to be found.

On the other hand, Ukrainians and ethnic Russians from the eastern, central, and southern regions share few of the west Ukrainians' anti-Polish sentiments. Jerzy Kozakiewicz, Poland's first envoy to independent Ukraine, in early 1992 noted that "in central Ukraine, not even speaking about left-bank Ukraine, society is not only open [to Poland and the Poles], but also full of interest." Similarly, Roman Szporluk more recently stated that the "remnants of anti-Polish stereotypes remain" near L'viv and Ternopil', but certainly not in Kiev, Poltava, or in hundreds of other localities. That policymakers in Kiev tended to stem from areas of Ukraine relatively unaffected by anti-Polish sentiments suggests there was little to preclude them from looking to Warsaw for support in their state-building endeavors, especially in view of the fact that the Poles seemed willing to lend such backing.

Following Solidarity's victory in Poland's semifree elections of June 1989, the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki began to implement a foreign policy premised on Poland's national interests. In other words, Warsaw, not Moscow, would now make this policy. Warsaw had to confront enormous hurdles as it began to develop and implement a policy toward its eastern neighbors, but the government
did not begin with a tabula rasa. Mieroszewski’s ideas provided the framework for an eastern policy.

The Emergence of a Bilateral Relationship

In the late 1980s, as the political systems of both Poland and the Soviet Union opened up under Gorbachev’s influence, Ukrainian national democrats were able to cultivate relations with their Solidarity counterparts. Solidarity representatives, including Adam Michnik, Bogdan Borusewicz, and Włodzimierz Mokry (an ethnic Ukrainian), attended the first congress of the mass national-democratic organization Rukh in September 1989. Bilateral relations between Poland and the Ukrainian SSR began a little more than a year later. On 16 July 1990, Ukraine declared its sovereignty, allowing it to pursue at least a semi-independent foreign policy. Concurrently, Warsaw was developing what became known as the “two-track” policy, which amounted to differentiating between the Soviet center and the republics; in testimony before the Polish Senate, Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski said Poland would try to achieve relations with the republics commensurate with their degree of independence from the center. In some respects, he said, Poland’s relations with the republics would resemble those it maintained with independent states.

Ilya Prizel points to the limited nature of the two-track approach. He writes, for example, that Warsaw could not tread on Moscow’s toes because it perceived the need for Soviet troops in Poland until Warsaw and Bonn were able to normalize relations.23 Poland’s dependence on the Soviet Union for raw materials and energy supplies also reduced Warsaw’s maneuvering room. Moreover, Warsaw was operating in circumstances of profound uncertainty: the Poles did not know how far Moscow would allow them to go in cultivating relations with the republics and did not know how the West, particularly the United States, would view a policy that seemed intended to loosen the ties between the center and the republics.
In mid-October 1990, Skubiszewski traveled to the Soviet Union, where he met with officials of the Soviet government, as well as those of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR. Poland signed declarations of friendship and cooperation with the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, but the attempt to do so with the Belorussian republic ended in a fiasco because officials in Minsk remained beholden to the Soviet center.24

The Ukrainian-Polish declaration had some of the characteristics of a state treaty: article 3 states that neither side has territorial claims against the other and that the border is inviolable; other articles called for political, environmental, and scientific-technical cooperation, as well as negotiations on the exchange of diplomatic, consular, and trade representatives. The two sides promised to respect the rights of national minorities and to improve the situation of ethnic Poles in Ukraine and ethnic Ukrainians in Poland.25

The document also constituted an effort to reverse generations of Soviet and Polish communist propaganda because it used history and tradition to legitimate renewed Ukrainian-Polish ties. It contained a reference to the “ethnic and cultural kinship of the Polish and Ukrainian peoples” and expressed the hope that the “positive heritage of their long relationship” would enhance contemporary Polish-Ukrainian contacts. The document as a whole indicated that Ukraine no longer oriented itself solely toward Russia and that, like Poland, it would try to “rejoin Europe.” The declaration, moreover, suggested that, like Poland, Ukraine was part of Central Europe, that its history and traditions differed from those of Russia.

Skubiszewski while in Kiev also met with representatives of the Ukrainian opposition, including Ivan Drach and Mykhailo Horyn’.26 The Polish foreign minister doubtless raised expectations on the part of Rukh leaders and Ukrainian government officials because in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in Moscow in late August 1991, Ukrainian national democrats looked first to Poland to support Ukraine’s independence, which the Supreme Soviet declared on 24 August 1991. Iurii Shcherbak, a leading democratic activist, told the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza that how Poland conducted its relations with Ukraine would influence relations
between Ukraine and other states. In words suggesting the Ukrainians were already thinking in terms of what they would later call a strategic partnership, Drach subsequently noted, “Ukraine’s road to Europe . . . really does lead through Poland.”

In early September 1991, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatolii Zlenko traveled to Warsaw seeking the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. Poland was unwilling to take that step: it feared Moscow’s reaction, as well as the reactions of the United States and other Western countries. Karl Hartmann argues that as a result of this Polish reluctance, the Ukrainians were not satisfied with the visit. Such a view seems overstated. The two sides signed a series of political agreements, and the joint communiqué obligated them to establish diplomatic relations in the near future. Both sides, as well as independent analysts, took it for granted that diplomatic ties would be established after Ukraine’s independence referendum, scheduled for 1 December 1991. Even though Zlenko might have left Warsaw not fully satisfied, Poland at this time accorded more support to Ukraine than any other Western or Central European state, with the possible exception of Hungary, whose president had visited Ukraine in September 1990 and which had signed several political agreements with Ukraine when then Supreme Soviet Chairman Leonid Kravchuk visited Budapest in May 1991.

Poland was the first state to recognize Ukraine’s independence, taking this step on 2 December 1991—the day after the Ukrainian populace expressed overwhelming support for their republic’s independence in the referendum. The reason for this boldness is not far to seek: Ukraine’s independence changed Poland’s geopolitical position because it now had a potentially friendly state on its eastern border for the first time in centuries.

During the first year and a half of their independence, Ukrainians looked to Poland to fulfill the role of strategic partner for Ukraine in everything but name. For example, Dmytro Pavlychko, then chairman of the Rada Foreign Affairs Commission, claimed the two countries shared a similar geopolitical position, writing, “there are no two other peoples in the world whose destinies are as
dependent on one another as the destinies of Poland and Ukraine." But this assertion was wrong: the two countries' geopolitical positions were similar in one respect—both perceived a threat from Russia—but different in others. Poland was closer to the West and had a far better chance of being accepted into Western institutions. Poland also had a potentially powerful patron in Germany; Ukraine at the time had no such patron. Finally, the Russian threat to Ukraine was far more profound than the Russian threat to Poland.

Such misperceptions led the Ukrainians to expect more from the Poles than the Poles were willing to give them. In January 1992, then Ukrainian Defense Minister Kostiantyn Morozov, who at the time was seeking a favorable division with Russia of the Black Sea fleet and was facing the prospect of a conflict with the largely ethnic-Russian population of Crimea, came to Warsaw looking for cooperation in the military sphere. He and then Polish Defense Minister Jan Parys envisaged joint weapons production, Polish training of Ukrainian soldiers, and the supply of spare parts to each other's armed forces. The Polish Foreign Ministry, however, resisted such steps out of consideration for Poland's interests vis-à-vis Russia and the West. Russia was still the dominant power in Eastern Europe, Russian troops remained on Polish soil, and Poland was dependent on Russia for raw materials and energy supplies. Moreover, the Foreign Ministry did not wish to raise concerns in the West about an over-ambitious Polish foreign policy. The West was wary of Ukraine owing to its reluctance to turn over to Russia its strategic nuclear weapons and the more general perception that Ukraine's move to independence had complicated the international situation by helping to cause the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The next milestone in the Polish-Ukrainian relationship came on 18–19 May 1992 with the summit of then Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Lech Wałęsa in Warsaw and the signing of a basic treaty. The accord contained many of the same points included in the earlier bilateral declaration: articles on the inviolability of borders and respect for the rights of national minorities among them. The treaty showed that "European standards" would govern relations between two nations.
divided in the past by serious ethnic and territorial conflicts. It thus reflected the Polish Foreign Ministry's minimal program on eastern policy at the time: it put Moscow on notice that it would not be able to exploit any Ukrainian-Polish differences to the detriment of Ukraine's independence or Poland's march to the West, and it showed the West that Poland would not be encumbered by territorial disputes or disagreements on ethnic minorities as it sought Western integration.

This summit thus provides evidence that Warsaw wanted to keep some distance between itself and Kiev. According to Karl Hartmann, Kravchuk went to the Polish capital seeking something approaching an alliance with Poland, including formal military relations. Moreover, since independence Ukrainian officials had been lobbying Polish officials to try to gain membership in the Visegrád triangle, composed of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The triangle had emerged in early 1991 to coordinate the efforts of these countries at creating liberal democracies, market economies, and civil societies—that is, to join Europe in spirit as a means to join European institutions in fact. Ukrainians urged the Poles to press their Visegrád partners for Kiev's membership at a February 1992 conference in Warsaw entitled "Ukraine's Road to Europe," attended by foreign and security policymakers and legislators from both countries. Kravchuk, concerned about Moscow's reaction, was very coy about Ukrainian intentions regarding the triangle in the run-up to the summit, but while in Warsaw he pointed out that a "quadrilateral is a more complete geometrical figure than a triangle and provides more possibilities." Waleśa was sympathetic to Ukrainian aspirations regarding Visegrád, but other Polish officials, notably those in the Foreign Ministry, were reluctant to press for Kiev's membership. Czechoslovak and Hungarian leaders, for their part, opposed Ukrainian participation. The ostensible reasons were that three governments could coordinate policies better than four and the lag between Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, on the one hand, and Ukraine, on the other, in implementing political and economic reforms. But Visegrád leaders were loath to include Ukraine for other reasons. They had gone to great lengths to try to establish a Central European identity for themselves by distancing their countries from associations that
included states lying to their east and south; inclusion of Ukraine would have linked them, again, to a country seen as part of Eastern Europe, the Polish-Ukrainian declaration of October 1990 notwithstanding. Furthermore, a move to include Ukraine in Visegrád would have elicited Russian anger, thereby evoking a negative response from the West, which both deemed a congenial Russia to be its first priority in the immediate aftermath of the cold war and did not want to be drawn into any political conflicts involving Moscow and the Central European countries. Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest also did not want to expend scarce political resources in the West on Ukraine’s behalf rather than their own. But paradoxically, without this kind of political assistance, Ukraine had fewer resources to ensure its security vis-à-vis Russia, and a Ukraine more vulnerable to Russia in turn reduced Central Europe’s security.

The visit in mid-January 1993 of then Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka yet again indicated the extent to which the Ukrainians were looking to the Poles as a counterweight to the Russians. Then Prime Minister Kuchma, apparently for the first time, emphasized that Poland was a “strategic partner” for Ukraine. Indeed, Kiev had few other options. Poland offered some verbal backing: Suchocka publicly stated that Poland was interested in the internal stabilization of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with the affirmation of Ukraine’s independence. The statement signaled that, on the eve of a CIS summit at which members were to sign a commonwealth charter, Poland would offer Ukraine at least rhetorical support in resisting Russian-led reintegration of the former Soviet republics.

Later in 1993, Poland’s negative reaction to a Kravchuk proposal to create a “security and stability zone” in East-Central Europe again showed it would not antagonize the West or Russia through policies to tie Ukraine more firmly to Central Europe and thereby facilitate its integration with European and trans-Atlantic institutions. The Ukrainians, believing that all states lying between NATO and Russia could not ensure their own security and that the West would do nothing for the foreseeable future to help these states in this respect, proposed the creation of a security zone made up of Austria, Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, and the Baltic states. The goals were modest: all members would agree to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, renounce territorial claims and the use of force against each other, undertake joint efforts to prevent conflicts, and enhance border cooperation. Moscow and the West, both of which saw the proposal as an effort to isolate Russia, criticized the concept.

Hungary, alone among the prospective members, expressed support for the proposal. Poland, which carried greater political weight in the region than any other country, was crucial to the project. The Ukrainians sought Polish backing in the run-up to the second Kravchuk-Wałęsa summit, which took place in May 1993 in Kiev. The Ukrainians reminded the Poles that Wałęsa had earlier proposed creation of a “NATO-bis” made up of Central and East European states, but the Poles, now pushing for NATO membership, were not interested in Kravchuk’s idea. The West, especially the United States, urged the Poles to reject this proposal. Warsaw effectively killed the idea by showing no interest in it.

Stagnation

By mid-1993 progress in the bilateral relationship had come to a halt. Policymakers in Kiev concluded that the Poles had no interest in deepening Ukrainian-Polish ties. The Poles were even more determined than previously to pursue two objectives that, absent a consideration of Ukraine’s interests, could cause an overall reduction in Ukraine’s security: NATO membership and better economic and political relations with Russia. Moreover, political infighting in Warsaw paralyzed Poland’s eastern policy to a significant degree.

Warsaw’s stated policy on Ukrainian-Russian relations was one of “equal distance”: Foreign Minister Skubiszewski in autumn 1992 told the Polish weekly Polityka that “Poland will not stand on one side or the other side in conflicts between Russia and Ukraine.” In a demonstration of this stance, Wałęsa in May 1992
almost immediately went to Moscow for a summit with Russian President Boris Yeltsin after his summit with Kravchuk. "Equal distance" nonetheless suggested Poland was giving Ukraine a higher priority relative to Russia than most other countries, which favored, sometimes strongly, the latter. The Poles were also being somewhat disingenuous: any support for Ukraine contradicted Russia's interests, as defined by both those backing reintegration of the former Soviet republics and nationalists making claims on Ukrainian territory.\textsuperscript{37}

In mid-1993 and 1994, however, the Ukrainians thought the Poles were actually tilting toward the Russians. In August 1993, while Ukraine and Russia were engaged in sensitive talks on raising prices for the transit to Europe of Russian gas and oil via pipelines that run through Ukraine, the Poles dealt a blow to Kiev by initialing an accord with the Russians to construct a gas pipeline from Russia through Belarus and Poland to Germany. Then Prime Minister Kuchma labeled this agreement "an anti-Ukrainian act" because it deprived Ukraine of considerable leverage over Russia: the gas pipeline that runs through Ukraine was the only one that supplied Russian gas to Europe.\textsuperscript{38}

Another problem arose in early 1994 owing to the trial of Ukrainian Security Service Major Anatolii Lysenko, whom the Poles had accused of espionage the previous August. Lysenko and his family had traveled to Poland to seek advice on his son's medical condition; he used a regular passport, not a diplomatic one, and neglected to inform his superiors of his plans. The Poles charged him with recruiting a Polish smuggler for espionage, but his "undercover" activities appeared to consist of asking a Polish citizen a few questions about the Przemyśl area and helping the smuggler bypass customs.\textsuperscript{39} The Poles could have quietly expelled Lysenko, but the trial made the affair a bilateral problem. No satisfactory explanation for Warsaw's actions in this case has yet emerged. It may have been a provocation by Moscow to drive a wedge between Kiev and Warsaw. Or Warsaw—as it prepared to press NATO for membership—may have used the arrest to signal Moscow that it would not exploit such links to the West to draw Ukraine away from Russia.
Some Polish observers point to the assumption of power by a leftist coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) in November 1993 as the source of the stagnation in Poland’s relations with Ukraine. Problems predated the emergence of this coalition, but in its first year in power it did nothing to enhance Poland’s relations with Ukraine. Then Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski in February 1994 enunciated a major initiative in Poland’s eastern policy that involved the strengthening of people-to-people contacts and trade ties between Poland and its eastern neighbors, as well as programs to assist these countries in building democratic institutions and market economies. The proposal signified an attempt to cultivate a role for Poland relative to these eastern countries that western countries earlier had assumed relative to it. But intragovernmental tensions scuttled this effort. Then Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak (PSL) did not want the credit for an initiative that might have benefited Polish farmers to go to Olechowski who, like the defense and interior ministers, was a Wałęsa appointee. Moreover, Pawlak thought he saw in Russia a market for Polish agricultural products and wanted to avoid taking steps, such as cooperation in various areas with Ukraine, that might have led the Russians to close this market to Poles. That the Russians had few funds with which to purchase such products failed to dissuade Pawlak. In addition, business interests linked to the SLD did not want relations with Ukraine to jeopardize their ties to Russian economic entities and thus may have lobbied against efforts to assist Ukraine.

The Poles at this time also tended to see NATO as a solution to the problems posed by the east: membership in the alliance would remove their country from the “gray zone” and secure them against any threat—whether of a possible military invasion or a mass migration caused by political or economic problems—coming from that direction. Warsaw by mid-1993 had become so focused on NATO membership that it all but neglected its eastern neighbors. Moreover, Poland emphasized cooperation with Western countries—as a means of gaining admission into NATO and the European Union (EU)—and Central and East European countries that shared its strategic goals, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and even
Lithuania. Ukraine may have shared with Poland the strategic goal of membership in Western institutions, but NATO membership for Kiev was out of the question and thus Ukraine’s place on the scale of Polish priorities fell in turn.

Poland’s NATO aspirations made it vulnerable to Western pressure, which Western countries exploited in getting the Poles to resist then President Kravchuk’s stability zone proposal. The Polish government, which well understood Moscow’s objections to NATO expansion, did not want to antagonize the Russians further by drawing closer to Ukraine. Finally, Kravchuk’s unwillingness to tackle economic reform meant that the Polish government could not pursue meaningful bilateral ties in this sphere—as it did with Russia, even though in that case serious political differences divided the two countries.

Leonid Kuchma to a large extent owed his victory in the 1994 presidential election to Ukrainians’ dissatisfaction with their country’s severe economic problems. His electoral strength lay in eastern Ukraine, whose antiquated heavy industry and mining concerns suffered from the break in economic ties with Russia and other republics that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the campaign Kuchma, in an effort to gain the support of voters, primarily in the east, who preferred a leadership in Kiev more politically and economically oriented toward Moscow, advocated a reinvigoration of economic links with the CIS and spoke of Ukraine’s cultural and historical ties to Russia. In his inaugural address on 20 July 1994, the new president labeled Ukraine part of the “Eurasian” cultural and economic space and said Ukraine’s “vitally important national interests” were concentrated on the territory of the former Soviet Union. He did not mention relations with Poland.

Kuchma’s election victory coincided with that of Aliaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus, whose platform rested on economic, political, and military integration with Russia, which itself in 1993–1994 was pushing the integration of former Soviet republics under its leadership to a greater extent than it had in 1992. The election of these two new presidents on Poland’s eastern border doubtless evoked concern in Warsaw. The Poles understood that Kuchma was no Lukashenka but feared that
Kuchma’s desire to reinvigorate economic ties with Russia would give Moscow leverage over Kiev on political and military reintegration.

Kuchma, however, did not for long rest his hopes for improving Ukraine’s economic performance on enhancing economic ties with Russia. In October 1994 he announced a far-reaching economic reform program whose success depended on assistance from the West.\(^4\) Equally important, Kuchma had reason to think that such assistance would be forthcoming because in January 1994 Kravchuk had signed the so-called trilateral statement, according to which Ukraine agreed to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state. Finally, Kuchma and his advisers quickly learned that Russian conceptions of CIS integration did not involve coordinated policies among equals but Russian domination of the newly independent states.

Kuchma’s reform program and efforts to cultivate relations with the West created an opportunity for Polish policymakers to pursue improved relations with Ukraine. However, then President Wałęsa’s efforts in late 1994 and early 1995 to oust Pawlak, and the installation of a new government headed by Józef Oleksy (SLD) in February 1995, meant that Poland was not then in a position to take any new initiatives toward Ukraine. Once established in power, however, the Oleksy government began a series of small steps that laid the foundation for the close ties that the two countries enjoy today.

**A Bourgeoning Relationship**

The Polish government by early 1995 appeared to realize that its quest for NATO membership, absent policies to ensure close relations with Ukraine and help it integrate into European institutions, threatened to isolate Ukraine in the region and make it vulnerable to Russian pressure. That prospect, plus Belarus’s military, political, and economic reintegration with Russia, might have reproduced the direct threat from Russia that Poland had faced for centuries. Moreover, such a menace

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might have reinforced reluctance in some Western capitals to expand NATO into Central Europe. Warsaw policymakers understood, in short, that the key to ensuring the security of their country—whether as a NATO member or not—was Ukraine. They began pursuing the kind of Ukrainian policy that Ukrainian officials had envisaged when they called for strategic partnership with Poland or discussed what they expected of Warsaw without formally invoking that term.

Warsaw in 1995 thus undertook a series of initiatives vis-à-vis Kiev to show the Ukrainians that Poland had not “forgotten” them as it sought to join NATO and the EU. For example, Poland was a strong advocate of Ukraine’s membership in the Council of Europe, which it gained in September. In addition, Ukraine—largely owing to Poland’s efforts—that same month became a member of the Central European Initiative (CEI), a group of countries in the region that undertakes projects in science and technology, transportation, and energy use; one of its objectives is to prepare EU aspirants for union membership, a mission from which Ukraine should benefit.45

Bilaterally, the Consultative Committee of the Polish and Ukrainian Presidents, which was formed at the second Kravchuk-Wałęsa summit but halted work in summer 1994 after Kuchma’s election, resumed its activities in summer 1995. In autumn of that year, the two governments decided to create a joint peacekeeping battalion, composed of soldiers from Poland’s Cracow Military District and Ukraine’s Carpathian Military District; that battalion should be ready for deployment in 1999 or 2000. Moreover, the two defense ministers resolved to hold consultations twice a year on regional security issues, organize military exercises under NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, and intensify military-technical cooperation.46

In February 1996 then Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Grzegorz Kołodko offered the Ukrainians ECU20 million in government credit guarantees to finance Polish-Ukrainian undertakings in Ukraine.47 A Polish firm is also manufacturing Bizon combine harvesters in Kovel’.48
Kuchma had traveled to Poland in January 1995 in connection with the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz; though he and Wałęsa expressed the desire for closer bilateral ties, Kuchma’s presence, like that of other leaders in attendance, was more symbolic than substantive. In June 1996, however, Kuchma went to Poland twice for political summits: the first multilateral, the second bilateral. The multilateral gathering involved the fourth informal meeting of Central European presidents, which took place that year in Łańcut. President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, taking advantage of the prerogative accorded the president of the host country to invite a new participant, chose Kuchma, who expressed delight at being present at “such an authoritative forum of countries.” He was particularly grateful to Kwaśniewski for helping “pull Ukraine into Europe.”

At the bilateral summit, which took place on 25–26 June, the presidents did not sign any agreements representing a breakthrough in their countries’ relations. Rather, the event marked an affirmation of the importance of the relationship and the desire to deepen it. They endorsed an accord on visa-free travel—Poland’s first with a CIS participant and a step that prompted criticism from the EU, which contended that if Poland became a union member, the accord could open up EU borders to citizens of a state that is a nonmember. The Polish government thus evinced a willingness to override its interests in joining the EU in favor of a measure that would facilitate day-to-day contact between Poles and Ukrainians, as well as bilateral economic relations. Kuchma and Kwaśniewski also agreed that the Consultative Committee of the Polish and Ukrainian Presidents would meet at least four times a year and that Poland would advise Ukraine on integrating with the EU.

The only disagreements arose over Ukrainian efforts to enter the Weimar triangle, composed of Germany, France, and Poland, and over the prospect of stationing nuclear weapons on Polish soil once Poland joined NATO. The Weimar triangle stemmed from a German initiative in 1991 to coordinate German, French, and Polish foreign and defense policies and to assist Poland in integrating into the EU. The Ukrainians had been pressing the Poles to facilitate their participation in the Weimar triangle since the early years of the Kravchuk presidency, but the Poles, not
willing to share their access to the EU’s two leading states and not believing the Ukrainians were politically or economically ready to take advantage of this access, have always brushed aside these entreaties. On the nuclear issue, Kuchma wanted Warsaw to reject the stationing of such weapons in Poland before it entered the alliance. The Poles, however, were not willing to place conditions on their membership in NATO, which would have impeded their efforts to join the alliance. Nonetheless, Kwaśniewski said Warsaw did not see the need for the stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory, and in December 1996 NATO made clear that it had no plans to position such weapons on the territories of its prospective members.

One sign that Poland and Ukraine were assuming joint responsibility for regional stability—and were willing to buck Russian interests to do so—was the November 1996 joint statement of Kuchma, Kwaśniewski, and Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas on the political situation in Belarus. It was a Polish initiative spurred by President Lukashenka’s efforts to ram through a new constitution considerably enhancing his powers at the expense of the legislature. The declaration, which called on the Belarusian leader to observe internationally recognized political norms and civic rights, signaled Moscow that Warsaw, Kiev, and Vilnius themselves have interests in a country that Russian leaders deem to fall within the Kremlin’s sphere of influence. The declaration did not stem from alarm that Lukashenka might somehow reintegrate his country with Russia—he had long ago made known such intentions, but Russia has been unwilling to take this step because the economic price is too high. Belarus lags far behind Russia in implementing economic reform, and any meaningful union would entail the expenditure of scarce Russian resources. Rather, the three leaders feared instability in Belarus leading to mass migration, which their countries would be unable to handle without massive foreign assistance.

In a similar vein, on 27 May 1997, Kuchma and Kwaśniewski participated in a summit devoted primarily to regional security with the presidents of the Baltic states in Tallinn. The session took place on the same day that Russia and NATO signed the so-called Founding Act, which created the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint
Council for consultations on security issues. Some Central European and Baltic officials feared the act might provide a basis for decisions on European security without the participation of NATO aspirants and Ukraine. The Tallinn summit’s communique clearly stated the interests of its participants on this matter: “security is indivisible and every country has a right to decide for itself what methods to use to ensure its security.”\textsuperscript{52} This language constituted a rebuff to Yeltsin, who has underscored Russia’s firm opposition to NATO membership for any former Soviet republic. Moreover, balance of power factors were at play in the Tallinn session: the Belarusian and Russian leaderships a week earlier had concluded another agreement on integrating their two countries. More specifically, for Kwaśniewski, the summit was a chance to promote his country’s leadership role in the region and to advance Poland’s foreign policy goal of ensuring that the first round of NATO expansion will be followed by others that will include its neighbors. For Kuchma, the summit was a chance to distance his country further from the CIS in favor of collaboration with countries that share his foreign policy goal of integration with Western institutions but that are not likely to attain it in the near term (with the exception of Poland).

The Impact of NATO and EU Expansion

Poland’s quest for membership in NATO earlier in the 1990s helped block progress in bilateral relations with Ukraine. Today, the fact that Poland, as well as Hungary and the Czech Republic, have joined NATO does not pose a problem for Polish-Ukrainian relations. Indeed, several factors suggest Poland’s NATO membership will be a boon for bilateral ties. The same cannot be said, however, for Poland’s eventual membership in the EU.

Thinking among policymakers in Kiev on NATO expansion has undergone considerable evolution. According to Taras Kuzio, then President Kravchuk did not oppose NATO enlargement, or even Ukraine’s future membership in the alliance.\textsuperscript{53}
Other officials, however, feared that expansion to include the Visegrád states would have left Ukraine, at best, in a buffer zone between NATO and Russia or, at worst, would have forced it under pressure from Russia to abjure its nonbloc status and join the Moscow-dominated CIS collective security pact. For example, Dmytro Pavlychko suggested that if Polish policymakers really understood that the Ukrainians might have to pay the price of invigorated attempts by Moscow to protect itself from a perceived threat from NATO, they would drop their efforts to join the alliance.\(^{54}\) President Kuchma’s views on the issue, according to Kuzio, were initially very similar to Russia’s. However, his administration, like Kravchuk’s, objected to any Russian veto over the expansion process, believing that had Moscow been successful in halting NATO expansion, its weight on the European scene would have increased tremendously, and Russian appetites vis-à-vis Ukraine might have grown considerably.

Kuchma’s thinking changed for several reasons. Kuzio cites Russia’s policy in Chechnya, which eroded domestic support in Ukraine for Kiev’s membership in the CIS collective security pact.\(^ {55}\) Moreover, Kiev urged NATO to take Russian concerns into account in formulating a policy on enlargement. NATO in fact did address many Russian concerns, which promised to reduce the prospects for Russian pressure on Kiev. NATO also agreed to state that it saw no need to station nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, which was a red line for both Kiev and Moscow. Another factor that helped change Ukrainian thinking was Polish policy: as we have seen, Polish officials since early 1995 have tried to pursue a policy toward Ukraine that ensures strong political links between the two states, thereby reassuring Ukrainian officials that their country would not be isolated in the region once Poland and the other Central European states entered NATO.

Ukrainian officials, academics, and policy analysts nonetheless have expressed fears that Poland’s NATO membership will cause it to turn its back on Ukraine.\(^ {56}\) The chances for Polish neglect of Ukraine, however, are low. First, Ukraine continued to be a priority for Polish foreign policy even after NATO’s membership invitation. Indeed, the importance of Ukraine to Poland’s security is one
of the few things on which Poland’s fractious political elite agrees. Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek, who entered office with the new Solidarity Electoral Action–Freedom Union coalition in November 1997, made his first official trip abroad to Vilnius and Kiev, mainly to underscore the importance that government places on regional cooperation and to emphasize Poland’s policy toward these two countries would not change with Poland’s NATO membership. It is in Poland’s interest to try to avoid the role of a frontline state within NATO; Warsaw will thus push for Lithuania’s membership and try to ensure the intensification of political and military ties between itself and Ukraine and between the alliance as a whole and Ukraine.

The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, signed by NATO leaders and Kuchma on 9 July 1997, provides the foundation for such links. Among other things, it calls for consultations twice a year within a NATO-Ukraine Commission, mechanisms for military cooperation, and a Ukrainian military liaison mission in Brussels. Margarita Balmaceda points out, however, that the charter leaves the actual means for cooperation and consultation open and leaves undetermined the specifics of a crisis consultative mechanism between NATO and Ukraine. She argues, correctly, that the provisions of the NATO-Ukraine charter pale in comparison with the NATO-Russian Founding Act. Thus, it will be up to interested countries such as Poland to try to hold NATO’s feet to the fire in building a substantive relationship with Ukraine.

Second, the Polish-Ukrainian relationship has spawned interest groups on both sides seeking the strengthening of bilateral ties. Leaders of the Polish Movement of 100 party and Rukh have proposed a joint memorandum on “The Strategic Partnership Between Poland and Ukraine”; signatories include former presidents Wałęsa and Kravchuk, former Polish prime ministers Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Hanna Suchocka, former foreign minister Andrzej Olechowski, former Ukrainian deputy prime ministers Mykola Zhulyns’kyi and Ihor Iukhnovs’kyi, and Ukrainian vice admiral Borys Kozhyn. In June 1996 Poland’s Polish-Ukrainian Forum signed
an agreement with Ukraine’s Ukrainian-Polish Forum to press for strengthening bilateral ties.\textsuperscript{59}

Third, the United States has taken an interest in the Polish-Ukrainian relationship and is using it to try to spur democratic and market reforms in Ukraine. The three countries in autumn 1998 launched an initiative to share with Ukraine the expertise Poland has gained in the course of its economic transformation. The project, involving government and nongovernment agencies, businesses, and private citizens from all three countries, will focus on macroeconomic policy reforms, small business development, and local government reform. The United States also promised Ukrainian officials that Poland would not turn its back on its eastern neighbors after it became a NATO member.\textsuperscript{60} Moreover, the NATO-Ukraine charter calls for exploration “to the broadest possible degree” of NATO support for the Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion.

Ukraine has already drawn certain benefits from the expansion of the alliance and will draw others. Russian concerns that Ukraine was moving too close to NATO led Yeltsin on 31 May 1997 to a bilateral friendship treaty more than two years after it had been initialed. Similarly, Kiev exploited Bucharest’s desire for inclusion in the first tranche of new NATO members to sign a basic treaty after several years of negotiations during which the Romanians appeared to raise territorial claims against Ukraine.\textsuperscript{61} More important, the mere fact that NATO now borders Ukraine ensures that NATO will have to address any security problem Ukraine faces. Or, in other words, a security problem for Ukraine is a security problem for the alliance. In addition, close military ties between Poland and Ukraine will permit the transfer of NATO military know-how to the latter. Polish defense ministry officials acknowledge that the Polish-Ukrainian battalion will be interoperable with NATO units.\textsuperscript{62}

By contrast, Poland’s prospective membership in the EU is likely to place serious obstacles on the path toward a genuine strategic partnership. New rules for entry into Poland by citizens of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russians and Belarusians, illustrate what may be in store for Ukrainians once Poland becomes a member of the union.
On 1 January 1998 Poland began to enforce regulations requiring Russians and Belarusians seeking entry into Poland to have an invitation from a Polish citizen (verified by a Polish regional governor) or a voucher confirming they have sufficient funds to cover the costs of their stay in Poland. The new rules had an immediate negative impact on business at Poland’s many wholesale markets, especially those in Warsaw and Bialystok.

The regulations did not affect Ukrainians wanting to enter Poland because, as noted above, Poland and Ukraine in mid-1996 had signed an accord on visa-free travel that contains a readmission agreement (providing for the return of illegal immigrants to Poland from Ukraine and vice versa). In early February, however, the European Commission informed Warsaw that the EU expected Poland before the end of 1998 to introduce visa requirements for Ukrainians, as well as citizens from all other countries from which the union requires visas, including Russia and Belarus. The EU commissioner for the uniform market, Mario Monti, told the Poles that “Poland’s ability to tighten its eastern border will be one of the basic criteria for admitting Poland into the EU.”

The EU was forcing Warsaw to choose between meeting the obligations for membership in the union and Poland’s desire to play a role in pulling Ukraine, as well as Belarus and Russia, westward; the economic ties Polish firms have developed in these countries; and the people-to-people contacts that officials from Poland and Ukraine argue are necessary to overcome nationalistic prejudices. In short, the rules posed a test to claims of a strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine. Foreign Minister Geremek in late February told British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook (for the first half of 1998 the UK was EU president) that Poland would request agreement from the European Commission to continue visa-free travel from Ukraine. Warsaw will try to postpone implementation of visa regulations for Ukrainians until after Poland’s entry into the EU, which is not expected until 2002 at the earliest. Polish officials have promised their Ukrainian counterparts that they will try to devise a visa regime that meets EU requirements while also permitting ease of access to Poland for Ukrainians.
The requirements for Poland's EU membership threaten further to retard what Bohdan Osadchuk has called the "infrastructure" of the Polish-Ukrainian relationship: collaboration on a daily basis between broad numbers of Poles and Ukrainians. The reasons for the lack of this infrastructure include Polish popular mistrust of Ukrainians and an economic relationship that has not reached its full potential, mainly owing to the stagnation of economic reform in Ukraine. These two problems constitute further obstacles to a Polish-Ukrainian strategic partnership.

The Influence of the Past on the Present

Both Poles and Ukrainians, particularly west Ukrainians, suffered wrongs at the hands of members of the other nation in this century. Significant numbers of Poles and west Ukrainians remain reluctant to acknowledge such actions as anything more than just retribution for previous wrongs inflicted upon them by members of the other nation.

A mid-1996 opinion survey showed 60 percent of Poles still distrusted Ukrainians, indicating the continued presence of negative historical stereotypes reinforced by more than four decades of Polish communist propaganda, as well as works of Polish literature, such as those by Henryk Sienkiewicz. Such stereotypes have also persisted because ethnic Ukrainians, as a result of Operation Vistula, were resettled in the formerly German territories of western and northeastern Poland, where they came in contact with Poles who were resettled there from what is now western Ukraine.

Only in southeastern Poland, near Przemyśl, have such negative attitudes informed political action, though they explain the Sejm's failure to condemn Operation Vistula and redress its legal, moral, and material consequences. In 1991 a grass-roots organization of Poles, objecting to the transfer of the Church of St. Teresa to ethnic-Ukrainian Greek Catholics, occupied the building. The occupiers left the structure only in response to a plea from the pope, who gave the Church of the
Sacred Heart to the Greek Catholic Church for its cathedral. Ethnic Ukrainians in
1994 erected a monument in Hruszowice, near Przemyśl, to the Ukrainian Insurgent
Army; unknown vandals subsequently damaged the monument, to which Home Army
veterans and other nationalists had strenuously objected. In 1995 some Poles in
Przemyśl sought to block a Ukrainian cultural festival there, claiming it was an effort
to “Ukrainianize” the city (of Przemyśl’s 70,000 residents, a mere 5,000 are ethnic
Ukrainians); in June 1997 the Przemyśl city council temporarily delayed the festival
because organizers did not secure a permit, for which they had applied well in
advance. The Przemyśl city council in early 1997 also passed a resolution to erect
a monument to the victims of “Ukrainian nationalist organizations.” Teodozii Starak,
an adviser to the Ukrainian Embassy in Poland, in March 1997 said the erection of
such a monument would “greatly affect [bilateral] relations.”

Such actions incite Ukrainian nationalist feelings, especially just across the
border in L’viv. In spring 1997 the director of the Lychakivs’kyi Cemetery,
apparently exceeding his brief, ordered all sepulchral crosses, plaques, and
inscriptions removed from the graves of Polish students who died fighting for Polish
control of the city in 1918–1919. The director also halted a plan for the renovation
of part of the cemetery containing these graves—the “Eaglets’ Cemetery” (Cmentarz
Orłat)—presented by Poland’s Council for the Commemoration of the Memory of
Battles and Martyrdom. During a Kuchma-Kwaśniewski meeting in early January
1998, the sides agreed on a plan for the reconstruction of the cemetery, to be
completed by 1 November 1998. The work was not finished on time, but Kuchma
has promised it will be done as soon as possible. Vandals in September and October
1998 also defaced the cemetery’s central tombstone, evoking protests from the Polish
foreign ministry. At a demonstration by the Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian
National Self-Defense in L’viv in late June 1997, participants trampled upon and
ripped apart the Polish flag (they did the same to the Russian and Romanian flags).
The Polish Foreign Ministry requested that Kiev investigate the matter; the Ukrainian
Foreign Ministry formally condemned the incident.
In response to the Przemyśl city council measure regarding erection of a monument to Polish victims of Ukrainian nationalist organizations, Poland’s then Prime Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz proposed erecting a monument on the Ukrainian-Polish border to all victims of Ukrainian-Polish conflicts. More important, during Kwaśniewski’s state visit to Ukraine in May 1997, he and Kuchma signed a Joint Declaration by the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine on Agreement and Reconciliation. The document was negotiated over a period of many months, doubtless because the sides had to consider the political impact of acknowledging culpability for actions that large segments of each nation continue to consider morally justified. The declaration condemns, inter alia, Warsaw’s anti-Ukrainian policies in the interwar period, Stalinist persecutions of ethnic Poles in Ukraine in the 1930s, and the massacres of Poles in Volhynia in 1942–1943. It also refers to Operation Vistula as a “separate dramatic page in the history of our relations . . . which dealt a blow to the Ukrainian community in Poland.”71

The declaration is not a legal document, but it sets a moral tone for both societies through its appeal to Ukrainians and Poles to acknowledge that members of each nation acted wrongfully toward each other in the past—and that prior wrongs suffered at the expense of the other nation were no justification for retribution. The declaration, as well as Cimoszewicz’s proposal, testifies to the fact that tensions between Poles and ethnic Ukrainians have not become politicized at the national level in Poland; no Polish politician at that level has played the ethnic-Ukrainian card for narrow political gain.

The true test of the declaration will be whether the two governments devote the necessary resources to educating their peoples about the history of Ukrainian-Polish conflicts to the point where the average Ukrainian and the average Pole can admit that their nations each did harm to the other, particularly in this century. One sign of progress is the existence of a commission of Polish and Ukrainian historians to develop text materials on the history of the relationship between the two peoples. But Ukrainian and Polish leaders have not devoted sufficient attention, or resources, to public diplomacy efforts that would enhance mutual understanding between
average citizens. For most of the 1990s, for example, there was no Polish cultural center in Kiev and no Ukrainian equivalent in Warsaw because of legal and financial obstacles. To help overcome these hindrances, then Ukrainian prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko and Cimoszewicz in March 1997 decided that the Polish government would provide a building for a Ukrainian cultural center in Warsaw and the Ukrainian government would do the same for a Polish Center in Kiev. A Polish Institute has opened in the Ukrainian capital, but a Ukrainian counterpart has yet to do so in Warsaw. The payoff of such centers could be high: helping to overcome negative stereotypes and thereby enhancing the chances of building public support for close bilateral relations.

Economic Ties

Whenever Ukrainian and Polish leaders meet, they repeat, as though it were a mantra, the notion that such economic links as have been established do not meet the two countries’ potential. However, bilateral trade will not reach its full potential unless Ukraine implements the necessary economic reforms.

The last years of communist rule in both Poland and Ukraine brought stark economic declines. In countries undergoing a transition from state socialism to a market economy, inflation, a fall in output, and unemployment are inevitable as subsidies end, prices are liberalized, markets are deregulated, and foreign trade opens up. The more thoroughgoing the efforts at macroeconomic stabilization, the shorter the period of this economic decline. In Poland, the Balcerowicz reforms were quite forceful, bringing success after two years, as shown in table 1.
Table 1
Percent GDP Change Compared with Previous Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-12.1</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-7.6</td>
<td>-11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>+2.4</td>
<td>-17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>+3.8</td>
<td>-14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>+5.2</td>
<td>-24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>+7.0</td>
<td>-11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>+6.0</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>+6.9</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Ukraine faces economic problems far more serious than Poland’s. Not only was there an economic transition to be undertaken, but the Ukrainians also had to accomplish it while they were creating the political and economic institutions of an independent state. In addition, supplies and markets were disrupted with the breakup of the Soviet Union, much of whose economy was devoted to the production of military goods, for which demand has fallen considerably. Economic reform, to which there is serious political and bureaucratic resistance, lags far behind that in Poland. Table 1 tells the story in terms of GDP decline. The economy is different than it was in Soviet times, but it is not yet based on market principles. Crime and
corruption are rampant as well. The chief obstacle to the Ukrainian-Polish economic relationship is thus the huge disproportion between the two economies. In an economy such as Ukraine’s, people have little money, which reduces demand for foreign products. In Poland, moreover, the dominant view is that Ukraine is a very risky, although a potentially lucrative, market. Most Polish enterprises are not yet strong enough to be able to take the risk of entering this market. The danger of course is that by the time Polish firms gain such strength, or once Ukraine becomes less of a risk, stronger Western firms will have beaten Polish enterprises to the punch. More important, this economic weakness means that Ukraine has no hope of joining the EU for the foreseeable future. Unlike such former Soviet republics as Latvia and Lithuania, Ukraine has not even concluded an association agreement with the union. Kiev has had to settle for a partnership and cooperation agreement, which entered into effect on 1 March 1998.

Another problem is the transportation infrastructure. Until early 1998, there were only four border-crossing points for cars and trucks and six for railroad traffic; in 1996, 11 million people and 2.7 million vehicles traveled through these stations. The average distance between border-crossing points for cars and trucks was 132 kilometers (by contrast, at the Polish-German border the average is 24 kilometers). The wait to get through could take several days—a serious obstacle to economic intercourse, but one that will require considerable funding to overcome. A new border-crossing point for cars and trucks opened at Korchova-Krakowiec in early January 1998; it can accommodate 5,000 vehicles every twenty-four hours. However, if Ukraine wants to strengthen economic relations with the EU, and if Poland wants to lend it real help to do so, money will have to be found for additional improvements.

A third obstacle to trade has been the absence of a payments mechanism. Such a mechanism would eliminate intermediaries in settling accounts, which prolongs payment and increases costs. The establishment in Luts’k of the Polish Lubelski Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy is a step in the right direction; that bank intends to establish branches in Kiev, L’viv, Chernivtsy, and the industrial cities of
eastern Ukraine. Barter, however, still figures prominently in Ukrainian-Polish trade. As table 2 shows, this trade has risen significantly, though Poland’s exports to Ukraine account for only 4 percent of total Polish exports.

Table 2
Polish-Ukrainian Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Polish Exports (millions of dollars)</th>
<th>Polish Imports (millions of dollars)</th>
<th>Total (millions of dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>161.6</td>
<td>123.8</td>
<td>275.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>187.5</td>
<td>201.1</td>
<td>388.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>280.4</td>
<td>204.9</td>
<td>485.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>742.6</td>
<td>290.8</td>
<td>1,033.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>973.9</td>
<td>418.1</td>
<td>1,392.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1,200.0</td>
<td>415.5</td>
<td>1,615.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The figures in this table do not capture the full extent of trade; actual volume is much higher because there is a great deal of cross-border “suitcase” trade (the kind that occurs in Poland’s wholesale markets described above). In fact, in 1995 more than 4.7 million Ukrainians visited Poland, a large number of them to sell their wares in various cities. Suitcase trade, though it detracts from the profits of legitimate enterprises and thus is not subject to taxation, doubtless helps many families in Ukraine survive economically.
Polish-Ukrainian joint ventures in Ukraine number more than six hundred; the Polish government as of early 1997 had approved ninety-three companies with mixed Polish-Ukrainian capital, but it is unknown whether all were actually functioning. Most in each category are small trading firms. The production of Bizon combine harvesters in Kovel', however, could set an important precedent for larger projects.

Conclusion

I have argued that Poland and Ukraine, despite the claims of their leaders, do not yet share a strategic partnership. Obstacles have included Warsaw's pursuit of such goals as NATO membership while keeping Kiev at arm's length, which in turn left Ukraine in a relatively less secure position in the region; the legacy of distrust on the part of average Poles and west Ukrainians stemming from the ethnic and territorial conflicts between the two nations in the first half of this century; and the stagnation of economic reform in Ukraine.

What of the future? Can the two countries build a strategic partnership in any meaningful sense of the term? The chances are not very good. Poland's NATO membership will not be a hindrance so long as Ukraine remains committed to the closest possible relationship with the alliance short of full membership. Rather, Poland's adjustments to EU laws and policies will impose obligations on it that will impede relations with Ukraine (and other non-EU members). An equally serious problem lies in the economic sphere, where Poland is far ahead of Ukraine in building a Western-style economy—and is likely to move further ahead over the next few years owing to its efforts to adjust to EU strictures and because the late March 1998 parliamentary elections in Ukraine strengthened political forces opposed to reform. Arguably, had the various governments in Ukraine pursued economic reform more seriously, its chances of becoming an EU member in the next fifteen to twenty years would be higher, reducing the obstacles to a strategic partnership with Poland.
Absent such reform, it will be difficult for Kiev to pursue one of the goals to which the strategic partnership is to contribute: Ukraine's membership in the EU. In addition, as long as Ukraine remains an economic laggard in the region, Polish—and Western—businessmen will be unwilling to invest there because of excessive risk. Intensified economic ties would contribute to the emergence of another interest group on both sides, composed of those who do business in the other country, with a stake in the strengthening of the political relationship. To the extent that such relations have not reached their full potential, the opportunities for daily interaction between average Poles and Ukrainians, which in turn could contribute to the reduction of mistrust that Poles still feel for Ukrainians, are reduced.

Poland will continue to pursue close ties with Ukraine, which will welcome those ties as long as Western integration remains Kiev's declared policy. But the obstacles to a strategic partnership now lie mainly in Ukraine. Kiev's willingness to implement rigorous economic reform will determine whether Poland and Ukraine can move beyond the rhetoric to the reality of such a partnership.
Notes

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1. "'Pidvodymo rysku pid spil’nym mynyym i buduemo maibutne’," Vysoky Zamok, 18 March 1997.

2. See, for example, “Chto stoit za ‘chetverkoi’ Kuchmy?” Izvestiia, 24 February 1998.


9. For a fuller account, see Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, chap. 34.


15. We must not slight the influence of the novelist Henryk Sienkiewicz’s trilogy on seventeenth century Poland. According to Magocsi, “Sienkiewicz’s powerful if distorted stereotypes are what generations of Poles most readily remember when they think about Ukraine and Ukrainians.” See *A History of Ukraine*, 337.


20. Garnett discerns four regions in Ukraine in addition to the west: the east (Dnipropetrovsk, Donets’k, Luhans’k, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts), the south (Odessa, Kherson, and Mykolaïv), the center (from Kharkiv in the east to Khmel’nyts’kyi in the west), and Crimea. He adds that there is no real consensus on the number of regions; two other analysts argue that there are six and another specialist that there are eleven. See *ibid.*, 18.


25. The declaration was published in Rzeczpospolita, 13 November 1990.


30. Sherman Garnett outlines three sets of views among Russian policymakers regarding Ukraine. Only what he terms the accommodationist perspective seems
completely accepting of Ukraine’s independence within its current borders. This view is confined mainly to the reformers. Those holding the nationalist perspective, using ethnic, cultural, and historical arguments, assert claims to parts of Ukrainian territory; the nationalists would, however, leave to the Ukrainians a rump state of their own. The integrationist view, according to Garnett, commands the strongest support among Russian policymakers. Some who share it simply want stronger economic, political, and security ties between Russia and Ukraine; even so, such ties would restrict Kiev’s freedom of maneuver. Others want to rebuild a union of the former Soviet peoples. Still others believe Ukrainian independence will be short-lived and that Ukraine on its own will pursue reintegration with Russia. See Keystone in the Arch, 49–52.

Taras Kuzio writes that a “major obstacle to the process of [normalization of relations between Russia and Ukraine] was the continued inability of the majority of Russians to accept Ukrainians and Belarussians as separate ethnic groups with a right to statehood.” He notes that an American poll of ethnic Russians in the Russian Federation found that 75 percent were unable to accept that Ukrainians are a separate nationality with a right to independence. See Ukraine Under Kuchma: Political Reform, Economic Transformation, and Security in Independent Ukraine (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997), 197–206, esp. 198.

31. Hartmann, “Polens Ostpolitik und die Ukraine,” 954.


37. See n. 30.


44. See Garnett, Keystone in the Arch, 33–35.

45. CEI members, in addition to Ukraine, include the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Italy, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belarus, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania; the last four achieved membership at the same time as Ukraine.

46. “Komunikat po spotkaniu ministrów obrony,” Polska Zbrojna, 6–8 October 1995. The battalion was to have been created by 1997, but only in late November 1997 did the two defense ministries sign a document establishing the unit. One problem was


53. Kuzio, Ukraine Under Kuchma, 188.


55. Kuzio, Ukraine Under Kuchma, 189.


67. For the poll, see R. W., “Polak lubi Włocha i Francuzę,” ibid., 17–18 August 1996.


69. The Polish Senate condemned Operation Vistula in August 1990. The March 1997 issue of Kultura published an appeal regarding Operation Vistula signed by a group of Poles ranging from Jacek Kuroń and Adam Michnik on the left to Jan Olszewski and
Leszek Moczulski on the right. The signatories expressed “the hope that the Sejm of the Polish Republic will try, to the extent currently possible, to make amends for the wrongs” inflicted on ethnic Ukrainians in Operation Vistula. Members of the postcommunist SLD, as well as Home Army veterans and other nationalist groups, have opposed such a condemnation.

70. “Pidvodymo rysku pid spil’nym mynulym i buduemo maibutne.”

71. The declaration was published in Rzeczpospolita, 22 May 1997.


80. Ukrainian Prime Minister Valerii Pustovoitenko complained at a CEI meeting in November 1997 that the Polish-Ukrainian enterprise Bizon-Ukraine had limited itself to importing Polish combine harvesters into Ukraine. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Polish Deputy Premier Meets Bosnian Heads at CEI Summit,” PAP, 30 November 1997. On the other hand, twelve joint Polish-Ukrainian investment projects are in preparation. Marcin Szymaniak, “Do Europy bliżej przez Polskę,” Prawo i