Local Self-Government and Titular Regime Control in Russia's Republics, 1991-1999
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The Gorbachev era call for “all power to the soviets” initiated a period of reform of local government in the USSR and Russia. The USSR’s local soviets had served as political outreach instruments of party rule, enabling the state to penetrate society all the way down to the tiniest town and village. In the post-Soviet era, despite the reform efforts, local bodies have continued to exercise social control reminiscent of their predecessors, the local soviets.

The use of the institutions of local government as instruments of social control for political purposes has been particularly widespread in Russia’s ethnically defined republics. In these entities the ruling titular regimes, whose names the republics bear, have relied on local governing bodies to stifle opposition from marginalized nontitular groups. The institutional features that have facilitated the use of local governing bodies for social control are similar to those of the Soviet system. Local bodies tend to be dependent on the republics’ executive hierarchies in a manner reminiscent of democratic centralism; they project nationalist ideologies to the local populations; and they continue to concentrate important material or other tangible resources, making the local societies highly dependent on them.

In this essay I discuss the use of local government as an instrument of ethno social control based on examples from the republics of Adygeya and Bashkortostan. First, I describe the role of the local soviets in maintaining the political and social stability of the Soviet system through their control over the vast country’s populations. Second, I outline the post-Soviet reforms and suggest that the local bodies have continued to be perceived as social control organs by both federal and regional regimes. The empirical sections illustrate these arguments with field research in Adygeya and Bashkortostan. A final section provides further examples from other republics.

Local Self-Governing Bodies in the Soviet System

The Soviet state was founded and legitimized by the notion of “people’s rule” through the soviets. The soviets, or councils, from the Russian word sovet (advice), were conceived by Bolshevik ideologues as the primary institutions of government. These bodies, born during the workers’ uprising of 1905, when they functioned as strike committees, were greatly appreciated by Lenin, who likened them to the Paris Commune of 1871. From October 1917 onward, the slogan “All Power to the Soviets!” aided the Bolsheviks in capturing, establishing, and legitimizing power throughout much of the former empire.
The Soviet state was a multilayered federation with several administrative levels. While the representative bodies at all levels were called soviets, officially, the local government organs proper, or mestnye organy, were considered to be those below the union and autonomous republics. They included the oblasts, autonomous oblasts, okrugs, krays, the districts or rayony, cities, city boroughs, settlements or posyolki, and went all the way down to the villages, or syola.

Bolshevik and official Soviet propaganda juxtaposed the soviets to the representative institutions of Western “bourgeois democracy,” stressing the soviets’ truly popular nature as a government “of all the people” which ensured grass-roots contact between the average citizen and the state. At the inception of the Soviet Union, however, and during the maturation of the system, the soviets became merely the instruments of party dictatorship. This was achieved through the doctrine of democratic centralism and its institutional manifestations, as well as the nomenklatura system of appointments. The representative organs of the soviets became rubber-stamp bodies, since power was vested in the soviets’ executive committees, whose senior functionaries combined party posts with soviet work.

The centralized hierarchies performed an important political function. I here use the term “political” to refer to the partisan and ideological activities of the local bodies on behalf of the ruling regime. In political science literature, the term is often distinguished from “administration,” the ideal apolitical type of which is understood in the Weberian sense of impartial bureaucracies, which are recruited or appointed on the basis of merit and perform functions that ostensibly benefit the society as a whole, rather than a narrow political regime, party, or grouping.

The Bolsheviks regarded the soviets as political bodies because their role was to transmit the regime’s ideology to the population and to mobilize the public for political campaigns. Consider Trotsky’s enthusiasm for the Petrograd strike committee soviet during the 1905 revolution: “The soviet was the axis of all events, every thread ran towards it, every call to action emanated from it.” It “organized the working masses, directed the political strikes and demonstrations, armed the workers, and protected the population against pogroms.” The party, he wrote triumphantly, “succeeded . . . in transforming the Soviet—formally a non-party organization—into the organizational instrument of its own influence.”

At the same time the soviets became hyper-administrative agencies considering the socialist nature of the economy and the vast amount of micromanagement that was required. “The Soviet citizen,” wrote Theodore Friedgut, “who changes his residence, wants his boots resoled, or wants to buy new clothing will most likely have to deal with an agency of his local soviet.”
This administrative role had very powerful social implications. De Tocqueville observed: “Centralization of government acquires immense strength when it is combined with administrative centralization. Centralization in that way accustoms men to set aside their own wills constantly and completely.” Yet the soviets did not simply reproduce a system of social passivity; they created a system of forced dependence. The local populations, which the soviets controlled, had to “subject their own wills” not simply because they were made accustomed to be taken care of, but because of the sanctions they might suffer if they deviated from the regime line. The executive committees—which the soviets ostensibly elected, but which were subject to party nomination and control—were in charge of the so-called administrative regime, and they had jurisdiction over the territorial branches of the Ministry of Interior for its enforcement. Aside from coercive mechanisms, they, together with other state agencies, controlled the system of local material sanctions and rewards, like the distribution of housing and payment of salaries to local state employees.

Local Government Reform in Post-Soviet Russia

Gorbachev made the reform of the soviets a centerpiece of his agenda for political liberalization, and the reform of local government continued well into the Yeltsin era. Yet Gorbachev and his successors continued to look at the institution from the point of view of its political role. Under Gorbachev, local governments were expected to rally support for his liberal reforms. Yeltsin manipulated local governing institutions and their set-up according to their level of support for him and his policies. Following the August 1991 coup and the October 1993 crisis, the local soviets were accused of siding with the anti-Yeltsin forces. In October 1993 Yeltsin issued a special decree abolishing virtually all local soviets. Municipal power shifted to executives appointed by, and loyal to, the federal executive or regional regimes.

Yet another cycle of reform began in 1994–1995. Yeltsin had come to regard local self-government (LSG) as a potential check against increasing “legal separatism” and the consolidation of regional regimes. The various conferences and seminars sponsored by the Kremlin around the time of the passage of the 1995 Russian federal law On the Common Principles of the Organization of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation suggested the political and mobilizational role LSG was to perform, once again, in the country’s history.

Formally, the 1995 law was to mark a significant departure from the democratic centralist nature of the system of the soviets. The law represented a compromise between several drafts, most notably the so-called Dolgopolov versus
the Murav’ev drafts, supported by different groups of Duma deputies. The Dolgopolov draft attempted to depart radically from the Soviet system by making local government independent from state administration, while the Murav’ev draft stressed strong executive power and one-man management. Although the Duma adopted the Murav’ev draft in the first reading, in the end it was significantly influenced by the federal government. The final version of the law made local government separate from federal and regional state bodies of authority (art. 14.5). In an effort to extricate local government from the regional executive hierarchies, it also mandated the election of the heads of municipal organizations directly—by the population or by the respective local councils (arts. 16.1, 16.2).

Over six years later, the implementation of the law and other relevant legislation has been slow and patchy at best. This is particularly true for the ethnically defined republics. While the 1995 law made LSG independent of both federal and regional authorities, it continued to be controlled by the chief executives of the republics and their local appointees. As the examples of Adygeya and Bashkortostan demonstrate, local organs have come to play the role of control bodies vis-à-vis the local populations.

At this point it is important to discuss at some length the essence of the ethnic question in the republics. Because of the haphazard nature of reform of Russia’s Soviet-era federal structure, the “titular” versus “non-titular” question has remained highly salient in these entities. In the Soviet ethnofederation, the titular groups were those entitled to institutionalized “ethnic homelands,” which carried the names of designated ethnic groups. These entities—the autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and okrugs—in fact embraced extremely diverse ethnic populations; the actual percentage of the titulars in these areas did little to legitimize their sense of “ownership” of the quasi polities. On the eve of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, the non-titular populations, mostly Russians, constituted a majority in twenty out of the thirty-one ethnically defined units; the titular nationalities comprised majorities in only eight and a plurality in three of the entities. The ethnic diversity of these areas stemmed from centuries of migrations, imperial conquest, deportations, and resettlements. Stalin’s grand experiment with nation-building, whereby autonomies were created for some groups and not others, with seemingly little regard for the actual ethnic composition of the respective entities, served to add another layer of complexity to the autonomies’ already intricate ethnic mosaic.

The territorial administrative structure was preserved almost intact in post-Soviet Russia. Russia is now composed of eighty-nine constituent units. They include thirty-one ethnically defined units—republics, autonomous okrugs and
one autonomous oblast (Jewish). The remaining are non-ethnically defined oblasts, krays, and the two cities of federal significance—Moscow and St. Petersburg. The Russian constitution, adopted in 1993, recognises the equal status of all these entities.\textsuperscript{17} However, the ethnically defined former autonomous republics and oblasts, which were in 1991 elevated to the status of republics, managed to extract significant power-sharing concessions from Yeltsin. They were allowed to elect their own chief executives earlier than did the regions, adopted their own constitutions, and passed legislation that often institutionalized the predominance of the titular groups in republic-level power structures.\textsuperscript{18}

Consequently, because the non-titular groups have remained a sizeable presence in most of the republics, they have been a potent source of challenges to the titular regimes’ nation-building programs. Large percentages of the republics’ non-titular, mostly Russian-speaking populations tend to be concentrated in the urban capitals, but many, such as the ethnic Tatars in Bashkortostan, also have compact settlements in rural areas.\textsuperscript{19} The municipal bodies in such areas, genuinely independent from the ruling regimes, could have become institutional bases of opposition and challenge to the republics.

The non-titular challenge appears to be one of the reasons why the ethnic republics, as opposed to the non-ethnically defined regions, have been most reluctant to comply with Russia’s legislation on LSG and to give up their control over the municipalities. Not only have they obstructed federal efforts to make LSG genuinely separate from republic control; they have made it into an active instrument for the furtherance of titular regime power and the projection of ethnic ideologies onto the grass roots.

The following sections discuss the use of local government as an instrument of social control based on the cases of Bashkortostan and Adygeya. These republics were chosen according to the “most different” criteria.\textsuperscript{20} According to this method, if broadly similar phenomena could be observed in the “most different” cases, one would expect the other cases in between to conform to the same pattern. As Przeworski and Teune write, “if the subgroups of the population derived from different systems do not differ with regard to the dependent variable, the differences among these systems are not important in explaining this variable.”\textsuperscript{21} The two republics are broadly similar in terms of the main institutional variable—local government—which in the Soviet and post-Soviet systems was imposed from above by the central ideologues and lawmakers. They are also similar on the dependent variable, that is, their ethnic stability and the lack of sustained challenge to the rule of the non-titular populations. The similarities
allow for generalizations about the role of local institutions while controlling for other variables that make the cases "most different," such as the ethnic composition, culture, religion, and economic development.

Case Studies

Adygeya

Adygeya is one of Russia’s smallest republics, covering a territory of 7.6 thousand square miles. It is territorially landlocked in Krasnodar kray in the "red belt," which is part of a larger area in the south with mostly communist constituencies, and until 1990 was an autonomous oblast administratively subordinate to it. Unlike Bashkortostan, it is one of Russia’s poorest entities, heavily dependent on federal transfers. Of the population of approximately 450.5 thousand people, sixty-eight percent are Russians (including Cossacks), while only 22.1 percent are the titular Adyge. The remaining 10 percent is comprised of Ukrainians, Armenians, and a number of other numerically smaller ethnic groups.22

Like Russia’s other republics, Adygeya enjoyed a brief period of local government independence lasting from 1990 until the end of 1991. However, after the 1991 August coup, which Yeltsin believed to have been supported by the local soviets, many of them were disbanded, and the formerly elected local executives were to be appointed pursuant to the decrees of the newly elected Adyge president, Aslan Djharimov. These decrees and further executive initiatives were aimed at bringing the soviets under the control of the chief executive and his appointed figureheads.23

In March 1992, the decree on the Structure of Government and Certain Questions Related to the Activities of Executive Power Organs in Soviet Socialist Republic of Adygeya stipulated that "the heads of administration of cities, rayony, village, and town soviets form a unified system of executive power." The decree empowered the Adyge government to "suspend decisions of executive power organs of the territory of the Republic of Adygeya if they contradict the constitution and laws of the Republic of Adygeya and the Russian Federation, as well as dismiss the officials of these power organs should they violate the relevant legislation."24

The stress on the executive power was subsequently cemented in the 1992 Law on the President.25 This was followed by the establishment of a policing agency, a Control Group within the presidential administration to "monitor compliance with presidential decrees by ministries, administrations of cities and
regions." A special Provision on Disciplinary Responsibility of Heads of Administrations threatened dismissal of those failing to comply with presidential directives.

In October 1993, after the victory of the Yeltsin forces against the Khasbulatov RSFSR Supreme Soviet, which ostensibly had been supported tacitly by the local soviets, Djharimov, pursuant to federal directives, urged the abolition of the city and rayon soviets altogether and transferred their functions to the republic’s Supreme Soviet. This was followed by a decree transferring the responsibilities of the city and regional soviets to the appointed heads of administrations. Finally, the local self-government legislation distinguished between “local self-government” and “local government,” mestnoe samoupravlenie versus mestnoe gosudarstvennoe upravlenie. Another law provided for “local government,” or the appointment of administrators, in the cities of Maykop and Adygeysk and in the rayony, with “local self-government” proper relegated to the smaller administrative units of towns and villages.

Although mirroring federal initiatives to strengthen genuine local self-government—the election of heads of local administrations was incorporated into Adygeya’s 1995 constitution—elections of the heads of city and rayon administrations did not take place before 1997. When they did, it was only after a special decree had been passed stipulating that “heads of city and rayon administrations . . . bear personal responsibility for the state of discipline in . . . the cities and rayony in the Republic of Adygeya.” While the local councils, many of which were disbanded after 1993, were again popularly elected in 1995, they continued to be controlled by the local executives.

### Bashkortostan

The Republic of Bashkortostan differs from Adygeya in many ways, but its local government policies are broadly similar. Bashkortostan is located at the junction of the Urals and the Volga, the Povolzh'e geographic regions. Russia’s most populous republic, it is also one of the wealthiest in natural resources, most notably petrochemicals. Of the population of over four million people, Russians constitute 39.9 percent, Tatars 28.4 percent, and Bashkirs, 21.9 percent. The remaining population largely consists of Chuvash, Mary, and Ukrainians.

In Bashkortostan, local administrative heads began to be appointed in early 1992. The debates on local institutional reform and the strengthening of the republic’s executive hierarchy were linked to the adoption of a constitution and the prevention of widespread challenges to proposed legislation that was perceived to be discriminatory toward non-titular groups, such as the language law. A
decision of the presidium of the Bashkortostan Supreme Soviet cited the “need for executive discipline” and avoiding “local soviets . . . as arenas of clashing political opinions and platforms.” The Supreme Soviet then amended the local self-government law to allow “the presidium the right of appointment of heads of regional and city administrations and dismiss them at its initiative.” In turn, the heads of administrations of cities and regions were given the right to appoint those of lower administrative-territorial units. While the soviets would still be elected, henceforth the real decision-making and executive authority would lie with the appointed administrative heads. In a further move to undermine the representative organs, the new provisions also allowed the combining of the posts of the soviet chairmen and the head of administrations. This combination eliminated the remaining controls the soviets might have had over their executives.

The Mechanisms of Control

*The Administration.* How did the “executivization” of local government after 1992 affect ethn-social and ethnopolitical dynamics in the two republics? The following discussion of local governing bodies’ organization and functions illustrates how they are used as mechanisms of political and ideological control much as they were in the Soviet system.

The post-1991 structural reforms substantially affected the lines of accountability—both formal and informal—of local executive and legislative bodies. These factors in turn influenced the nature of the business of local self-government and perceptions of its role. Unlike council members, the heads of administrations (HAS), by virtue of their appointment from above, were now linked into the “formal” structures of accountability and control. They were self-proclaimed “tough administrators.” They tended to have pursued careers in the party and local soviet *ispolkom* (executive committee) hierarchies. The other executives in the local administrations, appointed by the HAS, had similar careers as administrators. As late as 1999, local administrations in both Adygeya and Bashkortostan were staffed by such members of the former party and state apparat. These individuals were largely selected for loyalty, demonstrated by their failure to engage in activities in opposition to the titular regimes.

Take Anatoliy Baranov, the deputy head of Ufa’s city administration, an archetype of the loyal administrator who had risen through the party ranks and soviets’ administration. Baranov had worked in the *obkom* (oblast party committee) for a number of years prior to being elected to the Ufa soviet, then re-elected in 1990, 1995, and 1999. As chairman of the soviet, he is also deputy head of administration, which is a full-time administrative post. Baranov was
apparently never involved in political opposition campaigns during the democratic and non-titular upsurge of the early 1990s or subsequently, when the regime strove to consolidate its power.

Baranov views the mission of city government as service, rather than politics, meaning the representation of partisan interests. He criticizes Ufa’s highly politicized city soviet, elected in 1990 in the context of Gorbachev’s reform of the Soviet system, and contrasts it with the more businesslike councils elected subsequently. The 1990 city soviet, he says, “has for two years suffered from the malaise of politics, that is, we, deputies, at the time tried to give a political assessment of what was happening in the country, the republic, to a greater extent; and to a lesser extent paid attention to processes happening in the city from the point of view of creating normal conditions for life.” Finally, he concludes, “the soviet started to deal with the stuff that the representative organ is supposed to be doing—city administration.”

The power of the administration vis-à-vis the council was also augmented by the administrators’ increased specialization and the variety of social services they are supposed to be responsible for. This responsibility has reportedly increased in recent years, in response to a shortage of local funds for basic services and mounting social problems. Despite efforts at privatization, most former state assets continue to be in state hands. This means that salaries to local enterprise employees are paid out of municipal budgets. The budgets in turn depend on levels of funding from the republic. Local administrators claim that the functions of local governments in Russia are substantially wider that those exercised by municipalities in the West. The views of Baranov, who frequently travels to Ufa’s sister city in Germany, Halle, are typical:

When we are, say, in the West and ask a burgomaster or a mayor, what do you do if some food products are absent in a shop? he stares and says: “What do I have to do with this? Not my problem.” Here, in contrast, we are responsible for all now . . . in conditions when in our country the redistribution of property has not occurred, and when the main share of the property remains in state hands. . . . In the West, he [the mayor] is not concerned with how enterprises are working, and firms, companies. It is not his problem. It is the problem of those who work there, who own it, who founded it. Here in contrast we have a headache today about this too, because today we don’t have a real owner, it appears that everybody is the owner.”
Baranov’s equivalent in Maykop’s city administration, Sergey Stel’makh, maintains in a similar vein: “All the questions in the city have to be regulated by the authorities. Only in this case one can talk of real power, beginning from the birth of a child and ending with the lack of bread in the shops.”

Authorities at the republic level manipulate their control over local budgets as a means of political influence. “If the mayor shows independence toward the republic, the republic will say: handle the payment of the salaries yourself,” claims Baranov. Anecdotal evidence of the potential for such manipulation is supported by a recent World Bank-sponsored study of patterns of revenue distribution within the ethnically-defined republics. It shows that the republics strongly conform to the redistributive pattern of revenue allocation, in which decision-making authority over local expenditures is concentrated in the republics’ central organs. The study contrasts this with “Russian,” that is, non-ethnically defined, regions, where local governments retain more local revenue and possess much greater levels of authority over it. Such fiscal control enhances the republics’ institutional levers of influence over their localities, including the rich urban capitals.

The administrations, in turn, manipulate the disbursal of funds to enterprises in what has been observed in other regions as well and described as “pseudo-socialist activities.” Enterprise managers then manipulate their control over payment of salaries to individual employees by threatening that payments could be withdrawn should employees fail to vote for the regime during elections or engage in opposition activities.

The municipalities’ social responsibilities are likewise much greater than in the West. “In contrast to the West,” maintains Baranov, “when salaries are not paid here, even at privatized enterprises . . . workers come here, criticizing the administration: ‘Why don’t you pay us salaries?’ We have to interfere.” This view echoes the observations of scholars of local politics in other regions. In Sverdlovsk oblast, for example, during a student demonstration, “the demands of the students concerning the reform of higher education were directed at the mayor and the governor, even though these officials were not included in the formulation of that series of reforms.” Control of the budget, as well as the belief that the local government is omnipotent in social affairs, facilitate the threat, or imposition, of sanctions for deviating behavior. As mentioned above, these punishments could range from the withdrawal of salaries, to dismissal, to the initiation of criminal investigations.
The Local Councils. The local councils, disbanded after 1993, were again elected pursuant to new federal and republic legislation. Although power was now vested in the administrative bodies, the councils preserved formal authority over a number of important areas, such as the approval of local budgets. No formal mechanisms for the removal of local councillors had been put in place. Increasingly, however, local council members tended to be part of what may be referred to as both the formal and the informal frameworks of control and accountability. The formal lines of accountability stem from the failure of effective separation between the executive and legislative branches of power, Bashkortostan being a notorious example of this. Local councillors, like members of the republic-level legislature, are allowed to hold an executive post in the local administration of one municipality and at the same time be a councillor in another municipality. As full-time appointees in local administrations, they are primarily accountable to the bodies that appointed them, rather than to the council which they serve part-time. Aside from those formally under direct control of the executives, one can distinguish several categories of those within the “informal” control networks.

The Ufa City Soviet, elected in 1999, can serve as an example of the predominance of deputies who hold important positions within various professional networks (see figure 1). Out of fifty-eight elected deputies, most have the following professional affiliations. There are five (8.6 percent) directly connected to council administrations. Almost a quarter (24.1 percent) are heads of medical establishments—a general trend in Russia, which remains to be explained. Seventeen (29.3 percent) are managers or heads of state or private enterprises; and eight (13.8 percent) are heads of educational institutions, mostly schools. The council also has one head of administration of a lower region.

The above deputy corps could be divided into five categories. The first is made up of those forming part of the common system of executive power, such as the head of administration and other local executives. In the second category are directors or managers of state enterprises, who tend to be appointed by the republic’s Cabinet of Ministers, or conclude contracts with it. This group is subject to both formal and less formal accountability. The informal one stems from their vulnerability to the tax inspectorate, the police, and other “force” agencies, which may or may not be de jure subordinate to the republic or local administrations, but are de facto under the control of local HAs. The next category is the so-called business entrepreneurs, that is, heads of private enterprises, and there are several of those in the council. An examination of their activities and affiliations reveals that they tend to perform services vital to the city. Deputy Voropaev, for example, runs an enterprise for sanitary and technical works and

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has an exclusive contract with the city to do so. His dependence on the administration is an informal one, as he is subject to material rewards, rather than direct accountability.

Figure 1: Composition of the Ufa City Soviet, 1999

Aside from managers, the two largest groups of deputies are heads of medical and educational establishments. In coding the various categories, I made the distinction between doctors and teachers on the one hand, and heads of hospitals and schools, on the other. The distinction is an important one that prevents the grouping of the latter into the broader “teacher” and “doctor” or “professional” and “intelligentsia” categories. The “colonization” by these two groups, which has increased in the Ufa council from 1995 to 1999, and is observed in the Maykop 1995 council as well, is an interesting phenomenon. Some local interviewees believe that their electoral success stems from the generally high priority accorded to health care and education. School directors and hospital heads are successful at convincing the electorate that council positions would benefit the respective institutions in the form of greater financial and other
rewards. They may thus represent certain large "lobby" groups in the council, aggregating the preferences of their constituencies. However, hospital heads, as a local councillor maintained, are not mere doctors; they are entrepreneurs, "tsars and gods" within their institutions.\textsuperscript{50}

Although school directors could not be described as entrepreneurs, they are the most powerful individuals within their institutions and enjoy status and prestige in the republics’ educational hierarchies. The high representation of these figures in the local councils is unlikely to be accidental. The "selectorates" that operate in local council elections in many of the republics and regions are well known, and manipulations of electoral outcomes range from vote rigging, to the so-called dirty PR often sponsored by the republics’ leaders or their loyalists, to other forms of pressure on the electorate to vote for candidates supported by the regime.\textsuperscript{51}

This is not to deny that constituents’ preferences are also articulated in the elections. However, because of the high dependence of the electorate on the notables, the regime can influence voters by selectively allocating subsidies or other material aid to the institutions that the loyalists control, such as schools, universities, and hospitals.

These loyalists have significant influence within the respective professional networks, and they actively use it to foster support for the regime. Hospital staffs, for example, are in regular contact with district voters. Unlike countries with privatized health care, Russian hospitals continue to be attached to districts, and patients are assigned according to their \textit{propiska}, or residence permit. Those who opt for free health care, have to go through the local hospital, rather than to a doctor of their own choosing. I was told that prior to the 1999 Ufa council election, doctors campaigned for the election of their candidates while on duty.

The same holds true for school heads. One is attached to a school according to where one holds the \textit{propiska}, although since 1991 some flexibility has been introduced into the system, and there are more private schools now than before. However, most people continue to send their children to the official state schools. School heads can exercise leverage as to who gets in, attends what classes, grades, and so forth. In Bashkortostan, Adygeya, and elsewhere, school heads become important in the political process. Schools are used as polling stations during the elections. They are also a convenient media for information and agitation. Both school heads and hospital heads are subject to formal and informal lines of accountability. School heads are appointed through the local administrations’ \textit{nomenklature}; heads of hospitals are appointed either by local administrations or by the Ministry of Health.

What unites all the above categories is (1) their formal or less formal dependence on the executive chain of command; and (2) their key positions
within organizations representing business, social, professional, and other networks. The lines of accountability continue downward as we move on to the next level. The most straightforward formal control framework is the control over appointments within the organization, vested in the respective heads or managers. The second, an informal one, is the control over salaries. Heads of municipal organizations do not control this, but local administrators do. Heads of institutions inform the staff of the sanctions that they might suffer should they not support the regime, such as the withholding of the payment of salaries. These heads, considering their regular network contacts, status, and influence, are thus notoriously crucial players in the local political process. Finally, one could also infer that social sanctions might be applied to those within these professional networks who engage in opposition activism, since as a result, the whole organization might be penalized. People involved in opposition activities generally keep quiet about them for fear of sanctions and of undermining their associates and family members; those who donate money for such activities do not disclose their identities or professional affiliations for the same reason.

Figure 2: Composition of the Maykop City (Capital of Adygeya) Representative Assembly, 1995
The Maykop City Representative Assembly, elected in 1995, is broadly similar in its composition to the Ufa City Soviet in that it has a large proportion of local “notables,” as well as regular state employees (see Figure 2). It is, however, more diverse in its composition, reflecting the more competitive electoral process in the republic. Out of the council’s twenty deputies, the largest single category is heads of educational establishments, with 20 percent; heads of hospitals constitute 5 percent; 10 percent are managers. Teachers, who are kontraktniki (depend on municipal contracts), make up 10 percent, and workers 15 percent. There is one voluntary association member, and three are engineers. The “other” category includes four pensioners and one deputy listed as unemployed.

The council’s municipal employees and managers (45 percent) are subject to the same structures of control as in Bashkortostan. The body is known to have been much less vocal in criticizing the Adyge regime compared to its predecessor, elected in 1990. The communists have a large presence in the council, but their opposition has been limited to economic concerns. Still, considering its diversity, the council is freer of administrative constraints that the Ufa City Soviet. One of its deputies, Stasev, was active with the opposition group Union of Slavs of Adygeya in 1990–1992 and has continued to cooperate with the union throughout the 1990s. As the head of a small private enterprise, Stasev is less vulnerable to sanctions than the other deputies.

Ideaologies and “Mentalities.” Local governing bodies continue to perform important ideological functions, which acquire particular salience in the republics’ multiethnic settings. Ideology here is understood as an elaborate official doctrine designed to justify a given political line or regime and increase mass support for it while stigmatizing alternative views. The straightforward ideological function is the projection of nationalist ideologies to the local populations through special cultural or other departments in the municipalities.

Local administrators also practice a more subtle and seemingly politically free form of public agenda-setting. Examples are the juxtaposition of “tough administrators” or pragmatists (kreپkie khozymastvenniki, or pragmatiki) to the so-called political amateurs, and the stigmatization of opposition activism as threatening to undermine a “fragile social consensus.”53 Such forms of regime self-legitimization could not exactly be described as ideologies. Juan Linz, in his study of authoritarianism, describes them as “mentalities,” designed to justify a given regime and to influence public perceptions thereof.54 The following sections illustrate the usage of both nationalist ideologies and “mentalities” to influence non-titular public opinion in local settings in Adygeya and Bashkortostan.
Consider the example of Viktor Chernenko, the head of administration in Severovostochnye Sady, a town located some five kilometers outside the city of Maykop, with a population of 3300, mostly Russians, Ukrainians, and Armenians. Chernenko is a popularly elected head of the larger Kirovsky village district, to which Sady belongs. Republic functionaries like to describe him as a rebel and as testimony to the need to appoint, rather than elect, local heads of administrations even at the township levels. He is known to have fought for a larger budget for the district and has openly opposed the higher Maykop rayon HA. Chernenko is a renegade, and only one other HA of his kind apparently exists in Adygeya. This in itself indicates the submissive status of the other local HAs. Close scrutiny reveals that Chernenko, in fact, operates under a system of tough constraints, both formal and informal, and in many ways plays by the rules. His conflicts with the republic and rayon bodies have largely been over administrative matters, and he has kept ethnicity out of local government as best as he could.

The formal constraints stem from an amendment to local self-government law specifically aimed against local functionaries like him. The amendment, passed in June 1999, allows rayon heads of administrations to nominate local HAs from among local council deputies. According to another proposed amendment the popularly elected HAs may be removed, subject to recommendations of the rayon administration. Chernenko’s battles with the rayon head thus risk his position when he runs for re-election. The local budget, almost completely dependent on allocations from the Maykop rayon, is the most important informal constraint on his actions. Chernenko claims that his hand is constantly outstretched: “All the time we go to him [the rayon HA] and ask: ‘give, give.’”

According to Chernenko, the rayon administration is quick to use this lever of influence. It also fosters the strong sense among the local population that Chernenko’s political conflicts with the higher bodies affect on their own social and material well-being. “If the head of the rayon is unhappy, then who would be the first to suffer? He will definitely deprive us of something—like will not sponsor the building of a new road, will not give for the telephone line, gas, water . . . such is the mentality of the people. Since he [Chernenko] is not friendly with the rayon head that means he will have problems.” Local public opinion is shaped by the one major rayon newspaper, which is subsidized by the appointed rayon administration and reflects its views. It also, according to Chernenko, has tried to organize a campaign against him. Chernenko claims he
does not subscribe to it because of its biased nature; he says the paper refuses to publish his views despite his position. He would have loved to have his own paper, but lacks funds in the local budget to run it.

When ethnically sensitive issues come on the agenda, Chernenko feels more constrained by the preferences of the republic-level authorities than by those of his constituency. An example is a local controversy involving the repatriation of ethnic Adyge from Kosovo. A new Adyge village was to be built in Chernenko’s district. As the head of Kirovskiy administration, Chernenko claimed he and not the higher authorities had jurisdiction over the chosen area. Moreover, he claimed, the local populace was supposed to have had a major role in this decision. The republic, he maintained, “created a commission and I wasn’t included in it. They [the republic authorities] decided the matter in advance. They came here, measured [the land] and then came to me and said: sign [the authorization to construct the houses].” Chernenko’s initial reaction was twofold: to get the people involved, to rally them behind his view of the unjust nature of the decision; and to point to the ethnic dimension of the issue. In fact, he initially refused to sign the document: “I say: I am sorry, this is against the law, I have to gather people and see if my people want to live nearby. Practically, there is only one Cherkes [Adyge] aul’ [village] in the district.” Chernenko was thus pointing to the potential problem of close coexistence of the various ethnic communities. He also implied that the imposition of another Adyge settlement would undermine the numerical predominance of the non-titular populations in the area, fueling further hostilities between the respective communities.

Ultimately, Chernenko refrained from mobilizing the community against the proposed Adyge settlement. I asked him if he ended up having a skhod (township meeting). He laughed out loud: “Who would . . . allow that sort of a thing!” he exclaimed. Although the HA is not required to ask for permission to hold a skhod, his response indicates his anticipated reaction and the constraints he felt against such a meeting. When he did mention it to the upper-level functionaries, they explicitly warned him against “inciting ethnic tensions.” They also pointed out the material benefits—or penalties—that might follow from his actions.

The idea that the republic-level authorities are repositories of social and ethnic harmony is frequently propagated throughout Russia’s republics and is often used to silence opposition to policies perceived to be discriminatory or unjust by the non-titular ethnic communities.

The Sady case also illustrates how the republics rely on the resources that they control to selectively reward or penalize local communities. The Adege republic authorities controlled resources, which Chernenko lacked, such as the
possibility of providing the community with gas. If Chernenko had mobilized the towns that he controlled in opposition to the authorities, he risked depriving them of certain benefits as well as the loss of his own status and position. The result was the suppression of opposition from below to the policies of the titular regime.

In Bashkortostan, not only do local governing bodies suppress potential ethnic challenges from below; they actively transmit Bashkir nationalist ideologies to the local non-titular populations. The policies of the local administration in the town of Chakmagush illustrate this point. The town lies some 120 kilometers northwest of Bashkortostan’s capital, Ufa. The town’s 10,000-strong population is overwhelmingly Tatar, and Tatar is the predominant language. Although the official percentage is lower (82 percent), its residents claim that as much as 95 percent of the population is ethnic Tatar.

The deputy HA is Damira Altafovna Kazykhanova. She is the local equivalent of Anatoliy Baranov in Ufa. She self-consciously maintains the air of “professionalism”; her jargon is reminiscent of the Soviet-era Komsomol or party functionaries. She talks about the need to “work with cadre” and the nomenklatura, the need for professionalization of local government.

The deputy HA is not just there to “professionalize” local government, however, or indeed to suppress any potential conflicts from entering or expanding in the public domain. Instead, she combines this function with an ideological role, aimed at ostensibly preserving “interethnic peace and the development of culture of those living in the region.” Kazykhanova, an ethnic Tatar, is the head of the ispolkom, or executive committee, of the regional Chakmagush branch of the republic-sponsored Kurultay (congress) of Bashkirs. The ispolkom’s main function, according to her, is to promote Bashkir culture in the region, particularly the introduction of the Bashkir language in local schools. Instruction until now has been voluntary, although parents are encouraged to send the children for bilingual classes. Furthermore, she maintains:

The Bashkir Kurultay is also concerned with the study of the genealogical tree. And truly, on close inspection of this genetic tree, one discovers that in the olden times, naturally, it was the Bashkirs who lived here. . . . We even organized and held a scientific conference. The Bashkir Kurultay invited scientists from the state university . . . and people from the central archives, archaeologists. . . . And we came to the conclusion that Bashkirs lived here in these villages. So in the future, should parents wish, . . . if there is such a wish among parents and children, they should learn the Bashkir language.
She concludes:

Therefore, we have to promote this genealogical tree, classes in the history and culture of Bashkortostan, so a pupil will know his genealogical tree and will think and reflect, and each parent will have to know . . . not forcibly, but with the help of explanatory work.

Ideological control and projection here is facilitated with the help of *nomenklatura*, which serves the same function as it did in Soviet times. The person in charge of *nomenklatura*, Akhmatziya Fayazovich Khafizov, has the rank of deputy head of administration for cadres. His function: “The selection, placement, and upbringing of the cadres.”57 Khafizov maintains personal files (*lichnye dela*) for top administrative posts in the area, as well as reserve cadre. These are in turn divided into three categories: those appointed by the head of administration, those appointed “in consultation with the HA,” and the chairmen of collective farms, who, although formally elected, are usually recommended by the administration as well. “Incidentally,” proudly remarks Khafizov, “there was not a single case when the cadre recommended by us had been turned down.” Overall, the *nomenklatura* includes 113 appointive posts ranging from the heads of the lower-level soviets, to heads of municipal enterprises and such agricultural service enterprises as Agropromservice and Agropromtrans, to directors of cultural institutions, and the regional media and school heads. The latter are scrutinized before the administration’s commissions every year and their reappointment is coordinated with the HA. Heads of the branch offices of the so-called force agencies, such as the MVD (Ministry of Interior), although nominally subordinate to the respective ministries, work under the direct control of the HA. “It has to be like this,” maintains Khafizov, since “one man rule, *edinonachalie*, brings discipline.”

**Theoretical Reflections**

It is now important to step back and reflect theoretically and comparatively on the details presented in the above sections. On the face of it, the institutional changes that were introduced into local government in 1992—such as the appointment, rather than the at-large election, of local administrators—were similar to those made during the late 19th–early 20th century Reform Movement in America, with the goal of driving partisanship and politics out of local self-government altogether. The reformers wanted to professionalize LSG by extricating it from local and state-wide machine politics. The reduction of
partisanship was to be achieved through the appointment of nonpartisan professional administrations by local government boards or other ostensibly impartial agencies, and through elections to local councils on an at-large basis. New accountability structures, in line with Weber’s postulates, would produce rational bureaucratic functionaries, as opposed to those beholden to partisan political interests. The effects of these broad changes on public life have been well documented and studied.\textsuperscript{58} Reformed local governments ostensibly produced a more efficient and consensual style of administration, in which policies were implemented with greater facility and less political conflict. This role was arguably particularly salient in ethnically and racially diverse urban settings, where administrators were discouraged from playing the ethnic card, on the one hand, while on the other, the social constituencies were less likely to manipulate LSG for ethnic purposes.

In the West, driving partisanship out of local government and centralizing executive control have been generally viewed as a means to achieve efficient local administration. A city cannot run effectively, according to Banfield, without a large degree of centralization since there would be too many “civic controversies.”\textsuperscript{59} As I have noted above, similar views have been propagated by executives in the republics. According to another view, such as that of Bachrach and Baratz, however, the “depoliticization” of local bodies could in fact represent the concentration of political decision-making in the hands of a narrow group of powerful local actors.\textsuperscript{60}

One can distinguish two ways in which this result is achieved. The first is the prevention of conflicts and issues from becoming public. According to Bachrach and Baratz, “to the extent that a person or group—consciously or unconsciously—creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power.”\textsuperscript{61} The second, related method is the employment of the institutional and informal mechanisms for centralization that “non-partisanship” brings about, for the attainment or enforcement of political, policy, or public agenda-setting aims.

The institutional mechanisms include formal lines of accountability and subordination. The informal mechanisms would involve potential material rewards or other informal sanctions. Banfield refers to these as “structures of control.” He writes: “When two or more actors come under the control of another on a continuing basis, i.e., from proposal to proposal, a structure of control exists.” This would include the mayor’s control over the city council, the newspaper’s control over “civic leadership,” and the governor’s control over the legislature. According to Banfield, “centralization of control therefore necessitates a linkage of structures where structures exist.”\textsuperscript{62}
The preceding case studies have identified the formal and informal structures of control that exist in the republics. The most straightforward structure is the vertical chain of executive power. The president appoints heads of administrations, who in turn appoint the executives within local administrations. Formal executive control also largely extends to the legislature. While in municipalities with strong mayors the mayor tends to influence the decision-making of the representative bodies, here a large percentage of local councillors are subject to direct lines of executive accountability in their professional capacities as appointed functionaries, as discussed above. As such, they are subject to substantial pressures to conform to the preferences of the local executive. These councillors, in turn, extend the structure of executive control to those subordinate and accountable to them within the large enterprises or other organizations that they head.

The executives do not exercise formal control over social agencies. However, they have jurisdiction over activities and functions crucial for their work. This allows for the silencing of opinions contrary to those of the most powerful actors and for the prevention of their public airing.

The linkage of the structures of control is further exercised through the “private-regarding” and “public-regarding” benefits controlled by the power elite. Banfield defines the two categories as follows: (1) “Power which makes its effect by offering gains or losses which the responding actor values for his own sake or for the sake of some small private circle belonging to him (e.g., family, friends).” (2) “Power which makes its effect by offering gains or losses which the responding actor values for the sake of something (e.g., value, group, public) that transcends (although it may include) him and his small private circle.”63 Usually, according to Banfield, power is not spent; it is invested. In other words, it is the threat of sanctions and the constant promise of the flow of rewards, which make the actual imposition of sanctions redundant.

We now return to the question of agenda-setting. As examples from Bashkortostan and Adygeya demonstrate, control of public agenda-setting is crucial for this system of sanctions and rewards, particularly for “public-regarding” power. Local governing bodies through their spokesmen and newspapers spread information about potential public sanctions. Opposing the regime or engaging in nationalist activism are presented as threatening the community with the loss of material rewards. They are also said to threaten nontangible value systems like “ethnic peace” and “social harmony.” This also represents a system of indirect control over the public associations, their public relations, and the resulting levels of social support they might get from those they purport to represent.
Evidence from Other Republics

Can we generalize from the above two cases to Russia’s other republics? A detailed investigation of local governing practices in the other republics is beyond the scope of this essay. However, factual data on local government make-up and composition, as well as studies of other regions, allow us to make some generalizations. It also offers possibilities for comparative research along a number of dimensions.

Figure 4 contains official information from the Central Electoral Commission (TsIK) on the composition of local governing bodies in Russia’s republics in 1998. (Bashkortostan was not listed in the report, and Ingushetia had abolished its local governing bodies.) The figures show the continued “executivization” of local councils, as well as the predominance of the managerial elite.64 State and municipal employees form large proportions of the local deputy corps in all the republics. In Altay, for example, they constitute over half of all councillors, and almost a third in Buryatiya. Heads of enterprises, many of whom, as noted above, are dependent on the state in one way or another, constitute close to or over half of the deputy corps in Altay, Buryatiya, Kalmykiya, and Chuvashiya.

At the same time, heads of local administrations continue to be fused into local hierarchies and to be dependent on the republic’s chief executives. The Kremlin’s efforts to ensure compliance with the 1995 law on local self-government, which mandates the election of local executives, have resulted in some de jure modifications, but in practice, the republics have continued to sabotage this requirement and have devised nuanced ways of evading it. For example, according to TsIK’s report on local government in the republics, all Adygeya’s local governing bodies are popularly elected, while those of Tatarstan are ostensibly elected by the councils.65 Most of the republics in the manual, in fact, appear to have complied with the law by either electing HAs popularly or through the local councils. A careful reading of the republics’ laws on local government reveals a different picture. Adygeya appears to be a typical example: as described above, it has introduced an elaborate distinction between local state government and local self-government.66 It can thus claim that all its local governing bodies are elected. However, the most important local figure, the mayor of Maykop, is legally part of local state government and not local self-government, and is a minister in Adygeya’s government. He thus forms part of the republic’s executive chain of authority.
Figure 3: Composition of Local Representative Bodies in Russia’s Republics, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Total LSG Deputies</th>
<th>Employed Full-time in LSG</th>
<th>Nominated by Electoral Blocks</th>
<th>State and Municipal Employees</th>
<th>Enterprise Heads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adygeya</td>
<td>432,046</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altay</td>
<td>190,831</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buryatiya</td>
<td>1,038,252</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuvashiya</td>
<td>1,338,023</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagestan</td>
<td>1,802,188</td>
<td>5156</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1053</td>
<td>749</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabardino-Balkariya</td>
<td>753,531</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalmykia</td>
<td>322,579</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>378</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachay-Cherkessiya</td>
<td>414,970</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kareliya</td>
<td>790,150</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khakasiya</td>
<td>566,861</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komy</td>
<td>1,250,847</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary El</td>
<td>749,332</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mordovia</td>
<td>963,504</td>
<td>5478</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>784</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Ossetia</td>
<td>632,428</td>
<td>1055</td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>152</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakha (Yakutiya)</td>
<td>1,094,065</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>191</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatarstan</td>
<td>3,641,742</td>
<td>6937</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyva</td>
<td>308,557</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udmurtiya</td>
<td>1,605,663</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data on local government make-up and case studies of Russia’s other regions—both republics and the non-ethnically defined entities—also indicate that local governing bodies’ control over public and associational life is a widespread phenomenon. These special mechanisms of control reinforce the existing levers of influence over local constituencies, discussed above. The data suggest that social and political processes in the localities occur from the top down, which differs from pluralists’ assumptions. Even pluralist scholars of Russia’s local government have noted the under representation of parties and civic groups in local councils. Figure 4 reveals that organized social and political interests continue to be weakly represented in local bodies, and in many cases are not represented at all. Instead, as several studies demonstrate, local bodies control, sponsor, or suppress organized social interests.
Neil Melvin’s study of Omsk revealed the existence of forms of “civic corporatism” in the region. In Novgorod, which Petro hailed as a “Russian success story,” the showcase of democracy compared to Russia’s other constituent entities, civic associations are co-opted into a government-sponsored “Social Chamber.” In the ethnic republics, as the Bashkortostan elite-sponsored Bashkir Kurultay shows, often only the nationalist associations sponsored by the regime are allowed to exist, and their ideologies are projected into the grass roots through the local bodies. These examples of civic and political corporatism at a local level support the thrust of studies of regional-level politics regarding the generally controlled nature of much of political and social activism in Russia’s localities. It has been shown, for example, that political parties emerge concomitantly with regional institutional elite cleavages and disappear when the elite contests are over. The present study supports the thrust of these arguments, while also suggesting how the political preferences of the regional elite are enforced at very local, grass-roots levels.

Conclusion

Despite a decade of local government reform in Russia, a path-dependent view of the political role of these bodies is appropriate. Similar to the soviets in the Soviet system, the local governing bodies in Russia’s republics perform important control functions vis-à-vis the grass roots. The mobilizational role of local government has been fostered by the federal center, which regarded and continues to regard it as an important political and ideological tool. The reforms enacted by the federal center in view of this role have played into the hands of the republics’ regimes, which have looked at local bodies as the instruments for the exercise of titular regime power. Like the earlier soviets, the local bodies are packed with regime loyalists who control industrial, educational, recreational, and other networks. They influence these networks with the help of the local bodies’ agenda-setting power and its control over municipal resources, such as salaries.

Local government continues to play an important political role under the new Putin administration. Initially leaning toward Yeltsin’s strategy of strengthening the independence of local government to counter regionalism and separatism, Putin subsequently favored the option of possible removal of local mayors by both the federal executive and the regional authorities. The latter option is doubtless a concession to the regions to lessen their obstruction to his efforts to curb their powers. These measures are likely to result in further
executive centralization of control at local levels. As such, local government in Russia will continue to play a role greatly different from the one ascribed to it by normative theorists of the rule of the grass roots.
Notes

This paper was originally presented at the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Sciences Po, Paris, in December 2000. I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their very helpful comments. All errors are of course solely my own.


2. In the 1920s national rayony and national village soviets were created on an experimental basis for diaspora groups. These formations, which numbered over five thousand in the mid 1930s, were abolished in the late 1930s. Paul Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics (London: Hurst, 1995): 80.

3. Hahn, Soviet Grassroots, 12.


13. For a recent study supporting these findings, see Kimitaka Matsuzato, “From Communist Boss Politics to Post-Communist Caciquismo,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34, no. 2 (2001), 175-201.

14. This is not to deny, however, that ethnic predominance of what became titular groups, played a strong role in border delimitation, although the prevailing argument is the “divide and rule” assumption. See for example, Aleksey Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus, 1988–1994,” in Spornyje granitsy na kavkaze, ed. Bruno Koppieters (Moscow: Ves’ mir, 1996), 69; Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 304; and Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers (London: Sphere Books, 1972), 43–44. For an alternative view, see Lee Schwartz, “Regional Population Redistribution and National Homelands in the USSR,” in Soviet Nationalities Policies: Ruling Ethnic Groups in the USSR, ed. Henry Huttenbach (London: Mansell, 1990), 134–37; Robert J. Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 111–12; and Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, 79. Schwartz wrote, for example, that “the nationality jurisdictions were planned to include, within the borders of a single uninterrupted landmass, as much of an ethnic group’s homogenous union-wide population as was feasible” (134). It appears that the dispersed nature of ethnic settlements, considering Russian migrations even before the Revolution, would make precision impossible in such an undertaking, if it is at all possible elsewhere.


17. Art. 5.4 stipulates: “In relations with the federal organs of state power all subjects of the Russian federation are equal.”


20. For an example of the use of this approach, see David D. Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Nationality in Estonia and Bashkortostan*, Studies in Public Policy, 249 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1995).


34. A subsequent decree, based on "consultations" with heads of other republics, set a moratorium on elections to the soviets and heads of administrations until the expiration of soviets' terms. "Postanovleniye VSRB o moratoriium vybora v vysshie i mestnye organy gosudarstvennoy vlasti v RB," Vechernaya Ufa, 30 October 1992, 1.


36. Personal interviews in Bashkortostan suggest that HAs who support the opposition or criticize the republic's regime are frequently removed by the president, although the rationale usually given is "corruption" or lack of popular support for the HA on the ground.

37. Personal interview, Ufa, 4 June 1999.


41. Personal interview, Ufa, 4 June 1999.


43. Matsuzato found that in Kotovsk city, in Tambov oblast, the city administration’s Department of Control and Audit was “going beyond its ordinary competence to audit municipal accounts [and] tries to regulate economic activity within the city” by auditing the accounts of local companies to reveal their ability to pay municipal taxes. “Local Elites Under Transition: County and City Politics in Russia 1985–1996,” Europe-Asia Studies 51, no. 8 (1999): 1367–1400.

44. Personal interview, Ufa, 4 June 1999.

46. For examples of these practices, see Igor' Rabinovich and Sergey Fufaev, “Khozyain: shtrikhki k politicheskomu portretu prezidenta Murtazy Rakhimova,” in Nad gnezdom Murtazy: gazetnaya khronika vlastovaniya pervogo Bashkirskogo prezidenta (Moscow: InteTehk, 1998), 5–21, first published in Pro et Contra, Vol. 2, no. 2.

47. For a discussion, see Tomila Lankina, Local Self-Government or Local Political Control in Russia? The Case of Bashkortostan, Russian Regional Report, (New York: Institute for East-West Studies, September 1999).

48. For evidence from other constituent entities, see Matsuzato, “Local Elites Under Transition.”

49. Based on conversation with Artur Asaf’ev, Ufa, 3 June 1999.

50. Ibid.

51. For a discussion of such practices, see Nad gnezdom Murtazy: gazetnaya khronika vlastovaniya pervogo Bashkirskogo Prezidenta (Moscow: InteTehk, 1998).

52. Personal interview with Vladimir Karataev, Maykop, 9 August 1999.


55. This section is based on a personal interview with Chernenko, 6 August 1999.

56. This section is based on a personal interview with Kazykhanova, 17 June 1999.

57. This paragraph is based on a personal interview with Khafizov, 17 June 1999.


61. Ibid., 949.


63. Ibid, 315.

64. Data compiled from P. A. Goryunov et al., Formirovanie organov mestnogo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoy Federatsii: elektoral'naya statistika (Moscow: Ves’ Mir, 1999), 58.

65. Ibid., 171.


