The Carl Beck Papers
in Russian and East European Studies

No. 504

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND WORKERS IN ODESSA

Ethnic and Political Considerations

Robert Weinberg

Center for Russian and East European Studies
University of Pittsburgh

Robert Weinberg received his Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley in 1985 and is the 1986-87 Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University's Center for Russian and East European Studies. He is presently writing a book on workers and the Revolution of 1905 in Odessa.

July 1986

ISSN 0889-275X

Submissions to *The Carl Beck Papers* are welcome. Manuscripts must be in English, double-spaced throughout, and less than 70 pages in length. Acceptance is based on anonymous review. Mail submissions to: Editor, *The Carl Beck Papers*, Center for Russian and East European Studies, 4E23 Forbes Quadrangle, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., 15260.

Recent scholarship on the history of Russian labor has focused on the aspirations, organizations and actions of urban workers during the Revolutions of 1905 and 1917 and has investigated the relationship between labor unrest and political events and developments throughout the Russian Empire, especially in the two capital cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg.[1] Historians have been particularly interested in studying the interaction between socialists and workers and the extent to which labor protest and strikes were spontaneous in origin or the result of an orchestrated campaign conducted by the intelligentsia and socialist-workers. In general, these studies explain political radicalism among Russian workers by referring to the workers' specific work culture which combined elements of skill and craft solidarity, and links to the urban community; highly skilled and urbanized workers in both factories and workshops were more likely than lesser skilled and urbanized workers to be receptive to Social Democracy and to form labor organizations.[2]

The political activities and attitudes of workers in Odessa in the decade prior to 1905, however, do not exactly fit this pattern. In Odessa, unskilled workers who lacked a strong tradition of craft pride and workplace solidarity and were recent migrants to the city were sometimes just as likely as skilled and more urbanized workers to join social democratic circles and strike funds. The critical variable that distinguishes the behavior of Odessa workers from that of workers in other cities is ethnicity, since Jewish workers, regardless of skill, degree of urbanization, and workplace setting and experience, comprised most of the membership in social democratic organizations prior to 1905. By contrast, Russian workers, even skilled shopworkers in large metalworking and machine-construction enterprises, formed a small percentage of the membership in social democratic cells and strike funds. In this

article, I examine how the ethnic composition of the Odessa work force influenced the behavior of both workers and Social Democrats and explain why Social Democracy was generally more popular among all categories of Jewish workers than Russian workers on the eve of the Revolution of 1905. I specifically argue that the positive response by Jewish workers to Social Democracy in Odessa was not determined by cultural or socio-economic factors but by the organizational decisions of the socialist leadership, which consistently focused on the Jewish work force.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Odessa was the fourth largest city in the Russian Empire and in 1905 experienced as much labor protest and social and political unrest as many other cities in Russia. The city also boasted a sizable Jewish population which numbered some 140,000 out of a total population of nearly 500,000. Jews occupied highly visible positions in many sectors of Odessa society and economy, and the presence of a large Jewish work force allows one to study the Odessa Jewish labor movement and its relationship to both the general workers' movement and Russian Social Democracy at the end of the 1890s and beginning of the 1900s. Examination of the Odessa labor movement enhances our knowledge of the social underpinnings of workers' politics and labor radicalism and reveals how ethnicity affected the actions and attitudes of both workers and socialists.

Even though shipping and commerce dominated Odessa's economy, a significant number of workers were employed in factories and workshops. By 1903 some 72,000 workers in a wage-labor force of approximately 190,000 (38%) were employed in the manufacturing sector of the economy. Of these 72,000 workers, at least 25,000 were employed in factories, while nearly 47,000 labored in small workshops or at home as garret-masters.[3]

The imprint of nationality was clearly visible on the occupational structure of Odessa's manufacturing workers. In a city where Jews comprised a significant portion of the population, Jews and Russians rarely worked together in the same factory or workshop. In fact, Jews and Russians were generally not employed in the same branch of factory or workshop production. Most factory workers were Russian or Ukrainian; Jews formed a small minority. As one observer suggested, "Make the rounds of all the Odessa factories and you will perhaps find ten or fifteen Jewish metalfitters or lathe operators; some factories don't hire Jews at all."[4] One estimate placed the number of Jews employed in factory production at between 4,000 and 5,000.[5] Whereas Russians worked in both Jewish- and Russian-owned factories, Jewish factory workers were found primarily in small enterprises owned by other Jews. Jews were rarely employed in enterprises owned by Russians. In the late 1880s, for example, Jewish factory workers comprised only 7 percent of the factory labor force that was employed in Russian-owned enterprises, but 40 percent of the work force in Jewish-owned factories.[6] Only in granaries and match, tobacco, candy, cork, and cigarette paper factories, enterprises dominated by Jewish industrialists, do we find significant numbers of Jewish workers.[7]

The Jews who did not labor in factories found employment as workshop employees, salesclerks and day laborers. Between 65 and 70 percent of the city's 33,000 salesclerks were Jews, and certain trades such as shoemaking, printing and the apparel trades were dominated by Jews. Jews also figured prominently as gold-, silver-, copper-, and tinsmiths.[8] Roughly stated, employees in workshops and many small factories in Odessa tended to be Jewish, whereas workers in medium-sized and large factories were usually Russian or Ukrainian.

The residential patterns and industrial geography of Odessa also reflected the national divisions of the work force. Jewish and Russian workers may have lived in the same city, but to a large extent they lived and worked in isolation from each other. Jewish and Russian workers tended to reside in different neighborhoods and, although no neighborhoods or districts could be called wholly Jewish or Russian, they often assumed a predominant flavor that characterized them as either Jewish or non-Jewish. Thus, the city's outlying factory districts of Peresyp and Slobodka-Romanovka, which were topographically isolated from the central regions of the city by ravines and steep inclines, were inhabited primarily by Russians; Jews resided in the central districts of the city, where workshops and small industrial enterprises were located. Peter Garvi, the prominent Menshevik who spent his childhood and early adulthood as a Jew in Odessa, writes that "the central part of the city was so populated with Jews... that for a long time I considered that Jews comprised the majority of the population of Odessa."[9]

The appearance of Marxist propaganda circles in the first half of the 1890s and the adoption of the tactic of mass agitation after 1895 exposed a segment of the Odessa working class to Marxism and social democratic politics. These formative years of Social Democracy in Odessa are of special interest because the contours that the movement assumed not only reflected the ethnic characteristics of the Odessa work force and socialist organizers but also helped inform the attitudes and strategies of the Social Democrats (SDs) after 1900. Moreover, examination of this formative period of Odessa Social Democracy helps explore the crucial role that Jewish SDs and labor activists from the northwest region of the Pale of Settlement, Vilna in particular, played in the transfer to Odessa of those organizational strategies and institutions which had earlier propelled the Jewish

labor movement in Lithuania and Belorussia into the forefront of the general struggle by workers and socialists against the tsarist regime.

The first social democratic circles in Odessa emerged among university and high school students in the late 1880s. Members of small Marxist study groups gathered to read and discuss the works of Marx, Plekhanov and Akselrod. In 1890 D. B. Riazanov (D. S. Gol'dendakh), who would later become a prominent Bolshevik, established the first social democratic circle that included workers. Riazanov had been exposed to socialist literature in the mid-1880s, and his education continued in 1889, when he moved to Paris and attended lectures given by Lavrov and Plekhanov. In April 1890 he returned to Odessa in order to apply his knowledge of Marxism to propaganda among Russian workers and students. He befriended a Jewish housepainter named Rubinshtein and, with his help, soon formed a Marxist study group consisting of workers.

Riazanov furnished the literature and conducted discussions about the workers' movement in Western Europe and the conditions of Russian workers. Like SDs elsewhere in Russia, he exposed the members of his circle to the Marxist concepts of political economy and historical materialism in an effort to train a group of politically conscious students and workers who could then form new circles among other workers. In late 1891 the police arrested Riazanov, but not before he had successfully established a large library of Marxist and socialist literature as well as several other circles that included both workers and students.[10]

Despite the arrest of Riazanov, the circle movement did not entirely collapse. This was largely due to the efforts of Iu. M. Steklov (Nakhamkes) and G. V. Tsyperovich, two students who had belonged to one of Riazanov's circles. Using former contacts with workers and enlisting the support of radical students

from a Jewish vocational high school, Steklov and Tsyperovich were able to reestablish by 1893 a network of circles, primarily among factory workers, but also among certain groups of workshop employees. Circles were formed among machinists and metalfitters of the Russian Steamship and Navigation Company, bootmakers, sailors and stokers of various shipping lines, construction workers, and skilled workers of the workshops of the Southwestern Railway.[11]

Steklov and Tsyperovich believed that a decentralized structure would afford the various circles the best protection against police infiltration and arrest. They made no substantive efforts to establish a unified organization and avoided large meetings and the creation of ties among the various circles. Instead they concentrated on creating autonomous circles that preserved their conspiratorial nature, arguing that it was impossible to organize a mass workers' party under existing political conditions. Steklov and Tsyperovich decided to limit the scope of their activity to forming small cadres of politically conscious and enlightened workers, who, at the moment of revolution, would lead other workers in the struggle to overthrow the tsarist regime.[12]

The circles of Steklov and Tsyperovich enjoyed very modest success. Membership in the circles was fluid and attendance at meetings irregular. This state of affairs was undoubtedly due to the fear felt by many workers of participating in illegal organizations. We should also bear in mind that the organizational principle of the circles was not to recruit large numbers, but rather select from the ranks of the working class those individuals who demonstrated leadership qualities and promise in the conduct of propaganda. Furthermore, Steklov and Tsyperovich adopted a policy that further reduced the number of potential members: they prohibited the recruitment of Jews.

Even though many organizers and leaders of these early circles were Jews who had been converted to Marxism and revolutionary activity while attending school, Steklov and Tsyperovich did not permit Jewish workers to join the circles. Since social democratic activists had no trouble recruiting Jewish workers after the adoption of the tactics of mass agitation, a topic which we shall examine shortly, then presumably Jewish workers would also have joined propaganda circles if given the opportunity. But Steklov and Tsyperovich were afraid of alienating and frightening Russian workers who might have been receptive to Marxist propaganda but were wary of participating in organizations that included Jews. In his memoirs, Steklov admits that they deliberately excluded Jews from the circles so the government could not claim that the movement was the result of "Jewish intrigue." Hoping to combat the revolutionaries by preying upon whatever fears and prejudices existed among Russian workers, police officials in Odessa during the early 1890s hoped to discourage Russians from joining revolutionary organizations by fanning the flames of anti-Semitism.[13] Whether or not such police tactics corresponded to workers' sentiments or influenced their behavior is unknown, but the tactic certainly affected the strategy of social democratic organizers.

Even though Steklov, Tsyperovich and members of their circles were arrested in January 1894, a sufficient number of activists and organizers managed to avoid arrest. The survivors soon formed new circles, continuing to distribute social democratic literature and concentrating on the tactic of raising the political consciousness of a small number of workers.

One of the most important chapters in the history of Social Democracy and the workers' movement in Russia was the abandonment of so-called propaganda for the tactic of mass agitation. Outlined in *Ob agitatsii* (1893), the famous pamphlet written by the

Vilna Marxist Arkady Kremer, mass agitation was adopted in 1894 and 1895 by Jewish SDs and labor organizers active among Jewish workers in Lithuania and Belorussia. Mass agitation was based on the idea that workers, under the guidance of SDs, would acquire revolutionary class consciousness by participating in the struggle for economic improvement. Determined to better their lives, workers would engage in mass strikes, during the course of which they would recognize that the economic and political struggles were inseparable.[14] The tactic proved so successful in the Jewish community that SDs elsewhere in Russia adopted mass agitation among Russian workers with an equal measure of success.

The Jewish SDs who provided the impetus behind mass agitation also formed the nucleus of the General Workers' Union in Russia and Poland (commonly known as the Bund), which played a critical role in the organization of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (RSDWP) in 1898.[15] The activities of Bundist organizers in Lithuania and Belorussia and the confrontation between the Bund and Lenin and the forces of *Iskra* at the second congress of the RSDWP in 1903 are well-known chapters in the history of the Russian revolutionary movement.[16] Little is known, however, of the efforts of Jewish activists who moved from the northwest region of the Pale of Settlement to South Russia to avoid arrest and police harassment. Once in the south, they applied the techniques of mass agitation in cities with sizable Jewish work forces such as Odessa and Ekaterinoslav. In Odessa the transition to mass agitation from propaganda coincided with the arrival of a group of Jewish Marxists and labor activists from Vilna. Drawing upon their experience in the more developed revolutionary movement of the northwest, the transplanted Vilna activists set out to create strike funds and generate mass opposition to the employer class and government. These Vilna activists altered the structure and com-

position of Odessa Social Democracy and soon clashed with native social democratic organizers who had been active in the preagitation period in Odessa.

In contrast to their predecessors, newly arrived Vilna SDs, most notably Isai Aizenshtat (Iudin) and Polia Gordon, directed their efforts toward Jewish rather than Russian workers. The former Vilna revolutionaries, who were accustomed to work among Jews, helped them establish strike funds and promoted labor unrest. Their efforts were successful, and the year 1895 witnessed a flurry of organizational activity and strikes. Strike funds were successfully established among metalfitters, tinsmiths, woodworkers, cigarettemakers, seamstresses, male and female tailors, shoemakers, bookbinders, and pursemakers. With the exception of metalfitting, Jewish workers dominated these occupations. Cigarettemakers, women tailors and seamstresses conducted successful strikes, sustained in the case of the women cigarettemakers by a strike fund of 150 rubles.[17]

According to the police, the tactics of mass agitation "struck a responsive chord among workers."[18] The authorities noted the emergence of well-endowed strike funds, many of which were set up independently of the SDs. Not surprisingly, the Odessa strike funds, designed to unite workers in their struggle for a better life, were modeled upon their counterparts in Vilna and other cities of Lithuania and Belorussia. They sustained workers during strikes for higher wages and shorter workdays and provided material assistance to members and their families during times of hunger, illness and unemployment. Odessa labor activists placed special emphasis on organizing workers by craft and insisted that all workers in a given trade belong to a single organization. They encouraged each craft to establish its own fund and permitted members of one craft to join the strike fund of another only if no strike fund existed for that category of workers.[19]

It is important to note that, in their application of mass agitation in Odessa, the Vilna revolutionaries were not motivated by stirrings of nationalism and a desire to create an independent Jewish workers' movement as were many Jewish SDs in Lithuania and Belorussia. Aizenshtat, for example, was "never an enthusiast of the nationalist orientation."[30] On the contrary, the former Vilna activists saw their efforts among Jewish workers as a key component in the overall drive to construct an empire-wide workers' movement. As Allan Wildman asserts, the orientation of these emigre Vilna Social Democrats "was entirely toward the Russian movement," and, although they made use of their experience in the Jewish labor movement in Vilna, "their actions were directed solely toward the construction and solidification of a Russian Social Democratic party."[31]

The different conditions found in South Russia in general and Odessa in particular encouraged such an attitude. First, the language barrier was less formidable in Odessa than in the northwest region of the Pale, where Jewish organizers were unable to communicate with Lithuanian- and Polish-speaking workers. In Odessa, however, the presence of a sizable Russian-speaking labor force facilitated greater contact between Russian workers and those Jewish SDs who knew Russian. Peter Garvi, clearly an assimilated Jew, writes that he did not know Yiddish very well. It was presumably for this reason that he was instructed to organize Russian workers as one of his first tasks as an SD.[32]

Second, like the SD leaders, Jewish workers in Odessa were also relatively less isolated from Russian culture and more comfortable with the Russian language than their coreligionists in the northwest. Jewish organizers did not need to rely solely on Yiddish when communicating with Jewish workers. There was thus no need for an independent Jewish

labor movmement as it developed in Lithuania and Belorussia.[23] The greater proportion of Russians in Odessa's work force than in the cities of Lithuania and Belorussia, where Jewish SDs were also active, detracted from the appeal and practicality of a strategy designed to create an independent Jewish workers' movement. The cities of South Russia thus offered Jewish SDs the opportunity to find a niche in the general Russian revolutionary movement, an attraction which gripped the minds of many Jewish Marxists. As one historian of the Jewish workers' movement writes, "The old desire to serve the Russian movement had never died."[24]

Despite these mitigating factors, the Vilna activists nonetheless focused on organizing Jewish workers. Given their past activities among Jewish workers in Vilna, who were generally employed in workshops, the existence in Odessa of a large Jewish work force also concentrated largely in small shops, and the lack of familiarity and prior experience with Russian workers, it is not surprising that the transplanted Vilna Marxists chose to work among Jewish workers. The success of the Vilna activists encouraged other organizers, who had been working in the city for several years and had managed to avoid arrest and exile, to rethink their strategy and to adopt the technique of mass agitation. The shift proceeded smoothly, primarily because the emphasis on direct confrontation with employers and government excited even those Marxists who had been active in the propaganda circles. Inspired by the fervent response of Jewish workers to the Vilna revolutionaries, as well as the successes of the strike movement, the SDs who had been active in Odessa prior to 1895 embraced the new tactic.

Yet why did the adoption of mass agitation signify a shift to work among Jewish workers? Surely the SDs could have retained their focus on factory workers while engaging in mass agitation. SDs in

other cities with significant numbers of Russian factory workers did so. In Odessa, however, the ranks of social democratic organizations were riddled by arrests throughout 1894 and 1895. According to one report, 150 activists were arrested in 1895 alone.[25] The arrests enhanced the influence of the newly arrived Vilna activists, who assumed leadership positions and redirected the focus of the workers' movement.

As a result, Jewish workers soon formed the backbone of the social democratic movement in Odessa. To be sure, certain categories of skilled Russian workers, particularly metalfitters and machinists in metalworking and machine-construction plants and the railway workshops, continued to attract the attention of some labor organizers, primarily activists who had been working in Odessa for several years. But most strike funds were established among Jewish workers employed in workshops and small enterprises.

By late 1896 and early 1897, however, a group of leading SDs began to reevaluate the focus of mass agitation. The exact composition of this group remains unknown, but available sources indicate that most were activists who had experience in both the propaganda and agitation movements.[26] Motivated by concerns of ideology and a desire for personal power rather than by ethnic considerations, this group of Odessa SDs felt uncomfortable focusing all its energies on workshop employees and neglecting the more proletarian factory workers. They did not want to abolish mass agitation but to alter its focus. Since the strategy's purpose was to encompass as many workers as possible and stimulate widespread strike actions, they simply wanted to extend SD influence beyond workshop employees and return to organizational efforts in the factories.[27]

The attempt to shift attention from workshops to factories sparked a heated debate among some 25 local Social Democrats who met in Odessa in June 1897.

Even though details of the meeting are sketchy, we do know that a minority favored the continuation of work among workshops employees, and that the chief advocate of this position was the eighteen-year-old Marxist Leon Trotsky, then one of the principal social democratic organizers in nearby Nikolaev.[28]

Like other Odessa SDs, Trotsky firmly adhered to the principles of agitation, especially the emphasis placed on strikes as the appropriate means of struggle between labor and capital. But, while he did not oppose activity among factory workers in principle, Trotsky believed that workshop employees, because they had thus far been so receptive to the overtures of the SDs, should remain their chief focus. Trotsky and his supporters were outvoted, however. Led by a twenty-year-old woodworker named Immanuel Nudel'man, the majority rejected Trotsky's plea for joint work among both workshop and factory workers on the grounds that factory workers were easier to reach because they were concentrated in large numbers. The new rallying cry was to be: "Not one man nor one pamphlet to workshop employees-- all our efforts should be focused on factory workers."[29]

Given the dearth of information about this particular meeting and about Odessa Social Democracy in general during these years, we cannot ascertain with certainty why Nudel'man flatly rejected Trotsky's proposal or how he rallied support for the vote. The circumstances leading up to the June 1897 meeting strongly suggest, however, that a conflict over leadership and control played a role in the debate over the movement's direction. A native of Odessa, Nudel'man had attended a vocational school for Jews, where he was recruited into the propaganda circles of the preagitation period. He was arrested in 1895, but resurfaced in late 1896 or early 1897 and resumed his career as a revolutionary. M. G. Dargol'ts, another Jewish organizer who assisted Nudel'man in this campaign against Trotsky, had a similar background.

Given the instability caused by constant arrests and police harassment, it is possible that Nudel'man and Dargol'ts were trying to assume authority for themselves and other local SDs whose influence had ebbed since the arrival of the Vilna revolutionaries and the adoption of mass agitation. Another round of arrests in early 1897, which struck heavily at the organizations established by the Vilna activists and their allies in the Odessa social democratic movement, may have encouraged Nudel'man to attempt to undermine the authority of the Vilna Marxists.[30]

What other factors, especially developments in socal democratic movements elsewhere in Russia, influenced Nudel'man? The formation of the Bund was certainly not among them. As we have seen, the Vilna SDs who moved to Odessa did not support the drive to create an independent Jewish workers' movement, and therefore Nudel'man could not claim that he was acting to stifle any stirrings in that direction. Moreover, the constituent meeting of the Bund itself occurred in September 1897, two months after the Odessa meeting under discussion here.

Nudel'man may, however, have drawn inspiration from the social democratic movements in Ekaterinoslav and Kiev. In late 1896 or early 1897, Nudel'man went to Ekaterinoslav in order to establish contact with that city's social democratic organization, which had struck firm organizational roots in the factory districts. It is presumably this contact that influenced his decision to organize factory workers upon his return to Odessa several months later. Nudel'man and his followers were also influenced by members of the Kiev *Soiuz bor'by*. The Kiev SDs had already adopted the tactic of agitation among factory workers by this time and were trying to steer their colleagues in Odessa in the same direction. By early 1897, members of Kiev *Soiuz bor'by* had arrived in Odessa, and many of them, along with Nudel'man and his supporters, had assumed leadership posts in the local

party organization, filling the positions that had become vacant after the arrests of many SDs earlier in the year. Consequently, their presence strengthened the desire of Nudel'man and others to agitate among factory workers.[31]

Some SDs, obeying the party's injunction against organizing workshop employees, did transfer their energies to organizing factory workers. Yet the Odessa SDs never fully shifted to the factories. Given the intensity of the debate between Trotsky and Nudel'man, a debate that appears to have polarized Odessa Social Democracy, it is indeed curious-- even mysterious-- that the victors did not successfully implement the terms of the vote.

One probable explanation is the destruction in early 1898 of virtually all social democratic cells in Odessa. At this time, police raids netted several dozen of the leading members of the social democratic movement and sent many others into hiding. Nudel'man, Dargol'ts and other adherents of the revised policy, including several prominent activists from Kiev *Soiuz bor'by*, either were arrested and exiled or simply disappeared from Odessa. Coupled with the lack of a unified and centralized social democratic organization in Odessa, this flux and instability in the leadership ranks of Odessa Social Democracy undoubtedly reduced the likelihood that the proposed changes in strategy and tactics could be smoothy introduced without generating resistance.[32] Without Nudel'man and others to ensure implementation of the new policy, labor organizers who opposed the shift and managed to avoid arrest were apparently free to rebuild social democratic organizations among workshop employees. Unfortunately, examination of the available sources, including Soviet archives, does not shed additional light on this matter.

With the exception of skilled metalworkers in the railway workshops and some machine-construction plants, SDs in Odessa never succeeded in organizing

substantial numbers of Russian factory workers and never achieved significant influence among them. Most of the 45 social democratic organizations that existed at the end of 1901 originated in enterprises comprised of Jewish workers.[33] A 1901 gendarme report states that "the Social Democrats in Odessa have organized workers by craft," with each such organization possessing a fund "that provides money for agitation, strike support and unemployment insurance."[34] Such funds existed among bookbinders, printers, milliners, cigarettemakers, tobacco workers, shoemakers, teapackers, tailors, bakers, tinsmiths, metalfitters of the railway workshops and small workshops, seamstresses, woodworkers, housepainters, candymakers, and employees of cork factories. The predominance of Jews in these categories of work is striking. In addition, the social democratic activists and workers who played leading roles in these organizations were virtually all Jews.[35]

Other observers also noted the appeal of the SDs to Jewish employees in workshops and small enterprises. Steklov wrote at the turn of the century that workshop employees "are the most conscious, whereas the movement is still unnoticeable in the factories." He added that the situation among factory workers was "very sad" and concluded that there was very little promise for a strong labor movement among such workers.[36] The report on the Russian revolutionary movement presented to the International Socialist Congress in Paris in 1900 states that workshop employees comprised the bulk of the membership in social democratic organizations in Odessa.[37]

It is important to note, however, that not all organized Jewish workers were skilled workshop employees. Similarly, not all skilled workers joined social democratic circles and strike funds. In general, skilled and unskilled Russian workers in workshops and factories were not subject to the SDs' influence, whereas skilled and unskilled Jewish workers

in workshops and other small enterprises belonged to social democratic organizations. What explains this preponderance of Jews in Odessa's social democratic movement, and why did so many unskilled Jewish workers such as seamstresses and workers in teapacking, tobacco and candy factories create strike funds? Elsewhere in Russia, both inside and outside the Pale of Settlement, Russian workers often joined the social democratic movement and, beginning in the mid-1890s, actively participated in the organized labor movement. But such was not the case in Odessa. If, as other historians of Russian labor assert, political radicalism among workers reflects high levels of skill, a work setting that fosters craft solidarity, and embeddedness in the urban community, then why were ties between skilled Russian workers and Odessa Social Democrats so weak and tenuous? This state of affairs is all the more curious when we consider that Russian workers in Odessa, particularly metalworkers of the railway workshops and ship repairyards, comprised the membership in social democratic organizations prior to the shift to mass agitation. Clearly, then, skill or occupational distinctions were not the primary factors that determined why some workers supported the SDs and others did not.

The isolation of Russian factory workers from Social Democracy in Odessa (as measured by the creation of and membership in strike funds) stemmed from the deliberate strategy of political activists, who, after basing their actions on ethnic considerations, never made a concerted effort to recruit Russian workers. In short, Russian workers were never given the opportunity to declare their support for Social Democracy by forming strike funds or joining other social democratic organizations.

No evidence exists to support the assertion that Russian workers were ill-disposed to the SDs either from indifference or hostility to the tenets of So-

cial Democracy or from an inability to comprehend the political vision of Marxism. Russian workers, especially those who were skilled and well-rooted in the urban community, might well have established strike funds under the auspices of the SDs if only the agitators had undertaken energetic measures to organize them. Skilled and unskilled Russian workers were just as anxious as Jewish workers to organize and engage in struggles to achieve improvements in working and living conditions. Obviously, the Jewish organizers of the agitation period ignored the experience of Jewish Marxists in the preagitation period, when Jewish propagandists had successfully established ties to Russian workers. This suggests that Jewish SDs could have attracted Russian workers to their organizations. Indeed, it is far from clear why Jewish SDs in Odessa balked at the prospect of work among Russian workers, while Jewish revolutionaries overcame similar obstacles in cities with significant Russian work forces, making significant headway in organizing Russian workers. If Russian workers organized independently of the SDs, as in 1902 and 1903 under the aegis of the Zubatov movement, it was largely the responsibility of those SD agitators who survived the arrests of 1896-98, chose to ignore the decision of 1897, and decided to withhold their attention from factory workers.

Odessa SDs made organizational decisions on ethnic grounds. Most of the Jewish revolutionaries who operated among Russian workers in the preagitation period had since vanished from the revolutionary scene, as a result of arrest, self-imposed exile, or desire to work elsewhere in Russia. The SDs who replaced them in the agitation movement were, for the most part, Jews who had done most of their revolutionary work exclusively among Jewish workers. Having tailored their organizational methods to the specific characteristics and needs of Jewish workers and finding the tactics successful, they perhaps believed

that shifting to work among Russian workers would be too challenging and difficult. Peter Garvi emphasizes, for instance, the lack of trained organizers and agitators who could approach Russian workers.[38] The example of several Jewish agitators in the factory district of Peresyp who withdrew from the local social democratic circle after other circle members decided to shift their attention to factory workers underscores this hesitation to organize Russian workers.[39]

Finally, some SDs also claimed that Jewish workers provided fertile soil for their agitational efforts because they were more cultured than the illiterate, "gray" peasant masses who often comprised the ranks of the factory workforce.[40] This description did not fit skilled, Russian factory workers, but Jewish organizers often overlooked the distinction between unskilled and skilled Russian workers. Many Jewish workers for their part, especially women and teenage girls, were unskilled and fresh from the countryside, but nevertheless responded well to SD overtures, thereby indicating the issue of skill to be a false one. In short, the reason why most SD workers were Jewish is that organizers confined themselves to the Jewish milieu.

In late 1901 and early 1902, the issue of whether the focus of social democratic agitation and organization should be directed at workshop or factory workers once again emerged. This time the impetus was supplied by *Iskra* agents who had arrived in Odessa in 1901 to try to assume control of the Odessa Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party.[41] *Iskra* claimed that the Odessa Committee had fallen under the sway of "Economism", and *Iskra's* supporters waged a battle that lasted until early 1903, at which time they claimed victory. The struggle for control of the Odessa organization took the form of a debate on the nature of tsarist autocracy,

and whether the political or economic struggle should be the priority of the SDs.

The Iskraites, who had split from the Odessa Committee in October 1901 and formed the Southern Revolutionary Group of Social Democrats (renamed the Southern Revolutionary Union of Social Democrats in 1902), attacked the Committee for focusing on the economic struggle of workshop employees and failing to conduct political agitation among other workers, especially factory employees. The Group criticized the Committee's position that it was possible under current political circumstances to form mass, illegal organizations only in workshops and asserted that there were no "special difficulties involved in the organization of factory workers." The Group outlined specific plans to raise the political consciousness of factory workers, defining its task as the "development of a mass movement among factory workers through written and oral agitation and propaganda."[42]

The debate between the Group and Committee reflected the Iskraites' dissatisfaction with the Committee's focus on strike funds and strikes for improved wages, hours and working conditions. The Committee shied away from open political demonstrations and street rallies, claiming that such actions would invite police reprisals and endanger the party. Following *Iskra*'s lead, the Group condemned the Committee for passivity and the failure to widen its sphere of agitation beyond purely economic issues to embrace overtly political ones. The Group hoped that the workers' movement in Odessa would link up with the recent political opposition among educated society in general and students in particular. As the manifesto of the Southern Revolutionary Union, dated September 1902, states: "...we should devote our attention to the revolutionary student organizations."[43]

The decision to focus their activities on different categories of workers essentially meant

that the two factions within Odessa Social Democracy were attempting to carve out their own respective spheres of influence. Thus, the desire of the Southern Revolutionary Group (forerunners of the Odessa Bolsheviks) to concentrate on factory workers (and students) meant that they would be primarily organizing the non-Jewish workers of the city's factory districts. The supporters of the Committee (precursors of the Mensheviks in Odessa) would continue to appeal to workshop employees, who were primarily Jewish and worked and lived in the central districts of the city.[44]

Yet even the Odessa Group failed to recruit large numbers of factory workers. In this respect, they followed the precedent established in 1897, when SDs failed to alter the focus of agitation. As late as the beginning of 1905, the Bolsheviks had still failed to establish firm roots in the factory districts of the city. Indeed, they were still actively organizing workshop employees along lines that Odessa Social Democrats had pursued at the turn of the century, that is, by craft.[45]

Why the forces of *Iskra* did not successfully organize Russian factory workers still remains unanswered. As our discussion of events in 1897 revealed, problems of organization and government harassment provide some insight. First, social democratic organizations in Odessa were riddled with arrests that seriously disrupted their efforts. Second, the Southern Revolutionary Group (and its successor, the Southern Revolutionary Union) suffered from poor leadership and lacked adequate financial resources and literature.[46] Moreover, even though the two factions of Odessa Social Democracy reunited in early 1903, there is no indication that the tactical differences had genuinely been resolved. Many of the activists who adhered to the platform of the Committee still remained active and were no doubt

free to continue their organizational work among Jews.

In addition, a comprehensive reevaluation of *Iskra* policy affected the ability and determination of activists to organize factory workers. When Lenin and other *Iskra* leaders observed in 1901 and 1902 that the workers' movement had entered a period of remission, they grew disillusioned with labor, pinning their hopes for a new wave of revolutionary unrest on the revived radicalism of students, a group which had been eager to take to the streets and challenge the regime during the early years of the twentieth century. *Iskra* forces now relegated the economic struggle of workers to the background, pushing those efforts to promote political unrest through rallies and demonstrations into primary focus. By embracing the student movement and attempting to form alliances with the liberal and radical-democratic opposition, the Iskraites were devoting scarce resources and manpower to staging public protests. As a result, they did not have the time or even the desire to organize factory workers.[47]

Where the SDs failed to act, other, competing forces succeeded. The failure of Social Democracy to establish a network of solid party organizations among factory workers in the 1890s and early years of the twentieth century helped the Zubatov movement to establish a foothold in the factory districts of the city.

The famous experiment in police-directed trade unions conducted by Sergei Zubatov, chief of the Moscow Okhrana, was designed to undermine the appeal of revolutionary Marxism by offering workers the opportunity to organize for their economic advancement under the protection of the police. Zubatovist unions afforded workers the right to form legal collective associations in order to exact material concessions from their employers. The Zubatov unions were among the largest and most successful of all

workers' organizations in the pre-1905 period and, in Moscow, Odessa and elsewhere, they provided the organizational experience that contributed to the foundation of many of the trade unions workers established during the Revolution of 1905.[48] Workers in Odessa responded enthusiastically to the initial overtures of local Zubatovist organizers (also known as the Independents), who claimed a membership of several thousand workers in the spring of 1903.[49] Indeed, the Zubatovist unions were also instrumental in triggering the general strike that paralyzed Odessa in July 1903.

The Zubatov experience in Odessa was, from the ethnic standpoint, the reverse of the SD one.[50] In general, the Zubatovist unions appealed to skilled, Russian workers who tended to work in the railway workshops and large machine-construction and metalworking plants of Peresyp, the major factory district of the city. Here they outcompeted the SDs, who had a small following among workers in the railway workshops and some metalworking enterprises. The Independents also enjoyed a following among unskilled workers in the brickyards, creameries and tanneries of the city's factory districts and among certain categories of workshop employees.[51] Whereas Zubatovist unions enjoyed strong following among Jewish workers in some cities of the western and northwestern regions of the Pale, the Independents of Odessa failed to attract Jews into the ranks of their unions. The conspicuous absence of Jewish workers at the organizational meetings and discussions sponsored by the Independents prompted one Zubatov organizer to lament that "it is unusually difficult to work among Jewish workers."[52] Thus, when Zubatovist agents in Odessa informed Zubatov in July 1902 that "the majority of revolutionary workers are journeymen," they were merely acknowledging the fact that SDs had struck roots among Jewish workers in Odessa.[53]

Despite efforts by the Independents to wean them away, Jewish workers remained loyal to their social democratic organizations. This state of affairs contributed to the decision of the Independents to focus on the organization of factory workers. The Zubatovites established a local committee in the central district of Odessa, where many workers were Jewish, but they decided to locate their headquarters in Peresyp, the major factory district of Odessa.[54]

The Independents realized that thousands of Odessa workers remained untouched by the influence of the Social Democrats and had probably never been exposed to the propaganda of any revolutionary organization. In fact, one Zubatov organizer wrote that an "enormous gray mass of Russian workers did not know what an 'organization' was" until the Independents began their campaign to establish unions.[55] In other words, the Independents assessed the situation in Odessa in terms of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the SDs among workers and decided to focus their efforts on those segments of the work force where social democratic influence was weak or nonexistent, that is among Russian factory workers. Hence, the major metalworking and machine-construction plants and smaller industrial enterprises of Odessa's factory districts were fertile regions for the Zubatovites and fell under their influence, whereas the workshops that had been subject to the organizational efforts of the SDs and had established strike funds did not.[56]

Given the lack of ties between SDs and Russian workers and the shift in *Iskra* policy from economic to political agitation, it is not surprising that the Independents, who emphasized the workers' immediate economic discontents and grievances, attracted factory workers to their unions and generated hostility to the SDs.[57] This was especially true for the Russian factory workers who had not been organized by the Social Democrats prior to 1901-1902, and, despite

Iskra's hopes to recruit them, still remained outside the influence of social democratic organizations at the beginning of 1903. Since, however, the Odessa Committee opposed *Iskra*'s shift in policy away from economic issues toward political work among students, Jewish workers who belonged to strike funds did not become disgruntled with Social Democracy and abandon the funds for Zubatovist unions. Thus, unorganized Russian workers, and not Jewish workers who were members of social democratic organizations, formed the backbone of the Zubatov movement in Odessa.

The weakness of Odessa Bolshevism was not a product of the Independents' success, as Bolsheviks active in Odessa during 1905 like to assert.[58] The Zubatov movement may have compounded the isolation of SDs from factory workers, but the success of police trade unionism does not explain the initial failure of Odessa SDs to build ties to factory workers. This failure was due to the policies of the SDs themselves.

Jewish workers constituted the basis of the social democratic movement in Odessa, as they did throughout the Pale of Settlement. But whereas Jews often comprised the majority of workers in many cities of Lithuania and Belorussia, in Odessa they formed a minority of both the work force and the total population. Nor does the fact that most of them labored in workshops explain their domination of the organized labor movement. Although certain characteristics of workshop production, such as high levels of skill and craft solidarity, promoted labor radicalism elsewhere in Russia, they did not necessarily do so in Odessa. As we have seen, not all Jewish workshop employees were skilled, nor did all Jewish members of social democratic organizations work in workshops. Moreover, many Russians were skilled workers in factories or workshops, yet they remained generally outside the social democratic movement. Receptivity to Marxism in Odessa cannot

therefore be reduced to occupational distinctions based on skill and type of production, and arguments for the socio-economic determination of workers' attitudes toward Social Democracy must be questioned.

In Odessa the only difference between SD and non-SD workers was ethnic: Jews followed the SDs, Russians supported the Zubatovites. The ethnic and occupational patterns of Odessa Social Democracy can be understood by investigating the strategies of the SD leadership, which consistently focused its attention on the Jewish workers. For a combination of reasons rooted primarily in the organizational experience of party activists and the ethnic structure of the Odessa work force, Social Democrats in Odessa remained attached to Jewish workers, despite ideological pressure to organize Russian factory workers more vigorously. As a consequence, the tactics of the Odessa SDs left an indelible mark on the form and direction of workers' politics during both the pre-1905 era and the revolutionary crisis of 1905.

NOTES

1. The author wishes to thank Reginald Zelnik, Laurie Bernstein and the paper's anonymous referees for their valuable comments and criticism.

2. See Laura Engelstein, *Moscow, 1905: Working-Class Organization and Political Conflict* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); Gerald Surh, "Petersburg Workers in 1905: Strikes, Workplace Democracy and the Revolution" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1979); Victoria E. Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion: Workers' Politics and Organization in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-1914* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983); Kathleen Prevo, "The Revolution of 1905 in Voronezh: The Labor Movement and Political Consciousness in a Russian Provincial City" (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1979); S. A. Smith, *Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories, 1917-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Diane Koenker, *Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); David Mandel, *The Petrograd Workers and the Fall of the Old Regime: From the February Revolution to the July Days, 1917* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983) and *The Petrograd Workers and the Soviet Seizure of Power: From the July Days 1917 to July 1918* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).

3. See my dissertation, "Worker Organizations and Politics in the Revolution of 1905 in Odessa" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1985), chap. 2, for the size of the factory and workshop labor forces in Odessa.

4. *Iuzhnoe obozrenie*, no. 2982 (December 2, 1905).

5. Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv SSR (TsGIA) f. 23, op. 29. d. 80, 23.

6. A. P. Subbotin, *V cherte evreiskoi osedlosti* (St. Petersburg, 1890), 226. Data for later years are unavailable.

7. Subbotin, 226; TsGIA, f. 23, op. 29, d. 80, 23. One exception was the Jewish-owned Brodskii sugar refinery which hired almost exclusively Russians and Ukrainians.

8. I have chosen to use the phrase "workshop employee" rather than "artisan" because the latter term connotes a skilled craftworker who has gone through a lengthy training program as an apprentice and journeyman and works in a workshop where production is performed primarily by hand with little division of labor. The workshop is hierarchically divided into apprentices, journeymen and master craftworker, who owns the enterprise. While some Jewish workers shared these characteristics, many other Jews were unskilled laborers in workshops that were becoming mechanized with a division of labor. On the number of salesclerks, see *Voskhod*, no. 6 (February 12, 1904), 8. According to the 1897 census, Jews comprised nearly 60 percent of the workers in the needle trades and over half of those engaged in the printing trades. *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii, 1897g.*, vol. 47, *Gorod Odessa* (St. Petersburg, 1904), Table 20, 88-131.

9. Peter A. Garvi, *Vospominaniia sotsialdemokrata* (New York, 1946), 127.

10. "Pokazaniia D. B. Riazanova (Gol'dendakha) ot 17-23 dekabria 1891 g.", *Istoriko-revoliutsionnyi sbornik,* 2 (1924): 197-204; Iu. G. Polevoi, *Zarozhdenie marksizma v Rossii, 1883-94 gg.* (Moscow, 1959), 477-479; V. I. Nevskii, *Ocherki po istorii rossiiskoi kommunisticheskoi partii*, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Leningrad 1925), 289-291; Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii SSR (TsGAOR), f. 124, op., 6, d. 20, 1897, 103 ob.

11. Iu. M. Steklov, "Iz vospominanii o sotsial-demokraticheskom dvizhennii sredi odesskikh rabochikh v 1893-1894 godakh," *Minuvshie gody* (September 1908), 237-238; Nevskii, 352.

12. Steklov, 234-238; Polevoi, 479.

13. Steklov, 248-249. On the role of Jewish students active in the SD movement, see Polevoi, 483; Nevskii, 349; M. G. Dargol'ts, "Odesskaia rabochaia gruppa srediny 90-kh godov k momentu 1-go s"ezda partii," in *K dvadtsatipiatiletiiu pervogo s"ezda partii (1898-1923)*, (Moscow-Petrograd, 1923), 97. Ironically, Steklov does not mention that some of the leaders of the circles, including himself, were Jews. They also prohibited women from joining the circles. Steklov feared that women members would not observe the rules of conspiracy by "carelessly blabbing about the affairs of the circle to their neighbors." Moreover, he insisted that the circle members not tell their wives about their activities; in fact, he wanted the men to keep secret the very existence of the movement.

14. For an excellent description of mass agitation, see Ezra Mendelsohn, *Class Struggle in the Pale: The Formative Years of the Jewish Workers' Movement in Tsarist Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 45-81. On how the strategy of mass agitation was transferred to South Russia, see Moshe Mishkinski, "Regional Factors in the Formation of the Jewish Labor Movement in Czarist Russia," *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science*, 14 (1969): 41-42.

15. The General Jewish Workers' Union in Russia and Poland was renamed the General Jewish Workers' Union in Lithuania, Poland and Russia in 1901.

16. See, for example, Henry J. Tobias, *The Jewish Bund in Russia: From Its Origins to 1905* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), chaps. 14-16; Jonathan Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews, 1862-1917* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chap. 4; John L. H. Keep, *The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), chap. 4.

17. TsGAOR, f. 124, op. 6, d. 20, 1897, 26-27, 29 ob., 84-100, and 109-109 ob.; Nevskii, 516; Dargol'ts, 103; *Rabochee dvizhenie v Odesse (1894-96 gody)* (Geneva, 1903), 15-16.

18. TsGAOR, f. 124, op. 6, d. 20, 1897, 104 ob.

19. Nevskii, 516-517. See also: Mendelsohn, 53 and 64-65; TsGAOR, f. 124, op. 6, d. 20, 1897, 106-109 ob.

20. Frankel, 201. See also 196.

21. Allan K. Wildman, "Russian and Jewish Social Democracy," in *Revolution and Politics in Russia: Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicolaevsky*, eds. Alexander and Janet Rabinowitch with Ladis K. D. Kristof (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 84. Jonathan Frankel seconds Wildman's conclusion when he writes: "For those who left the northwest in order to work in St. Petersburg, Ekaterinoslav, or Odessa, the central element in the Vilna program was seen not as the national concept... but the tactic of economic agitation...." Frankel, 201.

22. Garvi, 30-31 and 47; Mishkinski, 41.

23. Even though the 1897 census reported that most Jews in Odessa stated that Yiddish was their language of daily use, evidence exists, albeit from a slightly later period, suggesting that Jewish workers understood Russian. In one incident, for example, Jewish workers protested the use of Yiddish at a meeting of bookbinders. *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii, 1897 g.*, 47: vi-vii; *Iuzhnoe obozrenie*, no. 2989 (December 11, 1905). See also *Kommercheskaia Rossiia*, nos. 255 (November 18, 1905) and 261 (November 25, 1905).

24. Tobias, 117.

25. *Doklad o russkom sotsial'demokraticheskom dvizhenii mezhdunarodnomu sotsialisticheskomu kongressu v Parizhe v 1900 g.* (Geneva, 1901), 34. See also Nevskii, 353-354 and 517-518; Dargol'ts, 101.

26. Presumably, many of these SDs either had escaped arrest or had been arrested and then returned to revolutionary activity after their release from custody.

27. Nevskii, 519-520; Dargol'ts, 106.

28. Leon Trotsky, *My Life* (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1930), 111. Trotsky spoke frequently at the meetings of SDs and workers in Odessa, and his inflammatory speeches and antigovernment pronouncements at these gatherings attracted the attention of the police, who arrested and subsequently exiled him from Odessa. The record of Trotsky's arrest is preserved in TsGAOR, f. 124, d. 27, ch. 8, 1898, 92-135 ob.

29. Dargol'ts, 106-107; Nevskii, 520.

30. On the careers of Nudel'man and Dargol'ts, see Dargol'ts, passim. On the new round of arrests, see Nevskii, 519; TsGAOR, f. 124, op. 6, d. 20, 1897, 1-135 ob.

31. Dargol'ts, 104-105; Nevskii, 520 and 523-524; D. N. Shcherbakov, "Deiatel'nost' revoliutsionnykh sotsial-demokraticheskikh organizatsii Ukrainy po politcheskomu vospitaniiu proletariata i rukovodstvu rabochim dvizheniem (1894-1904 gg.)" (Doctor of Historical Science dissertation, Kiev State University, 1979), 142.

32. TsGAOR. f. 102, Osobyi Otdel, d. 5, ch. 2, lit. B, 1898, 46-50 and 406-407; f. 124, op. 7, d. 31, 1898, 76-106 ob.; f. 102, Osobyi Otdel, d. 5, ch. 2, lit. V, 1898, 122; Nevskii, 520-521; Dargol'ts, 113-114.

33. Shcherbakov, 142 and 220-221 For a discussion of how SDs in Odessa conducted agitation at the turn of the century, see Garvi, 26-134; Jeremiah Schneiderman, *Sergei Zubatov and Revolutionary Marxism* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970, 1976), 291-293; Allan K. Wildman, *The Making of a Workers' Revolution: Russian Social Democracy, 1891-1903* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 110-112; S. Shapiro, "Iz istorii rabochego dvizheniia v Odesse," *Professional'naia zhizn'*, nos. 23 (110) (1922), 16-17, and 24 (111) (1922), 13-14.

34. TsGAOR, f. 102, Osobyi Otdel, d. 825, ch. 1, 1901, 1-2.

35. Garvi, p. 24; Shcherbakov, 220-221; Shapiro, nos. 23 (110) (1922), 16-17, 25 (112) (1922), 59-64, 28-29 (115-116) (1923), 65-68, 30 (117) (1923), 51-54, and 31-32

(118-119) (1923), 70-72. The high proportion of Jews active in these organizations is reflected in the lists of Social Democrats who were arrested. See TsGAOR, f. 124, op. 10, d. 147, 1901, 11-11 ob. and 137-138.

36. Iu. M. Steklov, *Iz rabochago dvizheniia v Odesse i Nikolaeve* (Geneva, 1900), 12.

37. *Doklad o russkom sotsial'demokraticheskom dvizhenii...1900 g.*, 33.

38. Garvi, 24 and 31.

39. TsGAOR, f. 124, op. 7, d. 31, 1898, 76 ob.

40. Garvi, 24.

41. The Odessa Committee of the RSDWP was formed in 1900. For a brief history of the social democratic movement in Odessa during 1900-1903, see Schneiderman, 291-294; Garvi, 106-183; S. K. Mel'nik and N. N. Filatova, "Sozdanie sotsial-demokraticheskoi organizatsii v Odesse i nachal'nyi period ee deiatel'nosti (1895-1904 gody)," in *Iz Istorii odesskoi partiinoi organizatsii*, ed. K. S. Kovalenko (Odessa, 1964), 36-42.

42. F. E. Los', ed., *Pod"em revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia na Ukraine nakanune pervoi russkoi revoliutsii (1901-1904 gg.)* (Kiev, 1955), 272; TsGAOR, f. 102, Osobyi Otdel, d. 850, vol. 12, 1901, 40-47.

43. In one public appeal, the Southern Revolutionary Group of Social Democrats asked the intelligentsia to join forces with them. TsGAOR, f. 124, op. 10, d. 149, 1901, 2. See also: TsGAOR, f. 102, Osobyi Otdel, d. 5, ch. 19, lit. G, vol. 2, 1898, 11; *Iskra*, no. 17 (February 1902); Garvi, 106 and 113-116; and TsGAOR, f. 124, op., 10, d. 147, 1901, 178 ob. For a more general discussion of this issue, see Reginald E. Zelnik, "Russian Workers and the Revolutionary Movement," *Journal of Social History*, 6, no. 2 (1972-1973): 226-228; Wildman, *The Making of a Workers' Revolution*, 213-218.

44. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the Committee's adherence to work among Jewish workers reflected sympathy with efforts of Bundist organizers to form a branch in Odessa, a task they accomplished in early 1903. Quite the contrary M. S. Zborovskii, who represented the Odessa Committee at the second congress of the RSDWP, soundly condemned Bundist efforts to create a local organization. Although the Group and Committee differed over many issues, both factions of Odessa Social Democracy wholeheartedly supported *Iskra*'s effort to halt Bundist attempts to establish a party along federated lines. *Vtoroi s"ezd RSDRP, Iiul'-avgust 1903 goda. Protokoly* (Moscow, 1959), 63-64.

45. *Perepiska V. I. Lenina i rukovodimykh im uchrezhdenii RSDRP s partiinymi organizatsiiami 1905-1907 gg. Sbornik dokumentov v piati tomakh* vol. 2, pt. 1, *Aprel'-mai 1905 g.* (Moscow, 1982): 135-136, 239 and 265-266. See also "Perepiska N. Lenina i N. K. Krupskoi s Odesskoi organizatsiei," *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia*, nos. 6 (41) (1925), 48, 7 (42) (1925), 24, 11 (46) (1925), 37-39, and 12 (47) (1925), 25-29.

46. TsGAOR, f. 124, op. 10, d. 147, 1901, 41; f. 102, Osobyi Otdel, d. 850, vol. 2, 1901, 46 ob.; S. K. Mel'nik, *V. I. Lenin i odesskaia partiinaia organizatsiia* (Odessa, 1960), 22; D. Novomirskii, "Iz istorii odesskogo podpol'-ia," *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia*, no. 4 (63) (1927), 188.

47. TsGAOR, f. 124, op. 10, d. 147, 1901, 137 and 178 ob.; f. 124, d. 149, 1901, 1; Mel'nik and Filatova, 40-41; Novomirskii, 191-197.

48. Bonnell, 80-86 and 128; Engelstein, 59-62, 79-81, 156, 173-174, and 232-233.

49. TsGAOR, f. 124, op. 12, d. 1546, 1903, 124. Some estimates place the membership at 6,000. See Schneiderman, 304.

50. Schneiderman provides the best account of the Zubatov movement in Odessa. See chaps. 11-13.

51. Schneiderman, 304-305; A. P. Chemeriskii, "Vospominaniia o 'evreiskoi nezavisimoi rabochei partiia'," *Krasnyi arkhiv*, vol. 1 (1922), 319-320; N., A. Bukhbinder, "Nezavisimaia evreiskaia rabochaia partiia (Po neizdannym arkhivnym dokumentam)," *Krasnaia letopis'*, no. 2-3 (1922), 281; TsGAOR, f. 124, op. 12, d. 1546, 1903, 123 ob.-124; TsGIA, f. 1405, op. 530, d. 88, 10 and d. 87, 187; *Soiuz metallistov (Po vospominaniiam veteranov) 1898-1925* (Odessa, 1925), 12-15.

52. Chemeriskii, 319.

53. S. Piontkovskii, ed., "Novoe o zubatovshchine," *Krasnyi arkhiv* vol. 1 (1922), 301.

54. G., Bronevich, "Tiazhelyi put'. Iz zhizni mel'nichnykh rabochikh," in *Pishchevik. Iubileinyi sbornik* (Odessa, n.d.), 53.

55. Chemeriskii, 319.

56. TsGAOR, f. 124, op. 12, d. 546, 1903, 123 ob.,; P. N. Lepeshinskii, "Ot kruzhkovshchiny k partii (Period staroi 'Iskry')" in *Protokoly vtorogo s"ezda RSDRP* (Leningrad, 1924), 103.

57. A similar state of affairs occurred in Minsk when the Bund deemphasized the workers' economic struggle and turned its attention to politics. This policy shift enhanced the appeal of the Independents and facilitated their efforts to recruit members. Schneiderman, 251-252. On worker hostility to the Social Democrats, especially during the General Strike of 1903, see the article on Odessa in *Iskra*, no. 46 (August 1903); Schneiderman, 324-325; S. Filinskii, "Za sem' let (Ocherk profdvizheniia rabochikh pechatnago dela v Odesse)," *Russkoe bogatstvo*, no. 7 (1913), 158.

58. V. I. Rogov (A. Cherniavskii), "Cherty iz zhizni odesskoi organizatsii bol'shevikov v 1905 godu," in *1905 god. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Odesse i Odesshchine*, 2 vols. (Odessa, 1925-1926), 2: 57; A. S. Shapovalov, *V podpol'e*, 2nd ed. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1931), 133.

University of Pittsburgh Center for Russian and East European Studies
4G12 Forbes Quad Pittsburgh Pa. 15260 (412) 648-7403
Ronald H. Linden, Director
Bob Donnorummo, Associate Director Lynn Whitlock, Assistant Director