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The precise function that Marxist-Leninist ideology serves in the formation and conduct of Soviet foreign policy remains a highly contentious question among Western scholars. In the first postwar year, however, few senior officials or Soviet specialists in the West doubted that Communist ideology served as the constitutive element of Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, the militant revival of Marxism-Leninism after the Kremlin had downplayed it during "The Great Patriotic War" proved to be an important factor in the complex of causes that led to the breakup of the Grand Alliance. Moscow's revival of that ideology in 1945 prompted numerous top-level Western leaders and observers to regard it as heralding a new wave of Soviet world-revolutionary messianism and expansionism. Many American and British officials were even alarmed by the claim, renewed, for example, in Moscow's official History of Diplomacy, that Soviet diplomacy possessed a "scientific theory," a "weapon" possessed by none of its rivals or opponents. This "weapon," Marxism-Leninism, Moscow ominously boasted, enabled Soviet leaders to comprehend, foresee, and master the course of international affairs, smoothing the way for Soviet diplomacy to make exceptional gains since 1917. Now, in the postwar period, Stalinist diplomacy opened before the Soviet Union "boundless horizons and the most majestic prospects."¹

Ironically, just when many western officials and observers sounded the alarm over this challenge, Soviet ideology pointed the USSR toward unprecedented cataclysm, not "majestic prospects," and left Soviet foreign policy planners in disarray. For, after Hiroshima, how would they apply Lenin's doctrine of the inevitability of wars, "just" and "unjust," while imperialism survived? If, as Soviet ideologists were again contending in 1945, war cannot be eradicated while "exploitation of man by man and nation by nation exists,"² what future did Soviet socialism have in the Atomic Age? Soviet leaders and ideologists have grappled with this fateful question since Hiroshima. Despite the significance of this problem, it has prompted few studies, either Soviet or Western, on the period when this

question arose, 1945-1946. Consequently, an important factor in the making of the Cold War has been neglected.³

The purpose of this paper then is first to ascertain the views of Stalin and his entourage in the first postwar year on the inevitability or noninevitability of a Third World War. Having established the Soviet leaders' assessment of the main trend of the postwar period, I then identify the policies they deemed necessary to ensure the security of the USSR and the policies they declared both desirable and possible in Soviet relations with the USA and Great Britain. This is followed by an examination of US and British perceptions or misperceptions of Soviet policy and conduct.

There is, of course, a cardinal question that follows from this analysis: to what extent was the USSR responsible for the onset of the Cold War? The conventional wisdom, official and academic, in the West holds that the USSR's (or more precisely, Stalin's) unlimited or unreasonable territorial and ideological expansionism was the fundamental cause. I will examine the validity of this perception in light of my analysis of Moscow's policies and conduct, 1945-1946, and close by presenting an alternative view.

Stalin announced on September 2, 1945, V-J Day, over Radio Moscow to his exhausted people that "the conditions necessary for world-wide peace had now been won." The victorious USSR had secured itself against the threat of German invasion from the West and Japanese invasion from the East. Stalin thereby implied the end of "capitalist encirclement." While referring to the newly won security on the USSR's Western and Eastern borders, he pointedly did not allude to the Southern borders — Turkey and Iran — the major section of the USSR's long border not yet bounded by "friendly" governments. Contrary to popular expectations in the USSR of a period of postwar relaxation, he offered the Soviet people little respite. Three weeks earlier, the Soviet press had announced an ambitious postwar five-year plan that envisaged a

considerable rise over the prewar level of industrial production as well as complete restoration of the war-ravaged territories.⁴

From September 1945 to February 1946 the vacationing Stalin made no public appearances. He did, however, receive numerous foreign emissaries in Moscow or at his vacation retreat in Gagri. They included a visiting delegation of US Congressmen headed by William Colmer, which was investigating the advisability of a US postwar reconstruction loan to the USSR. On September 15, in the Kremlin, Stalin assured the skeptical Congressmen that the USSR would demobilize and reconvert to civilian production, because the country's overriding task was peaceful reconstruction. A six-billion dollar American loan would open up the boundless Soviet market to American goods because the country needed 50 years of intensive building to meet 75% of its needs. Moscow might, if interest rates were favorable, even request an additional loan. Repayment would be made in various raw materials and gold. The USSR was neither draining the assets of Soviet-occupied countries nor preventing them from trading with third countries. Indeed, America would not be excluded from investment opportunities in Eastern Europe. Moreover, Soviet troops would soon be withdrawn from these countries.⁵

In a separate interview held on the same day, Stalin repeated to Senator Claude Pepper the mutual advantages of a large American loan to the USSR. As regards peace, Stalin claimed that the Red Army was being reduced to one-third of its wartime strength. If, however, the Allies wanted to keep Germany down this time, they must take over the Ruhr. He scoffed at the suggestion that Russia might have aggressive intentions with respect to border countries. "Our people are tired," he said, "they couldn't be induced to make war on anybody anymore." The US and the USSR had been bonded together by common enemies, and the Soviet Union was very indebted to the US for the help sent the USSR. True, this bond no longer existed, and a new basis for close relations in the future had yet to be found. That would not be easy. But, he concluded, "Christ said seek and ye shall find."⁶

In the absence of summit meetings since Potsdam, Stalin was now reduced to receiving lowly American legislators, ambassadors, and politicians. In place of consensus achieved in secret by summitry à la Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, and by a steady exchange of personal letters, the Big Three now substituted conferences of the three foreign ministers and "megaphone diplomacy" addressed to a global public.

The first major postwar pronouncement on the shape of the future peace came from the USA, however, not the USSR. On Navy Day, October 27, 1945, President Harry S Truman set forth his views before a crowd of one million people gathered in Central Park, New York. Although the US was demobilizing rapidly, he said, it would still retain the largest Navy in the world and one of the largest air forces. It would also establish an army reserve, all of which, he hoped, would be backed up by universal military training. And the US would, of course, retain the atomic bomb and secrets of its production until it could be safely outlawed forever. The United States needed this vast peacetime force not for territorial aggrandizement, because "Outside the right to establish necessary bases for our own protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power." A large peacetime military force was also needed to uphold the peace and the twelve fundamentals of US foreign policy he now proclaimed must undergird world peace. These fundamentals stressed national self-determination, equal access to international trade and raw materials, and civil liberties. Emphatically, he said, "We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power." The President conceded, however, that these principles, like the Ten Commandments, could not be realized everywhere overnight. Allowance had to be made for the legitimate security interests of friendly powers.

Regarding the Grand Alliance, Truman said that common hope for peace must now replace common peril to draw the allies together. This was possible, he said, for there "are no conflicts of interests among the victorious powers so deeply rooted that they cannot be resolved." But their

solution would require adherence to the lofty principles he had just promulgated.⁷

Truman's assertive speech plainly coupled implicit threat with explicit friendliness toward America's two major partners. While challenging Soviet unilateral actions in Eastern Europe and elsewhere that Moscow regarded as essential to Soviet security, Truman now propounded two unilateral claims of his own that were bound to alarm Soviet leaders and to disquiet the British: 1) America's "right" to foreign bases he deemed essential to its security; and 2) continued unity of the victors depended upon their embracing the twelve principles he espoused. If the President's speech was more than Navy Day bombast, the consequences for America's partners could be grave, indeed. Taken literally, Truman was, in effect, telling Moscow that it must abandon its planned economy, the territories it had acquired since 1939, and its Eastern European empire. London must liquidate imperial preference and perhaps the Empire itself. While these terms were not final, Moscow and London had to negotiate on this basis if they expected America's close friendship and, presumably, largesse.

Despite President Truman's challenge to the Soviet postwar position, Moscow's immediate response in *Pravda* was mild. Strangely, it omitted the President's reference to the US need for foreign military bases. But it did include all twelve principles verbatim and his statement on the atomic bomb. Foregoing editorial comment, the paper allowed readers to draw their own conclusions.⁸ Truman's speech elicited no public response from a Soviet leader until ten days later when Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov delivered a speech⁹ commemorating the 28th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The speech also presented the Soviet view of current problems within the Big Three coalition.

While hailing the Anglo-Soviet-American unity that won joint victory over Germany and Japan, Molotov noted three issues sundering the coalition. First, the Western powers were dilatory in fulfilling the Potsdam decisions on German reparations to the USSR. Second, imperialist

"zealots" abroad were fomenting a great-power arms race. The "propensity" to exploit the atomic bomb in international affairs ought not to be encouraged, because no technical secret could long remain the exclusive possession of any one country or group of countries. Indeed, now with peace restored, he predicted, "we shall have atomic energy and many other things, too in our country!" Third, all the talk in the West of forming a Western defense bloc smacked of Hitlerite anti-Sovietism, and it forced the USSR and other peace-loving states to maintain their "vigilance."

Despite the impasse over procedure for drafting the peace treaties in which the London Conference of Foreign Ministers adjourned on October 2, 1945, Molotov expressed optimism about the future of the Big Three. The coalition had also frayed during the war, but then eventually mended itself. Consolidating collaboration among peaceful powers would remain "our most important duty." But he solemnly warned his compatriots: "So long as we live in a 'system of states' and fascism and imperialist aggression have not yet been finally eradicated from the earth, our vigilance regarding possible new violations of peace must not slacken...."¹⁰ Thus Molotov publicly intimated for the first time that fresh threats to peace emanated from imperialists other than German or Japanese, namely "zealots" within Britain and the US.

As the rift between the USA and the USSR widened, Soviet leaders watched anxiously to see which way the British would go. In view of putative growing Anglo-American imperialist rivalry, would or could the two leading capitalist countries "gang up" on the USSR? Soviet ideologists doubted this; in fact, the possibility of economically beleaguered Britain breaking with the US could not be precluded. Prominent British figures, ranging on the Left from Harold Laski, Chairman of the British Labour Party, to Lord Beaverbrook, the pro-Empire press-lord, on the Right, had indicated that, if forced by harsh terms for an American loan to choose between America and the USSR, they might not be averse to choosing the USSR¹¹ or organizing a third force. A lively discussion of Anglo-

American relations ensued in the Soviet press. Most significant was Eugene Varga's contribution.

Varga, Moscow's top specialist on questions of world economics and politics, cited the rise of American economic supremacy over Britain as further corroboration of Lenin's theory of the uneven development of capitalism. Although Anglo-American relations appeared quite close, he wrote, Britain, in fact, was desperately mobilizing her economic defenses against American encroachments on imperial markets and sources of raw materials. This economic struggle was bound to aggravate political relations between the two countries. Varga harked back to Stalin's thesis of July 13, 1928, which held that the Anglo-American "contradiction" had become dominant within world imperialism.¹² Now that the aggressor countries, Germany, Italy, and Japan, had been crushed, the Anglo-American contradiction resurfaced as the principal conflict within world imperialism. This time, however, America's infinitely greater military as well as economic strength rendered that contradiction still more explosive. But did this antagonism make war between the US and Britain probable or even inevitable? Varga equivocated.

In 1945-46 Varga at first evaded the question or reverted to Stalin's assessment dating from the 1920s. Then he finally took a non-conformist position, subsequently denounced as heretical: the US Government might effectively "plan" its capitalist economy. Thanks to wartime state regulation of the US national economy, if retained, and effective consumer demand, generated and pent-up during the war, America's enormously expanded production capacity would be absorbed domestically. America's "inevitable" crisis of "overproduction" could therefore be held off for three or four postwar years, and the US would not immediately need to radically expand its foreign markets at the expense of the British. But then, America's crisis of "overproduction" would break out. The US would step up the imperialist struggle against Britain for markets and raw materials. Then the "inevitable" conflict between the two imperialist giants would take a bellicose turn.¹³

By the end of 1945, while Soviet ideologists disagreed on just when the "inevitable" postwar economic depression would break out in the USA, they agreed that the USSR held an advantageous position within the Big Three coalition. The sharp ideological and political differences estranging the USSR and the USA could, they argued, be outweighed by complementary economic interests. The USSR, unlike Britain, offered the US a vast postwar market and source of cheap raw materials, not economic rivalry. "Objective" conditions were therefore ripe for close Soviet-American economic partnership — if the USA proffered the USSR a loan or credit on generous terms. Nor would this preclude close Anglo-Soviet economic partnership. The USSR, unlike the USA, posed no threat to the British Empire, inasmuch as Moscow would hold its stock anti-imperialist rhetoric in abeyance — providing Britain did not challenge the Soviet Union's position in Eastern Europe or Soviet claims with respect to Turkey and Iran. The sharpest potential clash of economic interests in the Big Three coalition therefore inhered in Anglo-American relations, while the USSR was a natural trading partner to both. Thus, to Soviet ideologists, the USSR seemed to hold the pivotal position in postwar Big Three relations.

But Stalin and his closest associates had yet to speak out publicly on these and other vital issues. Soviet leaders had good reason to doubt that they enjoyed the unstinting support of the whole of the Soviet population. Stalin had admitted to Ambassador Averell Harriman during the war that the Soviet people were fighting for Russia not for Communism.¹⁴ Judging by the hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens that the NKVD executed, imprisoned, or exiled on charges of disaffection, the Kremlin, by its own lights, now faced serious morale problems at home. The regime accordingly initiated a vast campaign to arouse mass enthusiasm for reconstruction and to inspire faith in a brighter Soviet future. Not the least of aims was the restoration of Stalin's reputation for political clairvoyance shattered on June 22, 1941. The Kremlin hoped to rebuild popular confidence in the Stalin leadership's ability to spare the country

the horrors of another war while consolidating and expanding the gains scored since 1939. Toward these ends the Supreme Soviet election campaign of February 1946 climaxed a gigantic political mobilization.

From late 1945, foreign observers engaged in a good deal of speculation concerning Stalin's personal power. Was Stalin "a prisoner of the Politburo," as President Truman surmised? Or was he a prisoner of his marshals, as Churchill hypothesized? Or was he first among equals, as a knowledgeable American journalist wrote? Or did declining health, physical and political, subject him to increased manipulation by powerful lieutenants? Thus Stalin's dissembling that he had to defer to the opinion of his colleagues had partially swayed Western leaders and observers during the War. Yet, after the Great Terror of 1936-38, how could there be any doubts in the West that Stalin exercised absolute power over his colleagues?¹⁵

Nevertheless, was this Politburo of survivors really as monolithic in its views as the official party line purported? The election campaign of February 1946 offers significant evidence on that question. Indeed, as we shall see, two Politburo members publicly differed on a cardinal question: the prospects for East-West peace over the next five years.

The answer to that question brooked no further delay. Completion of the Draft Fourth Five-Year Plan required that a top-level decision be made on priorities in allocation of resources. Priorities would, in the last analysis, be determined by the Politburo members' assessment of the international situation, that is, the requirements for defense.

A carefully programmed eight-day pre-election campaign ensued in which all Politburo members delivered public speeches touching upon Soviet security. The entire campaign climaxed in an election-eve speech by Stalin himself. All Politburo members, of course, attributed the Soviet victory over the Axis to the foresight and genius of Stalin who, they claimed, had seen to it that the country was ready in every way for Hitler's onslaught. They averred that victory had demonstrated the superiority of the Soviet system in all respects and had strengthened the security of

Soviet frontiers as never before; nevertheless, danger still lurked without. But let Stalin's lieutenants speak for themselves in their respective constituencies.

Alluding ominously to Turkey, Lavrentii Beria, NKVD Chief, said in Tbilisi on February 5, 1946, that Soviet defeat of Germany had also foiled plans of "neutral" states to seize the Soviet Caucasus. Despite the smashing victory, "It would be a mistake to think that the need no longer exists to strengthen further the military and economic power of the Soviet state." Fascism, after all, had not been finished off everywhere.¹⁶ On the same day, captain of heavy industry and construction Lazar Kaganovich warned his constituents in Tashkent that it should not be forgotten that "the weak are always beaten and insulted and the strong are feared and respected. Therefore we must also be strong in the future so that enemies should fear us and friends respect and love the Soviet Union." Alone among his colleagues, Kaganovich explicitly stated, "our country still finds itself in capitalistic encirclement."¹⁷

Most combative was Georgii Malenkov, Stalin's potential heir although still only a "candidate," that is, a non-voting, member of the Politburo. Speaking on February 7th in Moscow, he warned that there were cases in history when the fruits of victory slipped out of the victor's hands. To avoid that fate and prevent interference in our "great creative work" we must strengthen our state and its Red Army and Navy. Hurling defiance at opponents of the USSR abroad, he said, those who "imagine that we shed our blood, suffered enormous casualties, and won our victory so that others may help themselves to its fruits" ought not to forget the enormous power possessed by the USSR. They should stop trying to frighten us, because we are not easily frightened. And if we have drawn the chestnuts out of the fire, "let us use them for the benefit of our glorious Soviet people."¹⁸

The fullest statement on Soviet foreign relations was, naturally, delivered by Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov. He alone of the speakers alluded to the growth in the strength and popularity of Com-

munist Parties in the West. Molotov also unlimbered the boastful language of an incipient superpower. It was now impossible, he claimed, to solve the most important international problems without the participation of the USSR or without heeding its voice. Indeed, "the participation of Comrade Stalin is regarded as the best guarantee of the successful solution of complex international problems."

Hitler's invasion, Molotov recalled, had interrupted the Soviet effort to fulfill its major task: "to overtake and surpass the economically most developed countries of Europe and the United States" in per-capita industrial production in the near future. The country could now return to that task — if a long period of peace and fully assured security were attained; that is, if the aggressors were kept down. But even now rapacious imperialists in capitalist countries engaged in baseless prattling about a "third world war'." Apparently alluding to atomic weapons, Molotov said that Soviet leaders were doing their utmost to equip Soviet armed forces with the most up-to-date weapons so that the Red Army would take second place to no army in the world.¹⁹ Thus Molotov joined Beria, Kaganovich, and Malenkov in asserting that the danger of a new war on the USSR stemmed from "warmongers" in the US and Britain.

How did all of these calls for vigilance, increased military strength, rapid reconstruction, and atomic weapons translate into directives for the postwar five-year plan? Former Commissar for Defense Kliment Voroshilov said that the order of priority must first be the development of science and technology, then heavy industry, culture, education, and art.²⁰ No doubt he, like Molotov, had atomic research in mind. But the ever-pugnacious Malenkov also stressed the need to give heavy industry priority. Victory over the Axis, he said, had not come of itself. Before the war, Stalin had foreseen the need for accelerated industrialization to prepare the country for the worst; he had not squandered resources on light industry. Despite the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, and Bukharinites, "the faithful servitors of fascism" who opposed our stress on heavy industry, Stalin had strengthened the defensive capabilities of the country.

Removal of these traitors had been a most important precondition of victory.²¹ Malenkov was not merely reciting past history. In his view, any Soviet citizen who wanted even in 1946 to assign high priority to light industry was a latter-day "faithful servitor of fascism."

But on the previous day, February 6th, Andrei Zhdanov, Politburo specialist in foreign affairs and ideology and Malenkov's most dangerous rival for succession to Stalin, had advocated just that priority. Of course Zhdanov fulsomely praised Stalin's foresight in building up the strength of the Soviet state in the 1930s to repulse potential imperialist aggression. But victory, Zhdanov said, was won thanks also to Stalin's success in creating and consolidating "a bloc of freedom-loving states" against German fascism. Herein lay the wisdom of Soviet foreign policy. The USSR could now engage in peaceful construction, for Zhdanov evidently foresaw a long period of fairly tolerable relations with the West. Like his comrades, he declared that the USSR must still be "vigilant," because the roots of fascism had not been destroyed, and within the "freedom-loving" countries "reactionary elements" sought to block Soviet efforts to consolidate the peace. Unlike Malenkov, however, Zhdanov did not play up the motif, "they are trying to deprive us of the fruits of victory." And he backed up his reference to the "freedom-loving coalition" with policy. Alone among his confreres, he urged, above all, the rapid expansion of light industry in the postwar period. Not much time is given us, he warned, in the matter of expanding it,

because the people, who over the course of many years of war bore sacrifices and privations, legitimately demand that material and every-day living conditions should speedily improve. All of this is no trifle. The task of improving the every-day living conditions and material well-being of the masses, broadening the production of consumers' goods, is a cause which must be defended, fought for, and invested with the same bolshevist enthusiasm with which we moved in solving war tasks. The people will only thank us for this.²²

The issue was now sharply drawn. Stalin's two leading heirs took diametrically opposed positions on Soviet defense needs. Malenkov in February 1946 spoke as if the USSR found itself in a position analogous with that of the eve of the Second World War; Zhdanov articulated the widespread popular hope that victory had made the USSR more secure than ever and for the first time made possible a Five-Year Plan that assigned top priority to consumers' goods production, a cause that must be "fought for." True, he would soon become notorious for his anti-Westernism in the *Zhdanovshchina*, the ruthless campaign to extirpate "cosmopolitanism" in Soviet intellectual and cultural life. True, in September 1947 at the founding conference of the Cominform Zhdanov blamed the West for the division of the world into two opposing camps. But this should not blind us to the fact that in February 1946 he stood out as the nonconformist, the soft-liner prepared to assign priority to consumer goods production on the assumption that the anti-Hitler coalition might still survive.

This brought Zhdanov into direct, open conflict with his arch-rival Malenkov, but it did not impair his relations with Stalin. Zhdanov retained exalted power at least until shortly before his death in August 31, 1948, while Malenkov went into temporary eclipse in May 1946.²³ That the most powerful member of the Politburo in 1946 publicly doubted that troubled relations with the West required overriding priority to heavy industry attests that an official line toward the Western partners had not yet crystallized.

The time had now come for Stalin to speak.

It will have been noticed that all Politburo members steered clear of one major problem: doctrine. "Creative Marxism" was an exclusive preserve of Stalin's. He alone had the authority to adjust Lenin's doctrine of the inevitability, under imperialism, of just and unjust wars and of proletarian revolution to the Atomic Age. The difficulty of solving that problem is illustrated by Stalin's famous election-eve speech of February 9, 1946. In the foreign-policy section of that speech, Stalin attempted a

Marxist-Leninist *aggiornamento*, an effort to adapt Lenin's doctrine on imperialism to the vastly altered "correlation of forces" in the postwar era. Although he did not fully endorse Zhdanov's assessment, he most certainly did not approve Malenkov's. Instead, he pronounced a cryptic third view. The result was unmitigated political disaster for Moscow — and for the West as well — because that speech, willy-nilly, played no small role in generating and exacerbating the Cold War.

Stalin apparently felt compelled to say something oracular to restore his tarnished reputation for political omniscience. The Party Central Committee had already set the stage. In effect it contrived to elevate him to Lenin's level by ordering the publication of Stalin's works in sixteen volumes with a press run of 500,000 copies. Stalin in his introduction in volume one, dated January 1946, claimed that because Lenin's genius had enabled him to see so far ahead, he was frequently compelled to bide his time until the moment was ripe for unformed Party members, such as the young Stalin, to grasp a new theoretical concept. Stalin's drift appears unmistakable. What arcane truth would the mature Stalin, Lenin's successor, reveal?²⁴

The unprecedented world situation of 1946 presented him with staggering doctrinal as well as material problems. For one thing, how to explain the outbreak of the Second World War and defend Soviet policy, 1939-1941? The victory of the Grand Alliance had not expunged the bitter memory in the West of Moscow's skewed neutrality toward Germany pursued until June 22, 1941. Hitherto, the Stalin line asserted that the British, French, and Polish governments had fought an unjust, imperialist war up to June 22, 1941. Adherence to that position would hardly enhance Big Three unity and Soviet-Polish friendship in the postwar era. Vastly more important, how should Lenin's theory of the inevitability of war under imperialism be interpreted in Year One of the Atomic Age? As we have seen, Party ideologists had broached this question without coming to categorical conclusions. Stalin, characteristically, resolved both problems *ipse dixit*.

Speaking to an elite audience that packed the Bolshoi Theatre on February 9, 1946, the eve of elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, Stalin set forth his views on the past, present, and future of the USSR with special reference to war.²⁵ General economic crisis and catastrophic armed conflict inhere in capitalism at its monopoly stage, Stalin asserted. Consequently the Second World War, like the First, broke out not merely by chance or miscalculation. Imperialist rivalries, exacerbated by "uneven" development of capitalist states, divide the world into two hostile camps, and war inevitably ensues as one or the other tries to repartition the world in its favor by armed force. An identical cause, imperialism, had generated both World Wars.

So far, Stalin said nothing new. Then, however, he reversed his earlier line on the character of the war, 1939-1941. Stalin now declared that although both World Wars were imperialist in origin, the Second World War, unlike the First, was a just war on the part of the Allies from the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. From the outset, the Allied cause differed from that of the Axis inasmuch as Britain and France were "freedom-loving" states, hence qualitatively different from the Axis States that had destroyed freedom at home as their first step toward world domination. Consequently, the Second World War, on the Allied side, "assumed from the very outset the character of an antifascist, liberationist war, one aim of which was also the restoration of democratic liberties." The entrance of the Soviet Union into the war, establishing an antifascist coalition with the USA, Britain, and other "freedom-loving" states, could not but strengthen the just character of that war on the Allied side.

Thus, at a stroke, Stalin sought to efface his shameful record of collaboration with Hitler from August 23, 1939, to June 22, 1941, and the view that Britain and France engaged in an "unjust" war in that period. Without admission of error on his part, Stalin now paid belated tribute to the heroic struggle Britain and its allies had waged against the Axis before the German invasion of the USSR. In the process, however, he reaffirmed an oxymoron, inconceivable in Leninist terms: "freedom-loving"

imperialist states. In any case, so long as the US, Britain, and other imperialist states remained "freedom-loving" (that is, not "anti-Soviet"), for Stalin, continued coalition with the USSR and a long period of peaceful coexistence between the two systems was possible.

But nowhere in his analysis did Stalin suggest that the process of "uneven" capitalist development had terminated or even abated. Perhaps it might be possible, he continued, periodically and peacefully to redistribute raw materials sources and sales markets among the capitalist countries in accordance with their economic importance. But, he categorically declared, "this is impossible to carry through under present-day capitalist conditions of the development of the world economy." Stalin thus contended that the division of the capitalist world into two hostile blocs and ensuing imperialist wars between them were still inevitable. True, he did not spell this out as he would in October 1952. Nevertheless, he implied that a new war, like the first two World Wars, would begin as a war between two major hostile imperialist camps. And it would spare the USSR for fifteen to twenty years, because he envisaged the USSR tripling its prewar output of iron and steel and doubling its output of oil and coal within three or more five-year plans as finally making the USSR safe against "any contingency." At the same time, he said, "special attention" would be "focused on expanding the production of consumer goods...." Thus, Stalin arcanelly projected the inevitability of future interimperialist war but the improbability of intersystemic war for at least fifteen years.

In this fashion, Stalin finessed a number of postwar foreign and domestic problems. He affirmed the continued validity of Lenin's doctrine on the inevitability of imperialist wars even in the atomic age. But he intimated that the USSR would initially be spared, because the next war would start within the system of imperialism. Conspicuous by its absence, however, was any reference by Stalin to the other half of Lenin's theory of imperialism, the inevitability of world-wide proletarian revolution ("... imperialism is the eve of socialist revolution"). Meanwhile, like Zhdanov, he blandished his wartime allies by classifying them as "freedom-loving"

(providing they did not go against the USSR). This assessment enabled him to tell his people that they could now have both atomic bombs and some butter. Then, in the following month he promoted Malenkov and Beria, among the most bellicose leaders, to full membership on the Politburo, thus counterbalancing Zhdanov, the least bellicose leader, who retained his position of eminence.²⁶

Stalin's Delphic message of February 9, 1946, clearly indicated that a third world war was ultimately inevitable — a war between the US and Great Britain! But in 1946, and for some time thereafter, hardly anyone outside of the Soviet Union read it that way, undoubtedly because this proposition appeared so utterly bizarre. Indeed, many foreign commentators, including certain Communist leaders, believed that Stalin had in fact declared the inevitability of a US-Soviet war, the precise opposite of the prognostication he had concocted. In America, the moderate Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas was not alone in labeling the speech, "A Declaration of World War III." Dean Acheson and Walter Lippmann regarded it as a bellicose statement. True, there were notable exceptions like Averell Harriman and Henry A. Wallace, among others, who discerned no great menace in the speech.²⁷

The puzzlement and uncertainty over the real meaning of the speeches delivered by Stalin and his lieutenants prompted the U.S. Department of State to request that George F. Kennan, Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, send Washington an "interpretive analysis" of the ramifications of the policies announced in February. Kennan's response was his "long telegram," which established his reputation as the Department's chief Soviet expert.²⁸

In Kennan's view, the Soviet postwar outlook, revealed by the official propaganda machine, contained several salient features. First, Soviet leaders still believed in the existence of "capitalist encirclement," and the continued danger of imperialist intervention against the USSR, which made impossible any permanent "peaceful coexistence" between capitalism and socialism. Second, they believed in the inevitability of im-

perialist wars, which were of two types, interimperialist and intersystemic. But the former was the more likely and, while fraught with danger for the USSR, would offer opportunities for new Communist-led revolutions. Third, Soviet leaders regarded socialists as an enemy more dangerous than out-and-out reactionaries.

In fact, however, little of Kennan's assessment corresponded to the message the Soviet propaganda machine churned out as of February 1946. Despite Kaganovich's allusion to capitalist encirclement, the Party line had it that the USSR was more secure than at any other time in its history. The most immediate danger to the country was the Allies' effort to deprive the USSR of "the fruits of victory," not anti-Soviet armed intervention. If the West's reactionary fomenters of war could be blocked, close cooperation between the "freedom-loving" states of the West and the USSR was quite possible. And, contrary to Kennan, neither Politburo members nor lower-level propagandists publicly associated a wave of postwar proletarian revolutions with such a war. Nor did the machine yet single out socialists as more dangerous to Moscow than reactionaries. Quite the contrary, Moscow regarded "reaction" as the main enemy, because it allegedly incited a new imperialist war against the USSR. Soviet propagandists did, however, heap harsh invective on socialists like Harold Laski and Leon Blum. Moscow branded their efforts to form a western-European bloc of socialist-led countries to stand as a third force between the USSR and the USA as the makings of a new "*cordon sanitaire*."²⁹

Since no country intended armed intervention against the USSR, Kennan further wrote, Moscow's groundless fears of "capitalist encirclement" demonstrated that the Stalin line was not based on an objective evaluation of the outside world. The Kremlin's outlook was at bottom a "neurotic view of world affairs," a view of reality distorted by an instinctive sense of insecurity, inferiority, and downright ignorance compounded by the fact that the Soviet Government was "actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy." Because Soviet leaders had "learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in

compacts and compromise," it was chimerical for the US to seek a permanent *modus vivendi* with the Kremlin.

This sweeping judgment was belied by the West's encounter with Soviet diplomacy since 1917 and more recently by the accords concluded in December 1945 at the Moscow Conference of the Big Three Foreign Ministers. In Moscow, Secretary of State Byrnes had reached a number of compromise agreements with Stalin and Molotov that broke the deadlock of the London Conference of September-October 1945 on procedure for drafting the peace treaties. Kennan's "long telegram," in fact, did not analyze the Soviet postwar outlook as such, but vented his long pent-up animadversions on the USSR. For Kennan mistakenly identified the Soviet outlook of February 1946 with that of Moscow of the late 1920s, replete with a wager on "world revolution." To Kennan's credit, however, he, almost alone among outside observers, saw that Stalin contended in 1946 that an interimperialist war, not an intersystemic war, was "inevitable."

Kennan's cable was not the only "long telegram" received in the West. Frank Roberts, British Chargé d'Affairs in Moscow and a close friend and confidant of Kennan's, cabled to London and to the British Embassy in Washington an analysis of Soviet policy that was far less alarming and ominous than Kennan's. Roberts regarded the Soviet challenge to Britain, then the main target of Soviet hostility, as a continuation of traditional Imperial Russian rivalry with Britain in the Near and Middle East, a renewal of the "Great Game," so to speak. Moscow now only camouflaged its territorial claims in Marxist-Leninist garb, when in fact a xenophobic, historically-determined desire for security motivated Moscow's expansionism. While it was becoming doubtful whether Soviet expansionism had limited aims, Moscow would nevertheless not press immediate issues to the point of armed conflict, except as the result of miscalculation of forces. Eschewing an evaluation that diagnosed Soviet conduct abroad as neurotic, paranoiac, autistic, and non-negotiable, Roberts believed that it was "possible, though difficult, to reconcile British

and Soviet interests in any problem with which we are likely to be faced, granted the right mixture of strength and patience and the avoidance of saber rattling or of raising of prestige issues...." Although Britain should no longer hasten to make unilateral concessions to the USSR, it should and could negotiate on a basis of reciprocity.³⁰

The Roberts characterization of the abhorrent features of the Soviet system tallied with Kennan's on numerous points. But a crucial difference separated the two. Kennan wrote that it was fruitless to seek long-term agreements with the Soviet Government, because Moscow sought security only in "total destruction of rival power." In contrast, Roberts concluded that despite all that had happened, Anglo-Soviet disputes could still be resolved by hard bargaining. Indeed, he wrote that, if it were only a matter of Anglo-Soviet relations, the two countries could work out "a zones-of-influence" agreement "in which we each left the other party free from interference or criticism within specified areas."³¹

Two questions arise at this point. Why did the view advanced by Kennan prevail?³² His message was hailed in Washington as revealed truth; the Roberts telegrams stirred barely a ripple either in London or Washington. And why did official Washington not grasp Kennan's crucial observation that the Kremlin operated on the assumption of the inevitability of interimperialist, not intersystemic, war?

It would seem that even before Kennan's telegram reached Washington, many American leaders, including President Truman, had already concluded the worst about the USSR. The clincher was Moscow's delay in evacuating its troops from Iran, which followed a long train of East-West frictions: Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, the demand Moscow made on Turkey for Soviet bases at the Turkish Straits and for border adjustments, the Greek Civil War, Soviet-backed Yugoslav intransigence over Trieste, the deadlock over German reparations, the Soviet bid for a trusteeship over Tripolitania, the uncovering of the Soviet atomic spy-ring in Canada, Soviet rejection of the invitation to sign the Bretton

Woods Agreements, the impasse in concluding the peace treaties, and a host of other East-West disputes.

Not the least of American concerns was the strength the Communist Parties had gained in France, Italy, Belgium, and elsewhere in Europe and the fear that one or the other might seize power.³³ All of these concerns prompted Washington, as well as London, "to get tough with Russia" from about February 12th onward,³⁴ that is, ten days before Kennan's telegram arrived in the capital. Many American officials on reading Stalin's speech, the text of which had appeared in the *New York Times*, February 10, 1946, hastily concluded that Stalin's discussion of the inevitability of imperialist war, topping the series of East-West disagreements, amounted to a "Declaration of World War III." Kennan's telegram arrived at a fortuitous juncture. With the ring of expert authority, it provided a coherent conceptual framework capacious enough to explain Soviet conduct, justify Western complaints against the USSR, and above all confirm the rectitude of the hardline mindset. In contrast, the Roberts telegram, contending that Soviet policy represented a search for secure boundaries in the Imperial tradition, which could accommodate an Anglo-Soviet "spheres of influence" deal, did not serve these purposes. In the Foreign Office his argument was given short shrift. Following the Stalin speech, Foreign Office officials found it difficult to accept the theory still held in the Moscow Embassy that "it is fear and suspicion of foreign dangers that makes Soviet policy so aggressive."³⁵

But Kennan's view triumphed in Washington because it also provided an easy way out of a domestic political dilemma confronting President Truman. As Truman hardened his line against the Russians, he was assailed by vestigial New Dealers such as Henry A. Wallace, Harold Ickes, Henry Morgenthau, among others, who charged him with betraying FDR's legacy for world peace. When, however, he adhered to that legacy, he incited increasingly louder cries from Right-Wing Republicans that he was continuing Roosevelt's policy of "appeasing" the Russians. Since the heart of Kennan's argument held that there was little the USA could do to alter

Moscow's neurotic expansionism but dig in its heels, his analysis absolved the US leadership from any responsibility for failing to get along with the Russians.³⁶ This probably also explains the traditionalist historians' continued partiality toward the Kennan analysis — even after Kennan has repudiated the way it was used in the Cold War.

Thus, although Stalin's speech did not "cause" the Cold War, it did inadvertently strengthen the resolve of the Truman administration, and the British Government as well, to get tough with the Russians. In January 1946, the President had bitterly disapproved of Byrnes' compromises with the Russians at the tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers of December 1945, in Moscow, as giving away too much to the Russians without obtaining any serious concessions in return. Truman claimed that Russia intended an invasion of Turkey and seizure of the Black Sea Straits. Unless Russia, he concluded, "is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making." The Stalin speech, following Truman's reprimand to Byrnes, then induced Byrnes to harden his line against the USSR. For, according to Byrnes, Stalin no longer seemed interested in securing speedy, just peace treaties.³⁷

In sum, this misreading of Stalin's speech followed by Kennan's analysis moved incipient Cold Warriors, both anti-Communist and Communist, toward their basic article of faith: peaceful coexistence, not to mention partnership, between the US and the USSR was impossible, because Stalin and his lieutenants allegedly postulated the inevitability of war with the capitalist world.

Back in Moscow, Soviet leaders, while celebrating their sweeping election victory, must have been appalled by the despondency the Stalin speech engendered at home and the fear it evoked abroad. The speech was quickly soft-pedaled notwithstanding its importance as a major revision and statement of Stalinist doctrine. Unlike Stalin's other major doctrinal pronouncements, this one — except for the passage on production targets — was not quoted or reprinted widely nor did it become the

subject of endless Hosannas by Agit-Prop and tedious glosses by Marxist-Leninist hierophants. Inevitability of a new war, any kind of war – imperialist or anti-imperialist, unjust or just – was not what the Soviet, the American, or the British citizen wanted to hear in 1946. Overnight Soviet ideologists launched a campaign to assure their own people and the world public that the Kremlin did not envisage war against the USSR as imminent or inevitable.³⁸ Stalin himself did not again publicly expatiate on the inevitability of war until 1952. Then, he expressly asserted what he had only suggested in 1946: the "contradictions" among capitalist countries were stronger than the "contradictions" between capitalist and socialist countries. Consequently, the next "conflict" would be fought by Britain and France on the one side and the USA on the other.³⁹

Meanwhile, in March 1946, Winston Churchill re-entered the picture. By then Churchill was perhaps more honored in Truman's America than in Attlee's Britain. Indeed, he could say things in America about Russia which, if said in Britain, would have brought obloquy on his head. Now he said them at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, in his famous "Iron Curtain" speech delivered from a platform shared with President Truman.

The fear aroused in the US by the hard-liners' misreading of Stalin's pre-election speech offered a propitious moment for revival of Churchill's old anti-Soviet strictures. The picture he drew of the horrors of life behind the "iron curtain" foreshadowed what might happen to the democracies if they did not check Moscow's machinations exercised through Communist fifth columns. Churchill declared that while the West still enjoyed a margin of military superiority, above all its atomic-bomb monopoly, the English-speaking peoples ought to unite with others to back Western demands for a "quick settlement" with the USSR. He denied that war was either inevitable or imminent. But averting a repetition of the West's experiences with Hitler could "only be achieved by reaching now, in 1946, a good understanding on all points with Russia" to be maintained through many peaceful years by the United Nations or-

ganization and "the whole strength of the English-speaking world and all its connections."

Churchill refrained from entering into the details of the "good understanding" he sought with Russia. But his "overall strategic concept" recommended that the West use atomic diplomacy to raise the "iron curtain" and force the USSR out of Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia.⁴⁰

Churchill's Fulton Speech offered Stalin an opportunity to divert attention from his own politically disastrous election-eve speech and to shift the onus for the war scare onto Churchill. It was, Stalin asserted on March 13th, Churchill who was following Hitler's footsteps by calling for world domination by the Anglo-Saxon "race." Churchill's proposal for a quick "settlement" with Russia was tantamount to an ultimatum: "Accept our rule voluntarily ... otherwise war is inevitable."⁴¹

Nor did Stalin stop with this statement in *Pravda*. Normally inaccessible to the press, Stalin also responded on five separate occasions to questions on Big Three relations put to him in writing by American and British journalists — and all of this in less than one year. Striving to allay the war scare at home and to reverse the rising tide of anti-Soviet sentiment in the West, Stalin stressed four points in these statements. First, a war between the US and the USSR was neither inevitable nor imminent; "capitalist encirclement" of the USSR did not exist. It was "warmongers" in the West, like Churchill and his ilk in Britain and America, who preached the inevitability of a new war. Second, he brazened out the threat posed by the atomic bomb. Atomic bombs, he said, were intended to intimidate the weak-nerved but they "could not decide the outcome of war, since atomic bombs are by no means sufficient for this purpose." In any case, monopolist possession of the atom bomb could not last long; furthermore, military use of the bomb would be prohibited. Third, to ensure world peace a broadly based, world-wide peace movement must mount a campaign to expose the warmongers. Fourth, despite all that had happened, Big Three cooperation was still possible. The USSR remained

interested in a large loan from the US. Moreover, a Big Three Conference (presumably at the highest level) was desirable. Indeed, Stalin favored several such conferences, not just one.⁴²

But Stalin's conciliatory words utterly failed to allay apprehensions in Washington or in London over Soviet expansionism. Nor did Stalin's conciliatory deeds ease fears in the West. In September 1945, despite Soviet claims on Bear Island and Spitzbergen, Moscow had announced that it was withdrawing Soviet troops from Norway without any *quid pro quo* and before the Western Allies withdrew their troops. This action was followed on April 6, 1946, when Moscow announced the withdrawal of the Soviet Command from the Danish Island of Bornholm, leaving no Soviet troops in Scandinavia.⁴³ On the same day Moscow stated that it would complete evacuation of Soviet troops from China by the end of April. Moscow also announced (or was compelled to announce) that it would withdraw all troops from Iran within one-month and a half. On May 22, 1946, Moscow announced that Soviet troops had been completely withdrawn from Manchuria, and on May 24 that the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran had been completed. At the Paris Peace Conference, the Soviet Union abandoned its request for a trusteeship over Tripolitania in favor of its passing to Italian trusteeship under United Nations control.⁴⁴

These retreats left the USSR with unsatisfied aims which, in Moscow's view, engaged vital rather than marginal security interests of the country; no further concessions could be made to the West. The USSR insisted on retaining the territory it had annexed since 1939, and sought allied acquiescence in Soviet hegemony in Eastern and Central Europe. But there remained the USSR's principal unsatisfied territorial demand: Turkey must grant the USSR bases for joint defense of the Turkish Straits and retrocede the districts of Kars and Ardahan to Soviet Armenia.⁴⁵

In sum, Soviet territorial demands were not unlimited; nor were they unreasonable or unprecedented in Russia's age-old search for security. As Roberts pointed out, if it had been a matter involving only Britain and the USSR, a straight spheres of interest arrangement might have been

worked out. But the US interests were now engaged in the Middle East, rendering this kind of solution impossible. For President Truman claimed the "right" to acquire foreign bases necessary to protect the USA but denied the USSR the same "right." Yet, Truman's logic applied with greater force to the Soviet Union, since protection of Soviet borders was at stake and not distant approaches as with the USA. In other words, while Truman sought retroactively to prevent "Pearl Harbor," Stalin must not seek *post factum* to prevent "June 22, 1941."

Stalin's conciliatory words and deeds did not assuage President Truman, who was under increasing pressure from US hardliners, especially those in the Republican Party, who demanded an end to the Democratic Party's continued "appeasement" of the USSR. From the hardline position Truman had assumed in January 5, 1946, through the hardliners' misreading of Stalin's speech and the policy of no-compromise with the USSR recommended by Kennan, the distance was not far to Clark Clifford's top-secret Report to the President, dated September 24, 1946. The Report stated that Soviet leaders appeared to be "conducting their nation on a course of aggrandizement designed to lead to world domination by the USSR." Ignoring everything Stalin had said and much of what he had done since February, the Report contended that Soviet leaders refused cooperation and friendship with the West, for these leaders believed that "peaceful coexistence of communist and capitalist nations is impossible." Indeed, Soviet leaders assumed "conflict between the Soviet Union and the leading capitalist powers of the Western world [to be] inevitable, and believe it their duty to prepare the USSR against the inevitable capitalist attack on the USSR." The Kremlin's paranoia was impervious either to "conventional diplomacy, good-will gestures, or acts of appeasement." Thus, the USSR was, "as Stalin euphemistically phrased it, preparing 'for any eventuality'."⁴⁶

In sum, nothing the USSR said or did after February 1946, it seemed, could alter the hardline mindset of the Truman Administration, based as it was on worst-case assumptions regarding Soviet ideology and foreign

policy. By embracing this hardline position, with the ideological justification given by Kennan, the Truman administration could finesse a serious domestic political problem. The President could now outflank his opponents on the Right and thwart or coopt his critics on the dwindling New Deal Left, while pinning on Moscow the entire blame for the deterioration of US-Soviet relations.

Conclusion

The Truman Administration's perception of a USSR allegedly bent on unreasonable or unlimited expansion even if it led to war was grossly in error. But how accurate was the Soviet, or more precisely Stalin's perception of US and UK postwar policies? What, in fact, were Stalin's desiderata in foreign relations?

As we have already noted, Stalin did his best in his own crude way to reverse rising hostility in the West aroused by official perceptions of Soviet words and deeds. Although Stalin's crimes were numberless, one crime was falsely charged to him; that he bears sole responsibility for starting what came to be called the "Cold War." In fact he neither planned nor desired it. This much is granted in recent studies by American scholars of Soviet policies in the making of the Cold War.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, these studies are in error where they contend that the USSR pursued "unreasonable" or "unlimited" territorial expansion and that this constitutes the main cause of the breakup of the Big Three coalition. Indeed, defying the history of all previous coalitions, Stalin had said that it was possible to retain the unity of this one after victory, at least "for a long time." Its members had fought a "people's war" from the outset for just aims; and the Big Three Allies had created in the form of the United Nations Organization machinery that could keep the peace. Stalin envisaged the postwar world as one controlled by a Big Three Condominium, which would above

all ensure the security, economic, and ideological interests of the three partners.

Concerning security, each of the partners would hold its own exclusive sphere of interest; that is, there would be a Soviet "Monroe," a British "Monroe," as well as an American "Monroe" — Stalin acquiescing in the extension of the latter into Western Europe and East Asia. Although serious disputes among the members were bound to arise, the Big Three could, nonetheless, be held together if the Condominium operated on the principle practiced during the war. That is, no partner or pair of partners would attempt to impose views on another where the latter's vital security interests within its sphere of interest were engaged. These and other international problems would be resolved by the three heads of government, who would meet periodically to coordinate their decision *in camera*, as at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. Prior coordination of decisions by the Three would be practiced, especially in UN affairs.⁴⁸ And he hoped, of course, that the specter of a German resurgence would unite the Big Three to keep Germany down. In sum, the US and Britain must treat the USSR as an equal, a legitimate state with legitimate security interests, not a pariah, outlaw, or revolutionary firebrand as it had been treated before the war.

Stalin also held that common economic interests would bridge the deep ideological divide cleaving East from West. The US and Britain, he argued, could gain more through peaceful trade with the USSR than through an attempt to break the USSR's hold on all it had acquired since 1939 — or since 1917. The main "contradiction" in the postwar period was the one between the major imperialist states, the US and Britain, not the "contradiction" between Western imperialism and Soviet socialism. Should the Big Three split, the major rupture would come between the US and Britain. Paradoxically, interimperialist rivalry made "peaceful coexistence" in the end *impossible* between the US and Britain, but quite possible between the USSR and the capitalist world. Regarding East-West trade, Stalin, of course, opposed the "open door," but he also

opposed a "closed door," as witness his continued eagerness to obtain large postwar loans or credits from the US. Initially, he was even unopposed to private American investment in the satellite countries.⁴⁹ But Stalin mistakenly assumed that a ruinous postwar depression would in fact soon drive his capitalist interlocutors to trade with him and his Eastern European minions on terms most favorable to the USSR. Thus he left the "door" ajar to Western capitalists.

Ideologically, Stalin strove to restrain both revolutionary action and rhetoric by Communist parties within the American and the British, and even the Soviet, sphere of interest. This even applied to the colonial and semi-colonial world, at least until 1947. The only kind of proletarian revolution he favored was one carried out "from above" (wrought or assisted by the Red Army), with support "from below." Genuinely independent revolutionary movements, such as those that had triumphed in Yugoslavia, Albania, and ultimately in China remained suspect in his eyes.

The Soviet attitude toward revolution continued unchanged from what it had been during the war. The Russians, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov said in 1944, "do not want revolutions in the West, but if they happen we must approve." Stalin in 1945 revived only one-half of Lenin's theory of imperialism: the inevitability of imperialist war. He left the other half — the inevitability of proletarian revolutions — in abeyance. Grievously hemorrhaged by the war, the USSR required continued friendship and expanded trade with the West. Moscow advised Communists in the American and British spheres against making an armed bid for power, which they well might have attempted in Italy, France, and Belgium, 1944-1946. Armed struggle for power in the West would invite counter-revolutionary intervention by American and British armed forces already on the scene and might provoke an anti-Soviet crusade, which the USSR was ill-prepared to combat. Greece offered an instructive example of what happened when Communist leaders abroad ignored Moscow's advice to avoid an armed struggle for power.⁵⁰ Never-

theless, many officials in Washington and London still argued that Stalin was out to spread Communism even at the risk of war with the West.

Despite the purported advantages of a "scientific theory," not one of Stalin's premises concerning Big Three postwar relations materialized, least of all his major premise that Anglo-American "contradictions," exacerbated by economic crises, must lead to armed conflict. This premise initially led Stalin to the mistaken belief that he could extend Soviet hegemony into the Near and Middle East and even make the USSR a Mediterranean power without provoking effective resistance on the part of his wartime partners. When they did offer such resistance, Stalin retreated on claims respecting Tripolitania and Tangiers. But he still insisted that Turkey must share defense of the Straits with the USSR. He evidently believed that a Soviet military base at the Straits was so vital to Soviet security that winning it warranted the risk of serious political conflict with the West.⁵¹

This point becomes clear when we consider Stalin's major postwar security aim, which he had made explicit on February 23, 1946. The Red Army, he said, "must make the borders of our Soviet Motherland inaccessible to enemies."⁵² By that time Soviet Armed Forces and Soviet diplomacy had made the entire border of the USSR in Asia as well as in Europe secure by Stalin's standards — with one major exception: the area lying between Afghanistan⁵³ and the Soviet Black Sea coast. But in trying to close that security gap Stalin undercut his own major premise, the "inevitability" of a split between Britain and the US. For London regarded Moscow's drive to close this gap as a greater threat to the integrity of the British Empire than "dollar diplomacy." In British worst-case projections, the Russians turned the Mediterranean into a Communist "lake" and pulled the Near and Middle East, including the oil-rich Arab lands, into the Soviet orbit.⁵⁴

Weakened by the cost of victory and no longer able to defend the Mediterranean "lifeline" alone, Britain was subsequently driven into American arms by the Soviet drive to close its security gap. Britain and

the US then "ganged up" to prevent the USSR from establishing a foothold either in North Africa (Tripolitania), or in the Turkish Straits, or in the Aegean, or in Northern Persia. The British and US Navies made the Mediterranean an "Anglo-American lake. By late summer 1946, the Russians found themselves chagrined witnesses to a burgeoning Anglo-American "special relationship" instead of Anglo-American estrangement,⁵⁵ with the USSR as *tertius gaudens*.

After February 1946, Stalin in his communications with the West resorted to conciliatory language (except where Churchill was concerned), and he withdrew the Red Army from its most exposed outposts. But this was done too late. If Stalin and all of his lieutenants had employed similar conciliatory words and deeds in February 1946 instead of acting on the premise of the inevitability of interimperialist war, might not the Big Three have cohered as a global condominium beyond 1945?

Likewise, let us suppose that Washington, rather than switching to a policy toward the USSR based on the hard-liner's worst-case assumptions, had instead based policy on a close reading of the Stalin and Zhdanov statements (e.g., as interpreted by Roberts). Might that not have delayed — or, perhaps, even prevented — the breakup of the Grand Alliance? We shall never know. What we do know, however, is that Stalin's theorizing in public on the inevitability of interimperialist war proved to be a political, strategic, and doctrinal mistake⁵⁶ of enormous magnitude, especially for the USSR. Misjudging the potential impact of this speech at home and abroad, Stalin's application of Marxist Leninism, Moscow's vaunted "scientific theory," only hastened the very international realignment Soviet leaders dreaded most: the formation of an "imperialist," anti-Soviet united front.

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Notes

1. For example, B. B. Berle and T. B. Jacobs, eds., *Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle* (New York, 1973), 442; Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal in Walter W. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), 57, 127-28; V. Potemkin, ed., *Istoriia diplomatii* Vol. 3 (Moscow: 1941-45), 764. The British Foreign Office commissioned an English translation of this "tendentious" volume for internal use. [British Foreign Office: Russia Correspondence N5791/605/38 371/56832. Public Record Office.]
2. Stalin's speech of November 6, 1944, had set a cautious line regarding future wars. If Big Three unity were continued after the war and exercised in the future international peace-keeping organization against aggressor nations, he said, peace could be assured "if not forever then at least for a long time to come." [Joseph Stalin, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1945), 140.] The Soviet ideologists in 1945 stressed Stalin's corollary to Lenin's doctrine on the inevitability of imperialist war: Big Three unity and mobilization of peace-loving peoples against reaction could preserve peace and security for "a long time to come." [P. Chuikov, "Uchenie Lenina-Stalina o voynakh spravedlivykh i nespravedlivykh," *Bol'shevik*, Nos. 7-8 (April 1945): 25-26; and P. Fedoseev, "Marksizm-Leninism ob istokakh i kharaktere voiny," *Ibid.*, No. 16 (August 1945): 57-59.] In short, even while imperialism existed, Stalinist foreign policy and the peace movement could reduce the "inevitability" of war to "possibility."
3. Books that focus on Soviet foreign policy, 1945-46, are Adam Ulam, *The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II* (New York, 1971); William McCagg, *Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948* (Detroit, 1978); Werner G. Hahn, *Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946-53* (Ithaca and London, 1982); William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War* (New York, 1982); Gavriel Ra'anana, *International Policy Formation in the USSR: Factional 'Debates' during the Zhdanovshchina* (Hamden, Connecticut, 1983). Useful articles are Frederic S. Burin,

"The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War," *American Political Science Review* LVII, 2 (1963): 334-54; and Paul Marantz, "Soviet Foreign Policy Factionalism under Stalin. A Case Study of the Inevitability of War Controversy," *Soviet Union* III, 1 (1976): 91-107. But none of these works treat Moscow's doctrinal-policy problem exhaustively.

4. Stalin, "Obrashchenie k narodu," *Pravda*, September 3, 1945. *Ibid.*, August 19, 1945.

5. Kennan to Byrnes, Moscow, September 15, 1945. *Foreign Relations of the United States* 1945, Vol. V: 881-83; *New York Times*, November 8, 1945; George Kennan, *Memoirs (1925-1950)* (New York, 1969), 290-95.

6. Kennan to Byrnes, 883-84; *New York Times*, October 1, 1945.

7. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman*, 1945 (Washington, 1961), 431-38.

8. *Pravda*, October 28, 1945.

9. *Pravda*, November 7, 1945.

10. To knowledgeable Soviet citizens, Molotov's allusion to living in a 'system of states' was a reminder of Lenin's apocalyptic warning issued in the middle of the Russian Civil War: "We are living not merely in a state but *in a system of states*, and it is inconceivable for the Soviet Republic to exist alongside of the imperialist states for any length of time. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that time comes there will have to be a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states." V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, Vol. 38, 139.

11. Laski quoted in *The Times*, May 13, 1946; A. J. P. Taylor, *Beaverbrook* (New York, 1972), 570-71.

12. "What is this basic contradiction fraught with? Probably, it is fraught with war. When two giants clash with each other, when the globe is too small for them, they strive to measure each other's strength in order to solve the burning question of world hegemony by means of war." J. V. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, Vol. 11, 199.

13. Eugene Varga, "Reshaiushchaia rol' gosudarstva v voennom khoziastve kapitalisticheskikh stran," *Mirovoe khoziastvo i mirovaia politika* XIX, 1 (1945): 11-21; "Problem promyshlennogo tsikla posle voiny," *Ibid.*, 2-3 (1945): 79-82; "Khod promyshlennogo tsikla

posle okonchaniia voiny v Evrope," *Ibid.*, 5 (1945): 23-34. When the war ended, Varga predicted that the Great American Depression would return in two or three years, because Washington was removing controls over the economy. [Varga, "Regulirovanie khoziastva i besplanovost' v kapitalisticheskikh stranakh vo vremia voiny," *Ibid.*, 9 (1945):3-13.] The American loan to Britain, he wrote, would alleviate but not resolve Anglo-American imperialist rivalry. "The struggle for markets will become still sharper when the postwar goods hunger will have become sated and the first postwar crisis of overproduction begins in the United States." [Varga, "Anglo-Amerikanskii finansovoe soglashenie," *Novoe vremia* (January 1, 1946): 10.]

14. Averell Harriman, *Peace With Russia* (New York, 1959), 11.

15. On Truman, Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston, 1977), 101, 104. On Churchill, Sir Orme Sargent to Prime Minister (May 2, 1945), N5014/165/38 FO 371 47882; Prime Minister to Sargent (May 14 and 16, 1945). *Ibid.*, N5014G *loc. cit.*; Harrison Salisbury, *Russia On Its Way* (New York, 1946), 246, 249-251. Rebutting Chargé d'Affaires George Kennan on December 11, 1945, Harriman wrote that "there is no evidence so far that Stalin will not be the boss in all matters that interest him." [W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin* (New York, 1975), 552.]

Of the thirty-three men promoted to full membership or candidate status on the Politburo between 1919 and 1938, fifteen were executed or perished in prison, two (Tomsky and G. K. Ordzhonikidze) escaped this fate by suicide, and two (Kirov and Trotsky) were assassinated in the period 1934-40.

16. *Pravda*, February 6, 1946.

17. *Ibid.*, February 8, 1946.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, February 7, 1946.

20. *Ibid.*, February 9, 1946.

21. *Ibid.*, February 8, 1946.

22. *Ibid.* It is difficult to find another instance since 1927 when two Politburo members publicly expressed such divergent views on a vital policy question; equally rare, these views were printed in the same issue of *Pravda*. Was this sharp difference of opinion stage-managed? Surely not. In Stalinist politics, it was "monolithic unity," not disagreement that was stage-managed. Besides, there was a long history of Zhdanov-Malenkov rivalry. See, Jonathan Harris, "The Origin of the Conflict between Malenkov and Zhdanov, 1939-1941," *Slavic Review* 35: 287-303; and Hahn, *Post-war Soviet Politics*, *passim*.

23. See footnote 26, *infra*.

24. "Ob izdanii sochineniia I. V. Stalina," *Bol'shevik* No. 1 (1946): 52-53; J. V. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, Vol. 1 (Moscow 1946): xii-xiv. Volume one appeared in June. Cf. William McCagg, *Stalin Embattled*, 233.

25. *Pravda*, February 10, 1946.

26. In March 1946 a Plenary session of the Central Committee also elected Malenkov and Beria as members of the Orgburo and Secretaries of the Central Committee, among others. ["Informatsionnoe soobshchenie o plenumе TsK VKP (b)," *Bol'shevik* No. 6 (March 1946), 3.] But in May, Stalin in his Kremlin apartment with Zhdanov present selected N. S. Patolichev to replace Malenkov as a Central Committee Secretary. [N. S. Patolichev, *Ispytannie na zrelost'* (Moscow, 1977), 280-84.] In short, Zhdanov's star was ascending, Malenkov's descending. Zhdanov was selected to deliver the main speech commemorating the 29th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Still in an optimistic mood, he stressed that Stalin had demonstrated the absence of the real danger of a new war; Zhdanov even hailed the election victory of the Labour Party in Britain and the Left parties in France as a significant part of a world-wide shift to the Left. [*Pravda*, November 7, 1946.]

27. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal noted in his diary Douglas's response. For Forrestal, Millis wrote, "this speech and the program it laid down came close to convincing him that there was no way ... in which democracy and communism could live together...." [Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries*, 134-35.] Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation. My Years in the State Department* (New York, 1969), 150, 194; Ronald Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century* (New York, 1981), 427; W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, *Special Envoy*, 546-47; John Morton Blum, ed., *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace* (Boston, 1973), 547-48.

For the Communist Party of the USA on the imminence of an American-Soviet war, see Joseph Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis, 1943-1957* (Cambridge, 1972),

148-149. But Maurice Thorez, General-Secretary of the French Communist Party, upon his return from Moscow in early September 1946, reported to his Politburo that he had been authoritatively informed in Moscow that the USSR was not prepared for war and would not be ready for a number of years; hence the need to avoid dangerous confrontations while endeavoring to maintain and consolidate positions already acquired. Above all, the Party must not endeavor to seize power, since that would probably precipitate an international conflict from which the USSR could hardly emerge victorious. [Memorandum by Mr. Norris B. Chapman, Second Secretary of Embassy in Paris, November 23, 1946. Forwarded by Ambassador Caffery to Director of Office of European Affairs (Matthews) November 26, 1946. *FRUS* 1946 V: 472-73.]

28. Kennan to Byrnes, Moscow, February 22, 1946, *FRUS* 1946: VI, 696-709. Also, Kennan, *Memoirs* (1925-1950) (New York, 1969), 583-598.

29. For example, A. B. Levin, "O proektakh zapadnogo bloka," (Moscow, 1946), 6-9, 18. This is the text of a lecture delivered January 15, 1946, at the Moscow Lecture Hall.

30. The Roberts message was dispatched to London in three installments: Roberts to Bevin, Moscow, March 14, 1946, N4065/97/38; March 17, 1946, N4156/97/38; and March 18, 1946, N4156/97/38 FO 371/56763 PRO. He also sent copies of all three to the British Embassy in Washington.

31. Roberts to Bevin, Moscow, March 18, 1946. *Loc. cit.*

32. Rereading the telegram twenty years later induced "horrified amusement" in the author. It sounded like a primer put out by superpatriotic organizations to "rouse the citizenry to the dangers of Communist conspiracy." But the rereading also prompted Kennan to pose a question fundamental to understanding of American attitudes toward the USSR: why did the telegram receive such an enthusiastic reception in Washington officialdom just at that particular time? Kennan, *Memoirs*, 309-11.

33. On President Truman's concern about a possible Communist uprising in France, *FRUS*, 1946, I: 435-38.

34. John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York, 1972), 312-15; Brian Thomas, "Cold War Origins, II," *Journal of Contemporary History* III, 1 (January 1968): 188; Fraser Harbutt, "American Challenge, Soviet Response: The Beginning of the Cold War, February-May, 1946," *Political Science Quarterly* 96, 4 (Winter 1981-82): 625-27. Kennan reported to Washington on February 12 that he had

orally delivered to Moscow the invitation extended by the US for Soviet representatives to observe the next US atomic-bomb test. [*FRUS*, 1946, VI: 691, 692 (fn. 38).]

35. Head of the Foreign Office Northern Department C. F. A. Warner, February 14th, 1946. Minute N1876/24/38 56725. PRO.

36. Robert Messer, *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, 1982), 182.

37. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Decisions* (Garden City, NY, 1955), 551-52; Kennan, *Memoirs* (1925-1950), 298-306; James Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, 255-56, 295-96; President Truman's *Memoirs* contain no reference to Stalin's speech. The President's response apparently did not take printable form.

38. For example, A. Leontiev, "Proiskhozhdenie i kharakter vtoroi mirovoi voyny," *Pravda*, March 31 and April 1, 1946. Leontiev disingenuously contended that the speech showed that the USSR was "the most resolute and important defender of the peaceful coexistence of peoples." Stalinist foreign policy upheld peaceful coexistence among imperialist states as well as between imperialist and socialist states!

39. Joseph Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (New York, 1952), 28-30.

40. Winston Churchill, "The Sinews of Peace," March 5, 1946, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, in Winston Spencer Churchill, *His Complete Speeches*, ed. Robert Rhodes James, 8 vols. (New York, 1974) 7: (1943-1949) 7285-93. Stalin contended that the Fulton speech showed that Churchill also reflected official Government policy although Churchill was not a member of the Labour Government. [Petersen to Bevin, Moscow, May 28, 1946. N4977/140/38 371/56783. PRO.] Bevin sought Cabinet agreement to outright dissociation from the Fulton speech, but Attlee was prepared to go no further than pointedly to abstain from endorsing it. [Cab, 128/5, June 3, 1946, PRO. Quoted in David Carlton, *Anthony Eden, a Biography* (London, 1981), 264, 498 (fn. 11).] Labour Party Left hostility to the Fulton speech made it impossible for Attlee to express his approval of the speech in public, but in private "he was delighted with it and the impact it made on the Americans, whom he still considered to be naive in their attitude toward Stalin." [Kenneth Harris, *Attlee* (London, 1982), 298.]

41. *Pravda*, March 14, 1946. English translation in Joseph Stalin, *For Peaceful Coexistence. Postwar Interviews* (New York, 1951), 9-15.

42. *Ibid.*, Interview with Eddie Gilmore, representative of the Associated Press, March 22, 1946, 16-17; Interview with Alexander Werth, correspondent of the London *Sunday Times*, September 24, 1946, 20-22; Interview with Hugh Baillie, President United Press, October 28, 1946, 23-27; Interview with Elliot Roosevelt, December 21, 1946, 28-31. For Stalin's brief reply to Baillie of March 25, 1946, declining Baillie's invitation to use UP facilities for a reply to Churchill *in extenso*, see *Pravda*, March 27, 1946; *New York Times*, March 26, 1946.
43. Geir Lundestad, *America, Scandinavia, and Cold War, 1945-1949* (New York, 1980), 46, 66; *Izvestiia*, March 20 and April 6, 1946.
44. On Manchuria, *Ibid.*, March 24, April 6, and May 22, 1946. On Iran, *Ibid.*, March 26, April 6, and May 24, 1946. But Soviet military men in Azerbaijani uniforms or civilian clothes apparently remained in Iranian Azerbaijan. [Rossow to Byrnes, Tabriz, June 6, 1946, *FRUS*, 1946, VII, 494.] On Tripolitania, V. M. Molotov, "Statement on Results of the Paris Peace Conference" (*Izvestiia*, May 28, 1946) in V. M. Molotov, *Problems of Foreign Policy* (Moscow, 1949), 42. On the same day, Stalin asked British Ambassador Maurice Peterson what good free access to the Mediterranean would do the Russians if Britain and the US denied them a base in the Mediterranean. [Peterson to Bevin, Moscow, May 28, 1946. N4977/140/38 371/56783 PRO.]
45. Soviet-Turkish relations, Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Les relations turco-soviétiques et la question des Détroits* (Ankara, 1968), 295, 299, 319, 323-24; Soviet notes of August 7 and September 26, 1946, to Turkey on the Straits, *FRUS*, 1946, VII: 827-29, 860-66.
46. "American Relations with the Soviet Union. A Report to the President. September 1946," Appendix A in Arthur Krock, *Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line* (New York, 1968), 425-31, 476-77. For a classic example of this persistent misreading of Stalin, see Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow* (New York, 1950), 56, 61.
47. But, in Mastny's view, Stalin, driven by the wretched system he himself had created, pursued "quixotic" and "extravagant" territorial demands in the name of Soviet security. Washington and London raised belated resistance, thus causing the Cold War. [Mastny, *op. cit.*, xvii-xviii, 283-306.] According to Taubman, Stalin had "unlimited" expansionist aims, which he thought he could achieve in détente over a period of fifteen to twenty years at US expense and without provoking war against the USSR. [Taubman, *op. cit.*, 5-9, 74-78, 128-131, 144-165.]

48. Meeting with Ambassador Bedell Smith, Stalin bitterly deplored US opposition to the USSR request that the hearing on the Iranian Question in the Security Council be delayed. If the US had been in similar circumstances, Stalin said, the USSR would have willingly acceded to such a request. Disagreements between the two states were bound to arise, Stalin said, but in spite of differences in political ideologies, such disagreements were not irreconcilable. He hoped that in the future "they might be reconciled before coming formally on the floor of the UN Conference, since that resulted in embarrassment to one side or the other." [Smith to Byrnes, Moscow, April 5, 1946. *FRUS*, 1946, VI: 734, 736.]

49. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation*, 116-119. Although the Soviet Union did not sign the Bretton Woods Agreements, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia did, December 27, 1945. [*FRUS*, 1946, I: 43-44.] In negotiating the peace treaties with the five European states formerly allied with Germany, the US insisted on including "open door" provisions in the treaties' general economic terms. Moscow finally consented only to inclusion of a provision that the defeated states would grant each member of the United Nations most-favored-nation status on the basis of reciprocity for a term limited to eighteen months from the day the peace treaty entered into force. [A. A. Gromyko and B. N. Ponomarev, eds. *Soviet Foreign Policy. 1917-1980*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1981) II: 43-44.] For texts of treaties, see *Treaties of Peace with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania and Finland*, Department of State, Publication 2743 European Series 21, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1947).

50. On Litvinov, see Kirk to Hull, Rome, September 9, 1944, *FRUS*, 1944, 3:1149. Chafing against the reformist program imposed by Soviet occupation authorities, a Berlin Communist exclaimed in June 1945: "And I tell you we've got to establish Socialism in Germany without the Red Army, and, if necessary, even against the Red Army." [Wolfgang Leonhard, *Child of the Revolution*, tr. by C. M. Woodhouse (Chicago, 1958), 417-18.] See also the advice Maurice Thorez brought from Moscow in September 1946, fn. 27, *supra*. Molotov and Zhdanov advised the Greek Communists in January 1946 to abandon insurrection and as a legal party enter the electoral arena. [George Kousoulas, "The Truman Doctrine and the Stalin-Tito Rift: A Reappraisal," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. LXXII (1973): 428.

51. Stalin's successors did not. Shortly after his death, the Soviet Government in a note dated May 30, 1953, informed the Turks that the USSR "has no territorial claims of any kind on Turkey." *Pravda*, July 19, 1953.

52. *Pravda*, February 23, 1946.

53. The Soviet-Afghan border demarcation agreement, signed on June 13, 1946, in Moscow, was ratified by the USSR on November 28, 1946. [*Izvestiia*, November 29, 1946.] Thus Turkey remained virtually the only state bordering the USSR that was not yet a buffer state, occupied by the Red Army, or party to a treaty of friendship or of alliance with the USSR.

54. By February 18, 1946, Attlee concluded that Britain, in the face of Soviet pressure, could not maintain its position in the Mediterranean without US support; such support might be forthcoming, however, if the Americans became interested in Middle Eastern oil. [Harris, *Attlee*, 299.]

55. By August 1946, the Soviet line on Britain and the US asserted that these two countries had concluded a "gentlemen's agreement" to divide the world into spheres of influence. But their anti-Soviet bloc could not long endure, because they were also rival imperialisms. [N. Sergeeva, "K voprosu ob Anglo-amerikanskikh otnosheniakh," *Novoe vremia*, No. 15 (August 1, 1946), 8-9; I. Zavich, "Britanskaia imperiia posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny," *Bol'shevik*, No. 16 (August 1946), 42-44.]

56. Moscow's de-Stalinizers have yet to publicly criticize Stalin's post-1945 views on the inevitability of interimperialist war. But Beijing's de-Stalinizers now point up the erroneous character of Stalin's (and by indirection, Mao's) projections on the inevitability of such war. Growing global economic interdependence, they contend, "is rendering wars between imperialist countries no longer inevitable." [Chen Qimao, "War and Peace: A Reappraisal," *Beijing Review*, No. 23 (June 9, 1986), 19-20.]

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