STATE CAPITALISM, STATE SOCIALISM AND THE POLITICIZATION OF WORKERS

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I. INTRODUCTION

Politicization implies a change in individual roles from parochial or subject to autonomous participant in political life.[1] The highest levels of politicization imply a fundamental transformation in the way citizens relate to government, with citizens becoming aggressive formulators of the agenda for public discussion and active participants in holding public officials to account. A high level of politicization could transform or threaten to transform any given political system.

We propose to investigate the existence of certain requisites for the politicization of industrial labor in the state socialist regimes of Eastern Europe and the state capitalist regimes of Latin America. Attention will be focused on particular regimes where each of the authors has done previous field work (Poland, Romania by Nelson; Mexico, Venezuela by Coleman). Although politicization has been the object of much research, the state's role in structuring the process of politicization has been underestimated. We believe that the distinction between state capitalism and state socialism is one which can help to explain the degree and kind of politicization which occurs in contrasting settings, as well as to suggest the systemic implications of politicization. Today, state socialist and state capitalist systems are the world's two predominant modes of political economy. A ruling communist party makes the identification of "state socialism" rather easy in at least sixteen systems.[2] A variety of other systems such as Tanzania, however, might be considered as cases of state socialism, were one to adopt a loose definition of the concept.

In principle, the concept of state socialism is clear. Malloy has characterized the political model of state socialism in terms of control by a bureaucratized elite, the elites' rhetorical identification with peasants and workers, the lack of a market mechanism, and the allocation of costs in national plans and their transmission as central command decisions.[3] Using these criteria, many of the "loosely socialist" Afican and Asian cases would fall short of the ideal-typical state socialist model. Nonetheless, ignoring some imprecision of fit, there may be two or three dozen cases of state socialist polities in the world today.

State capitalist systems, the essential characteristics of which are again described by Malloy,[4] are the form of political economy most commonly encountered in the world today. In much of Africa, Asia and Latin America, the state is expected to invest not only in the "social overhead" necessary to make private economic activity productive but also to undertake production and service activities. The latter are undertaken primarily where the private sector exhibits disinterest because higher returns are available in other activities, in industries where the investment needs are so great that only governmentally enforced "savings" will suffice to acquire the requisite capital, or where industries are deemed "too strategic" to be left to the private sector, especially the foreign private sector. There may well be one hundred or more countries that could be characterized as state capitalist systems. Hence, it ought be of interest to compare state socialist and state capitalist systems if only because they are very common arrangements, which have been understudied by North American comparativists.[5]

There is a more important reason, however, for studying such systems comparatively: state socialism and state capitalism represent contrasting positions on a continuum of possible state roles in structuring and managing

social conflict. Politicization may occur in either of these two very different contexts. By comparing the politicization of one social group, industrial workers, in the two settings, we can, loosely speaking, "control for" certain individual-level determinants of politicization. At the same time, we can begin to detect the extent to which the affective content, intensity and duration of politicization, as well as the targets thereof, are affected by contextual factors. We thus seek in this paper to escape the confines of area studies, while recognizing that our effort will be limited by imperfect and non-comparable data sets.[6]

The constructs of state socialism and state capitalism suggest a working hypothesis:

> The more obtrusive the state's role in structuring, managing, and "resolving" social conflict, the greater the tendency of dissatisfied workers to attribute responsibility directly to the state for conditions held objectionable on normative grounds.

That inequality, a condition objectionable on normative grounds, persists is more likely to be attributed to or "blamed on" the structures of authority in a state socialist than in a state capitalist regime. Consequently, the logic of comparing state socialism and state capitalism is not to determine which is most likely to make workers "unhappy."[7] Rather, our concern is to examine what difference it apparently makes for dissatisfied workers to be located in one type of structural setting vis-a-vis another. Dissatisfied workers exist in both settings; often there are good reasons for their negative assessments. What they do with their dissatisfaction may depend, however, on where they are located.

Details on workers' dissatisfaction will be provided below in Part II. In Part III, our concern is with the emergence of working class consciousness. The attribution of responsibility for one's dissatisfaction to the political system is addressed in Part IV. Data which tap workers'

perceptions of system responsiveness, or data indicating the degree to which institutions are perceived to serve the interests of workers, will be reported in this section. A consideration of the extent of politicization is undertaken in Part V. Finally, in Part VI, we assess the correspondence of our data to the working hypothesis and we attempt to interpret the systemic consequences of that pattern of politicization most commonly encountered in the two contrasting settings.

II. EVIDENCE OF DISSATISFACTION

Dictatorships "of the proletariat" have held power in Eastern Europe for almost four decades, and in the USSR for six and a half decades. Among the more poignant of today's political ironies is the high level of dissatisfaction apparent among industrial laborers in these state socialist regimes. Many, if not most, workers in such regimes feel that their interests are not well represented. The situation is qualitatively different in Latin America where state capitalist systems have based their claims to legitimacy less strongly on identity with workers' interests. Rather, the state capitalist regimes ask to be judged on their success in providing "economic development." But it is often argued, with reason, that such regimes have transferred the costs of economic growth to workers. Hence, workers have reason to be dissatisfied in the state capitalist settings also.

To take an initial dimension of possible discontent, satisfaction with the quality of the job itself is relatively high in the state capitalist settings.[8] It appears that roughly two-thirds of the workers in both Venezuela and Mexico find themselves basically satisfied with their jobs. But when asked to evaluate specific features of the job (whether it provokes boredom, whether it is disagreeable, etc.), the extent of positive assessment is even greater (over 80 percent for most items).[9]

Data from communist Europe are more ambiguous because surveys are less frequent and are reported less completely. We are able to make some inferences, however, that suggest important differences with workers in the state capitalist systems. We know from Romanian surveys, for example, that a bare majority of young workers in three key industrial sectors evince "general satisfaction" with their jobs.[10] Such fragmentary evidence leads us to suspect that a smaller proportion of Romanian workers would exhibit broadly positive views about their jobs than would Latin American workers.

The evidence is more complete from Poland. The difficult situation of industrial laborers is recognized by all segments of Polish society; the occupations of skilled workers consistently have been viewed as less "prestigious" in comparative rankings with other types of employment,[11] an assessment which theoretically ought be surprising in a "classless" socialist state. A sensitivity to comparative levels of material well-being has long been a critical element of the dissatisfaction prevalent among Polish workers. Polish workers of all kinds, but especially the unskilled workers, are rankled by personal deprivations which are not experienced by those in other occupations. More frequently than do individuals in other Polish social strata, workers think their incomes are too small and are concerned that their tenuous financial conditions will impair their ability to buy needed clothing, furniture, housing and food.[12] Housing shortages, even more than nutritional or other problems, afflict the Polish working class in a way that causes dissatisfaction. Shortages of housing, which worsened quickly in the late 1960s and 1970s with the growth of urban areas, had the greatest impact on those with less income, i.e. those most likely to have arrived recently from rural areas or to have married recently. These characteristics, of course, are also common among industrial laborers.[13]

The dissatisfaction of Polish workers is not fully a product of the absolute level of deprivation. Economic difficulties might be borne by workers in state socialist systems without complaint were there a sense that deprivation had been distributed evenly. The dissatisfaction observed in Poland since 1979 is peculiar to state socialist regimes that encourage citizens to judge the political system by norms of distributive equity but which fail to distribute goods and services equally. Lech Walesa's pithy statement goes to the heart of Polish working class discontent — Poles "could live on one crust of bread, as long as it were divided equally."

As long ago as 1961, skilled and unskilled workers indicated a more intense objection than did other Poles to remaining differences in earnings, wealth, education or other scarce values.[14] Polish citizens became even more cognizant of inequalities during the 1970s, such that by 1975, 91 percent cited differences in wealth as a "strong" or "very strong" impediment to the unity of Polish society. Other surveys conducted in late 1980 corroborated the 1975 findings, indicating continued concern about the unequal distribution of wealth and opportunities.[15] Poles were not objecting to all income differentials but were reacting "against the economic status and life style of the power elite."[16] The "power elite" against which the antagonism of Polish society grew in the 1970s and early 1980s was identified by shipyard workers as the "ruling group, government elite and prominent individuals."[17] Were such a sentiment found among all workers, then the material dissatisfaction of laborers would be compounded by comparison of personal situations with those of governmental elites who seem to epitomize the remaining inequalities in socialist Poland.

As with workers' dissatisfaction in Eastern Europe, the higher levels of satisfaction in Latin American state capitalist systems can be understood by

looking beyond the workplace. In both Venezuela and Mexico, urban growth has proceeded much in advance of industrial employment opportunties. Twentieth century pressures on available land in the countryside, originating in demographic changes or trends toward land concentration, have been exacerbated by pursuit of policies which favor large scale commercial agriculture which is capital intensive rather than labor intensive. As a consequence, Mexico and Venezuela follow the pattern of much of Latin America[18] in having a labor force that is distributed across a shrinking agricultural sector, a modest industrial sector, and rapidly growing service sector where most new jobs are found.[19] In general, industrial workers in both countries sense the value of the employment they have in the labor surplus environment in which they are located. This helps to account for the relative satisfaction of the Latin American workers.

In state socialist regimes, full employment is generally sought by the state, even at the cost of considerable inefficiency. For workers in such settings, employment "opportunities" are less of an issue than is the level of remuneration or the goods and services available for purchase with salaries earned on the job and the overall distribution of material benefits within society.[20] In Eastern Europe, the industrial sector of the economy has expanded more rapidly than has the service sector, while agricultural employment, as in Latin America, has declined.[21] So the contrast between "privileged" industrial workers and "less privileged" service sector workers is neither apparent nor meaningful to Romanian workers. In Poland, for example, workers would not see themselves as particularly privileged to be employed in industry; Polish workers are not as apt as the Latin Americans to see the lack of other alternatives as having led to their current jobs.[22]

Half or slightly more of workers in both state capitalist countries said that economic necessity or the lack of other alternatives led them to their current positions. Fewer than ten percent interpreted their current job as a case of occupational mobility over their last job.[23] Both figures speak to the point: employment choice is limited in the environment of late-developing capitalist economies that put priority on economic values other than job creation. Mexican and Venezuelan workers seem to understand those facts and judge their employment circumstances accordingly; for their East European counterparts rapid industrial expansion[24] fosters different attitudes. There is less gratitude in Eastern Europe for mere employment; expectations differ because employment opportunities and state policies on employment differ.

This is not to say, however, that the workers in state capitalist regimes are entirely satisfied. Indeed, their dissatisfaction with wage levels falls midway between the state socialist cases. In Table I, the adequacy of the wages paid at enterprises are assessed in the four countries under study. Over fifty percent of workers in both Latin American countries say that "salaries in this enterprise are low," while less than six percent say that they are high, with a balance of forty percent indicating that they are "acceptable."[25] Polish workers, even in the mid-1970s, were quite unhappy with salaries, while such problems seemed less acute to Romanian workers.[26]

Wages, of course, do not constitute the sole source of the dissatisfaction of workers. Prominent among alternative sources of displeasure is the issue of workers' control over the productive process itself. In Table II, we can see that roughly 65% of Mexican workers and 62% of Romanian industrial workers perceive themselves as being consulted infrequently or not at all, a proportion that is exceeded only in Poland.[27] Venezuelans are at the other end, with nearly half reporting frequent

consultation. But we also know that a sizable proportion of Venezuelans and Mexicans desired more frequent consultation (42.8% and 39.6%, respectively). For the state socialist cases, directly comparable data are unavailable. But from Table III we can observe some implicit contrasts. At the very least, Polish automobile workers seem desirous of participating in decisions affecting the plant as a whole, which contasts with the apparent fixation on job-specific matters in state capitalist settings. Experiences in a socialist society, in which decisions are made for collectives in a visible fashion, may lead workers to desire a greater role in decision-making for the collective.

Most consequential, albeit treacherous to interpret, is the extent to which workers entertain thoughts of changing types of employment, of escaping from current circumstances via further education or a move to another location. The level of apparent acceptance of existing roles seemingly is greater in Venezuela than in Mexico. Putting it another way, data collected by Coleman and others suggests that nearly 90% of the Mexican workers aspire to some other employment possibility. While these workers believe their current situations to be imperfect, it also reveals a belief that individual action nonetheless could be taken which might improve upon existing conditions. In Venezuela, the corresponding figure is only 41%, which would seem to indicate greater acceptance of existing situations. Venezuelan results may, however, indicate a greater resignation toward one's position in the social stratification system and a cognition that the prospects for change are limited, without necessarily implying a normative acceptance of those conditions.[28]

Data regarding workforce instablity in Romania indicate that nearly half of a large sample of young workers from three principal industries desired a change in "the place of work".[29] The inclination to "escape from

dissatisfaction" at the workplace may vary in Romania with the age of the worker. In a survey of workers at one large chemical plant, where the results were reported not by age breakdowns but rather by skill level, the proportion wanting to change jobs were not, in general, quite so high as in other studies.[30] However, among the semi-skilled workers (likely to be younger than workers in skilled categories), the desire for rather dramatic change was reasonably high (41% wishing to change place of work and type of job). Younger, semi-skilled workers seem more disillusioned and appear less confident that changing their job within the enterprise would resolve their dissatisfaction. Studies of "personnel stability" reveal that these problems have been even more severe in Poland than in Romania.[31]

In the state capitalist regimes of Latin America, workers thus seem to arrive at the final judgment that to be an industrial laborer is to have a "good job." However, the sense of gratitude for mere employment is not absolute; at least half of Latin American Workers believe that their firm pays salaries which are (too) low, about 40% would like to be consulted more frequently about how they perform their work, and somewhere between 40 and 90% think they might like to be doing something other than what they are currently doing to earn a living. Discontent does not seethe among Latin American industrial workers, but grievances exist and discontent will be articulated when workers are asked what they think.[32]

East European workers are even less certain that they like their jobs. Unlike their state capitalist counterparts, East European workers are presented with an environment in which industrial employment has expanded steadily as agriculture has contracted. State socialism, with its emphasis on heavy industrialization, fosters full employment and labor scarcity, but restricts labor mobility while generating pressures on workers for higher

productivity. The latter pressure "makes visible" a process of saving by the state for further investment in heavy industry that is financed by imposing costs on workers. Hence, industrial workers tend not to be grateful for their jobs in state socialist settings, but rather to be resentful of the pressures which are placed on them for higher productivity and attentive to any signs of distributive inequity.

Consultation of workers about job-related decisions appear low in all four systems, especially in pre-1979 Poland. However, a significant percentage of workers in all four political economies would like to be consulted more frequently, a finding that may be most politically consequential in the East European cases where "workers' self-management" has often failed to live up to expectations.[33]

Dissatisfaction exists among workers in both state capitalist and state socialist settings. There is no perfect correspondence between regime type and degree of dissatisfaction. The ordinal-level summaries in Table IV demonstrate, nonetheless, that the Polish labor force is the most dissatisfied, the Venezuelan the least. If one were to weigh all four indicators equally, on the assumption that each separate ranking captures an important dimension of satisfaction/dissatisfaction, there would be little difference between the Mexican and Romanian workers.[34] However, if one were inclined to take the summary judgment of job satisfaction more seriously, then workers in the state capitalist settings would appear to be less dissatisfied.

III. WORKING CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

Personal dissatisfaction need not imply that one's own situation will be interpreted as a function of one's membership in a social class. This disjunction between objective location and subjective self-placement was, of course, a matter of concern to Marx, Engels, Lenin and other early social

strategists. Concern with "false consciousness", with revolutionary vanguards and other major issues in socialist thought all involve recognition that industrial workers will not necessarily see themselves as proletarians whose interests are antagonistic to those of owners and managers. To what extent do they see the world in such terms?

In Table V, we encounter evidence that industrial workers in two state capitalist regimes tend to see the relationship between workers and owners/managers as highly antagonistic. Owners are perceived to receive remuneration that is excessive, workers generally are held to receive wages that are too low, bosses are rarely believed to be genuinely interested in the welfare of workers, and considerable doubt is expressed about the proposition that the welfare of the worker is served by promoting the welfare of the enterprise. Despite the greater tendency of the Venezuelan workers to reject the latter proposition, substantial doubt is expressed in both cases.

The persistence of classes in state socialist systems received greatest publicity via Milovan Djilas' The New Class. The extent to which Djilas' perceptions of state socialism have been widely shared can be documented with surveys done throughout East Europe over the interim. Over half of Polish blue collar workers in a 1965 sample, for example, thought that social classes exist in Poland — this despite official claims to the contrary. Curiously, industrial workers were more uncertain on this point than were white collar workers and the intelligentsia, who were more positive that classes exist. The "social class" most often cited among respondents who alleged that classes exist in Poland was the "industrial proletariat."[35] Self identification of social class is strongest, moreover, among manual laborers. Both unskilled and skilled workers see themselves as "blue collar workers" (Table VI). These

class distinctions, perhaps unnoteworthy elsewhere, are fraught with conflictual implications in Poland.

When workers were asked whether relations with other classes were "harmonious," "indifferent" or characterized by "dislike toward each other", only 39.6% of respondents in one national sample in Poland said that relations with white collar or intelligentsia members were harmonious, while the comparable percentage for relations with the petite bourgeoisie was 32.1 percent.[36] We have been unable to find analogous studies for the Romanian case. Less systematic research has suggested, however, that portions of industrial labor noted for their activism — miners, for example — believe that elites in the party, government and management will not pursue their interests.[37]

Class consciousness can be stimulated by intense personal experience. Somewhere between a quarter and 45% of the unionized workers in the state capitalist settings claim to have witnessed the repression of their union. In Mexico, the role of the government in repressing unions has been much more extensive than in Venezuela, as might be expected in a more authoritarian polity.[38] Some portion of the class consciousness apparent in Table V may well derive from personal experience. Many workers apparently have witnessed situations where force has been used either by government or company to "reconcile" labor-management conflict.[39]

Systematic data concerning coercive measures undertaken by the party against unions in state socialist settings are, of course, difficult to find. Were such data at hand, we are confident that the proportion of workers who had experienced government repression against unions would be higher in the Poland of 1982 than in the Latin American cases, but substantial even in Romania. The rationale for repression by the state socialist regimes is

clear: workers' interests are already "well represented" by the Party and its official trade union structure. Dissident efforts to create independent unions will, publicly at least, be attributed by governing elites to "bourgeois counter-revolutionaries." Incidents of repression of workers in East Europe are numerous, ranging from the dramatic imposition of martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981, to the arrests of union organizers in Romania in mid-1979 after several months of limited activity.[40]

Thousands of Poles were affected directly by repression as participants in the strikes of 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976 and 1980. More important, the expressed preferences of the population for an independent labor movement have been violated, with December 13, 1981 representing only the most blatant and recent episode. Popular approval for Solidarnosc had been evident not only in the mass membership of ten million but also in surveys which indicated that 86% of the public favored greater self-management in economic enterprises and 92% agreed that more societal control over government should exist.[41] The repression of Solidarity, therefore, is likely to have been salient to most Poles, generating more, not less, class consciousness among labor vis-a-vis those perceived as exploiters, i.e. the state authorities.

Class consciousness may also be evident if one understands the purpose of the labor movement to be a transformation of society which alters the principles guiding allocations to various social classes. If one is not highly class conscious, the major purpose of the labor movement may well be simply "to improve the salaries and the well-being of workers." If nothing is perceived as inherently conflictual in those relations, to improve the cause of workers need not impair the interests of others. Somewhere between 52 and 59% of the two Latin American samples of industrial workers would interpret the ultimate purpose of the labor movement in a fashion indicating the

presence of class consciousness.[42] This segment of the working class represents a group that might be receptive to appeals for a socialist transformation. The extent to which these Latin American workers would actually endorse any given transition to socialism could well depend on the "political package" into which the economy was wrapped.[43] But the labor movement is seen by over half of the Latin American workers as a potential vehicle for overcoming existing social class relations which are held to be inappropriate.

Although we lack comparable data from Eastern Europe, we can make some inferences from the Polish case. The "ultimate purpose" of Solidarity, for instance, was to serve as a vehicle for attaining the Poles' overriding desire for equality."[44] As an egalitarian movement, Solidarity's efforts were "primarily against the economic status and life style of the power elite." That the Poles werre seeking relief from inequality as much as from low wages or food shortages per se is indicated by many data-based studies which have found that Polish workers, more than other strata, object to the privilege, access to limited goods, and salaries of elites.[45] These goals, given expression by Solidarity, connote a desire for systemic transformation rather than for mere improvement of wages or benefits.

In Romania, no autonomous trade union "movement" has been allowed to go beyond rudimentary stages. Workers' objections to the existing official trade union structure and to the state-created channels for enterprise self-management (the so-called workers' councils - consiliile oamenilor muncii) are indicative, however, of roles that they would prefer for these institutions. A sample of 426 Romanian workers from four enterprises was asked in the mid-1970s "What negative behaviors do workers' council members exhibit which have most bothered you?" The most common response, "unjust behavior," was

described by the Romanian researcher as an answer which connoted much the same concern as evinced in the Polish surveys, a desire for equal treatment.[46] If workers' council members, who are not principally workers but more often are enterprise managers or party leaders, exhibit arrogance or if they take advantage of their jobs to enrich themselves monetarily or through perquisites, Romanian workers react negatively. Were there an independent labor movement in Romania, then, it is plausible that a principal target would be to rid the workplace and society of such "unjust behavior." To do so would be to challenge the allocative principles of society in a form indicating class consciousness of workers against those who act in the name of the state, but enjoy "disproportionate privilege" for doing so.

In sum, class consciousness, or the sense of sharing interests with other workers that are antagonistic to those of managers and/or owners, is present among the industrial workforce more often than not. A degree of "inherent antagonism" among "classes" is presumed to exist by workers in both state capitalist and state socialist settings. Repression of unions, undertaken by both governments and private companies in state capitalism, is a sine qua non of state socialism as practiced in East Europe. But union movements which dare to propose changes in the principles that currently guide allocative decisions are likely to be repressed in both systems. In the Latin American cases, these are likely to be unions that propose a transition to socialism (of any variety); in the East European context these are likely to be unions, such as Poland's Solidarnosc, which propose a democratization of existing forms of state socialism. The experience of repression, however, probably serves similar ends in both settings by heightening the sense of class consciousness.

Being dissatisfied with one's personal situation and sharing a sense of exploitation with other members of one's class, even when taken together, are not sufficient to politicize industrial labor. The critical cognitive step which remains is for dissatisfied, class conscious workers to attribute responsibility for their dissatisfaction to "the system."[47] The specific targets within the system to which such attributions can be made are subjects of the next section.

IV. ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY

There are at least three plausible objects to which workers could attribute responsibility for their dissatisfactions, other than to themselves. The first of these is the owners and managers of the enterprises in which they work. As we have seen in the section on class consciousness, the tendency to do so is strong among industrial workers in the two state capitalist regimes. Owners and managers are thought to be overpaid and unconcerned with the welfare of workers in the capitalist settings. However, the sensitivity to distributional inequalities is so strong among workers in the state socialist regimes that one could easily label the resultant attitudes class consciousness, even though existing in presumably classless societies.

However, there are at least two other targets of workers' dissatisfaction. Unions that purport to represent the workers, but which workers may feel represent them inadequately, are one such target. The other target of worker dissatisfaction might be the political institutions of the country, if they are seen by industrial laborers to produce outcomes consistently unfavorable to workers.

Unions:

Presumably unions exist to defend the interests of workers. Just what is held to be a "defense of workers" depends on whom you ask in which system. In state socialist systems where the Party proclaims itself the defender of the proletariat, the intended role for official trade unions is to augment Party control of society and to assure high levels of productivity, both of which presumably will benefit all segments of society. Likewise, however, unions which accept the corporatist bargain in state capitalist regimes may seek to augment productivity and abstain from strikes so as to create a "healthy investment climate" that will lure "job-creating" foreign investment. So union leaders are often torn between conflicting pressures toward "representation of the rank and file" and toward exertion of social control over their members "for the benefit of society as a whole, including workers."

In state socialist regimes, the balance seems to weigh heavily toward social control. One indicator of the subordination of unions to the Party in Poland is that almost two thirds of pre-Solidarity factory trade union council chairmen were PUWP (Polish United Workers' Party, as the Communist Party is known) members.[48] This suggests why workers chose to seek autonomous interest representation from without, rather than from within, the official trade union structures of Poland. To change the union would be to change a crucial part of the Party's system of political control. But even in state socialist systems, sanctioned unions are alleged to defend the interests of workers. The minimal freedom of maneuver available to official unions, however, determines the extent to which unions actually defend the interests that workers perceive themselves to have. Limited union autonomy implies limits on the utility of unions to workers.

In Latin American state capitalism where governments have assumed major roles in stimulating post-World War II industrialization by providing the necessary infrastructure and "labor peace" that is attractive to private industrialists, the balance has also tipped toward social control. A "triple alliance" between state authorities, domestic industrialists and transnational corporations has become increasingly common.[49] Labor peace has been maintained by carefully structured labor codes that give governments the right to determine, via control over registration procedures, whether any given union is to exist or not. Unions denied registration, often on political grounds, are fully exposed to whatever repressive action seems "appropriate" to state authorities, a determination again often made via application of political criteria.[50] These phenomena have led Schmitter to define one form of interest intermediation as "state corporatism", a variant found frequently in Latin America.[51]

State corporatism implies that union leaders accept a measure of restraint in demand-making in exchange for official recognition by state authorities and the channeling of certain material inducements to cooperative interest groups.[52] Political leaders in state capitalist regimes try to use the state apparatus to create conditions that will make major private investments both profitable and secure. From such a primary commitment comes the seconday decision to restrict the margins of maneuver of labor unions through the inducements and constraints of state corporatism. Should unions happen to decide that the interests of workers could best be protected by the abolition of capitalism, and should they begin to act politically on that premise, they will almost surely expose themselves to repression by the state.

Whereas unions in state capitalist regimes must live within the confines of such corporatist arrangements, the "state unions" in state socialism exist

to penetrate the working class on behalf of the Party. The pursuit of independent interests is not an approved activity for the simple reason that the Party's dictatorship already assumes that the interests of working people will be acknowledged and achieved. To suggest otherwise via independent union activity is an explicit challenge to Party hegemony

In Poland, Solidarity presented such an evident challenge, as it expanded from a workers' union to a national movement that was openly political.[53] Solidarity was, from the outset, unacceptable to the staunchly Leninist wing of the Polish United Workers' Party, as well as to the leadership of Poland's hegemonic neighbor, the Soviet Union. Moderates within the PUWP were uncertain in their response to Walesa and to the movement which outgrew his leadership, so they sought to bide time through legalization of Solidarity. Much smaller efforts to establish autonomous unions have met with more immediate repression in Romania, such as the attempt announced by Paul Goma in early 1979. But, in general, the size of the nascent autonomous unions is immaterial. Ruling communist parties must seek to maintain absolute adherence to the principle of non-negotiability. Because the Party sees itself as the spokesman for workers, it stands to "reason" that others could not negotiate with it on behalf of workers. But the net effect of such certainty about who represents workers is that workers can feel themselves wholly unprotected, obliged to sell their labor to a monopolistic employer, in this case, a socialist state rather than monopoly capital. To paraphrase Felipe Garcia Casals, state socialism has thus changed the form of property, but it has not yet made the producer master of the product of his work.[54]

As a consequence, the official trade unions of state socialism cannot defend the interests of workers as workers might like to see them defended. The official unions tend to confine themselves to "social welfare activities

at the workplace." These might include the organization of recreation and holiday activities and paying attention to health and safety matters. They also serve to guarantee workplace discipline, which is closer to a management function.[55] These unions do not, in other words, carry the case for workers beyond the immediate factory or workplace environment. Rather they place most emphasis on fitting workers into the regime's economic plans, giving little attention to possible adjustments of allocative principles at the national level which might better attend to the grievances felt by workers themselves.

In state capitalist regimes, the role of labor unions can vary considerably. Most Mexican unions, for example, are organized into a politically non-pluralistic umbrella organization, the Congreso del Trabajo, and into a dominant confederation, the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos, which is the heart of the "incorporated union" sector. In Mexico, therefore, pressures exist to reach an accommodation with the dominant Partido Revolucionario Institucional and to follow the guidance of state authorities on demand-making behavior.[56] In Venezuela, by contrast, a good deal more labor pluralism exists. Venezuelan unions hold competitive elections to select their union directorates; the elections are contested on explicitly partisan grounds and proportional representation is used to guarantee post-election representativeness. Moreover, labor unions which espouse explicitly socialist preferences are allowed to exist. However, evidence exists that the politically dominant centrist parties, Acción Democrática and COPEI, use occasional force and legal chicanery to prevent leftist unions from acquiring and retaining control in major confederations or in strategic industrial locations.[57] Venezuelan unions are thus subjected to less state control, but are not absolutely free from such intervention.

Thus differing state capitalist atmospheres are reflected in data on the internal life of unions. Mexican unions, in general, seem to be more coercive environments than are the Venezuelan unions.[58] In both countries union leaders or unions which threaten militant action designed to transform the state will find themselves repressed by the state authorities. But only in Mexico do unions routinely take recourse to milder coercion (generally in the form of fines) to induce participation in more mundane union affairs.

Recognizing such variation helps us to interpret apparent contrasts we find within state socialist and state capitalist cases regarding the sense of unity among workers (see Table VII). The degree to which workers evince a sense of unity or solidarity can be measured only with difficulty. It is clear, however, that Venezuelan union members look upon their unionmates with greater assurance than do Mexican workers. This difference may well be a function of the fact that Venezuelan workers are subjected, on the whole, to less coercion than are the Mexican workers.

In the East European state socialist systems, where union membership is a given, intra-group work relations and the extent to which a worker identifies personal well-being with that of colleagues may serve as the best available indicators of solidarity. Using these different indicators, one sees in Table VII that Polish workers (five years before the emergence of Solidarnosc) were unwilling to depend on fellow workers in matters important to them. However, Romanian workers, in a national sample of one type of industrial enterprise, appear to have exhibited greater unity with workmates. The Romanian results seem to us something of an anomaly, perhaps best explained by the limited breadth of the data available (chemical industry only) or by the age of the survey, which predated Romania's major economic difficulties of the late 1970s. Were the same survey undertaken today, we suspect that Romanian

workers would exhibit less unity with workmates. However, they do fit a general pattern of survey results indicating considerably less alienation in Romania than in Poland. In general, the Mexico-Venezuela and the Poland-Romania contrasts suggest that systems with higher degrees of coercion and with more state intervention are less able to foster a sense of unity or solidarity among workmates. Workers appear to lack confidence in colleagues who participate in instruments for collective decision-making that the state has obviously structured for its own purposes.

The sense of efficacy within sanctioned participatory channels also varies as a function of context. Venezuelan workers are, as reported in Table VIII, considerably more convinced that they can have an influence on union leaders than are Mexican workers. Mexican unions, more strongly constrained by the state, employ moderate coercion to induce participation by union members. Consequently, the higher propensity of Venezuelan union members to believe that they can influence union leaders may plausibly be interpreted as the reflection of a less coercive environment.

To examine similar phenomena in the East European state socialist regimes, we have used efficacy items from surveys about self-management structures. These structures, while not entirely uniform among East European systems, nevertheless usually involve a general assembly of the enterprise and a workers' council, the latter meant to connote a degree of enterprise-level autonomy. Official trade unions, because almost everyone belongs to one and no such unions dare to challenge the state, are simply not an appropriate setting in which to examine the psychological sense of efficacy. Very few will feel efficacious in their union; however, some feel efficacious within the structure of the workers' council.

Using these alternative indicators, we find that the Romanian workers seem to exhibit considerably more efficacy than do the Polish workers. It is of some interest that the Romanian figures are roughly comparable to the Venezuelan data, while the Polish data approximate the Mexican figures. The Polish workers interviewed in 1979, shortly before the upsurge of Solidarity, were shipyard workers. Their extreme discontent clearly led to their attempt to create alternative structures, after which the sense of efficacy began slowly to increase.[59] It is perhaps no accident that the 1970s witnessed a surge of attempts to create autonomous unions in Mexico, not wholly dissimilar to events in Poland.[60]

Curiously, this high sense of union efficacy does not lead people to participate more fully in unions or comparable structures in the Latin American regimes under study. Venezuelan workers, with their greater sense of unity with workmates and with their higher sense of efficacy, participate no more in union affairs than do the Mexicans. Aggregate participation figures may lump together autonomous, volitional participation and externally mobilized participation. If so, perhaps the use of sanctions in Mexico is the origin of a slightly higher voting rate in union elections than in Venezuela, although sanctions may be counterproductive for routine union meetings where the Venezuelans seem slightly more likely to attend.

Were we to use the same indicators of "participation" for East European cases, artificially high rates of worker involvement would be suggested. This would be because electoral turnout and meeting attendance are activities in state socialist environments that are most likely to indicate external mobilization. Indeed, the role of a rank and file trade union member at a general assembly of an enterprise is principally to be present; agenda-setting and leadership roles are confined almost exclusively to Party members.[61]

However, the same might be said for some of the more thoroughly "incorporated" of the Mexican unions, such as the petroleum workers union.[62]

State structuring of labor relations in the state capitalist and state socialist cases leads neither to a more quiescent working class nor to more quiescent unions. Mexican unions, more fully constrained than the Venezuelan unions, have nonetheless struck more frequently.[63] While the most fully incorporated Mexican unions never strike, other unions do. Indeed, the very attempt by state authorities to monitor union developments and to exert close control may stimulate repeated strikes as certain dissident groups seek to exit from state control.[64] The exertion of higher levels of coercion in the state socialist regimes has also engendered resistance. The Polish case attests to the persistence with which workers, frustrated by their own helplessness within official trade unions, have sought to air their grievances through strikes. In Romania, as well, we have the impression that "those workers who have struck are less sure about the benevolent response of the Party. These are, however, the same people who seem to be willing to strike again."[65] In short, the attempt to exert state control may be counterproductive.

In making summary judgments about the effectiveness of their unions, members will assess not only the ease of influence within the union but also the capacity of the union to influence the external environment. It is here that unionists in state capitalist regimes are most likely to render similar judgments, for the variations which exist between union settings are not likely to have a great impact on the global distribution of benefits to society. The data in Table IX make this clear. Approximately two thirds of the workers in both state capitalist countries claim that the performance of their unions is satisfactory. While not shown here, we have data suggesting

that most workers in the two state capitalist regimes are satisfied with the performance of their unions, believing either that personal benefits or desirable collective goods flow from union membership.[66]

Attempting to make a comparable judgment for state socialist systems necessitates making inferences on less complete data. We do know, however, that, as reported in Table IX, the Polish public was highly dissatisfied with the performance of official trade unions in alleviating the crisis which has gripped that country since 1980. In other surveys, official trade unions were trusted by only a fifth of Solidarity respondents, a figure comparable to that obtained by the security police (MO).[67] Along with most other government, party or "official" institutions in Poland, citizens' problems were thus attributed to trade unions.

For Romania, we find data which suggest that a large percent of workers ignore involvement in "production meetings" organized by the union, while about a third participate in making proposals. Many who do participate, regard their involvement as futile. We think these data (see Table IX) approximate Romanian workers' degree of satisfaction with official trade unions. Those who reject participation are likely to be dissatisfied and those who sense efficacy in their involvement are likely to be most satisfied. Overall, it seems that few workers have much confidence in trade union activity in Romania.

The greater degree of state intervention in Eastern Europe then, has, fostered a propensity for workers to include unions and other official mechanisms for working class participation among the structures to which they attribute their dissatisfaction. Latin American workers, while feeling inefficacious, are largely satisfied with their unions.

The Polity:

Individuals can also impute responsibility for personal dissatisfaction to the political order. In state capitalist regimes, the state structures allocative outcomes, but not as clearly as happens in state socialist regimes through central planning. It follows that the extent to which personal dissatisfaction will be directed toward political authorities ought be less clear in such polities.[68] The odds are high, conversely, that the state authorities will be held responsible for social outcomes in the state socialist regimes.

In the two Latin American state capitalist regimes, ambivalence is the prevalent attitude of workers toward the polities within which they operate (see Tables X and XI). This ambivalence transcends the apparent gulf between the more authoritarian Mexican polity and the more democratic Venezuelan polity. Even the Venezuelan polity is not held in uniformly high esteem. Workers do seem to differentiate between political environments, evaluating the Venezuelan polity more favorably on balance than the Mexican polity.[69] On balance, workers in both state capitalist regimes find something to criticize, as well as something to which allegiance might be expressed. Consequently, it can be said that they attribute a moderately high degree of responsibility for their condition to the polity in which they are located, regardless of location in a competitive or non-competitive polity.

Workers in state socialist political economies are somewhat more certain about who or what is responsible for their dissatisfaction. As suggested by Table X, industrial laborers in Poland and Romania view the system as largely unresponsive. Correspondingly, workers display little support for the regime per se. The indicators of support-disaffection at our disposal imply that workers in the East European state socialist cases overwhelmingly attribute

the existence of conditions with which they are displeased to the Party-state, which subsumes various institutional adjuncts, such as the ministerial structure, courts and prosecutors, security police, trade unions, other subservient political parties and "national front" organizations. None of the latter are held in great esteem. In part, East European workers are less ambivalent about the polities in which they live because the Party-state claims credit for all improvements and demands allegiance to all existing institutions. Demanding allegiance generally backfires, however, among the state socialist workers.

Tables XI to XIII indicate that judgments vary considerably within each polity depending on specification of the dimension of the polity to be judged. Nevertheless, concerning assessments of electoral mechanisms of accountability and assessments of the attitudinal dispositions of public officials, each system comes in for considerable criticism. In none of the systems do workers seem confident that they can have an influence on the polity.

The results in Table XI suggest that workers in both types of systems see elections as unreliable tools for influencing the behavior of elected officials. No comparable data exist for Romania, and the only Polish data available are very indirect indicators, thus complicating our inferential task.

A kind of diffuse belief that "elections matter" is reasonably widespread among workers in the Latin American state capitalist regimes. (Table XI, items a and c) Not unexpectedly, the belief is more evident in Venezuela. By contrast, in neither Latin American polity do workers believe that electoral mechanisms provide a compact which is binding on elected officials (Table XI, item b).

Poles would appear to perceive little electoral accountability. But we can reach this judgment only indirectly. As an analogue to item c in Table XI, we cite a survey which indicates that if Poles were given a choice, they would overwhelmingly choose to vote for non-communist parties in hypothetical competitive elections.[70] That percentage (6%) who would vote communist presumably would find little objectionable about current electoral arrangements, while those who would prefer to vote for a non-communist party ought find the current electoral rules objectionable since the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic options that many Poles would prefer are not available.

As an analogue to item a in Table XI, we find that Polish shipyard workers see their influence on the national polity as relatively low. This item does not refer directly to elections, but would certainly encompass electoral means of "citizen influence" as well as others. It is best not to overemphasize comparisons between East Europe and Latin America because questionnaire items and attitudinal objects (viz. electoral systems) are so different. Nonetheless, it makes sense to assume that Venezuelan workers would perceive their votes to be more consequential than workers in Poland or Mexico.

As an analogue to item b in Table XI, we cite an item pertaining to the desirability of more "societal control over government." Since 92% of Poles appear to favor greater "societal control," then we might assume that only 8% would believe that existing electoral mechanisms produce elected officials who do an adequate job of serving the public. Whether this reasoning is plausible or not, we would expect that the Polish figure would be lower than figures obtained in Venezuela and in Mexico. If elections do not work to produce compacts between voters and elected officials where it is occasionally

possible "to throw the rascals out," they certainly will be no more likely to produce such a compact in settings where nominated candidates never lose.

In Table XII, we move to consideration of how workers perceive the attitudes of public officials toward citizens. We find that in the state capitalist regimes workers are ambivalent. Mexican workers are more likely to expect a respectful hearing from public officials than are the Venezuelans, but the percent with a positive expectation is only moderately high in Mexico at 44.4% (Table XII, item a). The percentage believing that "the leading politicians and bureaucrats of this country pay attention to the interests of workers" is low in both countries, but again lower in Venezuela (Table XII, item b). The Venezuelan workers <u>are</u> convinced, however, that public officials would like to serve the public, whereas the Mexicans are more convinced that public officials are primarily looking out for their own interests (Table XII, item c).

We cannot compare these Latin American cases with state socialist environments on each item in Table XII. Certainly, however, Romanian miners reveal a disinclination to believe that politicians and functionaries have workers' interests foremost in their minds.[71] We know, moreover, that Romanian industrial labor exhibits little inclination to bring problems at the workplace to the attention of superiors, apparently expecting little serious response from those in posts of responsibility. Poles, and specifically Polish workers, have a low sense of their political efficacy at the workplace and within the political system. Very likely this would imply low expectations and responsibilities by functionaries and a weak sense that functionaries and/or politicians pay attention to the views of workers. But we lack the survey data to demonstrate that these logical expectations do obtain. Surely, however, the antagonism of Polish workers to bureaucratic

privilege reflects a belief that the PUWP and the bureaucracy writ large are ignoring the interests of workers. On the basis of comparable surveys of Czech and Hungarian respondents, we would estimate that perhaps 30% or fewer Poles would answer in the affirmative to an item comparable to item c of Table XII.

A similar pattern prevails among items in a scale of diffuse regime support (Table XIII). In general, Venezuelan workers are slightly more regime supportive than are the Mexicans. But there is variation within countries depending on the dimension of the regime that workers are asked to assess. The Venezuelans are more positive than the Mexicans on general items (Table XIII, items a and b) that would seem to reflect a global assessment of the more competitive Venezuelan polity.[72] Mexican workers are more willing to express personal allegiance to the polity and to pledge support (Table XIII, item c). Workers in neither country are favorably impressed by the outputs of the court system, by the honesty of political leaders, or, most importantly, by the degree to which the interests of workers are protected by political leaders (Table XIII, items d, e and f). In sum, then, industrial workers in Latin American state capitalist regimes are only moderately influenced in assessing their polity by location in a more or less democratic system. When it comes to assessing the way workers are treated by the political system, the important structural variable seems to be the state capitalist nature of the regime, not the degree of democracy. Industrial workers would seemingly rather be located in more democratic than less democratic polities, but genuine enthusiasm for the polity can be generated only when policy outputs favorable to labor are produced.

Polish data, while less precise on each indicator, are nevertheless unequivocal in pointing to generally low levels of diffuse regime support. We

would not argue that each proposed measure is fully equivalent to the items used in Latin America, but there is little doubt that Polish workers and the public in general evince little confidence in their system "to produce" on their behalf. It is important to note that Poles apparently distinguish between "socialism as a basically good system" and Polish socialism as implemented by PUWP leaders. Moreover, Poles of all ages retain a strong identity with "the Polish nation" and, as of 1978, 82% indicated a (hypothetical, of course) willingness to give their lives for the defense of the country.[73] To the Polish citizen and workers, the polity, now a militarized Party-state, bears the brunt of personal dissatisfaction. Discontent is attributed first and foremost to the system. The discontent is deep and pervasive. Data on Romania were unavailable.

In Latin America, discontent is attributed by workers to a variety of "causes": fundamentally to owners and managers (i.e., to the "capitalists"), but secondly to the public authorities. Notably absent as a target for attribution of responsibility in Latin America is the labor union. The links between capitalists and the state are perceived to some extent by workers in Latin America, but where competitive electoral procedures really produce turnover in office-holders, the public authorities are spared some criticism. Ultimately, however, Latin American workers perceive that public officials are somehow responsible for a development model that imposes many of the costs of development on workers and, in their view, imposes too few costs on those with money. Labor unions are not perfect instruments for the defense of workers, but the Latin American laborers are clearly much more satisfied with their unions than is the case among their East European counterparts. In Latin America, then, responsibility for working class discontent is attributed

selectively to a few targets, including the one target (the capitalists) no longer available as a target for discontent in the state socialist systems.

V. POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF WORKERS

Four types of political involvement might be identified: (i) mobilized or manipulated system-supportive behavior whereby citizens are coerced or deceived into political activity; (ii) conventional political behavior whereby citizens accept current allocative principles and thus, implicitly, support the existing structures which apply those principles; (iii) autonomous political behavior, of a conventional or non-conventional form, which attempts to influence the choice of allocative principles and, when possible, to impose alternative distributive criteria on decision-makers; and (iv) anti-system behavior, which is oriented toward changing the structures of decision-making. Certain modes of activity, such as protest, may fall into more than one category, depending on the motivations and goals of the participants. Protest behavior is not necessarily anti-system behavior but it is, at a minimum, autonomous behavior.[74]

With the data from the Latin American surveys, we are able to characterize the extent of mobilized, system-supportive behavior, to describe the incidence of various modes of conventional behavior, and to quantify the history of protest acts by industrial workers. We cannot, however, identify the motivations behind all of these behaviors. This is all the more true for East European cases, lacking, as we do, originally collected individual level data. Hence, we do not always know in what kind of protest workers engaged nor the content of the political discussions reported by workers. So the categorizations offered above can only be approximated with the survey data at hand.

Nonetheless, the total array of data in Table XIV suggests that industrial workers of Latin American state capitalist regimes are primarily depoliticized, while workers in East European state socialist settings are more politicized. The modes of politicization in Eastern Europe are multiple, ranging from mobilized behavior through conventional activity to protest. For example, the extent of mobilized system-supportive behavior is modest among state capitalist workers and considerably higher in state socialism. Notwithstanding the comprehensible intra-category variations in Latin America, pressures to provide frequent and overt displays of conformity to the reigning politico-economic model are simply much stronger in Eastern Europe.

Although encouraged to provide periodic displays of political allegiance to the parties that preside over the state-capitalist development model, most Latin American workers are not encouraged to play an active political role that would transcend the function of occasional voter. Few Latin American workers report talking about politics on the job (20% in Mexico; 10% in Venezuela),[75] fewer still attend political meetings or rallies, and fewer than 10% are involved on any regular basis in campaign activity. These are all activities which unions could foment, but choose not to pursue seriously. The votes of workers are anxiously solicited in both countries, as is reflected by the fact that three or four workers in both Latin American countries report a high incidence of voting. But for most Latin American workers, their major political act, voting, is a behavior uninformed by attention to political news, unsharpened by debate over alternatives with friends or acquaintances, but perhaps informed by a cynicism about the consequences of electoral processes. These workers take some pride when competitive electoral systems exist, but despair over the odds of politicians "keeping their promises" or "looking out for the interests of workers."

Romanian workers report that they almost always attend, but rarely participate in, sessions of workplace governance unless "asked to do so" (Table XIV, item I). Much of the other participatory behavior that they undertake is done without much expectation of systemic "influence." Rather, workers do and say things in an effort to avoid challenges from security police or to avert impediments to their job advancement. As argued earlier, we think workplace behavior is at the core of political behavior in state socialist systems. The extent to which external mobilization for elite-approved ends is evident within the processes of workplace governance, then, suggests the extent to which mobilization throughout society is sought by the Party.

Conventional behaviors, which accept the system's structures and principles of allocation, are widespread among Romanian and Polish workers, particularly among the Romanians. But these forms of "conventional" behavior are perhaps not as easily distinguished from mobilized behavior in East Europe as in Latin America.[76] Voting in East European national elections, for example, conveys nothing about individual preferences, given the lack of meaningful alternative candidates or parties. The news media are skewed toward conveyance of political news in East Europe, such that to pay attention to politics via the media is a "less difficult" act in these state socialist settings. Political "discussions" are often lectures organized by the Party for workers, more one-way discourses indicative of power relations than two-way activities indicating autonomous worker activity. Rallies and campaign activity are most accurately understood as mobilized or manipulated behavior on the part of workers.

Protest behavior, of course, is likely to be viewed with concern by the leaders of all polities. State socialist regimes in Eastern Europe take the

precaution of prohibiting most strikes and protests, rationalizing this action by invoking the concept of the proletarian dictatorship. Workers in state socialism, however, have not felt that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" obviates the need for protest as a tool for the articulation of grievances. Although pressured to engage in system-supportive behavior, very high proportions of East European workers seem willing to engage in protest. In Poland, most workers have even acted upon that disposition. The incidence of strikes and protests is much lower in Romania, but perhaps more frequent than available reports in the West allow us to detect. These workers, confronting a more interventionist state, are less fully convinced than the Latin Americans that protest will have few positive effects.

Latin American workers, depoliticized and cynical, are unlikely candidates for protest about existing policies, the authorities who make them, or the system that produces such authorities. While a sizable percentage of the workers in both countries (42% in Mexico, 62% in Venezuela) say that they can imagine themselves participating in a protest, few have actually done so. Not surprisingly, the percentage having done so is greater in Venezuela, where the risks for such behaviors are lower that in Mexico. We do not know the precise nature of the protest behaviors in which these few workers engaged,[77] but we do know that the workers in both countries judged their protest efforts largely to be unsuccessful.[78] If the belief is widespread that "protest does not pay" and if those with experience in protest were largely disappointed, the relationship of workers to their political environment would have to change for discontent to take the form that they have recently taken in Poland. It is to analysis of such systemic consequences that we turn in the succeeding section.

VI. SYSTEMIC CONSEQUENCES

Earlier we defined politicization as a multi-dimensional phenomenon implying transition from subject to autonomous actor, from recipient of dispensations under allocative principles decided by others to conceiver of new allocative principles and agitator for their implementation. Full politicization would imply a condition whereby the citizen would be engaged in normative discourse with those who govern about the principles which ought guide the allocation of values for the society. To skeptics, this might suggest images of a town meeting of philosopher-kings. However, our expectations are not so demanding. We merely define the highest levels of politicization as activities in which citizens effectively ask of those who govern: "Why do you follow these decision rules?," "Why are these wise allocative principles?," or, "Would it not be better to establish alternative priorities?".

Where those who govern engage in normative discourse and satisfactorily respond to such questions, system-supportive politicization can be present. To be politicized, however, may with equal frequency connote a state of tension with the decision-makers of any given society. The more fully politicized one is, the more one may be willing to challenge allocative principles. To be fully politicized in this sense is not necessarily to be subversive. Only if political elites fail to provide persuasive responses in normative discourse with citizens will the most politicized individuals drift toward behavior subversive of the existing order. Our definition does imply, however, that political leaders in all settings will find it convenient not to let politicization exceed some ill-defined threshold where mobilization seems "out of control." While most polities will have developed a rhetoric of "participation as civic duty," political leaders often seek to discourage what

they perceive as "excessive" participation. The fully politicized individual, therefore, experience modest tension with political decision-makers at all times and will occasionally experience overt conflict. The fully politicized individual is inclined to say: "How was that again?; I'm not certain that I agree."

What does it mean, then, for workers who are dissatisfied with one or another dimension of their existence to be located in variant structural settings? Our working hypothesis was suggested by James Malloy, who defined state socialism and state capitalism in a way which highlighted the "visibility" of state intervention in the structuring of social outcomes. The implication of Malloy's definition was that workers would be most inclined to attribute responsibility for their dissatisfaction to the state authorities where the role of the latter was least veiled. While state capitalist regimes may play a major role in creating or sustaining the condition to which workers object, Malloy's perspective implies that they would not "take the heat" that state socialist regimes would take from workers who are dissatisfied.

We think the data are generally consistent with such a thesis. The visible lack of "sub-system autonomy"[79] in Eastern Europe allows discontent with specific institutions to build cumulatively upon discontent generated in other settings; workers begin to interpret each grievance as indicative of a "system that doesn't work." Trade unions are distrusted because they are dominated by the Party; workers' councils are instituted to overcome distrust of the trade unions, but still do not succeed in quelling the unease with which workers view authorities. Autonomous labor movements emerge and are suppressed, thereby confirming the perception of workers that elites fear "normative dialogue" with citizens. In the state socialist setting, this spiral leads to more extreme demand-making by those who seek to participate in

such dialogue; once clear that the political leaders fear normative discourse with citizens, politicized workers are likely to challenge the very structures of authority. Lech Walesa eventually lost control of Solidarity because he could not contain those who spoke explicitly of redefining the Polish state. Walesa's inability was probably less a personal defect than a structural imperative of escalating politicization in the context of state socialism. Tragically, the logic of the situation also made the closure of the Polish system predictable. Having boldly proclaimed themselves to be defenders of proletarians and having claimed a monopoly of power to ensure that "justice be done" for proletarians, the state socialist authorities find it difficult to share power with those who claim that justice has not been done.

Full politicization is a greater threat to systems where power has been concentrated on behalf of a bold moral principle, absolute equality, than to systems where power is exercised by a wider array of actors whose relations to each other are less apparent. Coercion can be and is used to depoliticize labor in state capitalist systems. But, because of the nature of these systems, coercion can be applied more selectively. Elizabeth Jelin's study of spontaneous working class protests in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico documents cases where politicization has escalated rapidly, moving beyond the expression of workplace grievances to the articulation of direct challenges to national authorities. That the structures of formal authority are discontinuous in Latin American authoritarian regimes, however, tends to deprive working class protest of the "heroic tradition" established since 1956 in Poland and which has been impossible to extinguish.

In Latin America, each case of working class protest "starts over from scratch," so to speak. Workers move less quickly from complaints at the worksite to challenges to overarching structures of authority. Indeed, the

more democratic the state capitalist regime, the more that progression will be retarded in Latin America. Generally, state capitalist regimes do not need to apply coercion massively because the question of how decisions get made is unclear and the relationships between successive sets of decision-makers are confusing to workers. Consequently, any tendencies toward escalating politicization can be contained by selective application of coercion in the short-term and by natural turnover in decision-makers in the long run. The pluralism of state capitalism may be more apparent than real, but it has major political consequences. State capitalist regimes are less likely to generate the implacable hostility of workers than are state socialist regimes, even though social inequality may be considerably lower in the latter than in the former.

The first irony of state socialism is that, by attempting to direct working class politicization into state-approved channels, it makes autonomous politicization more likely. The second irony is that by boldly proclaiming themselves the patrons of workers, state socialist authorities increase the sensitivity of workers to distributive equity and make them more desirous of engaging in normative discourse over this subject. Given these two ironies, it is perhaps tragic that state socialism has not had enlightened leaders who would exhibit an exceptional willingness to engage in "time-consuming" normative dialogue with citizens. The similarity of political leaders in state socialism to political leaders elsewhere makes them especially inadequate in the more demanding circumstances created by their very boldness.

TABLE I

Satisfaction With Wages Among Industrial Workers In State Capitalist and State Socialist Regimes

Attitudes Regarding Pay (in Year)	Mexico (1980)[a]	Venezuela (1980)[a]	Romania[c] (1975)	Poland[d] (1975)
Wages low or very low (unsatisfactory pay; does not cover needs)	52.3%	55.3%	41.5%	77.5%
Wages acceptable (needs covered)	47.7%[b]	44.7%[b]	58.5%	22.5%

a "Structural Determinants Study, 1979-1980."

b combines responses of "acceptable salaries" and "high salaries".

c not a national sample; selected industrial sites only; authors'recalculation based upon 1975 data reported in Mariana Sirbu, "Conştiinţa Politică şi procesul integrarii în Munca" in Constantin Potinga and Vasile Popescu, eds., Conştiinţa Socialistă şi Participarea Socială (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1977).

d Data from Waclaw Makarczk (1975) cited by Maurice Simon, "Social Change and Political Tensions in Gierek's Poland", paper delivered at the Annual Meeting for the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Philadelphia, November, 1980, 4 and 5. Category of "Wages low" includes responses that "my wages are somewhat or much too small" to cover needs. These results do not depart from findings in the mid-1960s by Krzysztof Szafnicki, "Oceny płac individualnych i dochodów rodzin," in K. Słomczynski and W. Wesłowski, eds., Structura i ruchlowisc społeczna (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1973), 33-60. Szafnicki found that, among skilled, semiiskilled and unskilled workers in Szczecin, Koszalin and Łodz who earned a typical 2000 złoty per month, only a mean of 23 found their monthly earnings "suitable".

TABLE II

Consultation of Workers at the Enterprise in State Socialism and State Capitalism

How decisions are taken on job:	Mexico 1980[a]	Venezuela 1980[a]	Romania 1976[b]	Poland 1979[c]
I am always consulted	15.0%	23.1%	38%	4.5
Frequently, I am consulted	20.4%	24.7%		18.7%
I am rarely consulted	38.0%	39.9%	62%	38.6
I am never consulted	26.6%	12.3%		31.8

a "Structural Determinants Study, 1979-1980."

b Data are from two large industrial enterprises and are not a national sample; authors' estimate based upon percentages reported by Viorel I. Cornescu, Productivitatea Muncii si Factorul Uman (Bucharest: Editura Politica, 1977), 214-215.

c Question to Polish shipyard workers, 1979: "What influence does the rank and file worker have over what happens in the workplace"? Jacek Poprzecko and Tomasz Sypniewski, "Stoczniowcy 81", Zycie Warszawy as reported in James McGregor "Polish Public Moods in a Time of Crisis," paper delivered at Annual Meeting of the ISA, Cincinnati, March 1982, 11.

TABLE III

Polish Workers' Desire and Willingness to Participate in Making Decisions at Enterprise

	Desire to Participate	Willingness to Participate
On most matters affecting the plant	48	32
Only on problems affecting work	45	57
Only when management asks	7	9
No need for participation	9	2

Source: Adam Sarapata, "Polish Automobile Workers and Automation", in J. Forslin, et.a., eds., Automation and Industrial Workers Vol. I (Oxford: Pergamon 1979), 126 as cited by Jack Bielasiak, "Workers and Mass Participation in 'Socialist Democracy'", in J. Triska and Charles Gati, eds., Blue Collar Workers in Eastern Europe (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 100.

TABLE IV

Workers' Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction in State Capitalism and State Socialism

	Overall job Satisfaction		Wage Satisfaction		Consultation of Workers		Occupational Stability*	
		rank		rank		rank		rank
Mexico	high	1.5	mod	2	low	3	mod	2
Venezuela	high	1.5	mod	3	mod	1	high	1
Romania	mod	3	mod	1	low	2	mod	3
Poland	low	4	low	4	low	4	low	4

*where 1 = lowest levels of desire to change place of work or type of job, i.e., highest occupational stability.

Source: Authors' judgments based upon data in Tables I through VII as well as other data-based works cited.

TABLE V

Indicators of Class Consciousness Among Industrial Workers in Latin American State Capitalist Regimes

Item:	Mexico	Venezuela
1. Do workers generally receive a fair salary, given the work they do?		
No, salaries unfair	61.4%	60.5%
Sometimes	28.2%	30.5%
Yes, salaries fair	10.2%	8.5%
2. In general, do the owners of large companies receive...		
more than they deserve.	84.4%	80.0%
about what they merit.	13.6%	18.5%
less than they deserve.	1.8%	1.6%
3. There is a lot of talk about what owners and managers really feel about the problems of workers. Do you think...		
bosses/owners never really interested?	30.6%	25.0%
only care occasionally?	40.2%	56.6%
often concerned?	26.0%	15.3%
almost always care?	3.2%	2.7%
4. Sometimes it is said that what is good for the company is good for the workers. Is this point of view correct or not?		
No, it is not true	40.8%	56.1%
Depends	17.4%	24.1%
Yes, it is true	41.8%	19.8%

Source: "Structural Determinants Study, 1979-1980."

TABLE VI

Polish Social Class Identification

"To what social class would you say you belong?"

Social Class Identification (in %)

Social Class	Total Number	%	Blue-collar workers	Petite bourgeoisie	White-collar workers	Intelligentsia	Farmers	Farmer-workers	Other	Missing data
Total	556	100	42.1	3.2	5.0	15.5	5.2	0.5	23.6	4.9
Unskilled workers	133	100	58.5	---	0.8	1.5	3.0	---	29.4	6.8
Skilled workers	110	100	63.6	1.8	2.7	3.6	4.5	0.9	15.6	7.3
All blue-collar workers	243	100	60.9	0.8	1.6	2.5	3.7	0.4	23.1	7.0
White-collar workers and intelligentsia	207	100	24.2	1.4	10.6	37.2	1.9	0.5	20.3	3.9
Petite bourgeoisie	72	100	43.1	18.1	1.4	2.8	2.8	---	29.0	2.8
Farmers	34	100	14.7	---	2.9	2.9	41.2	2.9	35.4	---

Source: Jan Malanowski, "Relations Between Classes and Perspection of Social Class Distance", in Kazimierz Słomczynski and Tadeusz Krauze, eds. Class Structure and Social Mobility in Poland, (White Plains, NY: ME Sharpe, 1978), 134.

TABLE VII

Sense of Unity/Solidarity Among
Industrial Workers in State Capitalist and
State Socialist Regimes

	State Capitalism		State Socialism	
	Mexico	Venezuela*	Romania c. 1972**	Poland 1975***
Sense of unity with unionmates				
High degree	12.6%	38.4%	33.8%	1.5%
A bit	59.2%	48.2%	54.5%	n/a
None whatsoever	28.2%	11.6%	13.2%	30.9%

* "Structural Determinants Study, 1979-1980."

** Data from a national sample of skilled workers from the Romanian industry in the early 1970s, N=1098, as reported in Catalin Mamali,"Sistemul Om--om şi Integrarea Socioprofessionala a Tinerilor" in Ovidiu Badina and Catalin Mamali, eds., Tineret Industrial, (Bucharest, Editura Academiei, 1973), 74-75. Respondents were asked about their perception of their own personal relations with other members of their work group. The response "very good" is coded here as a "high degree" of unity, "good" is coded as "a bit" and "indifferent" or "bad" is coded as "none whatsoever."

*** Authors' recalculation of data from a 1975 survey by Waclaw Makarczyk in which respondents were asked: "Can you count on others in important that affect your life?" Skilled and unskilled workers who said that they could "count on" colleagues at work were regarded as having a "high degree" of unity, whereas those who said they could depend on no one were scored as experiencing no unity whatsoever. Data reported in Maurice Simon, op. cit., 14.

TABLE VIII

Sense of Personal Efficacy Within Unions and Self-Management Channels in State Capitalist and State Socialist Regimes

	State Capitalism		State Socialism	
	Mexico	Venezuela*	Romania**	Poland***
1. National efficacy: I can influence national union leaders...				
much	2.7%	19.9%	n/a	4.4%
some	16.0%	26.8%	n/a	21.2%
little	45.0%	36.6%	n/a	
not at all	32.0%	36.6%	n/a	[71.5%]
2. Local efficacy: I can influence local union leaders...				
much	4.5%	25.6%		4.5%
some	23.5%	38.2%	[56.8%]	18.7%
little	47.7%	26.4%	[43.2%]	38.6%
none	24.2%	9.8%		31.8%
"hard to say"	---	---	---	6.3%

* "Structural Determiants Study, 1979-1980."

** Data from a national sample of workers 30 years of age and under in construction enterprises in the early 1970s, where N=1232. Reported in Ovidiu Badina, "Participarea Tinerilor la Procesul de Realizare a Unor Invenţii, Inovatii şi Rationalizări," in Ovidiu Badina and Catalin Mamali, op. cit., 124.

*** Data from Jacek Poprzecko and Tomasz Sypniewsky, "Stoczniowcy 81," Zycie Warszawy, where N=287 randomly selected shipyard workers as reported in James McGregor, "Polish Public Moods in a Time of Crisis," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Cincinnati, March 1982, 11.

TABLE IX
Judgments of Union Performance in State Capitalist and State Socialist Regimes

	Mexico[a] (high coercion)	Venezuela[a] (low coercion)	Romania[b] (high coercion)	Poland[c] mod-high coercion)
Degree satisfaction with union performance				
very satisfied (very good)	8.6%	10.4%	37%	1.4%
satisfied	66.2%	58.7%		18.3%
dissatisfied	20.9%	24.1%	63%	40.0%
very dissatisfied (very bad)	4.3%	6.3%		20.8%
do not know	—	—	—	19.4%

a. "Structural Determinants Study, 1979-1980."

b. Data are from a national survey of young (30 and under) Romanians in three principal industries (machine construction, chemical refining and textiles) in the early 1970s. Data adapted by the authors from Ovidiu Badina, "Participarea Tinerilor î Procesul de Realizare a Unor Inventii, Inovatii şi Rationalizări" in Ovidiu Badina and Catalin Mamali, eds., Tineret Industrial (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1973), 123-124. Data concern the proportion of workers making proposals at union organized "production meetings": 63% said they never made proposals, while 22% of the sample (N=6236) said they did and felt the proposals had an effect, and another 15% said they made proposals but thought they had no effect. Those who reject participation are most likely, we think, to be dissatisfied, while those who make proposals we interpret to be among the "satisfied" -- the very satisfied probably being those who regard their participation as efficacious.

c. Public random sample in which respondents were asked their degree of satisfation with the performance of various institutions including trade unions in "alleviating the crisis". Responses ranged from "very good", "good", "bad" and "very bad". Reported by James McGregor, op. cit., 18. His original source was Krakow Press Research Center, Społeczenstvo Polskie Przed IX Zjazdem PZPR (Krakow, 1981), 12. Alternative data sources indicate that branch unions had the "trust" of 56 percent of a national sample in May 1981. We think these data are less comparable to our Latin American data given the latter's emphasis on a citizen's conviction that an institution will do something versus a general sense of goodwill. The OBOP report from May 1981, "Społezcne Zaufanie" is cited by David Mason, "Solidarity, Socialism, and Public Opinion", paper delivered at the 1982 Annual Meeeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, September 2-5, 1982, 10, Table 3.

TABLE X

Implicit Attribution of Responsibility for Dissatisfaction to the Polity: Industrial Workers in State Capitalist and State Socialist Regimes*

	State Capitalism		State Socialism	
	Mexico	Venezuela	Romania	Poland
1. Overall sense of system responsiveness	mod-low	mod-low	low	low
2. Diffuse support for polity	mod-low	mod-low	mod-low	low

* Individual items in supporting tables are labeled as low, moderate, or high if they fall into the following ranges: 0-33%; 34%-66%; 67%-100%. The entries in this table are indications of the central tendency across items in a variety of supporting tables. The sense of system responsiveness and diffuse support, of course, both represent positive assessments of the polity. Low scores on either would indicate the attribution of responsibility for one's dissatisfaction to the polity.

TABLE XI
Assessments of System Responsiveness by Industrial Workers:
Electoral Mechanisms of Accountability

	Mexico[a] (Non-Competitive)	Venezuela[a] (Competitive)	Poland (Non-Competitive)
a. Perceived effect of voting:			
percent indicating "much effect" or "some effect"	(low) 31.2%	(moderate) 58.2%	(low) 25.6%[b]
b. Electoral compact between voters and elected officials:			
percent assuming that majority of elected officials try to fulfill	(low) 18.5%	(low) 13.9%	(low) 8.0%[c]
c. Net effect of elections: do they warrant our attention?			
percent asserting that it matters that "the best candidate win" and rejecting assertion that "nothing will change as a result of elections."	(moderate) 49.0%	(moderate) 50.9%	(low) 6.0%[d]

a. "Structural Determinants Study, 1979-1980."

b. Data from 1979 survey of shipyard workers who were asked "Do you think the average person has influence over what happens today in Poland?" Original source, Jacek Poprzeczko and Tomasz Sypniewski, "Stoczniowcy 81", Zyclie Warszaway as reported in McGregor, op.cit., 11.

c. December 1980 data indicating support for the principle that there should be "more societal control over the government", here interpreted to mean that the percent not supporting such a principle (i.e., 8%) believe that government-society linkage as already strong enough. Over ninety percent believe then, that the compact between voters and government is weak. See Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, "Lad spoleczyny-Jaki", Zycie Gospodarcze (10 May 1981), 7 as cited by McGregor, op cit., 12.

d. Radio Free Europe, East European Audience and Opinion Research, "Trends in Hypothetical Party Preferences Among Respondents from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland" (December, 1981), 15, Table 6. Percent here, and judgment of "low", reflect those Poles for whom party choice of "communist" vis-a-vis others in a hypothetical election, implies that existing electoral system "warrants attention".

TABLE XII
Assessments of System Responsiveness by Industrial Workers
Attitudes of Politicians and Bureaucrats

	Mexico[a] Non-Compet. state capitalist)	Venezuela[a] (Compet. state capitalist)	Romania[b] Non-Compet. state socialist)	Poland (Non-Compet. state socialist)
a. Percentage who envision serious response from functionary hypothetical situation	(moderate) 44.4%	(low) 22.9%	(low) 6.6%	N/A
b. Percentage who believe that politicians and high function aries pay "much" or "some" attention to the views of workers.	(low) 29.2%	(low) 17.2%	N/	(low) 14.8%[c]
c. Percentage who believe that functionaries "want to serve the public", vs. belief that "functionaries are out to serve themselves."	(low) 28.6%	(high) 89.7%	N/A	(low)[d] <30%

a. "Structural Determinants Study, 1979-1980."

b. Data are from Georgeta Dan-Spinoiu, Factori Obiectiv şi Subiectiv in Integrarea Profesionala a Femeii (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1974), 74. Data are from a sample of 60 men and 60 women drawn at random from a much larger (several thousand) "pool" of workers in several types of industry. Question asked attitude of respondents toward "excessive bureaucracy and arbitrary decisions." A forced choice response was employed; 6.6% indicated that they would "try to attract my superior's attention", while others said that they do not react because it would have no effect (30% males, 13.3% females) while very high proportions said that they would not respond at all (53.5% females, 23.4% males), which we interpret to be a sign of low confidence in system responsiveness among workers.

c. This figure is a mean of the percentages of "unskilled", "skilled" and "peasant workers" (part-time industrial workers) who score high or very high on Campbell's political efficacy scale applied to an early December 1981 (before martial law) survey of 1119 Poles conducted by Renata Siemienska, op. cit., 16.

d. Radio Free Europe, East European Area Audience and Opinion Research, "Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Polish Attitudes Toward the Communist Party Leader and Toward the President of the United States" (February, 1982), 9; percent indicating that the party leader exhibits positive characteristics of being "for the average citizen", from a sample of citizens of these countries who traveled in Western Europe. The percentages of Czechoslovakia and Hungary are 23.5% and 34.5% respectively.

TABLE XIII
Indicators of Diffuse Support for the Polity:
Industrial Workers in State Capitalism and State Socialism*

	Mexico**	Venezuela**	Poland
a. Pride in our form of government: percent "very proud" or "proud"	(low) 31.6%	(moderate) 56.9%	n/a
b. Our system best for this country: percent "best system" or "good for country"	(moderate) 35.6%	(moderate) 54.5%	(low) 15%[a]
c. Extent to which citizens ought to support government percent "always" or generally" "always"	(moderate) 57.7%	(low) 29.2%	(low) 23.30%[b]
d. Extent to which courts render fair and just decisions: percent "almost always" or "frequently"	(low) 26.3%	(low) 24.2%	(low) 28%[c]
e. Degree honesty of political leaders: percent "very honest or "honest"	(low) 24.8%	(moderate) 34.7%	(low) 6%[d]
f. Extent to which politicians look after interests of workers: percent "maximum extent possible" or "well enough"	(low) 32.4%	(low) 28.3%	(low) 7.1%-19.0%[e]

* Insufficient data are available from Romania to make comparisons.

** "Structural Determinants Study, 1979-1980."

a Radio Free Europe, East European Area Audience and Opinion Research, "Eastern Socialism - Western Democracy and the Functioning of the Two Systems" (November, 1981), 20; N=2,143 interviews among Polish travellers to Western Europe from April 1970 to August 1980. Subjects were asked "How does Socialism work out in practice in ... (name of country) ... very well, well, badly, or very badly?" Percentage cited is the subtotal of "very well" and "well" responses.

b Lower estimate is from a survey in September of 1981 by the Social Research Center of Solidarity in Warsaw, as reported in McGregor, op. cit., 19. Respondents, all Solidarity members, were asked if they trusted specific institutions in Polish society and government. Here, 23% is the mean percentage of respondents indicating trust in ten principal party-state institutions, excluding only the Sejm, Army, Church and Solidarity. Higher estimate is from a public sample reported by David Mason, in his paper, "Solidarity, Socialism and Public Opinion", op. cit., 12, Table 5. His original source was an OBOP report, "Napiecia Społecznei Stosunki Władza-Solidarnosc w Opinii Publicznej" (Warsaw, November 1981). As martial law approached, ironically this public trust in "government" rose to 51%.

c. Data are from the same survey as "b", the 28% being the portion of the sample indicating trust in "courts."

d. Data are from public survey in late November 1980 indicating that only 6 percent thought the government was "displaying good will" in the dispute with Solidarity. Discussed in McGregor, op. cit., 17; his original source was FBIS Daily Report (Eastern Europe) December 8, 1981, G30.

e Data are Polish public's evaluation of performance by PUWP "leadership" and "Central Government" in alleviating the crisis in mid-1981 as gauged by a survey conducted by the Krakow Press Research Center. Responses of "good" and "very good" have been combined. The Party leadership's performance was, then, viewed positively by 7.1%; the "Central Government" received positive evaluations from 19.0%. See McGregor, op. cit., 18. See also the closely related item from Renata Siemienska's data reported in Table XII.

TABLE XIV

Political Behavior by Industrial Workers in State Capitalist and State Socialist Regimes: Mobilized, Conventional and Protest Activity

	Mexico*	Venezuela*	Romania	Poland
I. Mobilized Behavior:				
Total percent pressured to engage in any political act...	6.2%	1.0%	57.5%[a]	g
by union	3.6%	0.2%	N/A	N/A
by politicians (government)	1.0%	0.2%	N/A	N/A
by company	0.8%	0.0%	N/A	N/A
by multiple agents	0.8%	0.6%	N/A	N/A
II. Conventional Behavior:				
A. Percent voting "almost always" or "most times" in national elections	76.0%	75.8%	98.0%[b]	95.0%[h]
B. News Acquisition**				
via television	37.4%	33.8%	50.0%[c]	+60.0%[i]
via newspapers	34.8%	33.5%	16.0%[c]	N/A
C. Political Discussion**				
at home	20.6%	16.6%	N/A	N/A
at work	20.0%	9.9%	N/A	N/A
in organizations	10.8%	12.0%	29.0%[d]	N/A
D. Attend Political Meetings or Rallies*	17.2%	7.7%	N/A	25%[j]
E. Campaign Activity**	9.6%	6.9%	N/A	25%
III. Protest Activity:				
A. Claim Willing to Engage in	42.4%	61.8%	60-80%[e]	69-89.0%[k]
B. Have participated in strike or public protest demonstration	2.6%	6.6%	<2.0%[f]	65.8%[l]

C. Have signed protest letter published in newspaper protest	0.8%	4.8%	N/A	N/A

* "Structural Determinants Study, 1979-1980."

** Percent claiming to engage in activity "very frequently" or "regularly."

a Mariana Sirbu, "Conştiinţa Politică şi Procesul integrarii în Munca" in C. Potinga and V. Popescu, eds., op. cit., 43. Trade union only members who "participate in initiating activities for the general assembly of enterprises only when "asked" or "when obligated". "No response" rate was 27.8%.

b Data from 1980 Grand National Assembly elections in Romania. See Scînteia (11 March 1980), 1.

c Data are from Pavel Campeanu, Radio Televiziune Public (Bucharest: Editura Stiintifică, 1972), 134. Question to a national public sample asked where respondents learned about 1970 floods. More recent data, from a sample of 2600 workers, confirmed that television is the principal information source for Romanian workers. See Argentina Firuta, "Schimbari în Modul de Viata al Clasei Muncitoare," Viitorul Social 7, No. 1 (January-March, 1978), 77.

d Percentage reported is the mean of workers from towns, suburbs and villages who indicated that their "preference" in leisure time was to attend "lectures", by which is meant principally political topics (world events, for example). Such lectures are planned around the workplace or other organizations. See Firuta, op. cit.

e Authors' estimate for Romanian mining industry based upon non-scientific sample in 1978.

f Authors' estimate based upon size of workforce in industries where strikes and/or temporary stoppages have been reported since the mid-1970s.

g Although we can report no exact data, we estimate from about two-thirds of workers think they have no influence on what happens in Poland while 80-90% of Poles agreed with principles connoting greater democracy and freedom regarding political acts. We think it reasonable to conclude that a very high proportion of working-class Poles, then, would sense "pressure" to engage in political acts.

h Data from 1976 Sejm (national parliament) elections are reported in Polityka (3 April 1976), 4. See also Radio Free Europe, Polish Situation Report (26 March 1976) concerning lower voter turnout in locales such as Gdansk.

i Authors' estimate based upon ratio of TV/radio usage to reading in public sample reported in Maurice Simon and Christine Sadowski, "Attitudes Toward Participation in the Polish Political Culture", paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, New York, September, 1978, 33. Eighty-ninety

percent of unskilled and skilled workers possess televisions. See Nowak, op. cit

j Renata Ziemienska, op. cit., 21, reporting data on research in medium-sized Polish towns where public interviews were conducted; percentage is that part of population who had attended "election meetings."

k The higher estimate is from a survey of Solidarity members who supported strike activity in Gdansk and other coastal areas which brought the PUWP government into direct negotiations with workers. Support for strikes generally declined from this level during 1981. See McGregor, op. cit., 14 citing OBOP data. The lower estimate reflects such later measurements as reported by Siemienska, op. cit., 22.

l Data from Polityka (13 September 1980), N=500, stratified such that one of four groups consisted almost entirely of industrial workers who lacked complete secondary education. Data reported here are for this group, apparently in response to the question "Did you participate in recent strikes?" See Siemienska's data regarding increasing willingness to engage in protest of some kind, op. cit., 22-23.

FOOTNOTES

1. With regard to the concepts of parochial and subject roles, we follow Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963). However, in terms of more autonomous participant roles, the Civic Culture approach is inadequate. At a minimum, we suggest the need to distinguish between participation which accepts the general contours of the allocative principles preferred by political elites of the existing system, and participation which challenges the allocative principles preferred by system elites. See, for example, Ronald Inglehart, "Changing Paradigms in Comparative Political Behavior", paper presented at 1982 Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, Denver, September: 12-15.

2. See the cases identified in Chapter 2 of Gary Bertsch, Robert Clark and David Wood, Comparing Political Systems: Power and Policy in Three Worlds, second edition, (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1982).

3. See James Malloy, "Generation of Political Support and Allocation of Costs," in Carmelo Mesa-Lago, ed., Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Presss, 1970), 27.

4. Ibid.

5. For evidence on the neglect of Third World and East European polities, see Lee Sigelman and George Gadbois, Jr., "Contemporary Comparative Politics: An Inventory and Assessment," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (October 1983), 275-305.

6. The quantitative data from Eastern Europe come from a variety of survey sources, all secondary in nature and, therefore, not subject to further analysis. However, Daniel Nelson has conducted research on numerous occasions in both Romania and Poland, and is in a position to offer qualitative

FOOTNOTES

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6. The quantitative data from Eastern Europe come from a variety of survey sources, all secondary in nature and, therefore, not subject to further analysis. However, Daniel Nelson has conducted research on numerous occasions in both Romania and Poland, and is in a position to offer qualitative

judgments to complement the survey data. The data on Mexico and Venezuela come from surveys conducted in both countries between November of 1979 and February of 1980 under the terms of National Science Foundation Grant SES 79-01748 to Kenneth M. Coleman, Principal Investigator; Charles L. Davis (University of Kentucky Center at Ft. Knox), Co-Principal Investigator; Francisco Zapata (El Colegio de México), Mexican Study Director; Oly Lozada de Izcaray (Fundación para el desarrollo de la región centro-occidental), Venezuelan Study Director. The sampling design for the Latin American studies was to insure that variation along certain structural dimensions was guaranteed, such that in each country there would be roughly 100 cases in each of five categories: (1) non-unionized workers in non-strategic industries; (2) members of "state-controlled" or "incorporated" unions in non-strategic industries; (3) members of "incorporated" unions in strategic industries; (4) members of"autonomous" unions in non-strategic industries, and (5) members of "autonomous" unions in strategic industries. No claim has ever been made that these samples are "representative national samples." Rather, the goal in sampling was to guarantee variation in the types of structural settings to which workers were exposed. What <u>can</u> be said about the two Latin American samples is that they are highly comparable samples; hence, observed variations in results can be attributed to variations in national context and not to variant sampling procedures across countries. In all tables, the Latin American data will be labeled as coming from the "Structural Determinants Study, 1979-1980."

7. To some extent, we cannot avoid the issue of the degree to which discontent has its origins in the structural features of the economy. For example, the "meaning" of industrial employment to workers, as will be discussed below, will vary with its availability. Hence, the degree of

satisfaction expressed with similar jobs may be a function of location in different structures of employment which present different possibilities to workers. In Eastern European state socialist regimes, a higher percentage of the workforce is employed in industry than in Latin American state capitalist settings. For example, in 1979 the World Bank estimated that 39% of the Polish workforce was employed in industry, versus only 26% in Mexico and 27% in Venezuela. (Data on Romania were not included in the World Bank report.) In both the Latin American cases, service sector employment was high, 37% in Mexico and fully 54% of the economically active workforce in Venezuela, versus only 30% in Poland. These data reflected the tremendous pressure to produce employment for a rapidly growing workforce in Latin America, where in the 1970s the average yearly growth of the workforce was beteen 3.0% (Mexico) and 4.0% (Venezuela), vs. only 1.5% in Poland. Hence, the sheer rarity of industrial employment may make it somewhat more attractive in certain environments. We shall touch upon this point below, esp. pp. 4-8 and note 24. Data source for this footnote: World Bank, World Development Report 1981 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 170-171.

8. Details are provided in Table 1 of the unabridged version of this paper presented initially at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, September 2-5.

9. The one glaring exception to this generalization is the 40.3% of Venezuelan workers who confess that they "have to force themselves to go to work." A team of Israeli economists, led by Meir Merhav, recently prepared an exhaustive critique of national development efforts in Venezuela which argues that malnutrition is the origin of apparent "labor indiscipline:"

> "The biological/nutritional truth is that the average Venezuelan must economize his physical effort, and this affects 45% of the

national population... A state of acceptable nutrition is not present. The current generation of workers is not even physically adapted to the requirements of the modern industrial apparatus that Venezuela is trying to develop."

Cited in Joseph Mann, "Merhav's Venezuela: Poor Little Rich Country," Business Venezuela, July-August 1980, 35.

10. Zissu Weintraub, "Indicatori Motivationali ai Integrarii Profesionale", in Ovidiu Badina and Catalin Mamali, eds., Tineret Industrial (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1973), 101.

11. Michal Pohoski, et.al., "Occupational Prestige in Poland, 1958-1975", The Polish Sociological Bulletin, No. 4, 1976, 63-77.

12. Research by Wacław Makarczyk, 1975, reported by Maurice Simon,"Social Change and Political Tensions in Gierek's Poland," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Washington, D.C., 1981, 4-5.

13. Data on housing and on the extent to which desire for housing is a salient aspiration among young Poles can be found in Adam Andrzejewski, "Role Mieszkania i Polituki Mieszkaniowej w procesie Rozwoju Społeczno-Gospodarczego," in Społeczne Aspekty Rozwoju Gospodarczego (Warsaw: PWN, 1974), 188-191. See also Bronislaw Golebiowski, "Aspiracje i Orientacje Zyciowe Młodziezy," in Przekazy i Opinie, No. 1 (January-March, 1976), 13; and Renata Siemienska, "Mass-Authority Relationships in the Polish Crisis," paper presented at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, September 2-5, 1982, 19.

14. Stefan Nowak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People," Scientific American, Vol. 245, No. 1 (July 1981), 50

15. Jacek Kurczewski, "What the Polls are Saying," Polish Persepctives, Vol. 24 (1981), 25.

16. Kurczewski, op.cit., as cited by James P. McGregor, "Polish Public Moods in a Time of Crisis," paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, March 1982, 9. See also Siemienska, op.cit., 19.

17. Jacek Poprzeczko and Tomasz Sypniewski, "Stoczniowcy 81," Zycie Warszawy, date unknown, cited in McGregor, op.cit., 8.

18. See Harley L. Browning and Bryan R. Roberts, "Urbanization, Sectoral Transformation and the Utiliziation of Labor in Latin America," Comparative Urban Research, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1980), 86-103.

19. For a provocative interpretation of how and why service sector job creation in "peripheral" or "semi-pheripheral" economies can serve the needs of international capital accumulation, see Alejandro Portes and John Walton, Labor, Class and the International System (New York: Academic Press 1981), 67-106. For detailed statistics regarding such employment trends, see World Bank, Poverty and Human Development (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 74.

20. See Siemienska, op.cit., 19.

21. Marvin Jackson, "Perspectives on Romania's Economic Development in the 1980s," in Daniel N. Nelson, ed., Romania in the 1980s (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 257.

22. See, for example Katarzyna Gruber, "Czynniki społeczne wpływajace na wybor zawodu i realizac zamierzen zawodowych młodziezy" (Factors Influencing Occupational Choice and Realization of Occupational Aspirations"), Zeszyty Badania Rejonow Uprzemysławianych 26 (1967), 37-82.

23. See unabridged version of this paper, presented at 1982 Annual Meeting of APSA, Denver. Table III, data from Mexico and Venezuela.

24. The industrial expansion of East Europe may have been only slightly more rapid than that of Mexico, but was undertaken in the context of slower population growth rates.

25. The slightly more negative assessments of workers in Venezuela may surprise non-Latin Americanists who might be inclined to think that workers would be especially well paid in petroleum-rich Venezuela. In fact, these affective assessments correspond rather closely to the underlying distributional reality. Both the results of Structural Determinants Study and of other recent studies suggest that real wages are slightly higher in Mexico than in Venezuela, although nominal wages are greater in the latter. See Jorge Salazar-Carrillo, Estructura de los salarios industriales en America Latina (Buenos Aires: Ediciones, Siap, 1979).

26. We would expect, however, that levels of dissatisfaction would have increased from 1979 through 1982 as Romania's economic downturn had an impact on workers' buying power, a phenomenon also occurring in Venezuela and Mexico.

27. Even in a socialist system such as Hungary, where many market principles are allowed to operate, workers see little opportunity to play a role in job-related decision-making. See Csaba Maklo and L. Hethy, "Worker Participation and the Socialist Enterprise: A Hungarian Case Study," in C. Cooper and E. Mumford, eds., The Quality of Working Life in Western and Eastern Europe (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1979), 296-326.

28. Nearly 33% of Mexican workers would like to change jobs within the company, while another 30% would like to open their own business. The comparable figures are 18.5% and 11.8% in Venezuela. The 30% of the Mexican

workers who would wish to open their own business, for example, may be a good indicator of the belief that one's condition as a worker is merely transient.

29. Roman Cresin, "Aspect Privind Mobilitatea şi Fluctuaţia profesională a Tinerilor," in Tineret Industrial, eds., Ovidiu Badina and Catalin Mamali (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1973), 27.

30. As reported in mid-1970s survey at the Combinatului Chimic din Fagaraş, a large chemical plant, in central Romania. Reported in Nicolae Radulescu, Forta de Muncă Stabilitate-Mobilitate (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1977), 40-41.

31. One such study is Andrzej Balicki, Stabiliność kadr pracowinczych (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1975).

32. Elizabeth Jelin's work sensitizes students of working class politicization to the fact that sudden outbursts of spontaneously-expressed discontent are quite possible amongst the industrial workers of the more advanced state-capitalist regimes. Examining cases of rapidly escalating protest in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, Jelin warns of the danger of forecasting any long-term evolution of working class attitudes from occasional snapshot surveys of the views of workers. Circumstances can occur in which the emerge of class-conscious militance amongst workers will occur in a disjunctive, non-linear fashion. See Jelin, La protesta obrera (Buenos Aires: Editorial Nueva Visión, 1974), and Jelin, "Orientaciones e ideologías obreras en América Latina", in Rubén Katzman and José Luis Reyna, eds., Fuerza de trabajo y movimientos laborales en América Latina (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, 1979).

33. Venezuelan workers might acquire the opportunity to exhibit similar disaffection if the 1980 proposal of the Confederación de Trabajadores Venezolanos for "co-gestion" were to be implemented. For a discussion of the

proposal and the expression of doubts see Jose Ignacio Arriega A., "Unidad, participación y cogestión," Sic., No. 429 (November 1980), 389-392. One author sees the Venezuelan proposal as being strongly influenced by the West German model and reflective of the increased financial power of the CTV. See Hector Lucena," ¿Porqué la CTV propone la cogestión?," Revista Relaciones de Trabajo, Vol. 1, No. 1, (November 1981), Universidad de Carabobo (Venezuela). For a useful conceptual distinction between "worker's participation as system transformative action" vs. "worker's participation as integrative action which reinforces existing structures" see Evelyne Huber Stephens, The Politics of Workers' Participation: The Peruvian Approach in Comparative Perspective (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 4-5 and passim. Lucena interprets the Venezuelan proposal as "system integrative action."

34. Given post-1980 economic slowdowns, we would judge workers in both countries to be somewhat more dissatisfied at the time of this writing.

35. See Jan Malanowski, Stosunkiklasowe i roznice społenczne v miescie (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1967), 254-265.

36. Ibid., 297-302.

37. See Daniel N. Nelson, "Romania: Participatory Dynamics in 'Developed Socialism'," in Jan F. Triska and Charles Gati, eds., Blue Collar Workers in Eastern Europe (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), 246-247. The extent to which the evidence from miners can be taken as evidence for all workers is suspect, however, for reasons first articulated by Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, "The Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike: An International Comparison," in William Kornhauser, et al., eds., Industrial Conflict (New York: McGraw Hill, 1954).

38. Thirty-three percent of unionized workers reported repression by the government in Mexico, only 3% did so in Venezuela. See unabridged version, Table XII in Coleman and Nelson, 1982 APSA paper.

39. We are mindful that one man's "repression" may well be another man's "reinstitution of law and order." However, the very subjectivity of judgments is relevant to the concept under discussion. Class consciousness implies the propensity to interpret ambiguous situations in terms of social class referents, as the notion of repression of union activity does implicitly.

40. See Radio Free Europe Research, Situation Report: Romania (March 19, 1979), 18-22. Also see Daniel N. Nelson, "Worker-party Conflict in Romania," Problems of Communism (September-October 1981), 48.

41. Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, "Lad społeczny--Jaki?," Zycie Gospodarc (May 10, 1981), 7, as cited in James P. McGregor, "Polish Public Moods in a Time of Crisis," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Cincinnati, March, 1982, 12.

42. See Table XIII, unabridged version.

43. Our Latin American data suggest, for example, that Venezuelan workers are quite dissatisfied with the outputs of the political system, but supportive of the idea of competitive elections. Hence, the Venezuelan workers might not regret the passing of a capitalist order, if such a passing could be coupled with the maintenance of bourgeois electoral procedures. See Kenneth M. Coleman, Charles L. Davis, Fausto Izcaray and Oly Lozada de Izcaray, "Inequality, Working Class Acquiescence and Democratic Regime Consolidation: The Venezuelan Experience," paper delivered at 1982 World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

44. McGregor, op.cit., 13.

45. Nowak, op.cit., esp. 49. See as well Jack Bielasiak, "Inequalities and the Politicization of the Polish Working Class," in Daniel N. Nelson, ed., Communism and the Politics of Inequalities (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1982).

46. Ion Petrescu, Psihosociologis Conducerii Colective a Intreprinderii Industriale (Craiova: Scrisul Romanesc, 1977), 111-117, especially data on 110.

47. Here we follow, loosely, the conceptual lead of Alejandro Portes, who introduced the concept of "structure blame" to indicate attribution of moral responsibility for unsatisfactory conditions to man-made social structures which could be changed, rather than to one's own imperfections, to fate, to the deity, or to alternative causal agents.

48. See A. Witalec, "Organizacja partyjna pomocnikiem i inspiratorem swiazkowe go dzialania," in Prezegład Zwiazkowy, No. 12 (1978).

49. See, inter alia, Peter Evans and Gary Gereffi, "Foreign Investment and Dependent Development: Comparing Brazil and Mexico," pp. 111-168 in Sylvia Ann Hewlett and Richard S. Weinert, eds., Brazil and Mexico: Patterns in Late Development (Philadelphia: ISHI Publications); and Juan Pablo Perez Sainz and Paul Zarembka, "Accumulation and the State in Venezuelan Industrialization," Latin American Perspectives, Vol. VI, No. 3 (Summer 1979), 3-28.

50. One example is the marvelously vague provision of the Mexican labor code that refers to "maintaining a proper balance between labor and capital." For an excellent overview of two cases in which "labor's subordinate position is the result of policies designed by governing elites to establish political control over the working class" see Kenneth Paul Erickson and Kevin J. Middlebrook, "The State and Organized Labor in Brazil and Mexico," pp. 213-263 in Hewlett and Weinert, op.cit.

51. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?," Review of Politics, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1974), 85-131.

52. Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating "Corporatism'" American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 4 (December 1979), 967-986.

53. It was openly political in the sense of advocating a different allocation of values within Polish society.

54. See his "Theses on the Syncretic Society," Theory and Society, Vol. 9 (1980), 249.

55. George Kolankowicz, "Poland, 1980: The Working Class Under 'Anomic Socialism'", p. 146 in Jan Triska and Charles Gati, eds., Blue Collar Workers in Eastern Europe (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981).

56. As indicated above, however, our Latin American samples contain 200 workers in unions that might be presumed to enjoy a measure of autonomy from the state. In the Mexican case, these are unions affiliated with the Frente Auténtico de Trabajo and the Unidad Obrera Independiente.

57. See Latin American Weekly Report (1982, No. 12, 8-9); Resumen (1981, No. 422, 4-9); and Andreas Boeckh, "Organized Labor and Government Under Conditions of Scarcity: The Case of Venezuela," (unpublished Ph.d dissertation, University of Florida, 1972), 204-211.

58. Mexican workers perceive union meetings to be obligatory and the likelihood of sanctions for non-attendance to be high. These views are based in reality, as has been confirmed in interviews with leaders of the unions samples. Coleman and José González, field notes of May 11, 13-15, 17-18 and 20 of 1981 in Venezuela: Coleman and Francisco Zapata or Ilán Bizberg, field notes of February 24, 27-28, March 3 and 13, 1981 in Mexico.

59. By September of 1980, 10.9% of the shipyard workers thought they had "much influence," which is striking primarily for the fact that the creation of Solidarity changed attitudes so little.

60. The best short treatment of these events can be found in Manuel Camacho, La clase obrera en la historia de México: el futuro immediato (México, D.F.: Siglo XXI and Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México).

61. Mariana Sirbu, "Integrarea în Munca şi Participarea Politică în Procesul Dezvoltarii Conştiinţa Socialiste" in Constantin Potinga and Vasile Popescu, eds., Conştiinţa Socialistă şi Participare Socială (Bucharest: Editura Aademiei, 1977), 42.

62. Coleman and Zapata, field notes of February 27, 1981, on interviews with leaders of Section 24, Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la República Mexicana.

63. For example, 64.5% of Mexican union member respondents vs. 18.5% of comparable Venezuelan respondents said that their union had struck in the time that they had been a member. These estimates probably understate the incidence of strikes (over, say, a ten year period) because of the youth of the labor force sampled.

64. And, even if successful, disputes may emerge among rival factions as to how best to maintain union "independence." On this process in the Mexican automobile industry, see Ian Roxborough, Unions and Politics in Mexico: The Automobile Industry (unpublished manuscript, London: The London School of Economics, 1982).

65. Daniel N. Nelson, "Workers in a Workers' State," Soviet Studies (October 1980), 554-555.

66. In both countries the most commonly cited benefits are collective goods, such as housing projects, access to social security systems and the like (57% cite these in Mexico, 44% in Venezuela).

67. James McGregor, op.cit., 19, citing Tygodnik Solidarnosc (20 November 1981) and the data therein from Mazosze Solidarity'survey of 900 members in September of 1981.

68. Malloy, op.cit., 27.

69. This more favorable evaluation is not a function of public policy outcomes being more favorable to workers in Venezuela. A comparison of real wages for industrial workers across a variety of industries revealed that Venezuelan workers received salaries representing 148% of the average real wage in the 11 member Latin American Free Trade Association, but that the Mexican workers received the highest real wages at 192% of the eleven-country average. Jorge Salazar-Carrillo, op.cit., 138.

70. While some might question the validity of such survey items, public opinion polling in Franco's Spain provided a reasonably accurate picture of relative party strength in the "politically decompressed" post-Franco era. See also Brian H. Smith and Frederick C. Turner, "The Quality of Survey Research in Authoritarian Regimes," paper delivered at 1982 World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

71. See Nelson, "Workers' State," op.cit.

72. The more positive Venezuelan results might be understood in terms of a reaction to the competitive features of the political process in that country. Coleman, et al., "Inequality, Working Class Acquiescence...," op. cit., 27-29.

73. See Nowak, op.cit., 52-53.

74. Protest is autonomous behavior employed by those who have few other means to influence decisions. It is a form of activity that is unlikely to be successful. The Latin American poor understand the limitations of protest and are unlikely to prefer protest as a strategy for political demand-making. See Wayne A. Cornelius, "Urbanization and Political Demand-Making: Political Participants Among the Migrant Poor in Latin American Cities," American Political Science Review, Vol. 68 (1974), 1125-1146. Likewise, Romanian workers understand that their protests may change very little. See Nelson "Workers in a Workers' State," op. cit. Protest, however, challenges the allocative principles employed by decision-makers in a manner unguided by political elites. For an insightful discussion of why protest is so difficult to use successfully, see Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 4 (1968), 1144-1158.

75. The higher incidence of political discussion on the job in Mexico may seem strange. However, personal interviews by Coleman with Venezuelan labor leaders reveal that a conflict-aversion norm has been strongly implanted in recent years. This norm attempts to avoid any partisan bickering that might impair union solidarity. Ironically, the much-lauded political pluralism of the Venezuelan labor movement may contribute materially to the depoliticization of the Venezuelan laborer.

76. Even in Latin America, however, voting and attendance at campaign meetings are activities in which external mobilization can play a major role.

77. We do know that the most frequent reasons for participating in protest activity by workers in both Latin American countries were to express concern over salaries or to demand price controls. Explicitly political protests were more rare.

78. By a 2-1 margin in both countries.

79. Our use of functionalist terminology implies no covert desire for system stasis. We are inclined to believe that the world could do better than to preserve, ad infinitum, the existing state socialist regimes of East Europe or the state capitalist regimes of Latin America.