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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

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INTRODUCTION

It has now been almost six years since Jimmy Carter left office. In this period, the memoirs of almost everyone of the key American participants in Soviet–American relations during the Carter Administration have been published,[1] along with evaluations by Soviet officials,[2] and a major Soviet defector.[3] In addition a number of American scholars have published analyses of the Carter Administration's dealing with the USSR, the most extensive being that of Raymond Garthoff, himself a participant–observer of Soviet–American relations during this period.[4]

Garthoff's central thesis, which has influenced the analyses of other scholars, including Gaddis Smith,[5] is that Jimmy Carter, after initial -- if vacillating -- efforts to improve ties with the USSR, came increasingly under the influence of his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinksi, as the President sought to respond to Soviet activities in the Third World. Garthoff contends that by adopting Brzezinski's confrontational policy, Carter unnecessarily alienated Moscow by too rapidly improving ties with China, unwisely pushing weapons systems like the Pershing II, Cruise and MX missiles, and overreacting to Soviet activities in the Third World from Ethiopia to Afghanistan. Indeed, Garthoff asserts, the U.S. reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was grossly disproportional as the Administration tossed "almost everything movable onto the sacrificial bonfire of sanctions."[6]

Given Garthoff's assertions, along with the memoirs and other literature on Soviet–American relations that have appeared in recent years, it is clearly time for a reappraisal of Soviet–American relations during the Carter Era. What this study seeks to do is to examine Soviet–American relations from the Soviet perspective, seeking to understand how the USSR reacted to Jimmy Carter and how it sought to influence the Soviet–American relationship.

In seeking to determine the Soviet view of the Carter Administration, an analyst must first confront the problem of which Soviet

sources of information to consult. He may examine the writings of Soviet academic and political observers whose analyses appear in such specialized journals as *SShA* (*The United States*) and *Mirovaia Ekonomika in Mezhdunardonye Otnosheniia* (*World Economy and International Relations*). He may also consult the less theoretical articles which appear in Soviet foreign policy journals such as *New Times* and *International Affairs* (both of which are published in English as well as in Russian). Finally he may turn to Radio Moscow (whose broadcasts are translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service) and to the official Soviet Communist Party newspaper *Pravda* which presents the Soviet elite's foreign policy line to both foreigners and to Soviet officialdom. Given the authoritative nature of *Pravda*, and the difficulties of determining the degree of influence on Soviet policymaking possessed by such Soviet "Americanists" (or Americanologists) as Georgi Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada,[7] *Pravda* has been selected as the primary Soviet source for this paper, although both Radio Moscow and the foreign policy journals have also been consulted, particularly when they develop points initially made in *Pravda*, and such Americanists as Arbatov are cited when their views are published in *Pravda*.

The emphasis of this study will be on statements made by Soviet officials in *Pravda* (and by American officials, primarily Jimmy Carter, in public speeches and press conferences) with retrospective analyses such as memoirs, which often portray their authors in the most favorable light, as secondary sources.

With *Pravda* selected as the main source of information on the Soviet elite's world outlook, it is next necessary to examine just what that world outlook is in order to place the Soviet image of the Carter Administration in the proper perspective. In the past few years there have been a growing number of Western analyses of the Soviet view of the world.[8] These have tended to be divided into two general schools of thought, the "defensive" and "offensive" schools; although, naturally, there are many nuances of differences among the observers in each school. Essentially, the "defensive" school sees Soviet foreign policy as

growing out of a deep sense of insecurity, caused by a growing fear of China, the military and economic strength of NATO, memories of the severe losses suffered by the USSR in World War II, the waning influence of Soviet ideology, and a weakening Soviet economy. In the view of these analysts, the central desire of the Soviet political elite, aside from preserving its power within the USSR and ensuring the security of the Soviet Union and its East European empire, is for the Soviet Union to be recognized as the equal of the United States in world affairs and for it to obtain Western technology for its ailing economy. These analysts tend to explain the continuing Soviet conventional and strategic military buildup as an outgrowth of the regime's paranoia about China and its continued fear of a Western threat to the USSR's control over East Europe.[9] They also tend to dismiss the frequent Soviet statements about the "world correlation of forces" changing in the favor of the USSR as rationalization of the need to increase trade with the West or, as Paul Marantz has stated, "a brave attempt at whistling in the dark."[10]

By contrast, the analysts belonging to the school of thought which sees Soviet policy essentially as "offensive" take a far less hopeful view of Soviet goals and policies. They see the Soviet military buildup as nothing less than an attempt to intimidate the West, and they view Soviet talk about the changing "world correlation of forces" -- of which the growth of Soviet military power is a central factor -- as a serious statement of Soviet intentions. These analysts see "detente" as a tactic employed by the Soviet political elite to improve the Soviet Union's international position and to weaken that of the United States, while at the same time enabling the Soviet Union to benefit from U.S. grain and Western technology.[11] For the purpose of this analysis, a somewhat centrist position between the two schools has been chosen by the author, although it is one which leans toward the interpretations of the "offensive" school. It would appear that while the Soviet political elite is clearly concerned about China and Eastern Europe, and wishes to obtain a status of equality with the United States in world affairs, it is also

actively seeking to expand its influence in the Third World and elsewhere, and is increasingly willing to use military measures to achieve this goal, although only in low-risk situations such as Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, where the possibility of a Western military reaction is seen as very unlikely. In addition, while seeking to expand Soviet influence and weaken the American position in the world, the leadership in Moscow appears to be quite serious about seeking to avoid a major conflict with the United States which might lead to a nuclear war. In sum, Soviet policy may be summed up as one of "cautious expansionism," particularly in the Third World which the USSR sees as an open area of "zero sum game" competition with the United States. Indeed as Brezhnev stated in an oft-quoted speech to the 25th CPSU Party Congress in February 1976 (soon after the successful Soviet intervention in Angola), "Our party supports and will continue to support peoples fighting for their freedom."

In addition, in another central point of his speech, while calling for "detente" and mutual concessions on such weapons systems as the B-1 bomber, Brezhnev also spelled out the basic hostility with which the Soviet regime views the capitalist West, a theme which was to pervade Moscow's dealings with the Carter Administration:

> Detente does not in the slightest abolish, nor can it abolish or alter, the laws of the class struggle. No one should expect that because of the detente communists will reconcile themselves with capitalist exploitation or that monopolists will become followers of the revolution . . . We make no secret of the fact that we see detente as the way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction.[12]

* * * * * * *

While following its policy of "cautious expansionism," the Soviet political elite, led by Brezhnev, has had to be concerned about possible American reactions. Although the United States was weakened both

internally and in its world position in the 1970s by Vietnam and Watergate, developments that led to a sapping of the power of the American Presidency, a greater assertiveness on the part of Congress, and a public feeling against committing U.S. troops to battle overseas, Moscow still had three central concerns in dealing with the U.S. at the time Carter assumed the Presidency. In the first place, despite the sizeable Soviet strategic buildup which placed its primary emphasis on "heavy" MIRVed ICBM's, the Soviet military remained worried about a possible American technological advance that would enable the United States to leap ahead of the Soviet Union strategically, much as it had done in the early 1960s.[13] In addition, while the percentage of the American Gross National Product devoted to defense had been dropping since Vietnam, Moscow had to be concerned about a possible reversal of this trend since the American economy, despite its problems, remained about twice the size of that of the USSR, and the gap in such fields as computer technology and automation appeared to be widening.[14] For this reason, it was clearly as much in the interest of the USSR -- if, indeed, not more so -- than it was of the United States to achieve a SALT II agreement as speedily as possible. A second Soviet concern about the United States at the time Carter became President related to China. While Moscow could only have been encouraged by the fact that a rapid rapprochement between Peking (Beijing) and the United States did not occur in the aftermath of Nixon's 1972 visit to China (in part this was due to continued difficulties over the future of Taiwan; in part it was due to the influence of a group of Chinese leaders [later branded as "The Gang of Four"]), there remained the possibility of a Sino-American entente directed against the USSR. While Moscow had sought to prevent this -- *inter alia* -- by a series of summit talks with American leaders (there were four summit meetings between Brezhnev and a U.S. President between 1972 and 1976 to only one between an American President and the top Chinese leadership), and by maintaining the exclusive SALT talks, the Soviet political elite could not be sure that this pattern would continue, particularly in the post-Mao era which, coincidentally, began in September 1976, two months before Carter's election. Finally, despite its

military advances, the Soviet Union remained in need of American technology, and the USSR was becoming partially dependent on American grain sales. Nonetheless, while Soviet-American trade had sharply increased since 1972, it remained primarily in the realm of foodstuffs, since the USSR had repudiated the Soviet-American trade agreement after the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which called for freer emigration of Soviet Jews with no "head tax," and the Stevenson amendment which limited the USSR to $300 million in credits over four years, were added to it, and Moscow was eager to get these restrictions lifted.[15]

While SALT, China, and trade were important Soviet concerns at the time of Carter's inauguration, the Soviet leadership was also cognizant of the fact that the bilateral Soviet-American relationship had deteriorated sharply since the Nixon years. Despite a Brezhnev-Ford meeting at Helsinki in 1975 where the Helsinki Final Act was signed (ironically, this was to lead to increased dissent in Eastern Europe and the USSR rather than to an increased acceptance of Soviet domination over East Europe) and the symbolic Apollo-Soyuz joint space mission, the subsequent Soviet intervention in Angola had chilled relations to the point where President Ford had stated in March 1976 that the word "detente" was no longer in his political vocabulary. In addition, the SALT talks had stagnated, in part because of Angola and in part because of disagreements over the American cruise missile and the Soviet backfire bomber.[16] At the same time, the United States had called off three Soviet-American cabinet level meetings, and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had announced that he would no longer either urge Congress to lift the trade restrictions it had voted against the USSR or support multi-billion dollar investments in the USSR to develop Soviet oil and natural gas deposits.[17]

Another area of Soviet-American conflict lay in the Middle East. While the U.S. had suffered losses in Africa and Asia in the mid-1970s, it had met with considerably more success in the Middle East where not only had the United States replaced the Soviet Union as the dominant foreign influence in Egypt, the Arab world's most populous state, it had also dominated the Middle East peacekeeping process which had been

initiated by Kissinger in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war. Indeed, Soviet influence in the region, which had reached a high point during the war dropped sharply and Moscow was reduced to the point where it could only call from the diplomatic sidelines for a resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference, where, as co-chairman, it could hope to rebuild its waning influence in the Middle East.[18]

In sum, therefore, as the Carter Administration prepared to take office, Moscow was anxious to improve relations for a number of reasons including the reinvigoration of the SALT process, the lifting of U.S. trade restrictions, the continued prevention of a Sino-American entente and the reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference.

Consequently, once the election campaign was over (the USSR attributed a large part of the cooling off of Soviet-American relations to campaign pressures), the Soviet leadership set about sending signals to the incoming Carter Administration that it was interested in improved relations and would look forward to Soviet-American cooperation in many areas. A major signal to the Carter Administration came during the meeting of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council at the end of November 1976, when Brezhnev appealed for an end to the "freeze" on the strategic arms discussions and for a new agreement based on the Vladivostok accord. He also used the opportunity to call for an end to U.S. trade discrimination against the USSR, stating that U.S. firms lost between $1.5 and $2 billion because of it.[19] Two weeks later *Pravda* published a major article by Georgi Arbatov evaluating the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. After criticizing the "enemies of detente" (Soviet specialists like Arbatov tended to speak of "two tendencies" in the U.S., one of "realists" who seek cooperation with the USSR, and the other of cold-war "confrontationists"), Arbatov praised President-elect Carter's "positive" statements about improving Soviet-American relations and seeking ways to limit arms. Arbatov then went on to call for the resumption of the Geneva Middle East peace conference as quickly as possible.[20] Next, on December 28th, *Pravda* praised Carter's appointment of Cyrus Vance to the post of Secretary of State (Moscow

was clearly less happy with the appointment of Zbigniew Brzezinski as National Security Advisor), although not without reservations. Several days later Brezhnev gave an interview to a U.S. correspondent in which he said that a strategic arms agreement would be the most important step the United States and the USSR could take to strengthen their relations, and he hailed President-elect Carter for statements expressing a similar interest.[21] A more concrete signal came in the last two months of 1976 when there was a sharp increase in the number of Soviet Jews allowed to leave the Soviet Union.[22] The most important Soviet signal, however, came the day before Carter's inauguration when Brezhnev, in a speech in Tula, noted that the SALT I agreement would expire in October 1977 and appealed for the "consolidation" of the Vladivostok accord and for a resumption of the Geneva Middle East peace conference.[23]

Nonetheless, in evaluating Jimmy Carter's performance in the election campaign and in the post-election period before he took office, Moscow may have had some mixed feelings. On the one hand Carter had called for a more aggressive effort to achieve a SALT agreement and for a $5-7 billion cut in defense spending, and these sentiments must have been welcome in Moscow. In addition, he called for the gradual withdrawal of all U.S. ground forces from Korea, and this too must have been greeted warmly by Moscow as yet another example of "the retreat of American power." On the other hand, however, Carter had strongly emphasized human rights during the campaign and had followed up his words with a telegram of support to Soviet dissident Vladimir Slepak after the election. Carter's emphasis on human rights, perhaps to the surprise of the Soviets, was to accelerate after he became President and was to lead to a major clash with Moscow within a month of his taking office.

In seeking to understand the violent Soviet reaction to Carter's championing of human rights, there are two major factors to take into account. On the one hand, as Adam Ulam has noted, the Soviet political elite tends to be "power hypochondriacs," seeing in the demands of the Soviet dissidents a threat to their power position, however remote.[24]

Secondly, one might view the Soviet reaction to the human rights campaign as a test of wills with Carter. After all, the Soviets had not only signed the Helsinki Final Act, but had also disseminated it publicly. By harassing and arresting those Soviet citizens seeking to monitor compliance with the "basket three" provisions of Helsinki, the Soviets were, in effect, challenging the Western nations who had signed the agreement to see whether, or not, they gave anything more than mere lip-service to the ideals contained in the document.

The attack on Carter for his human rights stand came soon after Carter's inauguration speech which was positively received in Moscow as "restrained and modest."[25] It was precipitated by a formal declaration by the U.S. State Department which stated that by trying to intimidate Andrei Sakharov, the most prominent of the Soviet dissidents, the USSR was violating the principles of human rights.[26] While, initially, Moscow sought to separate its criticism of the State Department from a continuing positive treatment of Jimmy Carter, this ploy ceased after Carter endorsed the State Department action.[27] Perhaps as a response, the Soviet Union then arrested another key Soviet dissident, Aleksandr Ginsburg and expelled an AP journalist, George Krimsky.[28] These Soviet actions brought several questions to Carter at a news conference on February 8th as to whether he thought that the USSR was testing him by making the two moves, and whether he was concerned that his speaking out on human rights might jeopardize the American relationship with the USSR on other matters. Carter replied that he did not interpret the Soviet actions as a form of testing, and that he rejected the concept of linkage between human rights and other issues. Carter's reply on this topic is worth quoting in full:

> This brings up the question that is referred to as linkage. I think we come out better in dealing with the USSR if I am consistently and completely dedicated to the enhancement of human rights, not only as it deals with the Soviet Union but all other countries. *I think this can legitimately be severed from our inclinations to work with the Soviet Union, for*

instance, in reducing dependence on atomic weapons and also seeking mutually balanced force reduction in Europe.[29]

(emphasis mine)

If Carter felt that he could sever the human rights issue from the SALT talks, Moscow was to take a different position. Indeed, only two days later, Yuri Orlov, head of the Soviet Helsinki Monitoring Committee was arrested and two days after that, on February 12th, a *Pravda* editorial blasted the human rights campaign, citing Brezhnev to reinforce its view that such U.S. actions impeded detente, and amounted to attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the socialist countries. At this point, however, Carter did not appear deterred by the *Pravda* statement, for two weeks later he personally met with Vladimir Bukovsky, a leading Soviet dissident who had been allowed to emigrate from the USSR as part of a trade for Chilean Communist leader Louis Corvalan. This Presidential action (which contrasted with President Ford's refusal to meet Aleksander Solzhenitsyn in 1975 "lest it harm detente"[30]) was bitterly criticized in the Soviet press and precipitated a series of personal attacks on President Carter. These included an article in *Pravda* on March 13th which deprecated the American President's assertion that it would be possible to separate detente and talks on reducing strategic arms from "attempts to interfere in our internal affairs under the false flag of 'defending human rights'." Brezhnev himself leveled the strongest attack in his Trade Union speech of March 22nd in which he attributed the continued stagnation in Soviet–American relations to the Carter Administration and blasted its human rights campaign, stating "We shall not tolerate interference in our internal affairs by anyone, under any pretext. The normal development of relations on such a basis is, of course, unthinkable." While attacking the U.S. on human rights, Brezhnev did state that the USSR was still interested in pursuing cooperation with the United States in the areas of limiting strategic arms and chemical and bacteriological warfare, developing trade (if the U.S. removed its discriminatory trade barriers), and a peace settlement in the Middle East. On the latter issue, Brezhnev presented the most detailed and moderate

Soviet peace plan to date, although one that was still unacceptable to both Israel and the United States because it did not include an insistence on the establishment of diplomatic, economic and cultural relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors once a peace treaty was signed.[31]

Interestingly enough when asked in a news conference about Brezhnev's remarks, Carter replied that he considered the speech to be "very constructive."[32] This statement by Mr. Carter illustrated what might be termed either as an overly optimistic view of the world or more likely, a case of naivete.[33] Whatever it might be called, this attitude was increasingly evident in the Administration's view of the USSR until, as Mr. Carter himself admitted, the invasion of Afghanistan served to shock the Administration, or at least the President, into a new outlook.

In light of the Soviet threats about linking U.S. human rights policy to the SALT talks, the Carter Administration might well have waited a bit before pursuing the strategic arms talks with the USSR. Nonetheless, less than a week after Brezhnev's speech, Secretary of State Vance went to Moscow with the Carter Administration's multiple SALT plans. In taking this action, which actually was a protocol mistake since it was Gromyko's duty to come to Washington to meet the new American leadership, President Carter may well have signalled to the Russians an overeagerness to achieve a SALT agreement, yet another problem that was to weaken the U.S. bargaining position vis-a-vis the USSR over the next three years. In any case, by publicly announcing his SALT proposals before Vance left, one of which called for a major cut in strategic weapons on both sides, he had doomed the plans. In the first place, the Soviet leaders were used to the quiet "back channel" methods of Kissinger, and were undoubtedly surprised by Carter's public methods. Secondly, given the influence of the Soviet "military-industrial complex" on Soviet policy, it was highly unlikely that Brezhnev would immediately agree to the major cuts that Carter had proposed -- particularly when he had done so publicly, and when they appeared to weigh more heavily on the USSR.[34] Interestingly enough, however, not only did the Soviet leaders reject the Carter SALT program, they did so in a way that appeared aimed at

publicly insulting -- if not intimidating -- Carter. Thus not only were there extensive articles in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* denouncing the U.S. SALT position,[35] but Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called a rare press conference in which he attacked both the SALT proposals and the human rights policy of the Administration, stating that the latter poisoned the atmosphere and was an impediment to the resolution of other issues between the USSR and the U.S., including strategic arms.[36] As far as the U.S. SALT program was concerned, he attacked the effort of the United States to include the backfire bomber in the agreement, and also the sharp cuts the U.S. was seeking in "heavy" MIRVed missiles as an attempt at seeking "unilateral advantage." He also called for a ban on the U.S. B-1 bomber and the Trident submarine (two forthcoming weapons in the U.S. arsenal) and threatened to "toughen" the Soviet position by once again bringing up the matter of forward based U.S. nuclear delivery systems (FBS) in future SALT discussions. He did, however, hold out hope for improved Soviet-U.S. relations, but only if the U.S. changed its policies:

> We would like to express the hope that the leadership of the United States will adopt a more realistic position, that it will give greater consideration to the security interests of the Soviet Union and its allies and will not seek to obtain unilateral advantages.

Gromyko's use of the term "realistic" is a particularly interesting one, since that is the term used by the Soviet media to refer to Western statesmen who recognize that the "correlation of forces" is shifting against the West and "adjust" their policies accordingly. This theme of the Carter Administration's "lack of realism" was to be continued in the Soviet media, despite the Vance-Gromyko meeting in Geneva in May which President Carter was to characterize in his normally optimistic way as "upbeat,"[37] and *Pravda* on June 19th even went so far as to claim that "even the bourgeois press" of the United States had "noted with increasing frequency the lack of requisite realism" in the American Administration's approach to international affairs. At this point, however, Carter began to "adjust" American policies to better meet Soviet

sensibilities. Thus, for example, unlike his well-publicized meeting with Vladimir Bukovsky,[38] he publicly stated that he would not meet the wife of prominent Soviet dissident Anatoly Shcharansky who was then touring the United States, although he took pains to point out in his news conference of June 13th that Shcharansky never had any sort of relationship with the CIA as the USSR had charged.[39] Even more to the USSR's liking, however, must have been Carter's decision on June 30th to discontinue plans for production of the B-1 bomber. This was, to put it mildly, a unilateral gift to Moscow since Brezhnev in his speech to the 25th Party Congress had spoken of mutual concessions on such weapons systems as the B-1. Even Cyrus Vance, one of the Administration's leading doves, in retrospect noted in his memoirs that the U.S. might have sought some concessions from the USSR in SALT negotiations in return for cancelling the B-1.[40] It may well be that Moscow, having demanded that the U.S. show "more realism" in its policies, seemed satisfied at the result of its policy of intimidation -- particularly since Gromyko in his April 1st press conference had called for a ban on the B-1 bomber. Nonetheless, as if to press the Soviet advantage, the B-1 decision was dismissed as essentially a propaganda trick (the Soviet media noted that research on the weapon would continue), and the Administration was now intensely attacked for its plan to develop the neutron bomb and MX missile, thereby "moving toward a new upward spiral in the arms race."[41]

It was perhaps to correct what he saw as a continued Soviet misperception of American policy (at a news conference on July 12th, Carter stated that he did not know how to explain the unfriendly rhetoric coming out of the USSR against him - yet another almost classic case of naivete) that President Carter gave a major address at Charleston, South Carolina on July 21, 1977 in which he dealt extensively with Soviet-American relations.[42] Carter made three central points in this speech. In the first place, he called for enlarging the areas of cooperation between the USSR and the U.S. "on a basis of equality and mutual respect." The areas he mentioned included SALT, arms limitation in the Indian Ocean, and

peace in the Middle East. In discussing the latter area, Carter remarked "we have begun regular consultations with the Soviet leaders, as co-chairmen of the prospective Geneva Conference, to promote peace in the Middle East." Carter also called for increased trade and referred warmly to Brezhnev (this was in sharp contrast to the continuing Soviet attacks on himself), even quoting from one of the Soviet leader's speeches which Carter called "sincere." Carter also stated, as he had done many times before, that the U.S. advocacy of human rights was not an attack on Soviet vital interests. Finally, he outlined the overall strategy of the Carter Administration toward the USSR by stating that he wanted to see the USSR "further engaged in the growing pattern of international activities designed to deal with human problems -- not only because they can be of real help, but because we both should be seeking a greater stake in the creation of a constructive and peaceful world order."

This speech may have been seen in Moscow as yet another example of the eagerness of the Carter Administration to have good relations with the USSR. Not only had Carter emphasized such terms as the USSR's "vital interests" and "mutual respect" (areas which Moscow had claimed Carter had violated with his human rights and SALT policies), he also offered cooperation in the areas most important to the USSR and appeared to grant the USSR equality in dealing with key world problems including the Middle East. In making this speech, Carter seemed to place himself in the school of those analysts, mentioned above, who saw Soviet policy as essentially defensive in nature and he therefore sought to meet Soviet sensibilities. Unfortunately, while his policies might have borne fruit if in fact the USSR was to be defensively inclined, a more offensively inclined Soviet Union was to take advantage of them as was to prove to be the case over the next two years. Indeed while Carter's Charleston speech reflected his hopes of diminishing Soviet competition with the United States throughout the world, and getting the Soviet Union to aid the United States in solving the very serious problems in the Third World, his basic assumption was incorrect. He appeared to assume that Moscow could be persuaded to give up its plans to encourage and

support anti-Western movements in the Third World and instead cooperate in solving problems such as hunger, disease and war. Moscow, looking at the Third World as a region of active competition with the United States (a competition that was in some areas zero-sum-game), was not slow in exploiting Carter's naive view although ultimately this was going to cause a crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations.

The initial Soviet response to the Charleston speech was mixed,[43] and Georgi Arbatov writing in *Pravda* a week later appeared to give the official Soviet response to it.[44] Although he attacked the Administration for worsening the political atmosphere and for not lifting the "artificial barriers it created in the way of developing mutually advantageous cooperation," Arbatov stated that "some of what Carter said in his Charleston speech can be seen as positive." He quickly qualified even this gesture, however, by then attacking the Carter Administration for its decision to deploy cruise missiles and create a neutron bomb. Interestingly enough, Arbatov also deemed it necessary to reject the "fabrication" that the USSR is more interested in detente and in economic ties with the West than the West with it (the frequent repetition of this theme in the Soviet press would appear to indicate Soviet sensitivity on this issue). Arbatov ended on a positive note, however, stating that it was still possible to develop improved relations, but warned that "unlike disputes, peace and good relations require willingness and realistic efforts on both sides."

The first area, it would appear, in which the Carter Administration was to demonstrate its "realism" -- by making concessions to the USSR -- was the Middle East. As mentioned above, the U.S. had dominated Middle East diplomacy since 1973, but the Carter Administration was now moving away from Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy toward the convening of the Geneva Conference, thereby moving to meet one of the central Soviet demands. In an effort to prepare the diplomatic path toward the reconvening of Geneva, Secretary of State Vance set out for a trip around the Middle East in early August. Prior to departing, he stated that he had been in contact with the Soviet leaders about his trip

and they had indicated a willingness to "use their influence" with some of the parties to "encourage flexibility."[45] This, unfortunately, was to be yet another over-optimistic evaluation of Soviet politics. The Soviet media openly deprecated Vance's efforts during his trip[46] and Palestinian leader Zuheir Mohsen later stated that he had been told by the Russians at the time "not to have any trust in American promises."[47] In any case, Vance's trip proved to be a failure and the Carter Administration evidently decided that, by itself, it could not arrange the Geneva Conference because of Syrian and PLO opposition. Consequently, it decided that Soviet assistance was required and at the end of September, it negotiated a joint statement with the USSR on the Middle East which was released on October 1st and which called, *inter alia*, for the convening of the Geneva Conference by December 1977.[48] In making this move, which brought the USSR back into the heart of the Middle East peacemaking process for the first time since 1973, the Carter Administration made two fundamental judgmental errors. In the first place, it assumed that the USSR had enough influence over Syria and the PLO to get them to agree to a peace settlement which they opposed. The lack of success of Soviet policy during the Lebanese civil war of 1975-76, however, should have indicated to the Carter Administration how limited Soviet influence was with its Syrian and Palestinian clients.[49] A second mistaken assumption appeared to be that the USSR would be in favor of the type of peace settlement favored by the Carter Administration (with trade, tourism, cultural and diplomatic relations), and the Russians were to repudiate this assumption within days of the agreement.[50] Nonetheless, the U.S. had clearly sought to create a climate of cooperation with the USSR by bringing Moscow back into the Middle East peace process, and in this atmosphere both superpowers agreed to continue abiding by the SALT I agreement even though it formally expired on October 3rd,[51] moved ahead on their SALT II negotiations, and also moved ahead in the negotiations on limiting naval forces in the Indian Ocean. These talks, however, can be seen as a major concession to the USSR, given the Soviet Union's territorial propinquity to the Indian Ocean, and its ability to deploy military power there from air and land bases in Central Asia.[52]

In addition, during this period, the Carter Administration was seen by the USSR as trying to restrain its attempts at polemics and confrontation over "human rights" at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade.[53] Moscow also favorably reported the November meeting of the Soviet-American Trade and Economic Council,[54] the meeting of U.S. and Soviet scientists on cooperation in manned space flights,[55] and the sixth session of the mixed Soviet-American commission on cooperation on environmental protection.[56]

It was as part of its general effort to increase cooperation with the USSR that the Carter Administration requested that Congress consider changing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment trade bill so as to reverse the need for Soviet emigration assurances. Instead, the President was to be allowed to grant tariff benefits on an annual basis if he determined emigration levels were "adequate."[57]

Perhaps as a result of this shift in Administration policy, or because of the Helsinki follow-up meeting in the fall in Belgrade, Jewish emigration rose by almost 2,500 in 1977 to a total of 16,736, up from 14,261 in 1976, with a noticeable increase taking place in the latter half of the year when Soviet-American relations began to improve, after U.S. concessions on the Middle East, Indian Ocean, and other areas.[58]

In sum, by the fall of 1977, Moscow may well have thought they had succeeded in pressuring Carter into important concessions and could probably continue to do so. Gromyko reportedly told Arkady Shevchenko at the time, "We can deal with Carter. He is unsophisticated in many matters, and eventually we could probably get him to agree to a lot of things we want."[59] It was at this time that Carter gave Gromyko as a "going-away present," a wooden model showing all the U.S. and Soviet missiles known to exist. According to Carter's memoirs, Gromyko was "taken aback that I would do such a thing because the set of models showed the gigantic size and many types of their missiles contrasted with the few and relatively compact American ICBMs."[60] If Gromyko's memoirs are ever published, the episode may well be treated as another

example of Carter's naivete, or growing "realism".

This period of Soviet-American cooperation was to be a brief one, however. Less than two months after the joint statement, which was bitterly attacked both in Egypt and Israel, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat changed the face of middle Eastern history by journeying to Jerusalem to begin the process that was to wind up one and one-half years later as the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. The Sadat visit to Jerusalem came at a particularly difficult time for the Soviet Union's position in the Middle East. Moscow had chosen to back Ethiopia over Somalia in the conflict between the two states on the Horn of Africa, and Somalia had responded in mid-November by expelling the Soviet military advisors from Somalia, ousting the USSR from its bases, and denouncing the Soviet-Somali Friendship Treaty. With the loss of bases in Somalia and the overall weakening of its position in the Horn of Africa, the USSR's position in the Indian Ocean had also deteriorated. Not only did the United States now unquestionably have the largest and most formidable base in the region on Diego Garcia, but the overall geopolitical balance in the region had also shifted against the Soviets because of the sudden change of government in India in which Indira Ghandi, who had been quite sympathetic to the USSR, was ousted by popular vote and replaced by Moraji DeSai who appeared to take a much more neutral position in the Soviet-American struggle for influence in the Third World, and who moved toward a reconciliation with China. Thus the overall deterioration of their position in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean must have concerned the Soviet leaders as they sought to deal with an even more serious problem -- Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and its implications for Soviet policy in the core area of the Middle East.

Essentially, Sadat's decision to go to Jerusalem, which Soviet leaders claimed had been orchestrated by the U.S.,[61] presented the Soviet leadership with both a danger and an opportunity. On the one hand, were Sadat and Begin to successfully negotiate a peace settlement, there was a chance that Jordan and moderate Palestinian elements both within and outside the PLO might follow suit thus leaving the USSR isolated in the

Middle East with only radical Libya (whom virtually all the other Arab states distrusted) and possibly Syria (with whom Moscow had bitterly quarelled during the Syrian invasion of Lebanon in 1976) as backers of Soviet policy, along with radical rejectionists within the PLO, and South Yemen as well. On the other hand, however, should the Egyptian–Israeli talks fail to achieve an agreement to which other Arab states could adhere, there was the possibility that Syria, together with its then ally Jordan, its dependency, Lebanon, and its own PLO force, Saiqa, might be drawn to join the rejectionists, thereby isolating Sadat in the Arab world as the sole Arab leader willing to make peace with Israel. Such a development might well hasten Sadat's ouster or, at the minimum, lead to the formation of a large "anti–imperialist" bloc of Arab states which could be expected to be supportive of Soviet policy in its zero–sum game competition with the United States for influence in the Arab world. Finally, should the Egyptian–Israeli talks fail, Sadat would be discredited and the United States might feel constrained to again push for the immediate reconvening of the Geneva Conference where the USSR would play a major role as co–chairman.

As the Soviet leaders were contemplating their response to the Sadat peace initiative, Sadat was being warmly received in Israel, and when he returned to Egypt, he received a similarly warm welcome. The reaction in the other Arab states, however, was considerably cooler.[62] Saudi Arabia, Egypt's main Arab ally, gave at best grudging support for his visit, while Jordan's reaction was also noncommittal. At the same time, Syria, Libya, the PLO, Iraq, Algeria and South Yemen denounced Sadat's trip with only the Sudan, Morocco and Oman strongly supporting it. For its part the Soviet Union strongly criticized the Sadat visit as a legitimization of Israeli occupation of Arab lands and an effort to isolate both the PLO and the USSR.[63]

Indeed, seeking to profit from the Arab alignment that had come into being to oppose Sadat's peace efforts, the Soviet Union rejected an offer by the Egyptian government to participate in a peace conference in Cairo. Nonetheless, President Carter took an optimistic view of the

Soviet refusal stating that "my belief is that the desire of the whole world is so great for peace in the Middle East that the Soviets will follow along and take advantage of any constructive step toward peace."[64] This over-optimistic, if not naive, prediction was to be proved wrong, and, it was not long before a new chill had settled into Soviet-American relations.

The USSR, which had seen itself invited back into the center of Middle East diplomacy as a result of the joint Soviet-American statement of October 1st, was clearly angered by Sadat's peace initiative which Moscow saw as an American ploy, and Soviet reporting on relations with the United States again became more negative in tone, with a new hostility characterizing the Soviet evaluation of the American delegation's performance at the Belgrade talks.[65] On the other hand, Moscow continued to report favorably on cooperation with the U.S. in such areas where Moscow needed American assistance as the naval arms limitation talks in the Indian Ocean, which were characterized as having taken place "in a positive spirit,"[66] and the Soviet-American cooperation in agriculture. Brezhnev himself, in a *Pravda* interview on December 24th, held out the possibility for a nuclear arms limitation agreement although he utilized the opportunity to denounce the American plan to deploy the neutron bomb in Western Europe (where it would be effective against a Soviet tank invasion) and called for the mutual renunciation of the bomb. He also attacked the "notorious" Begin-Sadat meeting as an attempt to torpedo the Geneva Conference.

The issue, however, that was to sharply worsen Soviet-American relations was the massive Soviet intervention into the Horn of Africa. Beginning one week after Sadat's visit, Moscow airlifted some 20,000 Cuban soldiers to Ethiopia, together with 3,000 Soviet military technicians and large amounts of military equipment. The USSR also provided three Soviet generals to direct the Ethiopian army as it moved from the defensive onto the offensive against Somalia, and with Soviet and Cuban aid, by March, Somalia had been driven out of Ethiopia.[67]

From Moscow's perspective, the move into Ethiopia, while a gamble, may have been well worth the risk. In the first place, it had regional African support since Somalia had violated a long-standing OAU charter provision by invading another African state to rectify a dispute over a border established in colonial times. Therefore, at least in the eyes of most Africans, the USSR was acting legitimately in coming to Ethiopia's defense. Secondly, by aiding Ethiopia, the USSR sought to assure itself of at least a political -- and possibly a military -- base at the junction of the Middle East and Black Africa, one that commanded a large section of Red Sea coastline. This move would not only serve as at least partial compensation for the loss of the bases in Somalia, and prevent transformation of the Red Sea into an "Arab lake" controlled by conservative Arab regimes, it would also help prevent Moscow's isolation in the Middle East should Sadat's peace initiative lead to a general Middle East settlement.

The sharp influx of Soviet and Cuban forces into Ethiopia, however, the second such Soviet move in Africa since 1975, precipitated a major outcry in Washington, although the American reaction was to be a very confused one, and it was to be the very confusion of American policy on the Horn of Africa which helped ensure the success of the Soviet venture. In the first place, the Administration which was preoccupied with the Panama Canal treaty and also the energy crisis (which Carter called the "moral equivalent of war") as the crisis developed, seemed confused over whether or not to arm Somalia, first promising the Somalis arms and then retracting the promise.[68] Secondly, the Administration seemed divided over how to respond to the Soviet intervention. Thus, on January 12th, President Carter, again in a highly optimistic statement asserted "I hope we can induce the Soviets and Cubans not to send either soldiers or weapons into that area."[69] When Moscow ignored Carter's statement, a dispute broke out in the Administration as how best to respond to the Soviet move with Zbigniew Brzezinski publicly calling for a linkage to the SALT talks and Andrew Young and Cyrus Vance opposing such a policy.[70] Carter himself seemed

to come down on the side of the doves by stating at a press conference on March 2nd that there was no Administration policy of linkage between the Soviet involvement in the Horn and SALT.[71] One week later, however, at another news conference in which he announced that Somalia was withdrawing from Ethiopia, he stated his hope that once Ethiopian forces had reestablished control over their own country, "withdrawal of the Soviet and Cuban combat presence should begin."[72] This was to turn out to be yet another case of unwarranted optimism. Indeed, the only concrete step the U.S. was finally to take in response to the Cuban/Soviet move into Ethiopia was to temporarily discontinue talks on arms limitation in the Indian Ocean.

Moscow, by contrast, was pursuing a consistent policy. By February 1978, it seemed to be utilizing Carter's hopes for a quick SALT accord as a cover for its activities in Africa and it sought to put the Carter Administration on the defensive for not doing enough to achieve SALT. Thus *Pravda* in a major editorial on February 11th at the height of the Soviet buildup in Ethiopia, blamed the U.S. for the talks' standstill. It also noted that while Carter had publicly stressed the importance of achieving a new SALT agreement "from the standpoint of ensuring security for the U.S. itself and from the standpoint of the positive development of Soviet–American relations," "practical deeds" had to follow up such statements. Three weeks after denouncing Brzezinski's attempts at linking SALT to Soviet policy in the Horn, *Pravda* sought to demonstrate that many Americans, including President Carter, opposed such linkage as well, thus underlining the confusion in the American Administration over the issue.[73]

In a response to the Soviet activities in Africa and propaganda on SALT, Carter gave a major speech on national defense at Wake Forest University on March 17, 1978.[74] After discussing the rise in Soviet military power, he warned the USSR that while the U.S. was prepared "to cooperate with the Soviet Union toward common social, scientific and economic goals," if Moscow "failed to demonstrate restraint in missile programs and other force levels and in the projection of Soviet or proxy

forces into other lands and continents, then popular support for such cooperation with the Soviets will certainly erode." Carter went on to say that even while the U.S. was searching for arms control agreements, it would continue to modernize its strategic system and revitalize its conventional forces.

Moscow, despite being informed by Marshall Shulman that the speech should be viewed as primarily designed for domestic consumption[75] reacted forcefully to Carter's speech, with *Pravda* claiming on March 19th that he was shifting emphasis from efforts to achieve arms control to "a course of threats and the aggravation of tension." In a more extensive critique, Arbatov, writing in *Pravda* on March 28th, attacked the U.S. for creating "dangerous new types of weapons, such as the neutron bomb," and for the efforts of some "leading" Administration figures to link SALT with the "course of events in the Horn of Africa." Finally, Arbatov issued a thinly veiled warning that the time had come for:

> A choice of a path for the years to come: either an agreement on the basis of which one can make progress in the area of arms limitation and reduction and the development of peaceful and mutually advantageous cooperation, or the rejection of an accord, which would mean the torpedoing of the Soviet-American dialogue on fundamental questions of the two powers' security and international security, and a significant worsening of the overall atmosphere in relations between the USSR and the U.S.[76]

From Moscow's viewpoint, these repeated warnings may well have had some effect because on April 7th Carter announced he was deferring production of the neutron bomb -- a weapon long feared by the USSR. Just as in the case of the B-1 bomber decision, Moscow may have seen the Carter action as a response to Soviet pressure, since it appeared to reverse the Wake Forest assertion that the U.S. was continuing to modernize its strategic forces, and because the USSR had mounted such a major propaganda campaign in the West against the weapon. Ironically,

in the case of the neutron bomb, Carter went against the advice of Vance, Brown and Brzezinski who all wanted to deploy the weapon.[77] Brzezinski also wanted to use the neutron bomb as a bargaining chip against the Soviet SS-20, but could not convince Carter, who thus made yet another unilateral arms control concession, without seeking a *quid-pro-quo* from the USSR. Interestingly enough, however, just as Moscow had publicly deprecated Carter's B-1 decision, so too did it minimize the importance of the neutron bomb deferment, with *Pravda* on April 9th complaining that the decision did not affect work on the development of neutron warhead carriers. Brezhnev, in a speech to the Young Communist League Congress in late April, however, did make a gesture in response to Carter's action by stating that the USSR would not produce the neutron bomb if the U.S. did not, although there was no formal agreement.[78] The U.S., however, was well ahead of the USSR in neutron bomb research and development at the time of Brezhnev's "concession," and the value of the Soviet move was, therefore, doubtful. The Soviet leader also reported some progress in the SALT talks as a result of the Vance visit to Moscow in April

Once again, however, a Third World dispute was to lead to a further deterioration of Soviet-American relations. Thus when Zaire rebels, operating out of Angola, attacked the mineral-rich province of Katanga in Zaire, the U.S. blamed the USSR, since Angola was allied to the Soviet bloc and the rebels had been trained by Cuba which had a large military force in Angola.[79] The U.S., in an effort to stop the invasion, organized a force of African soldiers who, together with Belgian and French troops succeeded in repulsing the invaders. This American move to reverse the unfavorable flow of events in Africa was severely denounced by Moscow which claimed the USSR had nothing to do with the invasion[80] and Moscow also criticized the NATO decision to increase defense expenditures by 3% annually, a development which, if not precipitated by the Soviet moves in Africa (the budget rise had been under discussion for some time), certainly was enhanced by it. Interestingly enough, however, Moscow also stated that it would not

hesitate to give aid to Third World states in need, detente or no detente:

> Detente by no means implies artificial restraint on the objective processes of historical development. It is not a safe-conduct pass for anti-popular, rotten, and venal regimes or for any sort of special rights and privileges inherited from the colonial past or obtained through one-sided deals and agreements. And even less does it grant indulgences as concerns the right to suppress the just struggle of peoples for their national liberation and sound progress and the right to interfere in their internal affairs.[81]

Nonetheless, despite the Soviet activity in Africa, Carter clung to his "no linkage" position and stated, in a press conference on May 25th, that the "SALT agreement is so important for our country, for the safety of the entire world, that we ought not to let any impediment come between us and the reaching of a successful agreement."[82]

The American President, however, then appeared to sharply qualify this position by asserting:

> But there is no doubt that if the Soviets continue to abuse human rights, to punish people who are monitoring the Soviets' compliance with the Helsinki Agreement [Yuri Orlov had just been sentenced to seven years in jail], which they signed of their own free will, and unless they show some constraints on their own involvement in Africa, it will make it much more difficult to conclude a SALT agreement and to have it ratified once it is written.

In viewing the contradictory nature of the Carter speech, the Soviet leaders may well have been a bit puzzled. Nonetheless, on the basis of Carter's previous concessions on human rights, the B-1, and the neutron bomb, they may well have assumed that Carter would once again back down if the USSR pressed hard enough -- particularly in threatening a collapse of the SALT talks, which Carter had publicly stated he wanted so much. Consequently, as the summer of 1978 came on, Moscow

stepped up its persecution of the Soviet dissidents. Nonetheless, as it mounted its campaign against the dissidents, Moscow had to be aware of a new development that was likely to affect Soviet-American relations, the move toward a speedy rapprochement between the United States and China, and Moscow was to couple its crackdown on the Soviet dissidents with warnings to the U.S. not to get too closely involved with China lest SALT be harmed.

By February 1978, the post-Mao succession in China had finally ended with the team of Hua Kuofeng and Deng Hsiao Ping now clearly in charge. Unfortunately for Moscow, however, the new Chinese leadership was to prove more interested in improving relations with the United States than with the Soviet Union. A formal Soviet offer to improve relations on the basis of "peaceful coexistence" was rejected by the Chinese who demanded a major Soviet withdrawal all along the Sino-Soviet border and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Mongolia as well.[83] The Soviet offer came just prior to the convening of the Fifth National Peoples Congress in Beijing in February 1978 in which the new Chinese leaders formally set forth their program of the "four modernizations" and also announced a heightened interest in Western credits and technology to speed China's development.[84]

In rejecting China's demands for a military withdrawal from the Sino-Soviet border, Moscow may have felt that given the economic and strategic importance of the Far East and Soviet Central Asia, a withdrawal would be too dangerous. The Soviet leadership may also have seen that Sino-American relations were still stagnating (a visit by Vance in the fall of 1977 had been unproductive) and perhaps felt that there was nothing yet to fear from that quarter. Nonetheless, one wonders, in retrospect, whether Moscow might have been better served by negotiating a limited withdrawal of some troops from its border with China as a gesture to Beijing. Such a move might well have delayed the formal rapprochement with the United States, while at the same time not really affecting the military balance between the USSR and the PRC. It is interesting to note here that the Chinese demand was not for the rectification of the border,

a demand much more difficult for Moscow to accept, but rather for a pullback from the border, a development that would have allowed China's "four modernizations" program to develop in greater security -- and also without the need for the rapid acquisition of Western arms.[85] In any case, as is well known, Moscow did the opposite. After a highly publicized visit of Brezhnev and Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov to the Sino-Soviet border in late March, Moscow began to build up its forces there by increasing the number of SS-20 missiles and backfire bombers and bringing the Soviet airborne division stationed in the Far East up to full strength.[86] Further heightening Chinese suspicions at the time was the pro-Soviet Communist coup d'etat in Afghanistan in April 1978, and a Soviet raid across the Ussuri River in early May (despite a Soviet apology) as well as Soviet support for Vietnam in its increasingly severe quarrel with the PRC over the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and also over the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands.[87] As Moscow demonstratively increased its pressure on Beijing, the Chinese moved to strengthen their own position, and the visit of Brzezinski, by now a *bete noire* of the Russians, (Moscow's clear favorite in the Administration was Cyrus Vance, a "realist") to Beijing at a time of heightening Soviet-American, as well as Sino-Soviet tension in May, provided the opportunity. At a banquet welcoming Brzezinski Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua called for all the peoples of the world to "adopt a policy to upset the hegemonist's (USSR) strategic deployments," and Brzezinski, who shared Beijing's deep suspicion of Moscow, responded in kind by stating that the U.S. was also resolved to "resist the efforts of any nation which seeks to establish global or regional hegemony."[88] As a result of Brzezinski's visit, several major steps forward in Sino-American relations took place. First, Brzezinski told the Chinese that the U.S. would not oppose the sale of weapons to Beijing by Europeans. Given the increasing Soviet build-up on the Chinese border, this could only have been welcome news for Beijing. Secondly, Brzezinski told his Chinese hosts that the Administration was now ready to move ahead in the normalization talks, and the talks were formally resumed in July.[89] Then on June 8th the United States approved a sale to China of infrared scanning equipment which it had

denied to the USSR. Meanwhile, Carter had issued yet another speech in an effort to clarify American policy toward the Soviet Union, this time at the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis on June 7th.[90] Once again, as in the case of the Wake Forest speech, he seemed to give the USSR a choice between increased cooperation and confrontation, although there were some additional nuances. Thus he indicated that while the U.S. wanted to increase collaboration with the USSR, it also wanted to do so with China. In addition, while citing the huge losses suffered by the USSR in World War II and his conviction that the people of the Soviet Union wanted peace, he also strongly criticized the USSR for exploiting areas of instability in the world, and for the first time in his Presidency, he came close to joining the school of thought which saw Soviet policy as essentially offensive when he stated "to the Soviet Union, detente seems to mean a continuing aggressive struggle for political advantage and increased influence." He also again denounced the "abuse of basic human rights" in the USSR and the Soviet attempts "to export a totalitarian and repressive form of government." Nonetheless, he reiterated his call for improved relations with Moscow and once again stated that the U.S. had "no desire to link the negotiations for a SALT agreement with other competitive relationships."

The first official answer to Carter came in a *Pravda* editorial on June 17th which pointed to the contradictions Moscow saw in the Carter speech:

> . . . The U.S. President definitely failed to clarify American policy . . . toward the U.S.S.R. He failed for the simple reason that the speech was an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable -- to combine assurances of devotion to the ideas of detente and improved Soviet-American relations with undisguised attacks on the Soviet Union; to combine expressions of respect for the desire for peace and the fortitude of the Soviet people who lost 20 million sons and daughters in the war against Hitlerite aggression, with a prejudiced and distorted description of Soviet reality of the kind that had rarely

appeared since the cold war, even in the most malevolent American newspaper.[91]

The *Pravda* editorial also again challenged Carter to do more to push the SALT agreement in America:

> There has been a lot of talk in the United States, both in government articles and elsewhere, to the effect that a future agreement may run into difficulties in the Senate when it comes up for ratification. But the government itself is plainly in no hurry to take a definite stand and to begin to defend the agreement both in Congress and to the public, and to refute all the various falsehoods to which the opponents of arms limitation resort. On the contrary, many government leaders in this complex situation are busy stirring up mistrust toward the Soviet Union and spreading lies about the "Soviet military threat."

Pravda then went on to assert some linkage requirements of its own as far as SALT was concerned by warning the U.S. against playing the "China card":

> Washington's latest intrigues, or to be more exact, "petty intrigues" with China do not in the least serve to strengthen confidence. In and of itself, the desire to play the "China card" in the global game is nothing new for American politicians. But until now, it seemed that U.S. leaders were aware that they could not play that card without endangering the cause of peace and indeed, without danger to themselves and to the United States' own national interest.
>
> To all appearances, however, certain officials who occupy important positions in Washington are now so overwhelmed with anti-Soviet emotions that these dangers are being ignored. These officials are closing their eyes to the fact that alignment with China on an anti-Soviet basis would close off the possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union in reducing the

threat of nuclear war and, of course, limiting arms.

Brezhnev himself, in a major speech in Minsk a week later, reiterated the Soviet warning against playing the "China card."[92] Interestingly enough, however, he also drew attention to a major Soviet initiative at the MBFR talks in Vienna where Moscow offered to withdraw three divisions and 1,000 tanks from Eastern Europe. While this may have been a ploy to divide the U.S. from its European allies which had more to lose if detente weakened, it might also have been a recognition of the fact that the possible entente between the U.S. and China required a further reinforcement of the Chinese front, particularly at a time when Soviet manpower resources were becoming strained. Nonetheless, the "China card" issue in Soviet-American relations was temporarily to pale as the dispute over human rights increased in intensity during the summer.

The Soviet harassment of dissidents in the late spring and summer of 1978 differed from the anti-dissident campaign in the early months of the Carter Administration. This time, not only were Soviet dissidents persecuted (by June, Orlov had been sentenced to prison and Vladimir Slepak had been arrested), but so too were Americans who resided in the USSR. Thus, on June 12th, less than a week after the Annapolis speech, Francis Crawford, Deputy Head of the International Harvester Company office in Moscow, was arrested for currency speculation. Two weeks later, two U.S. newspaper correspondents, Hal Piper and Craig Whitney were accused by a Moscow court of libelling Soviet T.V., a Soviet action highly inconsistent with the Helskinki Agreement. While the Soviet actions may have been a response to the American arrest of two low-level Soviet U.N. aides for espionage, it may also have been intended as a test of the American willingness to continue its defense of human rights by signalling to Carter that Americans who lived in Moscow might become fair game in such a situation. Nonetheless, despite these events, during the early stages of the revived anti-dissident drive Carter continued to sound optimistic about relations with the USSR, stating on June 26th, "I have a deep belief that the underlying relationship between ourselves and the Soviets is stable and that Mr. Brezhnev, along with myself, wants

peace and wants to have better friendship."[93] He added once again that the U.S. opposed linkage and that it "never tried to threaten the Soviet Union" and "never held out the prospect of increased or decreased trade if they did or did not do a certain thing that we thought was best." Carter added at the news conference that he hoped that he and Brezhnev might meet personally to ratify the SALT agreement. In addition to such verbal gestures with which President Carter sought to once again assure the USSR of America's good intentions, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Malcolm Toom refrained from emphasizing the human rights issue in a T.V. address on Moscow T.V. on American Independence Day, July 4th.

Perhaps encouraged by this apparent softness of the American position on human rights, Moscow then announced the treason trial of Anatoly Shcharansky, a man whom President Carter had publicly stated was not involved with the CIA. In trying Shcharansky for treason, thereby in effect calling Carter a liar, however, Moscow went too far, even for Carter who can be said to have leaned over backwards in search of good relations with the USSR up to this point. Despite the fact that American U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young's statement that there were "hundreds and perhaps thousands of people" in American prisons whom he would call political prisoners, weakened the American protest against Shcharansky's jailing (the Soviet media gave extensive coverage to Young's comments),[94] Carter nonetheless decided to do more than merely verbally protest. Thus he cancelled a sale of a sophisticated computer system to Moscow and announced he was reviewing the sale of highly sophisticated oil drilling equipment, thus depriving the USSR of the American equipment which Moscow needed the most (the USSR was far behind the U.S. in both computer technology and in sophisticated oil drilling equipment). Carter further hit the USSR in areas of Soviet–American relations in which Moscow stood to gain the most by cancelling a Moscow visit by his science advisor Frank Press (who had just visited Peking), as well as American participation in the scheduled sixth session of the joint Soviet–American commission on scientific and technological cooperation.[95] Even these gestures, however, were weakened when Carter sent Secretary of

State Vance to Geneva for another SALT meeting at the very height of the furor over the harassment of the Soviet dissidents and American reporters.[96] Moscow took note of this, and reiterated Vance's statement that the SALT talks, because of their enormous importance for the maintenance of peace, should not be "linked to other questions."[97] Another weakness of Carter's policy, however, at least as probably seen from Moscow, came in the decision to once again allow the sale of oil field equipment to Moscow after Crawford was given a suspended sentence and the two American reporters were given small fines.[98] While the Americans had gotten out of trouble, the Soviet dissidents, Ginsburg, Shcharansky, Slepak and others remained in jail, and American willingness to once again send the oil equipment despite their continued imprisonment may well have signalled to the Russians that Carter would not use American trade pressure on behalf of Soviet dissidents, and that his human rights policies would again be limited to verbiage. Indeed, in a press conference on August 17th, Carter had said:

> We obviously don't have any inclination to declare a trade embargo against the USSR to stop all trade. It is to the advantage of our own country to trade with the Soviet Union. I think embargoes that have been enforced in the past by previous administrations, for instance, unannounced and unilateral (embargoes) of shipments of feed grains and food grains and soybeans overseas has been very detrimental to our country. I do not intend to do that.[99]

In sum, therefore, the USSR had mounted a major anti-dissident campaign in the face of American protests. While Moscow may have felt that once again it had successfully pressured the American President into retreating in his human rights efforts, as Carter reversed his position taken in the May 25th news conference that Soviet human rights violations would "make it much more difficult to conclude a SALT agreement," the Soviet leaders were to prove less successful in preventing Washington from playing the "China card," a development that threatened Soviet security in Asia.

Indeed, from the Soviet perspective, the situation in Asia seemed to be rapidly deteriorating. Not only had the United States and China entered into a more friendly relationship, but Japan and China were also moving closer together. On August 12th, Japan and China signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in Peking, which *Pravda* was to label as anti-Soviet because it contained an "anti-hegemony" article which was seen as directed against the USSR.[100] Soon afterwards Chinese Premier Hua visited Romania, Yugoslavia and Iran, an action which further aroused Soviet ire. Meanwhile, the USSR sought to counter the Chinese rapprochement with Japan by trying to improve its own relations with the economically potent island nation, but these efforts proved unsuccessful when Japan refused to sign a treaty with Moscow unless the USSR agreed to return the four small islands just north of Japan which the USSR had seized at the end of World War II, something the USSR was unwilling to do. Adding further to the pressure on Moscow at this time was Carter's unexpected decision on October 18th to go ahead with production of the neutron bomb, although he somewhat qualified this move by stipulating that the components would be stockpiled instead of inserted into warheads.[101]

Interestingly enough, however, possibly because Washington had played its "China card," or because of concern over the neutron bomb, Moscow became more forthcoming in the SALT talks and only a week after the neutron bomb decision *Pravda* reported that progress had been made in the talks.[102] At the same time there was another sharp increase in the number of Jews being allowed to leave the Soviet Union (the emigres included Benyamin Levich, a prominent Jewish scientist who had been denied permission to leave for seven years, and Boris and Natalia Katz.)[103] This Soviet tactic seemed directed at gaining Senate support for the SALT treaty which Moscow may have seen as close to signing. Indeed, Brezhnev himself met in Moscow with a group of U.S. Senators who would have to ratify the treaty, although the meeting, like Kosygin's with the group several days earlier, may have done more harm than good since the Senators seemed unhappy with the Soviet leaders' apparent

inability to understand the role of the Senate in the American governmental process.[104]

In any case, while seeking to push ahead on SALT, Moscow was also moving to enhance its position in Asia. Thus soon after Japan refused the offer of a treaty with the USSR, Moscow moved to sign one with Vietnam whose relations with China had become increasingly strained. The apparent goal of the treaty, when coupled with the large shipments of Soviet weapons to Hanoi in the fall of 1978, was to confront China with a powerful enemy on another border, thereby compelling China to deploy its military forces accordingly.[105] Soon after the signing of the treaty, Vietnam invaded China's ally, Cambodia, apparently on the assumption that its treaty with Moscow would deter the Chinese from any counter invasion. China, however, then played its "Washington card" by indicating its willingness to normalize relations with the United States by making concessions on the Taiwan issue. The United States responded affirmatively and on December 15th came the joint announcement that formal Sino-American diplomatic relations would be established on January 1, 1979, while U.S.-Taiwanese relations would be terminated the same day, although the U.S. would continue to maintain "commercial, cultural, trade and other (military)" relations with Taiwan.[106]

As might be expected, Moscow did not look very favorably on the acceleration of the Sino-American rapprochement, although Carter, in his typically optimistic fashion, reported that he had received a "very positive" message from Brezhnev on the development. Moscow Radio, however, and *Pravda* were quick to present a different interpretation of Brezhnev's message, noting that Brezhnev had stated that the Soviet Union would very closely follow how Sino-American relations would develop and would "draw the appropriate conclusions for Soviet policy."[107] A central Soviet concern about the rapprochement was expressed in a Moscow Radio broadcast by Valentin Zorin which indicated that Moscow was quite worried that the Chinese would now find it easier to acquire Western arms and modern military technology.[108] Indeed Brezhnev sent Carter a letter on December 27th which implied that "unless we prevented our

European allies from selling weapons to China, there might be no further progress on arms control."[109] Other Soviet media expressed the concern that a military bloc of China, Japan and the U.S. might be forming.[110] These fears were undoubtedly exacerbated during Deng Tsaio Ping's late January visit to the United States in which the Chinese leader used the opportunity to appeal to the U.S. to join a common anti-Soviet front. While the U.S. officially disassociated itself from Deng's anti-Soviet remarks, the fact that the joint communique issued at the close of his trip called for joint opposition to efforts to establish "hegemony," indicated to Moscow that the U.S. seemed to be supporting China's anti-Soviet stand.[111]

Moscow reacted to the Sino-American rapprochement in several ways. In the first place, it slowed the pace of the SALT talks (thereby preventing a quick U.S.-Soviet summit since the negotiations were almost completed) as a means of showing its displeasure and following through on the warnings it had issued in June against Washington playing the "China card." Secondly, it continued to warn Washington against being manipulated by the Chinese into a Soviet-American war. In addition, an article appeared in *Izvestia* on February 8th dealing with Deng's trip which expressed the continued Soviet worry that elements within the "vacillating" Carter Administration would seek to use the China connection to extract concessions from the USSR:

> On the one hand, doubts or at least differing opinions with respect to playing the "China card" do indeed exist in Washington. Having had the experience of postwar confrontation, Washington cannot fail to guess toward what slippery path the pilgrim from Beijing is pushing the United States. It cannot fail to realize the importance of normal relations with the Soviet Union and progress in such fields as detente and a SALT II agreement.
>
> On the other hand the demon of anti-Sovietism is a strong one, and the desire to pull the "China lever" in order to try to

> exploit one-sided concessions from Moscow is also strong. Vacillation is characteristic of the present Washington Administration. In the Administration itself there is a conflict between militant and more moderate trends.[112]

Fortunately for Moscow, however, subsequent events were to lessen its concern both about the Asian strategic situation and the Sino-American alignment, albeit only temporarily. Thus less than two weeks after the end of Deng's visit to Washington, China invaded Vietnam with the apparent goal of getting the Vietnamese to pull out of Cambodia thereby allowing China's ally, the Pol Pot regime, which was fighting a guerilla war against the Vietnamese, to regain power. If this was indeed the Chinese goal, it failed and after several weeks of fighting, China was compelled to withdraw its forces from North Vietnam although it stated that it was successful in "punishing Vietnam." Nonetheless, Vietnamese forces remained in Cambodia and the Vietnamese army had proven itself at least the equal of the Chinese. At the same time, there was clear embarassment in Washington over the Chinese move and Moscow may well have thought that the Chinese invasion would slow the Sino-American rapprochement.[113] As far as Sino-Soviet relations were concerned, while Moscow issued several warnings to China during the invasion, the period of fighting was so short the USSR did not have to follow through on its warnings. In addition, while China moved after the war to denounce its 1950 treaty with the USSR, it also called for new talks with Moscow, this time without the preconditions demanded in 1978. Moscow could only be heartened by this Chinese retreat, and by the subsequent Chinese government announcement that its 1978 modernization goals had been too ambitious and that they would have to be revised downward.[114] While China remained a long-term threat to the Kremlin, the immediacy of the danger, precipitated by the Sino-Japanese treaty and the Sino-American rapprochement seemed to have been averted.

If Moscow was feeling more secure on its Asian flank, it was also feeling more confident about its Middle Eastern position. Although

President Carter, at Camp David, had mediated the framework of both an Egyptian–Israeli peace agreement and a more general settlement between Israel and her other Arab neighbors, the Camp David agreements had been denounced by the entire Arab world with the exception of Egypt, the Sudan and Oman; and the Arab states, meeting in Baghdad, had threatened sanctions against Egypt if it went ahead and signed a peace treaty with Israel.[115] This development was of great benefit to Moscow for two reasons. In the first place, it meant the end to the Egyptian–Saudi Arabian axis which had been the pillar of American policy in the Arab world since 1973. Secondly, the fact that most of the Arab world, led by Iraq and Syria, had opposed Camp David, may have held out the hope to Moscow that the Arab world would swing over to the Soviet side, in what the USSR continued to see as a zero–sum game competition for influence with the United States.

While events in the Arab world seemed to be taking a favorable turn for the USSR in the aftermath of Camp David, Moscow was also to profit from the increasingly severe upheavals in Iran. Since the Nixon era, the United States had depended on Iran to be its "policeman" in the Persian Gulf and had given extensive amounts of arms to the Shah's armed forces. Indeed, under the Shah's leadership, Iran had proven to be a major obstacle to Soviet ambitions in the Middle East. On the one hand, Iran's efforts to form a Persian Gulf Security Pact seemed primarily aimed at keeping out Soviet influence. Secondly, Iran's military aid to Oman had helped defeat the PFLO insurgency backed by Moscow's ally, the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), and Iranian economic aid had been used to try to entice Afghanistan out of the Soviet camp. Iran also served as a moderating influence on the Arab–Israeli conflict, and the increasingly warm relations between Iran and Egypt seemed to solidify the central American alliance system of the Middle East, which, before Camp David was composed of Israel, Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia.[116] Consequently, as domestic turmoil in Iran increased sharply in the fall of 1978, the USSR welcomed the weakening of the Shah's government and the increasing influence of exiled Muslim religious

leader Ayatollah Khomeini, if at first somewhat cautiously. To be sure, the USSR now imported natural gas from Iran and the cut-off of natural gas exports by striking petroleum workers was not welcomed. In addition, as a Muslim fundamentalist, Khomeini posed somewhat of a threat to the Soviet elite's control of its large Muslim population. Nonetheless, most Soviet Muslims are Sunni, not Shiite like the Ayatollah, and the Islamic threat was, at least for the short run, essentially a theoretical one. On the other hand, however, if the United States could be deprived of its major economic and miltary positions in Iran, including sophisticated radar stations for checking the telemetry of Soviet missiles, the USSR would emerge with a clear gain in its influence competition with the United States. Thus by the end of November, the USSR began to issue stern warnings against American intervention in Iran,[117] and anti-American radio broadcasts to Iran increased in intensity (U.S. protests about the broadcasts were rejected).[118] Indeed, the USSR seemed to be trying to inflame Iranian popular passions against the United States, a fairly transparent effort to expedite the elimination of American influence from Iran as the revolutionary upheaval in Iran increased in intensity. Consequently, following the departure of the Shah and the installation of the short-lived Bakhtiar government, senior Soviet Middle East commentator Dmitry Volsky expressed Soviet satisfaction with the trend of events in Iran:

> The plans to knock together a pact in the Persian Gulf area and shore up CENTO have had to be shelved because of the events in Iran. . . . Whatever course the events in Iran may take, one thing is clear: never again will the West be able to rely on that country in its global strategy.[119]

Indeed, following the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran, and the coming to power of Khomeini, American Middle East policy appeared to be in a shambles. As a result of the Baghdad Conference, Egypt appeared effectively isolated in the Middle East while the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations on achieving a peace treaty remained stalemated. In addition, the confused American response to the events in Iran -- the dispatching

and then recalling three days later of a naval task force to the Persian Gulf -- was a prime example of American vacillation and seemed to indicate that the Carter Administration was unsure of the proper course to follow in the Middle East. Perhaps worst of all, the United States appeared humiliated as its Embassy was briefly seized by leftists in Iran soon after Khomeini took power in February and its ambassador to Afghanistan, now a Soviet client state, was murdered by terrorists.

Soviet satisfaction with the impact of the events in Iran on the Middle East situation was summarized by *Izvestia*'s political commentator S. Kondrashov:

> Let us emphasize that the problems of American foreign policy have been aggravated since the victory of the national revolution in Iran. *The revolution is tantamount to a direct defeat of the United States since the structure that Washington erected over many years, in which Iran was assigned the role of "policeman of the Persian Gulf" has collapsed . . .*
>
> In Egypt, Sadat has been forced to take a careful look not only at Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states that oppose the separate deal but also at the events in Iran and the fate of the Shah . . . *Doubts and apprehension have increased among those who so closely linked their present and future with Uncle Sam, contrary to the interests of their people.*[120]
>
> (emphasis added)

The South Yemeni invasion of North Yemen may perhaps be understood against this background of the apparently weakening position of the United States in the Middle East. To be sure, the North Yemeni regime was itself weak and had suffered two major coup attempts as well as the murder of its President in less than a year. At the same time the PDRY had a long history of conflict with the North and relations between the two Yemeni states had alternated between open warfare and discussions of unification since 1972. Nonetheless, the timing of the

PDRY invasion of North Yemen does not appear accidental. Coming only a week after the establishment of the Khomeini regime in Iran and the first seizure of the U.S. embassy in that country, it appears as if the USSR, in giving at least its tacit consent to its client's desire to invade North Yemen, was seeking to create a bandwagon effect to further erode American influence in the Middle East. In many ways the situation appeared similar to that of September 1970 when, after a series of American Middle Eastern reverses (the fall of the pro-Western government in Libya, the establishment of a major Soviet military presence in Egypt, and the Soviet-Egyptian violation of the American-mediated cease-fire agreement between Egypt and Israel), Moscow appears to have given its tacit approval for a Syrian move into Jordan to help the Palestinian guerillas in their war against King Hussein.[121] In both invasions, the USSR could remain in the background, but would profit if the pro-American regime was toppled by the Soviet client state's invasion. Interestingly enough, however, if indeed this was the Soviet goal in both invasions, in neither was it successful. In the case of Jordan, an American warning to the USSR, coupled with American-Israeli military maneuvers limited the Syrian invasion and an Arab League meeting provided the face-saving cover for the Syrian withdrawal (the Syrian tanks, meanwhile, had been badly battered by King Hussein's air force). A similar pattern occurred in the case of North Yemen. The United States coupled open warnings to the USSR about discontinuing logistic support for the South Yemeni invasion (the warnings, however, like the protests over Soviet broadcasts to Iran, seemed to have little effect) with two major military moves of its own. In the first place it dispatched the U.S. aircraft carrier Constellation along with supporting vessels to the Arabian Sea -- this time, without recalling them. Secondly, it began a major $390 million military supply effort to North Yemen including F-5 jets, tanks and armored personnel carriers, together with more than one hundred American instructors to aid the North Yemenis in using the new equipment, although ultimately the impact of the U.S. aid, which was delivered through Saudi Arabia, was limited.[122]

In addition to the United States' military moves, another factor which may have prompted the South Yemenis, and their Soviet advisors, to terminate the invasion was the active mediation efforts of the Arab League team led by representatives from Iraq, Syria and Jordan. The USSR clearly had no desire to alienate any of these three opponents of the Camp David agreements -- particularly since, in early March, President Carter launched a personal effort to achieve an Egyptian-Israeli agreement (an effort that was met with success in late March). The end result of the Arab mediation effort was a ceasefire agreement, the withdrawal of PDRY troops and an agreement by the Presidents of both South and North Yemen to once again undertake negotiations about the unification of their two countries.

Despite the apparent Soviet complicity in the PDRY invasion of North Yemen, and the hostile Soviet broadcasts to Iran, the United States pressed ahead with its efforts to achieve a SALT treaty. For its part Moscow, with the Deng visit to the U.S. ended, and with its position both in Asia and the Middle East now strengthened, also proved willing to resume talks -- particularly since the successful completion of the SALT talks was very much in the Soviet interest because the U.S. now appeared increasingly ready for a new military buildup. Consequently, following an appeal by Carter to Dobrynin to get the talks moving again, Moscow consented and the SALT talks entered their final stage. In an apparent effort to speed the process Jews were permitted to emigrate in record number, Brezhnev pardoned several of the Soviet Jews involved in the alleged hijacking of a Soviet airliner in 1970, and also arranged the trade of Soviet dissidents Aleksandr Ginsburg, Georgii Vins, Edward Kuznetsov, Mark Dymshits and Valentin Moroz for the two Soviet U.N. employees who had been arrested as spies in the U.S. in 1978.[123] The United States, for its part, was also making gestures to Moscow, as on April 5th the Commerce Department permitted the computer sale cancelled in 1978, and there was increased discussion in Washington about lifting the trade restrictions imposed against the Soviet Union. The end result of these developments was that the atmosphere improved, negotiations on

SALT II were completed, and a date was set for a summit between Carter and Brezhnev to sign the agreement.

The SALT agreement has been discussed in great detail elsewhere and need not be gone into any detail here. Suffice it to say that the agreement appeared to be a compromise between the two sides, establishing equal ceilings on MIRVed missile totals and delivery systems. Nonetheless the United States conceded to Moscow a larger number of "heavy" missiles (which could threaten U.S. land-based ICBMs), although there was a limit on how many warheads could be carried per missile. In addition the backfire bomber was not included as a delivery vehicle while the American cruise missile was. However, Moscow agreed not to step up its production of the medium-range (though refuelable) bomber, and the American forward based systems were also not included in the agreement.

The summit took place in Vienna (reportedly out of deference to Brezhnev's health) although this was yet another protocol concession on the part of the United States since it was Brezhnev's turn to go to the United States. Of particular interest were the speeches given by the two leaders during the summit. Carter, again expressing an optimistic view, stated on the first day the hope that "our new SALT treaty could provide the basic framework we seek to reduce tension and conflict throughout the world."[124] Brezhnev, however, directly challenged Carter's view:

> There are continuing attempts to depict social processes in one country or another, and the struggle of peoples for independence and social progress as "Moscow's intrigue and machinations." Soviet people, of course, are in solidarity with the liberation struggle of the peoples. Our appraisals of political regimes in different countries sometimes differ strongly from the appraisals made by certain circles in the U.S. But the USSR is against interference in the internal affairs of other countries. This is our principled position. We believe that every people has a right to decide its own destiny. *Why*

then pin on the Soviet Union the responsibility for the objective course of history and moreover use this as a pretext for worsening our relations?[125]

(emphasis added)

Perhaps because of the Soviet leader's comments, Carter took a sharper tone during the second day of talks, although he was to continue basically optimistic as he sought to convince the Russians to extend the detente of Europe to other parts of the world:

> I believe that two possible roads lie before us. There is the road of competition and even confrontation. Any effort by either of our nations to exploit the turbulence that exists in various parts of the world pushes us toward that road. The United States can and will protect its vital interests if this becomes the road we must follow.
>
> But there is another way -- the path of restraint and, where possible, cooperation. This is the path we prefer. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that the detente that has been growing in Europe as a result of the vast amount of work done by you can encompass other regions of the world.[126]

In his memoirs, Carter also notes that he complained to Brezhnev about Soviet propaganda attacks which were endangering American lives in Iran and Afghanistan. While noting that the U.S. had not interfered in the internal affairs of either country, Carter said he expected that the Soviet Union would also not interfere in them. He also seemed to take on faith Brezhnev's assertion that Moscow had no bases in Vietnam and would not acquire them in the future. Brezhnev, however, seemed to reject Carter's assertion that the Persian Gulf was a "vital interest" of the United States.[127]

Nonetheless, in an apparent effort to entice the USSR to take a more cooperative position in the Third World, the U.S. made several concessions to Moscow during the summit. Thus Carter agreed to the

resumption of the naval limitation talks in the Indian Ocean which had been interrupted after the Soviet and Cuban intervention in Ethiopia, despite the fact that the Cubans remained in Ethiopia in large numbers. In addition, the U.S. publicly committed itself to strengthen trade ties with Moscow, and "recognized the necessity" of working for the "elimination of obstacles to mutually beneficial trade and financial relations."[128]

Thus Vienna ended with a few more American concessions than Soviet ones, but with the expressed hope by President Carter that not only would Soviet-American relations improve, but that the USSR would show restraint in the Third World. Such, however, was not to be the case.

One of the areas of increasing contention between the USSR and the United States was Afghanistan. Noor Mohammed Taraki who had seized power in a military coup in April 1978 and who had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR in December 1978, was in deep trouble. Although Soviet military aid and advisors had poured into the country after the coup and Taraki had begun to institute major land reform and social reform programs in the rural areas of Afghanistan, he had incurred the wrath of the Islamic religious leaders as well as tribal leaders who resisted Kabul's efforts to extend its control to their areas. While the rebels were divided among themselves, the heavy-handed actions of the central government which included the physical mistreatment of Muslim Mullahs and the indiscriminate bombing of rebel areas helped expand the opposition to Taraki's regime, and the rebels were also aided by the defection of a number of Afghani soldiers and army officers as well. By June 1979 fighting was raging in more than three-quarters of Afghanistan's provinces, and an attack had been made in Kabul itself against the government.

The conflict in Afghanistan posed a major threat to Soviet prestige. Having signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Taraki regime, and having hailed the Afghani leader as a fellow revolutionary,[129] Brezhnev felt obligated to aid the new Afghani government -- particulary

since it shared a long border with the USSR. Consequently, as the Taraki regime began to lose control, the USSR expanded its military aid, sending helicopters and helicopter gun-ships to assist the Afghani government in fighting the rebels in Afghanistan's mountain regions, and there were a number of reports of Soviet involvement in military actions.[130]

In addition to stepping up its military aid to Kabul, Moscow also moved on the diplomatic front to try to curb the Afghani rebels' use of sanctuaries in neighboring countries. Pakistan, the main rebel base, was singled out for Soviet censure, possibly because Pakistan was in a difficult position because of its conflict with the United States over the independent Pakistani nuclear development program which had caused a sharp deterioration in Pakistani-American relations. Iran also came in for Soviet censure (Afghanistan was to cause a major rift in Moscow's relations with the new Iranian regime), and the USSR also accused China, Egypt and the United States of aiding the rebels. Indeed, *Pravda* openly accused the CIA of involvement in the rebellion,[131] a charge that was termed "slanderous and baseless" by the United States.[132]

Neither Soviet charges of outside intervention nor the military aid which the USSR had thus far extended, however, managed to stem the tide which appeared to be flowing against the Taraki regime by June 1st. The Soviet leadership then stepped up its diplomatic efforts to protect Taraki by issuing a formal warning in *Pravda* which stated:

> The USSR cannot remain indifferent to the violations of the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the incursions into its territory from Pakistan, and the attempt to create a crisis situation in that area . . . What is in question is virtual aggression against a state with which the USSR has a common frontier.[133]

Moscow followed up this warning by increasing still further its military involvement in Afghanistan, thereby disregarding a series of American statements opposing the heightened Soviet military commitment. Thus in a speech on August 2nd, Brzezinski, citing "prudent" American

restraint during the Iranian crisis, said "We expect others similarly to abstain from intervention and from efforts to impose alien doctrines on deeply religious and nationally conscious peoples."[134] Brzezinski's warning, however, was taken no more seriously by the Russians than Carter's plaintive hope of January 1978 that the Russians and Cubans would not get more heavily involved in Ethiopia, or Carter's appeal to Brezhnev about Afghanistan during the summit. Indeed, several days after Brzezinski's statement, Soviet forces helped put down an attempted coup in Kabul,[135] and the buildup of Soviet military advisors and military equipment increased, although the rebels continued to score victories against the highly unpopular Taraki regime, and against Taraki's successor, Hafiz Amin, who overthrew Taraki in mid-September.

If Moscow disregarded American warnings about Afghanistan, it acted similarly during the imbroglio over the "Soviet Brigade" in Cuba. When Carter proclaimed that the U.S. found the "status quo of the Soviet brigade in Cuba unacceptable" -- despite the fact that the brigade did not violate the Khruschev-Kennedy understanding of 1962 -- the American President soon had to back down when the USSR stood firm, thus, in effect, accepting the status quo that he previously said he had found "unacceptable." The end result was that the Soviet brigade in Cuba stayed in place (although Carter promised it would be watched closely and a new U.S. Carribean Joint Task Force would be created) and Carter pressed ahead to get the SALT agreement ratified -- despite a series of personal attacks on Carter in the Soviet press over the brigade issue.[136] Indeed, Moscow may have seen this as yet another example of Carter's weakness and vacillation, and *Pravda* on October 3rd noted that Carter in his speech announcing the end of the crisis "was forced to admit in his speech that the presence of Soviet military personnel at military training centers in Cuba is certainly no reason to return to the cold war." The *Pravda* article also cited Carter's pleas to the Senate to ratify SALT II.

Almost as damaging to the credibility of the Administration during the summer of 1979 was the "Andrew Young affair," where the American U.N. Ambassador first said he had met accidentally with the PLO

representative to the U.N., then admitted it had been a planned meeting, then resigned, and then stated that the State Department knew all along about the planned nature of the meeting, even though it violated both U.S. policy and a clear commitment to Israel. In watching the handling of the affair by the Carter Administration, Moscow may well have concluded that Carter's Administration was not only a vacillating one, but that the President could not control his chief assistants.[137]

If the Soviet "Cuban Brigade" and Andrew Young affairs might have raised questions about Carter's competence in Moscow, there was no such questioning of the competence of the American farmer, as Soviet orders for American grain spiralled because of another poor harvest in the USSR to 25 million tons by early October. The USSR also continued to hope for the lifting of trade restrictions, and Carter's decision to appoint former IBM Chairman Thomas Watson, an advocate of increased trade with the USSR, instead of a professional diplomat as Ambassador to Moscow, may have signalled to the Russians that the U.S. President was also genuinely interested in an increase in trade. Nonetheless, Congress seemed unwilling to grant Moscow Most Favored Nation Status, a development that must have been galling to the USSR since China seemed well on its way to achieving just such a status.

If Moscow was unhappy over the lack of Congressional action on trade, it was even more unhappy with Congressional opposition to the SALT II treaty. Indeed, after the treaty was signed, Soviet leaders warned the Senate against any changes,[138] and visits by Senate Majority leader Robert Byrd and Senators Joseph Biden and Richard Lugar did little to change the official Soviet attitude. Meanwhile, Moscow could not have been too pleased with President Carter either for the actions he had begun to take in the area of strategic weaponry. Gone were the days of unilateral concessions over the B-1 bomber and neutron bomb. Indeed, Carter decided, in an action that was clearly within the letter of the SALT II agreement -- although Russia said it was against the spirit of the agreement -- to push ahead with the mobile MX ICBM which was seen as a hedge against any Soviet first strike against the increasingly

vulnerable U.S. land-based ICBM force. In addition, Carter announced his agreement to a 5% increase in overall defense spending (hitherto he had wanted only a 3% increase). The USSR attacked both actions as a pay-off to the hawks to get SALT II approved by the Senate.[139] The development that seemed to anger Moscow the most, however, was Carter's efforts to get NATO to agree to deploy in Western Europe U.S. medium range ballistic missiles (Pershing IIs) and ground-launched cruise missiles that had the capability of hitting the USSR. Despite the fact that the United States argued that the deployment of the missiles was a counter of the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 mobile missile and backfire bomber, Moscow undertook a major propaganda campaign, similar to its anti-neutron bomb campaign two years earlier, to try to dissuade the Europeans from allowing the missiles to be deployed on their soil. This time, however, the campaign had a carrot and stick quality. On the one hand, Brezhnev, in a major speech in East Germany in early October, offered to reduce the number of Soviet medium range nuclear weapons -- if the Europeans refused to go along with the deployment of the U.S. missiles.[140] To sweeten his offer somewhat, Brezhnev announced the unilateral withdrawal of 1,000 Soviet tanks and 20,000 troops over the next year from East Europe back to the USSR. On the other hand, Gromyko, in a press conference in Bonn, warned the West Europeans that if they deployed the new weapons in Europe, there would be no negotiations on reducing the level of nuclear weapons in Europe and he then warned West Germany that the missile deployment would harm Soviet-West German relations.[141]

Pravda went even futher as on December 12th when, on the eve of the NATO decision, it warned, in an obvious effort to drive a wedge between Western Europe and the United States, that "Western Europe is being assigned the role of lightning rod, which is supposed to accept a (nuclear) strike, thus averting it from America itself."

Nonetheless, the Soviet campaign proved ineffective and NATO voted to accept the deployment of the new weapons, although the NATO communique also called for negotiations on mutual arms reductions with

Moscow. Moscow, however, initially rejected the offer, and branded the move, together with the other military actions taken by Carter, as an attempt to achieve military superiority over the USSR.[142]

While the American success in gaining the agreement of its NATO allies for the deployment of the nuclear-tipped Pershing and cruise missiles may have been seen by Moscow as an example of successful leadership by the Carter Administration (*Pravda* called it "armtwisting"),[143] the U.S. government's handling of the Iranian hostage situation may have been seen in a very different light. Indeed, the Administration's reluctance to impose economic, let alone military, sanctions at a time when the United States was being humiliated on a daily basis by street mobs parading with the sign "America can't do anything" may well have struck the Soviet leadership as a sign of weakness, particularly since President Carter emphasized so strongly that the lives of the hostages were the primary American concern. Indeed, the hostage situation weakened still further the position of the United States in the Middle East as many nations in the region began to openly wonder how likely it was that the United States would come to their aid if it could not even defend its own interests. Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership, up until the invasion of Afghanistan, seemed to be playing a double role in the hostage crisis. On the one hand it publicly deplored the taking of the diplomatic hostages (its own diplomats could one day find themselves in a similar situation) and voted in the U.N. Security Council on December 4th to call on Iran to release the hostages. On the other hand, however, a Soviet radio broadcast to Iran in Persian by the regular Persian language commentator, Vera Lebedeva, at the beginning of the crisis called the action by the Iranian students "totally understandable and logical" -- a clear signal of Soviet support.[144] In addition, Soviet press reporting on the crisis situation became increasingly favorable to Iran as the USSR saw the opportunity to obtain influence with the Khomeini regime. Consequently Moscow rejected American complaints about Soviet broadcasts to Iran while deploring U.S. military buildup in the Indian Ocean which had been precipitated by the hostage taking. Indeed, an *Izvestia* article one day

after the U.N. vote went so far as to accuse the United States of trying to blackmail Iran:

> Instead of setting an example of restraint, responsibility and composure in the present circumstances, redoubling efforts to seek a reasonable way out of this situation and not letting emotions take the upper hand, certain circles in the U.S. are leaning more and more toward the use of force. They claim that this is a response to the holding as hostages of U.S. embassy personnel in Teheran, which is contrary to the norms of international law. To be sure, the seizure of the American Embassy in and of itself does not conform to the international convention concerning respect for diplomatic privileges and immunity. However, one cannot pull this act out of the overall context of American-Iranian relations and forget about the actions of the U.S. toward Iran, which are in no way consonant with the norms of law and morality.[145]

Ironically, of course, the United States had been very patient with the Iranians, even to the point of weakness (the U.S. did not even intern Iranian diplomats in the United States), despite the fact that Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini not only rejected the U.N. Security Council resolution and the World Court decision which similarly called upon Iran to release the hostages, but also refused to meet with U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim during his visit to Iran to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis. In sum, one can see the Iranian situation as yet another case of a Third World crisis area which Moscow sought to exploit for its own benefit rather than cooperate with the U.S. as Carter had so fervently hoped.

Whether or not the Carter Administration's lack of firmness in handling the Iranian crisis was a factor in the Soviet decision to proceed with a massive invasion of Afghanistan in late December is only a matter of conjecture. Nonetheless, it must have struck the Kremlin leaders that if the U.S. was unwilling to intervene in Iran where it had major interests,

it was very unlikely to take action in Afghanistan where American interests were almost nonexistent.

Meanwhile, as Soviet-American relations began to chill in the latter part of 1979, Sino-American relations improved further. The improvement was highlighted by the visit of Vice-President Walter Mondale to Beijing in August. On Chinese T.V., Mondale told the Chinese that a "strong and secure and modernizing China was in the American interest." Soon afterwards, Hua Guo Feng visited West Germany, Britain and Italy, as the Chinese leader sought to strengthen anti-Soviet policies in each country (China strongly supported Carter's policy of putting cruise missiles in Europe to counter the SS-20s) while also searching for military and economic assistance. Hua's quest for military aid was successful in London as the Thatcher government agreed to sell the Harrier VTOL jets China had long been interested in, and the Chinese leader signed a number of economic agreements in Germany and Italy as well.[146]

As Sino-American and Sino-West European ties were improving, Sino-Soviet relations continued to stagnate. Despite the opening of formal talks on September 23rd, the propaganda battle between the two countries continued at a high level,[147] with Deng publicly taking a negative outlook towards the talks.[148] In this atmosphere it is not surprising that the talks made little apparent progress, although Moscow sought to gain Chinese acceptance of what it termed a "Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations Between the USSR and the PRC."[149]

At this point one might ask if Moscow, with its diplomatic and military position in Asia now strengthened, and with a military relationship between the United States and China not yet consumated, could have made a gesture to relieve some of the tension in the Sino-Soviet relationship by making a limited withdrawal of some of its forces from the Sino-Soviet border, something that Brezhnev's successor, Mikhail Gorbachev, was to offer to do seven years later. Moscow was to opt for the opposite policy, however, and three weeks after the end of the

Moscow round of the Sino-Soviet talks, the USSR invaded Afghanistan, thus placing Soviet troops along yet another border with the PRC, albeit a small one. China responded by not only denouncing the Soviet move but also by terminating its talks with the USSR.

If the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was to cause yet another deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, its effect on Soviet-American relations was to be far more serious. Following the invasion, an event which seemed to finally convince Carter of the basically aggressive nature of Soviet foreign policy, the American President announced the withdrawal of the SALT II treaty from Senate consideration, imposed a partial grain embargo and a high technology export ban on the USSR, and cancelled U.S. participation in the Moscow Olympics (an action that was soon backed by Beijing which also boycotted the Olympics). At the same time, the U.S. Academy of Sciences announced a suspension of scientific exchanges with the USSR. In addition, the U.S. stepped up its search for Middle East bases for its newly-created deployment force and sought to arrange an anti-Soviet alliance of Muslim states in the Middle East, as Carter, in his State of the Union address, declared:

> Let our position be absolutely clear: Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.[150]

In retrospect it seems clear that the Soviets made a massive miscalculation of the American reaction when they invaded Afghanistan. Perhaps, as mentioned above, seeing the minimal U.S. reaction in Iran when the Shah fell and American hostages were seized, it calculated the U.S. would not react strongly in Afghanistan where its interests were far smaller. Nonetheless, given Carter's preoccupation with both the Middle East and the energy crisis, Moscow's analysts were clearly off the mark if they assumed that a move into Afghanistan which involved both of Carter's preoccupations, would not evoke a major reaction. While

Carter's statement, that as a result of the invasion his opinion of the USSR had changed more drastically in one week than in the previous three years, has been frequently quoted, his description of the impact of the invasion in his memoirs is far more significant:

> The brutality of this act was bad enough, but the threat of this Soviet invasion to the rest of the region was very clear -- and had grim consequences. A successful take-over of Afghanistan would give the Soviets a deep penetration between Iran and Pakistan, and pose a threat to the rich oil fields of the Persian Gulf area and to the crucial waterways through which so much of the world's energy supplies had to pass.[151]

Given this perspective, the array of sanctions which Carter instituted should have been expected, along with his endorsement of a new and more aggressive strategic doctrine which became embodied in Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59).[152]

Moscow seemed taken aback at the U.S. reaction to the invasion, with Brezhnev, as might be expected, condemning the U.S. sanctions:

> As a result of the Carter Administration's actions, the entire world increasingly is forming the impression of the United States as a completely unreliable partner in interstate relations, as a state whose leadership, prompted by some whim, caprice or emotional outburst or by considerations of narrowly conceived immediate advantage, is capable at any moment of violating international treaties and agreements. There is hardly any need to explain what a dangerous destabilizing impact this has on the entire international situation, particularly when it is the leadership of a large influential power from which peoples have a right to expect a considered and responsible policy.[153]

It is possible, of course, that even after the invasion the Soviet leadership may have felt that the vacillating Carter Administration would again move to seek improved relations with the USSR and try to get the SALT agreement ratified. If so, they were mistaken, and relations soon

plummeted almost to the level of the Cold War. Under these circumstances, the United States moved to strengthen its alliances against the USSR, and the PRC was a logical candidate for improved relations. Thus in early January 1980, it was revealed that Carter had decided to give China access to the Landsat photo-reconnaisance satellite which the U.S. was soon to launch.[154] The agreement, which had clear military implications, was signed when Carter's science advisor Frank Press arrived in Beijing for a four-day visit on January 24th.[155]

The overall Administration position on selling military weaponry to China had changed as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan -- despite the opposition of Secretary of State Vance who was soon to resign over the abortive American hostage rescue mission in Iran. The change in policy first became clear when U.S. Secretary of Defense Brown visited Beijing in early January. Brown told the Chinese that the United States and China "should coordinate their policies in the face of the threat from the Soviet Union," and he also sought to coordinate policy toward aid to Pakistan following the invasion.[156] The Chinese Defense Ministry's director of foreign affairs, Chai Chengwen, responded by a call for "expanding contacts between military personnel of the United States and China."[157] At the end of his visit Brown indicated that the United States would be "receptive" to future Chinese requests to buy high technology equipment like computers that could have a military application, although he ruled out any direct U.S. sale of arms to China.[158] (The Chinese reportedly had expressed interest in the F-15 fighter, the C-130 transport plane, military helicopters and a variety of advanced electronic and radar systems.[159]) Nonetheless, the agreement to sell the so-called dual-use technology opened the door to sales of military equipment and it was not long before such sales were seriously considered. Indeed, when Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao, Vice Premier and Secretary General of the CCP's military commission visited the United States on May 30th, the U.S. reportedly approved export licenses to China of such items as tactical air defense radar sets, transport helicopters and planes and "passive countermeasure devices" to confuse

attacking aircraft.[160] As Sino-American military ties grew closer, so too did their economic ties as Congress, on January 24, 1980, voted overwhelmingly to grant "Most Favored Nation" status to China,[161] and a plethora of scientific exchanges soon took place.[162]

As these developments occurred, there was little the USSR, which was also worried about growing unrest in Poland, could do other than complain bitterly about the growing military ties between China and the United States, along with the push for higher military spending in Japan, another development caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While Moscow tried, alternatively, to show that Washington was manipulating Beijing and Beijing was manipulating Washington, this policy did not meet with success.[163] Moscow also seemed to show its dissatisfaction with the further consolidation of power by Deng in September 1980, with *Pravda* on September 14th noting:

> The anti-Soviet statements that were heard at the (3rd) session of the National People's Congress showed that Maoist foreign policy remains unchanged. Deng Hsiao-Ping was the instigator of Chinese aggression against Vietnam and the "architect" of Peking's "bridge" to the U.S. He and his supporters are credited with the idea of creating an anti-Soviet alliance between China on the one hand and U.S. imperialism and world reaction on the other.[164]

While Moscow was able to do little to prevent the consolidation of Sino-American ties -- and the visit of U.S. Undersecretary of Defense William Perry to China in September 1980 further underscored the strengthening of Sino-American military relations,[165] it did move both militarily and diplomatically to strengthen its Asian position. In addition to continuing its own military buildup and sending large amounts of arms to Vietnam which was fighting major battles against Cambodian guerrillas even as Moscow was fighting Afghan guerrillas, Moscow moved to strengthen its ties with India, a country the USSR had long hoped would serve as a counterweight to China in Asia. Fortunately for Moscow, soon

after the invasion of Afghanistan, Indira Ghandi returned to power in India and she quickly demonstrated that she was far more concerned with American and Chinese plans to militarily aid Pakistan, and U.S. military assistance to China, than by the Soviet invasion. Moscow took full advantage of Ghandi's proclivities and sold India a number of sophisticated aircraft while obtaining Indian recognition of the Vietnamese-dominated puppet regime in Cambodia.[166] India was also the scene of a Brezhnev visit in December 1980, when Moscow agreed to sell New Delhi additional oil to make up for the oil lost because of the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, and the two countries also called for the ouster of the United States from its Indian Ocean base on Diego Garcia and the return of the island to Mauritius.[167]

One month later, the Carter Administration came to an end. Yet even at the very last minute Moscow, which might have been more careful with a new administration coming to power, nonetheless chose once again to play zero-sum game politics in the Third World as it deliberately sought to sabotage the pending release of American hostages in Iran by spreading disinformation that the United States was about to launch a military attack on Iran.[168] It also brushed aside American complaints that the Soviet actions were harming the hostage negotiations.[169] The Soviet ploy failed, however, and Moscow was soon confronted with Ronald Reagan who was to cause Moscow far more problems than Jimmy Carter. In any case the advent of the Reagan Administration provides a useful point of departure for analyzing Soviet policy toward the United States during the Carter Administration.

CONCLUSIONS

In looking at the four years of Soviet-American relations during the Carter Presidency, there is no question but that a major transformation took place. At the time of Carter's inauguration, Moscow was giving a number of signals that it was actively interested in improving economic relations, working out a Middle East settlement, and achieving a

SALT agreement. At the time of Carter's departure from office, the Soviet leadership was seeking to sabotage the hostage negotiations in Iran, and thereby to prolong the agony that Carter and many other Americans were feeling over the hostage crisis. For his part, Carter moved from a position of seeking to withdraw American troops from Korea, cut defense spending, reduce strategic armaments, and refrain from too close a relationship with China lest Moscow be offended, to one of deploying the MX missile, significantly increasing defense spending, and strengthening the U.S. strategic position in Europe, while also imposing a series of economic sanctions against the USSR and dramatically improving relations with and selling arms to China. What accounts for these major changes? Some observers, like Raymond Garthoff, have argued that it was due to Carter's overreaction to Soviet activities in the Third World and his coming too much under the influence of Zbigniew Brzezinski who had far more of a confrontational approach to the USSR than other members of the Carter Administration. There is, however, another explanation, and in my view one that is closer to the mark. Jimmy Carter is a deeply religious man, genuinely committed to human rights and with a vision of a world where the two superpowers would cooperate to improve the human condition. As Arkady Shevchenko noted in his book, "Gromyko perceived that Carter was painfully naive about the USSR . . . Carter appeared to believe that one could work with the Soviet regime as an honest partner, as one would with a Western democracy."[170] Indeed, one major conclusion that can be drawn from examining Soviet policy toward the United States in the 1977-1981 period of Carter's Presidency is that Moscow both sensed and exploited Carter's highly optimistic view of the world, his oft-stated hope for improved Soviet-American relations, and most especially, his desire for a SALT agreement, to pursue policies inimical to American values and global interests, with little fear of American counteractions. Thus Moscow actively pursued its anti-dissident campaigns in 1977 and 1978, intervened decisively in the Ethiopian-Somali war, increased its military involvement in Afghanistan, openly encouraged anti-American feelings in Iran, and joined the opposition to the American-mediated Egyptian-Israeli

peace agreement, in the face of both warnings from the United States and, on occasion, rather plaintive hopes for cooperative Soviet activity, particularly in Third World crisis areas. Ironically, the only significant American reactions to Soviet activity before 1980 came in places like Zaire and North Yemen where the Soviet participation in the crisis was very limited.

Contributing to this Soviet image of the Carter Administration were Carter's unilateral gestures in the first fifteen months of his Administration which Moscow may have seen as aimed at gaining Soviet good will. These included his decision not to produce the B-1 bomber, a decision which obviated the necessity for Moscow to make a matching concession, despite Brezhnev's openly professed willingness to do so. Secondly, there was the Administration's decision to invite Moscow to help solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, thereby enabling Moscow to leave the Middle East sidelines. Finally, there was Carter's initial decision not to produce and deploy the neutron bomb, a weapon very much feared by the USSR which had waged a major propaganda campaign against it.

While these unilateral gestures diminished after June 1978, they were still a part of American policy, as evidenced at the Vienna summit by the American willingness to resume the naval limitation talks in the Indian Ocean, despite the continued presence in Ethiopia of large numbers of Cuban troops, and the strategic disadvantage any such limitation would cause for the United States, and the Administration's public commitment to eliminate the trade restrictions enacted by Congress against the Soviet Union. By contrast, the only significant Soviet concession during the Carter Presidency was Moscow's willingness to allow Jews to emigrate from the USSR in record numbers, and this may have been a ploy to improve the chances of the U.S. Senate ratifying the SALT agreement.

Another conclusion that can be drawn is that Moscow had an image of the Carter Administration as one that had a tendency to vacillate on key issues. Thus Carter initially gave strong backing for Soviet dissidents, but then backed off; in 1978 he promised the modernization

of America's nuclear arsenal one month, but then cancelled production of the neutron bomb the next; then he placed trade restrictions on Moscow, but several months later relaxed them; in 1979 he claimed that the status quo of Soviet troops in Cuba was "unacceptable" one month, but accepted it the next -- all of this was part of the vacillation seen by Moscow. Moscow seemed to profit from this vacillation and may well have sensed that whatever the initial American position, it ultimately might swing back to one more favorable to the USSR. Indeed, by standing firm and occasionally issuing some warnings of its own, Moscow, in a number of cases seemed to be able to produce American concessions. Thus, in the case of the dissident campaign of 1977, Moscow warned Carter that a continuation of his active support for the Soviet dissidents would result in damage to the SALT talks and Carter ultimately backed down from his public stance. Then, in rejecting Carter's initial SALT proposals, Moscow complained of American efforts at gaining "unilateral advantage" and soon after came Carter's decision not to produce the B-1. Similarly, Moscow's anti-neutron bomb campaign was rewarded by Carter's decision not to produce the weapon, nor to seek a Soviet *quid-pro-quo* for deferring its production. In sum, particularly in the first half of the Administration, Moscow may well have felt it could pressure Carter into concessions.

If in fact, this was Moscow's early tactic, it appeared somewhat less effective in the second part of the Administration. Thus Carter played the "China card," despite Soviet warnings (although the Administration seemed to be somewhat defensive in doing so). In addition Carter decided to produce the MX missile and also gained the acceptance of NATO for the stationing of nuclear-tipped Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe. Nonetheless, if Carter proved less susceptible to Soviet pressure in the latter stages of his Administration, the Administration itself remained divided over how to react to Soviet policy with Brzezinski favoring a harder line and Vance (and Marshall Shulman) a softer one, and Carter appeared to "ping-pong" between the two viewpoints, a development which appeared to underline the Administration's vacillation. This was evident not only in the public debate

within the Administration over the handling of the Soviet intervention in the Horn of Africa and in Carter's Annapolis speech, but also in the Administration's approach to China.

In sum, therefore, in the period before the invasion of Afghanistan the Soviet image of the Carter Administration's foreign policy would appear to be one of a weak and vacillating Administration, whose leader seemed so intent on improving relations with the USSR and obtaining a SALT agreement, that the USSR could do as it saw fit, particularly in the Third World, with relatively little concern for a major American response other than verbal protests. To what degree this perception may have played a role in the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in late December 1979 is impossible to determine. What is clear, however, is that such an image of the Carter Administration would do little to deter such a Soviet move, and Moscow may have felt that whatever the initial American reaction to the move, it would ultimately vacillate back to again seeking cooperation with the USSR.

Yet this turned out to be a major miscalculation. The sanctions imposed by Carter after the invasion remained in place during the remaining year of his term, and the U.S. adopted a tougher strategic arms policy (PD-59) while moving rapidly to improve relations with China. SALT II was shelved, Carter proclaimed U.S. willingness to militarily defend the Persian Gulf and any thought of including Moscow in an overall Middle East peace settlement was dropped. By invading Afghanistan, Moscow came into direct confrontation with three of the basic interests of Carter: human rights, energy and the Middle East. As the President who had loudly proclaimed his regard for human rights, who had called the energy crisis "the moral equivalent of war" and who had negotiated the first Arab-Israeli peace agreement in history, Carter was deeply angered by the invasion which not only deprived the Afghan people of their human rights (as seen by Carter), but also threatened the oil fields of the Persian Gulf and the entire Middle East. The White House watchers in the Kremlin clearly miscalculated his response to the invasion, probably the most serious miscalculation of an American President's

reaction since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

In sum, therefore, the period of the Carter Administration may be seen as one in which Moscow, after initially adjusting to Carter, felt it could pressure the naive and rather idealistic -- if vacillating -- President into concessions only to discover that by invading Afghanistan it had pushed him much too far with the result that Moscow faced not only a far worse relationship with the United States than in 1977, but a weakened strategic situation in the world because of the new Sino-American relationship.

[1]Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982); Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus Giroux, 1983); Harold Brown, *Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983). One other participant, Marshall Shulman, a special advisor to Vance on Soviet affairs, told the author he was not planning to write his memoirs.

[2]See, for example, Georgi Arbatov, *The Soviet Viewpoint* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1981).

[3]Arkady Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1985).

[4]Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985).

[5]Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986).

[6]Garthoff, *op. cit.*, 956.

[7]For a discussion of this issue, see Jerry F. Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986). Hough cites the reported warning of a deputy director of a Soviet institute to his subordinates "Those who write don't decide; those who decide don't read." (262).

[8]For a balanced view, see Morton Schwartz, *Soviet Perceptions of the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

[9]For a recent exposition of this viewpoint, see Garthoff, *op. cit.*.

[10]Paul Marantz, "Probing Moscow's Outlook," *Problems of Communism* Vol. 28, no. 2 (March-April 1979), 50.

[11]For a recent exposition of this viewpoint see Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). Gelman summarizes his suspicions of the USSR with the following quotation from Milovan Djilas (217):

> The importance of ideology for the Soviet leadership -- any Soviet leadership -- is seldom understood in the West . . . Their rule is anchored in ideology as the divine right of Kings was in Christianity, and therefore their imperialism too, has to be ideological or it commands no legitimacy. This is why the men in the Kremlin can lose no territory once acquired, why they cannot abandon friends and allies no matter how objectively burdensome they may become to them (can you imagine the USSR ratting on the Shah of Iran?) or admit alternative interpretations of the true faith. -- this is also why it is an unsupportable American hope that the Kremlin may be pressured or humored into a type of comprehensive detente which would guarantee Soviet moderation in Africa and Asia as part of a SALT settlement or any settlement. No Soviet leader can do that without abdicating his title to leadership and jeopardizing the justification of Soviet rule.

[12]*Documents and Resolutions, 25th Congress of the CPSU* (Moscow: Novosti, 1976), 16; 39.

[13]Cf. Dimitry Proetkor, "Problems of Military Detente in Europe," *International Affairs*, December 1975, 33, cited in Graham D. Vernon, "Controlled Conflict: Soviet Perceptions of Peaceful Coexistence," *Orbis* Vol. 23, no. 2 (Summer 1979), 286, and Schwartz, *op. cit.* Moscow also had to worry about the "Team B" report which emphasized the Soviet threat (Cf. Garthoff, *op. cit.*, 785.

[14]Cf. Seymour E. Goodman, "Soviet Computing and Technology Transfer," *World Politics* Vol. 31, no. 4 (July 1979), 539-570. See also Philip Hanson, "Western Technology in the Soviet Economy," *Problems of*

Communism Vol. 27, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1978), 20-30.

[15]For an analysis of the issue of Soviet Jewry in Soviet-American relations, see Robert O. Freedman, "Soviet Jewry and Soviet-American Relations" in Robert O. Freedman (ed.) *Soviet Jewry in the Decisive Decade 1971-1980* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1984), 38-67.

[16]For a study of the development of the SALT talks, see Garthoff, *op. cit.*, 442-453 and Strobe Talbot, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York: Harpers, 1980).

[17]Cited in report by Bernard Gwertzman, *New York Times*, January 31, 1976.

[18]For an analysis of Soviet policy in the Middle East during this period, see Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 195-275.

[19]*Pravda*, December 1, 1976.

[20]*Pravda*, December 11, 1976.

[21]*Pravda*, December 30, 1976.

[22]In the latter stages of the Presidential campaign, Carter had praised the Jackson amendment and told Jackson that if elected he would effectively implement it (Freedman, *Soviet Jewry*), 49.

[23]*Pravda*, January 19, 1977.

[24]Adam Ulam, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Unhappy Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs - America and the World 1978* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1979), 559.

[25]*Izvestia*, January 22, 1977.

[26]*New York Times*, January 28, 1977.

[27]Cf. Radio Moscow, in English, January 29, 1977.

[28]Cited in report by Peter Osnos, *Washington Post*, February 5, 1977.

[29]The text of the press conference is printed in *Presidency 1977* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1978) (hereafter *Presidency, 1977*), 124. In his memoirs, Carter claims that the human rights issue was never "the direct cause" of a failure in working with the USSR in matters of common interest (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 149).

[30]Ford later said he was sorry he did not meet with Solzhenitsyn (*Christian Science Monitor*, March 3, 1977).

[31]*Pravda*, March 22, 1977. For a comparative analysis of the various Soviet peace plans, see Robert O. Freedman, "The Soviet Conception of a Middle East Peace Settlement," in *The Limits to Power: Soviet Policy in the Middle East* (ed. Yaacov Ro'i) (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 282–327, and "Moscow and a Middle East Peace Settlement," *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1985, 143–161.

[32]*Presidency, 1977*, 133A.

[33]Carter's memoirs are filled with incidents which reflect a naivete in dealing with the world in general and the Soviet Union in particular. To take but one example, in relating that the Chinese had considered it significant that his first meeting with the Washington liaison chief of the Peoples Republic of China had lasted longer than his first meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, Carter noted that he "had never thought about measuring the length of the two discussions" (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 189). His preelection book, *Why Not the Best* (New York: Bantam, 1975) reflects a similar naivete in dealing with the world (see especially 140–141).

[34]For a discussion of the "back channel," see John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), 203–205. Garthoff, *op. cit.* and Talbot *op. cit.*, discuss the failure of the Vance visit. In an interview with the author, Shulman noted

that some of those urging major cuts on Carter wished to sabotage detente.

[35]Cf. *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, April 3, 1977.

[36]*Pravda*, April 1, 1977 (translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* Vol. 29, no. 13, 5-9).

[37]*Presidency, 1977*, 146A.

[38]*Pravda*, on June 11th had called the meeting "the infamous White House reception of the criminal Bukovsky."

[39]*Presidency, 1977*, 152A.

[40]Vance, *op. cit.*, 58. For President Carter's justification in not using the B-1 as a "bargaining chip," see his news conference of June 30th, reprinted in *Presidency, 1977*, 153A. His memoirs reflect the same rather naive position (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 81-82). Garthoff also downplays the significance of the B-1 decision, while emphasizing the U.S. development of other strategic systems like the Mark 12A warhead. In doing this, however, he misreads the impact of the B-1 decision on Moscow's view of Carter.

[41]*Pravda*, July 17, 1977.

[42]The text of the speech is found in the *Department of State Bulletin*, July 25, 1977, 193-198. In his memoirs, Carter continued to emphasize that he believed too many of America's international concerns "were being defined almost exclusively by the chronic U.S.-Soviet confrontation mentality which seemed to be shortsignted and counterproductive" (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 188).

[43]Cf. *Pravda*, July 24, 1977.

[44]*Pravda*, August 3, 1977.

[45]Cited in the report by Don Oberdorfer in the July 30, 1977 issue of the *Washington Post*. In his memoirs, however, Vance cites no

such Soviet cooperation (Vance, *op. cit.*, 187-190).

[46]For a description of Soviet policy during this period, see Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970*, 300-302.

[47]Cited in AP report from Beirut, *Baltimore Evening Sun*, September 14, 1977.

[48]For the text of the joint statement and an analysis of its implications, see Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970*, 308-312.

[49]See *Ibid.*, chapter 7.

[50]*Ibid.*, 310.

[51]*Pravda*, September 25, 1977.

[52]*Pravda*, November 15, 1977.

[53]*Pravda*, on October 23rd, indicated that the U.S. delegation to Helsinki was split between "diehard representatives of the infamous Washington Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe" and "more restrained and sober-minded professional diplomats."

[54]*Pravda*, November 15, 1977.

[55]*Pravda*, November 19, 1977.

[56]*Pravda*, November 20, 1977.

[57]Cited in William Orbach, *The American Movement to Aid Soviet Jews* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1979, 153-154).

[58]For a monthly breakdown of Soviet Jewish emigration in 1977, see *National Conference on Soviet Jewry News Bulletin No. 131* (November 15, 1978), 2.

[59]Shevchenko, *op. cit.*, 401.

[60]Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 222.

[61] *Ibid.*, 224.

[62] For a description of the Arab reaction to the Sadat visit to Jerusalem, see Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970*, 320.

[63] For details of the Soviet reaction to the visit, see *Ibid.*, 320-321.

[64] *Presidency, 1977*, 186A.

[65] *Izvestia*, on December 3, for example made a personal attack on President Carter.

[66] *Pravda*, December 13, 1977.

[67] For a detailed study of Soviet intervention in the Ethiopian-Somali war, see Richard Remnek, *Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: The Decision to Intervene* (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1980). See also David Albright, "The Horn of Africa and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in *World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (ed. Robert O. Freedman) (New York: Pergamon, 1979), 147-191. For a more sympathetic treatment of the Soviet position, see Garthoff, *op. cit.*, 630-653.

[68] Garthoff, *Ibid.*

[69] Cited in *President Carter: 1978* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1979), 85-A (hereafter *President Carter: 1978*).

[70] See the respective memoirs for the differing views. (Vance, *op. cit.*, 84-88; Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, 178-189).

[71] Cited in *President Carter, 1978*, 84-A.

[72] Cited in *Ibid.*, 85-A.

[73] *Pravda*, March 5, 1978.

[74] The text of the speech is in *President Carter: 1978*, 139-A to

141-A.

[75]Cited in Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, 189. Brzezinski felt this undercut the message of the speech.

[76]Translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 30, no. 12, 4.

[77]For Carter's viewpoint, see *Keeping Faith*, 226. For a more balanced view which underlines German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's role in the affair, see Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, 307.

[78]*Pravda*, April 26, 1980.

[79]Cf. Carter's press conference on May 25, 1978 in *President Carter: 1978*, 101-A.

[80]Garthoff agrees with the Soviet version (*op. cit.*, 623-630); Vance is somewhat more circumspect (*op. cit.*, 90-91). It is doubtful, however, that such a move could have taken place without Cuban -- and most probably Soviet -- knowledge.

[81]*Pravda*, July 23, 1978 (translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* Vol. 30, no. 25, 5).

[82]Cited in *President Carter: 1978*, 101-A. This is another example of Carter's preoccupation with SALT. In a 1979 speech he stated "I've got only one life to live and one opportunity to serve in the highest elected office in our land. I will never have a chance so momentous to contribute to world peace as to negotiate and see ratified this SALT treaty." (*Keeping Faith*, 240). In another place he said the U.S. would be considered a "warmonger" if it didn't ratify the treaty (237).

[83]The Chinese wanted Moscow to reduce its force levels to those of the early 1960s. (Cf. Harry Gelman, "Outlook for Sino-Soviet Relations" in *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy* (ed. Erik P. hoffman and Frederick J. Fleron) (New York: Aldine, 1981), 619.

[84]For the text of Hua's speech on the "Four Modernizations," see

China, U.S. Policy Since 1945 (hereafter *China*) (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1980), 332-334.

[85]On the border issue, see Gelman, *loc. cit.* For the Chinese position on the border question, see Li Huichuan, "The Crux of the Sino-Soviet Boundary Question," *Beijing Review* (*Peking Review*) No. 30, 1981 (July 27), 12-17 and No. 31, 1981 (August 3), 13-16.

[86]Cf. Carl G. Jacobsen, *Sino-Soviet Relations Since Mao* (New York: Praeger, 1981), 93-94.

[87]*Ibid.*, 95. For an analysis of the ethnic Chinese issue in Sino-Vietnamese relations, see Lucian Pye, "Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization," *International Security* Vol. 4, no. 1 (Summer 1979), 11-12.

[88]Cited in *China*, 237. Brzezinski took great pride in his visit (see Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, 209-219).

[89]*Ibid.*

[90]The text of the speech is in *President Carter: 1978*, 148-A to 151-A.

[91]Translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* Vol. 30, no. 24, 1. Interestingly enough, a former speech writer of Carter's, James Fallows claims that the speech was essentially a "stapling" of a Vance memorandum to a Brzezinski memorandum. See James Fallows, "The Passionless Presidency," *Atlantic Monthly*, May 1979, 43.

[92]*Pravda*, June 26, 1978.

[93]*President Carter: 1978*, 109-A.

[94]Cf. *Izvestia*, July 14, 1978.

[95]For Moscow's reaction, see *Izvestia*, July 28, 1978.

[96]In his memoirs, Carter mentions the Vance visit in the context of the SALT talks, but makes no reference to the human rights controversy

(Carter, *op. cit.*, 230).

[97]*Pravda*, July 15, 1978.

[98]Brzezinski, in his memoirs, deplores the handling of the Dresser case (Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, 324).

[99]*President Carter: 1978*, 116-A.

[100]*Pravda*, August 13, 1980.

[101]*President Carter: 1978*, 45.

[102]*Pravda*, October 29, 1978.

[103]By the end of 1978 no less than 28,864 Jews had been permitted to emigrate, the highest number since the record 34,733 in 1973.

[104]See the report in the *Washington Post*, November 19, 1978. In his memoirs, Carter deplores the negative consequences of the visit (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 236).

[105]For an excellent study of these events and the subsequent Sino-Vietnamese war, see Sheldon W. Simon, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia," a paper prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations Conference "The Soviet Union in Asia," New York City, December 1979.

[106]For the text of the joint announcement and Carter's comments on it, see *President Carter: 1978*, 161-A.

[107]Cf. Radio Moscow in English to North America, December 22, 1978 and *Pravda*, December 22, 1978. In his memoirs, Carter asserts that Brezhnev reversed his position, although he admits that the Soviet leaders "were more concerned about our new relations with China than we had supposed" (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 234).

[108]Radio Moscow, in English to North America, December 21, 1978. The U.S. said it would not sell arms itself, but would not stop the West Europeans (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 201).

[109]Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 234.

[110]Cf. *Izvestia*, January 14, 1979.

[111]Cf. *Pravda*, February 4, 1979. Carter called the Deng visit "one of the delightful experiences of my Presidency" (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 202).

[112]Translated in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, the Soviet Union*, February 12, 1979, B-1 - B-4.

[113]Cf. *Izvestia*, March 21, 1979. Carter claims that he tried to dissuade Deng from invading Vietnam (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 206).

[114]Cited in Robert F. Dernberger, "Prospects for the Chinese Economy," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 28, nos. 5-6 (September-December 1979), 10-11.

[115]Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970*, 348-349.

[116]*Ibid.*, 349.

[117]Brezhnev initiated the campaign with a warning in *Pravda* on November 19, 1978.

[118]Cf. Moscow Radio (in Persian), December 14, 1978; January 10, 1979 and especially January 24, 1979.

[119]Dmitry Volsky, "Vicious Circle," *New Times* (Moscow) no. 5, 1979, 8.

[120]*Izvestia*, March 8, 1979 (translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* Vol. 31, no. 18, 23).

[121]For an analysis of the Soviet role in the Syrian invasion of Jordan, see Robert O. Freedman, "Detente and Soviet-American Relations in the Middle East during the Nixon Years," in *Dimensions of Detente* (ed. Della Sheldon) (New York: Praeger, 1978), 92-101.

[122]For a description of American military aid to Yemen, see the article by Richard Burt in the *New York Times*, March 18, 1979. Most military observers felt that the organization of the three-pronged invasion of North Yemen could not have been accomplished by the South Yemenis themselves (Cf. report by John Cooley, *Christian Science Monitor*, March 13, 1979). Ironically, in an apparent effort to hedge their bets (and because of a reluctance on the part of Saudi Arabia, which financed the weapons sale, to allow sufficient weapons to flow to North Yemen), the North Yemeni government was to turn to Moscow for additional arms in the fall of 1979. For a background analysis of the events during the invasion, see Mark N. Katz, *Russia and Arabia* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986, 36-38). Given the nature of Soviet backing for the PDRY, Garthoff is a bit unfair in deprecating U.S. activity in response to the PDRY action (650). According to the head of the U.S. team sent to North Yemen, there really was an invasion, although the North Yemeni government did try to exploit it to maximize U.S. aid. (Interview with General Richard Lawrence [Ret.], Washington, DC, November 7, 1986.) See also Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970*, 352-353.

[123]By the end of the year, more than 50,000 Jews had been allowed to emigrate, a new record. (Cf. Freedman, *Soviet Jewry*, 63).

[124]*Pravda*, June 17, 1979 (translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* Vol. 31, no. 24, 2).

[125]*Pravda*, June 17, 1979 (translated in *Ibid.*, 3).

[126]*Pravda*, June 18, 1979 (translated in *Ibid.*, 5).

[127]Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 254-256.

[128]The text of the communique was printed in *Pravda*, June 19, 1979.

[129]Brezhnev made this assertion during a dinner speech honoring the visit of Taraki for the signing of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of

Friendship and Cooperation (*Pravda*, December 6, 1978).

[130]Cf. reports in *New York Times*, April 13, 1979; *Washington Post*, May 10, 1979; and AP report in *New York Times*, May 4, 1979, citing United States intelligence sources. For the best studies of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, see Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985) and Thomas T. Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).

[131]*Pravda*, March 29, 1979.

[132]Cited in report by Don Oberdorfer, *Washington Post*, April 3, 1979.

[133]Cited in Dmitry Volsky, "The Target: Afghanistan's Revolution," *New Times*, no. 24, 1979, 13.

[134]Cited in report by Hedrick Smith, *New York Times*, August 3, 1979. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter was subsequently to relate the warning specifically to Afghanistan.

[135]See the report in the *Washington Post*, August 7, 1979.

[136]Cf. *Pravda*, September 28, 1979. On the issue of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, see Garthoff, *op. cit*, chapter 24, and Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 262–264.

[137]Cf. *Izvestia*, August 17, 1979.

[138]Cf. *Pravda*, June 20, 1979 and July 1, 1979.

[139]*Pravda*, September 16, 1979. Garthoff puts credence in the Soviet complaints (745–746); I do not.

[140]*Pravda*, October 7, 1979.

[141]*Pravda*, November 25, 1979. Garthoff, in saying the U.S. agreed to deploy the Pershing IIs more to meet the needs of America's NATO allies than to meet any genuine Soviet threat, overlooks the

psychological element in West European fear of the USSR. (Garthoff, *op. cit.*, 864-877).

[142]Cf. *Pravda*, December 15, 1979 and December 16, 1979.

[143]*Pravda*, December 16, 1979.

[144]Radio Moscow, November 6, 1979 (in Persian to Iran) (Vera Lebedeva commentary). The clandestine Baku National Voice of Iran Radio on November 5, 1979 was even more supportive (Cf. Gelman, *op. cit.*, 229 f.n. 16).

[145]*Izvestia*, December 5, 1979 (translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* Vol. 31, no. 49, 4). (For a solid analysis of the hostage crisis, see Gary Sick, *All Fall Down*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1986)).

[146]Cf. *China*, 254-255.

[147]*Izvestia*, on October 17, made a count of the number of Anti-Soviet articles appearing in Jenmin Jihpao alone (160 in August, 177 in September, and 60 in the first 10 days of October).

[148]Cf. *China*, 254.

[149]*Pravda*, December 8, 1979.

[150]Cited in Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, 426.

[151]Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 471-472.

[152]Garthoff is bitterly critical of PD-59 (Garthoff, *op. cit.*, 789). For a very different view, see Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, 458-459. See also Arbatov, *The Soviet Viewpoint*, 95-97.

[153]*Pravda*, January 13, 1986. Cited in Garthoff, *op. cit.*, 992. See also Arbatov, *The Soviet Viewpoint*, 72-73 and 190-195 for a view that Moscow was not surprised. My interviews with Soviet scholars, however, indicate they were clearly surprised by Carter's action.

[154]Cited in *China*, 260.

[155]*Ibid.*, 263.

[156]*Ibid.*

[157]*Ibid.*

[158]Cited in report by Jay Mathews, *Washington Post*, January 10, 1980.

[159]Cited in report by Fox Butterfield, *New York Times*, January 6, 1980. Such weapons, of course, would also give China an improved ability to attack Taiwan.

[160]Cited in Parris Chang, "China Card or American Card," *Asia Pacific Community*, no. 11 (Winter 1981), 123-124.

[161]Cited in *China*, 264.

[162]For an analysis of the development of Sino-American ties from an "insider," see Michel Oksenberg, "China Policy for the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 59, no. 2 (Winter 1980-81), 304-322.

[163]*Pravda*, January 15, 1980 and February 4, 1980 stated that the U.S. was manipulating China. On March 20, 1980 *Pravda* saw the two countries equally manipulating each other, but by April 7th it was China which was manipulating the U.S. On June 7, 1980, *Pravda* returned to an "equal manipulation" theme. Garthoff, however, was clearly convinced of China's manipulation of the U.S. (Garthoff, *op. cit*, 984).

[164]Translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 32, no. 37, 19.

[165]Cf. *Izvestia*, September 21, 1980, complaining of 400 licenses for military equipment approved by Carter.

[166]Cf. *Pravda*, July 9, 1980. For an analysis of Soviet-Indian relations at this time, see Robert H. Donaldson, "The Soviet Union in South Asia: A Friend to Rely On?" *Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 34, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 1980/81), 235-258.

[167]Cf. Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970*, 397.

[168]*Pravda*, January 17, 1981 and Moscow Radio Persian Language broadcast January 17, 1981 (*FBIS:USSR*, January 19, 1981, A-2 - A-3).

[169]Reuters report, *New York Times*, January 18, 1981.

[170]Shevchenko, *op. cit.*, 401.

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