

SOVIET CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF THE
IRANIAN REVOLUTION

by

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On 16 January 1979, according to the ironic account provided by Izvestiia, "His Majesty Muhammad Riza Shah Pavlavi, Shah of Shahs, of Iran, departed the country accompanied by the curses of his people and the wailings of his parasites,"¹ thus plunging Iran into a turbulent process of revolutionary change. The Soviet Union, despite its own efforts to court the shah in the past, had good reason to be pleased. A key element in the USA's regional "containment" posture had collapsed, and the Iranian revolution promised far-reaching possibilities for an extension of Soviet influence at US expense. Not least, the fall of the shah seemed to validate the Soviet Union's own ideological postulates concerning the potential for revolutionary transformations in the developing world. Greeting the revolution as "popular, anti-shah and anti-imperialist," the newly-appointed leader of the pro-Soviet People's Party of Iran (Tudeh Party) Nur al-Din Kiyanuri described it as "one of the most significant world events of the last third of the century."²

In the five years that have passed since the fall of the shah and the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the hopes expressed in these early evaluations have been broadly disappointed. If on one hand the institutional framework built-up under the charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Ruhallah Khumayni and his Islamic Republican Party (IRP) has proven relatively stable, the nature of "Islamic" institutions has evolved in unexpected directions. The revolution has not created a significantly improved climate of relations between Iran and the USSR, and the vision of a revolutionary process pushing

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pro-Soviet forces to the fore has remained unrealized. Instead, the Iranian ulama in power³ have crushed the secular, liberal, and left-wing oppositions with waves of inquisitional terror; outlawed the Tudeh Party despite its support for the regime and humiliated and executed its leaders; stifled the progressive social and economic reforms promised during the popular movement against the shah; refused all concessions and negotiated solutions in their war with Iraq (a war which the USSR decries and opposes); and reasserted Iran's political and economic relations with pro-Western powers such as Turkey and Pakistan, and with Western Europe. Soviet evaluations of the Iranian revolution have soured accordingly.⁴ Setting the tone for the more critical perspective which now dominates Soviet analysis, one prestigious commentator has emphasized the rise of reactionary forces within the Iranian leadership and castigated the regime as an "Islamic despotism."⁵

For obvious reasons the USSR has been sensitive to the need to preserve a manageable level of relations with its strategically placed southern neighbor. In spite of the revolution's travails, Soviet commentators continue to praise its objectively anti-imperialist character, to encourage increased economic activity between the USSR and Iran, and to maintain a posture of formal neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war. The Soviet Union conducts conventional diplomatic relations with Tehran and has repeatedly observed that it has no claims upon any Iranian territory and "stands for the development of normal, good-neighborly relations with Iran based upon the principle of

mutually advantageous cooperation."⁶ For equally cogent reasons, however, Soviet analysts cannot avoid confronting the larger issues relating to the social character of the Iranian revolution, its political implications, and ultimately its historical significance. The USSR is itself the product of a social revolution from which it continues to derive considerable legitimacy, remains committed to a political ideology which defines revolution as the "locomotive of history," and asserts the inevitability of revolutionary change in a Third World still dominated by capitalist imperialism. In these regards both the accomplishments and failures of the Iranian revolution, marked by the dramatic ouster of the shah but also by the defeat of left-wing forces and the absence of far-reaching social transformations, present theoretical problems of particular relevance. Beyond the calculated pragmatism expressed in the effort to "get on" with Khomeini's Iran, there is a serious analytical core to Soviet evaluations which attempts to understand events in the context of an integrated body of revolutionary theory.

The present essay seeks to explore assessments of the Iranian revolution against the foil of Soviet theory concerning social conflict and revolutionary change in developing nations. In order to establish a framework for analysis, Soviet theoretical perspectives and analytical categories are briefly summarized before moving on to an investigation of how these categories have been applied in conceptualizing the course of events in revolutionary Iran. In conclusion, some ways in which

the "lessons" of the Iranian experience may be reinforcing trends in Soviet analysis will be suggested. The ideological dimension has often been missing in Western commentary upon Soviet policy toward Iran since the revolution, much of which has tended to emphasize the opportunistic motives which have supposedly shaped Soviet analysis at the expense of theoretical consistency.⁷ The conclusions drawn here suggest, to the contrary, that Soviet conceptualizations of the revolutionary process in Iran, though not without flaws, have been quite coherent and often insightful, and when examined closely would appear to provide a sounder foundation for policy formulation than has often been granted.

Revolutionary Change and Socialist Development

The sudden and dramatic collapse of imperial authority in Iran, toasted by US President Carter on New Year's Day 1978 in Tehran, one year prior to the shah's deposition as an "island of stability,"⁸ provides a particularly clear illustration of the powerful latent tensions which have made much of the Third World a powder keg of revolutionary conflict in recent decades. Soviet scholarship offers a carefully developed ideological model intended to explain both the sources and motive forces of such conflict. Couched in the idioms of classical Marxism-Leninism, but continually revised, it represents one of the most dynamic, and also disputacious areas of Soviet social theory.

Soviet theory places revolutionary transformations in the Third World within the larger context of a "world revolutionary process" presumed to be gradually but inexorably undermining the

foundations of imperialism and creating a "shift in the global correlation of forces on behalf of socialism and social progress."⁹ The components of this trend are multifold and include the consolidation of a socialist sector in the world economy around the USSR, the "general crisis" of the capitalist mode of production, the enhanced military power of the socialist states as a deterrent to imperialist aggression, the international labor and communist movements, and other factors. The relevance of national liberation struggles and efforts to build and consolidate socialist regimes in developing nations to this larger process is clearly asserted, though not necessarily their central importance. Liberation struggles do not proceed independently of other trends in world politics, and constitute only one dimension of a "protracted and complex" world-historical tendency toward socialism and communism.

According to the Soviet model, the dependent status of the Third World within the global economy was originally determined by its outright colonial subjugation to the metropolitan centers of international capitalism, and despite the collapse of the colonial system in the wake of World War II has been perpetuated in the post-war neocolonial order. Developing nations subject to neocolonial exploitation:

occupy a dependent and exploited position within the capitalist world economy and the capitalist division of labor ...; in their majority do not participate in the political system established by imperialism; serve as an object of neocolonial policy; exhibit backwardness in economic, scientific-technical, and social relations due to the fact that their societal forms and spiritual life bear within them deep-seated remnants of the period of enslavement ...; are living through a transition stage marked by the overcoming of

pre-capitalist relations and the creation of new, in the majority of cases capitalistic forms ...; possess as a component of their relations a strong national-liberation and anti-colonial tendency.¹⁰

As a result of the socio-economic inequities imposed by neocolonialism, the majority of developing nations find themselves relegated to the role of producers of undervalued primary commodities on the periphery of the capitalist world economy. "Development" under these circumstances means the growth of export-oriented commodity production, a deformed structure of consumer demand, and a widening gap between elite groups and the mass of producers, with aggravated social conflict an inevitable by-product.¹¹

In political terms, neocolonialism imposes a series of structural constraints within which the revolutionary tensions inherent in the capitalist world economy must gradually mature. The diversity of Third World societies dictates that this will not be an automatic process, and makes the forms in which social conflict might manifest itself virtually impossible to predict; but in the long-term structural crises and revolutionary transformations are said to be unavoidable. Capitalist-oriented development under the aegis of neocolonialism "is not only incapable of resolving the sharp socio-economic problems which confront it, but in fact deepens them, and adds to social tensions. Capitalism, as a socio-economic form which has outlived itself, does not have extensive prospects as a mode of development."¹² Neocolonialism thus leads directly to consideration of alternative modes of development that transcend the context of capitalist imperialism.

Over the past several decades Soviet scholars have developed a relatively coherent alternative to the "historical dead-end" of neocolonialism in the theory of the "non-capitalist path of development." The theory posits a phased transition capable of leading underdeveloped nations beyond neocolonial dependency, initiated by a national-democratic revolution bringing a diverse coalition of popular and progressive forces to power committed to the pursuit of anti-imperialist policies. If the revolution continues to develop, it will eventually grow into a revolutionary-democratic phase marked by the emergence of a vanguard party guided by the principles of scientific socialism, and an accelerated tempo of socio-economic change. Under certain circumstances, it is argued, the process can enable developing nations to "skip" the stage of capitalism and move directly from neocolonial dependence to the construction of the prerequisites for socialism. As summarized by A. S. Shin:

By national-democratic revolutions we understand anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolutions in economically underdeveloped nations during the contemporary era, carried out by an alliance of national-democratic forces under the leadership of revolutionary-democrats, in the course of which the possibility exists for the planned creation of the conditions of a gradual transition to socialism, by-passing capitalism or interrupting its development at the initial stages.¹³

The key to such a progression is the consolidation of a revolutionary-democratic leadership and its mastery of the instruments of state power. In effect, in developing the theory of the non-capitalist path, the Soviet Union has taken sides in regard to a fundamental issue in Marxist political theory, emphasizing voluntarism, a primary role for the state sector in

forwarding social change, and the relative autonomy of the superstructure vis-à-vis the socio-economic base.¹⁴

The theory of the non-capitalist path jelled nicely with the interest which the USSR began to manifest during the 1960's in cultivating relations with emergent Third World regimes. Unfortunately, banking on national-democratic leaders such as Gamal Abd al-Nasir in Egypt or Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana proved to be a risky business, and Soviet efforts to develop such relationships often ended in embarrassing and costly failures. The non-capitalist path scenario, which was originally presented with considerable optimism, has as a result been continually redefined and more soberly assessed. By the mid-1970s the concept of the state of socialist orientation had been introduced to help refine the scenario, bringing with it significant redefinitions which placed much greater emphasis than heretofore upon the obstacles to movement toward socialism.¹⁵

The redefinitions occasioned by the introduction of the socialist orientation concept may be summarized in four areas.

1. Soviet theory now offers a more pessimistic estimation of the prospects for revolutionary change to promote socialist development, with more emphasis upon the difficulties attached to the process. National-democratic leaders who adopt the path of socialist orientation are said to be pursuing a subjective choice and entering an experiment for which general guidelines but no fixed rules exist. The fragility and potential reversibility of the process is now underlined.

2. The prerequisites for a successful pursuit of socialist orientation have been more precisely specified. Evgenii Primakov lists four criteria for states following the non-capitalist path:¹⁶ (a) economic criteria, requiring the strengthening of the state sector via nationalization, industrialization, and land reform; (b) social criteria, calling for a broadening of the base of the revolutionary regime through efforts to modernize social relations and politicize the masses; (c) political criteria, demanding the creation of a vanguard party and alliance with the international community of socialist states led by the USSR;¹⁷ and (d) ideological criteria, requiring a gradual shift from the "revolutionary petty-bourgeois" ideology characteristic of the national-democratic phase to a more orthodox variant of scientific socialism.

3. A more fundamental distinction is drawn between the national-democratic and revolutionary-democratic stages. Earlier definitions equated socialist orientation with the entire process of non-capitalist development, but at present it has been narrowed to an advanced stage of the process equivalent to revolutionary-democracy. "Socialist orientation," writes one author, "reveals itself as one of the historical variants of non-capitalist development, and more precisely, as its revolutionary-democratic form."¹⁸ A clear implication is that only those states which have advanced well into the revolutionary-democratic phase are to be considered serious candidates for a successful pursuit of socialist orientation.

4. The mechanisms of effective third world development are defined much more liberally than in the past. The possibility of a sudden and absolute abandonment of capitalist development is rejected, limitations on the ability of socialist states to supply needed assistance stressed, and the need for a pragmatic, "mixed economy" approach underlined.¹⁹

Viewed in its totality, the Soviet model which has been reviewed represents a serious attempt to conceptualize the dynamic of revolutionary change in the developing world within the parameters of a general theoretical orientation--that of Marxism-Leninism as it is structured in the USSR. In outline, the argument suggests that the social conflicts generated by neocolonial dependence will produce periodic structural crises which create the preconditions for revolutionary transformations, albeit in unpredictable ways. The national-democratic revolution opens the door to a non-capitalist path toward socialism, but the objective limits to socialist development in a socio-economic environment characterized by backwardness on all levels cannot be wished away. A revolution which does not advance beyond a national-democratic level will revert backward to bourgeois-democratic norms and the trap of capitalist-oriented development under the conditions imposed by imperialism. Only when a revolution develops into the revolutionary-democratic phase, with a vanguard party at the helm and in alliance with the forces of "real socialism," can socialist orientation be pursued and a leap from neocolonial dependency to socialism be accomplished. The non-capitalist path of development is

difficult and problematical, but it can be followed. Soviet analysts count over twenty states of socialist orientation with a combined population of more than 220 million, and look forward to the emergence of more.²⁰

Iran's Revolution: The Neocolonial Context

Ideological formulas such as socialist orientation summarize long-term trends, and given their abstractions and idealization of Soviet motives are not adequate by themselves as measures of intention. They do, however, define sets of underlying assumptions and establish parameters within which decision-makers may impose order upon events and simplify the complexities of political choice. Writing in Pravda on 11 January 1979, with Iran in the throes of revolution, A. Petrov hailed the events in progress as "the liberation struggle of the people, and their attempt to defend their independence and sovereignty from foreign interference, an expression of the desire to free themselves from imperialist domination and to assert control over their own natural wealth, and finally the legitimate striving of all peoples to move onto the path of democratic, socialist transformation."²¹ Petrov's evaluation, which would set the tone for many to follow, places the revolution squarely within the confines of Soviet theoretical categories, universalizing its aspirations and pointing the way from neocolonial dependency to socialist orientation. A primary assumption is that the fall of the shah was neither accidental nor fortuitous, but rather emerged logically from the dynamics of structural crisis produced by Iran's neocolonial situation.

Iran maintained political independence throughout the colonial era, but the 19th and 20th centuries did see a de facto partition of the country into spheres of influence, with tsarist Russia dominant in the north and Great Britain in the south.²² Soviet accounts by and large ignore the extent of tsarist involvement in Iranian affairs, but praise the effects of the friendship treaty signed between Soviet Russia and Iran on 26 February 1921, in which the young Soviet government renounced a variety of privileges extracted from Iran by the tsars and cancelled Iran's outstanding debts.²³ In contrast, Iran's relationship with Great Britain (and later the USA) is characterized as unambiguously neocolonial.²⁴ In an analysis published subsequent to the revolution, a prominent Soviet historian cites the role of Britain in bringing Riza Shah to the throne in 1925, the dominant influence of the London-based Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) thereafter, and the gradual replacement of British by American tutelage after World War II as keys to the development of Iran's dependency. This reality is seen as only partially disguised by formal independence and cults of national grandeur under Riza Shah and his son Muhammad Riza Shah.²⁵

Neocolonial dependency was manifest above all in the effective control of Iran's most vital national resource, its oil and gas reserves, by foreign-based corporate interests (the AIOC and its successors after 1954).²⁶ Other manifestations included the growth of a private manufacturing sector dominated by foreign capital and emphasizing the assembly or production of consumer

durables for an elite urban market or for export, and the extension of capitalist commodity relations into traditional marketing, handicraft, and agricultural sectors. Particularly after the shah's agrarian reforms of the 1960's (the so-called "White Revolution"), these trends were accompanied by a mass exodus from rural areas to urban centers, most notably Tehran, which typifies imbalanced neocolonial development. Rural migration provided an abundant source of exploitable labor to feed the growing industrial proletariat, but also a large, displaced lumpenproletariat prone to extremist political appeals. The social base of the shah's regime is portrayed as relatively narrow, consisting of an elite urban stratum tied to the state bureaucracy, military court, or corporate interest circles. Perhaps the most visible symbol of dependency was the superficial Westernization of Iran's elite culture, notable for its conspicuous consumption patterns, apeing of Western standards, and venal materialism. The widening material and spiritual gap between the elite and mass of producers did, of course, lead to popular discontent, but political opposition remained poorly articulated and inadequately organized due in part to the social fragmentation imposed by a forced pace of economic change and to the work of a notoriously effective security apparatus.²⁷ Finally, Iran's integration into the global imperialist order as the "watchdog" of US interests in the Gulf region is claimed to have reinforced its dependency vis-à-vis the USA in particular.²⁸

Somewhat ironically, it was the achievements of capitalist-oriented development in Iran, despite the

contradictions presumed to accompany this, that most preoccupied Soviet specialists prior to 1978. In a 1976 colloquium devoted to the problem of interpreting Iranian achievements, one prominent commentator remarked almost euphorically that "according to available prognoses, in ten or fifteen years Iran may be capable of achieving the level on which the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] and France found themselves during the mid-50s, or of Italy today."²⁹ These accomplishments were attributed almost entirely to the possibilities created by expanded oil revenues. The shah's role as a moving force in the creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the quadrupling of world oil prices after 1973--initiatives which the Soviet Union strongly endorsed--were noted to have altered the relationship between Iran and the transnational oil monopolies in positive ways (though not to have changed its fundamentally exploitative character).³⁰ The resultant expansion of Iran's area of national sovereignty opened options normally not available to nations less fortunately endowed by nature. The land reforms of the 1960's also received guarded praise as a necessary step away from feudal patterns of land tenure, which "reflected a long-ripening historical need for the liquidation of feudal relationships within the country, clearing the way for the development of capitalism in Iran, and therefore possessed to a certain degree an objectively progressive character."³¹ Capitalist development, in Iran as elsewhere, performed a necessary function by shattering feudal

remnants and helping to create "the material prerequisites for a transition to the non-capitalist path of development."³²

Over time, however, the achievements of Iranian capitalism are perceived to have increased rather than lessened instability by generating radical imbalances between economic sectors and creating an illusion of power and potential which blinded the leadership to growing social tensions.³³ To the extent that oil wealth promoted the construction of industry and infrastructure its effects were positive, but it also contributed to increased social stratification and resentment. By allowing the regime to postpone or ignore needed reforms, oil revenues actually helped create the structural crisis which eventually overwhelmed the shah. Rapid industrialization ravaged traditional modes of existence without providing transitional alternatives, and rigid elitist authoritarianism foreclosed avenues for mass political involvement and self-expression. The long-term results of the much vaunted "shah-people revolution" in the countryside, a reform launched from above, reflected an elitist image of developmental priorities, and overly reliant upon crude repression to control accompanying tensions, too often belied intentions.³⁴ Ultimately, Iran's revolution became the simultaneous expression of the contradictions of a dying feudal and nascent capitalist mode of production, and a case study in the maturing of a structural crisis given unequal and imbalanced neocolonial development.³⁵

A modest recession in 1976-1977 provided a proximate cause for an outbreak of revolutionary conflict,³⁶ the roots of which

lay in "the forced implementation of capitalism by the shah, capitalism in its neocolonial variant: complete with the hegemony of transnational corporations and a narrow stratum of local compradors, with the ruination of millions of peasants and small-scale entrepreneurs, with attempts to artificially implant a 'Western life-style'."37 To these objective causes a subjective factor is sometimes added, for in a nation like Iran, it is claimed, "with an ancient, original, and independent civilization, with century-old Islamic traditions, such a course could not help but call forth more active resistance than in many other developing countries."38 At the outset of 1978, a mass base of discontent existed among landless and small-holding peasants, migratory communities and other non-integrated sectors confronting the breakdown of traditional modes of existence, disaffected industrial workers, alienated ethnic minorities, an embittered and often desperate lumpenproletariat, a growing stratum of educated youths frustrated by poor career prospects, and middle and petty bourgeois elements unhappy with foreign penetration of national markets. Discontent was made manifest in diverse and sometimes contradictory ways, but its deeply popular character helps to explain the rapidity with which the conjunctural crisis of 1978 could be transformed into a structural crisis provoking revolutionary change.39

Iran's Revolution: The Fall of the Monarchy

Soviet and Western accounts concur in dating the critical phase of the Iranian revolution from the demonstrations in the

holy city of Qum in January 1978, in protest against the defamation of exiled oppositionist Ayatollah Khomeini by an article appearing in the semi-official newspaper Ittela'at. In the following weeks and months, a wave of popular demonstrations gathered momentum, drawing support from diverse social groups, essentially urban in focus, and increasingly concentrated upon a central political demand--the ouster of the shah. In Isfahan during July and in Tehran during September, demonstrations led to the intervention of security forces and bloodbaths which only served to increase the isolation of the monarchy.⁴⁰

Soviet sources acknowledge that from the outset the most notable aspect of the popular movement was the leading role played by Iran's Shi'i clericals as the organizational and inspirational force behind mass protests. The imposing figure of Khomeini immediately became the symbol of opposition, and his statements from exile, circulated within Iran on recorded cassettes, both unified and politicized disparate sources of discontent. The revolution's most distinctive feature--its self-proclaimed identity as an "Islamic" revolution--thus thrust itself forward from the origins of popular protest.

Several explanations are offered by Soviet observers to help account for the prominence of the Islamic factor during the phase of revolutionary mobilization between January 1978 and February 1979. First, the severity of repression under the shah is cited for having decimated the Iranian left and weakened its organizational potential. This was true not only for the communist left represented by the Tudeh Party, but also for

so-called "ultra-left" organizations such as the Fedayan i-Khalq and Mujahidan i-Khalq, and the bourgeois opposition in the tradition of Muhammad Musaddiq represented by the National Front.⁴¹ Without a nationally coordinated structure for directing opposition on the secular left, a leadership vacuum presented itself which only the clerical opposition was in a position to fill. With its own tradition of opposition to the monarchy and an intact organizational structure based on the mosque, the clerical opposition was uniquely capable of coordinating and leading a mass movement.⁴² Second, in the conditions prevailing in Iran only the clerical opposition is considered to have been capable of uniting the heterogenous social groups into a movement capable of challenging the shah. These groups found a common element in the reassertion of cultural identity against Westernization and the resulting social inequities. Islam's appeal was likewise enhanced by the "socio-economic underdevelopment of Iran and the preservation of significant vestiges of the middle ages."⁴³ Third, the clerical opposition possessed a firm class base of its own in the Iranian petty and middle bourgeoisie, the bazaar stratum which was traditionally a source of support for the mosque, and which had been particularly threatened by the process of modernization set in motion under the shah.⁴⁴ Finally, the religious opposition, and particularly Khumayni, strongly identified with popular yearnings for social change, assisted by the millennial strain in Shi'i Islam with its emphasis upon resistance to tyranny (symbolized by the martyrdom of Ali and Husayn and the legend of

the Mahdi) and social justice.⁴⁵ Khomeini and the politicized faction of the ulama with which he is linked are said to have played a necessary role in galvanizing amorphous discontent, providing an organizational structure for oppositional activities, and articulating grievances. Coordinated leadership on the part of the religious community was absolutely vital for the protest movement to succeed. "The uniqueness of Iran consists precisely in the fact that the major part of its population identifies with the traditions of Shi'ism," wrote Pravda's Middle East correspondent Pavel Demchenko, "the slogans of which are of an objectively progressive character under present circumstances. They call the masses to struggle against the monarchy and foreign domination, and for the satisfaction of the social demands of the broad laboring masses."⁴⁶ Indeed, the efficacy of clerical leadership was undeniable and the resultant waves of demonstrations, both disciplined and tactically coordinated, shook the regime to its foundation.⁴⁷

The appointment of Shapur Bakhtiyar as prime minister and the shah's "temporary" departure from Iran on 16 January 1979 set the stage for the revolution's concluding act. In Soviet accounts Bakhtiyar is described as a representative of Iran's comprador bourgeoisie, one of the key social underpinnings of the monarchy now seeking a reformist alternative capable of preserving its privileged status.⁴⁸ Khomeini's return to a hero's welcome on 1 February and his appointment of Mehdi Bazargan as a shadow prime minister is said to have created a situation of "dual power"--a phrase filled with implications in

Soviet revolutionary theory--which clearly counterposed progressive and reactionary alternatives.⁴⁹ On 9 February an attempt by elements of the former Imperial Guard to suppress revolutionary agitation sparked what Soviet accounts describe as a popular insurrection marked by significant engagement on the part of the industrial working class.⁵⁰ These events represent the revolution's culmination and the necessary prelude for the creation on 11 February of a new government headed by Bazargan and dominated by Khomeini. The subsequent institutionalization of a post-revolutionary regime, with the promulgation of Iran's "Islamic" constitution, the disputed choice of Abulhasan Bani Sadr as first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the elections in the spring of 1980 placing pro-Khomeini forces led by Ayatollah Muhammad Baha'ati and the IRP in a dominant position in the Iranian Majlis, were the fruits of the popular victory of February 1979. By breaking the resistance of the armed forces, this ended once and for all the contentious reign of Iran's "king of kings."⁵¹

The earliest Soviet assessments of the shah's fall may be described as guardedly optimistic concerning prospects for the post-revolutionary regime. According to Demchenko:

the problems which the republic confronted in the first months of its existence were substantial. However, despite their complexities, one thing was undeniable: the old regime of the shah was finished, a return to the past impossible. In Iran a historic event had occurred ... an anti-monarchical, anti-imperialist revolution.⁵²

The anti-imperialist dimension of the revolution was reflected in Iran's new international orientation: the withdrawal from CENTO;

liquidation of US observation posts on Iranian territory; rupture of diplomatic ties with South Africa and Israel; annulment of military relations with the USA and cancellation of military purchases; and an announced intention to withdraw from the hegemonic role in the Gulf region to which the shah had aspired. Its popular character rested upon: the dismantling of the monarchy; reprisals against officers and public officials judged guilty of crimes against the people during the ancien regime; tighter controls over gas and oil holdings;⁵³ nationalization of the banking system, insurance companies, and a number of industrial concerns; promulgation of minimum wage legislation; and a host of proclaimed intentions in the area of social reform. The Tudeh Party, at the 16th Plenum of its Central Committee in March 1979, announced a policy of strong support for the new government and praised Khomeini's personal contribution to the revolution in glowing terms.⁵⁴ In April Soviet leader Brezhnev formally congratulated Khomeini upon the founding of the Islamic Republic.

From the outset, however, Soviet theoretical assessments of the revolution also included a critical dimension, noting the conflictual nature of the social forces which had united to bring down the shah, the contradictory ideological character of the clerical leadership, the absence of a strong, well-organized left alternative, the post-revolutionary regime's class base in the petty and middle bourgeoisie, and the ever-present threat of a US-sponsored restoration.⁵⁵ Praise for the revolution's anti-imperialist achievements was nuanced by references to the

instability of its institutions. Again in the words of Demchenko, written during the summer of 1979:

Many of the economic, political and even ethical problems ... upon which, in essence, the future of Iran depends, are still only beginning to be decided ... the situation in the country remains extremely complicated: a latent but distinct antagonism between various political forces, their mutual separation or drawing together, is in progress ... Immense transformations are occurring, but ahead still lies the difficult task of creating the new. Much remains to be decided, much remains to be fought for.⁵⁶

According to the logic of Soviet theory, Iran was ripe for a national-democratic revolution in 1978-1979, but in fact the revolution has never been so described even in the earliest, most positive assessments. Its accomplishments, though real, "did not go beyond the limits of bourgeois-democratic reforms," creating a base which "could in the distant future serve as a starting point for more radical, anti-capitalist transformation."⁵⁷ The distinction between bourgeois and national democracy is not expressed with great clarity, but seems to correspond to the line which separates capitalist-oriented development from the first hesitant steps onto the non-capitalist path. It is this choice of orientation which Soviet scholars identify as the overriding issue confronting Iran in the post-revolutionary period.

Several factors are introduced to help account for the revolution's failure to move beyond a bourgeois-democratic level in its early stages. First, the instability of revolutionary institutions and the constant threat of outside intervention are claimed to have made it difficult for a new regime to consolidate. Soviet accounts, like those in the West, seem to

have underestimated the ability of the clerical opposition to act forcefully to institutionalize their authority.⁵⁸ Second, despite the progressive strains in the Islamic tradition, the clericals grouped around Khomeini remained a politically divided and potentially reactionary force.⁵⁹ Third, the inability of the revolution to move decisively against Iran's privileged classes prevented the implementation of more sweeping socio-economic reforms, and hence the establishment of the necessary prerequisites for national-democratic development. Rather than vanguard elements coalescing around a revolutionary-democratic leadership, as the Soviet model calls for, the "completely dissimilar and sometimes openly hostile" social forces which had united around the slogan "down with the shah" remained temporarily undifferentiated within the vague confines of Islamic ideology. Had Khomeini himself proven less dogmatic and hidebound a traditionalist,⁶⁰ had the IRP managed to avoid polarizing society by seeking to monopolize power, had the Tudeh Party's united front strategy succeeded in drawing together a strong left opposition, had the social promise of the revolution been realized in greater measure, it is not to be excluded that, with appropriate references to the uniqueness of the Iranian situation, Soviet assessments might have concluded that the revolution had passed the threshold of national-democracy. That this failed to occur is fundamental to Soviet conceptualizations of the revolutionary process as a whole.

In an evaluation published in the summer of 1982 after the consequences of the rise of the Islamic Republic had become

apparent, the distinguished commentator R. A. Ul'ianovskii summarized the revolution of 1978-1979 as a three-stage process culminating at a bourgeois-democratic level. During the first stage (January 1978-September 1978, i.e., from the Qum demonstrations to the declaration of martial law following the "Black Friday" massacre on 8 September in Tehran), the movement's base is described as the "traditional, middle strata" of Iranian society demanding a democratic transformation of the socio-political system. A second stage (September 1978-January 1979, culminating with the shah's flight) is marked by political maneuvering on the part of the large and comprador bourgeoisie seeking to preserve their class status by reliance on the Bakhtiyar government, by significant intervention on the part of the industrial working class as a revolutionary force, and by the gradual development among the masses of the consciousness of the need for a complete liquidation of the monarchical system. In the third and concluding phase (January-February 1979, ending with the popular insurrection of 10-11 February and Bakhtiyar's resignation), the revolutionary struggle is said to assume a genuinely mass character. The uprising which results in the triumph of Khomeini reflects the popular, all-national character of the revolution, but lacks a class-conscious political vanguard. The Islamic identity of the movement is popular and temporarily unifying, but also "diffuse, above class, and non-party." It expresses:

the spontaneous [stikhiinoe] striving of the broad popular masses toward a fundamental social restructuring, toward the removal of the monarchy and the dominance of foreign capital, but on the other

hand also the gravitation of the commercial-owner component of the "middle-stratum" toward an unrestricted development of national capitalism, which had been blocked by the shah's policy of the implantation from above, with the help of foreign capital, of modern capitalist concerns with a state-monopolistic character.⁶¹

Once the common goal of the shah's ouster had been achieved, Ul'ianovskii suggests, a differentiation of revolutionary forces became inevitable. Here the fundamental class character of the clerical leadership (and not primarily its religious/ideological identity), itself attached to the traditional elite structure based in the middle and large bourgeoisie, became decisive. Given the inability of a left alternative to emerge capable of rivaling conservative forces, national-democratic development and socialist orientation became temporarily foreclosed as options.

Thus, summing up what has been said about the character of the Iranian revolution, it is possible to designate it in the following manner: judging by its motive forces, methods of struggle, and universal demands for social justice--as popular and democratic; as fundamentally and sharply anti-American; judging by its social essence--as bourgeois (insofar as certain clearly anti-capitalistic tendencies appeared within it they have remained unrealized); judging by its ideological character and the leading role of Shi'i clericals--as Islamic.⁶²

In Ul'ianovskii's influential assessment, the Iranian revolution is characterized as bourgeois-democratic, with its national peculiarities and limitations the product of "the insufficient development of class differentiation in Iran, and its specifically Islamic structure and organizational form."⁶³

Iran's Revolution: The Islamic Republic

The five years which have passed since the creation of Iran's Islamic Republic have seen the consolidation of a

post revolutionary regime in the course of severe confrontations with internal and external enemies, including: the "hostage crisis" from 4 November 1979 to 20 January 1981, provoking an abortive US military intervention; the attack by Iraqi forces along the Shatt al-Arab in September, launching a war which has endured for over four years with no end in sight; and a series of clashes with the internal opposition culminating in the bombing of IRP headquarters on 28 June 1981. To each of these challenges the Islamic Republic responded forcefully and effectively, by maintaining a high level of anti-American rhetoric and intransigence during the hostage affair, by guerre à outrance with Iraq, and by the brutal repression of internal opposition. In the summer of 1981, a virtual reign of terror was launched against the extreme left. On 16 July 1981, the Majlis initiated impeachment proceedings against President Bani Sadr, leader of the secular-liberal wing of the opposition, and in late July Bani Sadr fled the country accompanied by Mujahidin i-Khalq leader Mas'ud Rajavi. In the spring of 1982, former foreign minister Sadiq Qutbzadah was executed for alleged involvement in a plot against the life of Khomeini, and, during 1983, concluding the systematic elimination of left-wing and liberal opponents, the Tudeh Party was banned and its leader Kiyanuri executed after making an eerie public recantation in the course of which he warned Iranians against "imported" left-wing ideologies.

On one level, Soviet commentary has reacted to the revolution's turn against the left with expressions of disappointment and hostility. Izvestiia's senior political

commentator Aleksandr Bovin set the tone for such attacks as early as the autumn of 1979, writing in a bitter critique: "Every revolution gives birth to hope, hope for a better future. Thus it was in Iran, but unfortunately only was. Judging by the information received from this country, in place of hope has emerged uneasiness and anxiety, uncertainty and disillusionment."⁶⁴ More analytical assessments have balanced sharpened criticism of the revolution's internal evolution with continued praise for its international impact, which "despite all of its contradictions ... represents a defeat for US imperialism."⁶⁵ Iran's drift to the right is accounted for by reference to the narrowing class base of the post-revolutionary regime and the inability of left-wing and progressive forces to unite and pose a formidable political alternative.

Of these two dynamics, the changing class character of the Khomeyni government has received by far the bulk of attention. The coalition of social forces which came together to oust the shah, it is argued, predictably split apart once the issue of rebuilding the state structure was put onto the agenda. Soviet sources discern three major class groupings which emerge as conscious or unconscious rivals after February 1979.

1) A revolutionary petty bourgeois grouping with a strong Islamic coloration is described as based in the petty and middle bourgeoisie, most visibly represented by Khomeyni and a part of the IRP. This grouping has succeeded in winning most of its political battles to date, but confronts growing difficulties due to the "utopian" nature of its social ideals and serious internal

divisions. The IRP in particular is perceived to be split between proponents of ongoing social reform and more conservative, even reactionary elements, and between clericals committed to political engagement and those who oppose political involvement outside the ethical realm in the tradition of the former Azeri Ayatallah Sayyid Shar'iatmadari. The main accomplishment of this grouping has been the promulgation of Iran's Islamic constitution, "the most characteristic feature [of which] is the fact that within it, problems related to the social and economic system of the new government are posed strictly within the framework of petty-bourgeois concepts."⁶⁶

2) The liberal bourgeoisie is said to constitute an amalgam of elements drawn from the intelligentsia, the former comprador bourgeoisie, and the shah's financial and industrial oligarchy. It is distinguished somewhat tenuously from the pre-revolutionary large and comprador bourgeoisie by reference to the limited expropriations carried out by the revolution during 1979. Fundamentally committed to restoring capitalist orientation in a national context, this grouping was defeated politically with the Islamization of the revolution and the ouster of the Bazargan government at the beginning of the hostage crisis; but it has since revived, and its growing influence is interpreted as a significant cause for Iran's move toward the right.

3) Left-wing, progressive, and democratic forces also represent an amalgam covering a wide spectrum of social groups and movements committed to actualizing the revolution's social

aspirations. The Tudeh Party is located here, modestly described as "a part of the progressive forces of Iranian society."⁶⁷

Significantly absent from this tripartite breakdown are the Marxist-influenced Mujahidin and Fedayin, and the liberal intelligentsia represented by such figures as Bani Sadr and Qutbzadah, whose rivalry with the IRP dominated headlines during 1981-1982. Soviet accounts have contemptuously dismissed the former as "Trotskyists and Maoists" and the later as "agents of US imperialism," though in more recent commentary these epithets have been softened.⁶⁸ At any rate, neither political direction is considered to possess a significant class base.

Iran's political evolution since 1979 has been shaped by the growth of the influence of a more conservative constellation of class forces upon the IRP, aided by continuing personal and political rivalry within the Party itself. By breaking with the Tudeh Party in 1983, the clerical leadership signaled its preference for alliance with the liberal bourgeoisie over progressive forces. Its class base has been gradually narrowed and as a result important components of the ancien regime are reemerging in new forms. The ban upon the Tudeh Party was accompanied by the expulsion of eighteen Soviet diplomats and imprecations that party members had served as tools of Moscow. This provoked a distinct shift in Soviet analysis, which has since placed more weight upon the revival of right-wing forces. "Reactionary groups opposed to the implementation of the social and economic reforms that the masses expected after the anti-shah revolution of 1979," summarizes Pravda, "are doing everything

they can to destroy the fruits of that revolution."⁶⁹ Inevitably, these trends will eventually provoke a revival of mass-based agitation on behalf of more thoroughgoing social change. According to New Times Middle East reporter Dmitri Volskii: "Its [the revolution's] further development depends significantly upon whether Iran's genuinely popular forces ... will find a basis for unified action ... The simultaneously political, anti-monarchical, and anti-imperialist revolution has not developed into a social one, and finds itself at the crossroads."⁷⁰

In the absence of a revival on the left, Iran's drift away from the social aspirations of the revolution of 1978-1979 is considered likely to continue. The consequences are evident in various aspects of the regime's priorities and performance, several of which may be briefly reviewed.

1) The Islamic factor. Soviet evaluations of the role of Islam in the Iranian revolution have remained relatively consistent throughout the years of the Islamic Republic. Religious ideology, it is asserted, has been and can be a basis for progressive social movements, and historically has played an important role in the transition from feudal to capitalist modes of production. The decisive issue is the class character of social movements which draw upon religious ideology for inspiration.⁷¹ In Iran, messianic religious appeals helped inspire a revolutionary movement, but also paved the way to power for a potentially reactionary clerical faction, itself a privileged caste dependent upon propertied interests. In the post-revolutionary phase Islam has become a divisive and often

regressive force. The collapse of the social idealism originally attached to the Islamic Republic reveals the limitations of religious ideology as a context for progressive change and the need to eventually supercede such remnants of the past with a worldview grounded in scientific socialism.⁷²

2) Socio-economic policy. With the shift in the regime's class base from a mass revolutionary movement to a reestablished elite structure, its aspirations to accomplish significant social transformations have evaporated. Although the residual benefits of the revolution's early achievements remain, they have not been extended. The need for fundamental land reform and the problem of rural impoverishment have not been effectively addressed. Agricultural output has declined, industrial production has stagnated, and unemployment increased. Strike initiatives are crushed by armed force, and meaningful initiatives in the direction of economic planning have not been taken. In the face of economic difficulties, the regime has fallen back on the tried and true methods of the shah--a short-sighted exploitation of Iran's finite oil and gas reserves, reinforcing dependency upon the capitalist world market. As regards social policy, the oppression of women has increased, an atmosphere of terror has been created, paralyzing initiative, and the most primitive aspects of the traditions of Islamic justice revived.⁷³ The gap between rich and poor, characteristic of neocolonialism, is said to have continued to widen.

3) Nationalities policy. Like the USSR, Iran is a multinational state in which the dominant Iranian ethnic

community comprises roughly half the population.⁷⁴ In a manner increasingly typical of post-colonial upheaval in the Third World, the Iranian revolution sparked widespread demands for regional autonomy or independence among several ethnic minority groups, and a corresponding backlash on behalf of unified, centralized authority. The most severe agitation has occurred in Iranian Kurdistan, where sporadic fighting between Kurds in revolt and the national government continues. The Soviet Union has a patented formula for disputes of this type, favoring limited regional autonomy within a unified national state after the Soviet model, and this is the approach which it has applied to the Iranian case.⁷⁵ During the first months of the revolution, the USSR denied encouraging national unrest in Iran and warned against the potential manipulation of separatism by "friends of the shah."⁷⁶ On occasion it has mildly scolded the regime for insufficient attention to the national question,⁷⁷ but has not chosen to elevate the issue to one of major status. Considering the potential magnitude of the problem, criticism of the regime's handling of the national question is understated and does not represent an important component of Moscow's indictment against conservative tendencies in Iran. The Soviet Union seems to be holding the issue in reserve and in general it is not discussed in a theoretically full manner.

4) International alignment. Trade and barter agreements with Turkey and Pakistan, increasing economic interaction with Western Europe, outspoken opposition to the Babrak Karmal government in Afghanistan, intransigence in its war with

Iraq--these are some of the manifestations of what Soviet commentary warns could become Iran's gradual reintegration into the imperialist world system. The anti-imperialist thrust of the revolution is not yet exhausted, but it is imperiled if present trends continue.⁷⁸

Among foreign policy trends, it is the prolongation of the Gulf war which is clearly of greatest concern. From the outset of hostilities Moscow has assumed formal neutrality and called for an "early end to the armed conflict between Iran and Iraq and for the settlement of the problems at issue by political means, at the negotiating table."⁷⁹ It has reportedly supplied arms to both belligerents at intervals during the conflict, without providing the wherewithal for either side to achieve a decisive margin of superiority.⁸⁰ The Soviet Union's greatest expressed concern has been that the conflict provides an opening for an expanded US military presence in the Gulf region, and that it works to the advantage of conservative forces within the Iranian leadership. "One cannot help but note," writes Pravda, "that Iran's pursuit of the war 'to a victorious conclusion' entails the stirring up of chauvinistic attitudes. The principles and goals of the antimonarchical revolution in Iran are being consigned to oblivion."⁸¹ Unwillingness to consider negotiated options emerges as yet another mark of the revolution's drift away from progressive values. The continuation of the war serves the imperial purposes of the USA, encourages the reemergence of a conservative military-industrial bloc, and provides a distraction

by turning public consciousness away from the revolution's failed promises.

During the years of the Islamic Republic, the initial gains of the Iranian revolution have been considerably diluted by the consolidation of a post-revolutionary regime increasingly isolated from the masses and gradually reverting to capitalist-oriented development. This is seen as a disappointing but not necessarily surprising outcome given the particular character of Iranian society with its well-defined bourgeois strata, the contradictions inherent in the revolution itself, the failure of the left-wing to join cohesively in a united front, and the normal difficulties of initiating socialist orientation in the wake of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. Still, the key questions posed by the revolution have yet to be irrevocably decided:

Although the attempt ... to canalize the political direction of the new power to correspond with the interests of the leading Iranian bourgeoisie has not yet succeeded, representatives of the right-wing liberal bourgeoisie have not ceased pressuring for the achievement of their goals ... At the same time, one cannot ignore the significance of such factors as the social movement of the broad popular masses. They are hostilely inclined toward plans to restore the position of the leading neocomprador bourgeoisie and continue to stand for a transformation of Iran's socio-economic structure in line with the ideals of the revolution of 1978-1979. And one of the most important of these remains the rejection of development in the Western, capitalist image. The issue lies precisely here, will the Iranian revolution find ways to move forward to a real alternative to the capitalist model?⁸²

This dilemma continues to characterize Soviet conceptualizations of the Iranian revolution at the end of 1984. The Khomeini government has amply demonstrated the futility of plans to

project a third, "Islamic" way between capitalism and socialism. Its ideal of Islamic government has proven a chimera, incapable of providing solutions to the burning issues which will determine Iran's future. Increasingly a facade behind which Iran's pre-revolutionary class structure is being reestablished, the Islamic Republic is described as an ineffective, contradictory, and inherently unstable political interlude.

Conclusion: Iran's Revolution Manqué

"The revolution in Iran has a special character," stated Brezhnev in his report to the 26th Party Congress of the CPSU in February 1981. "For all its complications and contradictions it is fundamentally an anti-imperialist revolution, even though internal and external reaction is striving to change its nature."⁸³ Soviet analysis continues to echo these official guidelines, praising the revolution's anti-imperialist accomplishments and explaining its insufficiencies by reference to the "special" features of the Iranian national context. These assessments derive from a careful conceptualization of the revolutionary process at work in Iran developed within the parameters established by Soviet social theory. It is clear that, far from being irrelevant to the policy process, considerable effort is made to ensure a reciprocal relationship between policy choice and theoretically grounded conclusions.

The Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 is interpreted by Soviet commentators as the product of a structural crisis maturing in the context of neocolonial dependency. It is characterized as a

bourgeois-democratic revolution, the achievements of which include the elimination of certain inhibiting remnants of feudalism (including the monarchy itself) and an assault upon the domination of Iranian national life by the USA. The revolution has not propelled Iran onto a non-capitalist path of development, but the basic question of socialist or capitalist orientation has yet to be unambiguously decided. The revolution remains in process with the fate of the Islamic Republic likely to provide the setting for a new round of political confrontations.

Soviet political strategy toward Iran seems to have been broadly consonant with this theoretical perspective. The USSR has striven for a positive relationship with revolutionary Iran under the general rubric of peaceful coexistence. It has defended the anti-imperialist initiatives of the regime against a real or imagined threat of US intervention on behalf of counter-revolutionary forces. For their own part, the Soviets have responded to challenges from Iran (such as the expulsion of Soviet diplomats) both cautiously and judiciously; they seem committed to a policy of watchful waiting conditioned by the assumption that the revolution continues to evolve and that outcomes remain uncertain. The united front strategy of the Tudeh Party, albeit a catastrophic failure, seemed attuned to similar presumptions. Calling for unity with the Islamic Republic in the face of an imminent external threat, the Party sought to consolidate a left-wing alternative capable of asserting influence over a long-term process of political restructuring. The revolution's Islamic identity is in the end

relegated to a secondary level, with its prominence explained by the more fundamental dynamic of class struggle.

Within their own frame of reference these assessments have often proven insightful; but they also reveal flaws both in the Soviets' grasp of events and in the basic model of revolutionary transformations being applied in interpreting them. Despite the considerable attention paid to the process of class formation at work prior to and after the fall of the shah, the relationship between various bourgeois and popular strata remains obscure. Soviet accounts betray a distinct urban bias, with the peasantry often treated as little more than a passive object of policy. Much emphasis is placed upon the need for comprehensive land reform, but the relevance of the Soviets' own prescriptions in this regard is open to question. The national question is discussed superficially and opportunistically, and organized tendencies on the left whose programs do not mirror Soviet priorities are most often either ignored or reviled.

Some of these distortions reflect the characteristic rigidities of controlled Soviet ideology. Others flow from policy-level preoccupations, most notably the concern to prevent any reassertion of US influence in a strategic area directly contiguous to the Soviet border. Still others derive from more basic misperceptions and flawed underlying assumptions. Perhaps the most important of these has been the assumption, integral to Soviet revolutionary theory, that following the shah's ouster a phase of national democracy represented the logical next step in the revolution's progress.

National democracy as a theoretical concept first appeared in Soviet analysis in the early 1960s in association with the non-capitalist path scenario. At the time it referred primarily to the emergence of "united national front" governments dominated by military or political elites at the culmination of anti-colonial liberation struggles. Over a relatively extended period a process of class differentiation at work within these broad-based coalitions, it was assumed, would stimulate radicalization and bring more class-conscious revolutionary leaders to the fore.

Over time these early definitions have evolved considerably. Though the concept of national-democracy is retained, it has now been reduced to "a special variety of revolutionary-democratic state, its earliest stage of development."⁸⁴ Ul'ianovskii has suggested that a schematic outline of the political transition to socialism would now include no less than four phases: national democracy; revolutionary democracy; the creation of a "vanguard party of the toilers" oriented according to the tenets of scientific socialism; and the creation of a Marxist-Leninist party.⁸⁵ Some analysts have taken to distinguishing between first and second "generations" or "echelons" of socialist orientation, or even the "state of socialist orientation of a new type."⁸⁶ In the first instance, referring to regimes which emerged during the 1960's such as Egypt, Algeria, Burma, or Ghana, the establishment of national-democratic norms is said to ultimately have become setting for a regression to capitalist orientation. In the second instance, referring to products of

the 1970's such as Angola, Ethiopia, or the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, revolutionary change was propelled immediately onto the revolutionary-democratic phase and socialist orientation has been pursued successfully. In effect, national democracy as a distinct and protracted stage of revolutionary development is disappearing from Soviet analysis altogether.

The only revolutionary transformation comparable in scale and international impact to the Iranian revolution which occurred during the 1970's is that of Ethiopia, and a brief comparison of these two events can help to clarify the nature of the Soviets' theoretical dilemma. In Ethiopia, a revolution launched with the ouster of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 led to the emergence of what Soviet theoreticians appear to consider a virtual model of socialist orientation, complete since September 1984 with a full-fledged Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. Though the structural context of the Ethiopian revolution differs in many ways from Iran's, the dynamics of the revolutionary process should apply in both instances. In Iran, a bourgeois-democratic revolution is said to have temporarily foreclosed non-capitalist development as an option by creating socio-political structures within which a class-conscious bourgeoisie could continue to assert its priorities. In Ethiopia, a national-democratic revolution is said to have created the preconditions for a leap into the revolutionary-democratic phase under the leadership of a centralized revolutionary authority (the Provisional Military Administrative Council, or Derg). In the Iranian case, a process of mass mobilization and radicalization culminated with the

ouster of the shah, while in Ethiopia radicalization and mass involvement were initiated from above following the emperor's deposition. The Derg's policy of revolutionary centralism enabled a successful struggle to be waged against left and right opposition, and external intervention, while the Tudeh Party's united front strategy, crafted to correspond to a national-democratic stage, led to disaster. In both cases the concept of national democracy as a phase in the maturation of a revolutionary and developmental process is voided of content.

The results of the Iranian revolution seem to be reinforcing those trends in Soviet analysis which argue against a rigid schematization of the revolutionary process in developing nations, which emphasize the primacy of national context and circumstances, which evaluate pessimistically the prospects for a socialist orientation to grow out of national-democratic norms (especially in the case of states like Iran with relatively developed national infrastructures), and which cite the decisive importance of vanguard political organizations, whether or not they initially adhere to an orthodox variant of scientific socialism. Iran's national-democratic revolution has not occurred and does not seem likely to occur. When discussing prospects for a revival of the left, Soviet analysts now recommend tactics more appropriate to a revolutionary-democratic phase, with particular emphasis upon "specifically proletarian methods of struggle."⁸⁷ After a long period of exaggerated optimism concerning the potential for a gradual political evolution toward socialism in developing nations liberated from

colonialism, Soviet revolutionary theory seems to be returning to a more orthodox Leninist interpretation emphasizing the central role of conscious political leadership and political organization.

NOTES

1. Izvestiia, 25 January 1979, as cited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The Dynamics of Influence, (New York: Praeger, 1982), 94.
2. Nireddin Kiianuri [Nur al-Din Kiyanuri], "Narodnaia revoliutsiia v Irane," Kommunist, 5 (March 1980), 79.
3. The term ulama (literally "learned men") refers generically to the community of Shi'i theologians, a politicized fraction of which has dominated Iran's revolutionary institutions. See Joseph Eliash, "Misconceptions Regarding the Juridicial Status of the Iranian 'Ulama'," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1 (February 1979), 9-25.
4. On the process of growing disillusion see the excellent series of articles by Muriel Atkin, "The Kremlin and Khomeini," The Washington Quarterly, 2 (1981), 50-67; "The Islamic Republic and the Soviet Union," in Nikki R. Keddie and Eric Hooglund, eds., The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic: Proceedings of a Conference (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1982), 140-150; and "Moscow's Disenchantment with Iran," Survey, 118-119 (1983), 247-260.
5. R. Ul'ianovskii, "Iran--shto dal'she: moral'nye printsipy v politike i politika v oblasti morali," Literaturnaia gazeta, 22 June 1983, 10.
6. "v MID SSSR," Pravda, 4 May 1983, 4. Soviet-Iranian relations were severely strained during 1983 following the outlawing of the Tudeh Party, but they have since rebounded. In an interview during October 1984, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati described relations as "normal" and noted that "Our relations with the Soviet Union are exactly what relations between two neighbors should be." Elaine Sciolino, "Iranian Vows Help to the Oppressed," The New York Times, 4 October 1983, A8.
7. Neglect of the ideological factor pervades the entire literature. In some accounts, it is the irrelevance of theoretical assessments which is stressed, with a long-term Soviet interest in extending influence southward toward the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea assumed as the well-spring of policy. See, for example, Aryeh Y. Yodfat, The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran (London: Croom Helm, 1984). In others, the ideological limitations of Marxism-Leninism are said to have distorted the Soviets' views of events, and particularly cause them to miss the significance of the revolution's Islamic character. See Malcolm E. Yapp, "The Soviet Union and Iran Since 1978," in Mark V. Kauppi and R. Craig Nation, eds., The Soviet Union and the Middle East in the 1980s: Opportunities, Constraints and Dilemmas (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books,

1983), 233-234. In both cases theoretical assessments are dismissed as either irrelevant, misleading, or wrong.

8. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 13, no. 53, (12 January 1978), 1975.

9. Karl Shreder [Karl Schroeder], "Mirovoi revoliutsionnyi protsess: aktual'nye problemy," Kommunist, 4 (March 1984), 102.

10. K. Brutents, "Osvobodivshiesia strany v nachale 80-kh godov," Kommunist, 3 (February 1984), 105.

11. See I. Ivanov, "Kontseptsii 'bednykh' i 'bogatykh' stran: istoki, sushchnost', napravlennost'," Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia [hereafter cited as MEMO], 1 (1983), 25; and E. Ermoshkin, "Neokolonializm transnatsional'nykh korporatsii," Kommunist, 18 (December 1981), 97.

12. See G. Smirnov and A. Triasunov, "Vekhi Sovetskoi Afrikanistiki," Aziia i afrika segodnia 12 (1982), 20. For a sophisticated exegesis of the Marxist concept of structural crisis, see Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 14-24.

13. A. S. Shin, Natsional'no-demokraticheskie revoliutsii: nekotorye voprosy teorii i praktiki (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), 11-12.

14. For elaboration see Vl. F. Li, "Politicheskaiia nadstroika v obshchestvakh sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii," Voprosy filosofii 9 (1981), 3-16; and E. Mitra, G. Mirskii, and E. Pakhad, "Gosudarstvo i problema vybora puti v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh," Problemy mira i sotsializma, 3 (1982), 55.

15. Socialist orientation has become the central concept in the Soviet view of third world development, and the literature surrounding it is sizeable. For an insightful account of the evolution of the term, see Sylvia Edgington, "The State of Socialist Orientation: A Soviet Model for Political Development," Soviet Union/Union Sovietique, 2 (1981), 223-251. Soviet definitions are provided by Iu. I. Iudin, Gosudarstvo sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii (Moscow: Nauka, 1975).

16. E. Primakov, "Strany sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii: trudnyi no real'nyi perekhod k sotsializmu," MEMO, 7 (1981), 13-14.

17. The existence of a vanguard party is emphasized as the sine qua non of the non-capitalist path. "All historical experience demonstrates," noted Boris Ponomarev at the International Scientific Conference in Berlin during 1980, "that the most important factor providing for the survival and strengthening of progressive regimes is the existence of a revolutionary party ... Life teaches that only [such] a party ... is in a position to bring about in practice the realization of socialist orientation." "Protiv imperializma, za sotsial'nyi progress,"

Pravda, 21 October 1980, 4. See also Iu. V. Irkhin, "Avangardnye revoliutsionnye partii trudiashchikhsia v osvobodivshikhsia stranakh," Voprosy istorii, 4 (1982), 55-67; and Iu. V. Irkhin, Vozrastanie roli avangardnykh revoliutsionno-demokraticeskikh partii v obshchestvennom razvitii (Moscow: Nauka, 1983).

18. Iu. V. Irkhin, "Tendentsii razvitiia stran sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii," Voprosy istorii, 6 (1984), 65.

19. A. P. Butenko, "Nekotorye teoreticheskie problemy perekhoda k sotsializmu stran s nerazvitoi ekonomiki," Narody Azii i Afriki, 5 (1982), 74; and Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind (New York: Praeger, 1983).

20. Iu. S. Novopashin, "Vozdeistvie real'nogo sotsializma na mirovoi revoliutsionnyi protsess: metodologicheskie aspekty," Voprosy filosofii, 8 (1982), 12.

21. A. Petrov, "Prizrak 'Sovetskoi ugrozy' i real'noe vmeshatel'stvo," Pravda, 11 January 1979, 5. A. Petrov is generally considered to be a pseudonym designating a semi-official comment emanating from the highest levels.

22. Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran, the so-called "great game," was resolved with the negotiation of a convention on 31 August 1907 dividing Iran into spheres of influence. See Rogers Platt Churchill, The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 (Cedar Rapids: The Torch Press, 1939); and Fritz Kazenzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

23. For the text see J. C. Hurewitz, ed., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, Vol. II (Princeton: Von Nostrand, 1956), 90-94. Articles V and VI of this treaty granted Soviet Russia the right to intervene in Iran if threatened by the hostile actions of a third party. On 22 January 1980 these articles were unilaterally abrogated by Iran.

24. See D. Kasatkin and V. Ushakov, "Iran: osobennosti razvitiia revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia," Aziia i Afrika segodnia, 4 (1979), 7. Neocolonial dependence is a theme which runs through most Soviet scholarship devoted to Iran prior to 1979. For summarial reviews of such work see N. A. Kuznetsova, "Razrabotka Leninskogo teoreticheskogo naslediia v Sovetskoi Iranistiki," Narody Azii i Afriki, 3 (1980), 14-22; and Jacob M. Landau, "More Soviet Works on Iran," Middle Eastern Studies, 3 (October 1979), 408-411.

25. M. S. Ivanov, "Antinarodnyi kharakter praveleniia dinastii Pekhlevi v Irane," Voprosy istorii, 11 (1980), 58-74.

26. See especially M. S. Ivanov, et al., Istoriia Irana (Moscow: Izd. Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1977), 407-409. Ivanov describes the exploitation of Iran's oil holdings as a root cause of popular dissatisfaction. "The activity of the international oil

consortium and its plundering of the national wealth of Iran called forth the indignation of the broad popular masses, the progressive intelligentsia, students, the working class, and other democratic strata of the population, who demanded that an end be put to the harboring of foreign, and above all American, oil monopolies in Iran." (409).

27. See particularly the perceptive essay by Sh. M. Badi, "O sotsial'nom i klassovom razvitii sovremennogo Irana," in B. G. Gafurov, ed., Leninizm, klassy, i klassovaia bor'ba v stranakh Vostoka: sbornik statei (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), 236-245.

28. These points are developed at length in M. S. Ivanov, Iran v 60-70kh godakh XX veka (Moscow: Nauka, 1977). A particularly egregious example of dependence in the foreign policy realm is said to be the extent of Iran's military purchases from the West, claimed to have consumed over half of all oil revenues through the 1970s. P. Demchenko, "Kogda podnimaetsia narod: k sobytiyam v Irane," Pravda, 24 January 1979, 4. One scholar has argued that a special, structural relationship exists between neocolonial dependency and US militarism. A. A. Kutsenkov, "Amerikanskii militarizm i neokolonializm," Narody Azii i Afriki, 3 (1984), 3-12. For a general survey of Iran's role in world politics under the shah see E. A. Orlov, Vneshniaia politika Irana posle voiny, Moscow: Nauka, 1975).

29. P. Andreev and A. Salekhov, "Sovremennyi Iran," MEMO, 6 (1976), 131. The commentator in question was Evgenii Primakov.

30. R. N. Andreasian and A. D. Kuzinkov, OPEK v mire nefti (Moscow: Nauka, 1981).

31. Kasatkin and Ushakov, "Iran: osobennosti razvitiia revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia," 5.

32. Andreev and Salekhov, "Sovremennyi Iran," 131.

33. S. L. Agaev, Iran v proshlom i nastoiashchem (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), 255, puts it this way: "The deep basis of the popular, anti-monarchical and anti-imperialist revolution which erupted in Iran during 1978 was the sharp gap between modern and traditional sectors, the relative lack of socio-economic integration, and the complete failure to relate socio-political forms with the socio-economic levels corresponding to them." Agaev has been the Soviet Union's most prolific commentator upon the Iranian revolution, and one of its most expert.

34. A. I. Demin, Sovremennaia Iranskaia derevnia (osnovnye problemy sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiia) (Moscow: Nauka, 1977) provides a sophisticated analysis which confirms the inadequacy, indeed failure, of the reforms, emphasizing "the difficulties standing in the way of an effective resolution of this important problem under current socio-economic circumstances, and the urgent need for a deepening of social

transformations in the countryside and in the nation as a whole." (266). Subsequent to the revolution Soviet evaluations of the "White Revolution" have become predominantly hostile. G. Kim, "Sotsial'noe razvitie i ideologicheskaja bor'ba v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh," Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn', 3 (1980), 76, typically denounces its "reactionary-bourgeois" character.

35. A good deal of the theoretical literature produced in the West concurs with this analysis. See the review of such work by Andre Mabon, "Multiples approaches de la revolution islamique," Le Monde diplomatique, July 1983; 14, and particularly Jerrold D. Green, Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Countermobilization (New York: Praeger, 1982).

36. N. Z. Volchek, "Krizisnye spady v razvivaiushcheisia ekonomike," Narody Azii Afriki, 6 (1981), 14-25, attempts to give this type of recession-induced crisis a larger, more universal significance.

37. D. Volskii, "Revoliutsiia na pereput'e," Novoe vremia, 2 (7 January 1983), 13.

38. Ibid.

39. Iran is not perceived to be unique in its cumulation of structural imbalance. For a similar analysis applied to neighboring Turkey see P. P. Moiseev and G. I. Starchenkov, "Turtsiia: nekotorye itogi i osobennosti kapitalisticheskogo razvitiia," Narody Azii i Afriki, 1 (1984), 15-23.

40. Estimates of the number of victims vary. One Tudeh Party leader, writing in a Soviet-sponsored journal, cites between 60,000 and 65,000 deaths in the course of anti-shah demonstrations during 1978. Kh. Bakhrami, "Cherez prizmu revoliutsii," Problemy mira i sotsializma, 6 (1980), 89.

41. P. Demchenko, "Iran: stanovlenie respubliki," Kommunist, 9 (June 1979), 111-112. For the distinctions between opposition groups see Ervand Abrahamian, "Iran in Revolution: The Opposition Forces," MERIP Reports, 75-76 (March/April 1979), 3-8; Shahram Chubin, "Leftist Forces in Iran," Problems of Communism, (July/August 1980), 1-25; and Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

42. Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, "Mezhdunarodnoe obozrenie," Pravda, 21 January 1979, 4.

43. Ivanov, "Antinarodnyi kharakter pravleniia dinastii Pekhlevi v Irane," 73.

44. Nikki Keddie has warned against the use of the term bazaari to refer to "a class in the Marxist sense," emphasizing its heterogenous character including an artisan element and small-scale traders as well as substantially wealthy merchants.

Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 244. Heeding the advice, Soviet accounts generally avoid the term, or equate it loosely with the petty and middle bourgeoisie. See Sh. M. Badi, Gorodskie srednye sloi Irana (Moscow: Nauka, 1977). For a scholarly investigation of the ulama's "national bourgeois" class character, see E. A. Doroshenko, Shiitskoe dukhovenstvo v sovremenom Irane (Moscow, Nauka, 1975), 118-161.

45. The argument is posed by E. A. Doroshenko, "Politicheskie traditsii shiizma i antimonarkhicheskoe dvizhenie v Irane (1978-1979)," Narody Azii i Afriki, 6 (1980), 58-66.

46. P. Demchenko, "Kogda podnimaetsia narod: k sobytiyam v Irane," Pravda, 24 January 1979, 4.

47. Jacob M. Landau, "Religion and Revolution in the Middle East as Reflected in Some Soviet Works," Middle Eastern Studies, 3 (July 1983), 377-381, concludes a desultory review of Soviet work in this area with the ironic question, if Islam is as reactionary as the Soviets seem to think, how could it lead a revolution? In fact, the problem is extensively addressed in the Soviet literature and it is surprising that Landau, who has systematically reviewed Soviet writing devoted to the Middle East for over a decade, should be unaware of or indifferent to it.

48. Kasatkin and Ushakov, "Iran: osobennosti razvitiia revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia," 7 define the comprador bourgeoisie as "heavy industrialists, money-lenders, bankers, merchants, high-ranking civil servants and military leaders, as well as large landowners, Iranians functioning as directors and managers of foreign companies, the intellectual elite, and including a parasitical stratum of corrupt political functionaries." It is described in more general terms as the "intermediary of foreign monopoly capital, serving the function of the chief social support of neocolonialism." A. M. Rumiantseva, ed., Nauchnyi kommunizm: slovar' (Moscow: Izd. politicheskoi literatury, 1980), 191.

49. The concept of a "two-line struggle" at this phase of the revolution is particularly emphasized in the literature of the Tudeh Party. See Kiianuri, "Narodnaia revoliutsiia v Irane," and Nureddin Kiianuri, "Iranskaia revoliutsiia: ee druz'ia i vragi," Problemy mira i sotsializma, 11 (1981), 32-36.

50. The most detailed account of these events in Soviet writings is A. B. Reznikov. "Krushenie monarkhii v Irane (Ianvar'-Fevral' 1979 g.)," in R. L. Ul'ianovskii, et al., Revoliutsionnyi protsess na Vostoke: istoriia i sovremennost' (Moscow: Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury, 1982), 309-385.

51. On this entire process see S. L. Agaev, Iran: rozhdenie respubliky (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984).

52. P. Demchenko, "Iran posle krusheniia monarkhii," Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' 9 (1979), 95.
53. D. Pavlov, "Iran: porazhenie neftianykh monopolii," Aziia i Afrika segodnia, 8 (1979), 18-20, and R. Andreasian, "Iran, neft', mirovoi rynok," Novoe vremia, 12 (16 March 1979), 24-26.
54. Kiyauri became First Secretary of the Tudeh Party on 4 January 1979, replacing Iraj Eskandrai due to the latter's apparent opposition to a united front strategy of collaboration with the clerical leadership. The party's tactic was justified "recognizing the vital importance of preserving the unity of all anti-monarchical and democratic forces of the Iranian people before the threat of a restoration of the monarchy, and also realistically concluding that in the given historical moment only those forces rallied under the leadership of Ayatallah Khomeini and the progressive circles of the shi'ite spiritual leadership were able to carry out this task." Ashraf Akhmedzianov, "Iran: respublika rozhdennaia v ogne narodnogo vostaniia," Za rubezhom, 16 (13-19 April 1979), 12.
55. The threat of US-sponsored destabilization or outright intervention has remained a strong theme in Soviet commentary, sometimes compared to the Chilean precedent. See A. Pavlov, "Ugroza voennoi diktatury," Pravda, 20 January 1979, 5.
56. Demchenko, "Iran: stanovlenie respubliki," 110 and 116.
57. Volskii, "Revoliutsiia na pereput'e," 14.
58. Elaine Sciolino, "Iran's Durable Revolution," Foreign Affairs, 4 (1983), 893-920, traces this process very effectively.
59. Conflicting references can be traced in Soviet sources to the mix of positive and negative elements in the Islamic heritage. Despite efforts to work cooperatively with Khomeini, Georgia's Zaria Vostoka could refer already in June 1979 to the "fanatical religiosity" of "hooligan elements" in Iran and their "reactionary priesthood." V. Borisov, "Iran: trevoga za sud'ba revoliutsii," Zaria Vostoka, 1 June 1979, 3.
60. More precisely at issue is the balance of political forces within the clerical faction. See Kiyauri's characterization of the problem as cited in Eric Rouleau, "Iran: revolution et contre-revolution," Le Monde, 25 July 1981, 5.
61. R. Ul'ianovskii, "Iranskaia revoliutsiia i ee osobennosti," Kommunist, 10 (July 1982), 109-110.
62. Ibid., 111. Compare with S. L. Agaev's characterization of the revolution as "Popular judging by its demands for social justice, motive forces, and methods of struggle; anti-monarchical, anti-monopolistic, and anti-imperialist judging by its basic trends; bourgeois-democratic judging by the

immediate, burning issues standing before it (though containing certain anti-capitalist tendencies); Islamic judging by the leading role of clericals and its organizational-ideological base." S. L. Agaev, "Revoliutsionnye dvizheniia i reformy v Irana," in Ul'ianovskii, Revoliutsionnyi protsess na Vostoka, 306.

63. Ul'ianovskii, "Iranskaia revoliutsiia i ee osobennosti," 111.

64. Aleksandr Bovin, "S Koranom i sablei," Nedelia, 36 (3-9 September 1979), 6. Among Soviet commentators, Bovin has ranked as the most hostile critic of trends in the Iranian revolution. His pessimism has been echoed by accounts in the West. See, for example, Udo Steinbach, "Iran-Halbzeit der iranischen Revolution," Aussenpolitik 1 (1980), 52-69; and Andre Mabon, "Iran: un regime au bord du vide," Le Monde diplomatique, July 1983, 12-14.

65. Shreder, "Mirovoi revoliutstionnyi protsess," 103-104. The theme is developed at length in S. L. Agaev, Iranskaia revoliutsiia, SShA i mezhdunarodnaia bezopasnost' (Moscow: Nauka, 1984).

66. S. Aliev, "Problemy politicheskogo razvitiia Irana," Aziia i afrika segodnia, 11 (1980), 17.

67. R. Ul'ianovskii, "Na edinoi platforme," Pravda, 19 February 1983, 4.

68. For the charges see M. Krutikhin, "'Tri revoliutsii' aiatolly Khomeini," Bakinskii rabochii, 8 January 1981, 4. These crude designations, both tendentious and absurd, represent Soviet analysis at its worst. In more sophisticated accounts Bani Sadr has been described as embodying the aspirations "of the bourgeoisie, of the most mixed character, from petty to large." Iu. Bochkarev, "Smeshchanie Prezidenta," Novoe vremia, 27 (3 July 1981), 13. Treatment of the Mujahidin has been more subtle, and there have been reports that the USSR has become more interested in rebuilding contacts with this organization. See Yodfat, The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 116-117; and Zalmay Khalilzad, "Islamic Iran: Soviet Dilemma," Problems of Communism, (January/February 1984), 11. In his venomous memoir, former prime minister Bakhtiyar carries this argument to its logical extreme, describing the Mujahidin as a subversive front behind which "il y a toujours l'URSS." Chapour Bakhtiar, Ma fidelite (Paris: Albin Michel, 1982), 200-205.

69. K. Vital'ev, "Komu eto nuzhno?," Pravda, 31 December 1983, 5.

70. Volskii, "Revoliutsiia na pereput'e," 15.

71. A. T. Stepaniants, "Musul'manskoe rozrozhdenchestvo," Narody Azii i Afriki, 3 (1983), 20-29, links the much-discussed Islamic

revival of the 1970s directly to the disintegration of feudal structures, with its base in the peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie.

72. These arguments are summarized in E. M. Primakov, "Islam i protsessy obshchestvennogo razvitiia stran zarubezhnogo Vostoka," Voprosy filosofii, 8 (1980), 60-71.

73. Note the strong statement by Mikhail Krutikhin in Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 27 April 1984, 2, denouncing the "reactionary circles of the Iranian clergy" for conducting a "creeping counter-revolution" in particular as regards social legislation for women. Present norms, it is claimed, "conform to the norms of relations in slave-owning and early feudal societies."

74. Erhard Franz, Minderheiten in Iran (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institute, 1981).

75. An. A. Gromyko. "Opyt resheniia natsional'nogo voprosa v SSSR i Afro-Aziatskii mir," Narody Azii i Afriki, 6 (1982), 18-16. For a comprehensive review of the problem see Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

76. A. Akmuradov, "Orudie reaktsii--kleveta," Pravda, 4 April 1979, 5.

77. M. Lazarev, "Kurdy i kurdskaa vopros," Aziia i Afrika segodnia, 12 (1983), 36-39.

78. On patterns of economic interaction see A. Akhmedzianov, "Ukrepnenie nezavisimost'," Izvestiia, 11 February 1982, 4; and N. Iakubov, "Fakty protiv vymysla," Pravda, 5 August 1983, 5.

79. Quoted from the joint communique issued at the conclusion of Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz's visit to Moscow during November 1983. "S rabochim vizitom," Pravda, 22 November 1983, 4.

80. The USSR has urged cooperation with UN, Nonaligned Movement, and Islamic Conference Organization peace initiatives, generally praising Iraqi responses and regretting Iranian intransigence. However, to argue, as does an anonymous NATO source quoted by Drew Middleton, that the Soviets "have abandoned their last pretense of neutrality in the war" overstates the case. Drew Middleton, "War in the Gulf: A Stalemate With a Slight Edge to Iraq," The New York Times, 12 September 1984, A4. It seems clear that the Soviets would prefer precisely what they have repeatedly called for--a negotiated settlement that leaves neither party victor or vanquished.

81. Iurii Glukhov, "Zatianuvshaiasia voina," Pravda, 14 November 1983, 5.

82. Aliev, "Problemy politicheskogo razvitiia Irana," 19.

83. Pravda, 24 February 1981, 3.
84. R. A., Ul'ianovskii, "O revolitsionnoi demokratii, ee gosudarstvo i politicheskoi sisteme," Voprosy filosofii, 4 (1984), 30-31.
85. R. A. Ul'ianovskii, "O natsional'noi i revoliutsionnoi demokratii i put evoliutsii," Narody Azii i Afriki, 2 (1984), 17. Ul'ianovskii further notes that such an outline contains abstract, formal relevance only. In practice, the transition to socialism must correspond to national circumstances, with phases skipped or extended as the situation demands.
86. Ibid., 15; and Irkhin, "Tendentsii razvitiia stran sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii," 65. Similar terms appear in the work of several other scholars.
87. Agaev, "Revoliutsionnye dvizheniia i reformy v Irane," 307.