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**Polish Peculiarities?
Military Loyalty
During the 1980-1981
Solidarity Crisis**

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Introduction

On December 13, 1981, the Polish military under the leadership of Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski imposed martial law, effectively ending sixteen months of popular protest and bargaining between the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) and the independent trade union Solidarity. In the West, and particularly in the United States, martial law was interpreted as the Polish military declaring war on its own people on the orders of the Soviet Union. It was assumed and repeatedly asserted that the military was loyal to the Communist Party and to the Soviet high command, that they were little more than communists in uniform.¹ Such an assertion, however, leaves one hard pressed to explain the acquiescence of the militaries across Eastern Europe to the changes of 1989 and the ability of those militaries to adapt to noncommunist regimes to the point of being willing and even eager to join NATO.

Perhaps the largest obstacle to understanding the role of the military under communism was the overwhelming emphasis placed on the role of the Communist Party. It was assumed that the party controlled all aspects of the economy and the political system, and there was very little attempt to explore the role of other institutions as independent or semi-independent actors. The Solidarity crisis in Poland brought the factions within the PUWP and its problems with legitimation starkly to light. But there was at the time relatively little investigation into the roles of other institutions within the system. In order to understand the complex interactions between the military and the party, we must be able to distinguish the roles and interests of each institution. One useful step in achieving this is to examine the attitudes of the Polish military toward Solidarity, in order to discern the average military professional's motivations for following the orders to impose martial law.

It was assumed that the Polish officer corps, having been largely trained by Soviet officers, often at Soviet academies, would be loyal to Soviet wishes. It is my goal to show that this evaluation is oversimplified and to highlight some of the factors that complicated the Polish military's loyalties. Although controlled to some degree by the Soviet high command, the Polish military also displayed very strong nationalist and independent tendencies as early as 1944. Soviet concessions to the independent streak within the Polish military were evident in the fact that the Poles were the only one of the satellite militaries allowed to retain much of their prewar insignia and uniforms. The standing of the Polish military is also reflected in opinion poll data that consistently showed it to be one of the most trusted institutions in Poland, second only to the Catholic church and, eventually, Solidarity. It is simplistic, therefore, to dismiss the military as

simply another branch of the Communist Party, carrying out the will of its Soviet masters, especially since even the PUWP itself cannot be so easily characterized. Rather, the Polish People's Army (PPA) needs to be understood in the context of the complicated mixture of nationalist aspirations and communist internationalism in which all postwar Polish institutions functioned.²

Ultimately, I seek to document the argument that the Polish military was primarily influenced by and reflected Polish society. In doing so, I explore the attitudes of the professional cadre toward the Solidarity movement from its inception until the month following the imposition of martial law, using previously unpublished material. Rather than hostility, much of the officer corps expressed sympathy with Solidarity's early demands and saw popular protests as justified by the mistakes of the Gierek regime. I will show that the military was actually proreform, because economic development was considered essential to fulfilling Poland's international and defense obligations and the single greatest obstacle to continued economic development was the command economy. I present evidence that the military participated in and supported the reforms up to the point when it became obvious that the Soviets would not tolerate the situation. Military support for Solidarity's aims appears to be inversely related to the perception of threat from Poland's allies as well as to the perception of radicalization of Solidarity itself.

The events of the sixteen months between August 1980 and December 1981 have been well described and analyzed elsewhere, so I will not repeat them here, except as is necessary for my argument.³ The Main Political Administration of the PPA commissioned opinion polls to be carried out regularly among the cadre and enlisted men, using a combination of interviews and anonymous polling techniques in order to gauge the internal morale of the military.⁴ The results of these polls are somewhat counterintuitive and enlightening in the context of martial law events. Where one would expect a military loyal to the Soviet Union and the PUWP to be highly critical of Solidarity, we find instead a balance of views which placed primary blame for the crisis at the door of the party. To the extent that the data presented are counterintuitive and similar to that gathered across other samples within the population, I believe that they provide an insight into the complex nature of the position of the military within Polish society.

The Place of the Polish Military in Society

While analysts agree that the Polish military was both nationalist and communist, many stress that they were communist first and nationalist only as a means of placating the Polish people.⁵ I would argue, based on the evidence

presented below, that it is possible that they were nationalist and communist equally or that they were nationalist first and communist only as a means of placating the Soviet Union. More important, in the course of development of the PPA, officers increasingly identified themselves as defenders not of the communist regime, but of the existence of the Polish state. They saw themselves, not as an extension of the Communist Party, but as members of Polish society and defenders of the nation.

The formation of the postwar Polish army on Soviet soil, under Soviet influence, and for largely Soviet political purposes, cannot be ignored. But just as the Soviet army developed out of a mixture of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and pragmatic Soviet security needs, so the Polish army developed in response to a mixture of Soviet influence, Polish national security dictates, and PUWP politics. None of these elements can be ignored, for all of them continued to play a role in shaping military doctrine and organization throughout the postwar period. The development of an increasingly Polish officer cadre (see table 1) coincided with a growing concern for securing some autonomy over Polish national security matters. Changes in the political system of the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin were reflected in the less direct nature of Soviet control over Polish politics in general and over the Polish military in particular.⁶ Soviet control over Polish military matters in the 1960s and 1970s was not direct, but rather consisted of a framework of implicit rules with the threat of invasion as an ultimate enforcing measure.⁷

Christopher Jones has argued that Soviet influence in Eastern Europe depended on Soviet control over appointments to the upper echelons of the East European parties' leadership and on the preservation of a Soviet capability for military intervention in order to prevent either the capture of the local party hierarchies by national communists or the destruction of party control by anticommunist forces. To this end, the Soviets sought to prevent the adoption of policies that could have thwarted a Soviet invasion; the East European states were integrated into a larger international system in which each Communist Party was dependent on the Soviet Union to stay in power. Jones argued that those countries in Eastern Europe (Romania and Yugoslavia) that maintained independence vis-à-vis the Soviet system were able to do so because they convinced the Soviets of the cost of invasion by demonstrating their ability to mobilize forces for a prolonged resistance, to maintain continuity of leadership in an underground or exile situation, to brand collaborators as traitors to the sovereignty of the country, and to mobilize international support for their cause.⁸

Jones makes much of the fact that officer education was set up following the Soviet model and that most superior officers had been schooled at one point

or another in the Soviet Union: “no officer reaches the higher ranks without attending Soviet academies. These alumni form the greater socialist officer corps which accept Soviet missions and execute orders.”⁹ This assumes bonding on some level between Soviet officers and those of the East European countries during the schooling. However, there was actually very little contact between Soviet officers in training and their East European counterparts, and very little opportunity to develop personal loyalties.¹⁰ It is probably safe, therefore, to argue that Soviet control relied less on personal contacts and more on structural and procedural factors as well as on the credibility of the Soviet threat to invade any country that strayed too far from the acceptable parameters of behavior. It is not clear, however, how those parameters were communicated.

Some have argued that control was maintained directly through the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), with officers in all the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries carrying out the orders of the Soviet army as funneled through the WTO directorate. On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence pointing to a less complete and overarching control. In particular, incidents such as the resistance to the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the mobilization of segments of the Polish forces in support of Gomulka that same year, and the refusal of the Poles to allow training exercises in Poland in December 1980 seem to argue for the existence of a much looser framework of influence.

Condoleezza Rice argues that there was a wide range of formal, informal, personal, and institutional contacts between the Soviets and individual East European countries, allowing the Soviets to form a wedge between the domestic party and the army. It is thus a mistake for analysts to focus on the WTO as the locus of Soviet control in East Europe. Focus should instead be on the four major links in the two-dimensional relationship: (1) between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Soviet military; (2) between the CPSU and the domestic party; (3) between the Soviet military and the domestic military; and (4) between the domestic military and the domestic party. Over time, these relationships came to be based more on utilitarian and normative instruments and less on coercion. This change led to a strengthening of the fourth link at the expense of the second and third.¹¹

While Rice’s work focused on Czechoslovakia, this dynamic can be seen in Poland as well. Rice notes that Czechoslovak military leaders in 1968 were fond of saying that the armed forces were a part of society, mirroring it and being influenced by domestic changes. She argues that this was a change in attitude on the part of the military elite that sounded the death knell for the separation of the military from the larger society when the military began to take an active part in the Prague Spring reforms: “Only when it was clear that the military leadership

was paralyzed by the crisis and could not or would not defend the ‘honor’ of the alliance did the Soviets abandon the Czechoslovak People’s Army elite and demand a reversal of the military-political course.”¹² But such a change in attitude did not occur exclusively as a response to the Prague Spring. The roots of military support for the reforms must have already been present.

Soviet pressure explains the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and may account for the lack of resistance on the part of the Czechoslovak army, but it does nothing to tell us why the military initially supported the reforms. Interestingly enough, Rice fails to extrapolate her findings in Czechoslovakia in arguing that the Polish military in 1981 colluded with the Soviets to impose martial law in the face of Solidarity’s demands for reform. Rice finds it hard to imagine that the party would order its own fall from power and discounts that the military, even though it had a distinct identity, would act on its own. What she does not consider, is why, if the military were so eager to act on Soviet orders, did it hesitate for sixteen months?

The initially favorable response of the military to the protests, and even the willingness of the party’s Political Bureau to negotiate with Solidarity, can perhaps best be explained by the similarity in background of military officers, party leaders, and workers in the coastal cities where the strikes began. Gdańsk and Szczeciń were part of the recovered territories, lands given to Poland at the end of World War II to compensate for the territory taken by the Soviet Union. The German populations were expelled from the new Western areas, and, they were resettled primarily with Polish peasants from the lost Eastern borderlands (the *kresy*). Immediately after the war and during the fifties and sixties, these populations benefited from the enormous social mobility afforded them under the massive industrialization program pursued by the Polish government. With this mobility came the expectation of ongoing economic rewards, but the government was unable to make good on this promise, eventually leading to the disaffection of the classes meant to benefit from it.

Postwar military officers benefited from the same kinds of economic and social mobility and thus were likely to have developed the same expectations. As a result of party recruitment efforts as early as 1944, ten thousand young workers and peasants were taken into officer schools, and the military education system was expanded.¹³ The war and socialist ideology changed the social composition of the officer corps away from the traditional intelligentsia in favor of the workers and peasants, who by 1950 made up almost 80 percent of the officer corps.¹⁴ Military recruits had access to housing, education, and other benefits not readily available to the general public. While these benefits were designed to create loyalty to the system, their provision depended on continued

economic growth. Military officers and workers on the coast and elsewhere could be expected to react similarly to the general crisis in Poland, *up to the point where such protests would compromise state security*. Once the Solidarity movement began to have international repercussions, we should expect military support to lessen, which is indeed what happened.

Those who refer to the party in uniform assume that there was a confluence of interests between the military and the party, which there was: both sought to preserve the political system and the alliance with the Soviet Union. However, they also assume that both the PUWP and the upper officer cadre bowed to Moscow's wishes. This has clearly not always been the case with the Polish party; it would make sense to assume that it was also not always the case with the Polish military. Indeed, the events of October 1956 stand out as an obvious example of a case in which both the PUWP and the upper officer cadre of the PPA acted against Soviet wishes and interests.

Thus, one of the key assumptions of those who argue for direct Soviet control is clearly false. The Polish military did not always act in the interests of the Soviet Union. Given the nature of Polish nationalism and the identification of the military as an institutional representative of the Polish nation, it is much more likely that the Polish military found itself in the type of framework that Rice describes, with the added complication of needing to maintain at least a facade of serving true national interests. Within this framework, relations between the military and the party probably corresponded to Timothy Colton's model, with the military participating in internal, institutional, and intermediate issues through official prerogative, expert advice (always tempered by Soviet security needs), and political bargaining.¹⁵ In order for this model to fit, there must be clear evidence that the Polish military developed and maintained an identity and interests that were separate from those of both the Soviet military and the PUWP, and that the PPA was capable of negotiating with either of these institutions separately from the other.

The increasingly technological nature of warfare from the 1960s onward led to an increasingly professional military. However, the increase in professionalization did not lead to a disengagement from politics. A basic principle of the PPA was that the army was responsible for aiding the economic development of the country. The military was to be always at the disposition of the state, to be used for security purposes, but also for political, educational, and developmental tasks.¹⁶ But whereas civilians such as Jerzy Wiatr continued to refer to the military as "communists in uniform,"¹⁷ officers were more likely to point out that the military was not an organ of the PUWP, but rather an integral part of the overall political system and state apparatus. Because it is hard to

separate the state system from party control, obviously it becomes hard to separate the military from party control. The attitude in the military, however, was that the party was responsible for general matters and should not involve itself in combat leadership and other strictly military matters. In return, the military would not involve itself in strictly political matters, but would be at the disposition of the state for the protection of the social system.¹⁸

The late 1960s saw the rise of a generation of officers, raised during the interwar Second Republic, who had joined the army in order to help liberate Poland; they had been trained in the Soviet Union, were considered professional soldiers, and had managed to keep clear of PUWP factional politics.¹⁹ These officers were members of the party as a matter of course, but party membership in the military was treated much more as a professional requirement, as one of the implicit rules imposed by the Soviet Union, than as a measure of belief.

Membership in the PUWP was presented as a professional advantage: it would ensure the high quality of official work of the cadre because the acting principle of all party members was to try for the best results, to critically assess outcomes, and work toward increasing personal knowledge and capabilities. Throughout the 1970s party membership in the officer corps was about 80 percent.²⁰ As Wiatr describes it,

From 1968 on, the military command was entrusted to professional soldiers who were uninvolved in factional politics, younger, and better prepared professionally. Despite their military education and experience, and their exclusive devotion to their military careers, they were politically active party members whose military and political interests overlapped.²¹

There is a distinction made between being politically active party members with a political interest and being active in factional politics. This was important in an environment in which factional politics became increasingly evident from 1956 onward. Although this is not the place to discuss this issue, there is evidence that the increasingly factionalized nature of politics within the party led to the relative increase in importance of upper-level military party members who, because they were not associated with either faction, were acceptable to both sides.²²

Polish politics after the Stalinist period took on an increasingly idiosyncratic nature, with the relationship between the PUWP and the population being marked by cycles of protest and reform. During most of these incidents, the military was used as the armed branch of the party to restore law and order. Yet this was not without repercussions within the military itself, particularly after the strikes on the Baltic coast in December 1970, when morale hit an all time low. The military's

self-image appears to have been inconsistent with its continued use as an internal police force, and by 1976, the military appears to have been in a position to force the PUWP to seek other means to deal with popular protest.²³ While this change certainly has as much to do with the disintegration of the PUWP as with any possible ambitions on the part of the PPA, it is interesting to see the extent to which the motivations of the PPA were similar to or diverged from Solidarity's motivations in opposing the PUWP.

The Initial Response to the Solidarity Crisis

In seeking to understand the military response to Solidarity, it is important to point out that even the PUWP was not initially hostile to the strikes on the coast and that even as the crisis progressed, there was still some support for the Solidarity movement at the highest levels of party leadership. While we would expect to see differences of opinion between officers and draftees as well as between officers involved in policy formation and those not involved, it is still to be expected that the institution as a whole would take some signal from the very highest ranks. And even at the very highest ranks in the PPA, there was not the kind of overt hostility to the Solidarity movement that one might have expected from a military loyal to Soviet interests. Available evidence indicates that General Jaruzelski advocated restraint in dealing with the striking workers.

First Secretary Edward Gierek's approach to dealing with unrest on the Baltic coast in July and August 1980 was to begin with the pattern that he had set up in dealing with unrest in 1970 and 1976, but whereas concessions in 1976 had been followed by repression and dismissal of workers involved in the strikes, in 1980 the strikes were too widespread for this pattern to be followed exactly. The use of the army was brought up not by Gierek but by Władysław Kruczek, at a Political Bureau meeting August 29, in reference to declaring a general state of emergency (*stan wyjątkowy*). As minister of defense, General Jaruzelski's response was cautionary:

Someone has mentioned declaring a state of emergency there is no provision for such a thing in the constitution. There is only martial law [*stan wojenny*], but we cannot declare that, because how can one carry out such rigors when the whole country is immobile? That is unrealistic. It is important to avoid issuing orders that cannot be carried out. Twice already, the highest authority [Gierek] has spoken publicly, and nothing has changed, in fact, things are worse.²⁴

Thus, Jaruzelski did not appear to see the strikes as enough of an immediate

threat to public order to call on the military. He appeared to be primarily concerned, not with the political repercussions of using or not using the military to stop the strikes, but with avoiding issuing orders which would be illegal or dangerous to his men. So he advocated continued negotiation.

Jaruzelski's arguments were fairly representative of the attitude of the military as a whole. Although there must be a distinction made between career officers and draftees, as well as between career officers with some influence on policy and those without, it is to be expected that the highest ranking officer would have an idea of how the ranks felt about a specific issue and be able to represent the interests of the military as an institution to the government. It is important to note, as well, that the PPA's response to Solidarity was not out of line with that of the government.

In an opinion poll carried out among twenty-five hundred officers and draftees in September 1980, attitudes about the striking workers and the government's handling of the situation were not what one would expect of a military inherently hostile to reform (see table 2).²⁵ Although the official government response was that the unrest was the result of anti-socialist provocation, officers and draftees alike tended to see it as a direct result of faulty government policies. Only a very small minority saw the strikes as a result of propaganda. It is worth stressing that in the early stages of the Solidarity protests, 64.7 percent of military respondents felt that strikes were a justifiable reaction under extraordinary circumstances, whereas only 11.3 percent felt that strikes caused so much damage to the national economy that they could not be justified under any circumstances.²⁶ Interestingly enough, military personnel were more likely than society as a whole to see the strikes as a justifiable response to the situation in the country. Sociological research found that Poles in general were as likely to withhold their support from strikes as to support them.²⁷

Asked about the specific causes of the difficult situation in the country, large numbers of officers and draftees cited economic causes and faulty government planning rather than propaganda or antisocialist tendencies (see table 3). In all cases, more officers agreed with these postulates than draftees, the differences in some cases being as much as 20 percent.²⁸ These results probably reflect criticism of the government's attempts at implementing socialist policies rather than criticism of socialism itself. Contrary to what one might expect, officers were much more likely than the government to be critical of government policy and to link problems directly to government policy.

In general, there was strong support within the military for the demands made by the striking workers: 77.3 percent felt that Polish goods should not be sold in the hard currency (Pewex) shops; 61.2 percent felt that workers should

have the right to strike; 66.4 percent felt that the church should be given access to radio time; 62.2 percent felt that independent trade unions were justifiable; 71.7 percent felt that censorship laws should be changed; and 72.1 percent felt that all Saturdays should be declared nonworking days.²⁹ Although these figures are less than the general public support for the Gdańsk Agreements, they are much higher than one would expect the support for counterrevolutionary movements to be among communists in uniform.³⁰

While military personnel appear reluctant to see the strikes as having been instigated by antisocialist forces, they were very likely to see such forces as having taken advantage of the situation to press their interests (see table 4). There does not appear, however, to have been a perceived conflict between such interests and those of the workers as a whole. Interestingly enough, 38.8 percent (52.8 percent of the officer cadre) felt that antisocialist elements played the role of experts in the strike committees, and 32.7 percent (29 percent of officers) felt that they had effectively represented the interest of the working class; 14.2 percent were actually willing to express the opinion that antisocialist elements could play a positive role in the country.³¹

Thus, the military initially displayed a good deal of tolerance for the workers' strikes, placing blame for the unrest on poor policies and corruption within the PUWP. Over time, however, there was a definite decline in patience brought on by the radicalization of Solidarity and evidence of the inability of the PUWP to change the situation that had given rise to the movement. As it became clear that the PUWP was able neither to silence Solidarity nor to acquiesce in its demands, military opinion became increasingly negative toward the movement and the situation developing in the country.

Changes in the Military's Assessment of the PUWP

On the whole, the military was skeptical about the party's program for socialist renewal as it was presented in August 1980, largely voicing the opinion that although the program was proper, it would only be successfully carried out in certain areas (59.7 percent). Almost 15 percent of the senior cadre felt that the program was unrealistic and that it would be impossible to carry out under current circumstances. Asked about the chances for change in specific areas of the socioeconomic situation (see table 5), military men in general responded almost uniformly negatively with respect to the government's ability to bring about improvements in the time spent waiting for an apartment, the availability of alimentary goods on the market, and the availability of industrial goods on the market. However, significant portions were optimistic about the changes within

society that could be brought about through political renewal. This was expressed through a positive response to question about the level of consciousness of society, relationships between people at work, and workers' self-government. Although respondents were rather pessimistic about the worth of money, work politics, and social discipline, it is significant that 59.4 percent of the upper cadre felt that the strikes would have no effect on the external security of the country, while 25.2 percent felt that the situation would weaken Poland's international position.³²

There was general agreement that the following conditions would be necessary if the country were to move out of its difficult situation: peace and common sense on the part of society (65.1 percent); growth of work efficiency and discipline (80.5 percent); personnel changes in the government and the party (65.6 percent); democratization of social and political life (55.1 percent); decentralization of planning and administration (50.0 percent); disciplining of those who were responsible for the situation (78.8 percent); establishing market equilibrium (70.6 percent); the creation of independent trade unions (56.7 percent); recovering economic balance (67.2 percent). Views were less positive about the effectiveness of calling on those who were responsible for the situation by abusing power to their own ends extraordinary party congress (39.9 percent), asking other socialist countries for help (31.5 percent), and asking for more loans from capitalist countries (31.5 percent).³³

By the time Jaruzelski became premier in February 1981, the cadre claimed to be ready to "tighten the belt" but wanted some indication as to how much and for how long. Interviewees also expressed a great amount of dissatisfaction about the slowness with which those responsible for the crisis were being held accountable. The cadre expressed a lack of faith that Solidarity would respect the ninety-day moratorium on strikes, but stressed that in order for the moratorium to be effective the government must pass bills on trade unions and censorship, devise a realistic socioeconomic program, decisively resolve personnel matters (for many this meant bringing to account all those responsible for corruption and faulty decision-making), justify the actions of the government and state administration, and keep society informed of all important government initiatives.³⁴

For many, the ability of Poland to pull itself out of the situation depended on the degree to which the government and party could gain the acceptance and cooperation of society. There was a high level of belief among cadre and civilian workers that the recently appointed premier, General Jaruzelski, could integrate and rally the country around him to carry out the tasks ahead.³⁵ Clearly the overriding opinion among officers and draftees alike was that the government and the party were ultimately responsible for the unrest that had led to the creation

of Solidarity. Enthusiasm for Jaruzelski's appointment as premier grew from the impression that the party had been undisciplined and that Jaruzelski would be able to inspire discipline in responding to the justified concerns of the working class.

Thus, faced with widespread crisis, the Polish government, on the advice of its top military leader, chose to take a conciliatory attitude toward the strikers. It is perhaps surprising that Jaruzelski appeared to believe that the problem could be solved through intensifying propaganda (tell the people they are happy and they will become so), yet the belief appears to be sincere in that it continued to characterize his strategy. When Jaruzelski became premier in February 1981, he asked the country to grant him ninety days of freedom from strikes and unrest to try to deal with the general political and economic crisis. It is not clear what steps he thought he could take in ninety days to accomplish his goal, but he clearly believed that he would get social calm if he asked for it.

But his ninety days had barely begun when the government faced a new crisis. In what was characterized by many observers as a calculated provocation by party hardliners, several Solidarity activists were severely beaten by police after a meeting in Bydgoszcz. Solidarity responded with a nationwide strike mobilization, but at the same time attempted to keep the situation calm by circulating pictures of Solidarity activist Jan Rulewski to counter rumors that he had been killed in the confrontation. On March 28, the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee called for negotiations and a peaceful solution to the crisis. Deputy Prime Minister Mieczysław Rakowski was able to negotiate a compromise with Lech Wałęsa, and the strikes were called off.

The international consequences threatened to be severe, however. The Bydgoszcz provocation took place during the Soyuz-81 joint WTO exercises, which were being carried out on Polish territory and were prolonged "indefinitely" at the height of the crisis. It was clear that if the Poles had not reached an agreement themselves, the Soviets would have found one for them. There is much speculation as to the identity and motives of those behind the Bydgoszcz provocation. Because only Jaruzelski himself or Mirosław Milewski, Minister of Internal Affairs, could have ordered the police to move in, it was generally accepted that Milewski, a known hardliner, with or without the support of other Political Bureau members, purposely tried to provoke a confrontation between Solidarity and the government at a time when Soviet forces were in a position to intervene rapidly. Obviously, however, it was either not Jaruzelski's intention or not within his power to confront Solidarity at that moment. Since the largest part of the officer corps continued to voice support for socialist renewal and a political solution to the crisis, it seems likely that the government chose not to call on the military at

that time because First Secretary Stanislaw Kania had not yet given up on a political solution and his military experts were not urging him to. It should be pointed out, however, that there were differences of opinion on how to handle the ongoing crisis among the senior officers, just as there were among Political Bureau members.

Throughout the Solidarity crisis, both within the PUWP and within Solidarity, there is evidence that more radical factions struggled with more moderate factions. The limits of these disputes appear to have been determined by the various factions' determination of how far the Soviets could be pushed before they would take repressive action as they had in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In the military as well, we can see evidence of an inherent support for reform tempered by an understanding of the realities of Soviet power.

Many officers responded to the deliberations of the Ninth Plenum by voicing concern that the government had created problems for itself by dealing with problems only halfway. Military men in general expressed attitudes critical of the outcome of the plenum, because they felt that the crucial issues were not cleared up, miscreants were not punished, and the party had failed to regain the leading role in society, thus allowing other elements to usurp this position. They faulted the party for not publishing the complete text of plenum documents. The military also expressed concern over the role that soldiers would be called on to play if a state of emergency were declared or help from the WTO were needed in response to a general strike.³⁶

Interviewees expressed mixed feelings about the way that the government handled the most recent round of negotiations with Solidarity, noting that agreements were good because they would lessen the level of tension, but also worrying that Solidarity would learn that strikes were a way of getting whatever they wanted, even though social approval of the strikes was on the wane because of the dangers inherent in them. Officers felt that in order to guarantee durable agreements, the government should treat Solidarity as a partner; make sure that the public had access to proper and true information in a timely fashion; hold public figures accountable for their promises; discipline those who held up the process of accountability of guilty parties; undertake a no-holds-barred effort to ameliorate the economic situation; hold consultations with the steering committee of Solidarity in order to uncover and eliminate antisocialist elements hiding under its shield; carry out far-reaching personnel changes at all levels and even fill many positions with military personnel; explain to society exactly what happened in Bydgoszcz; refrain from "playing poker" with social tensions, because problems of this sort must be quickly and effectively solved; not shrink from

confrontations with Solidarity in the media; and carry out an aggressive propaganda campaign.³⁷

Military members of the PUWP wanted to know why the party had not acted against corruption in the government and in the party before the events of August 1980. They demanded to know when the process of renewal would begin in earnest, as well as why the decisions of the government and the party were not approved and carried out with full conviction. Career officers were concerned about the fate of their families if a state of emergency were imposed. They reported that there were already many instances of threats to officers' families and expressed shock that more concrete steps had not been taken to protect them and their families. They wanted to know what would be done to protect uniformed officers. At the same time many expressed support for the idea of making it mandatory to wear the uniform under all circumstances as a means of increasing the visibility and pride of the military.

Interviewees continued to express a positive outlook regarding Jaruzelski's premiership, but felt that he should be more careful in filling ministerial portfolios, because they doubted the ability of the current ministers to carry out the reform program on time. The feeling was also expressed that personnel changes should be carried out among the civil servants in the ministries since it was obvious that current personnel are not always capable of or willing to carry out the changes dictated by the new program at the center.³⁸ The military expressed much doubt as to whether Jaruzelski's ten-point program could be carried out in ninety days. In general they were frustrated because neither the government nor the party seemed capable of making a decision and sticking by it. At the time that this research was carried out, there were high expectations for the premier's presentation to the Sejm, scheduled for April 10, 1981. Most of the cadre believed that Jaruzelski would not only offer a penetrating analysis of the roots of the situation in the country, but that he would also propose concrete solutions that would arrest further unfavorable developments.³⁹ These attitudes are similar to those expressed by other militaries during times of national crisis: the civilian bureaucracy is considered too undisciplined and the military, or a military attitude, is needed to provide the motivation to overcome the crisis.

After Jaruzelski's speech to the Sejm, many officers expressed disappointment, noting that he said nothing really new, but only made a more dramatic presentation of old material. The speech was very clear and understandable; however, it was seen as too soft and indecisive in content, too descriptive. Many officers noted that the proposed reforms would be very hard to carry out because the bureaucracy would oppose them. The following opinions were expressed about the government at this time: it acted in a manner that was

neither decisive nor consequential; it did not act effectively enough against those who were clearly opponents of the regime, which led them to be more aggressive; it seemed that the administration acted against Jaruzelski, torpedoing his intentions. Several officers proposed that there should be more military personnel in the government, because this would lead to more effective government action. It was also suggested that Jaruzelski should make himself heard more often. All in all there was a high level of support for Jaruzelski in the military, but it was not as enthusiastic or emotional as it had been when he first became premier.⁴⁰

On the other hand, respondents expressed satisfaction that an exact date for the Ninth Party Congress had been set. There were generally high expectations for the congress in terms of restoring party rule while strengthening socialist democracy. It was expected that the congress would work out an exact program to get the country out of the crisis; resolve the issue of accountability for the crisis; inaugurate new party statutes commensurate with members' expectations and with the needs of democratization; unequivocally define the role and goals of party organizations within the army; carry out an appraisal and accounting of social crises until this point; underline the role of the PUWP in youth organizations; allow basic party organizations a wider range of action; reduce the party apparatus at all levels; work out insurance mechanisms such that in the future there would not be corruption within the PUWP; underline party responsibility for information; decrease the number of decrees from on high; elect a Political Bureau and Central Committee that would enjoy the confidence and authority of society; and sharpen criteria for election to party and government positions. Many respondents mentioned the need for the party to purge and account for itself to society.⁴¹

Thus, expectations for the Ninth Congress were extraordinarily high. Military personnel fully expected that the party would finally take full control of the situation within the country. The disappointment of these expectations can quite clearly be seen as a cause of the turning of military opinion in favor of more concrete action on the part of the military. Previous to the congress, it was expected that the congress would work out a realistic program to get the country out of the current crisis. Most often respondents expressed the hope that such a program would be very specific in terms of dealing with the most pressing problems. However, a sector of the respondents did express doubts that such a program could be worked out under current circumstances because the congress delegates did not have that type of vision. It was expected that the congress would elect to power candidates who would enjoy the confidence of a wide sector of society. The congress should have been used to purge the central organs of party power of all those who were not adequate to the new situation: opponents of renewal,

and those implicated in corruption. This was seen as a possible source of political conflict at the congress.⁴²

The deliberations of the Eleventh Plenum served to increase the already high expectations of what would be accomplished at the party congress. Brought on by a letter from the CPSU to the Central Committee of the PUWP, the plenum began with several members calling for the replacement of Jaruzelski and Kania and a stiffening of the party line in dealing with Solidarity. Enough members opposed such changes, however, that in the end the Central Committee affirmed its commitment to socialist renewal and conciliation by majority vote. It called on party conferences to show their support for these policies by electing as congress delegates the candidates recommended by the Political Bureau. In some cases, the results of the elections were encouraging (Kania received an overwhelming majority in Kraków), but by the end of the elections, 91 percent of the newly elected delegates would be attending a party congress for the first time.

Among military men, it was obvious that the plenum was the most important event in the time leading up to the congress. They felt that to a certain extent, it righted affairs in the party. The more decisive attitude adopted toward Solidarity was thought to have had a positive effect on pacifying the country. At the same time it was the opinion of some that such a plenum should have occurred at least two months earlier. When the plenum did occur, in response to the letter sent by the Central Committee of the CPSU, it was felt that outside influence should not have been necessary. The military expressed surprise that there did not seem to be enough strength within the party to carry out such a move. Indeed, the cadre worried that in such difficult times there should be so much political infighting going on within the party. They were concerned about the unity of the party at the congress in the light of evidence of long-standing splits that were only beginning to show up under the pressure of events. Generally, the cadre was happy about the fact that the plenum was not secret and expressed hopes that such a practice would continue.⁴³

The Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress was expected to lead to the beginnings of stabilization of the political situation in the country by obtaining real control over the media; by clearly identifying the actions of antisocialist elements in the country, who those elements were, the party's relations to them, and exact prescriptions for dealing with them; by defining the precise role of the trade union movement in the country, and the relations of the party to it (it was often repeated that the party must stop fearing Solidarity); and by specifying how to go about purging the party of rightist-nationalist, clerical, and accidental elements. Some even expected that there would be a reissue of membership

cards.⁴⁴

It was expected that the congress would work out a program to prevent the separation of the party from the nation in order to restore the nation's confidence in the party. One of the most important tasks of the congress was believed to be devising an educational curriculum, particularly for the military, that would counteract the tendency presented by Solidarity to deideologize the schools. These expectations were all tempered with a strong element of realism. It was felt that the congress should provide solutions to particular problems in order to begin to work the country out of the crisis. These included an exact calling to account of all those responsible for the current crisis.⁴⁵ That the cadre was very dissatisfied with the manner in which this particular problem was being handled is clear from the fact that it came up repeatedly in interview research. Over and over again it was made clear that the military held the PUWP, its corrupt activities, and its failed economic plans responsible for the rise of Solidarity. It was equally clear that the military expected the PUWP to take the appropriate steps to end the crisis.

The cadre wanted the congress to stabilize the situation within the PUWP by eliminating personal jockeying for position and eliminating all proposals which did not contribute to socialist renewal. It was expected that the congress would achieve a partial calming of societal unrest by easing the market situation (proponents of this realized that it would be difficult, but stressed the need for it nonetheless). Respondents understood that the congress would be working in a very difficult and unfriendly environment, and noted that the outcome of the congress and the reception of documents published by the congress would be colored by the current economic situation as well as by Solidarity propaganda; thus it was hoped that projects and programs would be carefully worked out before the congress.⁴⁶ That the military's faith in the PUWP's ability to handle the crisis was waning, soon became clear.

Within the military, the Ninth Congress was a turning point because the party failed to prove itself capable of dealing effectively with the crisis, either by actively pursuing appropriate reform or by facing down Solidarity. Only 23 percent felt that the topics discussed at the congress reflected issues that had been important in the time leading up to the congress, and only 30 percent felt that its resolutions accurately represented the congress's discussions. More than 45 percent felt that the final program was unrealistic and would be hard to carry out, and opinion was split as to whether the program would ensure the continuation of socialist renewal (44 percent answered yes or rather yes, and 46 percent answered no or rather no); 52 percent felt that the decisions of the congress would lead to a resolution of the economic crisis, but were not clear enough on

issues of further socialist development of the country.⁴⁷

Overall the military was lukewarm in its responses to questions of whether the party had assured them that it would continue to occupy the leading role in society (14 percent said “yes,” and 45 percent said “rather yes”); whether the congress had a mobilizing effect on them (53 percent responded “yes, but not to a very great degree”); and the extent to which they would expend energy to make sure that the resolutions of the congress were carried out. Fifty-one percent felt that the newly elected Political Bureau would assure the continuation of the process of socialist renewal, bringing the country out of crisis, and furthering socialist development; and 52 percent responded affirmatively when asked if they personally had confidence in the PUWP’s leadership.⁴⁸

From the Ninth Congress on, however, there is evidence of a growing attitude among the cadre that the government was simply unwilling or unable to put an end to the Solidarity crisis and that without confronting Solidarity, the government would not be able to deal effectively with the economic situation. By the time of the Solidarity Congress in September 1981, it was clear that the military no longer had much faith that the party would be able to take charge of the situation. What the researchers had been able to characterize as a lively and active interest among the military in party politics faded to apathy, along with the conviction that the party would renew itself, regain its connection to the nation, and lead the country out of the crisis. By the time of the Third Central Committee Plenum in September 1981, there was generally little interest expressed in the policy deliberations of the party, because for the most part it was doubted that anything could be achieved without Solidarity’s agreement. Those who did know something about the plenum tended to be critical of it. It was noted that there was a strong difference between the degree of criticism toward Solidarity in the deliberations and that voiced in the final documents, as well as that criticism of the party did not appear in the documents at all. Many of the directives were not very precise, as if to leave room to maneuver and to adapt the actual content to the situation. In general, opinions were very critical regarding government attempts to carry out reform. Many of the same criticisms voiced by Solidarity were repeated in milder form by the cadre.⁴⁹

Interviewees voiced a basic acceptance of the speeches at the plenum that had been critical of Solidarity’s actions. They also voiced reservations, however, saying that once again the party was threatening Solidarity with action that it would not actually carry out. The majority of the cadre was of the opinion that the state organs responsible for keeping order (the police, the public prosecutor, and the courts) were not in a position to energetically pursue action against Solidarity because they were either infiltrated by it or afraid of it.⁵⁰

The military themselves do not appear to have been either infiltrated by Solidarity or afraid of it, but what had been sympathy for the “justified protests of the working class” became impatience with the entire situation when the PUWP’s incompetence was compounded by the increasing radicalization of Solidarity, especially after the Bydgoszcz incident and during the Solidarity Congress.

Among other indications of the military’s growing impatience was the poor reception accorded the Solidarity Congress. Overall there was very little interest expressed in the congress, although there was more interest in the preparations directly preceding the congress than there was in the congress itself. Respondents expressed the overall hope that during the congress more moderate opinions would prevail, causing the steering committee to move away from open conflict with the government and toward greater understanding and cooperation in guiding the country out of crisis. This hope was greater among draftees, although cadre also hoped that the more level-headed members of the congress would work to prevent confrontation between Solidarity and the party government.⁵¹

These hopes were dashed almost as soon as the congress opened by what military professionals saw as arrogant and argumentative attitudes taken by the Solidarity delegates. These attitudes surprised both cadre and draftees, including Solidarity members, who were also displeased by the nonaccreditation of the official state trade union and the failure to invite delegates from trade unions from other people’s republics.⁵² This was regarded as a political scandal and a sign of discrimination, arrogance, and antagonism toward the party and government, as well as a belittling of society. Those who followed the congress were progressively disappointed by its proceedings, particularly the expression of willingness to engage in conflict with the government. The military for the most part expressed a disgust with social conflict; some officers who belonged to Solidarity were ready to resign. Some still held out hope that the second half of the congress would be less self-interested, although others thought that nothing would change and that confrontation was likely.⁵³

Most of the cadre expressed the opinion that nothing good could be said about the congress because everything presented or passed in the first half was against the government, the party, and socialism. Even the congress poster was considered confrontational. The presentations were seen as extremely one-sided and self-serving, refusing to address the extent to which Solidarity’s behavior had hindered the process of renewal in the country. It was obvious that the more extreme, confrontational elements outnumbered those who supported peace and order in the country.⁵⁴

These opinions were expressed particularly in reference to Solidarity’s

decisions to reject the court ordered annex to its statutes which would specify Solidarity's acceptance of the leading role of the party in society; to pass resolutions on self-government and boycott of Sejm laws and the Sejm; and to encourage the workers of Eastern Europe to follow its example and confront their own governments. The cadre expressed the opinion that the second half of the congress would address the issue of how to take power in the country; that the resolutions passed to this point were intended to create a situation of dual power; and that Solidarity was obviously seeking to become a legal political opposition. The following facts were cited as proving that Solidarity intended to form itself into a Christian Democratic party: the church's support of Solidarity, the clericalization of almost all gatherings organized by Solidarity, the criticism of almost all institutions in Poland except the church, and the organization's use of church support as a means of self-legitimization.⁵⁵

The military's impatience with Solidarity appears to have increased as Solidarity's agenda became more clearly political. Several of the items that respondents mentioned as particularly troublesome could also be seen as potentially compromising Polish security by irritating the Soviet Union. At the same time, the attitude toward Solidarity appears to have been colored by the increasing perception that the party was incapable of handling the crisis, thus making outside intervention more likely.⁵⁶ More important, as the crisis wore on, the military felt itself increasingly incapable of handling the security issues that might arise because of the effect on morale of the PUWP's ineptitude.

The Effect of the Crisis on the Military

Early in the crisis, military officers and draftees foresaw a larger effect on politics and authority within the military than on combat readiness or discipline (see table 6) and so appeared willing to allow the crisis to work itself out.⁵⁷ After the Bydgoszcz incident there was a change in morale within the military. While respondents expressed thankfulness that rational action on both sides led to new negotiations rather than intensifying the conflict, there was a strong negative reaction to the fact that the fate of the country had been risked on what should have been a local matter. Career officers expressed concern over electoral campaign matters; preparations for the Ninth Congress; the arrests of those who allowed themselves to be corrupted for material gains; the declining state of the economy and the provision of primary goods to the market; attempts to secure more loans from capitalist countries, which would only increase the debt and lower the stature of Poland in the international arena; and the continuing repercussions of the Bydgoszcz experience.⁵⁸

The cadre in general was very concerned by problems of combat readiness and expressed surprise that the upper echelons had not done a better job of asking and following up questions of military responsiveness to a confrontation with Solidarity.⁵⁹ The cadre disliked the idea of a confrontation, claiming that it was hard to evaluate how soldiers would react without knowing what form such a confrontation might take. It was noted, however, that predictions could be based on past behavior under situations of high alert, in which the following routinely occurred: mobilization to better carry out service and training exercises; a better attitude toward other tasks; a general amelioration of discipline and order; a willingness to put off personal matters, as evidenced by a visible reduction of requests for passes and vacation time.⁶⁰

Many officers believed that the government had no concept of how to confront Solidarity and that confrontation had become inevitable. (They also noted, however, that Solidarity did not seem to know how to confront the government either.) They felt that the government should prepare responses to various possible actions by Solidarity, carefully underlining the role of the armed forces in such plans, in order to avoid national tragedy and bloodshed. It was noted that the phrases “threat to socialism” and “defense of socialism” should be exactly defined, since at the moment they were too broad to be of any use in convincing soldiers of the need to use the armed forces in dealing with the crisis. In order to mobilize against Solidarity, needs and goals would have to be spelled out exactly. The cadre was specific that it regarded the use of military force as a last resort to be used only after all other radical methods had failed. In a confrontation instigated by Solidarity, it was expected that there would be an integration of cadre and draftees. The overall high assessment of future performance was supported by soldiers’ full acceptance of government changes, in which several generals became ministers, and their generally critical attitude toward Solidarity’s more militant actions.⁶¹

The very general nature of these responses would seem to indicate that the cadre had developed a broad definition of national security. However, unlike their Latin American counterparts, Polish officers did not consider themselves responsible for guaranteeing all aspects of this broader mandate. Military responsibility was still limited to combat issues, with the expectation that the government would do its part by taking military action only as a last resort. The apparent inability of the PUWP to hold up its end of this deal began to take its toll over the duration of the crisis.

The failure of the government to take concrete action against the hunger marches and, in general, to prevent Solidarity from becoming a de facto opposition party had a negative effect on morale among cadre and draftees alike. The cadre

was concerned about the attitude among draftees that Solidarity had already become a power that the government could not control or overcome. The attitude of cadre can best be summed up in this quote from one officer: "It is high time to end the situation in which a 35-million-strong nation is manipulated by a band of suicidal maniacs who refuse to consider the fate of the country as a whole."⁶²

The cadre believed that the army was prepared to carry out any order, as long as the soldiers understood the need for their actions. It was stressed that complete understanding of the necessity to protect and defend critical military and state objectives was required for effective completion of those tasks. At the same time there was a difference of opinion about the need to resort to arms, and not all officers were sure that such an action could be carried out. Most of them emphasized that the army would not willingly act on the offensive but would act decisively if put on the defensive. In difficult situations it was possible to observe a rallying of forces around commanders on the lower levels; in situations of need, these people would play the decisive role.⁶³

Officers noted the need for the party to express itself very clearly in order to assure the eventual cooperation of soldiers. Certain new opinions had arisen in response to recent developments, including a definite split between older and younger cadre: the older officers called for radical action, certain that orders would be carried out, but the younger officers were less sure. This hesitation stemmed in part from confusion about their eventual role in a confrontation. The differences in officers' assessments depended also on the type of demand foreseen. All officers were sure that their men would defend whatever objective was assigned them. No one, however, was sure of the response to orders for offensive action.⁶

In evaluating the possible reactions of particular groups of soldiers to a confrontation with Solidarity, the researcher noted that the older cadre was convinced that concrete action was necessary, but not sure how to take charge of the situation without inviting bloodshed. Among the younger cadre, there was a split opinion: some doubted whether the army should get involved in social conflicts; some agreed with Solidarity's actions; still another large portion felt that the government should take immediate, decisive action using the armed forces to bring order to the country. There was also a mix of opinions among noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and regular soldiers who generally expressed caution and a wait-and-see attitude. It was noted that newer draftees seemed more reliable than those preparing to go into the reserves: the latter were definitely unwilling to enter into a conflict with the society to which they would return after a few weeks. The cadre also expressed doubts about its ability to carry out action with the matériel which it possessed at the time, complaining that not

everything was in working condition and that they lacked replacement parts.⁶⁵

This reluctance to go on the offensive against Solidarity appears to stem from a combination of factors. It is clear that there was still support among some members for the goals of the Solidarity movement. The more important factor, however, seems to be a reluctance to use military force when the government had been unwilling to take the steps necessary to achieve a peaceful settlement to the crisis. Imposition of martial law in order to forestall a Soviet invasion may have been proposed as much to get the full cooperation of the PPA as for any other reason, although this would assume a wide level of collusion on the part of the senior officers.

Another interesting effect of the crisis was the cadre's willingness to criticize the role of the PUWP and party work within the ranks. In order to increase and maintain combat readiness, a number of proposals were made: increase discipline by allowing more frequent use of repressive methods; increase demands and degree of hardship during combat training by reducing the ceremonial and advertising nature of political meetings in favor of true training in soldierly knowledge; ensure that laws are not being suspended at the whim of officers; suspend or reduce economic work in favor of true military training; repeated suggestions that appraisals of the state of the military be carried out based on fact; equalize the living conditions of regular soldiers and SPR (reserve trainees with university level degrees); cut down on time spent in joint WTO training which is of a mostly formal nature.⁶⁶

There was a significant lessening of action on the part of political officers because so much of their information was outdated by the time they got it. Changing opinions and vacillation at the top compromised these officers and caused them to take a wait-and-see attitude at a time when it was thought that they should have been engaging in increased activity. Political education was treated as optional because many of the postulates were never carried out, often without explanation. Political officers suggested that the situation could be improved by increasing the independence of party organizations within the army, creating a new program of political lessons as well as materials for these lessons, and allowing more independence for each individual platoon in carrying out programs. They complained that the current system did not allow the political officer to respond to the needs of his situation and suggested that it would be wise to consider returning to the old system of Circles of Military Youth.⁶⁷

The political officers expressed concern about the effects on morale of a continuing state of tension. They noted that rifts were already developing among the younger officers, which could become deeper. Some felt that confrontation was inevitable and that putting it off only worked against the army.⁶⁸ In some

platoons, leaders claimed to be sure of 70 to 80 percent of their soldiers, but some expressed fear that if the current level of tension continued, there would be a progressive disintegration of the army. Indeed, some more radical elements among the officer corps believed that "our army will defend socialism in Poland with all the means available to it. However, if the situation continues to develop in the current direction, then the army may move less decidedly to defend a government that has done so little to take advantage of the means available to it in protecting socialism."⁶⁹

The Political Involvement of the Military Elite

Given the deep splits within the PUWP, which were highly exacerbated by the crisis, it is not surprising that there were multiple personnel changes within the government. On the other hand, such changes were a sure indicator of the inability of the party to deal effectively with the demands of Solidarity in the face of Soviet opposition to concessions. While many have seen the personnel changes as a sign of the increased militarization of the government, it must be pointed out that officers had always played a role in the Political Bureau. The great difficulty in analyzing the role of the military on this level lies in separating out the various roles played by a single person.

On February 10, 1981, General Jaruzelski was appointed chairman of the Council of Ministers, or prime minister. In most countries, such a move would be a sure indication of military involvement in politics. In Poland, however, the prime minister fulfilled a largely ceremonial function. In February 1981 the party was attempting to strengthen its bargaining power with society by coopting the prestige of the military. Jaruzelski's appointment reflected both the high standing of the military as an institution within society and, more significantly, the general's personal prestige within society and the party. Jaruzelski's acceptance of the position clearly indicated the military's ongoing support for Kania's attempts to reach a political solution to the crisis.

Just before his appointment, Jaruzelski argued at a Political Bureau meeting that the primary reason for continuing unrest in Poland was the failure of the party leadership to convince society that the party was committed to change and to socialist renewal rather than to a return to the status quo ante.⁷⁰ Obviously the leadership agreed with him and felt that as prime minister he would enhance the government's commitment to change. Jaruzelski began his tenure by appealing to society for ninety days of peace during which he proposed to carry out a ten-point program aimed at rescuing the country from economic crisis. Among the issues that he singled out for government attention during this period were the

provision of basic goods, health care, and housing; increases in agricultural, technical, and energy productivity; rectification of the balance of trade; and the prevention of further social and governmental corruption.

The response of military men to the appointment was overwhelmingly positive. They considered it an expression of society's respect for, and confidence in Jaruzelski, and a great honor for the PPA and an action that would have a great influence on the ties between the army and society as well as on the latter's respect for the former. The military believed that Jaruzelski would be the person to finally bring law and order to the country.⁷¹

Jaruzelski's acceptance of this position was seen by interviewees in the military as an act of great courage, which showed his sense of responsibility to the country. At the same time, they understood how much the army would lose if for some reason Jaruzelski did not succeed in his mission. Because of this, many soldiers claimed that they would carry out whatever orders he gave, in order to ensure that his program would succeed. Jaruzelski's speech to the Sejm brought about a renewal of soldierly pride in many of his listeners, some of whom expressed the sentiment that "the PPA has always been and remains an institution in which law and order prevail, in which there have never been such problems as in civilian institutions." Many soldiers were of the opinion that General Jaruzelski faced an enormous task: not only would antisocialist forces create obstacles for him, but many in the bureaucracy and in the central and regional administrations were not going to want to work as hard as one works in the military, and Jaruzelski would certainly expect that of them.⁷²

By the Ninth Party Congress, as discussed above, the military was showing clear signs of doubting that the PUWP could handle the crisis. More important, the Ninth Congress left the military in a position of increased influence within the party mechanism. Although only 10 of the 200 members of the newly elected Central Committee were military men, they represented the most experienced and cohesive group, including Gen. Czesław Kiszczak, soon to be minister of internal affairs; Gen. Florian Siwicki, chief of the general staff; and Gens. Józef Urbanowicz, Eugeniusz Molczyk, and Mieczysław Obiedziński, all deputy ministers of defense. Policy was made by the Political Bureau rather than the Central Committee, but it should be noted that after August 1981, Siwicki and Kiszczak were increasingly present at Political Bureau meetings.

Jaruzelski's appointment placed certain extra burdens on the military, including the necessity of full support for the party's program of socialist renewal; increased training efforts consonant with the greater threat from internal and external sources; increased discipline to assure the careful and timely completion of tasks; a strengthening of ties with society; action among civilian sectors to

promote the stabilization of the political situation in the country; and a generally wider engagement in the economic life of the country.⁷³ Throughout March and April, soldiers had been asked to donate their leave time to help agricultural, industrial, and construction workers, and in October, it was announced that draftees scheduled to be released at the end of their second year of service would be required to serve for an extra three months due to the need for experienced soldiers in helping to prepare for winter.

On a government level, Jaruzelski began addressing the disorganization brought about by the interpenetration of Solidarity and party cadres by filling positions in the state and economic administration with generals and officers. These decisions were taken to assure greater efficiency in directing the state and an objective flow of information about the situation in important sectors, thus facilitating optimal and clear decision-making on the part of the government in social and economic matters. Most of these moves were made, not to give the military an influence in decision-making, but rather, to put military expertise at the service of the government. This pattern does not seem to have changed immediately after Jaruzelski's election to the first secretaryship of the party in October 1981. In fact, the first moves made by the military after the Fourth Plenum were probably being planned before Kania's resignation.

Given the evidence available in Jaruzelski's memoirs, the transcripts of Political Bureau meetings, and elsewhere, it is hard, despite the testimony of Col. Ryszard Kukliński (a highly placed officer and CIA operative, who fled Poland in November 1981), to argue that Jaruzelski was in favor all along of imposing martial law, that he pressured Kania to do so, or that he was simply waiting patiently for the moment to do so.⁷⁴ Even though it is quite clear that the actual plans for martial law were drawn up, at least in preliminary form, early on and that many of the moves taken by Jaruzelski to strengthen civilian administration served a second purpose of furthering preparations for the possibility of martial law, such preparations can be taken as a sign that Jaruzelski did not believe the negotiations would work, or they can be seen as the logical steps of a seasoned military professional seeking to increase his options. I believe that Jaruzelski's ongoing hesitation to impose martial law supports the latter interpretation.

On October 23, 1981, the Council of Ministers approved a motion regarding the organization and function of Field Operation Groups (TGO) which were to aid regional administrations in overcoming the crisis by helping factories and public institutions prepare to meet the basic needs of the population during the oncoming winter. These groups were to consist of two or three professional soldiers or NCOs, whose period of regular service had been extended, and a

driver. They were usually under the command of an officer with the rank and experience of at least battalion commander and were assigned to work in one or several neighboring communities (*gmina*). The tasks of the TGO were to include supplying basic aid to regional administrative organs in carrying out economic, social, and security oriented tasks; making recommendations about the functioning of communications, transport, telephones, electrical and heating installations, as well as protecting points of a vital nature for the national economy (such as steel mills and the shipyards); initiating the use of civil defense and regular military units in work associated with preparing public service factories, socialized workshops, and communications networks for the upcoming winter. The TGO operated from October 26 until November 20, when their work was temporarily suspended.

The timing of the decision to send the TGO into the field makes it clear that whatever the long-term intentions of the government were for these operations, the short-term goal was to prevent or at least mitigate the effects of the strike that Solidarity called for October 28. In the military's opinion, the TGO had a positive effect in society. The Political Bureau noted that their work allowed for the exposure and dismissal of incompetent and corrupt administrators and that this work should continue and be used to the party's advantage.⁷⁵ This assessment, coupled with the increased social tension brought about by Solidarity's activities, caused the broadening of the scope of military activities.⁷⁶

On November 9, the Military Council of the Ministry of National Defense ordered that a thousand officers be sent to the larger factories to counteract Solidarity activism. Their purpose was to raise political consciousness among workers and point out the antisocialist goals of the extremist faction within Solidarity. On a more practical level, these troops were to aid in enforcing the laws against strike actions. The next step in this program was the assignment of City Organizational Groups (MGO) to the larger cities where they were to help state administrative organs and their dependent factories, institutions, and workshops plan for winter, particularly in the all-important areas of heating, electricity, public transport, city sanitation, snow removal, and apartment maintenance. These groups, which began operations on November 25, consisted of five to seven professional soldiers and five to seven extended service or second-year draftees. Among other things, they were to inspire additional efforts in assuring proper functioning of community equipment and providing heat for apartments, day care, pre-schools, schools, hospitals, and nursing homes during the winter months. This included inspecting equipment and providing follow-up. The groups were assigned to cities according to size—one group for every 50,000 residents. Roughly six thousand soldiers were involved in these activities.

Despite the military presence in the field, tension between Solidarity and the government continued to grow. On November 25, students at the Warsaw Firefighters' Academy began a sit-in strike, demanding that the school be taken out of the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior and placed under the Ministry of Higher Education. The Political Bureau saw this as a provocation on the part of Solidarity, since it was known that Solidarity's Mazowsze headquarters had approved the strike in advance. At a meeting on November 27, the Political Bureau decided that the strike must be resolved in a "radical manner."⁷⁷ On December 2, the students were forcibly removed from the building by special units of the police (the ZOMO), an action that met with sharp criticism from Solidarity.

On November 28 the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee resolved to ask the Sejm to approve a bill allowing the use of extraordinary measures to protect citizens and the state. The presidium of the Country Commission of Solidarity, meeting December 3 and 4 in Radom, resolved to call a day-long universal strike if the bill were passed and, if action were taken against the trade union, a universal strike. Against this background, the Political Bureau met on December 5 for what would be the last time before martial law.

The chief concerns at this meeting were assessing the remaining possibilities for reaching an understanding with Solidarity and determining the future course of action should such an understanding prove to be impossible. An understanding with Solidarity was felt to be absolutely necessary in order to carry out any type of economic reform, since Solidarity controlled so much of the work force. However, it was reported that Solidarity demanded uncensored access to the media and the political transformation of the country in return for entering into discussions of economic reform. Solidarity's minimum program for reform was reported to include an end to political repression; establishment of Solidarity cells in the military and militia; democratic elections to national councils on all levels; trade union control over the economy; particularly the food sector; a wide competence for the proposed National Social Councils; and full media access for the councils.⁷⁸

General Kiszczak observed that the situation was characterized by a strengthened attack by extremists within Solidarity whose objective was to take over the government. They seemed to believe that their taking power would result in stabilization of the economic situation and the rapid correction of the general standard of living. In addition, they seemed to be certain that once in power, they would be able to negotiate with the Soviet Union and the other allies and reassure them of their ability to fulfill Poland's international obligations. Kiszczak emphasized that it was important to have a plan of action that would

make it impossible for Solidarity to achieve its program. To this end he proposed the following actions:

- expedition of acceptance by the Sejm of the bill on extraordinary measures (there were suspicions that many of the representatives, under strong pressure, might vote against it)

- acceptance of the bill on trade unions

- consideration of ways to dissolve Solidarity organs in those factories and workplaces in which the activity of those organs has been particularly aggressive, as well as to suspend self-government in those factories and institute commissary self-government until such a bill can be passed

- decentralization of decision-making in regard to action to be taken in cases of occupation of public buildings

- a ban on the Independent Students Union (NSZ) as a particularly hostile organization; strengthening of disciplinary action against students and cadres of the organization

- within legal bounds, intensification of repression against illegal organizations, especially the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN); expedition of the trials of the leaders of the KPN; implementation of the arrests of the leaders of other antisocialist organizations

- implementation of decisive administrative action to protect radio and television

- in the case of a general strike, imposition of martial law throughout the country.⁷⁹

Most of the other members of the Political Bureau concurred with Kiszczak's assessment of the situation. General Siwicki underlined the need for the party to stop reacting to Solidarity and take concrete preventative measures, including dissolving all party organs controlled by Solidarity. Zbigniew Messner pointed out that if the Political Bureau were to dissolve party organs because of inactivity, then it would be necessary to dissolve the large majority of them. A far better solution would be to provide them with an example of strong leadership that they could follow by taking concrete action against Solidarity. Hieronim Kubiak added that although the line taken since the Ninth Congress had been correct, it had not achieved positive results because the conflict within the party took too long to resolve and then the party made the mistake of taking small

reactive steps in defense of socialism. The party thus wasted time, which Solidarity used to press the attack. However, this could be turned to the party's advantage, because now Solidarity had unmasked itself, and society could see it for what it really was. Under present circumstances, the party would not be in a position to withstand a general strike; therefore if a general strike were called, martial law should be imposed immediately.

Jaruzelski ended the deliberations with a rather long monologue in which he noted that it was a "terrible, macabre" compromise of the PUWP that after thirty-six years in power it would have to be defended by the army. He noted that some party activists were hoping that martial law would be imposed, while part of the administration was hoping for reform. Either view would have to be made reality by the work of a party committed to action. It would not be possible to count on the power of the military and the militia or expect that martial law and reform would miraculously change the situation in Poland. Although martial law was brought up and discussed many times during the course of the session, no concrete decision was taken. Jaruzelski noted that such a decision would depend on many circumstances, including the actions of Solidarity.⁸⁰

As minister of defense and a professional soldier, Jaruzelski hesitated to impose martial law because he was concerned about its cost in military and civilian lives. In Poland's geostrategic position, there was also the danger that if the PPA began a military operation and it was not successful or did not appear successful, then WTO forces would come in to finish it, thus bringing about one of the consequences that the Polish government and the PUWP claimed to have been working months to avoid. Because of this danger, it was essential that martial law be carried out quickly and efficiently. Its success would depend on timing, planning, and the reliability of the rank and file of Polish troops. As long as there was strong sympathy for Solidarity within the ranks, Jaruzelski hesitated to use his men against the population. It was better to wait until that sympathy turned to impatience with the unreasonableness of Solidarity's demands; but at the same time, to wait too long would be to invite impatience with the government also.

As prime minister, Jaruzelski was responsible for safeguarding the constitutionality of government action, and it is clear that, although in the final analysis martial law was not a legal action, every effort was made to follow legal channels in dealing with the crisis, thus the concern for getting the two bills passed through the Sejm before Solidarity could react negatively and force the government's hand. As of December 12, Jaruzelski still did not have the legal means to impose martial law, and indeed, had to resort to doing so unconstitutionally by asking the council of ministers to issue the decree even though the Sejm was in session.

As first secretary, it was Jaruzelski's responsibility to listen to the deliberations of his colleagues and draw the appropriate conclusions for action within the guidelines of the most recent party congress. The policy decision of the Ninth Congress was conciliation with Solidarity, and although most members of the Political Bureau brought up and supported the idea of martial law as a last resort, there were clearly still some hesitations. They agreed that definitive action must be taken, but had doubts about the loyalty and reaction of party members and allied countries alike, as well as an almost naive hope that the government could still negotiate its way out of the crisis. Even Minister of the Interior Kiszczak had a long list of actions that could still be carried out, and he referred to martial law primarily as a response to a general strike, rather than as a broad solution to the ongoing crisis.

In the days following the Political Bureau meeting, Jaruzelski met with Catholic activists and non-Solidarity trade union members, but also began to take concrete steps toward the imposition of martial law. On December 7, military units were sent to reinforce administrative organs; military plenipotentiaries were assigned to all cities, communities, and workplaces. The plenipotentiaries of the National Defense Committee took over leadership of the various operational groups already in place. In many cases, these plenipotentiaries were generals and officers of the central institutions of the ministry of defense and general staff. Each was responsible directly to the director of the National Defense Committee or to another plenipotentiary who was responsible to him.

The immediate responsibility of the plenipotentiaries was to oversee the carrying out of tasks assigned by the Council of Ministers and the National Defense Committee relating to national security and defense or those associated with efforts to overcome the crisis situation in the country.⁸¹ In each case, the first secretary of the voivodeship committee had access to the military command operating in his voivodeship for the protection of party activists and their families, although in strategic voivodeships the first secretaries were eventually replaced by military personnel.⁸²

These moves took place in an atmosphere of ever-increasing tension and pressure on Jaruzelski to make a decision. By all accounts, the pressure from the WTO and the Soviet Union, in particular, was intense. The WTO had met in Bucharest on December 1–4, and General Siwicki, representing Jaruzelski as defense minister, claims to have received a direct verbal warning from Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov:

You are constantly retreating in the face of the audacious attack of counterrevolution. The enemies of socialism increase their demands and in fact dictate the development of the situation. They deconstruct the state,

tomorrow they will take power from you, and you sit and watch. Remember that we will never agree to the withdrawal of People's Poland from the defensive Pact system, or even to its further weakening. Poland occupies a key strategic position in the European theater. NATO. . . equips its armies with the newest armaments and Poland does not fulfill its military industrial plan. This weakens not only the Polish Army, but other armies of the Pact. This is not only your business. . . Keep in mind, that under no circumstance will we allow encroachment on the vital interests of the alliance.⁸³

Even if the exchange did not take place exactly as Siwicki reported, testimony by Kukliński and Kania about exchanges that took place at earlier WTO meetings indicate that the Poles had been under pressure from the very beginning. There is no reason to believe that Ustinov and the others at Bucharest did not present Siwicki with exactly the kind of inducements to action that he describes and duly reported to his superior on his return. Siwicki also claims that at this time the Soviets asked Jaruzelski for permission to carry out military exercises on Polish territory beginning December 24. Permission was refused, but the suggestion added to the tension felt by Jaruzelski and his staff.

Jaruzelski was also under pressure from his own staff. On December 9, the minister of defense met with the heads of all the departments of the ministry, several generals and colonels, and the leaders of all the military districts. Because of the extreme secrecy of the meeting, there is only Jaruzelski's account of what was said, but his comments do not diverge much from what could be expected, given the opinion poll results quoted above. The officers reported that there had been a radicalization of attitudes over the months: the cadre was beginning to complain that nothing was being done to defend socialism. They expected to be used and wanted to know when. In some circles, criticism of the minister of defense could be heard. The enemy had declared itself openly and the government had not acted. Confidence in the government among the officer corps was beginning to fall. Some officers went so far as to say that it was high time for the military to take power in Poland and control the situation.⁸⁴

First and foremost a military man, Jaruzelski claims that the greatest tragedy for him would have been if divisions had appeared in the military, if soldier had stood against soldier. By late November, information from the ranks led the upper officer cadre to argue that the military must be used while it was still capable of action. There was fear that if Jaruzelski waited too long, he would no longer have a united military with which to carry out his operation. Thus he found himself balancing the patience of the Soviet government and the unity of his military against the ever-weakening hope of agreement with Solidarity. This balancing act was severely tested by the Solidarity meeting held in Radom on December 3, which led to the decisions of the Political Bureau meeting of

December 5.

Jaruzelski was further pressured by the Solidarity meeting in Gdańsk on December 11 and 12. All the reports that Jaruzelski received indicated that Solidarity was taking an even more radical stand toward the government than before; that Wałęsa was no longer successful in modifying Solidarity's demands. Reportedly, Wałęsa complained that the government was trying to provoke a confrontation by distorting the remarks that he had made in Radom,⁸⁵ but the government did not receive the reassurances it needed to believe that Solidarity was willing to act in good faith to reduce societal tensions. In particular, Jaruzelski was nervous about the demonstrations that Solidarity had planned for December 17. He was afraid that such concentrations of population in a situation of tension could lead to confrontation and civil war, or alternately, that the demonstrations and threat of a general strike would be used by the WTO as an excuse to move in.

Once Jaruzelski made the decision to impose martial law and gave the orders on December 12, the operation was carried out with a deft precision that betrayed months of planning. The work of the TGO, which had been suspended on November 20, was begun again December 9. By December 12, 287 Military Operational Control Groups were functioning in 862 workplaces across the country. MGO had been set up in 142 cities with plans being made to expand this number to 266.⁸⁶ After the declaration of martial law, these groups were strengthened with a number of additional officers in order to assure the continued functioning of all major factories and workplaces. Ostensibly sent out to guarantee the production and distribution of vital goods through the winter months, these forces must also have had a very specific role in Jaruzelski's martial law plans. If martial law had not been imposed, the troops could always have been quietly withdrawn, but it is clear that their position in the field prior to the declaration contributed to the efficiency of the operation.

Attitude of the Military Toward Martial Law

Jaruzelski justifies martial law in part by referring to pressure from the officer cadre to take action, and indeed his claims are largely borne out by opinion polls taken before and immediately following the imposition of martial law. The military's attitude toward decisions made at the Fourth Plenum was generally positive, but there was cynicism evident in the opinion voiced by 61 percent of the cadre and 57 percent of draftees that "the decisions [taken] are correct, but not all of them will be implemented under current circumstances."⁸⁷ Among the officer corps there was high support (70 percent or better) for resolutions to

combat all forms of counterrevolutionary action directed against the defense of the country or the military, to expedite and expand the government program for ending the crisis and stabilizing the economy, as well as for resolutions to ask the Sejm to pass bills outlawing strikes and granting the government the power to take extraordinary measures.

In general, the military responded well to Jaruzelski's becoming first secretary. The opinion was voiced that he would undertake discussions with all patriotic forces in favor of socialist renewal and deep reform, that the crisis would be resolved and order and social discipline would return. More than half the cadre felt that this was the last opportunity for a peaceful resolution of social conflict and that the party would finally take decisive action against the enemies of socialism. It is significant, however, that fully 22 percent of the officer corps believed that nothing would change.

Thirty-nine percent felt that Solidarity was driving the country to chaos and anarchy; 42 percent felt that the trade union was taking concrete steps aimed at seizing power in Poland; 69.7 percent felt that there was a real danger to the people's government in Poland; and 71 percent felt that some sort of administrative action should be taken to combat antisocialist actions. Interestingly enough, whereas in September 1980, almost 65 percent of the cadre had been willing to allow strikes as justifiable under some circumstances (see table 7), by October 1981, only 48 percent felt that they could be justified under some circumstances and 43 percent were willing to make them illegal under all circumstances because of the great loss that they inflicted on society as a whole (this was up from 11 percent in 1980). Sixty-eight percent of the cadre felt that open conflict between the government and antisocialist forces was a possibility in the near future if things continued as they were.⁸⁸

The impatience referred to by Jaruzelski is not as evident in the opinion polls taken before martial law as it is after the event. Most soldiers claimed to have been surprised by the orders that they received on December 12, because they had no way of knowing what the whole operation looked like. However, Jaruzelski's speech cleared up any doubts and left most of them with the feeling that the anarchy was being dealt with at last. Most of the interviewees accepted martial law as the only way to avoid a national tragedy; however, some of them voiced the opinion that the government had waited too long and that martial law should have been imposed in March. Some felt that Jaruzelski should have disciplined society as soon as he became prime minister while others argued that it was right to wait until Solidarity showed its intent to displace the government.⁸⁹ In general, the military was proud of martial law as a military exercise and felt that the military council of national salvation (WRON), a council of professional

officers called to act as the government during martial law, was a positive addition.

The military generally expected that decisive and consistent action on the part of WRON would result in a return to solid and honest work as well as law, order, and social discipline. Those interviewed expressed the conviction that Poles were capable of resolving the situation themselves without help from the WTO (although a small portion of the older cadre did express the opinion that the WTO should be called in). It was expected that martial law would include a purge of opposition elements, as well as the punishment of all those responsible for the mess, and their replacement by young, competent, and committed personnel. It was further expected that socialist renewal and economic reform would continue and that the country would find its way out of the crisis through the hard work, savings, and watchfulness of society.

Conclusion

When the strikes in the Baltic cities of Gdańsk and Gdynia first began, the military was not at all hostile to the protests and indeed was inclined to support the protest as justified. Most of the military agreed with society in placing the blame for the crisis on the party's poor planning and corruption. Within both the military and Solidarity, the crisis of 1980 was seen not as a failure of socialism, but as poor implementation of the socialist system. Throughout the early months of the crisis, the military consistently supported thorough economic and political reform.

This support changed over time in response to three factors: the perception of increased incompetence on the part of the PUWP, the radicalization of Solidarity, and the increasing level of threat to military effectiveness, including the threat of outside interference. These three factors, rather than any inherent hostility to the goals of the Solidarity movement, explain the military's willingness to see their officers become increasingly involved in the day-to-day political and economic business of the country to the point of imposing martial law.

It is consistent with what sociologists have found of militaries everywhere that the PPA preferred decisive action over the wait-and-see attitude taken by the PUWP; therefore it should not be surprising that there was increasing impatience with the lack of concrete response to Solidarity and a sense of satisfaction once such action was taken. It was expected that WRON would take the necessary steps to put Poland's economy and social development back on the right track.

The military's expectations in carrying out martial law were not fulfilled. There was no socialist renewal and little economic reform. Indeed, many of the

problems that led to the rise of Solidarity continued under martial law, but with the military firmly in control of the government, the threat of “fraternal aid” on the part of the WTO countries disappeared. Over the long run, however, General Jaruzelski’s government proved to be no more able than the PUWP to fix Poland’s fundamental problems, and in 1989, the military leadership engaged in a series of discussions with the leaders of the outlawed Solidarity movement which led to partially open elections and the designation of the first noncommunist government in East Central Europe since World War II.

By 1989, only one of the three factors crucial to the imposition of martial law no longer came into play. The PUWP was still incompetent; Solidarity was, if anything, more radicalized and, given the outcome of the June elections; more powerful; but the situation presented no threat to the military’s ability to defend Polish independence. Given the information presented above, it cannot be argued that either the military or the PUWP was more inclined in 1989 than in 1981 to bargain with Solidarity. Rather, it is clear that by 1989, the Soviet government was less inclined to uphold the leading role of the Communist Party in its satellite societies, so the reform which had begun in 1980 was finally carried through in 1989.

The data presented here, as well as more recent data, show that there has been little congruence between the attitudes of the military and those of the party. Indeed, taken as a whole, the data indicate a sense of corporateness. The military saw itself as separate from both the PUWP and society at large. Throughout the crisis, the cadre was critical of both Solidarity and the PUWP and felt free to express its own perception of what was best for society.⁹⁰

In spite of the pressures of Soviet hegemony in East Central Europe, there is little evidence that the cadre saw itself as tied into the Soviet military establishment. The Soviets are always referred to as other. This does not mean that the military under communism was not the instrument of the Communist Party. There is no doubt that in so far as the military responded to government orders and the government was communist, it had to be the instrument of the PUWP. It does mean, however, that the military was no more thoroughly loyal to Soviet ideals than was the PUWP itself. And it means that the relationship among society, the government, and the military in Poland will continue to be a highly complicated matter worthy of ongoing exploration.

Tables

Table 1
Origins of Polish Officers, 1948 1956

	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956
PPA	63.2	77.2	82.5	89.0	92.6	95.2	96.7	97.3	98.0
RedArmy	7.7	3.6	2.5	2.0	1.4	0.9	0.4	0.2	
officer ^a	7.9			2.2	1.5	0.8		0.4	0.4
reserve ^a	9.6	12.0	11.0			1.5	2.9 ^b	1.1	0.9
noncom ^a	11.2			3.5	2.4	1.5		0.9	0.7
partisans	0.4	7.2	4.0	3.3	2.1	0.1		0.1	

Note: Blank spaces indicate that figures were not available.

^a. Component of pre-1939 army.

^b. Combined noncom/reserve.

Source: Handwritten manuscript from the director of the Military Institute for Sociological Research, Warsaw, Poland.

Table 2
Military Opinions About the Events of August 1980
(percent of respondents)

	Officers	Draftee	Total
What, in your opinion, were the latest events in Poland?			
1. They were a justified but unacceptable form of protest by the working class.	10.7	9.9	10.9
2. They were the main result of the activities of anti-socialist and anarchist forces.	4.8	4.3	4.1
3. They were the direct effect of recent policies.	53.1	34.7	44.3
4. They were a health-giving shock for all of society.	9.3	9.5	8.7
5. They were a justified and acceptable form of protest by the working class.	15.9	25.8	21.5
6. They were a complete shock.	2.3	4.5	3.4
7. They were something other than the choices mentioned.	0.7	1.0	0.6
8. It is hard to say.	3.2	10.3	6.5

Note: Totals reflect figures for non-commissioned officers and ensigns.
Source: IBS/WAP Research Report, October 8, 1980.

Table 3
Military Opinions About the Causes of the Crisis
(percent of respondents)

	Officers	Draftees	Total
What, in your opinion, are the causes of the current difficult situation?			
1. Faulty economic planning	83.9	66.1	74.3
2. Lack of responsibility in implementing plans	78.0	61.8	68.8
3. Overcentralized administration	73.5	51.6	60.8
4. Corruption of socialist democracy	80.8	45.6	59.9
5. Failure to fully inform society about the situation	87.3	72.6	80.0
6. Exaggerated indebtedness of the country	73.7	75.0	74.7
7. The systematic rise of prices and lowering of the national standard of living	85.5	79.6	83.1
8. Other causes	46.6	44.0	41.6
9. Hard to say	8.2	8.7	7.9

Note: Totals reflect figures for non-commissioned officers and ensigns.

Source: IBS/WAP Research Report, October 8, 1980.

Table 4
Military Opinions About the Role of Anti-Socialist Elements
(percent of respondents)

	Officers	Draftees	Total
In your opinion, what role was played by antisocialist elements during the strike period?			
1. They agitated for strikes	34.7	18.6	26.7
2. They wrote some demands	60.6	37.6	47.4
3. They caused an increase in the tension associated with the strikes	51.7	40.8	43.9
4. They were experts on the strike committees	52.8	30.5	38.8
5. They sent tendentious information to the West	67.3	44.3	55.0
6. They represented the interests of the working class	29.0	36.5	32.7
7. Hard to say	19.5	34.0	24.4

Note: Totals include figures for noncommissioned officers and ensigns

Source: IBS/WAP Research Report, October 8, 1980

Table 5
Military Opinions About Possible Changes
(percent of respondents)

	Officers	Draftees	Total
In your opinion, what types of changes will take place over the next three years in the following sectors of socio-political and economic life in our country?			
1. Waiting time for an apartment			
a. will improve	25.8	23.5	25.0
b. will stay the same	50.6	53.4	49.8
c. will get worse	14.1	9.3	12.6
d. hard to say	9.5	13.8	12.6
2. Provision to the market of alimentary goods			
a. will improve	26.7	31.5	29.2
b. will stay the same	43.5	41.3	42.1
c. will get worse	20.2	13.0	16.0
d. hard to say	9.6	14.2	12.6
3. Provision to the market of industrial goods			
a. will improve	25.8	22.4	24.2
b. will stay the same	51.0	47.5	49.3
c. will get worse	14.8	12.1	12.6
d. hard to say	8.4	18.0	12.6
4. Societal level of consciousness			
a. will improve	46.3	49.2	51.2
b. will stay the same	30.4	28.0	27.3
c. will get worse	13.6	3.8	7.4
d. hard to say	9.7	19.0	14.1
5. Relationships between people at work			
a. will improve	48.1	38.6	41.7
b. will stay the same	23.1	35.5	30.0
c. will get worse	20.1	35.5	30.1
d. hard to say	8.7	16.3	13.3
6. Workers' self-government			
a. will improve	55.1	38.9	41.7
b. will stay the same	29.3	32.2	31.1
c. will get worse	6.3	4.7	6.0
d. hard to say	9.3	24.2	17.6

Table 5 (cont.)
Military Opinions About Possible Changes
(percent of respondents)

	Officers	Draftees	Total
7. Openess of political life			
a. will improve	36.0	35.1	36.1
b. will stay the same	50.4	36.7	40.8
c. will get worse	5.9	9.2	8.2
d. hard to say	7.7	19.0	14.9
8. Participation of society in making important decisions			
a. will improve	38.1	39.4	39.3
b. will stay the same	46.2	38.4	42.4
c. will get worse	4.6	5.4	4.6
d. hard to say	11.1	18.88	3.7
.....			
13. Value of money			
a. will improve	3.4	9.0	6.0
b. will stay the same	10.9	29.5	19.8
c. will get worse	77.1	45.3	59.8
d. hard to say	8.6	16.2	14.4
14. Politics of employment			
a. will improve	23.2	21.4	21.1
b. will stay the same	44.0	45.7	46.2
c. will get worse	16.5	10.6	13.3
d. hard to say	16.2	22.3	19.4
15. State of Poland's external security			
a. will improve	8.2	18.1	13.7
b. will stay the same	59.4	48.8	51.9
c. will get worse	25.2	13.8	19.7
d. hard to say	7.2	19.3	14.7

Note: Totals reflect figures for non-commissioned officers and ensigns.

Source: IBS/WAP Research Report, October 8, 1980.

Table 6
Military Opinions About the Effects of Recent Events
 (percent of respondents)

	Officers	Draftees	Total
In your opinion, what effect have to recent events in our country had on the following sectors of military life?			
1. Combat readiness			
a. positive	12.9	12.0	16.8
b. negative	21.8	17.6	19.4
c. none	50.6	40.2	45.2
d. hard to say	14.7	22.7	18.6
2. Schooling and education			
a. positive	19.1	19.7	15.2
b. negative	41.1	17.9	25.7
c. none	38.5	37.6	40.1
d. hard to say	11.3	24.8	19.0
3. Military discipline and order			
a. positive	16.1	20.4	16.8
b. negative	30.9	16.8	23.1
c. none	41.6	42.5	43.2
d. hard to say	11.4	20.5	16.9
.....			
12. Authority of superior officers			
a. positive	6.8	8.0	7.3
b. negative	41.5	31.1	34.7
c. none	40.2	37.3	40.1
d. hard to say	11.5	23.6	17.9
13. Authority of the political officers			
a. positive	4.6	14.2	9.1
b. negative	67.8	33.7	52.7
c. none	18.6	30.2	22.8
d. hard to say	9.0	22.1	15.4
14. Authority of party organizations			
a. positive	4.6	12.8	8.1
b. negative	71.6	38.3	55.4
c. none	14.5	22.3	18.3
d. hard to say	9.3	26.6	18.2

Note: Totals reflect figures for non-commissioned officers and ensigns.

Source: IBS/WAP Research Report, October 8, 1980.

Table 7
Changes in Military Opinions About Strikes: October 1980 and November 1981
(percent of respondents)

	1980		1981	
	Officers	Draftees	Officers	Draftees
What is your personal relation to workers' strikes as a form of pressure with the goal of obtaining sociopolitical and material advantages?				
1. I believe that this is a form that in all cases brings great loss to society and should be categorically forbidden.	15.7	6.8	43.1	28.0
2. I believe that some strikes can be justified under certain circumstances.	63.0	61.4	48.3	57.9
3. I believe that every strike can be justified	16.8	23.3	3.3	7.1
4. Hard to say.	4.5	8.5	5.3	7.0

Note: Figures for 1980 exclude noncommissioned officers and ensigns, but figures for 1981 include them.

Sources: IBS/WAP Research Report, October 8, 1980; *ibid.*, November 10, 1981.

Notes

1. See especially Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande, *The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems*, *American Political Science Review* 76 (December 1982): 778–89; George Malcher, *Poland's Politicized Army: Communists in Uniform* (New York: Praeger, 1984); and Andrew Michta, *Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944–88* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institute Press, 1990).
2. Although some argue that all non-Soviet Warsaw Pact militaries were tightly controlled by the Soviet High Command, I believe that there is ample evidence that Soviet control was much less direct. See Elizabeth P. Coughlan, *Martial Law in Poland: The Dynamics of Military Involvement in Poland* Doctoral Dissertation: Indiana University, 1993.
3. See, among others, Lawrence Goodwyn, *Breaking the Barrier: The Rise of Solidarity in Poland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), Jadwiga Staniszkis, *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Roman Laba, *The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working-Class Democratization* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).
4. The data presented in this essay were obtained during June and July 1991. I was given limited access to the archives of the Military Institute for Sociological Research and allowed to read research reports from the early and late 1980s. I was not given access to raw data nor to any information beyond that presented in the research reports. This renders the data of more limited use than I would prefer, since I have no way to break the polls down by rank, age, or length of service. I have no information on how many military men belonged to Solidarity. These things would certainly make these data more useful, but I trust that they will be interesting even in the limited form in which I must present them.
5. The majority of the works available in English present the Polish military as loyal to the Soviets, while Polish-language works on the subject appearing since 1989 tend to be more split in their approach.
6. For example, the recall of Marshall Konstantin Rokossowsky, a Soviet citizen, and his replacement as minister of defense by Marian Spychalski, an associate of Gomulka's.
7. See Jan Triska, *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States: The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the United States in Latin America* (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1986).
8. Christopher Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Praeger, 1981), 62.
9. *Ibid.*, 3.
10. Personal interviews with Polish officers, Warsaw, June and July 1991. See also Alexander Alexiev and A. Ross Johnson, *East European Military Reliability: An Emigre Assessment* (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND, 1986).

11. Condoleezza Rice, *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948–1983: Uncertain Alliance* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 25.
12. *Ibid.*, 224.
13. Katarzyna Zborowska-Falcman and Kazimierz Frontczak, eds., *Ludowe Wojsko Polskie w Służbie Narodu i Socjalizmu* (Warsaw: Main Political Administration of the Polish People's Army, 1973), 77.
14. Zdzisław Gregorek, *Analiza Zmian Jakościowych Kadry Zawodowy Ludowego Wojska Polskiego w Latach 1943–1985* (Warsaw: Instytut Badań Społecznych Wojskowej Akademii Politycznej, 1988).
15. Timothy Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).
16. Gregorek, *Analiza Zmian*, 282.
17. Wiatr, *The Soldier and the Nation*.
18. Jerzy Muszynski, "Siły Zbrojne w Systemie Politycznym PRL," in *Ludowe Wojsko Polskie w Systemie Społeczno-Politycznym PRL* (Warsaw: Wojskowa Akademia Polityczna, 1984), 45–46. This volume contains material from a conference organized by the Institute of Basic Problems of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the PUPW and the Military Political Academy, January 12, 1983.
19. By this I in no way intend to imply that they didn't become members of the PUPW, or even participate on a rather high level. I simply mean that, in an organization known to be split into two main factions since the 1950s, those officers who were party members mostly managed to avoid such politics.
20. Handwritten notes from the file of the director of the Instytut Badań Społecznych Wojskowej Akademii Politycznej.
21. Wiatr, *The Soldier and the Nation*, 117.
22. A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier* (New York: Crane Russak, 1982).
23. It appears that deliberations about the crisis in Radom in December 1976 included a statement by General Jaruzelski to the effect that "Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish workers." See Andrzej Korbonski, "Poland: Changed Relationship Between the Polish United Worker's Party and the Polish People's Army" in Paul Simon and Trond Gilberg, *Security Implications of Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 268.
24. Wojciech Jaruzelski, from the Protocol of the Political Bureau meeting of August 29, 1980. Published in *Polityka*, no. 48, November 30, 1991. Author's translation.

25. All the opinion poll figures quoted here are taken from research reports of the Institute for Social Research at the Military Political Academy. The research was carried out in various garrisons using mechanical collection methods to guarantee anonymity (unless otherwise noted), thus encouraging honest responses. The reports were then written up in three copies, one of which was sent to the Main Political Administration. These reports were all highly classified until July 1991. Hereafter reports will be designated "IBS/WAP Research Report" with the date that the report was submitted.
26. IBS/WAP Research Report, "Zolnierze o aktualne sytuacji w kraju" (Soldiers' opinions on the current situation), Warsaw, October 8, 1980.
27. In this survey, 11.8 percent decidedly supported strikes and 34.5 percent rather supported them, while 33.2 percent rather did not support them and 14.5 percent decidedly did not support them. Władysław Adamski, ed., *Polacy 81: Postrzeganie Kryzysu i Konfliktu* (Warsaw: IFiS, PAN, 1996), 131.
28. IBS/WAP Research Report, October 8, 1980.
29. *Ibid.*
30. According to the *Polacy 80* survey, 91.7 percent of those interviewed supported the agreements (Władysław Adamski, ed., *Polacy 80* (Warsaw: IFiS/PAN, no date) quoted in David Mason, *Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland, 1980-1982*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 117.
31. IBS/WAP Research Report, October 8, 1980.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*
34. IBS/WAP Research Report, "Nastroje Zolnierzy na tle sytuacji w kraju po VIII plenum KC PZPR i zmianach w rzadzie" (Attitude of soldiers in the context of the situation of the country after the VIII Plenum of the Central Committee and changes in the government), Warsaw, February 23, 1981. Research interviews were conducted February 17-21, 1981, among career officers and draftees in Grudziadz, Poznań, Wrocław, Lublin, Walcz, Minsk Mazowiecki, and Warsaw.
35. *Ibid.*
36. IBS/WAP Research Report, "IX Plenum KC PZPR w Opiniach Kadry Oficerskiej" (The IX plenum of the Central Committee in the opinions of the officer corps), Warsaw, April 11, 1981.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*

39. IBS/WAP Research Report, "Opinie Stanów Osobowych Jednostek Wojskowych O Aktualnych Wydarzeniach w Kraju" (Opinions among military personnel about current events in the country), Warsaw, July 1, 1981. Research was conducted by interview in the last ten days of June in Elbląg, Ostroda, Gdynia, Ciechanow, Swiecie, Grudziadz, Opole, Sluspk, Czarne, Kostrzyn, Warsaw, Kraków, and Rzeszów.
40. IBS/WAP Research Report, April 11, 1981.
41. *Ibid.*, IBS/WAP Research report, July 1, 1981.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*
47. IBS/WAP Research Report, "Opinie Stanów Osobowych Jednostek Wojskowych o IX Nadzwyczajnym Zjeździe PZPR" (Opinions among military personnel about the Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress), Warsaw, July 30, 1981.
48. *Ibid.*
49. IBS/WAP Research Report, "Opinie Stanów Osobowych Jednostek Wojskowych o III Plenum KC PZPR" (Military opinions of the III Plenum of the PUWP Central Committee), Warsaw, September 15, 1981. Research was conducted September 7-12, 1981 in Bytom, Gdańsk, Elbląg, Leszno, Lublin, Mragowo, Nysa, Poznań, Siedlce, Sieradz, Sochaczew, Torun. Interviewees included troop and company leaders, political officers, and party secretaries, as well as a selection of draftees.
50. *Ibid.*
51. IBS/WAP Research Report, Opinie kadry zawodowej i żołnierzy zasadniczej służby wojskowej o I krajowym zjeździe NSZZ Solidarność (Opinions among career officers and draftees about the I National Solidarity Congress), Warsaw, September 16, 1981. Research was conducted September 7-9, 1981 in the following garrisons: Bytom, Elbląg, Gdańsk, Leszno, Lublin, Mragowo, Nysa, Poznań, Siedlce, Sieradz, Sochaczew, and Torun. Its goals were to determine (1) to what degree members of the army were interested in the preparations for and implementation of the congress, and (2) how military society appraised the deliberations and final documents of the congress.
52. *Ibid.*, The report noted the response of Solidarity members, but did not give any information as to the proportion of Solidarity members among respondents nor how membership was determined. One can only assume that at this time, respondents felt free to acknowledge their membership.

53. *Ibid.*, Although I was not able to determine how many officers belonged to Solidarity, it is interesting that membership was permitted.
54. *Ibid.*
55. *Ibid.*
56. By late 1981, 52.6 percent of average Poles surveyed thought that the sociopolitical situation created a threat to the independence of the country. See Krzysztof Jasiewicz, *Polityczny wymiar kryzysu, (political dimensions of the crisis)* in Adamski, *Polacy '81*.
57. IBS/WAP Research Report, October 8, 1980.
58. IBS/WAP Research Report, April 11, 1981.
59. IBS/WAP Research Report, "Opinie Kadry Zawodowej o Mozliwych Zachowaniach Stanów Osobowych Jednostek Wojskowych W Wypadku Konfrontacji" (Opinions of career officers about possible behavior on the part of military personnel in the event of a confrontation), Warsaw, August 18, 1981. Research was conducted throughout the Fall 1980 in connection with another project in Warsaw, Gdańsk, Kazun, Modlin, Białobrzeg, Lask, and Sochaczew.
60. *Ibid.*
61. *Ibid.*
62. IBS/WAP Research Report, September 16, 1981.
63. IBS/WAP Research Report, August 18, 1981.
64. IBS/WAP Research Report, September 15, 1981.
65. IBS/WAP Research Report, August 18, 1981.
66. IBS/WAP Research Report, July 1, 1981.
67. IBS/WAP Research Report, September 15, 1981.
68. IBS/WAP Research Report, August 18, 1981.
69. IBS/WAP Research Report, September 15, 191.
70. Zbigniew Włodek, ed., *Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZRP a Solidarność, 1980–1981* (London: Aneks, 1992), 248.
71. IBS/WAP Research Report, February 23, 1981
72. *Ibid.*

73. Jerzy Poksiński, "Udział Ludowego Wojska Polskiego w Przewycięzaniu Sytuacji Krytycznych w Polsce Ludowej w Latach 1956–1983," in Bolesław Krasiewicz, ed., *Kryzysy Społeczno-Polityczne w Polsce Ludowej i Rola Sił Zbrojnych w Ich Przewycięzaniu* (Warsaw: Military Political Academy, 1985), 50.
74. Ryszard Kukliński, Wojna z narodem widziana odśrodką, *Kultura* (Paris) 4/475 (April 1987), 6–7, 17–19.
75. Zbigniew Włodek, *Tajne Dokumenty*, 521.
76. Poksiński, Udział Ludowego Wojska, 54.
77. Zbigniew Włodek, *Tajne Dokumenty*, 539
78. *Ibid.*, 550.
79. *Ibid.*, 552.
80. *Ibid.*, 568.
81. Poksiński, Udział Ludowego Wojska, 58.
82. Zbigniew Włodek, *Tajne Dokumenty*, 545; Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Anatomy of the Martial Law Regime: The Institutions," *RFE/RL Background Report/32* (Poland), February 2, 1982.
83. Siwicki as quoted in Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Stan Wojenny: Dlaczego...*, (Warsaw: BGW, 1992), 378.
84. *Ibid.*, 392.
85. Peter Raina, *Poland 1981: Towards Social Renewal* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), 463.
86. Poksiński, Udział Ludowego Wojsko, 59.
87. IBS/WP Research Report, "IV Plenum KC PZPR w Opiniach Kadry Zawodowej I Zolnierzy Zasadniczej Służby Wojskowej" (The Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee in the opinion of the professional cadre and draftees), Warsaw, October 10, 1981.
88. *Ibid.*
89. IBS/WAP Research Report, "Opinie i postawy zolnierzy wykonujących zadania w rejonie Gdańska i Katowic w początkowym okresie stanu wojennego" (Opinions and attitudes of soldiers carrying out tasks in the Gdańsk and Katowice regions in the beginning stage of martial law), Warsaw, December 29, 1981. Research interviews were conducted December 20–24, 1981, among cadre and draft soldiers in Gdańsk and Katowice.

90. See Elizabeth P. Coughlan, "Democratization and the Military in Poland: Establishing Democratic Civilian Control," in Constantine Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, eds. *The Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989) 115-36