

ESTATE, CLASS, AND COMMUNITY: URBANIZATION
AND REVOLUTION IN LATE TSARIST RUSSIA

by

DANIEL R. BROWER

Paper No. 302
1983

Daniel R. Brower is Professor of History at the University of California at Davis. He is the author of Training the Nihilists: Education and Radicalism in Tsarist Russia (1975) as well as numerous articles on Russian and Soviet history, and the compiler of The Guide to the Records of the Smolensk Oblast of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1917-1941 (1980).

**THE CARL BECK PAPERS IN
RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES
William Chase, Acting Editor
4E-23 Forbes Quadrangle
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA
15260**

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In what ways did the development of cities in late tsarist Russia alter the character of social relations and conflicts in that key period? At first glance, the question may appear poorly posed. It has long been customary to assess the history of Russian society in the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries in terms of estate and class, to evaluate change by class differentiation, and to look for the sources of social conflict in the strains engendered by the transformation (to the extent it occurred) of a "society of estates" into a "society of classes." The urban centers of the country from this point of view provided merely the setting in which key segments of the population experienced and reacted to new economic forces and political pressures. Recent books in the social history of the time have substantially enlarged and enriched our understanding of the changes under way among the urban population. Yet in my opinion they demonstrate serious conceptual shortcomings arising from a narrow definition of Russian social structure and of the pattern of social change appropriate to their period. My purpose in writing this essay is to examine some of these recent works, pointing out what I believe to be the weaknesses in their assumptions and methods of analysis, and to propose a new approach (actually quite venerable but updated) to the study of urban relations and of the revolutionary movement in Russia's cities.

It is worth mentioning in passing, primarily for purposes of contrast, the view of the development of class relations presented by

Soviet studies of late tsarist Russia. Soviet historians are, for obvious reasons, the ardent defenders of the dynamic role of urban groups in the socio-economic transformation of Russia. Most have, after extensive debate in the 1960s, come to accept the position that capitalism came to their country in the mid-eighteenth century.¹ Discussion continues on the beginning of the industrial revolution, though even those emphasizing the delayed introduction of factory technology and organization date its onset no later than the 1870s.² Their studies of class relations in the last decades of the nineteenth century assume rapid social change, focusing therefore on the development of industrial capitalism in urban areas and the emergence of bourgeois and proletarian classes, identified by those criteria of economic interest derived from Marxist social theory. Some of the more sophisticated studies, such as those by I. F. Gindin on the "bourgeoisie" and L. M. Ivanov on the proletariat, have refined and colored the class traits to leave substantial room for Russian "peculiarities" by comparison with Western classes. Still, Soviet treatment of urbanization views it as the manifestation of capitalist relations in a decaying feudal society; the city functions as the chrysalis from which emerged by the early twentieth century the new class enemies destined to confront one another in violent revolution. Though vivid in its dramatic form and satisfying by its synthesis of social and political revolution, the Soviet view appears both simplistic and schematic, an arbitrary selection of evidence to satisfy ideological imperatives. It has probably had its greatest effect on Western works by negative reaction, encouraging historians to seek evidence of the

persistence of traditional social relations and attitudes within a social structure they conceive to be a society of estates.

It would seem, on reading Western histories of late tsarist Russia, that historians are drawn to an image of an unchanging, immobile society. They recognize the significance of economic forces unleashed by industrial and commercial expansion. They may accept the proposition that large-scale temporary migration into urban areas created new conditions of geographical mobility and urban acculturation for millions of peasant migrants. They will frequently pay lip service to the proposition that the estate pattern of social relations was weakening or disappearing among groups where occupation and wealth were displacing rank and ancestry. Yet in spite of these indices of change they continue to emphasize the tenacity of estate barriers and the continued resistance to innovation. In this they follow a long tradition, one set by Russian statist historians on the one hand, and by intellectuals on the other. The continued use by the Russian state of estate categories of social allegiance provide still the most generally employed measures of social stratification, despite the fact that the estate system had become by the end of the nineteenth century anachronistic. Because tsarist documents referred constantly to estate in identifying individuals and groups, historians--this author included--have been prone to assume that these labels actually provided reliable indices of social position (and mobility).

Reinforcing this preoccupation with estate has been the respect shown the observations of contemporary intellectuals, Russian and Western, on social conditions in Russia. Western historians' assessment of nineteenth-century Russian society has often reflected the literary

images and social criticism of Russian writers. These "observations" of current social conditions usually reflected aspirations for progress and, at best, a meager familiarity with social conditions and attitudes of the "backward" masses. The picture of Moscow as "big village" springs surely from the disdain of these Westernized, educated Russians for the turbulence and coarseness of lower-class urban dwellers. The attitude reappears in the comments of Western visitors like Sir Bernard Pares, who after traveling through the country in the 1890s concluded that the urban petty bourgeoisie--difficult to identify under any circumstances, most particularly for an occasional visitor like Pares--differed hardly at all from the peasantry.⁴ In fact, his conclusion revealed how little he understood the economic opportunities and social relations in urban Russia. These misconceptions are understandable in men such as he, critical toward all that did not meet English Victorian standards.

Their continued appearance, albeit in elegant academic garb, in works on Russian social history has reinforced a stereotype of an unchanging, stagnant society ordered and structured by a rigid estate system to fit the needs of the Russian state. The real issue is not the existence of such rigidities and traditionalism in late nineteenth century Russia--abundant evidence makes clear that strong bonds still tied many Russians, urban and rural, to their past. The problem is rather methodological--by incorporating these assumptions in the conceptual formulation of their studies, authors create categories of analysis which narrow and restrict their ability to perceive and to explain the nature and origins of social change. Recent studies of the Russian merchantry offer good examples of these shortcomings.

Should the urban estate system be equated with social backwardness in Russia in the decades following Emancipation? Alfred Rieber would answer the question in the affirmative. However, his very manner of posing the problem of "merchants and entrepreneurs in imperial Russia," the title of his work, precludes a balanced and comprehensive examination of the degree of change and adaptation among members of the merchant estate in the last half of the nineteenth century. His book, a pioneering study of Russian traders, industrialists and financiers in their formative years, represents a major contribution to Russian social history and deserves therefore close and careful attention to its premises as well as to its conclusions. Its very weaknesses are helpful in suggesting issues and questions essential to a proper understanding of the history of Russian society in transformation.

In his work, Rieber employs a structural concept of social change, delimited and defined by the polar dichotomies of caste on the one hand and class on the other. He asserts in the introduction that "throughout most of the imperial period Russia bore a close resemblance to a classical hierarchical society" and was therefore "castelike."⁵ The Russian merchant estate, marked in his opinion by "patriarchal authority, religious piety, and insecurity of status," fit this social model through the nineteenth century as a result of its "unwillingness to alter traditional patterns of behavior under favorable economic conditions." It remained far removed thus from the group which for him defines the appropriate polar extreme, namely, the "classical bourgeoisie in nineteenth-century Europe" consisting of "the owners of the main means of production, the creators of the dominant social values, the leaders in the drive for control of political power."⁶

Though he rejects any assumption of unilinear social development and seeks to discover "intermediate social structures" among Russia's business groups, his model of social change leaves him insufficient latitude to explore social relations which are not closely identified with caste or class. In using these polar dichotomies, he incorporates into his model what one historian has called (ironically) the "law of the conservation of historical energy." In his study, the failure of Russian society to evolve a bourgeois class necessarily implies the preservation (a form of "conservation of historical energy") of the castelike characteristics of the merchant estate. He shares the concern of most contemporary social historians to understand and to explain in the Russian context the "two distinctive but intertwined social processes [of] stagnation and innovation."⁷ However, he narrows drastically the scope of his work by denying substantial internal transformation to the merchantry, since it did not fit the image of the Western bourgeoisie. In this manner, it becomes as a matter of definition the embodiment of backwardness and stagnation.

As a result of this dichotomous view of social change, Rieber pays insufficient attention to or dismisses evidence of internal adaptation and economic innovation among the merchantry. He notes the appearance in the 1860s in Moscow of successful peasant entrepreneurs, commenting that "in their pursuit of profits the new guild members from the trading peasantry behaved more like genuine merchants than had most of the old 'fictional' third guild." Still, he minimizes these signs of change in business circles with the remark that "Russian urban society was re-peasantized."⁸ One might easily imagine a history of urban Russia emphasizing this "pursuit of profit" by merchants and peasants engaged

in industrial investment and new commercial ventures in order to evaluate the decline of "traditional patterns of behavior." In Rieber's work, the static image of the merchant estate hinders seriously such an evaluation. When studying the emergence of the "fringe" entrepreneurs--men largely operating in the Western and southern industrial areas, usually of non-Russian nationality, and hence clearly unfitted to the Russian merchant "mold"--his analysis is freed from a priori assumptions and becomes a comprehensive examination of the forces of social change and adaptation in the rise of new groups in Russian urban society. Yet these findings serve primarily to highlight the inadequacies of the Russian merchantry, lacking the "flexibility and tactical skills needed to excel in public life and parliamentary maneuvering" when the opportunity arose after 1905, and hence unable to use their "presumptive economic leadership" to create "political or social hegemony."⁹ Thus his concept of change and models of social groups lead him in the end to reaffirm the old view of Russia's "backward" merchantry, condemned by contemporary radical intellectuals and historians alike for their inability to fulfill the "role" assigned them by history. The reader does not find a full assessment of the real economic and social conditions in which business groups worked, the risks they confronted and the means employed to reconcile these risks with available technology and resources, the extent to which family business relations were compatible with formal and informal social networks, the extent to which political institutions and policies hindered or facilitated the attainment of economic goals they judged most desirable. The range of questions is great but the answers have yet to be formulated. One reason for this strange silence (by no means limited to Rieber's book

alone) resides, I would suggest, in the baneful attraction still exercised by the estate image of society in late tsarist Russia.

While our vision of socio-economic change among business groups remains particularly befogged by conceptual confusion, our understanding of the evolution of Russia's urban laboring population has, in a somewhat similar manner, been restricted and narrowed by the polar dichotomies of estate and class. Soviet historians have labored long and hard to establish the existence of a "hereditary proletariat" in the factories by the late nineteenth century. Complicating greatly their efforts is the fact that the pool of factory labor carried the estate label of peasant, was born in rural villages, and retained family ties there. In reaction to dogmatic Soviet insistence on the proletarian transfiguration, recent studies by Western scholars have tended to revive the concept of the Russian town as enlarged village. One work, the first to examine in detail the many social dimensions to the massive peasant migration to Moscow in the late nineteenth century, makes clear the extraordinary mobility of these migrants, their importance to the urban economy, and also their remarkable adaptability to difficult urban living conditions. Yet the conclusion presents the urban experience as tangential to the lives of these migrants, affirming that "the bulk of the [migrant] population lived as it always had, preserving many patriarchal rustic ways and far from integrated into city life." The peasant migrants represented thus a "second society within the city."¹⁰ The characterization would be more convincing had the reader reliable measures of "integration" and some indication of the supposedly immutable "patriarchal rustic ways." It is only fair to add that one major problem which faced this author confronts any scholar writing on

the social history of Russia in the nineteenth century, namely, the absence of a satisfactory socio-economic history of the evolution of the Russian peasantry during that period.¹¹

The problem of the adaptation and acculturation of migrants to urban conditions constitutes the topic of a recent study of the factory workers of the Moscow region. The author provides a wealth of evidence on the process by which migrants found a place for themselves in a new social setting. His points of reference for assessing the extent of social and cultural change remain, however, the "peasant community," which for him is defined primarily by informal ties to land, family, and neighbors (zemliaki). While recognizing that "a certain proportion of workers . . . did move steadily from the peasant community," he emphasizes the "stability and continuity" of social relations and outlook and the "insularity of the worker-peasant's world."¹² His careful analysis of the factory workforce proceeds within narrow conceptual limits. The "peasant community" remains a fixed, unchanging category; the measures of social identity remain essentially dichotomous--either worker-peasant or urbanized worker. The accessibility of literate workers (a majority) to new ideas and circles of acquaintances appears significant only for a handful of "worker-radicals." The complex and diverse range of responses to urban living and working conditions, evident among the men and boys who surrounded young Semen Kanatchikov in his first years as a metal worker in the 1890s,¹³ is compressed into two distinct and antithetical types of peasant or worker.

This study, like the others discussed here, offers valuable material relevant to any discussion of urban social change. The defect

apparent in all arises from a conception of social change delimited by the opposing images of estate and class. Confronted with a choice between polar opposites--either "merchant" or "bourgeois," either "peasant" or "worker"--the authors naturally are inclined to emphasize evidence delineating one image or the other, to choose either stagnation or innovation. The weight of scholarly opinion has tended in the West to emphasize the former, as though "real" urban society remained unaffected by forces of change in a situation, as one historian has assured us, of "general breakdown of urban modernization."¹⁴

This image of a turbulent yet structurally immobile urban society in the late tsarist period lends itself well to a vision of imminent revolutionary upheaval. It appears to explain both the incapacity of urban groups to mobilize behind a liberal political movement and the great hostility of the laboring population toward the upper social orders in the cities. A supposedly unresponsive social structure, no longer able to contain the economic stress occasioned by early industrialization, precluded gradual adaptation and exacerbated social conflict. Leopold Haimson suggested such a view in his now classic article on "Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1914." He might well have referred to "stagnation" rather than to "stability," for in his scenario a few patricians of the "privileged sector of society" confront the "people," largely peasant migrants animated as in previous centuries by a violent "spirit of buntarstvo."¹⁵ The setting is new, but the characteristics defining the groups in opposition derive from a perception of traditional social conflict in Russia. New forces appearing in the pre-war years among the urban population--the increased geographical mobility of the labor force, the emergence of

entrepreneurial and professional groups, a "new generation of young workers"--remained channeled and constricted by social and cultural barriers inherited from the estate system. Hostile social groups confront one another across "psychological chasms that had . . . divided Russia's society of estates."¹⁶ Revolution constituted the final act of destruction of a decaying society. If one agrees with the premise that the concept of a society of estates defines and describes urban social relations down to World War One, this 'cataclysmic' interpretation is indeed cogent and logical. If, on the other hand, it appears that important dimensions of urban change are excluded and ignored by this assumption, then both model and conclusions are open to question.

In examining social change in urban Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, scholars ought, in my opinion, to consider questions of estate and class stratification to be only two important issues worth exploring. To assume the primacy of these criteria of change is to constrict and to blur our perspective both on the process and causes of transformation and--equally important--on the impact the changes (or lack of change) had on the emerging political crisis of the tsarist regime. Social structure certainly represents one important area of research, but alongside it should be placed other dimensions of the urban experience including relations among groups. Estate labels dwindle in importance to become symbols--among others--of group identity or merely a vestige of state efforts to institute a society of orders.

What is needed now is the formulation of appropriate and significant criteria to guide research into the many areas of urban history. This work, itself properly to be viewed as one aspect of the much vaster history of Russian society in the pre-and post-revolutionary period,

will come (as the recent developments in Western European social history suggest) through the collaborative efforts of many scholars. I propose here to explore one potentially rewarding area of urban history which rests on assumptions relevant to the changing character of urban society and which places the problems of social groups (estate, class) in the larger context of urban social relations.

Works on Russian urban society preoccupied with social stagnation and traditionalism have left unexamined questions of the existence and nature of social contacts and interaction among urban dwellers. Geographical mobility--temporary or permanent migration--did increase contacts among groups of the population. The intensification of economic exchange brought into existence new economic institutions and social relations. Urban political life involved actively as well as indirectly a segment of the urban population, while church parish activities formed one nexus of neighborhood relations. The interest in learning, formal and informal, produced new institutions for the diffusion of information and skills. A variety of sources point to a growing network of social organizations in Russia's cities and towns by the late nineteenth century. To what extent did this trend constitute a significant element in urban life? In what ways did both formal and informal institutions provide the means of personal contact and group interaction to undermine traditional patterns of behavior and attitudes? The issue has a long history in Western historiography, the proper point of departure thus for an examination of its relevance to Russian social history.

The concept of changes in social relations associated with urbanization first took the form of two ideal types: "community" and

"society" (rough translations from the original German terms Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft). The debate which this sociological theory provoked continues to this day. Its effect on Western historical studies has proven enduring, though the results have been uneven. The entire subject has been reviewed and its effects assessed in an excellent survey by the American historian Thomas Bender. My comments are drawn from his work. As he points out, at the start the theory emerged from a romantic nostalgia for the bucolic countryside, where villagers enjoyed close relations based on trust and cooperation, opposed to the formality and sterility to human contacts in cities. The two types retained for succeeding generations of scholars the qualities of "polar dichotomies" (much like "society of estates" and "society of classes" in Russian historiography), implying unilinear development from one to the other. Needless to say, very little historical evidence appeared to support the theory, which was in fact ahistorical.¹⁷

This simplistic view of Western urban development has given way to a more balanced, restrained use of the concepts to suggest problems, not to prove preconceptions. As Bender suggests, the two types can be freed from their narrow, ahistorical constraints using a "notion of differential change" in which "modern social developments might even reinforce or invigorate other traditional patterns of social relations in the same society" and both formal and informal relations might develop simultaneously. The concept of community, on the other hand, suggests the examination of formal organizational structures, such as schools and enterprises, involving large numbers of people in activities toward which they might feel little emotional involvement. The recent work of sociologists points the way, in Bender's view, toward the real

task of historians: "to probe the interaction [of community and society] and to assess their relative salience to people's lives in specific situations."¹⁸

What value might the use of these concepts have in Russian urban history? In the first place, it would reduce the problem of estates to its proper proportions, that is, as one among many forms of social relations in a period of rapid urbanization and economic growth. In the second place the evidence--or lack of it--for networks of association and organization provides an indication as important as class (worker, entrepreneur, etc.) by which to measure social change within the urban population. Finally, the existence of such networks among city dwellers would point to new factors, in addition to class conflict and revolutionary ideology, leading to mass political mobilization. In this manner, urban history of the late tsarist years would illuminate directly and deepen our understanding of a central historical issue of that period, the origins of revolutionary conflict. The examination of communal and formal social relations among the urban population leads logically to the study of the values and attitudes engendered and nurtured within these networks. Yet the social and cultural issues are logically separate, an important distinction if one is to avoid the conceptual confusion evident, for example, in Rieber's assertion that "in its social relationships the Russian merchantry clung tenaciously throughout the late nineteenth century to its hierarchical paternalistic view of the universe."¹⁹ The merchants' deference to social superiors might have declined substantially without affecting their "view of the universe." The remainder of this essay will explore very briefly themes

suggested by these concepts as they apply to conditions in urban Russia between the mid- and late-nineteenth century.

The image of mid-century Russia as a "society of estates" proves of little use in understanding the patterns of social relations and political influence among the urban population. It implies too much, for urban estates had in fact no functioning institutions or social unity, and too little, for there existed no impenetrable barriers among "urban" estates. The dynamics of urban relations are visible only in a few memoirs and ethnographic studies. The reports of officials touched only in passing on the conditions of the population, focusing largely on municipal politics.

This area of urban activity does provide one indication of relations among the estates, though the actual responsibilities of the municipalities under the 1785 statute made them arms of the state administration with onerous duties and few rewards. The natural result was that few townsmen let themselves become involved in municipal affairs. One contemporary report--clearly the work of an intelligent by its language and point of view--lamented the fact that "the majority of the citizens and the very elected officials" in the town judged "public affairs something completely alien to them."²⁰ The situation applied equally to the urban "elite" and to the insignificant petty bourgeois. The involvement of artisans, laborers, and traders, the bulk of the meshchanstvo, remained so insignificant that the estate in effect played no role in urban politics. Noble townsmen had withdrawn from urban affairs, for lack of specially recognized place of preeminence. The wealthy merchants employed every possible ruse to avoid municipal responsibilities, which had fallen by default largely in the hands of

the merchant estate societies in each town. The activists in urban politics came largely from the lower merchantry, fighting for office by mobilizing factional supporters. Deference on the one hand and bribery on the other brought together what an 1860 report from the Urban Affairs Section of the Ministry of the Interior called "large and disorderly crowds, mostly from the lower ranks of the taxed estates" in support of their candidates.²¹ From all the available evidence, one would have to conclude that popular involvement in municipal politics remained so meager, and so capricious, that it represented little more than an occasional distraction to urban dwellers. It did not embody the dominance of any one estate--even merchants fled whenever possible burdensome duties--and in no way constituted a network for contact and exchanges among the adult members of the urban community.

In fact, neither communal organizations nor estates provided in those years social bonds among Russia's city dwellers. Loyalties and common concerns did not even bind the merchants of one town, if we may assume that Perm municipal leaders writing in 1862 were reliable observers of the larger merchant world. In their opinion, there existed no real "ties" or any "community of interests" among the "merchants of one city."²² Thus feeble participation in municipal institutions corresponded to insubstantial bonds of "estate" relations. As among the merchantry, so among nobles and state administrators in the urban social world the importance of rank and power dominated estate solidarity. Evidence was emerging by the 1860s that the barriers separating nobility and urban estates were beginning to crumble as new marks of distinctions made themselves felt in urban society. Writing from the Western Russian city of Mogilev, one contemporary--unfortunately we know neither his

identity nor social position--claimed that "wealth and education give greater rights than does [noble] privilege. . . . We see presently many merchants and petty bourgeois enjoying greater advantages and esteem from society than nobles. We see nobles placed in the midst of poor petty bourgeois and other ranks, in no way distinct from them and even not assuming any distinctions."²³ The transformation of status described here represented a harbinger of the future, when new wealth and learning would make their effects felt widely among Russia's urban population. In the mid-century, such conditions were the exception, not the rule.

At that time, social relations appear narrowly restricted by interests and concerns focused on the neighborhood and the family. While business and leisure contacts operated within the boundaries largely of the immediate neighborhood, affective ties remained within family bounds. Though urban workers even in mid-century moved about frequently in search of temporary labor, the family residence usually did not change. Home ownership was the privilege of as many as half of a town's families. Such was the case in Saratov, where many of the houses were little better than hovels, however. Among Saratov homeowners, one-third were excluded from the municipal electorate because their house did not meet even the minimal property requirements.²⁴ Still, poor urban dwellers dreamed of their own home for the stability and security it represented. To the literary critic Belinsky, writing in the 1840s of a city he knew well, it appeared that "the dream of every Muscovite is to have his own house, even if with only three windows [the poorest type, resembling a peasant cottage]. It may be poor but it's his own, and with a courtyard he may be able to

raise chickens and even a calf. But the most important thing is that under this little house is a cellar--what more could he wish for!"²⁵ Into these humble dwellings could crowd the parents and children, perhaps grandparents and relations. In the new textile center of Shuia, the family numbered usually between five and seven, though one household, noted in the petty bourgeois society's conscription records, numbered twenty-four people, headed by a 36-year old worker in a print factory, living with his children, two brothers, their wives and children, two uncles and their wives, and assorted cousins, in ages ranging from one to fifty-three.²⁶ Their life centered about the household, its uncertain future constituting their main concern. The women had few contacts outside the family, save those provided by sewing and conversation groups. As one Soviet ethnographer noted, "the backward opinion of women's behavior among the large mass of urbanites" excluded them from a larger world.²⁷

Within the neighborhood, close personal contacts took place in the market, the parish, and the tavern. The activities of most townsmen, whatever their estate, occurred in these areas. Around the markets, held several times a week, were also the public baths which had become by the mid-nineteenth century "regular places of gathering for the common people."²⁸ On Sundays and religious holidays, the parish and episcopal churches played an active part in the community, while the yearly krestnyi khod (an elaborate religious procession) was a major event in the life of the town.²⁹ Among the men, the center of contacts for work and leisure was the tavern, as plentiful in towns as the churches and with special ceremonies of its own. Vodka constituted an integral part of social bonds, sealing of contracts, confirmation of

entry into the workforce. In many ways the tavern constituted the core of real urban life transcending the barriers of estates, providing a setting to settle affairs of their neighborhood. Then, of course, it was the place to find refuge from the grim monotony of most townsmen's lives, where vodka offered escape until, as one observer noted, "'they gave up the ghost' and collapsed on the ground."³⁰

This pattern of constrained and confined social relations repeated itself apparently throughout urban groups, from the town councilors and the local administrators down to the shopkeepers and laborers. The wealthier and more important inhabitants lived on a larger scale, but did not differ in their range of social bonds and attachments. Our information on the merchants is more abundant, for this estate left more records and was more visible than the urban poor. For them as for other townspeople, family bonds and ties constituted the primary social group. The household was a closed group, and the house and yard its citadel. Belinsky summed up well the importance of the house of the well-to-do townsman, "similar to a fortress, ready to withstand a long siege." Its locked gate, heavy window curtains, chained and snarling dog summed up for him a mentality based on "family solidarity [semeistvo]" and the absence of outside interests. "Nowhere," he concluded, "is the city visible."³¹ Certainly the tiny literary world in which he was a central figure had a far more active network of relations through the circles and a much broader sense of community of interests than the average Muscovite--indeed the average townsman--of the mid-century.

Visitors rarely penetrated the residences of even the merchants, except for the traditional religious holidays when relatives, neighbors,

business acquaintances came to visit, or when family weddings brought together the world of relatives, business relations, civic dignitaries. The church played an important part in the social life of the merchants, its ceremonies dutifully attended by the entire family, the parish supported financially by the head of household, the priest received as a special guest along with other important community members, the church holidays determining the rhythm of the weeks and seasons. For the merchant as for the tradesman or worker, the tavern provided a place of business and relaxation in lives confined by interest and custom to a small world. Even the "fear of losing status," which Rieber identifies as peculiar to the merchants,³² was not unique, only more acute among those who had further to fall in an urban economy of hardship and insecurity. We possess a vivid first-hand record of the fall in the 1870s of the house of one craftsman and guild master in Nizhny Novgorod, thanks to the memoirs of his grandson. What remained clearest, however, in Gorky's memory was the "stifling, pent-in atmosphere" in which his family and "the ordinary Russian lived."³³

This sketch of what appear dominant characteristics of the social relations of Russian townspeople of the mid-nineteenth century, which some readers may judge distressingly oversimplified, suggests the absence of any extensive network of social relations, formal or informal, in the lives of townspeople. Neither the legal bonds of estate nor the ties of wealth and property nor the political activities of municipalities could overcome the barriers isolating families and neighborhoods. In this light, therefore, I would argue that the appearance of new forms of association, both formal and informal, among townspeople would be evidence of social change as significant in its own

way as such indices as structural and career mobility and the appearance of forms of class solidarity and awareness.

The increasing complexity and diversification of the Russian urban population by the end of the century present the social historian with a panorama of social change of perplexing configuration and evolution. Recent work in the area, only a part of which has been mentioned here, has begun to delineate the outlines and the salient features of the transformation. Occasional flashes of light onto this "terra incognita" are provided by population surveys undertaken by the tsarist regime. One such study examined the distribution of urban property and rental quarters by occupation and education; it offers one perspective on urban social structure valuable in determining the urban social hierarchy prior to the war. As might be expected, the material further complicates our picture of urban population. It reveals, for example, the presence of a sizeable group (one-fourth of the property owners in the typical city) of urban dwellers "living from income of capital and property";³⁴ solely by reason of their wealth and numbers these "proprietary capitalists" ought to be granted a place alongside the merchants and entrepreneurs as part of the growing middle classes. Yet their social profile remains a matter of conjecture for want of any other indications of their activities, attitudes, and relations with other urban groups.

A similar problem confronts the historian seeking to understand the activities and social relations of urban artisans and craftsmen. Their proportion of the population of most cities remained great--as large or larger than factory workers throughout the nineteenth century. They shared to a lesser degree certain of the prevalent characteristics of

workers and unskilled laborers, including a readiness to move about in search of better conditions. Even master artisans with their own enterprise shared in this urge to move; a survey undertaken in the mid-1890s revealed that half of a sample of 500 artisans from four cities (Kremenchug, Nizhny Novgorod, Voronezh, and Aleksandrovsk) were migrants, working in a town not their place of birth.³⁵ An account of the laboring population of the cities would thus have to devote considerable attention to them as well as to factory workers to give proper weight to new social forces within Russian urban society.

The active role of Russian factory workers in collective action in defense of economic interests and in support of political revolution in the early years of this century provides substantial evidence of the existence of a working class resembling its Western counterpart. Clearly the transformation of Russian urban population must include the emergence of the factory laboring class aware of a common identity as "worker" and prepared to undertake joint action in defense of collective interests and ideals. It is significant that the appearance of this "class consciousness" occurred within an urban context marked by direct exposure to varied social and cultural influences from other groups. Reginald Zelnik has suggested that this sense of class was most apparent among those workers who evolved their own "urban identity forged by the interaction of factory and city with their own characters and values." In a recent essay, he suggests that the crucial factor in this transformation came from their "encounters with city life, with other urban classes, with school, church, neighborhood, and tavern."³⁶ In effect, he is raising in terms appropriate to the experience of urban factory workers the issue of social interaction and networks of

association emerging through the evolution of urban forms of society and community.

The choice of relevant subjects suggested by this approach is vast, including local politics, schooling, semi-official charitable and cultural societies, the family, and much more. The comments that follow are intended to be suggestive of directions for investigation, and draw both on secondary studies, of which there exist only a few, and on scattered archival sources. Following the example of American historians concerned with community and society in U.S. urban history, one can approach the topic of municipal politics from the perspective of community involvement. American historians have explored the patterns of political mobilization and conflict in urban elections, uncovering the involvement of social and ethnic groups in party affairs in their towns and cities.³⁷ In Russia, on the other hand, popular involvement in municipal life changed and expanded slowly and to a very limited extent. Through the years of the municipal statute of 1870, large numbers of urban dwellers possessed the legal right to participate in municipal elections by voting or running for office. In reality, participation was so limited that municipal affairs remained the concern of a small minority. This group consisted of a portion of the well-to-do business classes--though evidence suggests that small traders and educated nobles tended to predominate in meetings of the municipal assemblies (the dumas). The voters mobilized for elections appeared most often to support their social superiors, either through loyalty or promise of reward. The governor of Kharkov province, writing in the late 1880s, demonstrated his sense of social superiority when he complained of the harm done municipal elections by the predominance of

salespeople and small traders, completely dependent "on their bosses." His later comments revealed, though, that he was referring to small factions of townspeople who voted according to the "recommendations . . . of those on whom they depend" assisted by "promises, intimidation, vodka, and outright bribes of a very miserly sum." He did discern a new element in urban politics in the presence of "powerful capitalists" who intervened "for their own interests or for the profit of their own party in city elections."³⁸ The scant evidence of electoral participation and on social origins of municipal deputies and leaders reveals that urban politics was in the hands of small factions and a few activists attracting neither wide community participation nor the wholesale domination of any urban group, even the merchantry.

When the new municipal statute went into effect in 1892, it excluded over half of the previous voters by raising the property limits for eligibility. Yet the restrictions, on close examination, altered only slightly by actual participation and functioning of the municipal institutions. A minority continued to be active, while the same municipal leaders continued to appear in the *duma*, mostly drawn from the representatives previously chosen by the large electorate under the old statute. In Moscow, through the 1890s "most *duma* members remained those who had earlier belonged to the third curia." The appearance of new municipal activists came as a result of the transformation of the urban population itself. In Moscow, where the trend was clearest, "the changes in the composition of the *duma* were based less on the new municipal law of 1892 than on the economic and political development of the country."³⁹ The most notable change was the increased involvement

of educated Russians, often with some professional training and occupation, whose sense of "public duty" led them to contest the policies of the local and business interests within the municipal leadership. Still, even their presence did not alter the fact that the real electoral base of municipal politics did not include the vast majority of the adult males, leaving municipal affairs to a small part of the urban upper classes, a sort of patrician group. Only a self-chosen sense of leadership could justify the claim of these activists to speak as the voice of the urban community.

Where then can one find evidence indicating the emergence among Russia's urban population of groups strongly united by shared interests and values? Easiest to identify are the many societies and associations which brought together educated and white-collar Russians with common cultural, social, and professional concerns. One of the most notable--and exceptional--of these groups was the Russian medical profession, recently the subject of an excellent historical study. The emergence of these highly trained professionals constituted one aspect of the restructuring of Russian society through the process of social--more precisely, structural--mobility. As the author makes clear, estate criteria of social rank meant nothing in the actual lives of the doctors (though the medical degree brought with it the designation of "honorary citizen"). Professionalism constituted the mark of achievement and responsibility by which Russian doctors defended their place in society and by which they justified the rights and privileges demanded of the tsarist state.⁴⁰ In a real sense, their professional organization, the Pirogov Society, gave formal structure to a group bound by strong communal ties. The community of interests and concerns uniting the

doctors, most of whom were in public service, made the society an active and vocal force in Russia's burgeoning public life, both at the local and national level. Its members shared a common awareness of their importance and of the need for unity to defend their calling as pioneers in the spread of civilization; some became activists in urban reform, and ultimately in national politics.⁴¹ Chekhov, though not a member, was heart and soul a part of their community. Though unique in many respects, it did typify the growth of relations of group solidarity characteristic on a lesser scale of other groups within the urban population.

Within urban centers new opportunities for contact and association emerged. Alongside the old noble and merchant clubs appeared such organization as, in Simbirsk, the "unified club," so called by its organizers since it was a city-wide organization not restricted by estate but open to all. It was successful to the extent of absorbing the town's noble club. New clubs appeared for salespeople and white-collar workers in both private and public employment. Societies for mutual aid were formed in many towns. One in Nizhny Novgorod provided a meeting place and financial aid to the town's white-collar workers, giving them, in the opinion of the society doctor, a feeling of "individuality, honor, emancipation of personality and desire for learning".⁴² One might doubt that the society had such an extraordinarily powerful effect on all its members. The good doctor was himself committed to political emancipation (the reason for his forced

stay in Nizhny) and might be suspected of building fanciful communities in his imagination.

The number of such organizations was by the end of the century in the hundreds or thousands, their types usually restricted formally to mutual aid of some sort--acceptable public activities by tsarist bureaucratic standards. They took the form of the Mutual Society for Fire Insurance in Kaluga or Saratov's Society of Lovers of Fine Arts. The latter is worth particular attention, for it introduces the new and important theme of community organization and oppositional political activity. Saratov's society came under police surveillance in the 1880s. Ostensibly it met solely to promote musical performances, literary readings, and plays performed by local talent, offering cheap tickets to all "lovers of fine arts" (a perfect setting for The Three Sisters!). The local gendarme officer noted, however, that members included politically suspect individuals who "can freely enlarge the circle of their acquaintances and entice new people into their group."⁴³ In a word, the officer feared a "front organization." The idea was not as preposterous as it sounds, though the officer had obviously an interest in keeping his superiors impressed by his own discernment and knowledge of Saratov activities. For our purposes, however, the important point to keep in mind is that such organizations did in fact offer contacts and networks of association of a sort which had never existed before, and which, in their small ways, could open up horizons and introduce new forms of social activity previously non-existent in Russia's urban areas. The involvement in such societies, small and largely limited to educated Russians (some of whom would not fear describing themselves as "intelligenty"), provided networks of

association and trust among urban populations earlier cut off from one another.

Such societies directed toward mutual cultural and social interests offered little to the masses of laborers in Russia's urban areas. Many were migrants, settled for a short or long period in one place, a large number (several million in the 1890s) moving regularly back and forth between permanent abode (either village or less frequently small town) and their place of urban employment, changing frequently that employment. The pattern of high mobility applies even to the factory labor force; in Moscow, certain factories replaced half their labor force each year.⁴⁴ These facts are easily documented, and have led historians to conclude, as noted earlier, that this laboring population remained largely peasant in attitude and isolated from other segments of the population. One might well argue, however, that exposure to an urban style of life was even more pervasive as a result of the movement back to the countryside, as urban acculturation led these migrants to bring back to their villages both the artifacts and attitudes they had assimilated while in their urban setting.⁴⁵ Similarly, the argument of social isolation in the cities rests largely on evidence of geographical residence. A recent study of Moscow factory workers has used the information on residence to conclude that "in the cultural sense as well as the geographical sense, the factory labor force remained on the fringe of urban life." While recognizing that many workers "had spent long years in the city and had developed a distinctive sense of identity and of local community," the author portrays their urban world solely in terms of "the workplace, the dormitory, communal apartment, and the tavern"⁴⁶--in other words, their neighborhood. Such a description calls

up images of the mid-century urban life, expanded to include peasant workers yet still contained within narrow social and geographical limits.

In fact, there existed a variety of organizations, formal and informal, which sought to penetrate this world of urban labor. Their efforts deserve close attention, for the degree of success or failure, and the actual contacts created, provide one real measure of the involvement of workers in community life. The process of adaptation included probably only a part of the migrant population, yet among these few the consequences for social and political involvement in the life of the cities were potentially great.

Viewed in terms of efforts at contact and communication across social boundaries, the organizations directly concerned with the laboring population emanated primarily from Russia's two "churches," the Orthodox Church and the intelligentsia. The first operated primarily at the level of the parish. Discussion of church activities is difficult as a result of the neglect of the subject of the church as a social and cultural influence among the growing urban population. It is clear that parish churches did not multiply sufficiently to keep up with the expansion of city neighborhoods. This situation existed principally on the fringes of the manufacturing centers, whose factories tended to situate on the outskirts, attracting around them worker residential areas. The inability to create new parish organizations, plus the well-known antagonism towards priests on the part of many workers, would lead one to minimize the capacity of the church to create new means of attracting and involving the laboring classes in cultural and social activities.

What has remained unnoticed is the significant expansion (by comparison with the pre-1860s) of parish initiatives in urban areas, most notably charitable organizations and efforts to spread religious learning and to fight drunkenness. Both movements had their own organizations, both took advantage of the newly authorized brotherhoods of parishioners, and both existed in the hundreds by the end of the century. Aided and supported by state authorities, church priests and elders sought to attract an audience for religious readings and to organize a concerted campaign against drunkenness. Priests and parishioners collaborated in organizing public readings, meetings authorized by law in 1870 and becoming numerous after 1890. The new temperance crusade begun in the 1880s adopted the methods already introduced and sponsored new social centers (tea rooms and cafeterias) and readings in the hope of attracting men away from taverns. The hand of official Russia lay heavily on all these efforts. In 1872 the police prefect of St. Petersburg, Trepov, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs organized the first commission for popular readings, fixing its aim as "the struggle against drunkenness, the elimination of coarse manners and the improvement of the moral and intellectual level of the people."⁴⁷ By the early 1890s the fight against drunkenness had led to the formation of temperance societies, numbering over 600 by 1900. The national organization claimed to be active throughout the urban areas of Russia. Certainly readings occurred frequently and apparently attracted large crowds. In Moscow, every year in the 1890s several hundred readings attracted between 150,000 and 200,000 people--or so claimed officials.⁴⁸ It is easy to dismiss these associations and activities as officially sponsored efforts by the state and upper classes to restrain

the growing turbulence of the urban labor force. Such activities became a part of the efforts to "assist" workers in Moscow and St. Petersburg under police patronage. Zubatov took a direct part in these efforts in Moscow in 1902-3, as did Gapon in 1904 in the capital. The audience might well have consisted in large part of the lower middle classes, the artisans, traders, and clerks and their families rather than the more numerous laboring population.

We know from recent studies that at least a part of the workers did in fact participate in this campaign for sobriety and morality. One historian of the St. Petersburg worker movement has noted that the "religiousness" sponsored by the church and state "undoubtedly met with a positive response from a large part of the working class," despite the fact the societies "served as vehicles for the propagation of traditional and conservative religious views and for the suppression, rather than the encouragement, of worker self-organization."⁴⁹ One should also keep in mind the probable cultural differentiation which participation by workers might have produced. Important distinctions among workers came in large measure through levels of skill and urban acculturation; they also were drawn along lines of sobriety. Numerous memoirs, including that of the young metal worker Semen Kanatchikov, refer to the importance of avoidance of drink for "elite" workers.⁵⁰ The process of transition from the vodka culture to sobriety came in part through the work of such societies of temperance, which assisted in the process by which there emerged a group of urbanized workers who were to constitute the organizing force behind collective worker protest in the early twentieth century. In this sense, the public organizations sponsored by church and state provided the network of association and

mutual interest instrumental--albeit unwittingly--in the creation of a politically active elite among the workers.

The second group active in organizing and bringing workers in contact with other groups through formal and informal association were intellectuals. They were self-consciously leaders, believing themselves endowed with special knowledge and ideals necessary to raise workers to a civilized level. The presence of these socially active Russians was evident in the cultural and social societies discussed earlier. Among some, the sense of mission and social responsibility led to the creation of their own forms of public readings. Their work, along with that of the other organizations involved in readings, in popularizing and distributing inspirational and other simple forms of literature helped make the late nineteenth century city, as Jeffrey Brooks has observed, "an environment filled with printed words."⁵¹ Teachers were particularly prominent in these public readings. They were prime movers as well in the new "literacy school" movement of the 1890s. They formed literacy committees to sponsor evening classes for adults and to open reading rooms to encourage the spread of learning, directed particularly to the new working class sections of their towns. Their commitment resembled a crusade, and their dedication won them the respect of at least some of the worker pupils. Ivan Babushkin, in St. Petersburg at the age of twenty with a yearning for more than his minimal learning, wrote in his memoirs that he "had heard good thngs about [the literacy school]: that there was a good group of people there, and most important one could receive an education; that all the teachers taught for free, that is, solely for the sake of bringing knowledge to the people, and were ready to put up with all kinds of pressures and surveillance from

the government." Babushkin remembered that he appreciated the attention of "people from another class [sredy]," and regarded their zeal with a feeling of "amazement."⁵² His account suggests strongly that the school brought him into a new network of relations with intellectuals whom he trusted--a "good group of people." Even though he recognized them of another "class," he still shared with them the desire for intellectual emancipation and hostility toward the state. One ought to multiply many times over such contacts to assess at their proper value the importance of the new, albeit tenuous, bonds between workers and educated Russians within these informal organizations. The emergence of political opposition uniting many urban dwellers in the early twentieth century owed much to such activities. Through such associations the conditions appeared to mobilize a worker elite with a new sense of right and justice.

The historical records of the revolution of 1905 provide us with at least a few instances of the direct involvement of organizations created in previous years for social and cultural activities of the urban community. In Moscow itself, one survival of Zubatov's efforts at officially sponsored community work among the laboring population was the Museum for the Assistance of Labor. Organized by the Imperial Russian Technical Society in 1901, it transformed itself in 1905 as "nerve center of the Moscow labor movement." Laura Engelstein, in her study of the 1905 revolution in Moscow, uses evidence such as this in arguing that during those tumultuous months Moscow's working class was

mobilized in large measure because "the entire urban community, from top to bottom, was moved to action."⁵³

One might well find similar roots of political mobilization in communal organizations in other towns and cities that year. One event in Saratov at the beginning of the year points in this direction. The Saratov Temperance Society was scheduled on January 8, 1905, to hold its usual literary-musical soiree in the entertainment hall, which functioned in the daytime as a tearoom-cafeteria offering inexpensive food to the town's lower classes and other evenings served up cultural fare through public readings. That night the scenario was suddenly changed, however. Under the chairmanship of a town doctor, 1,500 people gathered to hear Marxist workers talk of the working class and the Russian revolution, and to vote a resolution, passed unanimously, calling for liberty in Russia.⁵⁴ For a brief moment, the participants could believe that they were building on the foundations of their urban community the structure of a new Russia.

The sudden outburst of action and the involvement of people from a wide variety of occupations and social standing came certainly as a result of years of quiet organizational activity building up networks of trust and cooperation. Whether literacy schools, public readings, temperance societies, etc., the effect was to overcome the social isolation and political submissiveness of participants, educated or not, wealthy or poor. Reginald Zelnik has argued that organizations such as these helped created "the spiritual and physical space that filled a part of the void in the workers' civic and cultural lives." He suggests that the result led, "as part of a broader continuum of experience, to the workers' own creation of a universalistic though, paradoxically,

class-based vision of the future."⁵⁵ The vision led ultimately to a social revolution; its origins lay in the peculiar network of urban institutions and the unique process of adaptation and acculturation by which migrants to the industrial factories and workshops became a part of Russian urban society.

Thus the model of community would appear both relevant to the transformation of the urban population of Russia in the last decades of tsarist rule and pertinent to the key question of the origins of mass political opposition to the tsarist regime. This essay began on a critical note, suggesting that the structural analysis of Russian society in its period of change had not provided a sufficiently broad perspective on the process of change. It focused particularly on the tendency apparent in certain recent works on the Russian urban population to assume that the scope of that change could be compressed within the continuum of "society of estates" and "society of classes." This polar dichotomy has led to the neglect of key issues important for a full and comprehensive evaluation of the extent to which urban society in Russia was changing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These images, whose roots are found in nineteenth century tsarist policies and in intellectual controversies, have encouraged historians to overemphasize the "backwardness" of much of the urban population throughout that period. I would argue that a reevaluation of both the assumptions and the evidence leading to this conclusion would reveal to what extent it is based on a one-sided examination of the process of urban change. How then ought the transformation of urban Russia to be measured? The tentative conclusion proposed here is that one set of questions should focus on social networks and associations,

on the types of social and cultural organizations which emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, on the attitudes and bonds which these new modes of social activity encouraged among the urban population. The history of Russian society in the past 150 years is far more complex than previously recognized. Only by confronting this complexity--including the many dimensions to the urban experience and the variety of responses of the population to their new conditions--can we hope to understand the full scope and nature of the transformation of Russian society.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Samuel Baron, "The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism in Russia: A Major Soviet Historical Controversy," American Historical Review, v. 77 (June 1972), pp. 715-29.
2. Pavel Ryndziunskii, Utverzhdenie kapitalizma v Rossii 1850-80 (Moscow, 1978); the debate between Ryndziunskii and N. M. Druzhinin flared up in the mid-1970s in the pages of Izvestiia severokavkazskogo nauchnogo tsentra vysshei shkoly: obshchestvennye nauki, No. 1 (1974); No. 1 (1975); No. 2 (1976).
3. For example, I. F. Gindin, "Russkaia burzhuaizii v period kapitalizma, ee razvitie i osobennosti," Istoriia SSSR, No. 2 (March-April, 1963) pp. 57-80, No. 3 (May-June, 1963) pp. 37-60; and L. M. Ivanov (ed.), Rossiiskii proletariat: oblik, bor'ba gegemoniia (Moscow, 1970).
4. Bernard Pares, Russia between Reform and Revolution (New York, 1962), p. 73.
5. Alfred Rieber, Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1982), pp. xx-xxi.
6. Ibid., pp. xxiv, 24.
7. Ibid., p. 81; the critique of the "conservation of historical energy law" is in J. H. Hexter, Reappraisals in History (New York, 1963), p. 39-41.
8. Rieber, p. 51.
9. Ibid., pp. 332, 371.

10. Joseph Bradley, "Muzhik and Muscovite: Peasants in Late Nineteenth Century Urban Russia" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1977), pp. 276-279.

11. The criticism directed here at works on urban society applies even more directly to G. T. Robinson's survey of the post-emancipation peasantry (Rural Russia under the Old Regime [New York, 1957]).

12. Robert Johnson, Peasant and Proletarian: The Working Class of Moscow in the Late Nineteenth Century (New Brunswick, N.J., 1979), pp. 97, 161.

13. Reginald Zelnik, "Russian Rebels: An Introduction to the Memoirs of the Russian Workers Semen Kanatchikov and Matvei Fisher," Russian Review, v. 35 (June 1976), pp. 257-70.

14. Michael Hamm, "The Breakdown of Urban Modernization," in M. Hamm (ed.), The City in Russian History (Lexington, Kentucky, 1976), p. 182

15. Leopold Haimson, "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-14," Slavic Review, v. 23 (December 1964), pp. 634-36.

16. *Ibid.*, v. 24 (March 1965), p. 21.

17. Thomas Bender, Community and Social Change in America (New Brunswick, N.J., 1978), pp. 17-19, 28-30.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

19. Rieber, p. 230.

20. "Mnenie Kommissii dlia sostavleniia soobrazheniia," TsGIA (Central State Historical Archives in Leningrad), fond 1287, opis' 37, delo 2171 (1863), list 5.

21. "O Dozvolenii dvorian," *ibid.*, delo 2004 (1859-65), list 61.

22. "Mnenie Kommissii," op. cit., list 32.

23. "Mnenie Kommissi," ibid., delo 1262, list 10; this document was a private "opinion" written by an individual and attached to the municipal commission's report.

24. "Saratovskaia guberniia," in Ekonomicheskoe sostoianie gorodskikh poselenii Evropeiskoi Rossii v 1861-62 g. (St. Petersburg, 1863), II, 4.

25. V. Belinskii, "Peterburg i Moskva," in Fiziologiiia Peterburga (St. Petersburg, 1845), I, 45.

26. B. I. Vasil'ev, "Formirovanie fabrichno-zavodskogo proletariata tsentral'nogo promyshlennogo raiona Rossii (1820-1890)" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Novocherkassk Technological Institute, 1972), I, 308-9.

27. L. A. Anokhina, Byt gorodskogo naseleniia srednei polosy RSFSR v proshlom i nastoishchem (Moscow, 1977), pp. 277-78.

28. Mikhail Rabinovich, Ocherki etnografii russkogo feodal'nogo goroda: Gorozhane, ikh obshchestvennyi i domashnii byt (Moscow, 1978), pp. 131-32.

29. Anokhina, pp. 259-60.

30. I. T. Kokorev, Moskva sorokovykh godov (Moscow, 1958), pp. 127-28.

31. Belinskii, p. 45.

32. Rieber, p. 32.

33. Maxim Gorkii, Autobiography, trans. I. Schneider (New York, 1949), p. 11.

34. D. Brower, "Urban Russia on the Eve of World War One: A Social Profile," Journal of Social History, v. 13 (Spring 1980), p. 429, Table 1, p. 430.

35. "Statisticheskie svedeniia o remeslennykh zavedeniakh," TsGIA, fond 1290, opis' 5, delo 37 (1893).

36. Reginald Zelnik, "Passivity and Protest in Germany and Russia: Barrington Moore's Conception of Working-Class Responses to Injustice," Journal of Social History, XV (Summer, 1982), p. 502.

37. Bender, pp. 100-105.

38. TsGIA, fond 1287, opis' 37, delo 1296, listy 18-19.

39. L. F. Pissar'kova, Moskovskoe gorodskoe obshchestvennoe upravlenie: avtoreferat (Moscow, 1980), pp. 12-14.

40. Nancy Frieden, Russian Physicians in an Era of Reform and Revolution, 1856-1905 (Princeton, N.J., 1981), pp. 208-228.

41. Ibid., especially pp. 198-199, 255, 261.

42. S. Ia. Elpat'evskii, Vospominaniia za piat'desiat' let (Moscow, 1929), p. 207.

43. "Politicheskii obzor Saratovskoi gubernii," TsGAOR (Central State Archives of the October Revolution), fond 102, delo 152 (1887), chast' 35, list 4.

44. The general tendency of urban dwellers to move frequently is noted in James Bater, "Transience, Residential Persistence and Mobility in Moscow and St. Petersburg," Slavic Review, v. 39 (June, 1980), pp. 239-54.

45. A vivid but neglected source on this process of social interaction is The Village of Viriatino, trans. and ed. Sula Benet (New York, 1970), esp. pp. 125-30; see also D.H. Zhabankov, Bab'ia storona: Statistiko-etnograficheskii ocherk (Kostroma, 1891), esp. p. 16 ff.

46. Laura Engelstein, Moscow 1905: Working-Class Organization and Political Conflict (Stanford, 1982), p. 50.

47. Cited in L. M. Ivanov, "Ideologicheskoe vozdeistvie burzhuazii i tsarizma na proletariat," in Rossiiskii proletariat, p. 323.
48. Ibid., pp. 331-32.
49. Gerald Surh, "Petersburg's First Mass Labor Organization: The Assembly of Russian Workers and Father Gapon," Russian Review, v. 40 (October, 1981), p. 437.
50. Zelnik, "Russian Rebels," pp. 276, 284-85.
51. Jeffrey Brooks, "Readers and Reading at the End of the Tsarist Era," in William Todd (ed.), Literature and Society in Imperial Russia, 1800-1914 (Stanford, 1978), p. 142.
52. I. V. Babushkin, Vospominaniia (Leningrad, 1925), pp. 35-36.
53. Engelstein, pp. 13, 179.
54. TsGAOR, fond Departament Politsii, delo 1250, #3/1905, listy 50-51.
55. Zelnik, "Passivity and Protest," p. 504.