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The Northern Pacific Fishery

**A Case Study of Soviet-Japanese
Economic Relations**

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Introduction

In the nineteenth century, the Japanese first came into contact with the Russians in the fishery in the north seas. The Japanese expansion continued after the signing of the Kuril-Sakhalin Exchange Treaty in 1875 and led to the acquisition of Japanese fishing rights in the Russian territories of Kamchatka and Sakhalin as specified in the Portsmouth Treaty in 1905. The active Japanese fishery in these areas remained basically unchanged after the Bolshevik Revolution and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in 1925. The San Francisco Peace Treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers that ended World War II and the post-war occupation was not signed by the Soviet Union. The 1956 negotiations aimed at restoring diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union resulted in a deadlock primarily because of the dispute over the Northern Territories, specifically the islands at the southern end of the Kuril Chain. Despite the fact that the territorial issue remained unresolved, the Japanese decided on a partial restoration of diplomatic relations. Their decision was prompted partially by the desire to return to the Sakhalin, Okhotsk and West Bering Sea areas to exploit the fishery.¹ The Soviet Union, meanwhile, increased fishing activities in these areas, a move that resulted in further restrictions of Japanese fishing activities in the Soviet territorial waters. The Japanese fishing fleet was in retreat. A significant turning point came in 1976-1977, when the major countries in the world declared the areas two hundred nautical miles off their coastal lines as exclusive economic zones where their own fishing activities took precedence and where those by foreign vessels were restricted. The restriction was a heavy blow to the Japanese fishing industry because the traditional fishing areas of the Northern Pacific were now enclosed either in the Soviet or in the U.S. 200-mile zones.

This article's purpose is to view Japanese fishing activities in terms of their relation to the Soviet Union after the coming of the 200-mile zone era. This author interviewed the Japanese involved in the fishery: those in

the government at national and local levels who negotiated with the Soviets, those in industry directly engaged in the north sea fishery, and the private citizens in Hokkaido where the bases for north sea fishery are located. This article is a report of the results of these interviews and the literature surveyed.

Among the Russian publications that deal with Japan and its relations with the Soviet Union, only the book on Soviet-Japanese trade and economic relations edited by Ia. A. Pevzner [17] has a fairly detailed chapter on the Japanese fishery, though its main thrust is merely to present the decrees by the Council of Ministers for regulating the Japanese fishery. Other Soviet publications [10, 14] focus primarily on the Soviets' desire to engage in joint Soviet-Japanese exploitation of fuel resources and to adapt Japanese management techniques and those of quality control of manufacturing products. In contrast to the dearth of Soviet publications on the northern Pacific fisheries, the Japanese have published frequently on this issue, a reflection of the fact that the fishery is important to Japanese-Soviet relations. The works by Hirasawa, Kawasaki and Tanaka, and Nikolaev and Arsen'ev provide general discussions of and guides to the Japanese fishery, whereas those by Aoki and Kumazawa, Itabashi, Mishima, Mochizuki, Nakai and Yasufuku discuss more specifically Japanese fishing activities in the Northern Pacific. The studies by Kimura and Krasnokutskii are devoted to the closely related issue of the Northern Territory of Japan. This list does not include the numerous pamphlets on the territorial question published by the national and regional authorities. John Stephan's two monographs are the major English language studies of the history of the two territories that the Japanese Empire acquired and then lost, and include the description of the Japanese fishery there.

This paper will discuss, in order, salmon fishing, fishing for other kinds of fish, and fishing for sedentary species² by the Japanese. Organizing the discussion in this manner is both logical and convenient because the restrictions imposed on the Japanese activities, such as the quotas on catches, the areas and periods for fishing activities, the types of boats used,

and the parties that negotiate the two-country agreements, all depend on the kind of fish to be caught. Since politics and national security issues are inextricably intertwined with the fishery issue, these issues will be discussed in the conclusion.

Fisheries in the High Seas

In recent years, the ocean fishery catch by the Japanese has dropped to two million tons per year, almost one-half of the peak level in 1968. Nonetheless, the ocean catch still accounts for about 20 percent of all fish caught by the Japanese. The salmon and sea-trout fishery³ that used to be the "star" in the Northern Pacific fishery is no exception to this general trend. The annual volume of the salmon catch fell from more than eighty thousand tons per year in the pre-200-mile zone era to forty thousand tons per year in the 1980s. (See columns (1) and (2) in Table 1.) Because efforts have been made to increase the salmon stocks in Japanese coastal waters (by reducing water pollution, creating hatchery and nursery grounds, etc.), the national total of the salmon catch (both in the deep seas and near the Japanese coasts) shows no detectable upward or downward trend. (See columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.) But without question, there has been a decline of the salmon fishery in the deep seas.

The main reason for the sharp decline is that the areas in which the Japanese are allowed to catch salmon have been greatly limited as a consequence of the 200-mile zone. Salmon are anadromous fish that originate in a river, migrate to the deep ocean for four or five years and then return to the original river for spawning. The Japanese used to catch salmon off the coasts of Kamchatka, Kuril and Sakhalin on their way back to the rivers in which they spawn. The areas inside the Soviet 200-mile zone, however, are now reserved for the Soviet fishing fleet, and the Japanese are excluded from the Soviet zone for salmon fishery. Furthermore, the Soviet Union also regulates the salmon fishery by the Japanese

Table 1. Japanese and Soviet Fishery of Salmon and Sea Trout in the Northern Pacific and the Sea of Japan

[In tons]

Year	Japanese Ocean Fishery Outside Soviet 200- Mile Limit		Japanese Coast Fishery	Total Japanese Fishery	Soviet Coast Fishery
	Quota (1)	Actual Catch (2)	(3)	(4) = (2) + (3)	(5)
1975	87,000	91,045	64,038	155,083	83,991
1976	80,000	82,186	39,593	121,779	72,329
1977	62,000	62,539	49,732	112,371	139,364
1978	42,500	41,517	17,732	99,249	84,527
1979	42,500	42,447	86,086	128,533	130,456
1980	42,500	42,480	77,322	119,802	99,033
1981	42,500	42,467	104,845	147,312	115,979
1982	42,500	42,368	91,086	133,454	67,437
1983	42,500	42,098	115,667	157,765	137,135
1984	40,000	-	-	-	-
1985	37,600	-	-	-	-

even outside of its 200-mile zone. The UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (1973-1982) which marked an epoch in the history of marine resource preservation and which was signed by most countries in the world clearly stipulates that, in order to preserve the anadromous stock, the country of origin has the right and the obligation to take the necessary protective measures even beyond its exclusive economic zone.⁴ This provides the legal basis for Soviet actions.

The areas in which the Japanese are allowed to catch salmon are now east of the Soviet 200-mile zone and of the U.S.-Russia convention line⁵ (see Figure 1). The triangular area north of the 44 degrees North latitude and west of the 170 degrees East latitude, though outside the Soviet 200-mile-line, is also off limits. Furthermore, according to the U.S.-Canada-

Table 2. Ocean Fishery of Salmon and Sea Trout by the Japanese

[Number of boats approved each year]

Fishery Type and Boat	1962-71	1972-76	1977	1978	1979-84	1985	
In the Pacific							
Mothership-type							(14,080)
Motherships	11	10	6	4	4	4	
Catchers	369	332	245	172	172	172	
MSGN	333-325	374-368	298	209	209	209	(17,115)
SSGN	1283-1262	1132-1120	832	678-671	671	671	(2,405)
MSLL	369	0	0	0	0	0	
In the Sea of Japan							
SSGN/MSGN	569-275	201-167	127	127	126-125	125	(2,300)
LL	483	414-340	264	261	260-219	171	(1,700)

SSGN = Small Size Gill Netters MSGN = Middle Size Gill Netters LL = Long Liners MSLL = Middle Size Long Liners

The 1985 figures in parentheses represent the quotas of catch in tons.

Japan Convention, the Japanese are excluded not only from the U.S. 200-mile zone but also from the high seas east of the 175 degrees East latitude for salmon fishery.⁶ In short, the Japanese boats are allowed to catch salmon only in the reverse-L-shaped areas marked as (1) to (7) in Figure 1.

The number of boats and their types are also regulated. Four motherships and 172 catchers were allowed to operate in the north-easternmost areas (areas (1), (2) and (3) in Figure 1) in 1985, compared to the eleven motherships and 369 catchers that were in operation in the 1960s. This is a substantial reduction. (See Table 2). In addition, these four teams may catch no more than fourteen thousand tons of salmon per year. The medium-sized (above 30 tons) gill netters that work individually and bring the catches back by themselves are confined to areas (4) and (5) in Figure




Figure 1: 1985 Japanese Fishery in the High Seas. Salmon of Soviet Origin.

1. More than three hundred such ships were in operation in the 1960s, but the number has now dwindled to 209. (See Table 2.) Small-sized gill netters are confined to areas much closer to the base ports in Japan (area 6 in Figure 1), while area (7) in the Sea of Japan has been assigned to gill netters and long liners. In general, the larger the boat, the further offshore it is permitted to fish. The time period during which the fishery is allowed also varies with the area. As summer approaches, the water temperature rises and the shoals move northward, causing the fishery to also shift to the north.

Annually, the Japanese and Soviet governments negotiate in Moscow the terms under which Japanese fishing of the salmon which originate in Soviet rivers can operate. In 1985, the talks began in March but dragged on until an agreement was finally reached in early June. Given that in 1984, the agreement was signed on May 5th, the delay in 1985 was significant and very costly. Had the 1985 agreement been reached in early May, the Japanese boats could have made two round-trips to the north seas. But since they left port in June, they were only able to make a single voyage and their catch in 1985 was considerably smaller than the year before. The reason for the delay in negotiations was that the Soviets tried to tighten restrictions on every aspect of the regulations,⁷ and the Japanese resisted. With the shoals moving northward into the Soviet zone and the departure time for Japanese fishing boats long overdue, a deal was cut that was advantageous to the Soviets. One of the sticky points in the negotiations was the amount of compensation the Japanese should pay to the Soviets. The total amount agreed on in 1985 (nineteen million dollars; see Table 3) was the same as that paid in the previous two years, despite the fact that the quota for catch has kept on falling each year. The money is used for building the rearing grounds, for increasing hatching and liberation capacity in the Soviet waters, etc. in order that the salmon stocks remain undepleted. The bulk of the payment is made in kind in the form of machines and materials, but a small portion is also paid in hard currency. The Soviets maintain that the purpose is not to charge the fees

Table 3. Japanese Compensation to Sovrybflot for the Salmon and Sea Trout Fishery

1978	8,000,000
1979	15,000,000
1980	17,000,000
1981	18,000,000
1982	18,000,000
1983	19,000,000
1984	19,000,000
1985	19,000,000

The exchange rate of \$1 = 220 Yen is assumed.

for common-of-piscary but to let the Japanese share the cost of reproduction.

Some Japanese in the fishing industry who were interviewed by this author remarked that, if 1977 was the first year of the exclusive 200-mile-economic zone era, 1985 may be remembered as the first year of the UN Law of the Sea era. At the negotiating table, the Japanese adherence to the classic principle in international law of the freedom of the high seas looked weak and outdated compared to the Soviet assertion of the right of a country in whose rivers the anadromous stock originates. A compromise was reached when the Japanese team reminded the Soviets of the proviso in the Law-of-the-Sea agreement that the country of origin for anadromous fish should cooperate in minimizing the economic dislocation experienced by other countries as a result of the restrictions.⁸ To put it more bluntly, the Japanese acquiescence in the sizeable compensation payment seemed most helpful in paving the way to the final agreement.

Fisheries in the 200-Mile Zones

The size of the Japanese catch increased steadily throughout the 1960s, an expansion due primarily to the extension of deep-sea fishing. From 1960 to 1975, the catch from deep-sea fisheries increased by 126 percent, whereas the catches from the offshore fisheries and from the coastal fisheries increased only by 77 percent and 43 percent respectively. The movement from coast to offshore, and from offshore to deep-sea, is the direction in which the Japanese fishery grew. The catches from the deep-sea fishery reached their peak in 1975 and have diminished ever since. The catches from the deep-sea fishery in 1983 were only 63 percent of the 1975 level, whereas the catches in 1983 from offshore fishery and from coastal fishery were larger than the catches in 1975 by 47 percent and 18 percent respectively. [1 and 14] Clearly, the imposition of the 200-mile zone has had an adverse effect on the Japanese exploitation of the deep-sea fishery.

The Soviet Union is the second in the world, after Japan, in terms of the size of catch. The area of operation for the Soviet deep-sea fishery gradually has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific; for example, the Soviet catch in the Atlantic increased only by 0.4 percent per year for 1960-1976, whereas their catch in the Pacific increased at 1.9 percent per year for the same period. [8] For 1977-1983, the Soviet catch from the Atlantic decreased sharply, by 2.3 percent per year. For the same period, the Soviets increased their catch in the Pacific at the annual rate of 2.3 percent. The imposition of 200-mile zones by the North Atlantic countries accelerated this shift. Since 1977, when Japan and the Soviet Union each announced their own exclusive 200-mile zones, each country has allowed the other's fishing activities within its exclusive zone, but has monitored them carefully under severe restrictions. The two governments' representatives meet every year to discuss and sign agreements that regulate each other's fishery in the 200-mile zones. The most recent agreement was reached in December 1984.⁹

Table 4. The Fishery Within the Respective 200-Mile Zones

[In 1000 tons]

Year	Japanese Fishery within Soviet Zone			Soviet Fishery within Japanese Zone		
	Quota (1)	Actual Catch (2)	Ratio (%) (3) = (2)/(1)	Quota (4)	Actual Catch (5)	Ratio (%) (6) = (5)/(4)
1977	455	302	66	335	63	19
1978	850	466	55	650	360	55
1979	750	537	72	650	457	70
1980	750	535	71	650	331	51
1981	750	526	70	650	209	32
1982	750	478	64	650	188	29
1983	750	427	57	650	200	31
1984	700	441	63	640	119	19
1985	600	-	-	600	-	-

1977 Figures for July-December only.

The salient feature of the new agreement is the principle of equal quota, that is, the Japanese quota in the Soviet zone and the Soviet quota in the Japanese zone must be equal -- six hundred thousand tons per year. Until 1984, the Japanese quota exceeded that of the Soviets. (See Table 4.) As a result of Soviet insistence in the 1984 negotiations, equal quotas were agreed upon. This principle of equality is *sine qua non* to the Soviets for two purposes: to protect the domestic marine resources from further Japanese exploitation, and to gain a firm footing in the Japanese waters. At the beginning of the negotiations, the Japanese reportedly offered to pay the Soviets ten million dollars in compensation to maintain the unequal quotas favorable to them; the Soviets rejected the offer. Apparently, unlike the case of salmon that spawn in Soviet waters, the Japanese offer of hard currency was not enough to induce the Soviets to bend the principle.




Figure 2: 1985 Japanese Fishery within the Soviet 200 Mile Zone.

Within the Soviet 200-mile zone, the Japanese are permitted to fish in five areas: the Sea of Okhotsk off the Kuril Chain (marked as (1) in Figure 2), the Pacific off the Kuril Chain (marked as (2) in Figure 2), the East Sakhalin area (marked as (3) in Figure 2), the Nijo-iwa and La Pérouse (Soya) Strait area (marked as (4) in Figure 2), and the Sea of Japan area (marked as (5) in Figure 2).¹⁰ The Pacific waters off the Kuril Chain are the most important of the five areas, for two-thirds of the six hundred thousand ton quota are caught in this area. The 1985 quota on fish taken from these waters was a heavy blow to the Japanese as it represented a sharp drop from the previous quotas: 700,000 tons in 1984, and 750,000 tons each year from 1979 to 1983. In addition to this quota reduction, the Japanese fishermen are subjected to stricter regulations. For example, they are obligated to report daily to the Soviet authorities the area of operation and the quantities of catches for each kind of fish. Furthermore, they must report their entry into the Soviet zone in advance and keep a diary aboard. Among various kinds of fish the Japanese catch in the Soviet zone, the walleye pollack is by far the most important. (See Table 5.) The increased importance of the walleye pollack to the Japanese can be attributed to the invention of the technology for production of minced fish meat. After this invention by a scientist in Hokkaido in 1961, the walleye pollack has been widely used as raw material for fish cakes, sausages, crab sticks, etc.

The Soviet quota in the Japanese zone is dominated by the spotlined sardine and the mackerels. (See Table 5.) The Soviets hope to increase these catches because it is hard to expect that herring, the fish the Soviet people traditionally prefer, will reestablish its stock and because it is unlikely that the supply of meat as a protein alternative on the Soviet market will substantially increase. Despite the quotas, one is struck by a wide gap between those quotas and the actual catch; the gap is particularly noteworthy on the Soviet side. (See Table 4.) During the negotiations, the Soviet delegation demanded two changes to narrow this gap. One was to loosen

Table 5. Negotiated Quotas within the Respective 200-Mile Zones

[Catches in 1000 tons]

Japanese Quota within Soviet Zone	1984	1985
Walleye pollack	270.0	250.0
Right-eye flounder	25.0	20.0
Ocean perch	17.0	14.0
Gray cod	32.0	29.0
Saffron cod	15.0	13.0
Saury	64.0	64.0
Sand lance	38.0	31.0
Squid	138.0	117.0
Queen crab	2.8	0.0
Red queen crab	2.4	0.0
Neptune whelk	3.5	0.0
Other	92.3	62.0
Total	700.0	600.0

Soviet Quota within Japanese Zone		
Spotlined sardine, Mackerel	490.0	495.0
Walleye pollack	10.0	10.0
Forked Hake	90.0	45.0
Saury	10.0	10.0
Other	40.0	40.0
Total	640.0	600.0

the regulations that the Japanese authorities imposed on the Soviet trawlers; the other was to open a port of call for the Soviet trawlers on the Japanese coasts.

The Soviet boats that enter the Japanese 200-mile zone to catch sardine and mackerel are subjected to various restrictions in terms of fishing methods, the period and area of operation, and catch quotas. As seen in Figure 3, the areas where Japan allows the Soviet boats to operate are in the Pacific and the Sea of Japan. The area in the Pacific north of Tokyo

is subdivided into 17 sections. Within each section the methods and the period of fishing that are forbidden are specified.¹¹

The Japanese government puts tight restrictions on the Soviet vessels in order to protect its own coastal fishery. The coastal waters of Japan are crowded with four hundred thousand tiny fishing boats, many of which are operated by individual families. Japanese official statistics indicate that, in 1983, 77 percent of the Japanese fishermen (and women) were engaged in coastal fishery; the remaining 23 percent were engaged in offshore and deep-sea fishery. Of the 77 percent, the majority -- 65 percent -- were self-employed and only 12 percent were employed by companies. Twenty-three percent of the men who exploit the coastal fishery are 60 years or older. To protect these small, inefficient family businesses, the Japanese authorities extended the broad network of restrictions to which all the fishing operations, domestic as well as foreign, are subjected. During the negotiations, the Japanese representatives pointed out that it was very difficult to lift the restrictions for foreign vessels while maintaining them for domestic ones.

The Japanese fishing industry is characterized by a wide variety of fishing firms. At one end of the spectrum are the small family firms just mentioned; at the other end are the giant corporations. Each of the three largest corporations employs two thousand to four thousand workers, owns motherships and trawlers on the sea, operates canning plants and freezing facilities on land, and has annual sales of one to three billion dollars. Normally, a strong, competitive industry and a weak, less competitive industry have different goals and objectives. The industry that demands a foreign government remove protective restrictions and the industry that asks the home government for protection are, as a rule, different industries. The Japanese fishing industry, however, is very unusual in its structure in that it contains within it two sectors whose interests in terms of domestic protection are diametrically opposed. The principle of equal




Figure 3: Soviet Fishery within the Japanese 200 Mile Zone.

quota now established in the Japan-Soviet agreement poses a dilemma. In order to develop the offshore and deep-sea fishery, particularly in another's 200-mile zone, the government may have to enact policies that damage the coastal fishery. In order to protect the coastal fishery, however, it may have to curb the growth of ocean fishery.

The second change that the Soviet negotiating team raised during the 1984 negotiations was the issue of the port of call for Soviet trawlers. The Soviet negotiators argued that Soviet vessels operating within the Japanese 200-mile zone need fresh vegetables and water, and that the crews need rest and recreation. Time could be saved, so the Soviets argued, if the boats would be allowed to call at a Japanese port instead of returning home. Under this arrangement, their prospects of meeting the quota would be enhanced. As a result, in 1984, the Japanese port of Onahama northeast of Tokyo was opened to the Soviets (see Figure 3). There were, however, many restrictions. The number of Soviet boats that can call at Onahama was limited to 70. No boat could stay in the port for more than 48 hours. No more than one hundred fifty crew members could go on shore at the same time, and they were allowed to be on shore for no more than five hours. The Soviet Embassy in Tokyo was required to apply for permission to the Japanese government two weeks prior to a ship's arrival. From March to August 1984, nineteen Soviet boats (mainly trawlers) called at Onahama. In 1985, a similar arrangement was concluded. This time, Shiogama (on the Pacific coast, north of Onahama in Figure 3) was designated as the port of call. From March to June 1985, fifteen Soviet trawlers called at Shiogama.

The Shellfish in the Soviet Continental Shelves

Both sides of the Kamchatka Peninsula are a rich source of crabs. Since the 1920s the Japanese have sent factory ships and catchers to these

Table 6. Species in the Soviet Continental Shelves: Agreements between Governments

[Quotas assigned the Japanese in 1984]

Species	Area of Operation	Number of Boats Quota/Actual	Quota of Catch (in tons)	Compensation Paid (in \$1000)
Northern king crab	(2) Okhotsk Sea	Mothership 2/2 Catchers 7/5	800	0
Queen crab	(3) East Sakhalin	(50-350 ton type) 23/23	2,800	
Red queen crab	(6) Sea of Japan	(50-100 ton type) 54/24	2,400	
Horsehair crab	(4) La Perouse Strait (Nijo Iwa)	(15 ton type) 14/14	500	0
Neptune Whelk	(1) North Okhotsk Sea	(200-500 ton ship) 13/11	2,800	
	(3) East Sakhalin	(96 ton ship) 8/5	700	0
Shrimp	(6) Sea of Japan	(50-100 ton type) 15/15	500	0
Subtotal		136/99	10,500	0

areas. The Japanese have also been engaged in catching shrimp and other shellfish (primarily Neptune whelks) in these areas. The delineation of the 200-mile exclusive lines in 1977 and the UN adoption of the Laws of the Sea were fatal blows to Japanese operations in these areas.

Crabs are one of the sedentary species that live on the continental shelves. For those resources, the Laws of the Sea say that the coastal state has exclusive rights. Even if the coastal state does not exploit the resources, no one else can exploit them without the express consent of the coastal state.¹² The quota on the Japanese crab catch was cut sharply from eighteen thousand in 1976 to ten thousand in 1977. Correspondingly, the number of Japanese boats for crab catching dropped from 124 in

Table 6 Cont'd. Species in the Soviet Continental Shelves: Agreements between Private Organizations

[Quotas assigned the Japanese in 1984]

Species	Area of Operation	Number of Boats Quota/Actual	Quota of Catch (in tons)	Compensation Paid (in \$1000)
Shrimp	(7) Tartar Strait	3/-	165	683
Queen crab			167	217
Horsehair crab	(7) Tartar Strait	3/-	150	255
Blue crab			135	413
Queen crab	(8) West Bering Sea		1,764	2,293
Blue crab	Oliutorskii Zaliv	5/-	198	606
Northern king crab			120	156
Subtotal		11/-	2,697	4,623
Grand Total			13,197	4,623

1976 to 78 in 1977. The restrictions which the Soviet authorities imposed on Japanese operations in 1984, such as the quotas of catch, the areas of operation, and the number of ships used can be found in Table 6 and Figure 4. The crabs are caught in the Sea of Okhotsk (Area 2 in Figure 4), East Sakhalin (Area 3), La Péruse Strait (Area 4), Sea of Japan (Area 6) and Tartar Strait (Area 7). In addition to government-to-government negotiations, the Japanese Association of Fishing Industries, a private business organization, has also been involved in the negotiations with the Soviets. Whenever this private organization has represented Japan, the Soviet counterpart at the negotiating table has been Sovrybflot (the Soviet Fishing Fleet Organization). Since 1978, the Soviets have charged the Japanese private association the fees for common-of-piscary. The




Figure 4: The Catches of Sedentary Species in the Continental Shelves.
Areas Assigned to the Japanese.

Japanese government in principle is opposed to the fees for common-of-piscary and will not sit at the negotiating table.

In 1985, government-level negotiations were suspended. The only negotiations actually concluded were those held in Moscow in May between the Japanese Association of Fishing Industries and Sovrybflot. During the negotiations, the Soviets warned the Japanese of the near extinction of marine resources on the continental shelf and excluded the Japanese from almost all of the areas. The only area the Soviets agreed to open to the Japanese was that east of Sakhalin where queen crabs could be caught. But the quota there was cut to 2,400 tons from the quota of 2,800 tons in 1984. Initially, the Japanese proposed to pay the charge for common-of-piscary on the basis of \$200 per ton of catch, but the charges finally agreed upon were calculated on the basis of \$860 per ton. In addition to the reduction in quota and the rise in the charge for common-of-piscary, the Soviets wanted the Japanese to reduce the number of boats from 23 in 1984 to 6 or 7 because the Soviets wanted to send three observers on board to enforce these agreements. All in all, with the rise in payment for common-of-piscary, the Japanese are not sure of breaking even, let alone making a profit. The shellfish fishery by the Japanese has suffered irrecoverable damage.

The agreement for sea kale harvesting¹³ off Kaigara-jima Island (Ostrov signal'nii) is another case in which a private Japanese organization rather than the government conducts the negotiations. The island is located in the disputed Northern Territory and only a few miles off the eastern end of Hokkaido. Its location dictates that the Japanese government cannot bypass the territorial issue and only negotiate the terms of seaweed harvesting. To avoid this sensitive issue, from 1963 through 1976, the Japanese Association of Fishing Industries conducted negotiations with the Soviet Ministry of Fishery. Beginning in 1977, when the Soviet Union and Japan set their 200-mile zones, the negotiations ceased for three years. In 1981, the negotiations resumed with the Hokkaido Association of Fishing Industries negotiating on behalf of the Japanese.

Table 7. Catches of Sea Kale off Kalgara Jima (Ostrov Signal'ni) in the Northern Territory

[Catches in tons; compensation in \$1000]

Year	Number of Boats	Catch	Compensation Paid
1963	299	1195	16
1964	299	1035	16
1965	299	668	16
1966	299	1049	16
1967	299	833	16
1968	299	473	16
1969	329	841	18
1970	329	466	18
1971	329	915	18
1972	329	1058	18
1973	329	982	18
1974	329	865	18
1975	329	854	78
1976	329	964	78
1981	330	507	300
1982	330	1157	300
1983	375	551	341
1984	375	848	358
1985	375	-	415

Interrupted 1977 through 1980

The significance of sea kale to the Japanese economy as a whole is minimal. The total annual catch is at most one thousand tons. Currently, 375 boats with three crew members or less are involved. (See Table 7.) The operation is politically important, however, because of the territorial issue. After the existing agreements were broken in 1977, the negotiations to resume sea kale fishery went through many zigs and zags. The final agreement signed in 1981 left the issue as opaque and ambiguous as possible so that neither side could raise strong objections. For example, the signatory on the Japanese side is a private organization. No name of the

island (either in Japanese or in Russian) is mentioned in the agreement. Instead, the location is specified in terms of latitude and longitude.

Linkages

Japan's economic relations with the Soviet Union, perhaps more than its relations with any other country, have intricate entanglements with issues of both domestic and international politics. The Japan-Soviet relationship on the open seas (as well as in the 200-mile zones) is a case in point. The fishing industry, though gradually losing its economic power, remains a potent political force among many Japanese constituencies and it maintains influence within the ruling conservative party, the LDP. The interest of the fishing industry is one of the factors which must be reckoned with when seeking to understand Japan's relationship to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union for its part may also use the fishing issue, to a limited extent, as a lever either to improve or to harm the general climate surrounding Japanese-Soviet relations.

One can cite numerous examples of the importance of fishing in bilateral relations. To mention a few: in 1956, right after the Soviet-Japanese negotiations for resumption of diplomatic relations deadlocked, the Soviet Union unilaterally declared what the Japanese termed the "Bulganin line" that encompassed the vast areas of the Northern Pacific. Since the Soviet Union made the area within the "Bulganin line" off limits to Japanese fishing vessels and since the Japanese fishing industry strongly desired to keep that area open, there was no choice for the Japanese but to bypass the territorial issue, settle for a tentative agreement, and let the Soviets repeal the "Bulganin line." In 1977, when the 200-mile economic zone went into effect, the Japanese Minister of Agriculture visited Moscow three times. Yet the negotiations for a fishery agreement remained unresolved because of the territorial dispute. The question as to where the 200-mile line should be drawn is of course most relevant to the issue

of national boundaries because the distance of 200 miles is measured from coastal lines.

There have been many conflicts, large and small, between the two countries. In the fall of 1976, just before the controversies surrounding the 200-mile zone started, a Soviet airforce pilot asked for political asylum with his undamaged MIG. In 1978, in spite of Soviet protest, Japan and China signed the Peace and Friendship Treaty in which an unspecified third country seeking regional hegemony was denounced. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Japan joined in the boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980. The Japanese government announced the observance of "the Day of Northern Territory" (February 7) in 1981. The next year Japan participated in the economic sanction against Poland. The downing of KAL 007 in 1983 took place right off La Péruse Strait, and further strained Japanese-Soviet relations.

The political tensions between the two countries and the disputes over the territory coincided with the ever increasing restrictions on the Japanese fishery inside, and even outside, the Soviet 200-mile zone. It is only natural that those Japanese involved in the fishing industry are anxious. The economic damage to the industry has been so great that it may never be able to recover. An average Japanese fisherman may feel that, in order to regain a foothold in the Northern Pacific, his country should perhaps reconsider its position on the Northern Territory and on global political issues. Throughout this article, however, the argument has been that the basic Soviet concern over the North Sea fishery is well defined and can be summarized in two parts. First, the Soviets fear that their marine resources are being depleted, and they are determined to take action to maintain them. Secondly, they consider that marine resources should be exploited first by the nation which has sovereign rights over them. The foreign vessels may take them only when there is a surplus. The territorial issue, the ideological issues, and other issues may affect the Soviet-Japanese fishery relationship, sometimes positively, sometimes

negatively, but the basic tone of that relationship is set by the Soviets' concern with these two principles.

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Notes

1. The other factors on the part of the Japanese that prompted the restoration of diplomatic relations were the need for Soviet cooperation in the repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war from Siberia and the need for a Soviet pledge not to veto the admission of Japan to the UN.

2. The sedentary species in the Kuril, Sakhalin, Okhotsk and West Bering Sea areas refer to crabs, shrimp, Neptune whelks and sea kales.

3. The importance of sea trout is very small in terms of both tonnage and monetary value. Henceforth, in order to save space, we will use only the word salmon and include sea trout in it.

4. UN Convention Article 66 reads in part that "the State of origin of anadromous stocks may...establish total allowable catches for stocks originating in its rivers." [22]

5. The U.S.-Russia convention line was drawn in 1867, the year of the Alaska Purchase.

6. The exceptions to this rule are areas (2) and (3) in Figure 1. Area (2) is a part of the U.S. 200-mile zone, but outside the 175 degree EL line. Area (3) is east of the 175 degree EL line, but it is outside the U.S. 200-mile zone. The Japanese are permitted in these areas.

7. We avoid going into too minute details. For example, the quotas are specified for each kind of salmon: king salmon, red salmon, silver salmon, pink humpback salmon, etc. For each kind, the quota in 1985 is smaller than in the preceding years.

8. The Law of the Seas, Article 66, Paragraph 3, Subparagraph b in [22] says that "The State of origin shall cooperate in minimizing economic dislocation in such other States fishing these stocks..." Similarly, Subparagraph (c) states that "States referred to in Subparagraph (b), particularly by agreement with the State of origin in means to renew anadromous stocks, particularly by expenditures for that purpose, shall be given special consideration by the State of origin in the harvesting of stocks originating in its rivers."

9. Until 1984 two agreements, the Soviet-Japan agreement that regulated the fishery by the Soviets in the Japanese zone and Japan-Soviet agreement that regulated the fishery by the Japanese in the Soviet zone, were signed separately every year. In December 1984, the two agreements merged to form a unified offshore fishery agreement. In addition, the term of validity was extended from one year to three years.

10. The narrow strips of water close to the coasts of the Maritime Region were removed from area (5) in 1985. The Japanese are no longer

permitted there. As a result, the quota in area (5) in 1985 was cut and stood at only two-thirds of the 1984 quota.

11. During the negotiations in 1985, Japan agreed to extend the period during which Soviet boats are allowed to use stick-held dip nets for catching sauries off Hokkaido coasts.

12. See Article 77 of [22]. The same article also defines the sedentary species as "organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the sea-bed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the sea-bed or the subsoil." Right after passage of the Laws of the Sea at the UN Convention, the Soviet and Japanese delegations hotly debated whether crabs swim or crawl. Apparently some crabs do swim without "constant physical contact with the sea-bed." The majority of them do not, however. They do just crawl and therefore belong to the sedentary species.

13. The name of sea food is *kombu* in Japanese and *morskaia kapusta* in Russian.

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