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The 1987-1990 Revelations and Debate

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Introduction

This paper¹ examines the de-Stalinization debate that reemerged in the late 1980s as conducted by, or concerned with, the non-Russian nationalities.² The paper focuses on one aspect of this debate – the discussion of individual cases of repression and the discovery of mass gravesites. Many individual testimonies of repression have been published in the press. These testimonies have been particularly graphic and powerfully illuminative. Even more graphic have been reports of mass gravesites in virtually all the republics. As noted by Stephen White, these testimonies and reports have been the most emotionally significant element of de-Stalinization: “This grisly record...[is] in itself a critique of Stalinism more powerful than anything historians could muster.”³

These emotionally significant manifestations of “discontent”⁴ quickly expanded to embrace wider political issues. As White notes, the de-Stalinization debate in the late 1980s moved beyond condemnation of Stalin’s personality quirks or other limited areas to questions about socialism itself.⁵ Discussion of repression and mass gravesites in the various republics has often been a part of, or is immediately followed by, wider questioning such as advocating establishment of democracy, a civil society, and the rule of law, adherence to international law and human rights strictures, calls for “Leninist nationality policy,” calls for the ouster of conservative republic or local leaders, and the formation of public groups such as the Memorial society (with its branches in all the republics). Of particular interest here is how attacks on Stalinism have also been linked to criticism of Soviet nationality policy. In this sense Stalinism, exemplifying the massive bureaucratization, centralization, and authoritarianism of the political system since the 1920s-1930s, has in its extreme excesses encouraged a break with past political forms and the embracing of de-bureaucratization, de-centralization, and de-authoritarianism.

Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost*' allowed the de-Stalinization debate to reemerge from the semi-official "re-Stalinization" of the Brezhnev period. In regard to nationality issues raised by the debate, as Beissinger and Hajda point out, "*Glasnost*' undermined traditional patterns of ethnic stratification because attacks on Stalin that it unleashed could not be separated from attacks on the system of ethnic stratification that Stalin created."⁶ The center attempted, unsuccessfully, to channel the debate away from areas such as whether such crimes are inevitable under Marxism-Leninism and single party rule, the culpability of Lenin in establishing the apparatus of repression, and ethnic issues such as the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states through sham elections, the deportation of nationalities, the need for and impact of collectivization, and the repression of nationalist parties such as Musavat of Azerbaidzhan or Alash of Kazakhstan. All these topics came to be discussed in central and republic media.

This paper briefly compares the current de-Stalinization debate to that which occurred during the Khrushchev period generally and as pertaining to nationality issues. The paper also examines the evolution of Gorbachev's views on de-Stalinization. Lastly, the paper surveys the de-Stalinization debate in selected union republics—Belorussia, Ukraine, Moldavia, Azerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan, and Central Asian republics.⁷ The focus is on testimonies and reports of individual and mass repression and the discovery of mass gravesites, and how these testimonies and reports are linked to discussions of nationality grievances, including discussion of independence and sovereignty.⁸

Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces Acting on Debate

There has been a certain degree of circular causation involved in the de-Stalinization debate. While Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost*' provided

the impetus to open debate, various groups and individuals in the Soviet Union have pressured the central leadership to accede to wider efforts to de-Stalinize. This pressure resulted in the creation of official party, state, and government commissions in 1987-1989 in the center and in localities to carry out de-Stalinization. Intellectuals, former victims, families and descendants of victims, and others at the center and in the republics have pushed the discussion of repression in the republics.⁹ Intellectuals in Moscow and Leningrad and in some of the republics have pushed a broad de-Stalinization during the 1980s in the form of fiction (such as Abuladze's *Repentance* and Bykov's *Manhunt*), through the publication of foreign or banned authors (Conquest's *The Great Terror* and Solzhenitsyn's *The Gulag Archipelago*), and through "publicistic works" (non-fiction published in popular media). The liberal media at the center have been a conduit for de-Stalinization, by printing articles from non-Russian authors and also from their own correspondents in the republics. *Literary Gazette* has been a prominent example of print media publishing articles on Stalin's repression of nations. The still-increasing popularity of *samizdat*, containing graphic testimonies of repression, has also pushed the debate by official media. During 1986-1989 the ouster of Brezhnev-era political leaders in all the republics (with the Moldavian and Ukrainian first secretaries being the last to be replaced) also brought to the fore more moderate party leaders who have cooperated to lesser or greater degrees with public groups in carrying out central decrees on de-Stalinization.

Opponents of de-Stalinization have included surviving agents of Stalin's repression, some party members, some veterans and veterans' groups, and neo-Stalinists at the center and others based in the republics and regions such as Yegor' Ligachev, Ivan Polozkov, and Nina Andreyeva. The military and the KGB have been identified by Soviet and Western analysts as institutions resistant to broad de-Stalinization (see below). Gorbachev also resisted extension of the debate, although his views have evolved over time to embrace wider de-Stalinization ef-

forts. In the past he voiced his support for the basic policies of collectivization and industrialization, suggested that the Secret Protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact might not exist (before the findings of the Yakovlev commission confirmed their existence), and supported the idea that the annexation of the Baltic states was a legal act since elections were held.

Khrushchev and De-Stalinization

Khrushchev's de-Stalinization efforts, particularly the Secret Speech delivered at a closed session of the 1956 CPSU Congress and his report at the 1961 CPSU Congress, had a powerfully de-legitimizing impact not just on Stalin's rule during 1934-1952.¹⁰ Bertram Wolfe, in his 1957 book on the secret speech, concluded that at that time the speech was "perhaps the most important document ever to have come from the communist movement....It is the most revealing indictment of communism ever to have been made by a communist, the most damning indictment of the Soviet system ever to have been made by a Soviet leader."¹¹ He went on to discuss why the speech made such an impact:

There is about it a nightmare quality...to hear the confidences as to what went on behind the scenes, torture, false confessions, judicial murder, perfidious destruction of the bodies and souls and very names of devoted comrades and intimates;...to sense how much greater crimes have been committed against a helpless people by this little band whose deeds against each other are being in part recited....What runs through this report is a series of expressions and synonyms for cruelty unmatched in the bloody chronicles of history.¹²

Wolfe explained that, despite the efforts of Khrushchev to limit the effect of the speech by defending many of Stalin's policies, Stalin's "merits and services are expressed in tired, worn political cliches, and the crimes in startling images of cruelty, suffering, and terror. The self-serving political cliches concerning Stalin's 'services,' on which his heirs intend to continue to base their power and rule, pass unnoticed."¹³

The speech was read throughout the Soviet Union at closed party meetings, and rumors spread quickly to the general population despite Khrushchev's desire that "We cannot let this matter get out of the party....we should not wash our dirty linen before [enemy] eyes."¹⁴ A slightly altered version of the speech was given to foreign communists, was leaked to the West, and was retransmitted to the Soviet Union.¹⁵

Robert C. Tucker, in analyzing the de-Stalinization campaign, including the Secret Speech, notes that Khrushchev attempted to delineate two phases of Stalinization, the first which brought society under the control of the "state" (collectivization and forced industrialization, circa pre-1934), while the second brought the "state" under personal rule by Stalin (circa 1934-1953). Khrushchev sought to repudiate elements of this second phase. But, as Tucker notes, the two phases are not separable, and "the repudiation of the latter [phase] inescapably poses in the mind of the public the question of repudiating also the earlier phase...."¹⁶ Although the Secret Speech was not published in the USSR until 1989, a party decree based on the report was published. This decree specifically attempted to limit de-Stalinization to the "second phase" of Stalinism, stating that "It would be a gross error to draw conclusions, from the existence of the cult of personality in the past, concerning some kind of changes in the social system of the USSR."¹⁷ Tucker concludes that the decree was prompted by a public "unofficial" de-Stalinization broader in scope than the official version: "It envisages changes in the control structure which the present regime would deny, such as the emancipation of artistic and literary work from official censorship and tutelage, freedom from the strait-jacket of ideological conformity, the right of limited political dissent. It shades off at one extreme into a tendency...to question the Leninist legacy of dictatorship and one-party rule."¹⁸

The secret speech itself lightly but significantly touched on nationality problems. Khrushchev mentioned the "monstrous...acts whose initiator was Stalin and which are rude violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet state," although he prefaced this

remark by proclaiming that the “Soviet Union is justly considered as a model of a multinational state because we have in practice assured the equality and friendship of all nations....”¹⁹ The only nationality problem he mentioned was the deportation of nations during World War II. As Connor aptly points out, he ignored the decimation of national cadres during the 1930s or their replacement by Russians. Khrushchev himself had been involved in Ukraine in the late 1930s in purging the national elite and was himself a Russian, so Beria’s 1953 efforts to revitalize national elites struck at Khrushchev’s own career. Also, Connor suggests, the Presidium actually opposed any wholesale re-nationalization of local elites.²⁰ Nevertheless, the secret speech, and two other speeches delivered at the 20th CPSU Congress, were significant in signalling a more conciliatory policy toward the non-Russians.²¹

The effects of the secret speech, denunciations of Stalin at the 1961 CPSU Congress, and de-Stalinization in general have been discussed in Western scholarly literature from several perspectives, including effects on the East European populations and the international communist movement.²² Less has been written in the West or the Soviet Union from the perspective of effects on Soviet nationalities.²³ This is changing, however, with the appearance of Soviet memoirs, the opening of archives, and Soviet research on this period.²⁴ Peter Duncan, in briefly examining Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization efforts in 1956, concludes that they “formed a watershed. They laid the political and ideological basis for the resurgence of the cultures of the national republics and their [internal] political cohesion.”²⁵ As an indicator, within months of the secret speech the Azerbaidzhan Supreme Soviet voted to make Azeri the official language of the republic. In 1956-1957, Moslem historians attempted to rehabilitate Shamil.²⁶ When members of several deported nationalities — the Kalmyk, Chechen, Ingush, Balkar, and Karachai peoples — heard about the Secret Speech or their formal rehabilitation by laws passed by the Supreme Soviet in February 1957, tens of thousands began the long journey from Kazakhstan and Central Asia to their homelands, to the conster-

nation of central authorities who envisaged a controlled resettlement process. Other deported nationalities – Kurds, Greeks, and Turks – also returned to their homelands in the Caucasus and on the Black Sea coast.²⁷ However, the rising minority nationalism catalyzed by de-Stalinization caused Khrushchev to change course, deemphasizing the flourishing of nations and emphasizing *sblizhenie* and *sliyanie* by the early 1960s.²⁸

In May 1987, Robert Conquest, in comparing *glasnost*' in the Khrushchev period to the Gorbachev period, was uncertain whether Gorbachev's *glasnost*' had gone beyond that of Khrushchev, mentioning that greater revelations about economic conditions and about the high crimes of the Stalin period would be needed.²⁹ The period since mid-1987 has seen an avalanche of material on both actual socio-economic (and military) conditions in the Soviet Union and on the crimes of the Stalin period, including crimes against nations, material that in its scope and detail goes far beyond that revealed during the Khrushchev period. A major element has been the revelations about ethnic victims of repression: testimonies about how and why they were arrested, their sentences and executions, and where they were buried. The whole period of Stalin's rule including the collectivization and industrialization periods are also being examined. This literature in its form has matched the "prison-camp literature" of the Khrushchev thaw as exemplified by *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, but has gone beyond it in graphical presentation. Even more significantly, the literature has drawn explicit lessons from the crimes including, in not-so-extreme variants, repudiation of Marxism-Leninism, the role of the Communist Party, and Soviet power.³⁰

Gorbachev and De-Stalinization

Gorbachev has displayed an evolution in his approach to Stalinism. This evolution appears to be at least partly a function of his ability to increasingly assert his own policy preferences, although pragmatism in the face of opposition has also played a role. This evolution can be dated

from the general radicalization of the reform process launched at the January 1987 Central Committee plenum. Before he became General Secretary, in December 1984 he praised the Stakhanovite Movement, receiving much public criticism. In an interview with *L'Humanite* in February 1986, he referred to "Stalinism" as a term "coined by enemies of communism and used in a widespread way to smear the Soviet Union and socialism as a whole."³¹ In June 1986, he told writers that "if we start trying to deal with the past, we will dissipate our energy."³² However, his public viewpoint began to change in 1987. At the January 1987 Central Committee plenum, he pointed to the problems of the country as traceable to mistakes made even before the "era of stagnation." In July 1987, he told a conference of media workers that "we never will be able to forgive or justify what happened in 1937-1938 and never should."

In his 70th Anniversary Day speech of November 2, 1987, approved earlier at the October plenum of the Central Committee, Gorbachev took a firmer though still contradictory position in denouncing Stalinism, stating that Stalin personally knew about the repressions taking place and that "the guilt of Stalin and those closest to him...for the mass repressions and lawlessness that were permitted are immense and unpardonable."³³ In his speech Gorbachev took a Khrushchevian stance in that, first, he urged a measured assessment of Stalinism, asserting that collectivization, industrialization, and actions during World War II were beneficial to the USSR (some excesses involving the pace of collectivization were admitted), while the cult of personality was harmful: "the period of the twenties and thirties [was] yet a great and heroic path [of socialism]." Second, he was careful to separate condemnation of Stalin from any possible condemnation of the party: "despite the assertions of our ideological enemies, the cult of personality was not unavoidable. It is alien to the nature of socialism and is a deviation from its fundamental principles and has no justification." Third, he was careful to demarcate the excesses of the "administrative command system," which was said to have emerged in the early 1930s, from the period of Lenin's rule and NEP. Lastly, in talking of

the “real crimes” of Stalin, he deemphasized their extent by outlining that “Many thousands of members of the party and nonparty members were subjected to mass repressions.” Gorbachev, unlike Khrushchev, did not mention crimes against nations, and his treatment of nationalities in the speech reflected his naive belief at that time that “the nationalities issue has been resolved in our country.” He praised Khrushchev’s “courage” in restoring “socialist legality” at the 20th and 22nd CPSU Congresses, mentioning that the process of de-Stalinization “effectively stopped in the mid-sixties.”³⁴

De-Stalinization was an important thread running through Gorbachev’s report to the 19th CPSU Conference in June-July 1988, and his Political Report to the 28th CPSU congress in July 1990. At the conference, Gorbachev in his concluding speech endorsed the idea of creating a memorial to Stalin’s victims.³⁵ In his report to the 28th Congress, he referred to the “Stalinist model of socialism” as being replaced by “a civil society of free people....The transformation of our super-centralized state into a truly federal state based on self-determination and the voluntary union of peoples has begun.”³⁶ As one of the accomplishments of the party in the past five years, he twice mentioned de-Stalinization measures. At the beginning of the report he stated that “We resolutely condemned the crimes of the authoritative-bureaucratic system. We restored the good names of thousands of people who had been the victims of illegal repression.” Later in the report he returned to this accomplishment, asserting that the “party took the initiative” in de-Stalinization: “The work of reviewing the cases of all victims of lawlessness during the time of Stalin’s repressions has become a highly important part of the people’s acquisition of historical truth.” He went on to mention posthumous rehabilitations of “thousands and thousands” of party members, workers, peasants and intellectuals. He concluded that “we still have not completed this work [of de-Stalinization]; it must be continued.” However, he also warned against the “sweeping negation” of the party and socialism, and pointed to his

70th Anniversary Speech as setting desired limits to the de-Stalinization debate.³⁷

In assessing why Gorbachev would permit and endorse some degree of de-Stalinization, it is important to distinguish his personal views of Stalin from his assessment of Stalin's impact on the Soviet Union and his ability to publicly articulate his assessment. In his speech to cultural workers on November 28, 1990, Gorbachev revealed that both his grandfathers had been arrested during the Stalin period. One had been arrested for failing to fulfill the sowing plan in 1933, "even though half his family had died of hunger." The other grandfather was a representative of the Ministry of Procurement, an agent of Stalinist repression in the countryside, but nevertheless was arrested and "confessed to things he had not done." Gorbachev added that as a child he had lived in the latter grandfather's house, "that plague house, that house of an 'enemy of the people' that relatives and friends could not enter. Otherwise they would have followed in grandfather's footsteps."³⁸ Gorbachev in the same speech termed this and other experiences as indicating the "rottenness" of the Soviet system before his reform efforts. Since this speech indicates his personal awareness of Stalin's crimes, why did Gorbachev not take a more consistently anti-Stalinist approach? One reason is probably that his ability to publicly criticize Stalinism has been subject to his consolidation and maintenance of power. But, as with Khrushchev, there has been cognitive dissonance between his personal revulsion against Stalinist "excesses" and his positive assessment of many of Stalin's policies, although there is evidence that learning has occurred.³⁹ Also, as appears evident in Gorbachev's statements, he has tried to control the pace and extent of de-Stalinization in his efforts to reform the political system yet maintain the survival of some form of centralized rule.

Gorbachev has used de-Stalinization for several political purposes. First of all, similar to Khrushchev, Gorbachev has used de-Stalinization to discredit an older generation whose political experiences include the Stalin period. However, this is a shrinking cohort that has largely

departed the political arena (the many retirements encouraged by Gorbachev have hastened the trend). Also, de-Stalinization tends to discredit both the Brezhnev era elite members and the Stalinist command-administrative system they headed (Gorbachev and other members of his leadership seek to exclude themselves from this type of discreditation).

Lastly, as mentioned above, this discreditation of the command-administrative system, said to have been set up by Stalin, is a primary component of Gorbachev's *perestroika*.⁴⁰ He is attempting to discredit or delegitimize the previous political institutions and re-legitimize the system through new political institutions embracing (1) new forms of participation by nationalities and (2) a revitalization of economic inducements to the republics to continue in the union and not secede. However, the graphic discussion of individual cases of national repression and of gravesites tends to deepen the crisis of legitimacy and endangers the re-legitimization of the system on a non-coercive basis (assuming that total national independence is ruled out).⁴¹ Hence the de-Stalinization encouraged or acceded to by Gorbachev has led, as it did for Khrushchev, to demands for societal change far beyond those envisaged by the leader. As Kul'chyts'kyi points out in regard to revelations about the Ukrainian famine: "When an ordinary person...becomes acquainted with all the materials, they make such an impression on the human imagination that one automatically asks oneself, 'Why did this happen, how was this possible?' And this emotional point of view that, aha, Stalin did everything to destroy the Ukrainian people is very widespread."⁴² This type of assessment leads to or encourages a negative assessment of the center (Russia and the Communist Party), endangering successful re-legitimation.

Institutional Structure and Decisions on De-Stalinization

A resolution of the October 28, 1987 Politburo session created a "Politburo Commission for the Further Study of Materials Connected with the Repressions of the Thirties, Forties, and Early Fifties." As per the decision, republic and lower party bodies were to cooperate in the investigation of repressions. Commissions were subsequently set up in the republics and at lower levels. M. Solomentsev was initially named chairman of the commission.⁴³ In October 1988, Aleksandr Yakovlev became chairman. The name of the commission, and its composition, indicated a conservative attempt by Politburo members such as Ligachev and the KGB-affiliated members but also, possibly, Gorbachev at that time (who had defended Stalin's policies of the late 1920s and early 1930s in the 70th Anniversary speech) to limit criticism to the 1930s and beyond.⁴⁴ However, in fact the commission soon moved to rehabilitate victims of repressions in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

As chairman of the commission after October 1988, Yakovlev became the driving force promoting rehabilitation of Stalinist victims. As he admitted in his report to the 28th CPSU Congress, he was obsessed with clearing victims' names: "I will tell you frankly...the ashes of millions of people constantly haunt you." He asked the party delegates why Stalinism emerged and why there were "attempts to resuscitate" it during the Brezhnev period. His goal for the commission was clearly stated: "The truth about Stalinism is a condemnation of the system Stalinism created." As his report also made clear, Yakovlev regarded *perestroika* as an attempt to extinguish the many aspects of the Stalinist system still existing. In his report he also repeated his call for a widening of the mandate of the commission to include study and rehabilitation of peasants suppressed during collectivization.⁴⁵

Until his retirement from party posts subsequent to the July 1990 CPSU Congress, he had opposed some efforts within the commission to soft-pedal the crimes of the Stalin period. He unsuccessfully opposed

efforts of the working group of the commission and the commission itself to disassociate Stalin from Kirov's murder and its aftermath, speaking of fierce "opposition" within the commission against his call that documents and other information be released to the public.⁴⁶ He was also unsuccessful in his efforts to have the commission investigate the crime of collectivization, similarly speaking of "opposition" within the commission to a broadening of its mandate.⁴⁷

Besides de-Stalinization measures undertaken under the aegis of the commission, others were undertaken. The 19th Party Conference, held in July 1988, endorsed setting up a public subscription to build a memorial complex to the victims of Stalinism, and the Politburo immediately adopted a decision to create the memorial.⁴⁸ On January 16, 1989, the Supreme Soviet Presidium issued a decree "On Supplementary Measures to Restore Justice in Relation to Victims of the Repressions of the Thirties, Forties and Early Fifties." The Central Committee Politburo on January 5 had requested that the Presidium issue the decree. The Supreme Soviet and soviets at all levels down to the city level were instructed to establish special commissions to decide on compensation and assistance to rehabilitated victims of repression and to plan memorials. Also, "extrajudicial verdicts" by the troikas (*troykami*) and special conferences (*osobymi soveshchaniyami*) were set aside, automatically rehabilitating all but a few categories of arrestees.⁴⁹

Subsequently, in July 1989 the Central Committee (Politburo) issued a criticism of local work: "work to perpetuate the memory of the victims of the repressions in a number of republics, krajs, and oblasts is still inadequately organized and inconsistent." The Central Committee pointed to the soviet commissions as not performing properly, and also "instructed" the republic, krai and oblast party committees to step up their work. The Central Committee specifically ordered that places of burial be designated official cemeteries, cleaned up, and provided with monuments and memorials. In a measure undoubtedly intended to halt the mass public demoralization caused by grisly revelations, the Central Committee in-

structed the MVD and KGB to "help" the various commissions so that "unwarranted exhumations and reburials" are precluded.⁵⁰

The September 1989 Central Committee plenum resolved that "local party organs, the CPSU CC Party Control Committee, and the CPSU CC Marxism-Leninism Institute" should study "material connected with so-called 'national deviationism'" in order to help the Politburo commission to rehabilitate innocent victims. Subsequently, in May 1990 the case of the "Sultan-Galiyev counterrevolutionary organization" was examined and the Politburo commission ruled that "This case, which arose on the crest of the wave of the artificial struggle against 'national deviationism,' was falsified by OGPU organs in late 1928....Study has shown that this organization did not really exist."⁵¹ The Politburo commission stated that because the January decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet automatically set aside certain sentences, the victims of the Sultan-Galiyev case were rehabilitated. The Party Control Committee also reported that several victims were being reinstated into the CPSU. Apparently much of the work of rehabilitating victims charged with "national deviationism" has been delegated to the local party organizations, and this work has proceeded more slowly than other rehabilitations and has not been as well publicized.

Memorial Society and the Non-Russian Nationalities

The All-Union Historical Enlightenment Society ("Memorial") has been at the forefront of groups formed to actively combat Stalinism. During 1990, its mandate broadened to include condemnation of the whole period of communism and it has assumed many of the characteristics of human rights groups in the West with broad agendas. Originally Moscow-based, it has spread throughout the Soviet Union. In its early period and among some members an unexamined principle was the maintenance of the

Soviet Union. Its statutes talk of the "unity of nations" in sorrow, rather than speaking, as some nationalities have, of Stalin as the instrument of Russian imperialism. However, the condemnation of Stalinist repression by the myriad local branches of Memorial has grown to embrace such issues as condemnation of repression in the Baltic states and in the Caucasus and calls for negotiations to reform the federal system.⁵²

Memorial began with a petition drive in Moscow, then other cities, to erect a memorial to Stalin's victims. This petition drive was loosely organized and was subject to police harassment until January 1988, when *Literaturnaya gazeta* published an expose of the harassment.⁵³ The petitions, signed by about 30,000 people in thirty cities (some sources cite 50,000 signatures), were taken into the Palace of Congresses during the 19th Party Conference in June-July 1988, where Gorbachev endorsed the idea of memorializing Stalin's victims and the delegates voted to establish a memorial.⁵⁴

In August 1988 Memorial was formally organized in Moscow by representatives of several creative unions and *Literaturnaya gazeta* and *Ogonek*.⁵⁵ At the founding meeting a Public Council was set up and Andrey Sakharov elected its honorary chairman, with Ales' Adamovich, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, and Yuri Karyakin serving as co-chairmen.⁵⁶ Other members of the council included Grigori Baklanov, Vasil' Bykov, Lev Razgon, Bulat Okudzhava, Yuri Afanas'yev, Vitali Korotich, Dmitri Likhachev, Mikhail Shatrov, Mikhail Ul'yanov, and Boris Yel'tsin.⁵⁷

In a letter published in *Literaturnaya gazeta* in early November 1988, Yevtushenko stated that the basic goals of Memorial were the complete public disclosure of the range and extent of repression during the Stalin period, and the memorialization of victims.⁵⁸ The key assertions were that disclosure and memorialization would: (1) totally repudiate Stalinism as a system of rule; (2) serve as a penance to the victims; (3) unite the nationalities in a jointly-shared sorrow; and (4) encourage permanent democratization.

Yevtushenko explained his stance that disclosure and memorialization would unite the nationalities in joint sorrow:

surely our multinational people are a united family, and surely our memory should mourn our shared family losses....In all corners of the country, by the people's will, there must be memorials commemorating the victims of repressions, like eternal flames cast in stone....The Memorial Society will strengthen interethnic ties between our country's fraternal peoples, because nothing bonds as firmly as shared suffering.

He went on to link the repression of nationalities to the destruction of democracy:

The poison contained in the barbs of the camp wire has contaminated those who perceive the path into the future as leading not through democracy but through forcible subordination, not through pluralism but through conveyor-belt uniformity. This camp wire entangled so many talented sons and daughters of all nationalities in our motherland....Who knows, had they remained alive, maybe democracy and *glasnost*' would have developed naturally as far back as the twenties...An analysis of the trampling of democracy in the past means ensuring the protection of democracy in the future.

He concluded by expressly identifying Memorial with the democratization effort:

The Memorial Society must become one of the centers for the most active assistance to restructuring, *glasnost*', new thinking, and democracy....The Memorial Society hopes that it will receive international support because our society's democratization and complete de-Stalinization offer one of the main historical arguments for nuclear disarmament and mutual trust between peoples.

A follow-up meeting of the Public Council and other participants was held in Moscow in January 1989 to finalize plans for the upcoming founding conference and to denounce efforts of the Soviet government to ignore its recommendations. The Public Council voiced opposition to the Ministry of Culture's plan for a memorial complex in Moscow that excluded establishment of a research center, library, and archives. The Public Council stressed that the center, library, and archives were necessary to prevent the recurrence of lawlessness.⁵⁹ Also, Memorial opposed the es-

establishment of only one monument in Moscow, instead calling for autonomously-administered republic and regional monuments and centers. Yevtushenko at another Memorial Society meeting at the "House of Film" asserted that "In all republics people fell....[The plan of the Ministry of Culture] is a blow against our movement and an insult to the victims." Karyakin added that the plan "is a nationalization of [the] denationalization" inherent in the Memorial plan.⁶⁰

In the face of this protest, the Ministry of Culture altered its stance, explaining that since the society held a founding conference in late January it had become 'legal' and had been invited by the Ministry to help sponsor the design competition.⁶¹ Despite this concession by the Ministry, the legal status of the society in fact remained ambiguous, prompting a letter to *Izvestiia* in July, 1989 calling for the society to be registered by the RSFSR Council of Ministers according to existing laws on such societies.⁶²

An all-union founding conference was planned for mid-December, but because of regional and central party opposition it had to be postponed until January 28-29, 1989. Five hundred delegates from more than 100 cities and most republics attended.⁶³ The delegates adopted the statutes of the society and elected a governing board and auditing commission. The board was formed from representatives of local societies, rank-and-file members, and representatives of victims' organizations. The co-chairmen of the Public Council (Adamovich, Afanas'yev, and Karyakin) served as the co-chairmen of the board. Although the society declared at its founding conference that it was not a political party, it has supported candidacies in elections to soviets, such as supporting Andrei Sakharov and Boris Yel'tsin in their early 1989 candidacies for the Congress of Peoples' Deputies. The political stance of the society at that time was revealed by Andrei Voznesenskii in his speech to the conference when he declared that "The country's further democratization will be the best monument to the 30 million victims" of Stalinist repression.⁶⁴ One newspaper account of the conference reported that "Only the further

democratization of society and the creation of a rule-of-law state can serve as a guarantee that this past will never repeat itself. And the 'Memorial' society has set itself the task of contributing to these noble processes....[the society] is promoting the unification of various social strata and nationalities."⁶⁵

While some of the delegates spoke of the successes they had in organizing their societies at the local level, such as the report of the Khar'kov delegation, other delegates from Alma-Ata, Kiev, Orel, and Chernigov spoke of local party opposition to Memorial activities. Some delegates were discouraged from attending the conference.⁶⁶

Its statutes, set forth at its founding conference, epitomize the democratic reaction to Stalinism. The statutes assert as goals not only the negative goal of condemning Stalinism—"Stalin's crimes are to be considered as crimes against humanity"—but also the positive goal of "promoting democratic change in the civic and legal atmosphere in the light of experiences with Stalinism." In keeping with its decentralizing ethos, Memorial calls for the establishment of memorial complexes "on the territory of the USSR." In asserting that Stalin's crimes are crimes against humanity, rather than against nationalities, the statutes stress the "common suffering" of the nations, a theme stressed by many of the delegates in their speeches at the conference.⁶⁷

On October 30, 1990 the Moscow monument was dedicated. Reflecting the broadening of Memorial's goals, the monument consisted of a stone taken from the Solovyetskii Island camp established by Lenin in 1918, making the monument in effect an indictment of communism. The Moscow (Soviet executive committee) gorispolkom provided a site on Dzerzhinskiy Square for the monument. Memorial society members and victims of repression from all over the Soviet Union met to dedicate the memorial and to call for further democratization efforts. The dedication was marked by funeral music broadcast over loudspeakers and emotional personal testimonies by victims and their families about repression.⁶⁸

Memorial has established branches in most of the republics, regions, and cities and has ties with many kindred groups. In the case of Ukraine, in October 1988 a meeting was held in Kiev of former political prisoners and others who were interested in forming a branch of Memorial. At the end of November, the Ukrainian Writers' Union adopted a resolution to become a sponsor of the Ukrainian Memorial Society, and its founding conference was held in Kiev on March 4, 1989.⁶⁹ About 500 delegates from throughout Ukraine took part in the conference, as well as representatives of other groups such as the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and observers from the Latvian Baltic Front and U.S. and French Embassies. Many delegates stressed that repression in Ukraine had a national character, and they felt that this aspect of the repression was deemphasized by the Moscow-based society. Only loose ties, not status as a regional branch, with the Moscow Memorial Society were agreed upon.

The statutes of the Ukrainian society call for documenting the crimes of the Stalin period, helping the survivors and their families, building a republic memorial complex, and fostering democratization. A resolution passed at the conference called for monuments to victims to be erected in Khar'kov, the former capital of Ukraine, to memorialize famine victims, and at Bykovnya and other mass grave sites. The resolution also went beyond the scope of the Moscow-based society at that time in calling for the rehabilitation of Brezhnev-era victims of repression such as Vasyl' Stus, Yuriy Lytvyn, and Oleksii Tykhyi, and the release of political prisoners still serving sentences.

At a public rally held the next day, society speakers condemned repression by the Shcherbitskii regime and called for democratization, indicating just how anti-Stalinism found expression in practical politics.⁷⁰ Subsequently, the Shcherbitskii regime attempted to discredit the broader aims of Ukrainian Memorial — by warning that “Banderists” under pay of the CIA were trying to infiltrate the society — while faintly praising its narrow goals of memorializing victims of repression and assisting their survivors.⁷¹

Ukrainian Memorial has also been involved in setting up at least one international conference. In September 1990 a conference on Stalin and the Ukrainian famine was held in Kiev, organized by the Ukrainian Memorial Society and Ukrainian and Canadian researchers.

On December 6, 1988 party and soviet officials joined with writers, historians, and filmmakers in setting up a Kazakh branch of Memorial. The branch was officially founded with the election of a governing board in April 1989, and given the name "Adilet" or justice. The society did not plan to focus exclusively on Kazakh victims of repression, but also peoples deported to Kazakhstan, such as Koreans, Germans, Meskhetians, Chechens, Karachais, and Crimean Tatars. Also, it emphasized that beyond the memorialization of victims, it would work to strengthen democracy and *glasnost*.⁷² As part of its efforts, it has worked to identify mass graves in Kazakhstan and to encourage discussion of the political repression of Mustafa Chokaev and the Alash Orda party.

The De-Stalinization Debate in the Republics: A Survey

Background

The de-Stalinization debate in the non-Russian republics has been in many respects similar to and part of that at the central (or Russian) level, except in one major respect—the theme of Stalin's crimes against the particular nation have been emphasized, and de-Stalinization has embraced national cultural, language, and political rights. While some aspects of this debate have been carried out through the central press (involving, for instance, Russians writing about Stalinist repressions in Belorussia), the republic media have increasingly joined in and broadened this debate since 1987. In some regions the local party and party-controlled media have opposed de-Stalinization, although the more moderate

party leaderships installed in all the republics in 1986-1989 have led to a certain amount of cooperation with local public groups in carrying out central decrees on de-Stalinization. The Baltic media have spearheaded discussion of the illegitimacy of the union of the Baltic states with the Soviet Union and the need for self-determination, and the creation of pluralist political systems. The stridency of the de-Stalinization debate has been increasingly linked to the rejection of Marxism-Leninism and Russian national communist rule.

In the debate about Stalinist repressions, some writers have attempted to deemphasize the national component of the purges by asserting that repressions occurred everywhere, including Russia, so that no nations were singled out. This argument has overlooked the extreme examples of the deportations of nations. Also, it has ignored the implication that an effective sovereignty would have limited repressions to Russia. In the case of the discussion of mass gravesites, perhaps recognizing the extremely negative image of Soviet power conveyed by pictures and stories about the exhumation of graves, the central authorities called in July 1989 for republic and local authorities to limit this form of evidence-gathering.

Adam Michnik, writing in the Krakow *Tygodnik powszechny*, ably discusses several Soviet articles on Stalinism written during 1987.⁷³ He notes that during 1987 the term "Stalinism" reemerged in the Soviet press, along with the debates of the Khrushchev period about the meaning of Stalinism. Michnik discerns several schools of thought on the Stalin period.⁷⁴ First, there have been those who have rejected the term "Stalinism," instead preferring the limited term "era of the cult of personality" because they have stressed the positive contributions of Stalin while deemphasizing the "mistakes." Although Stalin committed mistakes or even crimes involving millions of people, this school has argued, these resulted in positive benefits such as collectivization or the building of the White Sea Canal or were necessitated by capitalist encirclement and the dangers of Hitler. Michnik finds such a "compromise" argument, used by Khrushchev and subsequent party leaders, as a means of preventing a

more penetrating assessment of the legitimacy of party rule. Second, some Russian nationalists have depicted Stalinism as the imposition of alien, Western forms of conduct on Russia. Even alcoholism has been treated as a Western import by some members of this school and the anti-alcoholism campaign was embraced as a return to traditional tea-drinking. Third, other Russian nationalists have depicted Stalin as the ideal Russian despot who enlarged the empire and fought against “cosmopolitanism” and “national deviation.” Forth, the “Westernizers” have condemned Stalin for trampling civil rights and lawlessness.

The fifth group Michnik discerns is the non-Russian nationalists. Michnik asserts that to the non-Russian nationalities, “Stalinism is not only a system of terror and lies but also a policy of denationalization and the struggle against Stalinism is a struggle for national identity....The cruel Georgian is to the ethnic minorities yet another embodiment of classic Great-Russian chauvinism.” Michnik assesses articles written by M. Titma and A. Vakhemetsin, Algis Bitrimas, Rasul Gamzatov, and Oles’ Gonchar as representative of this school. The Estonian academics Titma and Vakhemetsin wrote in late 1987 that a large element of Stalinism was “national oppression.”⁷⁵ In another article, published in September 1987, the Lithuanian author Bitrimas denounced Stalin’s hypocritical nationality policy, which on the one hand proclaimed the “equality of peoples and languages,” but on the other hand pursued active imposition of Russian culture and language. Bitrimas saw this policy as continuing to the present day: “In practice the native inhabitants of the non-Russian republics exist in a situation of second-class citizenship with hopeless prospects, as a kind of relic condemned to cultural extermination and deprived of the possibility of deciding their own fate.”⁷⁶ Ukrainian writer Gonchar attacked Stalinist nationality policy, describing in novels and articles its goal of destroying Ukrainian culture by closing down Ukrainian-language schools and reducing publications and radio broadcasts in Ukrainian, all in the name of “internationalism.”⁷⁷

Other authors have broadly discussed the Stalinist repression of nations. Bashkir writer Yamil Mustafin examines nationality problems facing the Soviet Union, blaming them on Stalinist repression and Russian chauvinism.⁷⁸ In looking at repression, Mustafin asserts that

The first blow to internationalism in our country was made by Stalin's repressions....The places of highly educated, real internationalists were occupied by a large number of impostors....Remorselessly, they...accused others of 'nationalism' and tried to accelerate the unification of national cultures....An [incorrect] impression is created that the years 1937-39 had touched only economics, science, and the military....[Under Stalin] the notion 'international' now meant to loudly declare one's love and personal devotion to the 'Father of the Peoples.'

He also notes that the World War II deportation of nationalities was another deep wound to a Leninist nationality policy that was based on moral principles of honesty and compassion that are the same for all nations. He adds that after World War II, despite the unified efforts of the nations in defeating Hitler, repression of nationalities was renewed.

Mustafin notes that the creation and legacy of the Stalin period was an elitist bureaucratic order hostile to non-Russian national expression. The number of schools teaching in native languages and the number of books and magazines in native languages declined, leading to the decline in national cultures especially among smaller nationalities. In many cases national writers belong to an older generation and few young writers have emerged. He adds that Lenin strongly criticized Stalin's nationality policy in the Transcaucasus, calling its practitioners "derzhimorda." These derzhimorda still exist, Mustafin states. He gives two examples of myths about the so-called flourishing of national languages under socialism. In 1957, he relates, at a conference of Tatar literature and art in Moscow the fiction was maintained that Soviet power had brought the Tatar people a written language, although in reality Tatar literature had existed for almost 1000 years. It has also been maintained that Soviet power "and the Russian people" brought the Udmurts a written language, although actually

the written language is over 200 years old. Russian chauvinism has also been exemplified in the recent "alarm" over the swamping of Russian culture by the Central Asians.

Belorussia: Organizations and Programs of De-Stalinization

In 1987 Belorussian writers and intellectuals such as Vasil' Bykov stepped-up their criticisms of Stalinism, calling for investigation of repression in Belorussia.⁷⁹ Various informal associations began to be formed by youth in Belorussia in 1987-1988, such as "Talaka," (mutual assistance) "Tuteyshyya," (literary youth group; the term is actually a pejorative term used in the past by Russians to refer to Belorussians) and "The Martyrologists of Belorussia." The criticisms of Stalinism quickly came to embrace calls for democratization and greater national rights.⁸⁰ In November 1987, Talaka and Tuteyshyya members and others demonstrated in Minsk for the revival of All Souls' Day (*Dzyady*) as a day of remembrance for Belorussian victims of Stalinist repression, but the demonstration was broken up by the city militia.⁸¹ In December 1987, the Belorussian writer Pavel Prudnikov asserted in a letter in the Belorussian weekly newspaper *Litaratura i mastatstva* that more Belorussian writers were repressed by Stalin than died during World War II and called for memorials to these victims.⁸² Also in December the newspaper *Zvyazda* published a frank roundtable discussion of Stalinist repression in Belorussia, including details of torture tactics used to extract confessions.⁸³

The revelation on June 3, 1988 in *Litaratura i mastatstva* that a popular recreation area informally called Kurapaty Forest in the Zyaleni Lug (Green Meadow) district of Minsk was actually the site of a mass grave of Stalin's victims created a massive public reaction (details are given below). Many readers wrote letters to the weekly newspaper offering further information about the mass graves in Kurapaty Forest and at other sites and

calling for creation of a memorial to Belorussian victims of repression.⁸⁴ The Belorussian Council of Ministers responded two weeks later by announcing that a government commission would be formed to investigate the mass gravesite.⁸⁵ The Belorussian Writers' and Cinema Workers' Unions and the editorial board of *Litaratura i mastatstva* reacted to the Kurapaty Forest revelations by setting up the "Martyrologists of Belorussia" to "resurrect...the tragic facts of Stalinist repressions in the republic."⁸⁶

Two demonstrations were held in Minsk and another in Novopolotsk in the wake of the revelation.⁸⁷ The plans for a demonstration in Minsk were pushed by the Talaka youth group and other informal associations. Talaka argued for a demonstration at the site of the mass graves in Kurapaty Forest, but city party officials insisted on an official meeting in downtown Minsk, with the result that in fact two demonstrations were held. Large crowds attended both demonstrations on June 19, 1988, and at both speakers denounced the crimes of the Stalin period. At both demonstrations speakers also talked about broader issues such as language training and democratization. At the Talaka demonstration at Kurapaty Forest the speakers criticized the composition of the government commission formed to investigate the Kurapaty murders, and announced the formation of an independent citizens commission headed by Bykov. Subsequently, the membership of the government commission was broadened to include one of the authors of the original revelation, Paznyak, and members of the Belorussian intelligentsia such as Bykov and Mikhail Savitskiy.⁸⁸

At first, some local party authorities and party-controlled local and even All-Union media continued to try to cast doubt on the identity of the perpetrators of the murders by continuing to mention Nazi occupiers of Minsk as possible perpetrators.⁸⁹ Also, there was criticism of informal associations involved in revealing Stalin's crimes in Belorussia and attempts to conceal other mass gravesites.⁹⁰ However, in November 1988, the Belorussian Prosecutor's Office concluded that the murders did take

place during the Stalin period. The government commission came to the same conclusion in January 1989. A careful effort was made, however, to limit culpability of local or central party officials, with even Stalin not being explicitly blamed. The report of the commission assigned main blame to various heads of the Belorussian NKVD: G. A. Molchanov (1936-1937); B. D. Berman (1937-1938); A. A. Nasedkin (1938); and Lavrenti Tsanova (1938-1951). The commission did endorse the creation of a memorial to the Kurapaty victims.⁹¹

Following the commission's report, the Belorussian Council of Ministers in January 1989 adopted a decision to erect a monument in Kurapaty Forest and publish a commemorative book. The Council of Ministers also authorized the Belorussian Academy of Sciences to study "all aspects of the causes and consequences of the mass repressions which took place in Belorussia during Stalin's cult of personality."⁹² Subsequently, on October 29, 1989 a "cross of pain" monument was dedicated at Kurapaty Forest and consecrated by clergy.

Along with the activities of informal organizations, the government commission, and the prosecutor's office, anti-Stalinist bodies were set up by the party and soviets and Trade Union Council. The Politburo of the Belorussian Central Committee, following Gorbachev's decision to set up an All-Union commission attached to the Politburo, in June 1988 established its own "Commission for the Further Study of Materials Connected with Repressions that Occurred in the Period of the 1930s, 1940s, and Beginning of the 1950s," to rehabilitate members of the party who were victims of repression and to reinstate them as party members.⁹³ Subsequently, similar commissions were formed at the city, *raion*, and *oblast'* party committee levels. The objectives of the Politburo commission were broadened later in 1988 to include memorializing victims of repression and their gravesites, and specifically to plan the creation of a republic monument to Stalinist repression.⁹⁴ In late 1988, a commission was established by the Belorussian Trade Union Council and other commissions at

the *oblast* level to rehabilitate trade union members and plan memorials.⁹⁵

Commissions to rehabilitate victims of repression and plan monuments were set up by the Belorussian Supreme Soviet and by lower level soviets in accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree of January 1989 (mentioned above). Aleksandr Zdanovich, Belorussian Supreme Soviet deputy and chairman of the working group of the commission to investigate Stalin's crimes, explained the division of labor among the various organizations examining repression: the Belorussian Supreme Court and Procuracy worked to rehabilitate victims, the Central Committee Bureau commission worked to restore party membership, the Supreme Soviet commission worked to aid those who had been rehabilitated, and various public councils attached to the Komsomol, Organization of Veterans of War and Labor, Women's Council, and Labor Council assisted these primary bodies. In addition, Zdanovich stated that he welcomed the assistance of informal organizations.⁹⁶

Uneasiness by Belorussian party officials regarding the implications of de-Stalinization on party rule can be discerned in how the revelations about Kurapaty Forest were handled, reticence of party media in reporting repressions, and other incidents. Nikolay Dementey, Belorussian CC Secretary and chairman of the Politburo Commission, may have attempted to deny any consequences of de-Stalinization to party rule when he stated that both democratization and the strengthening of the Belorussian communist party would result from de-Stalinization:⁹⁷

In these letters [to the commission] and in [its work], we can see...Stalinism as a phenomenon which was tragic, sick, and incompatible with the ideas of socialism....We need to consolidate all healthy forces to work for restructuring and create a state ruled by law in which it is impossible for past mistakes to be repeated. Restructuring headed up by the party is providing a guarantee of that.

Revelations of Repression in Belorussia

The Kurapaty Forest (named such by local villagers because of the *kurapaty* or white flowering anemones which grew there) grave site had been a popular picnic and recreation area just outside of Minsk until publication of an article in the Belorussian weekly newspaper *Litaratura i mastatstva* on June 3, 1988 by archeologist-historians Zyanon Paznyak and Yavgen Shmygalev.⁹⁸ Paznyak was the chairman of the Martyrologists of Belorussia and also of the Belorussian Popular Front, illustrating the linkages between de-Stalinization, exposure of gravesites, democratization, and the assertion of national rights. Paznyak, Shmygalev, and other personnel of the Institute of History of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences had begun their interviewing of witnesses in 1987. The Institute had become interested in the site after an excavator operator and school-children had dug up skulls containing bullet holes. According to testimony of witnesses who had lived in a village next to the execution site, the killings had begun in 1937. At first the killings took place three times a day, but later in 1937 the pace of killings was stepped up with executions beginning in the afternoon and proceeding all night. The killings proceeded for five years until the German invasion. Automobiles and trucks would begin to enter the compound after burial pits had been dug in the morning and, according to one witness, the victims "were being killed in entire groups. They were placed in a row, gags were placed in their mouths, which were then tied with rags....The killers wore NKVD uniforms. They fired their [revolvers or pistols] sideways at the first person in the row so as to shoot two people with one bullet...." According to testimony and other evidence gathered by Paznyak and Shmygalev, the mass killings were part of the "planned economy of persecutions," involving "competition for fulfilling and over-fulfilling the plan for repressions."

In May 1988, Paznyak, Shmygalev and other investigators conducted the first excavation of the site. They immediately discovered that the burial pits had already been excavated, corroborating witness testimony

that Soviet soldiers had been involved in digging activity in the area immediately after World War II. The investigators concluded that the NKVD and other perpetrators of the killings had tried to hide all traces by having the corpses incinerated. However, the excavations had been done sloppily, and dozens of corpses were found deep in the pits. Paznyak later estimated that as many as 300,000 persons had been executed in Kurapaty Forest, with thousands of corpses remaining at the site.

Based on the public outcry following publication of the May 1988 article, the Belorussian prosecutor's office instigated a criminal investigation of the case and the government set up a commission to further investigate the gravesite. In July 1988, another excavation of graves was conducted, and among other findings was the apparent working and peasant class origins of the victims. While most of the victims had apparently been Belorussians from the vicinity of Minsk (as evidenced by brands on footwear), some were from West Belorussia and even Latvia. According to the criminal investigation, the identities of the victims will probably never be ascertained, because NKVD organs were ordered to destroy all files in Minsk in the wake of the German invasion in 1941.

The public outcry following publication of information about Kurapaty Forest has brought forth testimony about other possible mass graves in Minsk (Loshitsa, Stsyapyanka Station, and Chelyuskintsev Park) and elsewhere in Belorussia (Zhdanovichy, Kalvariya, and Kastsyanevitsky Forest). Some neo-Stalinists have tried to prevent any further examination of sites; according to Paznyak the Loshitsa site had been freshly-plowed when he visited it in 1988. At a vigil by about 40,000 people at Kurapaty Forest on June 19, a plaster monument was placed at the site, but was later removed. Finally, in January 1989, the Belorussian Council of Ministers adopted a decision to erect an monument on the site and a monument was dedicated, as mentioned above, during the *Dzyady* ceremony on October 29, 1989. At this ceremony, officially sanctioned and attended by thousands, Paznyak spoke of the continuing need that justice be done to the victims of Stalin. He mentioned that six gravesites exist in the vicinity of Minsk,

and estimated that about two million Belorussians were victims of "Stalinist genocide" before World War II. He asserted that the bodies exhumed had not been given "decent burials" by the authorities, indicating a continuing immorality. Several speeches by neighboring villagers who witnessed the murders and by descendants were also given.⁹⁹

Ukraine: Organizations and Programs of De-Stalinization

The Ukrainian Central Committee created a commission to study Stalinist repressions on September 13, 1988, somewhat later than in Belorussia. One of the first cases under discussion by the Ukrainian procuracy and the commission was the case of the "League for the Liberation of Ukraine," concocted in 1930 and supposedly headed by the former vice-president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. In February 1989, after the CPSU ordered automatic rehabilitation of victims sentenced by troikas and special commissions, the Ukrainian CC Politburo ordered lower-level party bodies to expedite re-admissions of newly rehabilitated ex-party members. The Ukrainian Politburo decided that a monument to victims be planned for Kiev. The Politburo also ordered that in line with CC and USSR Supreme Soviet decisions, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium and lower-level executive committees would establish commissions to help rehabilitated people and clean up and memorialize burial places. The Politburo also approved the list of candidates forwarded by the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet of members of the new Presidium commission. The chairman of the commission would be A. P. Lyashko, "pensioner," and other mainly conservative individuals.¹⁰⁰

In December 1988, in the face of popular outcry following an article published in *Literaturnaya gazeta* in November, a commission attached to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers was formed to investigate the mass burial site called Bykovnya Forest in Darnitsa Park, Kiev. The commis-

sion concluded in March 1989 that the murders were committed during the Stalin period (more on this below).

A report of a Politburo commission meeting in December 1989 (now chaired by Secretary S. I. Gurenko) mentioned that the commission was continuing to examine cases of "so-called revolutionary 'centers,' 'blocs,' anti-party groups, and opposition groups" in Ukraine. The commission called on law enforcement organs and the party's Institute of Party History to "accelerate the examination of archives," and submit results to the commission. Despite the wordiness of the report it was apparent that little actual progress had been made during 1989 in rehabilitations.¹⁰¹

The results of the "examination of archives" were revealed in February 1990. Two significant party decrees were issued in the name of the Ukrainian Central Committee. On February 4, a decree authorized the publication of much material from party archives on the Stalin period. This decree and a subsequent decree issued on February 7 regarding the famine of 1932-1933 are intimately related, since discussion of the famine requires publication of party documents.¹⁰²

On February 7, another statement and decree were issued dealing with the famine of 1932-1933.¹⁰³ The statement reported that: "The archival materials give a tragic picture of mass death from famine and epidemics, especially beginning in March 1933. Such a fate befell the peasantry of northern Caucasus, the Volga River region, and a number of other regions." The decree went on to "acknowledge" that the famine was "a consequence of the criminal policy of Stalin and his closest circle (Molotov and Kaganovich)...." The decree further "condemn[ed]" the Ukrainian leadership of the time (Kosior, Chubar). It echoed the February 4 decree in some respects by ordering that a collection of archival documents and articles on the famine be published and that the republic media publish information about the famine. Some aspects of party apologetics were evident in the statement and decree. At the forefront is the attempt to blame the famine on personalities rather than on the party or socialism. The statement and decree only referred to

“numerous victims” of famine, and the party vowed “To dissociate ourselves decisively from forcible, repressive methods,” implying that it could really dissociate itself from its own past practices. Lastly, the statement and decree attempted to put a gloss on the calamity by claiming that “party and state organs [attempted] to render food aid to the starving regions,” as if the party itself had not forbidden aid and had not denied that starvation existed.

Besides the party, soviet, and government de-Stalinization activities, and those of the Ukrainian branch of Memorial (discussed above), other de-Stalinization activities occurred in Ukraine. In early February 1989, a mass meeting of the citizens of Chernigov *oblast'* took place to discuss how the *oblast'* suffered repressions during the Stalin period. Details were given of how Chernigov was criticized in *Pravda* in June 1937 for laxity in unmasking enemies, and how a frenzy of mass repression resulted. In another incident related at the mass meeting, in April 1938, 100 persons were shot for belonging to an anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist Socialist-Revolutionary insurgent organization, including teachers, collective farmers, pensioners, and painters. Children of victims told of the arrest of their parents. The account of the meeting ended by noting that the discussion became an indictment of the Stalinist “centralized administrative system” and a call for “the development of democracy and *glasnost'*.”¹⁰⁴ In mid-February 1989, a new organization, the Commission for the Rights and Interests of the Rehabilitated Victims of Stalin’s Purges, held its first meeting in Kiev, discussing the erection of memorials to victims throughout Ukraine, including Kiev.¹⁰⁵

Revelations of Repression in Ukraine

Besides the Kurapaty revelation, another major case that has recently come to light is that of the Bykovnya Forest mass grave. During the Khrushchev thaw, members of the Creative Youth Club of the Kiev Writers’ Union—including Vasyl Symonenko, Alla Horska, and Les

Taniyuk—attempted to get the government to investigate the mass gravesite. In 1962, the members sent a petition to authorities in Kiev calling for an investigation of the gravesite, but were firmly warned against pursuing anti-state activities.¹⁰⁶ The mass gravesite remained a matter of high public concern, however, as evidenced by formation of government commissions in 1971 and 1987 to reopen investigation of the gravesite. These commissions, however, repeated the finding of the original 1944 commission that the Nazis were responsible for the gravesite.

Public revulsion against the findings of the 1987 commission, announced in 1988, led to the formation of another commission in December 1988. A prominent role in forcing the Ukrainian government to form the commission was played by an article published in the All-Union press. On November 30, 1988, the Ukrainian correspondent for Moscow's *Literaturnaya gazeta* wrote a macabre article, accompanied by a picture of the Bykovnya Forest.¹⁰⁷ The article reproduced some testimony, by two aged witnesses, of events in the forest in the late 1930s. Like the Kurapaty grave site, the Bykovnya site was apparently established in 1937 and operated until the German invasion of 1941. The forest had been surrounded by a green fence, and a large ravine had been used to dump bodies. One witness testified that regular convoys of trucks, covered with tarps and sometimes dripping blood, entered the compound at night. Another witness, who peered over the fence, saw masses of bodies. In 1970-71, the MVD covered the ravine with sand and planted pines following vandalism of the site. However, many bones remained uncovered and in 1987 Ukrainian intellectuals decried the conditions and mystery surrounding the gravesite. The MVD reburied many of the bones in a large common pit, paved it over and erected a granite monument to the victims of "Fascist Occupying Forces from 1941-43."

This new commission gathered new evidence from witnesses, and in late March 1989 concluded that the grave site was an example of Stalinist repression.¹⁰⁸ The commission basically accepted a figure for the number of victims as given by an earlier commission, adding about 400 to come up

with 6,783 victims. Many Ukrainians disputed this number, calculating between 120,000-225,000 victims.¹⁰⁹ A follow-up story to the original expose in *Literaturnaya gazeta* was published in early April, where it was revealed that the names of many victims had been discerned through the examination of engraved belongings found with the victims.¹¹⁰ The article also revealed that the commission had been unsuccessful in obtaining access to KGB archives.¹¹¹ Lastly, the article confirmed that the victims had been shot in Kiev's NKVD building and taken by truck to Bykovnya Forest.

Following the findings of the commission, the inscription on the monument asserting that victims of fascism were buried there was erased. An author writing in *Literaturnaya gazeta* reported that, in April 1989, there were attempts to halt the exhumation of bodies in order to block discovery of who was buried there and the extent of repressions.¹¹² He implied that the Ukrainian party wished to end the investigation by May 1. He also noted the disarray of the gravesite, asserting that "the so-called reburials of 1944, 1971, and 1987, with which several generations of Kiev bureaucrats essentially tied to cover up the crimes of Stalin's hangmen, today fairly well impede the establishment of the truth."¹¹³

The Moscow television show "View" on May 12, 1989 also reported evidence that, in the case of Bykovnya Forest and other repressions, the Ukrainian party authorities acted to impede the investigation and limit publicity.¹¹⁴ On this show the announcer read out a letter written by a Ukrainian pensioner detailing executions he had carried out in the 1930s. He revealed that at least 200 Stalinist executions had been carried out at Babi Yar, to the right of the monument, and called for their investigation. The letter had been typeset for publication in *Vecherniy Kiev*, but for some reason it had not been printed. The announcer also mentioned that the government commission failed to comment on the validity of the letter despite inquiries, implying that the commission was not properly investigating Stalinist repressions.

Mass graves have been reported in various other locations in Kiev and throughout Ukraine. There have been public calls for investigation of possible mass graves in Kiev's Lukyanovskoye Cemetery.¹¹⁵ Media reports about mass graves have also created public furors in Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Drohobych, Ivano-Frankivsk, Khar'kov, Lugansk (Voroshilovgrad), Poltava, Ternopil, Vinnitsia, and Zhitomir.¹¹⁶ In the Drohobych case, local residents remembered the repressions and the local Memorial Society, Rukh, the Ukrainian Republican Party and other groups worked together in 1990 to excavate the site, where an estimated 1,000 victims of repressions during 1939-1941 and 1945-1946 were buried. A Western correspondent visiting the site in late 1990 reported parents with children watching the digging, candles and flowers being placed on racks containing bones, and people gazing into a locally-infamous well where bodies had been thrown during the NKVD evacuation of the town in 1941.¹¹⁷ In the case of Ivano-Frankivsk, a local branch of Memorial was set up in early 1989 to hunt for gravesites and to gather eyewitness accounts of the repressions, in order to counter local officials' assertions that the Banderists had been responsible. Several gravesites in the *oblast'* were discovered or publicized by Memorial. One, Demianiv Laz (near the village of Pasichna) was discovered in September 1989, and one of the pits yielded over 200 victims, mostly peasants, who were executed in 1941. In October 1989, a memorial service, attended by thousands, was held at this site.¹¹⁸

A primary role was played by the Vinnitsia branch of Memorial in exposing Stalinist responsibility for mass graves in Vinnitsia. These graves of about 9,500 victims had become internationally known during World War II when the Germans exhumed them for propaganda reasons. Although the evidence, as in the case of the Katyn Forest massacre, overwhelmingly implicated the Soviet Union, the Soviets continued for decades to assert that the Germans were responsible. The local Memorial Society had gathered together photographs and testimonies about Stalinist responsibility for the repressions, but when the Society tried to hold a

meeting to memorialize the dead, the Vinnytsia city officials refused to allow it. Members of Memorial and others then made their information available to Hryhoriy Drobchak, a correspondent for the Ukrainian Central Committee newspaper *Silski visti*, who published an article on June 4, 1989 pointing to Stalin as responsible for the mass graves. The next month L. Pastushenko and V. Savtsov also published a detailed account of Stalinist responsibility for the mass graves and appealed for a criminal investigation.¹¹⁹

In the case of mass gravesites in or near Khar'kov, in November 1989, members of several informal associations erected a cross in Leisure Park, a mass burial site. They had tired of waiting for the local party and soviet bodies to erect a monument to victims of repression and famine. Indicative of the popular push to commemorate the victims, emergency service, park, fire-fighting, and militia personnel units all refused to take down the cross although city authorities demanded that the cross be removed. In reporting this incident, *Izvestiia* criticized the fact that the Khar'kov authorities had not erected a memorial "long ago," and held a "day of commemoration." In June 1990 other mass gravesites were reported in or near Khar'kov. One, termed "square six," contained thousands of Polish military personnel along with Soviet citizens.¹²⁰ Probably because it contained Polish officers, the Ukrainian KGB was apparently in charge of the investigation of this gravesite. One KGB officer revealed that "NKVD criminals...thoroughly destroyed the archives and eliminated documents with even an indirect bearing on the Khar'kov executions." Other Stalin-era gravesites in Kharkov include one in a former Jewish cemetery and another at the Khar'kov city dump. In the latter case, the Khar'kov branch of the Memorial Society and the local KGB reportedly discovered the site. The dump was cleared and a temporary memorial erected.¹²¹

Moldavia

The de-Stalinization debate re-emerged in Moldavia by early 1987, although throughout 1987 the republic party press tried to defend policies of the Stalin period. By May 1987, the debate had reached a point where the second secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party, Viktor Smirnov, felt pressed to warn at a plenum of the Moldavian Komsomol that "national conceit" was getting out of hand and should be combatted. He criticized the Moldavian intelligentsia for discussing repression, deportation, and famine in Moldavia after its annexation in 1940.¹²² In 1987 and 1988, the Moldavian party authorities began to make concessions in areas of language policy. Some of the impetus for the addressing of nationality problems came from the central Soviet press in support of Moldavian intellectual demands.¹²³

In response to demands from the center and from individuals and unofficial groups in Moldavia, the relatively conservative Moldavian leadership began the rehabilitation process. In early 1989, the Moldavian Council of Ministers issued a decree rehabilitating the almost 100,000 victims deported by Stalin and the "hundreds" of people who were shot, and authorizing compensation to them and their survivors. In July 1989, the Bureau of the Moldavian Central Committee issued a sweeping (and surprising, considering the previous party line) resolution condemning the crimes of Stalin in Moldavia. According to the text of a published resolution:¹²⁴

The main targets of the Stalinist illegalities were leading officials of party, soviet, and economic organs, the mass media and propaganda, and literary and art figures. Innocent workers, peasants, employees...were among the victims....Mass repressions began in right-bank Moldavia in 1940-1941....The abuse of power and violations of socialist legality continued during the postwar years. The exile operation during the night of 5-6 July 1949...was a blatantly arbitrary act. The unjustifiably cruel and inhuman dekulakization was a grave crime...The practice of mass repressions...established in peoples minds scorn for the norms of law and human morality.

This is why the restoration of historical justice has acquired tremendous political importance.

The resolution also revealed that local party and state bodies had been instructed to identify mass graves and to erect monuments to the victims, and that the Ministry of Culture and the Kishinev city soviet executive committee had been instructed to design a memorial to Stalin's victims. The Bureau also instructed various museums and institutes to create books, materials, and exhibits on Stalin's crimes, and supported a national day of mourning (July 6) for Stalin's victims. Lastly, the Bureau instructed editorial offices of print and television media to provide "objective coverage" of the personality cult period.

In June 1990, the Politburo of the Moldavian Communist Party issued another resolution recognizing "that the famine of 1946-1947 was a real tragedy for the Moldavian people and resulted from the Stalinist command and administration system and the policy of the Central Committee Bureau of...Moldavia in regard to the peasantry, as well as to the drought."¹²⁵

On June 9, 1990, the Association of Victims of Repression was created at an inaugural meeting attended by 500 delegates from all towns and raiony in Moldavia and some villages in Ukraine.¹²⁶ At the inaugural meeting the delegates adopted a draft charter and decided to hold the first congress of the association in July 1990.

Azerbaidzhan

In Azerbaidzhan, a commission attached to the Central Committee and headed by the republic's second secretary was established in March 1989 to "speed up" the rehabilitation of victims of the Stalin period, somewhat later than the establishment of these commissions in Belorussia or Ukraine. Also, the Azerbaidzhan Central Committee ordered that similar commissions be set up by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Nakhichevan ASSR, and by city

and raion soviet executive committees to help victims “restore their rights.” The Central Committee also established a press group attached to the State Legal Department to publicize the rehabilitations.¹²⁷

Various Azeri intellectuals have denounced Stalin’s crimes in the republic. In mid-1988 *Selskaya zhizn* carried a harsh article by Vladimir Sinitsyn, who exposed new details of the “Shemakha Tragedy” resulting in the arrest and execution of Gamid Sultanov and other Azeri Old Bolsheviks. Azeri playwright Ilyas Afandiyev, in a January 1989 interview with the Azeri *Kommunist*, discussed the impact of Stalinist repression on Azeri literature and art. He pointed out that many literary topics were taboo, including the division of Azerbaidzhan between the Soviet Union and Iran and desires for cultural contacts across the borders.¹²⁸

In discussing the Shemakha Tragedy, Sinitsyn stated that, in June 1937, the Shemakha NKVD had issued instructions to villages and kolzhozes throughout Shemakhinskiy raion to compile lists of “Stakhanovites” to attend a republic rally. Instead, the lists were used to round up mostly peasant victims who were accused of belonging to an insurgent bourgeois-nationalist organization and were executed or sent to camps. Mir Dzhafar Bagirov, at that time the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaidzhan, had concocted the scheme to arrest Gamid Sultanov, who had played an important role in the achievement of soviet power in Azerbaidzhan in 1920. Sultanov was accused of leading the fictitious insurgency, and the NKVD was charged with inventing the members of the organization. Sinitsyn concluded his account by asserting that the new thaw of the Gorbachev period has revealed what Khrushchev’s thaw failed to reveal—that the crimes of the Stalin era were not the result of Stalin’s poor choice of subordinates, but were carried out upon Stalin’s orders: “Today we know that Stalin not only knew about the repressions, but also planned them, he stage-directed the terror, for 30 years he waged a destructive war against his own people....Every oblast, krai, and republic offered to Stalin its own trials...As the former People’s Commissar of Nationalities, he had so perverted nationality policy that the exiling of the

outcast peoples became its shameful sad practice.” Sinitsyn added that Stalinism remained at the root of current nationality problems: “And if today we want to analyze the real reasons for the Nagorno-Karabakh explosion and the Sumgait tragedy, we must search for the dynamite in the ideological heritage of [Stalin].”

Georgia

The de-Stalinization debate began in Georgia a little later than in the central press or in some other republics, such as the Baltic republics, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, or Ukraine. At the January 1988, plenum of the Georgian Central Committee, film director Eldar Shengelaya argued that the de-Stalinization debate should not be limited to the All-Union level but should also be taken up in Georgia. He advocated that the debate be taken up in Georgia in order to counter the myth that Stalin spared Georgia from mass repression.¹²⁹ By mid-1988, several articles on Stalinist repressions in Georgia had appeared.¹³⁰ Georgiy Margvelashvili wrote in June 1988 to lay to rest the myth that Stalin had spared Georgia: “Repressions were falling upon small Georgia almost continuously starting in the Summer of 1924, then in 1929, during 1936-1938, again after a ‘break’ of the war years..., in 1948-1949, and finally in 1951-1952. Outstanding scientists, writers, musicians, artists, and directors were all erased from the face of the earth...this phenomenon is now called ‘Stalinism.’”¹³¹ Film producer Eldar Shengelaya also wrote on this theme, stating that “The legend...about the happy life of Georgia under Stalin...is absolutely groundless and ridiculous.”¹³² He asserted that Georgian propaganda of the Stalin era was responsible for the riots of 1956, because propagandists “worked to persuade us that [Stalin] contained within himself the best features of the Georgian people...,” as well as embodying socialism. Shen-

gelaya linked de-Stalinization with democratization (apparently 'socialism with a human face' within the orbit of the Soviet Union):

The mechanical administrative-bureaucratic...structure...must be replaced by new relations between peoples....They must be manifested in greater representation of the republics in the Union-wide government of the country, in greater independence in the resolution of questions concerning national culture, education, the press, all problems of spiritual life, as well as independent actions by the republics in entering into international cultural and economic contacts with...countries. These new relations must also be manifested in recruitment...into...high staff positions in the Army and Navy. Sometimes the republic's lack of representation in the Army command and the space program is explained by the lack of physical training. This thesis is simply ludicrous....

Shengelaya called on the party to "expose gaps in history" such as the repression of the "so-called Mdivani group" in 1922 so that nationality policy could be based on "Leninist ideas."

In November 1988, the first installment of a remarkable article on the horrors of the Stalin period (in fact implicating the entire Soviet period) appeared in the Georgian language journal *Literaturuli sakartvelo*.¹³³ The article used testimony from a woman whose husband and father were repressed as nationalists in 1923 to illustrate the horrors of Soviet power. The authors baldly asserted that repression in Georgia began in the 1921-1924 period when Soviet power was established in Georgia, and argued that it is wrong to call the opponents of Soviet power bandits, because they desired an independent Georgia. The repressions against these people were also visited upon their innocent relatives and friends, and "whole villages were wiped out." One graphic incident related is an all-night "blood orgy" of killings at the Politburo building in Tbilisi in the summer of 1924. The subject of the article testified that upon her re-arrest in 1942, she refused to sign a confession. Significantly, the confession was reproduced in the journal in the Russian language.

Mass gravesites have also been mentioned in the press, including Soganlugskiy ravine. By late-1988 the Georgian Culture Foundation began accepting public donations to build a memorial complex to Stalin's

victims on a mountain above Tbilisi. One design for the memorial includes a pit, "like the pits in which the shot victims fell." According to Georgian People's Artist Dmitriy Mikatadze, who was responsible for the design, "Innocent people suffered by the thousands in Georgia, as elsewhere, during the Stalin years....It cannot be denied that there was not a single family in the republic that did not suffer from the illegalities."¹³⁴

Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan

The de-Stalinization debate also revived in the Central Asian republics (Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and Kazakhstan, partially as a result of the All-Union party decision to create commissions in all the republics to examine repression, but also driven by popular and intellectuals' calls for justice as a result of *glasnost*'. As Kathleen Watters pointed out in her review of nationality problems as conveyed by the central press, the central press has provided relatively less coverage to Stalinist repression in Central Asia than in other regions of the Soviet Union.¹³⁵ In fact, *Pravda* in April 1989 even criticized, to no avail, the coverage of the past by *Pravda vostoka* and other Uzbek newspapers as dwelling too much on the past.¹³⁶ Illustrating how criticism of the Stalin period has broadened to include other themes, during late 1990 the Uzbek press published a series of sensational articles about how the Red Army devastated Kokand in 1917, articles characterized by one Western analyst as "strik[ing] at the legitimacy of Soviet rule in Central Asia from the very beginning."¹³⁷

In Uzbekistan, the Central Committee created a commission to study republic repression and rehabilitate victims in 1988. Later, the commission established a group of social scientists from Tashkent State University and the Institute of History to provide historical background material, so that criminal cases from the Stalinist period could be correctly evaluated. The commission also ordered that *oblast*', city, and *raion* newspapers

regularly publish the lists of rehabilitated persons in order to notify the public, relatives, and possible survivors. In September 1988, a special study group of prominent Uzbek jurists, headed by senior legal counselor A. P. Zhukov, was set up by the Uzbek Procuracy to speed up the re-examination of Stalin-era criminal files.

D. A. Usatov, Uzbek Procurator, reported that—unlike the situation in areas occupied during World War II and apparent practices in other KGB jurisdictions where archives were destroyed—in Uzbekistan “The files of many thousands of criminal cases...which for decades had gathered dust on the shelves of special archives,” still existed in pristine condition.¹³⁸ In discussing how he had leafed through countless brittle folders in order to right social injustice, he concluded that “The extermination of millions of people who were not guilty of anything—fathers and mothers, husbands and wives, children, grandchildren—were those terrible years really not related to genocide?” In the article he went on to relate several graphic cases of repression against innocent citizens, mentioning cases in Chutskiy raion, Kara-Kalpak ASSR, and Tashkent. In Tashkent, a milling-machine operator mentioned the lack of food and observed that one could be arrested for even mentioning such a thing. As a result, he was arrested and sentenced for two indiscretions: “slandering the material situation of the workers,” and “anti-Soviet agitation directed against the measures of Soviet power!”

Chingiz Aytmatov has been at the forefront of de-Stalinization efforts in Kirghizia. While he has opposed Kirghizian independence efforts by the fledgling popular front Ashad, seeing the Russian influence as positive, he has also called for greater emphasis on bilingual education and cultural expression. His opposition to oppressive aspects of nationality policy has been expressed in his term “mankurtization” to refer to imposed docility of nations, an imposed forgetting of the past. In an article in *Sovetskaya Kirghizia* in May 1988, Aytmatov wrote of the Kirghizian famine of 1932 as caused by Stalin, a famine where the starving “sold small children and young girls for a bit of bread.” He also argued that Stalin was

not responsible for the industrialization of the Soviet Union, comparing such industrialization to that occurring in other countries. He also attacked the myth that "Stalin won the war," noting the strategic blunders and sacrifices of people during the war. He closed by linking de-Stalinization to democratization: "The echo of his violence against the people will continue to rumble ominously in the hearts and souls of the Soviet people for a long time to come. The terrible thing about 'his echo' is [how] we have passed off anti-democracy as supreme Stalinist democracy....A fully valid culture of free-thinking men can only be developed through democracy and *glasnost*'....only a mind free of Stalinist thinking can comprehend and perfect the new world."¹³⁹

Kazakhstan officials and citizens have also moved to expose the crimes of the Stalin period. A Central Committee commission to investigate Stalinist repressions in Kazakhstan, set up in 1988, examined a number of decisions taken by the party regarding decrees on literature and art. It duly recommended that the Central Committee repeal these decrees and decisions, which it did. In late 1988, the Kazakh Party Institute decided to allow access to, and eventually publish, hitherto secret documents from the Stalin period held in its archives.¹⁴⁰ The Kazakh procuracy also began to reexamine the cases of citizens repressed during the Stalin period and, in early 1990, had reported the rehabilitation of over 30,000 people, and projected that the process of rehabilitations would be complete by mid-1990. The procuracy, reportedly along with the security apparatus, was also working to identify mass graves, and noted that graves had been reported by citizens in Aktyubinsk, Tselinograd, and Chimkent *oblast*'.¹⁴¹ In January 1990, *oblast*' newspapers in Kazakhstan began publishing the names of victims of repression.¹⁴²

In July 1988, *Kazakhstanskaya pravda* published a sensational article by writer Viktor Dik on the Karaganda Special Regime Corrective Labor Camp, the headquarters of which was about 20 kilometers south of Karaganda city. The Karaganda camp complex consisted of a host of camps spread throughout Karaganda *oblast*'. Individual camps specialized

in various functions or contained different types of prisoners such as the female relations of “traitors.” Dik appealed to the Karaganda *oblast’* internal affairs administration not to destroy the records of the camps so that the victims could be suitably memorialized, and called on the public to voice opposition to plans to build a highway over a mass gravesite. Dik stressed that the intellectual elite of the Soviet Union could be found in the Karaganda complex, many of whom perished. He wrote that in reporting the horrors of the Karaganda complex he would be fighting against neo-Stalinists who looked with nostalgia on the “iron order” of the period.¹⁴³

Other articles about the Karaganda complex also appeared in 1988, including an article in the Karaganda *oblast’* newspaper discussing mass gravesites in the *oblast’*. Following the newspaper article a local branch of Memorial was formed in the *oblast’*. The Memorial group organized a meeting with MVD veterans of the camp complex in order to discover details about mass repressions. In a stormy meeting, the veterans denounced the publication of articles. The veterans asserted that there was no cruelty at the camps, that they contained only common criminals, and that the diet lavishly consisted of port wine and high-quality fish fillets. The veterans maintained that the reason why people who entered the camps never left was because, after they had served their sentences, they had grown attached to the camps and chose to live nearby. A local Memorial Society member pledged to continue to hunt for the truth of the Karaganda camps and the location of mass graves despite obstructionism, so that people could “remember everyone’s names, rehabilitate them in society’s eyes, and perpetuate the memory of the innocents who died.”¹⁴⁴

Conclusions

The literature on de-Stalinization has moved far beyond that found during the Khrushchev period both in its graphic representation of the details of individual and mass repression in official (and freely available unofficial) media and in its linkage of repression to negative assessments not only of the Stalin period but also of Soviet power, the Communist Party, and nationality policy. The literature has over-fulfilled the aims set by Gorbachev for de-Stalinization – that it expose the crimes of the Stalin period and the evils of the command-administrative system. The former aim was envisaged as providing an emotional catharsis to seething memories of regime repressions, while the latter aimed to repudiate the ministerial apparatus and personnel opposing *perestroika*. The cathartic effect, however, has not taken the form of merely remembering and commemorating the dead but, as it did in the Khrushchev period, has spilled over into popular demands for justice. When the local party and KGB resisted bringing those identified by survivors as perpetrators of injustices to trial, it increased the tendency to blame the system as a whole for the crimes and contributed to the precipitant decline in the legitimacy of the communist party. Even when some perpetrators were mildly punished, their identity as members of the nomenklatura reflected poorly on the system. In general, catharsis has not re-legitimated the political system. Gorbachev's second aim in supporting de-Stalinization – the repudiation of the ministerial apparatus and personnel he inherited – while successful, has not been followed by the creation of effective new political institutions. This failure is illustrated by Gorbachev's continued tinkering with the constitution, the seemingly intractable problems in drawing up a new union treaty (with Gorbachev seeking to retain the top-down nature of Soviet "federalism,") and his attempts to remodel the Communist Party.

In terms of its themes, the literature on de-Stalinization in the non-Russian republics, while informed by and part of debate in the central press, has differed somewhat in emphasizing particular nationalist themes

of cultural autonomy and political sovereignty and independence. The debate has involved inter-republic communication through the central press and through inter-republic membership in organizations such as Memorial Society. The de-Stalinization debate actively spurred concomitant debate in the late 1980s and in 1990 on political sovereignty and independence. The inter-republic nature of many of the de-Stalinization efforts, such as undertaken by branches of Memorial, has also served as a precedent for the current expansion of inter-republic ties outside the purview of the center and the drive for new structures of relations among several of the union republics.¹⁴⁵

The question inevitably raised in the West and among Soviet citizens in examinations of Stalinist repressions is how many victims may be attributed to the "crimes of the Stalin period." This debate has focused on country-wide totals and not on individual union republics or ethnic groups, except as noted below. Among Soviet writers, the most prominent estimates of the numbers of purge and other deaths are those by Alexandr Solzhentisyn, Dmitriy Volkogonov, and Roy Medvedev.¹⁴⁶ Alexandr Yakovlev eventually acknowledged that millions perished in purges and by famine during the Stalin period. In the West, the debate about the extent of excess deaths has had a long, contentious history and has taken many paths. Some analysts have focused on census data, debating the proper adjustments to be made to the 1939 census, and more recently to assessing new data on the suppressed 1937 census.¹⁴⁷ Some have debated the validity of memoirs and other personal testimonies as evidence of the scope of terror.¹⁴⁸ Some have focused on the numbers of deaths caused by collectivization; some have focused on the "man-made famine" in Ukraine and other areas in 1932-1933; some have focused on numbers of deaths attributable to Stalin's horrendous military strategies and tactics; some have examined terror against homeless children; some have examined deportations or repressions aimed at particular ethnic or religious groups such as Meskhetians, Kalmyks, Karachai, Balkars, Jews, and Uniates; some have examined repressions against post-World War II

repatriates. Some prominent estimates in the West include those of Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver, Robert Conquest, Frank Lorimer, Alec Nove, Steven Rosefielde, and Steven Wheatcroft, ranging from a low of 0.5-5.5 million excess deaths between 1926-1939 (Anderson and Silver) to a high of well over 20 million for the period 1930-1939 (Conquest).¹⁴⁹

This paper has eschewed detailed enumeration or evaluation of the validity of the locally reported numbers of excess deaths in the union republics examined. Rather, the focus has been on describing the development and form of debate over the crimes and the emotional content and effect of the debate. The paper has attempted to document the debate about the discovery of dozens of mass gravesites, each containing scores or even tens of thousands of bodies, and to illuminate the powerful psychological impact on ethnic populations, contributing to revulsion against Stalinism and the wider ethnic stratification system.¹⁵⁰ It may well be the case that some of the estimates given by national groups of the numbers of victims buried in mass graves are exaggerated for the purpose of exacerbating grievances with the center.

Nevertheless, some attempt may be made to examine the issue of numbers of repressions. Paznyak described a plausible methodology that resulted in his estimate that up to 300,000 victims had been originally buried at Kurapaty. Other estimates are that the true number of victims buried at Kurapaty is half of this number or less. Even so, the large numbers of mass gravesites being reported in the Soviet press—in addition to the figures and evidence already examined by Western scholars—supports an interpretation that low estimates of less than three-five million purge victims for the period of the 1930s to early 1940s may need to be revised upward. Tolz, in looking in August 1990 at reports of the numbers of victims buried at such sites as Kurapaty and Bukovnya, suggested that this recent evidence supports a higher estimate of the range and scope of the terror.¹⁵¹ This issue is highly unlikely to be firmly resolved through exhumations, however, given the difficulties in making sure that all bodies have been accounted for, the many cases of intentional or unintentional

effacement of known gravesites (making enumeration impossible), and the question of yet-undiscovered gravesites. The issue of numbers still awaits comprehensive access to Soviet archival data.

Notes

1. An earlier draft of this paper was delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, October 18, 1990 in Washington, D.C. The paper was partially written while the author was a MacArthur Fellow at the Center for East-West Trade, Investment, and Communication, Duke University. I would like to thank the MacArthur Foundation and Jerry Hough, the Director of the Center, for their support. I would also like to thank Henry Huttenbach, Barbara Chotiner, Robert Kaiser, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this paper represent those of the author and not those of any institution.
2. The need to examine how the non-Russian nationalities are discussing history is mentioned by R. W. Davies, *Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 10.
3. Stephen White, *Gorbachev in Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 66.
4. The failure of Western analysts to understand the nature and scope of Soviet citizens' discontent with communism, and the many manifestations of discontent that emerged in the late 1980s, are described in Paul Hollander, "Communism and Its Discontents," *Problems of Communism* (May-June, 1991), 116-123. See also his forthcoming book, *Decline and Discontent: Communism and the West Today*.
5. *Ibid.*, 217. Other books that discuss de-Stalinization include Walter Laqueur, *Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1990); Alec Nove, *Stalinism and After: The Road to Gorbachev*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Alec Nove, *Glasnost' in Action* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Alexander S. Tsipko, *Is Stalinism Really Dead?* (San Francisco: Harper, 1990); Robert C. Tucker, ed., *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation* (New York: Norton, 1977); George R. Urban, ed., *Stalinism: Its Impact on Russia and the World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982).
6. Mark Beissinger and Lubomyr Hajda, "Nationalism and Reform in Soviet Politics," in Hajda and Beissinger, eds., *The Nationality Factor in Soviet Politics and Society* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 314-315.

7. While the de-Stalinization debate has proceeded farthest in the Baltic States, this study examines the evolution of debate in other republics. The course of the debate in the other republics indicates a rather quick broadening of the debate.
8. The period of focus is from the late 1980s through 1990, although in some cases additional information from 1991 has been included.
9. Ernest Mandel points to the role of families and descendants of victims in pressing for justice when he argues that "Outside the Soviet Union there is a tendency to underestimate the importance of de-Stalinization in the political, intellectual, and emotional lives of the Soviet people....a large portion, if not a majority, of families in the Soviet Union today are affected [by purges or collectivization]." See Ernest Mandel, *Beyond Perestroika* (London: Verso, 1989), 85.
10. Graeme Gill, "Changing Patterns of Systemic Legitimation in the USSR," *Coexistence*, Vol. 23 (1986) 247-266. His is one of the few treatments that examines legitimacy in a multinational context.
11. Bertram D. Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), 67. Roy Medvedev echoes this sentiment that the secret speech was "one of the most important in the history of the world communist movement." See *Khrushchev* (New York: Anchor Books/Doubleday, 1983), 86. Leonard Schapiro also sees the secret speech as having "an enormous effect" on communism. See Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), 568. Soviets who perceived the speech as a watershed include Lyudmila Alekseeva, Vladimir Bukovskiy, Boris Vail', Petro Grigorenko, Raisa Orlova, Leonid Plyushch, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. See the excellent discussion of the significance of the secret speech in Julia Wishnevskiy, "The Thirtieth Anniversary of Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech,'" *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 76/86 (18 February 1986).
12. Wolfe, *Ibid.*, 67-68, 70.
13. Wolfe, *Ibid.*, 71.
14. Wolfe, *Ibid.*, 248. Medvedev asserts that Khrushchev actually wanted the secret speech to be widely discussed, though it is unclear why it was not published. See Roy Medvedev, *Khrushchev, Op. cit.*, 88.

15. Amy Corning, "Brief History of the Appearance of Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' Outside the USSR," *Radio Liberty Background Report*, RL 344/88 (28 July 1988).
16. Robert C. Tucker, "The Politics of Soviet De-Stalinization," *World Politics*, Vol. IX, No. 4 (July, 1957), 570.
17. Decree of June 30, 1956, published in *Pravda* (July 2, 1956), 1. Quoted in *Ibid.*, 570.
18. Tucker, *Ibid.*, 572.
19. Wolfe, *Op. cit.*, 190.
20. Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 280-283, 355 (note 102), 356 (note 104). By 1961 the new party program proclaimed as a virtue the "continuous exchange of trained personnel among nations."
21. Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, *Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 118-119.
22. William E. Griffith, "The Fruits of the Thaw: What Happened to Revisionism," *Problems of Communism* (March-April, 1960), 1-9; on international communism, see Henry L. Roberts, *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956).
23. To look at Western literature published soon after the secret speech, Tucker, although noting that one of the first acts after Stalin's death was Beria's espousal of cultural autonomy for the non-Russian nationalities, does not explore national reactions to de-Stalinization or to the Secret Speech (Tucker, 577). Wolfe, while noting Khrushchev's discussion of crimes against nationalities, does not explicate national reactions to the speech. See Wolfe, *Op. cit.*, 225, 227. Wolfe does discuss East European and Western intellectual reaction to the secret speech (69-70, 77-78), and generally concludes that "The one right [the Soviet people] have, as they had before [the secret speech], is the right of silent pressure....And in many ways that pressure has grown by virtue of...Khrushchev's speech and Stalin's death," (75). Merle Fainsod, while astutely pointing to "pluralistic forces which are seeking expression in Soviet society," and to the impact of the Secret Speech on party members, does not examine de-Stalinization and the nationalities. See "The Party in the Post-Stalin Era," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. VII, No. 1 (January-February, 1958), 7-13; he also mentions the impact of de-Stalinization on the party, Kom-

somol, and intelligentsia in *How Russia is Ruled*, revised ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 126, 292. Inkeles, in an article published in 1960 explicitly examining Khrushchev's nationality policy in the wake of the Secret Speech, notes some changes such as increased central leadership visits to the republics, rehabilitation of repressed nations, and increased representation of non-Russian nationalities in higher party posts, but no change in the "forceful imposition of social, political, and economic forms by a powerful center upon a host of colonial subjects." Alex Inkeles, "Nationalities in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. IX, No. 3 (May-June, 1960), 34. Schapiro focuses on the impact of the speech on communism in Eastern Europe and the West and as one of the causes of the June 1957 "anti-party group" effort to unseat Khrushchev. See Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, *Op. cit.*, 568-569. See also "The Nationality Policy of the Soviet Union: A New Phase," *Central Asian Review*, Vol. X, No. 4 (1962), 317-32; Alfred D. Low, "Soviet Nationality Policy and the New Program of the CPSU," *Russian Review*, Vol. 22 (January, 1963), 3-29; Oleh S. Fedyshyn, "Khrushchev's 'Leap Forward': Nationality Assimilation in the USSR After Stalin," *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* (June, 1967), 34-43.

24. Publication of, or access to, archival material remains limited. On material from the NKVD collection in the Central State Archives of the October Revolution, see Vera Tolz, "New Information About the Deportation of Ethnic Groups under Stalin," *Report on the USSR* (26 April 1991), 16-20. For memoirs, see Wishnevskiy, *Op. cit.* Soviet research includes Pougay, "The Truth About the Deportation of the Chechen and Ingush Peoples," *Voprosy Istorii*, Vol. 7 (1990), 32-44; E. Kh. Panesh and L. B. Yermolov, "The Meskhetian Turks," *Sovetskaya etnografiya* (January-February, 1990), 16-24; V. P. Kim, "Koreans," *Literaturnyi Kirghizistan*, No. 2 (1988); testimony of David Kugul'tinov on the Kalmyk deportations, *Ogonek*, No. 35 (1988), 24; S. A. Arutyunov, Ya. S. Smirnov, and G. A. Sergeeva, "The Ethno-Cultural Situation in Karachai-Cherkass Autonomous Oblast," *Sovetskaya etnografiya* (March-April, 1990), 23-29; and sources cited in Ann Sheehy, "Justice at Last for the Karachai?" *Report on the USSR* (28 December 1990), 17-20.

25. Peter Duncan, "Ideology and the National Question: Marxism-Leninism and the National Policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," in Stephen White and Alex Pravda, eds, *Ideology and Soviet Politics* (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1988), 186.

26. On the attempted rehabilitation of Shamil, see Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers* (London: Macmillan, 1970), 164-169. He notes an early attempt to rehabilitate Shamil at a conference in Moscow in late January, 1956. See also, Duncan, *Op. cit.*, 186.

27. Roy Medvedev, *Khrushchev* (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1983), 113. Two Western sources that discuss the fates of deported nations during the Khrushchev period are Aleksandr M. Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 137-166, and Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers*, 141-209. Medvedev relates one case where the secret speech led to nationality problems. Within days of the secret speech, rumors had spread to Georgia, leading to riots in Tbilisi and other cities in which hundreds died (92-93). On the beginnings of the new de-Stalinization debate in Georgia in early 1988, marked by a discussion of the riots of 1956, see Elizabeth Fuller, "Georgia, Stalin, and the Demonstrations of 1956," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 190/88 (3 May 1988).
28. Duncan, *Op. cit.*, 187; Connor, *Op. cit.*, 282-283; Nahaylo and Swoboda, *Op. cit.*, 129-146; Helene Carrere d'Encausse, *Decline of An Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt* (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979), 41-45.
29. Bohdan Nahaylo, "Robert Conquest on Gorbachev, *Glasnost*', Khrushchev, and Stalin: An Interview," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 202/87 (26 May 1987). Vera Tolz, in comparing Khrushchev's to Gorbachev's de-Stalinization efforts, concluded that Gorbachev's efforts had gone far beyond Khrushchev's. See "Debates Over Stalin's Legacy on the Eve of the Seventieth Anniversary of the October Revolution," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 407/87 (15 October 1987).
30. A similar point is made by Carter, though he is primarily concerned with charting political groups and ideas. See Stephen K. Carter, *Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 142. The book contains few details about Khrushchev's or Gorbachev's nationality and de-Stalinization policies.
31. The interview is reproduced in *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987-1989), Vol. 3, 162.
32. "Gorbachev Meets Soviet Writers: A *Samizdat* Account," *Radio Liberty Research* (23 October 1986).
33. *Pravda* (3 November 1987), 1-2. The speech was approved at the October 21, 1987 plenum of the Central Committee. See *Pravda* (22 October 1987), 1.
34. At a press conference on November 3, 1987 Aleksandr Yakovlev, then head of the Propaganda Department, responded to a query about why Gorbachev had mentioned only "thousands" of victims by denying that millions of people had died under Stalin. See *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 452/87 (6 November 1987), 5. As noted below, after Yakovlev

took charge of investigating Stalinist-era repressions, he became a proponent of the view that millions had perished.

35. Yuriy Afanas'yev interview in Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina vanden Heuvel, *Voices of Glasnost* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1989), 111; "Speech of M.S. Gorbachev," *Pravda* (2 July 1988), 1, 3.

36. M. S. Gorbachev, "The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 28th CPSU Congress and the Party's Tasks," *Pravda* (3 July 1990), 2-4.

37. The party program statement approved at the Congress, a temporary document elucidating party policy until a new program appears, is rather conservative in crediting the party with exposing Stalin's crimes (with a strong implication that de-Stalinization has concluded) and warning against "blanket accusations against honest communists." An earlier draft, apparently closer to Gorbachev's sentiments, called for "the full grim truth about tragic aspects of our history," but asserted that this search for truth must not include "attempts to erase everything really great and valuable in our historical legacy," including "patriotism" leavened with "internationalism." See "Toward a Humane, Democratic Socialism....," *Pravda* (13 February 1990), 1-2; "Toward a Humane, Democratic Socialism," *Pravda* (15 July 1990), 1, 3. Gorbachev's own sentiments may also have been revealed at his January 1988 meeting with media figures and artists. At this meeting he seemed to amend some of his historical remarks made in his November 1987 speech (discussed above), pointing out that "The understanding of our history which we achieved in preparing for the 70th Anniversary of October is not something frozen, and given once and for all. It will be deepened and developed in the course of further research." He added that "Our history took place, and we must really know and understand it." Gorbachev may have deliberately delivered a more conservative report later in the year to the party Congress, in keeping with his non-confrontational style of governance. See *Pravda* (13 January 1988), as reported in R. W. Davies, *Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution*, *Op. cit.*, 136-137. Davies argues that Gorbachev's commitment to *glasnost* led him to revise his views of the past in the face of new evidence rather than move decisively to limit *glasnost* as called for by conservative party members (193).

38. M. S. Gorbachev, "M. S. Gorbachev's Speech," *Pravda* (1 December 1990), 4.

39. Vera Tolz has suggested that Gorbachev's assessment of collectivization changed during 1988 from that given by Gorbachev in his November 1987 speech (discussed above). In a speech in Krasnoyarsk in September 1988, Gorbachev noted that "We were too fast in trying to change Soviet agriculture as quickly as possible, and today we are suffering

from the consequences of this....We destroyed the peasantry of our country.” See *Pravda* (14 September 1988), as reported in Vera Tolz, “The Changing Official Line on Collectivization,” *Radio Liberty Research*, RL424/88 (20 September 1988), 1.

40. Gorbachev’s ideological “manifesto” of November 1989 defined *perestroika* as a stage of development during which Stalinism would be purged from the polity. See M. S. Gorbachev, “The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika,” *Pravda* (26 November 1989), 2.

41. A major role in re-legitimation is accorded to the process of decentralizing political and economic power to the republics. This process, begun by the center, has been used by the republics to assert greater decentralization. The center hopes that this decentralization will re-legitimize the system among the 49.2% of the population that is not Russian. The dilemma of a Leninist nationality policy has reemerged—how to both encourage the ‘flourishing of nations’ while at the same time maintain political domination over them. As Walker Connor points out, Lenin approved persuasive measures to accelerate assimilation, and disapproved of what he considered coercive measures. The perceptions of the nations as to which policies were coercive and which not were not taken into account by the center; rather the central authorities decided on nationality policy. See Connor, *Op. cit.*, 480-483; and his “Nationalism and Political Illegitimacy,” *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, No. 2 (Fall, 1981), 201-228. The present decentralization is increasingly perceived by various nationality groups as maintaining coercive, and hence illegitimate, elements of control by the center.

42. Roman Solchanyk, “Filling in the ‘Blank Spots’ in Ukrainian History: An Interview with Stanislav V. Kul’chyts’kyi,” *Report on the USSR* (20 April 1990), 19. Kul’chyts’kyi believes that Stalin’s dedication to creating a communist economy, an impossibility, led to repression of the peasantry and the suffering of Ukraine; Stalin was not dedicated to the extermination of the Ukrainian peasantry.

43. “About the Formation of the Commission of the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU...,” *Izvestiia TsK KPSS* No. 1 (288)(January, 1989), 109-110; “At the CPSU Central Committee Politburo Commission...,” *Pravda* (5 August 1988), 1, 2. Also in August M. S. Solomentsev spoke at length about the activities of the commission. See Viktor Kozhemyako and Arkady Sakhnin, “Truth versus Slander,” *Pravda* (19 August 1988), 1, 3. Other reports include *Pravda* (29 March 1988), 1; *Pravda* (25 October 1989), 1; *Pravda* (31 May 1990), 1, 2; *Pravda* (6 June 1990), 2. The inaugural issue of *Izvestiia TsK KPSS* contained a short history of the commission. See “In the Name of Legality, Justice, and Truth,” No. 1 (288)(January, 1989), 107. The account briefly sketched the first seven meetings of the

commission held during 1988, listing members of the working group formed at the first meeting in January and giving the main topics of work during subsequent meetings in February, March, July (two meetings), October, and December. In addition, protocols of the first two meetings were reproduced in the inaugural issue. Reports of four meetings held during 1989-1990 are contained in *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, Nos. 10 and 11 (October and November, 1989)(8th meeting); No. 1 (January, 1990)(9th meeting); No. 2 (February, 1990)(10th meeting); No. 9 (September, 1990)(11th meeting).

44. Solomentsev in the August 1988 interview stated that archival evidence had revealed that repressions had started "prior to 1934." See *Ibid*. The KGB has used a classic propaganda technique of itself announcing damaging information to the population in a counterproductive attempt to "decisively alienate themselves from the heritage of the past." For one official KGB report on the discovery of mass gravesites, see Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 1629 GMT (31 October 1990), as reported in FBIS-SOV-90-212 (1 November 1990), 28-29. On KGB efforts to conceal the full extent of repression, including the location of mass graves and the numbers of victims buried in mass graves, see Vera Tolz, "Archives Yield New Statistics on the Stalin Terror," *Report on the USSR* (7 September 1990), 3. A former employee of the KGB, Dmitri Yurasov, told *Trud* (4 March 1990) that the Shvernik Commission set up after World War II worked to shift blame for mass graves onto the Germans. On the anti-reformist nature of the KGB in general, see Amy Knight, "The Future of the KGB," *Problems of Communism* (November-December, 1990), 20-33.

45. "Report by A. N. Yakovlev, Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee," *Pravda* (4 July 1990), 2-3.

46. Interview with Alexander Yakovlev, *Komsomol'skaya pravda* (10 July 1990); Alexander Yakovlev, *Pravda* (28 January 1991). See also Vera Tolz, "Alexandr Yakovlev Provides New Information About the Mystery of Kirov's Murder," *Report on the USSR* (22 February 1991), 9-12.

47. *Moscow News*, No. 1 (1990), 6-7. See also Julia Wishnevskiy and Elizabeth Teague, "Alexandr Yakovlev Speaks of 'Act of Repentance,'" *Report on the USSR* (21 September 1990), 8-9.

48. *Pravda* (5 July 1988), 1.

49. *Pravda* (6 January 1989), 1; *Pravda* (31 January 1989), 3. Deputies criticized some provisions of the January decree and the Legal Committee enumerated these criticisms in

a document. See "On the Proposals and Comments of People's Deputies of the USSR Made at the First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in the Discussion of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 'Additional Measures to Restore Justice with Respect to Victims of Repression that Occurred in the 1930s-40s and early 1950s,'" *Vedemosti S"ezda Narodnikh Deputatov i Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No. 8, item 184 (1989).

50. "At the CPSU Central Committee: On Perpetuating the Memory of the Victims of the Repressions of the Thirties, Forties, and Early Fifties," *Pravda* (4 July 1989), 1.

51. "Protocol No. 11: Meeting of the CPSU CC Politburo Commission...," (May 29, 1990) and "About the So-Called 'National-Deviationism,'" *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, No. 9 (308) (September, 1990), 72-76, 76-84; "In the CPSU CC Politburo Commission...," *Pravda* (31 May 1990), 1-2; "About the So-Called 'Sultan-Galiyev Counterrevolutionary Organization,'" *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, No. 10 (309) (October, 1990), 75-88.

52. On May 5, 1991 the Memorial legal defense society tried unsuccessfully to hold a demonstration on Red Square to protest use of Russian troops to deport Armenians from Azerbaidzhan, calling for negotiations between the combatants. They were barred from the square, while Pamyat was allowed to hold a ceremony there. See Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian, 2000 GMT (5 May 1991), as reported in FBIS-SOV-91-087 (6 May 1991), 14-15.

53. *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No.3 (January, 1988), 2; as cited in Julia Wishnevskiy, "Conflict Between State and 'Memorial' Society," *Report on the USSR* (January 20, 1989), 8.

54. Afanasyev interview in Stephen F. Cohen, *Op. cit.* See also Walter Laqueur, *Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1990), 259-276.

55. V. Interview with V. Glazychev, "Descendants' Anxious Memory," *Izvestiia* (26 August 1988), 3; *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 35 (September, 1988), 2.

56. "'Memorial' – Public Council Begins Work," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 36 (21 September 1988), 2.

57. Julia Wishnevskiy, *Op. cit.*

58. Yevgeny Yevtushenko, "Help 'Memorial,'" *Literaturnaya gazeta* (2 November 1988), 2.

59. Moscow World Service in English, 0410 GMT (31 December 1988), as reported in FBIS-SOV-89-001 (3 January 1989), 66.
60. Kerstin Witt, "Amnesia," *Profil* (Vienna)(23 January 1989), 43-44.
61. Interview with Vasili G. Zakharov, USSR Minister of Culture, "Our Common Duty," *Sovetskaya kultura* (11 March 1989), 1.
62. "Who Then Distrusts 'Memorial,'" *Izvestiia* (27 July 1989), 6.
63. "Descendants' Anxious Memory," *Izvestiia* (26 August 1988), 3.
64. "To Name All By Name," *Literaturnaya gazeta* (1 February 1989), 2.
65. M. Zarayev, "In Memory of Millions: The Constituent Conference of the 'Memorial' Society," *Selskaya zhizn'* (31 January 1989), 4.
66. Karayev, *Ibid.*, Interview with Yuri Afanas'yev, "Getting Out of the Quagmire of Stalinism," *Der Spiegel* (13 February 1989), 164-166. For information on the establishment of the Khar'kov Memorial group in December 1988, see *Robotnycha hazeta* (December 28, 1988), as reported in Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukrainian 'Memorial' Society Confronts Stalinist Heritage in Ukraine," *Report on the USSR* (March 17, 1989), 15.
67. Zarayev, *Ibid.*
68. Bill Keller, "Moscow Monument Dedicated to Victims of Totalitarian Regime," *New York Times* (31 October 1990).
69. "The 'Memorial' Society Has Been Founded," *Pravda Ukrainy* (5 March 1989), 3. Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukrainian 'Memorial' Society Confronts Stalinist Heritage in Ukraine," *Op. cit.*
70. Bohdan Nahaylo, *Ibid.*, 17-18. Nahaylo concludes that the Ukrainian Memorial Society is a vehicle "for campaigning for real democratization in Ukraine. The new organization supplements the already existing informal associations...and in this way strengthens the multifarious Ukrainian movement for national renewal."
71. M. Derimov, "Readers' Letters and Commentary," *Pravda Ukrainy* (11 March 1989), 3.

72. B. Qoyshibaev, "Adilet tu Koterdi," *Qazaq Adebiety* (April 21, 1989), 14; as cited in Azade-Ayse Rorlich, "Adilet" – The Kazakh Chapter of 'Memorial,'" *Report on the USSR* (January 26, 1990), 27.
73. Adam Michnik, "More Dreams (Questions About Stalinism)," *Tygodnik powszechny* (24 April 1988), 1, 4, (1 May 1988), 4.
74. Laqueur also discerns types of anti-Stalinism. Anti-Stalinism may be expressed as pluralism but may also take the form of Russian nationalism, including such manifestations as condemning Marxism-Leninism. He does not discuss non-Russian nationalism and anti-Stalinism. See Walter Laqueur, "Why Stalin? A National Debate," *Society* (March-April, 1990), 26-42.
75. Michnik analyzed the article by M. Titma and A. Vakhemetsin in *Sovetskaya kultura* (3 December 1987).
76. Algis Bitrimas, *Sovetskaya Litva* (1 September 1987).
77. Oles' Gonchar, *Literaturnaya gazeta* (7 October 1987).
78. Yamil Mustafin, "We Need Each Other," *Sovetskaya kultura* (11 February 1988), 3.
79. In 1986 Vasyly Bykov criticized dekulakization in Belorussia and suggested that collectivization contributed to collaborationist tendencies during World War II. See *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 20 (1986); Vera Tolz, "Novelist Says Excesses of Collectivization Explain Peasants' Welcome of Nazi Invaders," *Radio Liberty Research* (23 May 1986).
80. "Vasil Bykov: Guided by the Changes," *Literaturnaya gazeta* (18 January 1989), 4. Bykov spoke of the creation of a "democratic society," as a reaction to Stalinism, and firmly rejected the idea that de-Stalinization was an unnecessary aspect of democratization or was merely a campaign imposed from above to distract people from more important societal issues. Criticism of violations of Leninist policy in Belorussia is found in N. Kuznetsov, "Collectivization: Difficult Paths," *Sovetskaya Belorussiya* (25 December 1988), 2. He seems to argue for private holdings such as the Stolypin-era *khutor*, and against collectivization as a necessary part of socialism.
81. Bohdan Nahaylo, "Political Demonstration in Minsk Attests to Belorussian National Assertiveness," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 481/87 (26 November 1987). Some speakers at

the demonstration criticized the Russian view that Belorussian incorporation into the tsarist empire was progressive. Others maintained that repression in Belorussia in the 1930s amounted to genocide. Still others argued that the whole period of Soviet rule as a "tragedy." See Bohdan Nahaylo, "More Signs of Greater National Assertiveness," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 22/88 (18 January 1988).

82. Pavel Prudnikov, *Litaratura i mastatstva* (25 December 1987), 3.

83. A. Lukashuk, *Zvyazda* (22 December 1987), 2-3.

84. Kathleen Mihalisko, "Belorussian Public Reaction to Kurapaty: Other Massacre Sites Identified, Memorials Proposed," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 326/88 (21 July 1988).

85. Zenon Paznyak, "Kurapaty: A National Tragedy That Everyone Should Know About," *Moscow News*, No. 41 (16-23 October 1988), 16. Kurapaty Forest is briefly mentioned in Alec Nove, *Glasnost' in Action*, *Op. cit.*, 101.

86. *Sovetskaya Belorussiya* (23 October 1988). After the Kurapaty revelations, Bykov wrote a novella about the horrors of forced collectivization and the moral bankruptcy of Stalinism entitled "Manhunt," *Polymia* (January, 1989). He gave the journal's honorarium to the Martyrologists of Belorussia. See Joseph Mozur, "Vasil' Bykau: Exhuming the Belorussian Past," *World Literature Today* (1990), 251-258.

87. Kathleen Mihalisko, "Rival Anti-Stalin Demonstrations in Minsk Prompted by Kurapaty Grave Find," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 315/88 (July 12, 1988).

88. Kathleen Mihalisko, "The Archeology of Stalinist Genocide in Belorussia," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 452/88 (October 3, 1988).

89. G. Tarnavskiy, Deputy Chairman of the government commission investigating the mass gravesite in Kurapaty Woods and Belorussian Prosecutor, in an interview published in *Izvestiia*, was careful not to assert that Stalin was responsible for the murders, and pointed out that since Nazis carried out mass executions in Minsk, "hasty conclusions" should not be drawn. See M. Shimanskiy, "Glasnost' versus Rumors: Whose Remains Lie in the Forest Near Minsk?" *Izvestiia* (28 August 1988), 2. But see *Moskovskie novosti* (21 August 1988) which objectively reported the discovery. The central press began to change its stance in late 1988. In September, 1988, *Izvestiia* published a noncommittal article on the interrogation by the governmental commission of witnesses to the murders. This article, though not asserting that Stalin was responsible, reproduced grisly testimonies dated

from the 1937-1940 period. See M. Shimanskiy, "Tragedy in Kurapaty: Who Was Shot Here?" *Izvestiia* (12 September 1988), 4. In late November, *Izvestiia* published a third article on Kurapaty Woods on the results of the investigation by the Belorussian prosecutor's office and the government commission. These authorities concluded that the murders were committed by NKVD troops in 1937-1941. The author concluded that "I am deeply convinced that a public trial of Stalin should take place as soon as possible." See M. Matukovskiy, "The Truth About the Kurapaty," *Izvestiia* (27 November 1988), 3.

90. Local harassment of Talaka is discussed in Alesya Semukha, "Potential of Regional Movements," *Vek XX I Mir*, No.7 (1988), 5. Semukha notes that the Belorussian Kom-somol tried to control Talaka and "The republican press is unfriendly to the idea of ethnic and cultural revival." Kathleen Mihalisko, "The Archeology of Stalinist Genocide in Belorussia," *Op. cit.*, 5, mentions Paznyak's discovery that another gravesite in a Minsk suburb had been plowed over just after he had published his first article on Kurapaty Woods.

91. "Report of the Governmental Commission Formed by the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers on 14 June 1988," *Zvyazda* (22 January 1989), 1, 3. See also the interview with Nina Mazay, chairperson of the government commission, in M. Shimanskiy, "In the Republics' Governments: In Memory of the Victims of Repression," *Izvestiia* (26 January 1989), 1.

92. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1400 GMT (26 January 1989), as reported in FBIS-SOV-89-017 (27 January 1989), 63.

93. "At the Belorussian CP Central Committee Bureau Commission...," *Sovetskaya Belorussiya* (23 November 1988), 1.

94. A. Lukashuk and M. Mikhayevich, interview with N. I. Dementey, "We are United by Memory and Truth," *Sovetskaya Belorussia* (15 December 1988), 2. Interview was reprinted from *Zvyazda* (11 December 1988).

95. "The Commission Begins Work," *Sovetskaya Belorussiya* (9 February 1989), 4.

96. V. Khachirashvili, interview with A. A. Zdanovich, *Sovetskaya Belorussiya* (18 February 1989), 3.

97. A. Lukashuk and M. Mikhayevich, *Op. cit.*

98. Zyanon Paznyak and Yavgen Shmygalev, "Kurapaty—Road of Death," *Litaratura i mastatstva*, No. 23 (June 3, 1988), 14-15. Bykov wrote an introduction to the article, comparing the massacre to Nazi war atrocities. The article was reprinted in Poland's *Prawo i zycie*, No. 31 (July 30, 1988), 11, 16 under the title "The Corpses Rotted, The Earth Subsided." Paznyak published additional details in *Litaratura i mastatstva* (September 16, 1988). See also Kathleen Mihalisko, "Mass Grave of Stalin's Victims Discovered in Minsk," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 288/88 (26 June 1988).
99. Walter Stankevich, "Kurapaty Victims Commemorated in Minsk," *Report on the USSR* (17 November, 1989), 24-25.
100. "In the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee: Restoring Historical Justice," *Pravda Ukrainy* (5 February 1989), 1.
101. "In the Ukrainian Communist Party Politburo Commission...," *Pravda* (Kiev)(10 December 1989), 3.
102. Roman Solchanyk, "Filling in the 'Blank Spots' in Ukrainian History: An Interview with Stanislav V. Kul'chyts'kyi," *Op. cit.*, 22.
103. "The Truth About a National Tragedy," *Pravda Ukrainy* (7 February 1990), 4. Ukrainian party authorities had long denied that a man-made famine had occurred. See "Another Soviet Denial that there Was Ever a Man-Made Famine in the Ukraine," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 299/86 (5 August 1986). Ukrainian intellectuals had tried to expose the truth. See, for example, e.g., Oleksa Musiyenko, *Literatura Ukraina* (18 February 1988), 7-8. Musiyenko terms Stalin "a monster" who immediately after Lenin's death began murderous repressions and who bore major responsibility for the 1932-1933 "murder famine" in Ukraine. Stanislav V. Kul'chyts'kyi has also been active in pointing to Stalin's collectivization measures as a cause of the famine, although in 1988 he did not appear to condemn collectivization itself. See S. V. Kul'chyts'kyi, *Visti z Ukrainy*, Nos. 3-4 (1988); *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, No. 3 (1988), 15-27; More recently he has suggested that industrialization and collectivization were catastrophes ultimately traceable to Stalin's attempts to create a type of "society that is not capable of existing." See Roman Solchanyk, "Filling in the 'Blank Spots' in Ukrainian History: An Interview with Stanislav V. Kul'chyts'kyi," *Op. cit.*, 19; *1933: Tragediya holodu* (Kiev: 1989). At the 19th CPSU Conference the Ukrainian writer and delegate Borys Oliinyk had proposed that the party investigate the cause of the 1932-1933 famine and other crimes of the Stalin period, and identify the victims and perpetrators. See the report of his speech in *Pravda* (2 July 1988).

104. E. Kiyashko, "To Know and to Remember," *Rabochaya gazeta* (Kiev)(2 February 1989), 3.
105. Kiev International Service in English to North America, 0030 GMT (19 February 1989), as reported in FBIS-SOV-89-034 (22 February 1989), 54.
106. Marco Carynnyk, "The Killing Fields of Kiev," *Commentary* (October, 1990), 20.
107. Sergey Kisilev, "The Mystery of Bykovnya Forest," *Literaturnaya gazeta* (November 30, 1988), 2. See also Bill Keller, "Behind Stalin's Green Fence: Who Filled the Mass Graves," *The New York Times* (March 6, 1989), A1, A8.
108. TASS report (March 24, 1989) as reported in "Government Commission Says Stalin Responsible for Bykovnya Grave," *The Ukrainian Weekly* (April 9, 1989), 15.
109. Marco Carynnyk, *Op. cit.*, 22.
110. Sergey Kisilev, "The Bykovnya Archipelago," *Literaturnaya gazeta* (April 5, 1989), 2.
111. The commission had formally requested access to KGB archive materials. See Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian, 2200 GMT (2 March 1989), as reported in FBIS-SOV-89-047 (13 March 1989), 91.
112. Sergey Kiselev, *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 17 (26 April 1989), 2.
113. On May 7, 1989, the first annual memorial service at Bykovnya Forest was held. At the service, the Kiev branch of Memorial invited L. M. Kaganovich to attend the next annual memorial service, and collected funds for his travel. Memorial called on him to repent and tell the truth about Bykovnya. See "Open Letter to L. M. Kaganovich: Waiting for You in Bykovnya," *Vechernyaya Moskva* (14 February 1990), 2. The appeal also appeared in *Vecherniy Kiev*.
114. Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1923 GMT (12 May 1989), as reported in FBIS-SOV-89-098 (23 May 1989), 68-69.
115. A. Kleva, "Sign of Sorrow and Purification," *Izvestiia* (6 November 1989), 6.
116. *News from Ukraine*, No. 21 (1989); Vera Tolz, "Publication of Archive Materials on Stalin's Terror," *Report on the USSR* (10 August 1990), 15. Brief accounts of media revela-

tions about mass graves in Dnepropetrovsk, Pasichna (just south of Ivano-Frankivsk), Poltava, and the previously discovered Vinnytsia gravesite are given in Marco Carynnyk, *Op. cit.*, 22-24.

117. Christine Demkowycz, "Victims of Stalinism: Drohobych Confronts Horrific Past," *Ukrainian Weekly* (10 March 1991), 1-2.

118. *Komsomolskyi prapor* (30 September 1990), as reported in "Mass Grave of Stalin's Victims Unearthed Near Ivano-Frankivske," *The Ukrainian Weekly* (12 November 1989), 1, 10.

119. Hryhoriy Drobchak, "Vinnytsia's Kuropaty," *Silski visti*, No. 45 (4 June 1989); L. Pastushenko and V. Savtsov, "Crime Without Punishment," *Radyanska Ukraina* (1 July 1989); Kathleen Mihalisko, "Ukrainian Press Publishes Details of Vinnitsa Affair of 1943," *Report on the USSR* (14 July 1989), 19-20. See also the excellent book by Ihor Kamenetsky, ed., *The Tragedy of Vinnytsia: Materials on Stalin's Policy of Extermination in Ukraine During the Great Purge 1936-1938* (Toronto: Ukrainian Historical Association, 1989). This volume reproduces excerpts from the U.S. Congress hearings on Vinnytsia. For the hearings, see *The Crimes of Khrushchev*, Part 2, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, 86th Congress, First Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959).

120. A. Kleva, "Echo of Katyn," *Izvestiia* (13 June 1990), 4.

121. Gennadiy Zhavoronkov, "Horror of the Black Road," *Moscow News*, No.1 (1-7 June 1990), 10.

122. Viktor Smirnov, *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* (31 May 1987), 1.

123. Bohdan Nahaylo, "National Ferment in Moldavia," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 32/88 (24 January 1988).

124. "At the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee," *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* (2 July 1989), 1-2.

125. *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* (10 June 1990), 1.

126. Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 1535 GMT (9 June 1990), as reported in FBIS-SOV-90-113 (12 June 1990), 112-113.

127. Baku Domestic Service in Azeri, 1700 GMT (21 March 1989), as reported in FBIS-SOV-89-058 (28 March 1989), 62-63.
128. Ilyas Afandiyev, *Kommunist* (Baku)(15 January 1989), 3, 4.
129. Elizabeth Fuller, "Georgia, Stalin, and the Demonstrations of 1956," *Op. cit.*, 1-2.
130. These articles include a positive appraisal of the period of Georgian independence, a discussion about 'national deviationists,' testimonies by intellectuals about purges in the 1930s, and an eyewitness account of the deportation of the Meskhetians in late 1944. As cited in Elizabeth Fuller, "Filling in the 'Blank Spots' in Georgian History: Noe Zhordania and Joseph Stalin," *Report on the USSR* (31 March 1989), 19.
131. Georgiy Margvelashvili, "Fate: Postscript to History," *Zarya vostoka* (12 June 1988), 4.
132. Eldar Shengelaya, "Half-Truth Feeds the Lie," *Sovetskaya kultura* (18 June 1988), 6.
133. Mzia Bakradze and Bela Tsveradze, "Several Episodes of a Bloody Time," *Literaturuli sakartvelo*, No. 46 (11 November 1988), 13-14.
134. M. Aydinov, "To the Victims of Stalin's Repressions," *Trud* (21 October 1988), 4. In late 1990 with the break-in at the Tbilisi KGB headquarters (where some documents were stolen), and later with the massive change in personnel in the Georgian KGB, there were fears by the center that local archives would be seriously compromised, and the Georgian KGB archives were shipped to Rostov.
135. Kathleen Watters, "Central Asia and the Central Press: A Study in News Coverage," *Journal of Soviet Nationalities* (Summer, 1990), 115.
136. V. Artemenko, "In the Chase for Readers," *Pravda* (4 April 1990), 2, as cited in Watters, *Ibid*, 120. For coverage by *Pravda vostoka*, see, for example, the anti-Stalinist article "Personality in History," (1988); this article prompted a letter from a war veteran who defended Stalin by stating "whatever someone suffered in the struggle for power was, probably, necessary." He also repeated apologia such as Stalin's ignorance of repressions and the necessity of Stalinization for the industrialization and defense of the USSR. See A. Kerbalayev, "One Should Not Slander," (22 January 1989), 3. This letter prompted a response from A. Zhukov, supervisor of the Uzbek Procuracy's group in charge of examining files, who basically answers that most of those repressed were innocent victims. He

concludes that "monstrous lawlessness" calls out for redress and that "we have the right to be judges over Stalin and his circle of cronies." A. Zhukov, "We Will Not Forget the Victims," (5 February 1989), 3.

137. James Critchlow, "The Crisis Deepens," *Report on the USSR* (4 January 1991), 40; James Critchlow, "Uzbeks Retreating from Ties with the Center," *Report on the USSR* (25 January 1991), 24-26.

138. D. A. Usatov, "In the Name of the Triumph of Justice," *Pravda Vostoka* (10 January 1989), 5.

139. Chingiz Aytmatov, "Is the Foundation Being Undermined?" *Sovetskaya Kirghizia* (6 May 1988), 3. Another article that appeared in mid-1988 dealt even more than Aytmatov's article with the crimes of Stalin in Kirghizia. Writing in *Sovettik Kyrgyzstan*, Shabdanbay Abdyramanov linked de-Stalinization to democratization. He discussed the distortions created in asserting that the Russian Empire "liberated" Kirghizia and how Kirghiz writers were accused of "anti-Russian" and "anti-Soviet" sentiments, and mentioned details of Stalinist repressions. See "Why is Restructuring Necessary?" *Sovettik Kyrgyzstan* (26 June 1988), 3.

140. "In the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee," *Kazakhstanskaya pravda* (2 January 1989), 1.

141. Moscow TASS in English, 1743 GMT (16 February 1990), as reported in FBIS-SOV-90-037 (23 February 1990), 69.

142. Moscow TASS in English, 1508 GMT (5 January 1990), as reported in FBIS-SOV-90-005 (8 January 1990), 64.

143. Viktor Dik, *Kazakhstanskaya pravda* (24 July 1988). As reported in Bess Brown, "Kazakhstanskaya pravda Publishes Description of Karaganda Prison Camp Complex," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 379/88 (19 August 1988).

144. M. Petrov, "Vacation Camp," *Komsomol'skaya pravda* (3 March 1989), 1.

145. The growth of inter-republic diplomatic ties through the resurrection of the *postpredstva* system is discussed in the author's forthcoming *Union Republic Diplomacy* (1992).

146. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956*, Vols. I-II (London: Collins, 1974); Dmitriy Volkogonov, *Triumf i tragediya: politicheskii portret I.V. Stalina*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1989); Roy Medvedev, *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 5 (February, 1989); Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism*, Rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

147. On the new data, see the overview in Vera Tolz, "Publication of Archive Materials on Stalin's Terror," *Op. cit.*, 15-16; S. G. Wheatcroft, "More Light on the Scale of Repression and Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union in the 1930s," *Soviet Studies* (April, 1990), 355-367; Alec Nove, "How Many Victims in the 1930s?" *Soviet Studies* (April, 1990), 369-373; Alec Nove, "How Many Victims in the 1930s?—II," *Soviet Studies* (October, 1990), 811-814.

148. J. Arch Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Robert W. Thurston, "Fear and Belief in the USSR's 'Great Terror': Response to Arrest, 1935-1939," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (1986), 213-234. In his "The Soviet Family During the Great Terror, 1935-1941," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (1991), 567, Thurston argues that the numbers of positive reports about close family ties implies that the number of purge victims was low, supporting estimates such as Lorimer's or Anderson's and Silver's.

149. The numbers of books, articles, letters, and rejoinders published by these scholars are too voluminous to completely cite here. Some representative samples of the debate include Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes in the USSR," *Slavic Review* (Fall, 1985), 517-536; Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946); Alec Nove, "How Many Victims in the 1930s?" *Soviet Studies* (April, 1990), 369-373, and "How Many Victims in the 1930s?—II," *Soviet Studies* (October, 1990), 811-814; Steven Rosefield, "Incriminating Evidence: Excess Deaths and Forced Labor under Stalin: A Final Reply to Critics," *Soviet Studies* (April, 1987), 292-313, and "Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union: A Reconsideration of the Demographic Consequences of Forced Industrialization, 1929-1949," *Soviet Studies* (July, 1983), 385-409; S. G. Wheatcroft, "More Light on the Scale of Repression and Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union in the 1930s," *Soviet Studies* (April, 1990), 355-367. For an excellent introduction to the debate, see Thomas Sherlock and Vera Tolz, "Debates over Number of Stalin's Victims in the USSR and in the West," *Report on the USSR* (8 September 1989), 10-14.

150. Mark Beissinger and Lubomyr Hajda, *Op. cit.*, 314-315.

151. Vera Tolz, "Publication of Archive Materials on Stalin's Terror," *Op. cit.*, 15.



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