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The 1982 Reorganization of Agricultural Administration in the Soviet Union:

The Role of the Communist Party in Agenda Setting

Barbara Ann Chotiner

**University of Pittsburgh Center for
Russian and East European Studies**

Barbara Ann Chotiner, is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama. She is the author of *Krushchev's Party Reform*, and "Dismantling an Innovation" (title 501 in *The Carl Beck Papers*), and shorter studies of Soviet policy processes and the role of the Communist Party in the economy.

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Soviet politics under Mikhail S. Gorbachev became the arena for wide-ranging institutional and policy change across a broad spectrum of issue areas. These alterations were supported and opposed by sometimes unpredictable coalitions; victories were engineered using novel as well as familiar techniques. As a consequence, there has often been a tendency to treat the political scene in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from March 1985 through August 1991 as almost *sui generis*. In many respects, the period of Gorbachev's General Secretaryship of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has been treated as the antithesis of the political regime during the so-called "era of stagnation" under Leonid I. Brezhnev.

Such emphases very properly alert both the scholar and the layperson to major discontinuities in Soviet political development as well as to the scope and salience of innovation, especially after the Nineteenth Party Conference. Yet to understand more fully the character of the changes that have occurred and the nature of the system that was evolving until the attempted coup of August 1991, one needs to know more about previous political patterns. These include programs and behavior not only during the interregna of Yuri V. Andropov and Konstantin V. Chernenko but also during the late Brezhnev General Secretaryship. During these years of three leaders who were slowed by physical frailties, other political actors should have been freer to relate to one another without reference to a final political arbiter and to search for new approaches to political, economic, and social problems that were not being solved successfully. Strategies and tactics – tried during these years and even at the beginning of the Gorbachev administration – could be discarded, when proved inadequate or unworkable, in favor of more radical alternatives. As a result, processes of social learning may have been accelerated, so that after 1985 consensus could rapidly be built in favor of non-incremental change that was often heterodox according to previous interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. Understanding experimentation with policy initiatives, carried out by Gorbachev and other junior members of the Brezhnev administra-

tion, can help the analyst to account for solutions either chosen or disregarded by top Party and government officials after Chernenko's death. Such information can also help to account for the pace of alterations following March 1985.¹ Hence, the sources of Gorbachevian politics may be better illuminated by more complete knowledge about the relatively recent past.²

The present study represents a limited effort to contribute to such a task. Attention will be directed toward one of the last major domestic political initiatives of the Brezhnev administration—the Food Program adopted at the May 1982 Plenum of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). More specifically, exposition and analysis will focus upon those provisions of the Program which redefined the structures for administering state and collective farming, agricultural services, procurement, the foodstuffs industry, and trade in comestibles. Created were territorially-based agencies at the *raion*, oblast or krai, union-republican, and all-union levels to administer the “agro-industrial complex.”³ Historically and in contemporary times, agricultural policy and the modes of directing farming operations had been viewed as helping to define the nature of the former Soviet regime. Grass-roots involvement in rural production processes has not only served as a generator of political resources for the Communist Party, but also provided a framework within which power has been exercised. Hence, altering agricultural organization in 1982 had actual or potential salience in terms of regime values, popular satisfaction, and the role of the Communist Party in society.

Under Gorbachev, efforts to recast the Soviet economy—including the agrarian sector—engendered debates about values, efficacy, and the role of institutions. Before the failed August 1991 coup, a persistent topic was the roadblocks that Party apparatchiks and organizations raised against economic liberalization. Prior to suspension of Communist Party activity in the wake of the plot, there was speculation about the effect that increased governmental pre-eminence and the fostering of private

enterprise might have had in eroding the position of the CPSU in Soviet society. While the latter set of questions is now moot, understanding *earlier relations* of Communist Party officials to changes in economic institutions and practices would help to clarify the likelihood that the Party would have functioned as a brake upon the transformation of the Soviet system. An important aspect of this issue would be information about the receptivity or resistance of apparatchiks to proposed changes, as well as the officials' efforts to implement or sabotage those reforms that were enacted. In this connection, experience with the creation of *raion* and *oblast* agro-industrial associations as well as Commissions for the Agro-Industrial Complex of the Presidiums of the union-republican and the USSR Councils of Ministers may be germane. The operations of these agencies were slated to reduce Party committees' involvement with decision-making and operations in farming along with related industries.⁴ Yet, CPSU functionaries and committees had traditionally been heavily occupied with prescribing, controlling, evaluating, and rendering assistance to production activities in the countryside.⁵ A better understanding of involvements by CPSU agencies and officials with the 1982 reorganization of agricultural administration might therefore help shed some light on later reactions by professional politicians and their local organizations to a reduction of their economic prerogatives. Particularly interesting is the relationship of apparatchiks and Party organs to the fashioning of reform proposals and their placement upon the political agenda for action. Orientation toward issue-creation and acceptance is, to a significant degree, indicative not just of receptiveness to change but to diagnoses of novelty as potentially threatening or advantageous.⁶ Moreover, underlying attitudes about altering one aspect of the former Soviet system are likely to have been evaluations of the larger web of political and economic interactions, as well as the place of the Communist Party in them.

Analysis of Party roles and functions will encompass the months from the October 1980 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, at which Brezhnev announced plans to formulate a Food Program, to the May 1982 CC

CPSU meeting which approved the initiative. (One of its components was administrative reorganization.) Primary emphasis will be upon the means by which, at about the time of November 1981 CC Plenum, territorially-based agro-industrial organs emerged as the preferred solution to perceived inadequacies in the national and local administrative structure. Concerns will include the substance and methods of policy initiation and opposition, contrasts and similarities in participation by Party bureaucrats and others such as state officials and scholars, coalition-building and cleavages, and institutional as well as procedural parameters of agenda-setting. In addition, attention will be directed, to the manner in which issues subsumed under the topic of organizational reform were defined, explored, and developed.⁷ This process would be a medium through which alliances could be fashioned, consensus gained about the meaning and implications of new proposals, and barriers to change removed. In a system where ideological interpretations could be used to close gates against policy initiatives and in which the identification of institutional interests with particular organizational arrangements might bias elites against novelty, issue determination and presentation could significantly affect the likelihood that problems or opportunities would be addressed.⁸ Through such an investigation of the deliberative phase of the decisional process, one may be able to discover whether, within one issue-area, there is evidence of political patterns that were to emerge after 1985.

**Utilizing a Platform for Policy-Initiation:
From the October 1980 Central Committee Plenum
through the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress**

On October 21, 1980, General Secretary Brezhnev announced to the CPSU Central Committee that the Politburo had concluded the desirability of drawing up a "food program" and including it in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan.⁹ This decision was likely to have been made by

consensus, or with objections being muffled or ignored; for Geidar Aliev told a 1976 meeting with the press that there had never been a “formal vote” during his years on the highest Party body.¹⁰ Of course, consensus decision-making tends to mute the expression, development, and persistence of clearly-differing points of view.

Describing the character and purposes of the suggested special plan, Brezhnev said that it should create conditions so that “agriculture and branches of industry, procurements, preservation, transportation, and processing of agricultural products serving...[farming],...the food industry and trade in food goods...should...be planned,...financed, and administered as a single whole.”¹¹ He also served notice that “[t]he Council of Ministers is preparing proposals for the improvement of the organizational structure of administration”¹² of the economy and suggested that these blueprints be finished before the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress. Discussing problems that the governmental recommendations should address, the General Secretary mentioned several themes that were to become significant later. These included local decision-making capabilities, “departmentalism” and relationships between production-branch and areal systems of organization¹³ Since these indications were accepted by the Plenum,¹⁴ they became the basis for further policy initiation and parameters within which ideas for change might be advanced.

However, support for the Food Program or its utilization to urge structural alterations varied significantly among members of the leadership. Writing in that issue of *Kommunist* which immediately followed the one carrying the news of the October CC meeting, Konstantin U. Chernenko emphasized the primary importance that the Food Program would assume. He also praised “agro-industrial integration” and, in particular, “agrarian-industrial associations.”¹⁵ Mikhail S. Gorbachev characterized “the solution of the food program [as] one of the most important economic political tasks of the eleventh and subsequent five-year plans.”¹⁶ However, he made no specific mention of any kind of permanent relationship between organizations in different functional

branches.¹⁷ Politburo candidate member M. S. Solomentsev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Republic, only alluded to “specialization and concentration of production” in a late December article.¹⁸ He seemed to have favored fewer and simpler long-term economic arrangements between farms and/or other productive entities. In the *World Marxist Review*, Politburo candidate Boris Ponomarev placed deficiencies in “the mechanism of management” in distinctly second place as a cause of inadequate food supplies.¹⁹ Thus he may not have favored structural rearrangements.

At the late February and early March 1981 convocation of the all-union Party Congress, six Politburo members and candidates made reference to the Food Program, but not to agro-industrial integration. (See Appendix A). These were the Kazakh, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Uzbek Communist Party First Secretaries as well as the national and Russian Prime Ministers. Among the eight areal party secretaries included on the Politburo, only Eduard Shevardnadze discussed permanent structural ties between organizations involved in the food production cycle. He alluded specifically to *raion* agro-industrial associations,²⁰ and was the only one of thirty-six upper-echelon CPSU and state bureaucrats to do so. Only the Party First Secretary for Moldavia—where vertical amalgamation of enterprises in specific sectors like viticulture and the wine industry was quite advanced—and the USSR Agriculture Minister also clearly talked about agro-industrial integration. The Ukrainian Prime Minister also may have alluded to the topic. Thus, enthusiasm or promotion for the Food Program was not necessary for plans to re-order agricultural administration; and slightly more Party than state officials—who made their views on the two subjects known—may have favored restructuring (see Appendix A). Also notable are the significant numbers of CPSU bureaucrats heading republics, *oblast*, *krais*, and the City of Moscow whose positions seemed to indicate at best no enthusiasm and at worst opposition to yet another large project for improving the Soviet diet.

Nevertheless, opponents and those indifferent to the Food Program were afforded a vehicle to press other agriculturally-related concerns by the broad framing of issues to be included within the ambit of the special-purpose plan. Helpful, too, was its intended insertion into the overall development scheme for the decade. The Eleventh Five Year Plan, with its projections to 1990, would be discussed at the national Party Congress; and of course, local variants would be scrutinized at comparable sub-national meetings. Such planning also required scholarly consultation—and hence was a topic at convocations of experts. The republican, *oblast*, *krai*, and *raion* food programs would have to be negotiated among agencies in each area and vertically along various organizational chains of command, such as those of Gosplan and the Ministry of Agriculture or the CPSU apparatus. Finally, the press would serve not only to mobilize and pressure, but also to inform and provide a channel for debate over subsidiary as well as basic issues.

Individual jurisdictions were apparently given a time-table for compiling their sections of the USSR Food Program. Work on this project had apparently begun in the Russian Republic by December 1980.²¹ V. V. Shcherbitskii told the Ukrainian Party Congress that “the order and period of the working out of the program in the localities is known, and the corresponding work is already being carried out.”²² At the January 1981 Congress of the Georgian Communist Party a “representative working group” considered matters associated with the “agro-industrial complex and the food program.” Such committees contributed to the drafting of Congress enactments²³ like the republican five-year plan.

Involvement by territorial CPSU and state authorities seems to have been rather strongly urged by Gorbachev at a December meeting.²⁴ His exhortation may have been motivated by a wish to bind unconvinced officials to the fortunes of the Food Program by their participation in drafting the specifics of the new policy. However, the Central Committee Secretary for Agriculture may also have been concerned that local leaders have an opportunity for genuine inputs into the decisional process; Krem-

linologist Dev Murarka quotes Zdenek Mlynar as saying that in 1967, at least, Gorbachev thought a more independent role for sub-national functionaries was desirable.²⁵ To the extent that he acted upon such views, the CC Secretary may have helped to engender a type of politics in which regional and republican interests received better articulation and inter-territorial cleavages became more apparent.

The structuring of the process for developing the Food Program, as a bureaucratic task for local officials, may have strengthened the advancement of areally-oriented concerns. Yet many sub-national CPSU committees and their leaders may not have been among the major actors in elaborating the Program. Vladimir Karlov, Gorbachev's deputy in supervising agriculture within the CC Secretariat, listed a number of organizations and groupings involved in discussions and bargaining over specifics of the new complex of policies. He named the CPSU Central Committee, the all-union Council of Ministers, "corresponding ministries and departments," farm heads, as well as experts on agriculture and economics.²⁶ He then added that "[t]aken into account were proposals of local party and soviet organs, materials of the press and letters of workers!"²⁷

Perhaps one reason for the rather peripheral role that Karlov seems to have been suggesting for the sub-national CPSU committees was skepticism, resistance, or unwillingness to make a commitment on the part of territorial officials. In a 1982 article, Petr Alekseev, Editor-in-Chief of *Izvestiya*, reminisced that earlier he had asked republican and provincial leaders to furnish information about the direction of their contributions for the Food Program, but was met with an unwillingness to fulfill his request.²⁸

The importance of the press as a channel of communication and persuasion for policy development and adoption was underlined by a change in sponsorship of the journal *Kadry sel'skogo khozyaistva*. It had begun publication as an organ of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture, which—along with Gosplan—had been charged since 1978 by the CC CPSU with harmonizing agro-industrial integration activities.²⁹ The first 1981 issue

of the journal announced that it had become a publication of the CPSU Central Committee. The notice also stated that “[t]he transformation of this periodical...into a journal of the Central Committee testifies about the enormous significance which the party attaches to the development of the agro-industrial complex, to the implementation of the food plan.”³⁰

Two specialized meetings also drew Communist Party representation. One was the December 1980 All-Union Agronomic Conference at which Gorbachev spoke about the Food Program and which republican, *oblast*, and *krai* CPSU secretaries attended.³¹ Earlier, in November, the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the Economics of Agriculture and the Ukrainian Institute of the Economics and Organization of Agriculture *imeni* A. G. Shlikter had held a series of sessions. Their topic was “further development of the specialization and concentration of agricultural production on the basis of inter-farm cooperation and agro-industrial integration.”³² Ukrainian Party Central Committee personnel attended.³³ This conference was likely to have been planned well in advance. Nevertheless, the gathering may have provided some sort of early forum for considering implications that a set of new initiatives to increase the food supply might have for the structure of farming and related production branches.

Within those arenas used to discuss the Food Program, several issues were raised that either supported or directly advanced the possibility of introducing *raion* agro-industrial associations (RAPO's). Several Communist Party journals discussed governmental administrative arrangements for economic operations as a source of deficiencies in providing the populace with an adequate diet. While *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* simply noted that the “mechanism of economic administration” was outmoded,³⁴ in *Kommunist Estonii*, *raikom* First Secretary V. Roosma applauded the proclaimed intention to manage the entire agro-industrial complex in a unified fashion. Roosma believed this change would contribute to better “coordination.”³⁵ Writing in *Kommunist*, economist P. Ignatovskii pointed to the large number of independent departmental actors in policy-im-

plementation as a condition impeding efforts to raise the supply of comestibles. He reminded readers that uncoordinated activities by such organs had previously undercut execution of the Program for the Non-Chernozom Zone of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR).³⁶ The editorial in the same issue of the magazine argued that any reform of economic structures and management practices should have several objectives that would seem likely to expand the role of territorial authorities below the all-union level. Any reorganization, the editorial noted, "should help to overcome departmental disconnection and to ensure the correct combination of branch and territorial administration."³⁷ Hence, an early signal may have been given that national CPSU officials were not adverse to extending analysis of dysfunctional elements of the ministerial system in the agro-industrial sphere to an examination of the proper role of lower-echelon territorial organs. Such an investigation could also have implications for the role of local Party agencies.

Within such a context, many proposals and diagnoses were made in different circumstances. As early as the Kiev conference on farming organization, in November 1980, the director of a national research institute who also sat on the collegium of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture advocated "thorough studies of territorial-production structures at the level of administrative *raions*."³⁸ The speaker may have been privy to knowledge that district coordinative structures were being considered as one lever for effecting greater availability of foodstuffs and raw materials.

Certainly, the Latvian Communists took some advantage of the opening provided by the October Plenum's approval of Brezhnev's propositions about supervising the agro-industrial complex. In the issue of *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii* that went to press just after the CC CPSU Meeting, an economist extolled the virtues of *raion* agro-industrial associations. He mentioned the records of such agencies in four districts — Talsinskii and Valmierskii in Latvia itself, Vil'yandiskii in Estonia, and Abashkii in Georgia.³⁹ The author also urged that

[a]nalysis shows that at the given stage of the development of agriculture, for the effective administration of production; for the successful leadership of the processes of specialization, concentration, and industrialization on the basis of inter-farm cooperation and agro-industrial integration, the most expedient is the creation of common formations in the form of *raion* agro-industrial associations.⁴⁰

Hence, an initiative to get the diffusion of RAPO's onto the national political agenda was made. Yet, in a later issue of the same republican organ, Latvian Premier and CC Bureau member⁴¹ Yuri Ruben was more cautious; he did not urge the RAPO as a pattern for widespread adoption.⁴²

In 1981, party congresses were to provide opportunities for agitating for broader utilization of the RAPO form and for a reinforcement of district administration. Reporting on the speech of the Abasha *Raikom* First Secretary, G. D. Mgeladze, *Kommunist's* correspondent complimented the performance of the district RAPO.⁴³ In his report to the Estonian Party convocation, CC First Secretary K. G. Vaino narrated the histories of the Vil'yandi and Pyarnu associations and praised the economic effectiveness of these experimental organizational prototypes. He stated that all other Estonian *raions* should have RAPO's and suggested that the republican agricultural and associated industrial agencies might need a new administrative nexus.⁴⁴ While his comments were not as expansive as those of economist A. Bondars in the Latvian Party press, Vaino did seem to suggest that the utility of the RAPO outside Estonia was worthy of consideration.

Developments in Ukraine were sometimes mentioned by commentators as precursors of the introduction of agro-industrial associations on a national basis.⁴⁵ However, discussants at the Ukrainian Party meeting pursued more general issues of the function of state and party organs in the *raion*. I. G. Grintsov, First Secretary of the Sumi Obkom, claimed that the "*raion* link" was being rendered more effective.⁴⁶ A *raikom* first secretary—also using a positive declarative approach—expressed appreciation that the all-union and republican CC's were concerned about expanded functions for *raikoms* in assuring farm policy implementation.⁴⁷

Further support for upgrading authority at the bottom of the governmental and CPSU hierarchies was evidenced at the national Twenty-Sixth Party Congress. A *raikom* first secretary praised Brezhnev's memoir of the Virgin Lands campaign⁴⁸ in order to point out the desirability of upgrading the standing of district *partkoms* as political institutions. Besides being the only ranking speaker to mention RAPO's explicitly, Eduard Shevardnadze distinguished himself from other Politburo and Central Committee members and candidates in advocating increased capabilities for district institutions. He argued the need for "branch departments" in the *raikom*.⁴⁹ Some of them could probably oversee services, education, and the like, while other departments might deal with agriculture or specific types of industrial production.

Thus, although evidence appears to exist of concern about coordination and decision-making powers in the basic territorial jurisdictions, a countervailing tendency was also manifest. Just as the Latvians had published an article immediately following the October 1980 CC Plenum about their development of novel administrative forms, so did the Moldavian Communists. In the issue of *Kommunist Moldavii* that went to press on October 28 there was a contribution by I. I. Bodyul.⁵⁰ Bodyul had served as Moldavian CC First Secretary from 1961 to 1980 and in the latter year became USSR First Deputy Premier supervising agriculture.⁵¹ He is believed to have been Leonid Brezhnev's preference—rather than Gorbachev—for the post of CPSU Central Committee Secretary for Agriculture; and, of course, Bodyul had been the General Secretary's subordinate when Brezhnev was Moldavian Party chief.⁵² Hence, Bodyul's contribution might be considered worth the attention by others interested in the implications of the Food Program for agricultural organization; at least some readers might wonder whether any views he expressed were shared by the General Secretary. Such questions might have been highlighted by knowledge that the essay had already appeared in *Partiinaya zhizn'*⁵³

Emphasizing previous national Party Congress and CC CPSU approbation for Moldavian initiatives, Bodyul described the republican system which emphasized integration by product type or by function and had as a centerpiece four vertically-interlinked entities for operations dealing with tobacco, fruits and vegetables, wines and meat. However, collective farm councils were used to harmonize at least some kinds of interfarm productive work.⁵⁴ A later interview with *Pravda* correspondents also suggested that Party authorities had little involvement beyond gate-keeping with the development of new structures; the USSR Deputy Premier only told of a communication from the Chadyr-Lungskii *Raikom* that the local *kolkhoz* council wanted to form a joint association for mechanization and electrification and of his own fact-finding trip to the area.⁵⁵

Popularization of Moldavian experience and affirmations of its validity continued until approximately the time of the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the National Communist Party. A report on the Fifteenth Moldavian Party Congress in *Partiinaya zhizn'* highlighted the *kolkhoz* soviets as well as the four republican agrarian-industrial associations. (These were the networks Moldefirmasloprom, Moldplodoovoshchprom, Moldtabakprom, Moldvinprom.) CPSU Central Committee sanction was referenced,⁵⁶ and the unnamed authors highly evaluated Moldavian contributions to modernizing management. According to the writers, "in recent years, the republic has been made famous by its innovative relationship to the organization of agricultural production, has given models of specialization and concentration of it [agriculture] on the basis of interfarm cooperation and agro-industrial integration."⁵⁷ Hence, functional- or product-based linkages and close vertical production ties seemed to be further championed in the national press, while territorially-organized multi-functional, multi-product agencies received less attention in central Party magazines. Perhaps this differential reflected preferences by Brezhnev and/or Chernenko, who had referred to agrarian-industrial entities and who had also been the General Secretary's subordinate in the Moldavian SSR.

Recognition for political creativity emerged more strongly as a desirable attribute in the republican First Secretary's remarks to the Twenty-Sixth CPSU Congress. Referring to the successes of the *kolkhoz* councils and of the vertically-oriented agrarian-industrial agencies,⁵⁸ S. K. Grossu also seemed to point to limited, controlled innovation and its successful management. He spoke of the Moldavian Party's "broadly using effective measures of the current agrarian policy of the USSR, actively developing processes of inter-farm and agro-industrial cooperation..."⁵⁹

The completion of the Twenty-Sixth Congress, with its approval of official positions that would guide the Party in coming years, would seem to have signalled a new phase to the discussion of possible alterations in the system for managing agriculture and economically-related activities. Partisans of change—and of particular new approaches—could determine what progress the advocates had made in inserting their proposals into the declared national policy agenda. These actors could also ascertain the constraints and opportunities created by the official standpoints.

Although Brezhnev's Report to the Congress offered no significantly different formulations about agro-industrial administration,⁶⁰ the Eleventh Five Year Plan, which was approved by the Congress, seemed to place a degree of stress on the direction of territorial economies below the national level. Most notably the "Basic Directions" indicated CPSU and government intentions.

*[t]o improve the organization of the structure of administration. To realize measures directed toward the overcoming of departmental dissociation, the fuller combination of branch and territorial administration. To improve coordination of the activity of central, branch, and local organs of administration...*⁶¹

The document also discussed district or regional determinations of the siting and character of farming operations. Reference was made to agro-industrial associations.⁶² Moreover, the Plan singled out the contribution of "republics, *krais*, *oblasts*, and *raions*" to the national supply of comes-

tibles.⁶³ While not foreclosing organizational reform along Moldavian lines, the directives also seem to have made areally-based solutions—like RAPO's—more salient to continuing discussions of the Food Program. It, of course, was not completed in time to be discussed in full along with other portions of the “Basic Directions.”

**From the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress to the
November 1981 Central Committee Plenum:
The Emergence of Territorially-Based
Agro-Industrial Associations as the Preferred Alternative**

With Congress validation of the Eleventh Five Year Plan,⁶⁴ the parameters within which the Food Program as well as the administration of farming and related operations were to be discussed had been more clearly defined. Moreover, lines for the further development of policy were marked out for study, debate, advocacy, and opposition. Themes suggested at the CPSU convocation were discussed or ignored by ranking leaders, scholars, and lower-level Party and state bureaucrats in various arenas. In at least some cases, upper-echelon apparatchiki seemed to make purposeful efforts to open channels of communication for broader discussion of agro-industrial management structures.

In the months between the Congress and the November 1981 CC Plenum, several Politburo members and republican CPSU secretaries had occasion to discuss aspects of organizational reform. In a May meeting with Georgian leaders, General Secretary Brezhnev seemed to acknowledge, and possibly sanction, the republican record with district agro-industrial associations. According to what may be an “account” rather than a verbatim transcript, Brezhnev reminded his listeners of the continuing goal to upgrade farming and related sectors of the economy. He then

commented that “[a]s you have told me, definite experience [has been] accumulated among you in a number of *raions*. It is necessary to improve and develop this work.”⁶⁵ Since the good performance of the Abasha RAPO was known and the similar Makhharadzevskii association was also functioning,⁶⁶ Brezhnev’s reference to previous local efforts is likely to have included these cases of structural innovation. Since Shevardnadze had talked about RAPO’s at the Twenty-Sixth CPSU Congress, it is unlikely that he and his colleagues would not have discussed the still rather novel form of local agro-industrial integration with the General Secretary and officials accompanying him to Georgia. If the Georgians did promote their solution for management, they would have been taking an activist role in trying to affect the list of potential policies that might be debated.

Although the General Secretary may have been indicating a qualified acceptance of territorially-based, agro-industrial organizations at the lowest levels of the political hierarchy, other full members of the CPSU Politburo approached institutional change gingerly. Writing in *Partiinaya zhizn’*, Mikhail Suslov emphasized the creation of tighter connections between the agro-industrial branches.⁶⁷ His position could, but did not necessarily, support structural reorganization. Konstantin Chernenko seemed to be particularly bothered by conflicts of interest, lack of coordination, and the neglect of some activities or goals that could be caused or exacerbated by the departmental, state-committee organization of farming, related industries, services, and trade. He mentioned “departmental disconnections” more than once in his April address on Lenin’s birthday.⁶⁸ His article in *Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie* repeated the Central Committee Secretary’s concern that these “disconnections” were an obstacle to improving agricultural output.⁶⁹ While his statements also did not indicate any clear-cut endorsement for reorganizing agricultural administration, they might be construed to mean that Chernenko could acquiesce to an organizational solution to the problems he had diagnosed.

The CC Agricultural Secretary also took an equivocal position—but one that may have promoted change—on the pattern of areal agro-industrial associations encompassing all branches relevant to the availability of food and other natural products. Speaking to an assembly of ideological specialists, Gorbachev iterated his support for “agro-industrial integration”. However, he noted that more analysis was needed regarding “the selection of the most progressive...organizational forms, which have proven themselves, of interfarm and interbranch cooperation...”⁷⁰ He also stressed republican and regional involvement in compiling the Food Program and even seemed to indicate a process of interactive bargaining between sub-national authorities and organs, on the one hand, and those at the center, on the other. Thus, he stated that

[t]he CC CPSU is proceeding from this, that the most realistic Food Program...can be worked out only in connection with the active participation of republics, *krais* and *oblast*. This is a matter not only of the central departments, although their role here is enormous. Each republic, each *krai*, each *oblast* should define its own contribution and the level of its own participation in the working out and implementation of the Food Program...Gosplan USSR has directed control figures to the republics. With account of the proposals from the localities...will be worked out the Food Program of the country.⁷¹

To the extent that local input really was needed or desired, or that national Party and government officials wanted their subordinates to accept the targets assigned with some good grace, local bureaucrats may have gained leverage. Also, all-union state and CPSU leaders may have been persuaded to give republican, *krai*, *oblast*, and even *raion* functionaries powers the politicians claimed to need, if they were to deliver the required harvests and comestibles in the stores. By advocating the “study” of agro-industrial forms, Gorbachev may have bought time and helped to create another opportunity for discussion, if not negotiation. The emphasis on the areal basis for drawing up the Food Program, moreover, may have highlighted—to all-union officials—the localistic aspects of Soviet farming

and related tasks. As a result, politicians and bureaucrats in Moscow may have gained another ground for receptivity to the idea of RAPO's, *oblast* and *krai* agro-industrial associations, as well as similar republican agencies.

As will be shown in greater detail below, another undertaking for which Gorbachev was responsible, theoretically or in actual fact, reinforced such situational constraints and prods. In the May-June 1981 issue of *Kadry sel'skogo khozyaistva* began a special section on agro-industrial integration from the district through the union-republican echelon. This feature was justified by an allusion to the Food Program.⁷² Under this rubric, Politburo candidate Eduard Shevardnadze was interviewed about developments in Georgia.

Shevardnadze used the occasion to express more general views about administrative reform. He seemed to suggest that the existing RAPO type of management needed further structural as well as economic bolstering. Such improvement, he appeared to argue, would be dependent upon the installation of "a new order of planning, finance,...and...supply..."⁷³ The Georgian First Secretary's line of analysis may thus have indicated in part, that the existing territorially-based agro-industrial organizations might function more effectively if they were part of a broader network of similar agencies—perhaps even above the district plane. Since currently operating RAPO's had acquired new planning, finance, and supply powers, Shevardnadze may also have been obliquely reminding journal readers that such prerogatives could be used more effectively if the national administrative system were reorganized. Again, one way in which the change could be accomplished would be by establishing territorial coordinating organs for agriculture and linked processing, service, and trading branches that would have not only directive powers, but also more indirect means of regulation.

Below the Politburo, additional Party discussants took favorable stances toward the possibility of more broadly introducing areal agro-industrial organs. The Kirghiz CC First Secretary may have signalled a

positive attitude simply by endorsing “agro-industrial integration”⁷⁴ in an economic magazine. The Second Secretary of the Chernovitskii Obkom made the connection—adumbrated above—between further emphasis on such integration, better administration, and the improvement of agricultural performance.⁷⁵

First Secretary Udam of the Pyarnu *Raikom* in Estonia did not just single out *raion* agro-industrial associations as the best form for managing interrelations among farming and contributing or consequent operations. The district leader also limned some of the politicking and social “search” connected with the drive for broader adoption of RAPO’s. In remarks published in *Kommunist Estonii*, Udam claimed that similar agencies existed “in a number of *raions* of the country.”⁷⁶ Thus, he seemed to be alluding to the possibility of at least some significant active or passive backing for his views. Perhaps to capitalize on such sentiment or to coordinate advocacy by republican leaders and scholars, the First Secretary of the Pyarnu *Raikom* met with his counterparts from the Abasha *Raikom* in Georgia and the Talsinskii *Raikom* in Latvia. Rather surprisingly for a Party official, Udam claimed USSR Ministry of Agriculture endorsement for the RAPO to buttress his case.⁷⁷

His assertion of support by agricultural professionals was certainly reinforced on the pages of *Ekonomika sel’skogo khozyaistva*, an organ of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the Economics of Agriculture. (The agency was subordinate to the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences *imeni V. I. Lenin*.) The journal’s pages carried repeated, explicit affirmations of the desirability of territorial agro-industrial management agencies, down to the *raion* subdivisions. These statements were made not only by scholars but also by the chief of a Main Administration in the USSR Ministry of Agriculture.⁷⁸ Several writers named RAPO’s in Georgia, Latvia, and/or Estonia as worthy of study or emulation.⁷⁹ Hence, there was a constituency for areally-oriented administrative reform outside the CPSU apparatus, among those with professional responsibility for agricultural supervision or research.

As the November 1981 Plenum approached, *Kommunist* editors and their overseers may have wished to prepare CPSU bureaucrats and officials of other hierarchies for a decision that administrative reform would have to embody some form of integration of agro-industrial operations. The October issue of the magazine ran features on the Bulgarian agro-industrial complex and Hungarian agro-industrial associations. Productive organization in the former seemed closer to the Moldavian model than to the structures elaborated in Latvia, Estonia, and Georgia.⁸⁰ The Hungarian entities were territorial and interbranch; and the author of the essay about them claimed that they were established only after taking Soviet precedents into account.⁸¹ From the two articles, the reader might be persuaded that integrative structural reform in agriculture was a more general development in the "socialist community." Some policy-makers and implementers might find more difficulty in rejecting a RAPO-type reform if another "fraternal" party and government had claimed to learn from the Soviet example! Yet the attention paid to Bulgarian practice might also have signified that members of the *Kommunist* editorial board or of the higher Soviet leadership still favored some type of reorganization in which vertical, branch interests prevailed.

Along with general discussion of proposed agro-industrial reform, several issues received more intensive examination. These included the importance of the structural alterations already made in several republics, along with appropriate ways of extending innovation up the administrative chain. Also discussed were the consequences of highly developed "departmentalism" in state administration. There was significant participation in such exchanges by persons other than party functionaries. However, as might be expected, the apparatchiks came much closer to monopolizing the topics of previous CPSU involvement with agro-industrial integration and apposite Party responses to more widespread change.

Coverage of agro-industrial experimentation in the smaller republics gave their leaders and scholars opportunities to extoll successes

achieved—which could gratify local nationalism and reflect well upon territorial political establishments. Surveying cases of areal unification of farming, agricultural services, the food industry and/or trade, *Kadry sel'skogo khozyaistva* provided a resonant forum. On the pages of the Central Committee publication appeared expositions by Moldavian, Georgian, and Estonian officials, and a Latvian contribution was published at the beginning of 1982.⁸²

In the interchange, the Estonians seemed to be afforded a dominant role. Articles by several persons having duties related to the creation and supervision of RAPO's appeared in the first number of *Kadry sel'skogo khozyaistva* to carry the special section "Agro-Industrial Complex: Formation and Development." Maybe discussants from a republic whose chief did not sit on the CPSU Politburo could more energetically press the cause of horizontal integration; for the author's positions would be less likely to be taken as hints of sentiment within the highest party body. Moreover, K. G. Vaino of Estonia—unlike Shevardnadze—did not have to interact as a junior member of a group which did its business by common agreement. In such a situation, a strongly championed initiative might be dysfunctional for group dynamics and for Shevardnadze's personal political fortunes. Of course, the Estonian leadership may have just been less cautious than its Latvian counterparts. Nevertheless, the attention given in the journal to Estonian efforts and ideas may have betokened interest by Gorbachev and/or his deputy Karlov in territorial agro-industrial associations. One or both of the CC CPSU Secretarial officials may have believed that RAPO's in Estonia were especially well-devised or well-run.

The May-June 1981 issue of *Kadry sel'skogo khozyaistva* carried essays by Republican Party First Secretary Vaino, A. Ryuitel', a Deputy Chairman of the Estonian Council of Ministers, and V. Rozenberg, Deputy Chairman of the Estonian Gosplan. Another contributor to that number was M. Bronshtein, a corresponding member of the republican Academy of Sciences and Chairman of its committee on agro-industrial questions.⁸³ The articles naturally contained technical information, as well as economic

and management theory. The authors also advocated further policy development, pointing to the Estonian contributions for improving economic institutions and mechanisms. Agricultural specialist Bronshtein wrote that “[i]t seems to us important in principle that in the Vil’yandi [*Raion Agro-Industrial*] Association for the first time [were] approved the scientific principles and normative base—worked out by Estonian scholars—of the formation and allocation of centralized funds...”⁸⁴ The cutting edge of innovation could be found in his republic!

The officials referenced past legitimization to argue for wider adoption of the RAPO form. Ryuitel’ seemed to argue that past economic performance by the Vil’yandi and Pyarnu organizations demonstrated that similar institutions (presumably located across more of the Soviet Union) would most efficaciously carry out the Food Program.⁸⁵ Vaino quoted from the “Basic Directions of the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period to 1990,” in order to explain why agro-industrial associations were to exist in all districts of the Estonian SSR. Ryuitel’ cited Twenty-Sixth CPSU Congress determinations to that same end.⁸⁶ Presumably, if the horizontal integrating organs were to become universal in one republic, they might be considered for installation elsewhere. The Estonian Gosplan Deputy Chairman may have reinforced this campaign by pointing to the difficulties that isolated RAPO’s encountered in coping with their bureaucratic environments!⁸⁷ Nor was this caution only for readers and policy-makers outside the republic; on the pages of *Kommunist Estonii*, Pyarnuskii *Raikom* First Secretary Udam complained of conflicts between the district agro-industrial coordinating body and local branches of service organizations,⁸⁸ like Soyuzsel’khoztekhnika. He also expressed the hope that “realization of the Basic Directions” would help to rectify the situation.⁸⁹

Later, in *Kommunist*, Karl Vaino pushed more strongly to place organizational innovation along Estonian lines on the national policy agenda. His efforts, additionally, seemed to be colored by a kind of triumphalism. Thus, he stated that “[t]he Vil’yandiskii experiment, and...the

experience of the Pyarnuskii *raion* agro-industrial association, which have justified themselves economically and socially, are receiving more and more dissemination in our and in other republics.”⁹⁰

Ye. Kalenik, a Secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, in the July-August issue of *Kadry sel'skogo khozyaistva* argued for the economic effectiveness of vertical integration in farming and linked endeavors.⁹¹ In contrast, Eduard Shevardnadze used his interview in the journal to return to the theme of establishing areal, horizontal coordinating agencies throughout the country. He baldly declared that “[t]he main merit of its [the Abasha RAPO’s] method is its universality.”⁹² Nor was the Georgian First Secretary willing to allow the Estonians to appropriate all the credit for creativity in the sphere of structuring agricultural-industrial relations. He dated institutional novelty in the Abasha district to 1974 and observed that “here was found a search for new, progressive forms of administration...”⁹³ The reputation for innovation appeared to be a “political good” scarce enough to engender contestation.

Advantage in such competition—as well as more emphasis to Vaino’s implication that if RAPO’s were appropriate for all Estonian subdivisions they might be desirable elsewhere—was likely gained by yet another of Shevardnadze’s remarks. The Georgian Central Committee, he noted, had legislated the extension of district agro-industrial associations to approximately thirty *raions*.⁹⁴ Since the Latvians had also multiplied the number of such organizations,⁹⁵ perhaps national decision-makers as well as Party and government officials of other republics would look more favorably upon the institutions. Influential policy makers might even be inclined to adopt the institutions outside Georgia, Latvia, and Estonia!

The expositors of district agro-industrial administrative practices, and other knowledgeable commentators, advocated the upward extension of territorial coordinative organs. Particularly, these seemed to be desired at the republican level. In his article for *Kadry sel'skogo khozyaistva*, Estonian First Secretary Vaino broached the idea of a conciliar body. It should, he

stated, be comprised of agricultural and industrial “ministries and departments..., the activity of which is mainly connected with production on the territory of the republic and bringing to the consumer...foodstuffs.”⁹⁶ In the long run, he hoped that this entity would have managerial powers and report to the Estonian Council of Ministers.⁹⁷ Later, in *Kommunist*, Vaino offered his republic as a trial site for such a common republican agro-industrial organ—pointing to his and his colleagues’ rather considerable “experience with new forms of administration.”⁹⁸

These proposals were repeated and strengthened by Academician Bronshtein in *Kommunist Estonii*, where he also echoed Rozenberg and Udam about the environmental conditions that hampered the RAPO’s functioning. He argued that a republican agro-industrial agency would be able to overcome obstacles raised by the activities of ministries, state committees, and other branch organizations.⁹⁹ Both Bronshtein and Vaino seemed to be searching for a way to gain extra leverage vis-a-vis local entities whose chiefs looked to Moscow headquarters for direction and protection.¹⁰⁰

Another scholar expressed concern that the real and potential benefits of district integration could not be realized amid existing relationships between various components of the USSR Council of Ministers. Writing in *Kommunist*, V. Mozhin specifically referred to the Latvian, Estonian, and Georgian cases. As an antidote to departmental interests and operations he advanced the idea of republican coordinative agro-industrial bodies which would be part of a hierarchy beginning with a national cap and extending through the *oblasts*.¹⁰¹ Since Mozhin chaired an organization within Gosplan USSR,¹⁰² his initiative may have represented more broadly held views that also took into account institutional interests.

The probability that there might have been a self-serving Gosplan initiative seems attested by Shevardnadze’s observation in a discussion with staff members from the CPSU Central Committee journal on agriculture. He noted that “to improve administration of the processes of agro-industrial integration, to ensure a complex approach to...the [F]ood

[P]rogram apparently requires...form[ation of] special structural subdivisions in Gosplan USSR and in the gosplans of the union republics.”¹⁰³ However this effort at departmental aggrandizement did not stop the Georgians from taking those steps about which the Estonians had earlier written. Shevardnadze announced that there already existed “a special commission of the [Georgian] Council of Ministers” to harmonize the work of agricultural and related ministries, state committees, and the like.¹⁰⁴

While developments in the Georgian SSR might be explained by a time lag or by Shevardnadze’s status as a CPSU candidate, the Ukrainians had had a hierarchy of inter-agency councils before or at about the same time that Vaino’s remarks appeared in *Kadry sel’skogo khozyaistva*. In May, the Ukrainian First Deputy Agriculture Minister¹⁰⁵ published an article stating that there existed republican and *oblast* “interdepartmental soviets[s]” to oversee “specialized farms, interfarm enterprises and associations.”¹⁰⁶ The republican planning committee as well as ministries and state committees for farming and linked industries were included in the republican organ. First Deputy Minister Tovstanovskii indicated that the conciliar entities had been established to obviate problems caused by “the absence of common organs of the administration of agriculture in the *raions*.”¹⁰⁷ The Ukrainian solution may have demonstrated that leaders of the second largest union republic, where farming is conducted on a larger scale than in Georgia or Estonia and where the administrative pyramid is steeper, might have felt that RAPO’s alone would not provide a sufficient span of control. Although the republican and *oblast* soviets would not necessarily have overseen all *kolkhozy* and *sovkhozy*, creation of the new structures seems to suggest that Ukrainians, too, desired greater authority in relation to all-union ministries and state committees. Earlier creation of the provincial and republican agro-industrial bodies may have stemmed from their less-than-full inclusiveness, so that it could be argued that their founding was an answer to a specific dilemma, rather than a precedent-setting innovation. Moreover, the significance of Ukraine for Soviet

politics and economics, the political roots of both Brezhnev and Khrushchev in republic, and Shcherbitskii's full membership in the Politburo may have given the elite in Kiev more autonomy.

As republican leaders and scholars essayed solutions to government departmentalism—and national politicians expressed unease about the phenomenon—analyses specified its economic effects and more general political impact. Some arguments about distortions in productive relations, decisions, and outcomes appeared in more technical media.¹⁰⁸ Specialists, planning officials, and apparatchiks also used CPSU journals to explore the problems of insufficient coordination between vertical productive-administrative hierarchies with operative agencies in the districts and, of course, head offices in Moscow. The Chairman of the Byelorussian Gosplan—who also served as First Deputy Chairman of the Republican Council of Ministers—delivered a scathing indictment.

At the present time, in connection with the planning of the work of technologically-linked but departmentally separate branches, unavoidably arises lack of agreement in deliveries of raw materials, violation of economic expedience in the distribution of capital investment, impeding conduct of a single technical policy.... Goskonsel'khoztekhnika and enterprises of other service departments occupy..., in essence, an autonomous position in relation to the very agricultural production which they are called upon to serve...¹⁰⁹

The criticism about poor supplies procurement was further developed by a *raikom* first secretary from the Kurgan Oblast,¹¹⁰ while Academician Mozhin mentioned problems with capital investments.¹¹¹ K. Pankova argued that ministerial (rather than local agricultural administration) subordination of farms made equalizing various levels of development harder.¹¹² Yet the upgrading "lagging farms" had long been perceived as one means for improving Soviet agricultural performance; and the Pyarnu *Raikom* First Secretary also mentioned obstacles to such a policy.¹¹³

Other questions of policy-implementation and resource distribution were also raised. Mozhin pointed to the possibility that production-

branch-based supervision of farming might lead to bureaucratic instructions that insufficiently took into account variations in producing and selling conditions from one part of the USSR to another.¹¹⁴ Estonian Party chief Vaino and his subordinate V. Udam questioned the dispersion of resources among multiple bureaucracies as well as the increasing cost of maintaining numerous administrative offices.¹¹⁵

Participants in this exchange over economic dysfunctions went beyond financial concerns in analyzing results of dominant vertical organization of farming and related economic activities. Mozhin and Vaino criticized the existing system in which financial rewards and plan goals reflected production-branch organization and thus skewed activity toward discrete segments of the production cycle, rather than toward the final plentiful supply of high-quality agricultural goods.¹¹⁶ These arrangements had a further unfortunate correlate; farmers—and even RAPO's—were in an unequal bargaining position vis-a-vis other agricultural agencies upon which crop production depended.¹¹⁷

Such a rather extended scrutiny of the economic difficulties engendered by departmentalism provided further reinforcement for earlier criticism and grounding for change that would seem easily assimilable within a Marxist-Leninist framework. Moreover, individuals associated with different institutions within society could agree upon negative results from the ineffective or partial areal harmonization of agricultural and related operations, and that the magnitude of the damage incurred could be partially or fully calculated. Furthermore, the claims of RAPO proponents could be juxtaposed to the costs of not having similar organs.

Raikom First Secretary N. Bagretsov extended the criticisms of departmentalism to the issue of governmental and, even, Party autonomy near the bottom of the Soviet political pyramid. Arguing that the situation that he was describing was widespread, the CPSU functionary stated that the disproportionate power relationship between local government organs meant that many enterprises involved with agricultural operations could not afford to follow directions issued by district authorities. Even the

raispolkom, with *raikom* assistance, was likely to be unable to make at least some decisions stick!¹¹⁸ Hence what could be said for the authority of lower-echelon general political institutions? What was the real nature of the Communist Party as a goal-setting and implementation-guaranteeing organization, when its basic links were likely to be taking their cues from minor representatives of individual ministries and departments? How well was political integration being performed under such circumstances?

Several ranking members of the Communist Party did address the questions of the organization's "leading role" and of the nexus between the Twenty-Sixth Congress and the November 1981 CC Plenum. The CPSU Politburo members at times framed their answers particularly relative to *partkoms* in the smaller sub-national units. Konstantin Chernenko focused upon party organs as what Hough calls "area coordinators".¹¹⁹ The Central Committee Secretary likened the CPSU agencies to orchestral conductors, bringing about "harmonious action of all soviet, economic, and other organs of the localities."¹²⁰ Yet the repeated complaints, catalogued above, suggested that such a role could not always be carried out in a district. Since state committees and ministerial components often did not answer to the *raispol'kom*, the *raikom* would have to appeal, in those instances, to higher Party bodies. They might not be disposed to take the *raikom*'s side in all instances, or might react in ways that did not produce consistent policy or impeded timely intervention to bring the actions of different bureaucracies into alignment. Thus, to the extent that Chernenko—who had criticized "departmental disconnections"—valued local CPSU organs as comprehensive political governors, he might be looking for administrative solutions which would buttress this role in the countryside.

A related issue was the extent to which CPSU "political leadership" should involve local committees in economic affairs. V. V. Grishin, perhaps directing his remarks more to urban district *partkoms*, seemed to feel that much work in the production sphere should be undertaken by Party

aktivs, rather than by the apparatus.¹²¹ Somewhat in contrast, Chernenko appeared to endorse some “daily” supervision by CPSU “committees” over production entities, but he also cautioned against Party functionaries’ over-management of, and too assiduous help to, state bureaucrats and economic managers. The Central Committee Secretary seemed to fear that the Communist Party could then bear the blame for failures!¹²² Mikhail Gorbachev may have indicated a more interventionist orientation in his speech to ideological workers. Along with primary party organizations and the CPSU *aktiv*, he named country *raikoms* as “directly organiz[ing] the realization of the decisions of the Party in concrete practical affairs.” He also stated that “in the future, it is necessary continually to trouble about raising the level of their activity.”¹²³ While these words may simply have reiterated a pious intention to help local *partkoms* work more effectively, the remark may have denoted the Agricultural Secretary’s belief that the functions of the *raikoms* should be enhanced. In such a case, there would be some alignment between his position and some of the views expressed by Eduard Shevardnadze.

Attitudes about the proper economic role for local CPSU organs—as well as the impact of RAPO’s upon Party productive involvement—might dispose influentials to support or oppose nationwide establishment of the novel agro-industrial institutions. To those pondering such topics, some brief vignettes of Party activity in regard to agro-industrial formations or in promoting integration might have supplied helpful information. Available accounts showed that local CPSU bodies helped facilitate institution-building and secured membership for apparatchiks in the new entities. For example, the Pyarnu Raikom First Secretary sat in the RAPO council,¹²⁴ from which he could monitor the association’s undertakings, make suggestions, and press for changes. A Kazakh *Obkom* First Secretary reported that his organization had placed the establishment of interbranch structures in farming on meeting agendas.¹²⁵ The Chernovitskii *Obkom* had overseen or participated in *raion-by-raion* planning for and creation of new permanent relations among collective and state farms.¹²⁶

The examples might have suggested that the origination of new territorial agencies to coordinate farming with related operations would offer continued, or even greater, scope for Party interference in economic affairs. This conclusion would have been reinforced by Karl Vaino's praise for the Vil'yandi and Pyarnu Raikoms. Despite the RAPO's, he stated that these agencies "go deeply into business, reveal reserves, and skillfully decide complicated problems of the administration of production!"¹²⁷ Those who equated the functional reach and degree of detailed involvement of Party organs with CPSU pre-eminence might draw encouragement from such reports. Interventionists not only might not see the RAPO's as a threat, but might picture the associations as better instruments for more effective control over agricultural and allied production.

Holders of these views may have been further cheered by Pritovol'nyi Raikom First Secretary Bagretsov's declaration that "party influence on...agricultural production...will be significantly strengthened in connection with the formation of the RAPO."¹²⁸ On the other hand, believers in a more restricted CPSU role, like V. V. Grishin, might take comfort from Bagretsov's mention of primary party organizations and the *aktiv* as well as from his negative reference to *partkom* crisis assistance.¹²⁹ Perhaps, in the months that RAPO's had been discussed as a solution to administrative problems in the agro-industrial sector, the ways in which RAPO's could facilitate or impede a particular societal role for the Communist Party had not been fully explored. Maybe, as a consequence, conflict over this topic did not become significantly developed before the November 1981 CC CPSU Plenum.

Yet Bagretsov's article seems likely to have been a signal that the issue of local agricultural management had been placed on the agenda for the session and that the RAPO solution continued to gain backing. His essay was sent to press on November 10,¹³⁰ less than a week before the CC meeting. A boldface introduction to the piece noted that it "broach[ed] questions of the coordination of the activity of enterprises and organizations which serve *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes*." Further noted was the place

of Bagretsov's analysis as the first in a series in *Partiinaya zhizn'*, specifically about *raion* agro-industrial associations.¹³¹ Thus, his "*Raikom i upravlenie sel'skim khozyaistvom*" was the first contribution in the central political journals devoted fully and directly to advocacy of the national establishment of RAPO's. The district first secretary described pitfalls of trying to regularize interactions between farms and other agricultural operating agencies through a *raion* agricultural soviet¹³² —which might have reminded his readers of the *kolkhoz* councils favored in Moldavia. He then argued

In order to finish with dissociation in the administration of agricultural enterprises and interest all organizations serving *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes* in the final results of production, it is necessary to create a common organ of administration in the *raion*. Let it be...the *raion* agrarian-industrial association, for short — RAPO...¹³³

Such an outspoken preference, by a very junior functionary, on a policy that had not yet been officially set would doubtless betoken significant predisposition for the same goals by figures in the top central leadership. No extended argument in favor of the agro-industrial associations, even by Shevardnadze, had been published in either *Kommunist* or *Partiinaya zhizn'*, in contrast to the more specialized *Kadry sel'skogo khozyaistva*. Hence, one might conclude that Bagretsov's call had wider backing among Politburo and/or CPSU Central Committee members—but perhaps not yet enough support for a more authoritative commitment. Alternatively, upper-echelon RAPO proponents may have been deferring more public advocacy until there was more agreement (perhaps even at the Central Committee level) on all the provisions of the Food Program, which was still under negotiation and debate.

In his address to the November 16 Central Committee Plenum, however, Leonid Brezhnev was able to indicate movement on both fronts. He said that "the Politburo proposes to discuss the food program at one of the next plenums of the CC CPSU." He also spoke of the "working out" of the document, as if drafting and bargaining were still occurring. In this

relation, the General Secretary declared that attention ought to be paid "to such major problems as improvement of...the system of...administration of...the agro-industrial complex as a whole[, a]nd...in the localities."¹³⁴ He endorsed arrangements that would strengthen the farms' leverage vis-a-vis other organizations and reinforce district institutions.¹³⁵ With these words, Brezhnev seemed to imply his assent to the creation of RAPO's or similar organizations, as well as to changes in other aspects of the directive structure for farming and linked branches of the economy. Since he did not spell out many characteristics and interrelationships between agro-industrial institutions that were to be created, the General Secretary left himself and other participants in policy-making ample opportunities for further refining potential innovation. Some provisions for alterations might provide the objects of dickering to gain support, either in the Politburo and CPSU Central Committee or among those who would have to implement the reform. Such politicking and planning could continue in the months before the May 1982 CC Plenum passed the Food Program, with its component enactment on administrative restructuring. Nevertheless, by the end of the November Central Committee session, territorial agro-industrial associations were definitively on the national political docket.

Lessons of 1980-81 Agenda-Setting With Regard to Agricultural Administration

Examining the process by which a particular approach to organizational change became part of the Soviet leadership's platform yields some interesting lessons and raises further questions for study. The analyst can draw some conclusions about the Communist Party and the attitudes of its leaders toward governmental institutions, about the openness of the

leadership structure toward policy initiation, and about political differentiation along institutional and regional lines. Some partial hypotheses about the roots of more recent behavior by CPSU bureaucrats and office-holders may also be advanced.

Rather surprisingly, in view of conventional wisdom about the reasons for the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev and of the behavior of many *apparatchiki* since the Nineteenth Party Congress, many Party actors in the process chronicled above did not shy away from proposing institutional alterations. Instead, these individuals may have viewed the creation of novel organizations as providing new opportunities for Party bodies and functionaries to act in society, and thus to generate and amass more socio-economic-political resources. Those trying to gain recognition of the viability of territorial agro-industrial agencies also seemed to see them as tools for redressing the balance with USSR ministries and state committees—and, potentially perhaps, between horizontally- and vertically-related interests. Disquiet about the degree to which functional concerns, represented by increasingly specialized government agencies, impeded formulation and implementation of regional policies had been growing in the late Brezhnev era.¹³⁶ As a consequence, proponents of district and higher-level agro-industrial organs could present their initiative as part of a broader trend. Moreover, if RAPO's and superior agro-industrial coordinating bodies were created by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, not only local government executive committees but also territorial *partkoms* would be likely to be advantaged. For example, in a district, the *raikom* could exercise the CPSU's "leading role" over the RAPO, to which, in turn, sub-units of ministries or state committees would report. The CPSU committees could thus directly give policy guidance, oversee program implementation, or criticize activities of local operating organizations of all-union governmental departments.

CPSU influentials like Eduard Shevardnadze, I. I. Bodyul, and, particularly, Karl Vaino used successful innovation and its dissemination as means for aggrandizing the reputation and clout of their republican or-

ganizations and of themselves. Since Georgia and Estonia provided venues for the largest number of tests of novel policy initiatives, and because such “policy experiments” were more easily carried out in small republics,¹³⁷ the leaders may have been acting partially within established roles. Also, Darrell Slider argues that a reform like the establishment of RAPO’s would have been particularly attractive to elites in small, highly-nationalistic union-republics; for the officials would have gained more leverage vis-a-vis all-union authorities.¹³⁸ Hence, competition by high-ranking CPSU functionaries from Georgia, Moldavia, Latvia, and Estonia might have been intended to increase support in the localities as well as to gain political resources in the Soviet Union as a whole. Investigating attitudes toward structural reform during the docketing phases of other efforts at organizational development under Brezhnev would, of course, show whether the orientations delineated here were typical. The extent to which positive or entrepreneurial approaches to structural novelty may have been widely held between 1965 and 1982 could be gleaned by studying contributions to ongoing debates over policy proposals that had been officially put forward for discussion and eventual enactment. Gorbachev’s recommendations, in the late eighties, for increasing the role of state institutions and for democratization may have been regarded at first with complaisance by CPSU functionaries because of outlooks developed during the “era of stagnation.”

Although this study documents efforts to create conditions for a larger Party instrumental role in the agricultural and food sector, evidence presented may, paradoxically, suggest causes for other behavior by apparatchiks. Perhaps they did not react more strongly and effectively in the late 1980s to rebuff the General Secretary’s attempts at reducing party involvement in day-to-day administration because officials may not have shared a clear-cut definition of the way that the CPSU’s “leading role” was to be effected.¹³⁹ Noted has been the differentiation of views between those associated with the Moldavian Party organization, on the one hand, and Latvian, Estonian, and Georgian leaders, on the other, about the

proper way to achieve agro-industrial integration. The different schemes would, of course, have allowed Party bodies to intervene in agricultural, farming-service, commodity-processing and distribution activities in dissimilar ways. While jockeying over this issue may have served non-substantive ends, the description of other apparatchiks' views, in the foregoing section of this essay, does not seem to demonstrate conflict for or against specific policy positions or clusters of such orientations. Instead, there seems to have developed enough of an accretion of overlapping views supportive of RAPO's and superior territorial organizations to gain formal consideration of reform. When drawing up the Food Program was first initiated, there seems to have been no widely-shared conception that there was a "Party interest"¹⁴⁰ in some type of administrative reorganization.

Nor does the information presented here document a divergence between CPSU and governmental officials over agro-industrial integration. On the contrary, Estonian Party and state officials seemed to work together to promote their version of territorial administrative coordination. Eduard Shevardnadze suggested changes that would not be disadvantageous to Gosplan USSR and its subsidiary organs and that would facilitate better relations between farming and other branches of production. In turn, Gosplan employees made arguments supportive of RAPO's. Thus, under Brezhnev and later, members of the CPSU and state hierarchies may not have always perceived structural reform as pitting them against each another.

Also noteworthy, to this observer, is the apparent lack of closure in the process of bringing new plans for action to the leadership. Admittedly, General Secretary Brezhnev was not robust and might not have been expected to control every aspect of policy-making, but his vague statements about unitary administration of the agro-industrial complex provided the basis from which to suggest areal coordinative organs. Yet he seemed to become involved in the discussion of administrative options only to move policy proposals formally along. To the extent that he served as a political

“broker,”¹⁴¹ perhaps letting alternatives emerge and consensus accrete about the nature of a problem and its solution was functional, since then Brezhnev need not unnecessarily dissipate good will. However, Boris Yeltsin describes the General Secretary in his last years as an office holder who had to be told what to do with a document he had signed.¹⁴² Hence, his limited participation in agenda-setting regarding agricultural administrative reorganization may not have represented a tactical choice. Chernenko, who assisted the General Secretary in discharging his duties, took a rather equivocal stand which might be interpreted to favor territorial integration. Gorbachev, the Central Committee Secretary whose bailiwick the creation of RAPO's and superior bodies would most affect, took no position, but seemed to encourage participation by lower-ranking officials. His stance may have stemmed from past experience, ambivalence on the issues raised by reorganization suggestions, or his own position in the CPSU leadership. Because Gorbachev had never served as a *raikom* first secretary,¹⁴³ and because initiatives for comprehensive agro-industrial associations had initially focused on *raions*, he may have been unsure about the need for relatively low-level harmonization of undertakings by different state organs. After all, such coordination had been established at the provincial level in Ukraine, an important farming area like his own Stavropol Krai.

Moreover, various changes in state structure and Communist Party operations during Gorbachev's General Secretaryship may indicate, in retrospect, that in the early eighties he had not reconciled the relative merits of functional integration and territorial decentralization in the economy. Such alterations may also show that in the late Brezhnev era, Secretary Gorbachev had not defined for himself how involved in production the CPSU should be. After March 1985, successive restructurings of the state farming and agriculturally-related bureaucracies could be seen to have had conceptual affinities to the RAPO's and superior agencies created by the May 1982 CC Plenum; the establishment of the USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee (Gosagroprom) in 1985 was one of the first

organizational conversions carried out under the Gorbachev regime. This amalgamation of entire ministries, a state committee, and portions of other central government departments emphasized operational implementation and policy guidance for a whole cycle of operations from production support, through raising plants and animals, to food processing and distribution. RAPO's remained as the lowest units of Gosagroprom's organizational pyramid.¹⁴⁴ The 1989 abolition of Gosagroprom—and of the RAPO's—may have demonstrated that social learning by elites was proceeding by trial and error; branch harmonization no longer was effected by a single all-union organization or brought down to the level of producers. Instead, the integration of operations related to farming and food processing devolved to the republics.¹⁴⁵ Of course, republican officials had been in the forefront of efforts to place territorial agricultural agencies on the all-union political docket at the beginning of the last decade. While Gorbachev seemed to favor some instrumental functions for local CPSU bodies, the foregoing analysis has demonstrated that he was not a campaigner, in open fora,¹⁴⁶ for areal agro-industrial organs that would have increased *partkoms'* economic leverage. If this apparent lukewarm attitude mirrored his state of mind when Brezhnev was alive, Gorbachev's uncertainty would seem to have been resolved by the time of the Nineteenth Party Conference. There he championed a clear distinction between the responsibilities of CPSU committees and soviets, as well as Party bodies' and officials' abstention from direct involvement with concrete, practical decision-making and implementation.¹⁴⁷

As the highest Communist Party agricultural official, Gorbachev's failure to support or oppose any approach to structural reform in farming and food sectors may have been intended not to foreclose discussion and to allow a shared outlook to develop among those who would have to work with or in new agencies. Relative passivity by full Politburo members may have shielded them from errors which could have damaged political standings or prematurely committed the entire leadership to an undesired course of action. However, such a pattern of behavior did encouraged

more junior personnel to develop policy skills, to differentiate themselves from one another, and to gain successes or endure failures in the decisional cycle. To the extent that such interactions took place in other policy sectors, as well, political actors may have gained experience that they could use after 1985. Yet, to determine the impact of Brezhnevian opportunities upon the politics of *perestroika*, the analyst would also have to determine the career paths of today's influentials in those years before 1982.

Finally, if configurations delineated in this study recurred in enough other policy areas over time, cleavage patterns and identifications which favored republican and regional competition may have become rather well-developed. Later, as General Secretary Gorbachev encouraged greater political involvement by lower elites and implemented freer electoral practices, republican and provincial politicians—seeking support—might naturally have accentuated locally-oriented conflicts and allegiances. Hence, not just stifled national feelings and increased education under Leonid Brezhnev may have contributed to the politics of nationalism and sectionalism before the August 1991 coup, behavior learned by current sub-national influentials may also have contributed.

In short, if this case of introducing territorial agro-industrial entities to the national policy arena is in almost any way typical of the late Brezhnev period, there is much more that could be investigated and learned. Some of those findings might help analysts better to understand the sources and dynamics of change under Mikhail Gorbachev. Specialists might also gain a better understanding of what aspects of Soviet politics after 1985, or after the Nineteenth Party Congress, are truly new or even “revolutionary.”

Appendix A: Popularity of the Food Program and Its Linkage to Agro-Industrial Integration at the Twenty-Sixth CPSU Congress

Major Officials Discussing the Program	Mention of Brezhnev in connection with program	Mention of Food Program	Mention of agro- industrial integration
PARTY OFFICIALS			
<u>D. A. Kunaev</u> <u>First Secretary, CC,</u> <u>Communist Party (CP)</u> <u>of Kazakhstan</u>	Politburo	*	
<u>V. V. Shcherbitskii</u> <u>First Secretary, CC,</u> <u>CP of Ukraine</u>	•	X	
<u>T. Ya. Kiselev</u> <u>First Secretary, CC,</u> <u>CP of Byelorussia</u>	Candidate, Politburo	X	*
<u>Sh. R. Rashidov</u> <u>First Secretary, CC,</u> <u>CP of Uzbekistan</u>	•	X	X
<u>P. P. Grishkyavichus'</u> <u>First Secretary, CC,</u> <u>CP of Lithuania</u>	Central Committee	X	*
<u>D. Rasulov</u> <u>First Secretary, CC,</u> <u>CP of Tadzhikistan</u>	•		+
<u>T. U. Usubaliev</u> <u>First Secretary, CC,</u> <u>CP of Kirghizia</u>	•	X	*
<u>K. G. Vaino</u> <u>First Secretary, CC,</u> <u>CP of Estonia</u>	•		*

...continued Appendix A

Major Officials Discussing the Program		Mention of Brezhnev in connection with program	Mention of Food Program	Mention of agro- industrial integration
<u>N. F. Aksenov</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Altai Kraikom</u>	Central Committee	X	X	
<u>S. F. Medunov</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Krasnodar Kraikom</u>	•		X	
<u>A. P. Filatov</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Novosibirsk Obkom</u>	•		X	
<u>V. I. Konotop</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Moscow Obkom</u>	•		*	
<u>V. K. Gusev</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Saratov Obkom</u>	Not-member Central Committee		X	
<u>B. V. Kachura</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Donets Obkom</u>	•		X	
<u>N. A. Tikhonov</u> <u>Chairman,</u> <u>USSR Council of</u> <u>Ministers (C of M)</u>	STATE OFFICIALS Politburo		X	
<u>M. S. Solomentsev</u> <u>Chairman,</u> <u>C of M of the Russian Republic</u>	Candidate, Politburo	X	+	
<u>A. P. Lyashko</u> <u>Chairman,</u> <u>C of M of the Ukraine</u>	Central Committee		X	?

...continued Appendix A

Major Officials Discussing the Program		Mention of Brezhnev in connection with program	Mention of Food Program	Mention of agro- industrial integration
<u>V. K. Mesyats</u> <u>Minister of Agriculture</u> <u>of the USSR</u>	Central Committee	X	+	X
<u>B. A. Ashimov</u> <u>Chairman,</u> <u>C of M of Kazakstan</u>	Not member Central Committee		X	

 The balance of this chart is of individuals who did not discuss the food program

<u>V. V. Grishin</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Moscow Gorkom</u>	Politburo			
<u>G. V. Romanov</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Leningrad Obkom</u>	•			
<u>G. A. Aliev</u> <u>First Secretary, CC,</u> <u>CP of Azerbaidjan</u>	Candidate, Politburo			
<u>E. A. Shevardnadze</u> <u>First Secretary, CC,</u> <u>CP of Georgia</u>	•			R
<u>K. S. Demirchyan</u> <u>First Secretary, CC,</u> <u>CP of Armenia</u>	Central Committee			
<u>M. G. Gapurov</u> <u>First Secretary, CC,</u> <u>CP of Turkmenia</u>	•			

...continued Appendix A

Major Officials Discussing the Program	Mention of Brezhnev in connection with program	Mention of Food Program	Mention of agro- industrial integration
<u>S. K. Grossu</u> <u>First Secretary, CC,</u> <u>CP of Moldavia</u>	Central Committee		X
<u>A. K. Chernyi</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Khabarovsk Kraikom</u>	Central Committee		
<u>G. P. Bogomyakov</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Tyumen Obkom</u>	•		
<u>I. A. Bondarenko</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Rostov Obkom</u>	Central Committee		
<u>L. A. Gorshkov</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Kemerovo Obkom</u>	•		
<u>Yu. N. Khristoradnov</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Gorki Obkom</u>	•		
<u>I. P. Morozov</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Komi Obkom</u>	•		
<u>R. M. Musin</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Tatar Obkom</u>	•		
<u>B. V. Popov</u> <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Arkhangel'sk Obkom</u>	•		

...continued Appendix A

Major Officials Discussing the Program	Mention of Brezhnev in connection with program	Mention of Food Program	Mention of agro- industrial integration
M. Z. Shakirov <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Bashkir Obkom</u>	•		
B. N. Yeltsin <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>Sverdlovsk Obkom</u>	Central Committee		S
OFFICIALS, SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS			
A. I. Pastukhov <u>First Secretary,</u> <u>All-Union Komsomol</u>	Central Committee		
A. I. Shibaev <u>Chairman,</u> <u>All-Union Central</u> <u>Council of Trade Unions</u>	•		

Key to Symbols Denoting Tenor of Speakers Remarks About Brezhnev, the Food Program, and Agro-Industrial Integration:

x - denotes mention of topic

+ - indicates that the speaker mentioned two or more clearly different activities to be implemented as means of assuring success of the Food Program

* - commitment of the speaker's geographical area or organization to activity for the success of the Food Program

? - possible reference to agro-industrial integration by mention of the July 1978 CPSU Central Committee Plenum enactments

R - reference to raion agro-industrial associations

S - reference to agricultural specialization and cooperation within a territorial area

Source: [Kommunisticheskaya partiya Sovetskogo soyuza], XXVI S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soyuza (23 fevraliya-3 marta 1981 goda): Stenograficheski otchet, 3 vols. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1981).

Notes

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1. George W. Breslauer, "Soviet Economic Reforms Since Stalin: Ideology, Politics, and Learning," *Soviet Economy*, 6 (July-September 1990): especially 255, 264, 267-268, 270. The author of the present essay is not referring to what Breslauer calls *subterranean* or *backstage* learning (270), but to a more active process by which actors formulate positions and test them as participants in the policy process. (See Breslauer's basic definition of social learning, 255). Also helpful was Seweryn Bialer, *The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 126-128.
2. See Thane Gustafson, *Crisis Amid Plenty: The Politics of Soviet Energy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 329-331, for another discussion of "social learning" by Gorbachev and his associates under Brezhnev. The development of reform ideas and relationships among advocates of change before Gorbachev's election as General Secretary of the Communist Party is described in Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina vanden Heuvel, *Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev's Reformers* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1989).
3. "Postanovlenie Tsk KPSS: Soveta ministrov SSSR 24 maya 1982 g. Ob Uluchshenii upravleniya sel'skim khozyaistvom i drugimi otraslyami agropromyshlennogo kompleksa", in *Resheniya partii i pravitel'stva po khozyaistvennym voprosam*, ed. K. M. Bogolyubov and M. S. Smirnyukov, *Aprel' 1981 g. - dekabr' 1982 g.* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1983), 14: 441-444.
4. For a brief summary of some Soviet statements about changed expectations for CPSU activity, see Barbara Ann Chotiner, "Organizational Change, Local Party Committees, and Farms: Soviet Local Party Committees and Farms after the Inception of Raion Agro-industrial Associations," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 21 (Spring 1988): 47.

5. Works explaining this point include Gregory Bienstock, Solomon M. Schwartz, and Aaron Yugow, *Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944); Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule* (New York: Vintage Books, 1958); Sidney I. Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-making in Soviet Agriculture: A Case Study in Agricultural Policy, 1953-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Robert F. Miller, *One Hundred Thousand Tractors: The MTS and the Development of Controls in Soviet Agriculture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); [Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev], *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. Strobe Talbott (New York: Bantam Books, 1971); Werner G. Hahn, *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960-1970* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); Thane Gustafson, *Reform in Soviet Politics: Lessons of Recent Politics on Land and Water* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); George W. Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982); Barbara Ann Chotiner, *Khrushchev's Party Reform: Coalition-Building and Institutional Innovation* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984); and Cynthia S. Kaplan, *The Party and Agricultural Crisis Management in the USSR* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987).

6. On this point, see Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," *American Political Science Review*, 56 (December 1962): 948-949. Another classic discussion of agenda-setting in American politics is Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, "The Politics of Agenda-Building: An Alternative Perspective for Modern Democratic Theory," *Journal of Politics*, 33 (November 1971): 892-915.

7. Examination of the policy process is based primarily on documents, books, and journals as well as a still partial reading of newspapers.

Attention is focused on sources from the era under study in order to try to capture the character of public discussion as it actually took place. Utilization of such a procedure should help to establish a base-line for comparing later revelations about bargaining, individuals' issue orientations, procedures, and the like. Ray S. Cline has suggested that such disclosures may not always be completely reliable. See his "The Cuban Missile Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, 68 (Fall 1989):191-192. Of course, when a full range of documentary evidence becomes available, a study like this one can be juxtaposed to that new material to help assess the degree to which the methodology used produces useful deductions.

8. Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, "Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems," *The Journal of Politics*, 53 (November 1991): 1044-1047; H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Breslauer, "Soviet Economic Reforms Since Stalin," 254-255; Zbigniew

Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: The Viking Press, Compass Books, 1965), 19; E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 71.

9. "Informatsionnoe soobshchenie o plenumе Tsentral'nogo komiteta Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soyuza," *Kommunist*, no. 16 (November 1980): 3; "Rech' tovarishcha Brezhneva na Plenumе TsK KPSS 21 oktyabrya 1980 goda," *Ibid.*, 6.

10. Martin Walker, *The Waking Giant: The Soviet Union under Gorbachev* (London: Michael Joseph, 1986), 27, 262 n.

11. "Rech' tovarishcha Brezhneva na Plenumе Tsk KPSS 21 oktyabrya 1980 goda," 6.

12. *Ibid.*, 10.

13. *Ibid.*

14. "O proektakh gosudarstvennogo plana ekonomicheskogo i sotsial'nogo razvitiya SSSR i gosudarstvennogo byudzheta SSSR na 1981 god: Postanovlenie Plenuma Tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS, prinyatoe 21 oktyabrya 1980 goda," *Kommunist*, no. 16 (November 1980): 12.

15. K[onstantin] U. Chernenko, "Velikoe edinstvo partii i naroda," *Kommunist*, no. 17 (November 1980): 18-20.

16. M[ikhail] S. Gorbachev, "Kursom intensivatsii i effektivnosti: Rech' na Vsesoyuznom agronomicheskom soveshchanii 24 dekabrya 1980 goda," in *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i*, 1: 255.

17. *Ibid.*, 253-271.

18. M. Solomentsev, "V tsentre vnimaniya – povyshenie blagosostoyaniya," *Kommunist*, no. 18 (December 1980): 17.

19. Boris Ponomarev, "Soviet Union: The Way to Peace and Constructive Endeavor," *World Marxist Review* 24 (February 1981): 12.

20. "Rech' tovarishcha E. A. Shevardnadze," in *XXVI s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soyuza (23 fevralya-3 marta 1981 goda): Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1981), 1: 195.
21. Solomentsev, "V tsentre vnimaniya," 16.
22. V. V. Shcherbitskii, "Otchet Tsentral'nogo komiteta Kompartii Ukrainy XXVI s'ezdy Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy: Doklad chlena Politburo Tsk KPSS, pervogo sekretarya TsK Kompartii Ukrainy tovarishcha V. V. Shcherbitskogo," *XXVI s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy, 10-12 fevralya 1981 goda: Stenograficheskii otchet* (Kiev: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury Ukrainy, 1981), 39.
23. Ye. Bugaev, "V dukhe partiinoi vzyskatel'nosti i tovarishchestva: S XXVI s'ezda Kompartii Gruzii," *Kommunist* no. 3 (February 1981), 94; "XXVI s'ezd Kompartii Gruzii," *Partiinaya zhizn'*, no. 4 (February 1981): 60.
24. Gorbachev, "Kursom intensivatsii," 255-256.
25. Dev Murarka, *Gorbachev: The Limits of Power* (London: Hutchinson, 1988), 76-77.
26. V. A. Karlov, *Agramaya politika KPSS na sovremennom etape* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Znanie", 1983), 21-22. Karlov was chief of the Department of Agriculture and the Food Industry within the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat.
27. Ibid., 22.
28. P. Alekseev, "Prodovol'stvennaya delo—zabota obshchaya," *Kommunist*, no. 2 (January 1982): 26.
29. P. Ignatovskii, "Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khozyaistvo: Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii problemy intensivatsii," *Kommunist*, no. 18 (December 1980): 67.
30. "Ob osveshchenii v zhurnale kadrovoi politiki KPSS v agropromyshlennom komplekse: K nashem chitatel'yam," *Kadry sel'skogo khozyaistva*, no. 1 (January-February 1981): 3.
31. "Nazreshie voprosy kadrovoi raboty (Po materialam Vsesoyuznogo agronomicheskogo soveshchaniya)," *Kadry sel'skogo khozyaistva*, no. 1 (January-February 1981): 8.

32. S. Smolyanskii and V. Arkhangel'skaya, "Kompleksnoe reshenie problem spetsializatsii i kontsentratsii proizvodstva," *Ekonomika sel'skogo khozyaistva*, no. 3 (March 1981): 89.
33. Ibid.
34. "Velichestvennye plany partii," *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii*, no. 1 (January 1981): 16.
35. E. Kalle and E. Lybu, "1976-1980: Uspekhi, problemy, chayaniya," *Kommunist Estonii*, no. 2 (February 1981): 37.
36. P. Ignatovskii, "Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skogo khozyaistvo: Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie problemy intensifikatsii," *Kommunist*, no. 18 (December 1980): 69-70.
37. "S"ezdu leninskoii partii—myslii dela millionov," *Kommunist*, no. 18 (December 1980): 9.
38. Smolyanskii and Arkhangel'skaya, "Kompleksnoe reshenie," 89.
39. A. Bondars, "Sovershenstvovat' upravlenie agropromyshlennymi kompleksami," *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii*, no. 11 (November 1980): 64.
40. Ibid.
41. Boris Lewytskij, ed., *Who's Who in the Soviet Union: A Biographical Encyclopedia of 5,000 Leading Personalities in the Soviet Union* (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1984), 278.
42. Yu. Ruben, "Narodnoe khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR v odinnatsatoi pyatiletke," *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii*, no. 3 (March 1981): 4.
43. Bugaev, "V dukhe," 95.
44. K. G. Vaino, "Otchet Tsk Kompartii Estonii i ocherednye zadachi respublikanskoi partiinoi organizatsii: Doklad pervogo sekretarya TsK Kompartii Estonii tov. K. G. Vaino," *Kommunist Estonii*, no. 3 (March 1981): 29.
45. See, for example, R. I. Tonkonog, *Maiskii Plenum TsK KPSS—Dal'neishee razvitiie agrarnoi politiki partii* (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1983), 108; Bugaev, "V dukhe," 96.

46. "Rech' tovarishcha I. G. Grintsova," in *XXVI s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy*, 289.
47. "Rech' tovarishcha N. K. Shul'zhenko," in *Ibid.*, 106.
48. "Rech' tovarishcha A. P. Osokinoi," in *XXVI s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soyuza*, 2: 74.
49. "Rech' tovarishcha E. A. Shevardnadze," in *Ibid.*, 1: 195.
50. I. Bodyul, "Leninskie printsipy sotsialisticheskogo khozyaistvovaniya v deistvii," *Kommunist Moldavii*, no. 10 (October 1980): 22-32.
51. Lewytkyj, *Who's Who*, 52; Michel Tatu; *Gorbachev: l' URSS va-t-il changer?* ([Paris]: Le Centurion, 1987), 95.
52. *Ibid.*; Murarka, *Gorbachov*, 75.
53. Bodyul, "Leninskie printsipy," 32. Please see the note at the end of the article.
54. *Ibid.*, 28-29.
55. B. Yevdalov and Yu. Makhryn, "Chuvstvo novogo," *Pravda*, 10 January 1981, 2.
56. "XV s"ezd Kompartii Moldavii," *Partiinaya zhizn'*, no. 4 (February 1981): 62.
57. *Ibid.*, 61.
58. "Rech' tovarishcha S. K. Grossu," in *XXVI s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soyuza*, 1: 305.
59. *Ibid.*, 1: 304.
60. "Otchet tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS XXVI s"ezdu Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soyuza i ocherednye zadachi partii v oblasti vnutrennei i vneshnei politiki: Doklad General'nogo sekretarya TsK KPSS tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva," in *XXVI s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soyuza*, 1: 63.

61. "Osnovnye napravleniya ekonomicheskogo i sotsial'nogo razvitiya SSSR na 1981-1985 gody i na period do 1990 goda," in *XXVI s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soyuza*, 2: 225.
62. *Ibid.*, 2: 188, 226.
63. *Ibid.*, 2: 188.
64. *XXVI s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soyuza*, 2: 153.
65. L[eonid] I[l'ich] Brezhnev, "Vystuplenie na vstreche s rukovoditel'yami Gruzinskoi SSR 24 maya 1981 goda," in *Leninskom kursom* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1982), 9: 127n., 129.
66. "Vo imya rosta blagosostoyaniya Sovetskikh lyudei: Kandidat v chleny Politbyuro TsK KPSS, pervyi sekretar' TsK KPSS Gruzii tovarishch E. A. SHEVARDNADZE otvechaet na voprosy redaktsii," *Kadry sel'skogo khozyaistva*, no. 5 (September-October 1981): 22.
67. M. A. Suslov, "Sozidatel'naya strategiya razvitogo sotsializma," *Partiinaya zhizn'*, no. 8 (April 1981): 18.
68. K[onstantin] U. Chernenko, "Sveryayas' s Leninym, deistvuya po-Leninski," in *Utverzhdai' leninskii stil v partiinoi rabote* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1983), 10.
69. K. Chernenko, "Resheniya XXVI s"ezda KPSS – Leninizm v deistvii," *Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie*, no. 5 (1981): 4.
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72. *Kadry sel'skogo khozyaistva*, no. 3 (May-June 1981): 27.
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79. Soskiev, "Zadachi," 57; Yurchishin, "Sochetanie," 35; "Agropromyshlenni kompleks strany," *Ekonomika sel'skogo khozyaistva*, no. 7 (July 1981): 11.
80. Vasil Tsanov, "Agrarno-promyshlennaya integratsiya v NRB," *Kommunist*, no. 15 (October 1981): 37-47.
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84. *Ibid.*, 42.
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88. "Na voprosy chitatelei," 19.
89. Ibid.
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91. Ye. Kalenik, "Integratsionnye protsessy v sel'skom khozyaistve respubliki," *Kadry sel'skogo khozyaistva*, no. 4 (July-August 1981): 24, 25.
92. "Vo imya rosta," 22.
93. Ibid., 21-22.
94. Ibid., 23.
95. V. Karalyun, "Agropromyshlenni kompleks: dostizheniya i perspektivy razvitiya," *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii*, no. 4 (April 1981): 25.
96. Vaino, "Nadezhnyi put'," 29.
97. Ibid.
98. Vaino, "Zhivotnovodstvu," 67.
99. M. Bronshtein, "Ob organizatsionnam i ekonomicheskom oformlenii respublikanskogo agropromyshlennogo (prodovol'stvennogo) kompleksa," *Kommunist Estonii*, no. 76 (July 1981): 47-49.
100. In *The Soviet Prefects* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), chapter 5, Jerry F. Hough sets forth the influences of institutional lineaments upon relations among CPSU and state agencies.
101. V. Mozhin, "O razvitiu Prodovol'stvennogo kompleksa," *Kommunist*, no. 13 (September 1981): 44.
102. Idem, "O razrabotke Prodovol'stvennoi programmy," *EKO*, no. 6 (96) (1982): 5.

103. Shevardnadze, "Vo imya rosta," 24.
104. Ibid.
105. "Avtory statei," *Ekonomika sel'skogo khozyaistva*, no. 5 (May 1981): 96.
106. A. Tovstanovskii, "Opyt i problemy razvitiya mezhkhozyaistvennoi kooperatsii i agropromyshlennoi integratsii v Ukrainskoi SSR," *Ekonomika sel'skogo khozyaistva*, no. 5 (May 1981): 31.
107. Ibid.
108. See Prosin, "Mezhkhozyaistvennoe kooperirovanie," 18; Yurchishin, "Sochetanie," 34; A. Bachurin, "Intensifikatsiya: Predposylki, puti osyshchestvleniya," *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, no. 9 (September 1981), 24, 30.
109. V. Grozdev, "Rasshiryat' i ukrepyat' mezhotraslevye svyazi," *Kadry sel'skogo khozyaistva*, no. 3 (May-June 1981): 49-50.
110. N. Bagretsov, "Raikom i upravlenie sel'skim khozyaistvom," *Partiinaya zhizn'*, no. 22 (November 1981): 40.
111. Mozhin, "O razvitii," 40-41.
112. K. Pankova, "Obyazatel'noe slagaemoe uspekha," *Kommunist*, no. 14 (September 1981): 46-47.
113. "Na voprosy chitatelei," 17.
114. Mozhin, "O razvitii," 44-45.
115. Vaino, "Zhivotnovodstvu," 66; "Na voprosy chitatelei," 17.
116. Mozhin, "O razvitii," 40; Vaino, "Zhivotnovodstvu," 67.
117. Ibid.; Pankova, "Obyazatel'noe slagaemoe uspekha," 46; Rozenberg, "Sovershenstvovat' formy," 39; Revenko, "Povyshenie urovnaya," 85.
118. Bagretsov, "Raikom i upravlenie," 39-40.

119. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects*, 235.
120. K. U. Chernenko, "Leninskaya strategiya rukovodstva: O nekotorykh voprosakh deyatel'nosti partii v usloviyakh razvitogo sotsializma," *Kommunist*, no. 13 (September 1981): 13.
121. V. Grishin, "Organizatsionno-partiinuyu rabotu – na uroven' trebovaniï XXVI s"ezda KPSS," *Kommunist*, no. 8 (May 1981): 10-11.
122. Chernenko, "Leninskaya strategiya," 13.
123. Gorbachev, "XXVI s"ezd KPSS," 288.
124. "Na voprosy chitatelei," 18.
125. O. Kuanyshev, "Yedinstvo organizatorskoi, khozyaistvennoi i vospitatel'noi deyatel'nosti," *Partiinaya zhizn'*, no. 12 (June 1981): 25.
126. Revenko, "Povyshenie urovnaya," 85.
127. K. Vaino, "Sovershenstvovat' upravlenie sel'skim khozyaistvom," *Ekonomika sel'skogo khozyaistva*, no. 7 (July 1981): 23.
128. Bagretsov, "Raikom i upravlenie," 42.
129. *Ibid.*, 42, 38.
130. *Partiinaya zhizn'*, no. 22 (November 1981): 80.
131. *Ibid.*, 38. For later articles in the series, see O. Teneishvili, "Agropromyshlennyi kompleks: natselennost' na konechnye rezul'taty," *Ibid.*, no. 1 (January 1982), and V. Udam, "V poiske naibolee effektivnoi formy upravleniya ekonomikoi sel'skogo raiona," *Ibid.*, no. 3 (February 1982).
132. Bagretsov, "Raikom i upravlenie," 42.
133. *Ibid.*

134. "Rech' tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva na Plenum TsK KPSS, 16 noyabrya 1981 goda," *Ibid.*, no. 23 (December 1981): 8.
135. *Ibid.*
136. George Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders*, 238; Gustafson, *Crisis Amid Plenty*, 303-304.
137. Darrell Slider, "Regional Aspects of Policy Innovation in the Soviet Union," in *Politics and the Soviet System*, ed. Thomas F. Remington (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 142-143. The term "policy experiment" is Slider's (139).
138. *Ibid.*, 146.
139. The author has noted the existence of differences over the appropriate societal role of the CPSU – and specifically over the relations of Party committees to economic processes – at the beginning of Brezhnev's administration. See Barbara Ann Chotiner, *Dismantling an Innovation: The November 1964 Decision Reunifying Industrial and Agricultural Organs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, No. 501 (Pittsburgh: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1985).
140. Jerry F. Hough warns against the concept of a "Party position" (78) and shows the possibilities of intra-CPSU conflict as well as of coalitions between apparatchiks and officials of other institutions in his "The Party Apparatchiki," in *Interest Groups and Soviet Politics*, ed. Skilling and Griffiths, 47-92.
141. Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders*, 11, 245, 249. See also Thane Gustafson, *Reform in Soviet Politics*, 157.
142. Boris Yeltsin, *Against the Grain: An Autobiography*, trans. Michael Glenny (New York: Summit Books, 1990), 69.
143. Otdel po voprosam raboty Sovetov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Odinnadtsatyi sozvyv* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya"), 110.
144. "Ob izmeneniyakh v sisteme organov upravleniya agro-promyshlennym kompleksom", *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo soveta SSSR*, no. 48 (1985), item 938; "O dal'neishem sovershenstvovanii upravleniya agropromyshlennym kompleksom (Izlozhenie)," *Resheniya partii*

i pravitel'stva po khozyaistvennym voprosam, tom 16, *mai 1985-fevral' 1986*, chast' 1 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1988), 232-235.

145. "Ob izmeniyakh v sisteme organov upravleniya agropromyshlennym kompleksom strany", *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo soveta SSSR*, no. 15 (1989), item 107; "Ob uluchshenii prodovol'stvennogo obespecheniya naseleniya strany na osnove korennoogo povysheniya effektivnosti i dal'neishhego razvitiya agropromyshlennogo proizvodstva," *Sobranie postanovlenii Pravitel'stva Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik*, no. 19-20 (1989), item 60; "O korennoi perestroike ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii i upravleniya v agropromyshlennom komplekse strany," *Ibid.*, item 61.

146. I am indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing to the possibility that Gorbachev's activities and opinions, recorded in sources published in 1980 and 1981, may differ from ideas expressed and maneuverings undertaken by him more privately.

147. M. S. Gorbachev, "Vystuplenie na XIX Vsesoyuznoi Konferentsii KPSS: 30 iyunya 1988 goda," *Izbrannye rechi i stati'i* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1989), 6: 402-403, 405. See also XIX Vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soyuza, "Rezolyutsii XIX Vsesoyuznoi Konferentsii KPSS: O nekotorykh neotlozhnykh merakh po prakticheskomu osushchestvleniyu reformy politicheskoi sistemy strany," *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika*, 1989, ed. V. Ya. Gribenko et al. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1989), 5, 15-16.