The
Carl Beck
Papers
in Russian &
East European Studies

Number 1702

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State and Nation Building Policies and the New Trends in Migration in the Former Soviet Union

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No. 1702, November 2003

ISSN 0889-275X

The Carl Beck Papers
Editors: William Chase, Bob Donnorummo, Ronald H. Linden
Managing Editor: Eileen O'Malley
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Cover Design: Mark Weixel

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State- and Nation-Building Policies and the New Trends in Migration in the Former Soviet Union

Democratic transitions are especially complex in federal states and countries with multinational populations and compact, ethnic minority settlements; the increasing ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural heterogeneity of a society complicates the achievement of political compromises. In this sense, the post-Soviet newly independent states (NIS) face an especially complex transition pattern. Roman Szporluk, for example, enumerates three different transformations: the dissolution of the imperial structure and the resulting formation of independent states, the transition from a centralized to a market economic system, and the transition from authoritarianism to (at least ideally) a political democracy, with all three "combined or fused in the chaotic and extremely difficult process of formation and transformation of states and nations."1 Thus the transition in the NIS is marked by simultaneous developments in the political, economic, social, religious, ideological, and cultural spheres, including the creation or re-creation of ethnic and other identities.

The complexity of these processes can potentially work against the very goals of democratization, even those in the ethnic sphere, that have set them in motion initially. In the post-Soviet case, the complicating factors include the absence of democratic political traditions, the history of ethnic inequality, the weakness of civic societies, and the heritage of the Soviet period, when the federal policies encouraged the perception of ethnic republics as "belonging" to their titular nationalities, while simultaneously creating vertical hierarchies of the Soviet nations. Also important is the fact that after the dissolution of the USSR, power in many NIS was retained by members of the former Communist elites, who frequently combined state-building and privatization with the formation of new, ethnically based privileges, enhancing nationalistic support for their regimes and simultaneously excluding ethnic aliens from the process of power and property redistribution.2

An important question at present is, to what extent do the recent migration patterns in the former Soviet Union (FSU) are rooted in the Russian imperial and the Soviet political heritage, and to what extent do they result from ethnic inequalities and mistreatment of minorities in the new states? Thus the main goal of the present research is the analysis of both the historical and the modern (post-Soviet) causes of ethnic tensions and migration flows developing in the FSU after 1991. Special attention is given to the role of post-Soviet elites and the impact of their policies in the fields of state- and nation-building on the position of the ethnic minorities in the NIS as factors stimulating the development of new migration flows.

Specifics of the Post-Soviet Transition

The peaceful dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the formation of fifteen independent states at the end of 1991 represented a significant political achievement, especially if one considers the disastrous processes that accompanied the simultaneous dissolution of Yugoslavia, another multiethnic socialist federation. At the same time, the 1996 congressional hearings on "Forced Migration in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union" revealed that the weakening of the previously nearly total central control of the Soviet state resulted in "thousands of incidents of ethnic violence, . . .some 10 armed conflicts or other eruptions of sustained, organized violence that have lasted anywhere from several weeks to 8 years."3 Political and ideological decentralization and the end of the Communist Party's domination have led, among other consequences, to open expressions of previously contained animosities and suppressed intergroup claims; the development of these tensions was delayed, but not prevented by the Communists monopoly of power. The paradox is that while trying to preclude national self-determination or even the development of national movements, the Soviet leadership created ethnic protostates and stimulated the progress of national consciousness and the formation of territorially based ethnic elites. Thus, even with limited power, ethnic federal units created the territorial framework for future nationalist activities.

When the one-party, multiethnic federal system began to collapse, national affiliation became the only unifying characteristic, empowering local national elites first of all.4 These elites frequently relied on the titular ethnic groups in order to control political power and the redistribution of the state property. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that, along with the old elites, many elements of the previous administrative mechanisms and political cultures also survived this "peaceful divorce." This was especially apparent in the desire to divide society and to rely on the support of a part of it (the titular ethnic elites), discriminating against the others. The new populism has simply replaced one image of the enemy with another—instead of class enemies there emerged ethnic or religious aliens. As a result, many polities are developing on the basis of an exclusive, ethnically based definition of nationhood.

The non-democratic essence of such nationalizing policies was further strengthened by the manner in which the dissolution of the USSR and the formation of the NIS in December 1991 were executed—unexpectedly quickly and essentially illegally. The character of the dissolution, meanwhile, was to a large extent defined by the specifics of the Soviet political system: the merger of the state and the ruling Communist Party (which played the dominant role) and the ethnofederal organization of the USSR. The

weakening of the Party during *perestroika* also led to the disintegration of the centralized state, resulting in the shift of power to ethnic Communist elites, who still controlled local politics. This trend can be illustrated by the fact that the dissolution of the USSR was essentially brokered in the closed, elitist circle of the leaders of the major Soviet republics, usually, though not always, dominated by the former Communist *nomenklatura*.5 Thus the reforms, controlled by the executive branch with a monopoly of power, were oriented toward sweeping privatization and the rapid building of nation-states for the titular ethnic groups. These goals were effectively substituted for those of genuine democratization and the growth of civic cultures and societies. More than that, transition under nationalist slogans became the main mechanism of property redistribution, leading Philip Roeder to conclude that the absence of a balance of forces and the political domination of the former *nomenklatura* opened the way for new authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet Union: "Authoritarianism [there] has proven to be the rule, democracy the exception."6

Quite in accordance with this pattern, Boris Yeltsin's policies in Russia were aimed at quick privatization, the achievement of Russian control over the "New Abroad"7 as well as the domination of the federal executive over the other branches of government and the exclusion of the former president's opponents from decision making. This approach, in the words of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, has "weakened the state, weakened democracy, and weakened the economy," resulting in the de-legitimization of government and the political regime in general.8 The ruling group ignored to a large extent the execution of a consistent political reform and the introduction of effective minority guarantees. The same trend or even the complete substitution of privatization and national-state building for democratization and the development of civic society is visible in other NIS, especially those in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. In the words of Linz and Stepan,

"Ethno authoritarianism, ethnic conflict, and state erosion [have become]... dominant features of many of these polities... [T]he discourse of 'national liberation' was privileged over democratization and the discourse of collective rights of 'titular nationalities' was privileged over individual rights."9

Migration represents in such cases the most radical of a minority's *peaceful* reactions (though not the only one) to the new and unfavorable political situation in the NIS, including the increasing inter-ethnic tensions and the nationalizing policies of the new states. The 1996 congressional hearings concluded that the post-Soviet migration wave represented "the largest potential migration, forced or otherwise, in Europe since the Second World War," which could involve up to twenty-five million people.10 Although these bleak forecasts have not become the reality, the figures are still significant. The ethnic, demographic, and social characteristics of migration flows also indicate

the existence of grave political and socioeconomic imbalances and dislocations in the post-Soviet area, posing serious questions about the role played by the NIS governments' policies (including those toward local minorities).

The Ethnic and Migration Policies of the Soviet Period

The recent, nationally based problems in the post-Soviet area, including ethnic intermixture and the presence of a large Russian Diaspora (which essentially includes both ethnic Russians and the so-called Russian-speakers—living in non-Russian ethnic areas people of non-titular ethnic groups who communicate primarily in the Russian language), have deep roots in the history of the region. The Russian and Soviet historical heritage includes a high degree of political centralization and ideological control as well as the political and economic domination of one ethnic and religious group, Christian Orthodox Russians. This domination results from more than four hundred fifty years of Russia's territorial expansion into non-Russian areas, initially primarily to the east, and since the middle of the seventeenth century, also to the west. For centuries, Russian political life was marked by deep social, national, and religious inequalities and divisions. At the same time, Russia differed in a number of important characteristics from other great European empires. In the words of Hans Kohn,

"The Russian Empire conquered vast territories alien in race and civilization and welded them into a centralized despotism mightier than any other in history...[The] Russian Empire, [relying on a messianic, religiously based ideology, tended]...to impose uniformity upon its immense domains, to Russify or later to communize them without any freedom of spontaneous development."11

Gregory Gleason agrees that the Soviet Union was an atypical imperial system. For him, this uniqueness is associated with such features, favorable for the development of state- and nation-building processes, as the long historical association of the peoples, the high degree of economic integration and population intermixture, as well as the unifying role of ideology in the later, Soviet period.12 Nevertheless, with the passing of time, the domination of one, although numerous, ethnic and religious group over the political, economic, and cultural life of the country increasingly contrasted with the growing ethnic and religious heterogeneity of the population of the expanding Russian state.13 Even before the Communist revolution, such dominance was becoming politically disturbing in light of the growth of local ethnic professional and political elites and the development of ethnic self-consciousness and local cultures.

The Soviet period (1917-1985) was marked by serious discrepancies between official ethnic policies and their practical implementation.14 The introduction of Communist rule and the forceful incorporation of ethnic regions into the Soviet state prevented the growth of national self-determination, implemented in Europe in accordance with the principles formulated by Woodrow Wilson, and doomed the majority of those ethnically based states that were initially proclaimed after the revolution. 15 Rapid industrialization and changes in the social structure of the population were not matched by a comparable free rise of nationalist feelings and local ethnic movements or the development of civic cultures and societies. This situation contrasted with those phenomena that, with different degrees of success, were evolving in the successor states to three other territorially homogeneous multiethnic European empires—Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey.

In Central and Eastern Europe, post imperial state-building, formation of civic societies and market economies (while rarely complete and successful) were developing simultaneously with attempts to create ethnically based states out of parts of previously multiethnic conglomerates.16 In their turn, Soviet reforms included the prohibition of social, ethnic, and religious discrimination; the development of a universal, relatively more equal and compulsory educational system (though simultaneously discriminating against the previously privileged groups); and increasing and frequently enforced social mobility. In the economic sphere, the major changes involved sweeping nationalization, collectivization, and industrialization. These programs were imposed from above by the Communist elite and were supposed to destroy the remnants of feudalism and to support the growth of modern society and economy under centralized state control. Nevertheless, the contrast between the rapid and centrally enforced economic reforms, changes in the social structure of the population and the absence of political democratization and consistent implementation of the national self-determination principles created serious developmental distortions that became visible with the consequent liberalization of the regime.

The Soviet period witnessed serious revisions of the nationality policies as compared to the previous, Tsarist period. While political power was retained in the hands of the central government controlled by the Communist Party, Soviet policies encouraged the development of local economies, ethnic cultures, languages, and educational systems, and promoted the growth of ethnic elites, including bureaucracies. However, with all the ideological and political changes of the Communist period, the Soviet political system retained a number of features of the traditional Russian imperial state. These included a high degree of political centralization and the imposition, after a relatively short period of indigenous cultural development (1917-*circa* 1930) of a single, officially promoted and supported, cultural tradition. Thus the centralization of political and economic life increased even further through the introduction of the

Communist Party structure, parallel and superior to the state. Centralization also involved new spheres of life and, in contrast to the Tsarist period, included total state control of the economy and mass media and the suppression of religion.

Nevertheless, simultaneously with the existence of these non-democratic features, the Soviet regime was characterized by a unique internal dualism based on both extreme centralization and the encouragement of controlled national development, supported by a multilevel, ethnically based, Soviet federation. These policies, in the opinion of Zbigniew Brzezinski, "in fact intensified popular nationalist passions. . . Nationalism was. . . nurtured, rather than diluted in the communist experience."17 The existence of such internal tensions in Soviet nationalities policy is frequently explained in the West by the class-dominated nature of Marxism and the misperception of national factors by Soviet leaders and Marxist theorists.18 Indeed, while initially believing that a federal structure weakened class solidarity, Lenin changed his view during the Civil War. He nevertheless considered this policy shift a tactical compromise, or, as Gleason rightfully emphasizes, as a provisional step toward the formation of a classless and internationalist society that would eliminate interethnic divisions and would make any previous concessions to particular ethnic groups or federal formations a pure formality.19

Although perceived as a tactical compromise, Soviet ethnic federalism has played an important state- and nation-building role. Rogers Brubaker, for example, concludes that, however brutal, the Soviet "regime had no systematic policy of 'nation-destroying.'. . .The repression of nationalism went hand in hand with the consolidation of nationhood and nationality." Elaborating on the uniqueness of Soviet ethnic policies, he writes that the USSR differed from a nation-state in a number of ways. He specifically mentions the simultaneous development of the "system of ethno territorial federalism. . . [and] the elaborate codification of. . . personal nationality," which essentially emphasized the ethnic differences among Soviet citizens and created a psychological affiliation with an ethnic homeland irrespective of the place of an individual's actual settlement.20 This dualism of attachments was further strengthened by the persistent development of national bureaucratic and intellectual elites, educated in their vernacular languages and concentrated primarily in their ethnic republics.

Soviet ethnic policies, meanwhile, should not be regarded as totally consistent and continuous. They were marked by unevenness and periodic, significant revisions. Following an initial, *relatively* liberal period (1917-*circa* 1930), the USSR entered a totalitarian stage of development (*circa* 1930-1953), characterized by the elimination of any alternative to the central Communist leadership groups in society. The total monopolization and control of cultural and ideological activities by the Communist Party during this period was achieved by destroying the remnants of alternative parties (or factions within the Party), interest groups, and social and cultural organizations, and the imposition of unified social, economic, and political institutions. T. H. Rigby

characterized this system as a "mono-organizational society. . . [in which] nearly all social activities were run by hierarchies of appointed officials under the direction of a single chain of command," controlled by the Communist Party.21 In the ethnic field, this policy resulted in the secondary status awarded to local cultures, traditions, and religious beliefs; manipulations of the officially presented versions of history; and ranking nations in accordance with their "reliability" and "value" from the point of view of the Communist leadership. Nations and ethnic groups were divided into the major ones (Russians and, to a lesser degree, the ethnically and culturally close Slavic Ukrainians and Belorussians); titular nations of ethnic federal units, that is, those having their own republics or administrative territories; and those lacking ethnic territorial units or living in the titular regions of other ethnic groups. From the mid-1930s, the official ideological internationalism was paralleled by the growing emphasis on "patriotism," in essence meaning the increasing stratification of the Soviet nationalities and the policies of Russification.22 Simultaneously, some of the most severe blows of the Stalinist purges were directed against national professional and intellectual elites, especially in such economically, politically, or culturally developed regions as the Baltic republics, Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia. The ideological campaigns of the late Stalinist period (1948-1953) also had an expressed anti intellectual orientation and were frequently aimed against particular ethnic groups.

While pursuing the policies of ethno federalism, the Communist regime was also forcefully changing the population structure in particular ethnic regions. The whole Soviet period was characterized by large-scale population movements, both politically and economically motivated. Politically, migrations assisted in changing the ethnic structure of the population of a particular region, either increasing the share of the nationalities considered more reliable by the regime, or moving to remote areas those viewed as not reliable enough. Pavel Polian specifically emphasizes that these policies were especially visible in the border areas, from which local populations were frequently removed to internal regions, while their territories were settled by Russian-speaking populations.23 Brubaker stresses another aspect of this policy, concerning the promotion of "migrations of persons outside 'their own' homeland. . . [aimed at] weakening homeland attachments and identities and promoting an emergent supra-national identity."24 The politically motivated migrations also included the movement of repressed people, many of whom, considered "unreliable" by the regime, were transferred across ethnic borders (for example, Russians and other Russian-speakers, exiled to Kazakhstan and Central Asia).

Communist migration policies, while ignoring the interests of particular ethnic groups, resulted in serious changes in the ethnic structure of the national regions, increasing the proportion of non-titular ethnic groups. From the late 1920s, new political and professional elites were brought in large numbers to the ethnic regions, primarily

from the Russian center. This process further stimulated the formation of what Michael Hechter describes as a "cultural division of labor"—essentially, the provision of different status and social roles to representatives of the core and peripheral cultural communities.25 The open disregard by the newly arriving elites for local cultures and traditions provided anti centrist feelings with an ethnic ideological and emotional foundation. Frequent arbitrary redrawings of the borders among the ethnic regions and the complex multilevel character of the Soviet federation26 also articulated the unequal status of various ethnic groups inhabiting the USSR.

At the same time, state-directed migrations of that period were at least partially economically motivated, primarily, if not exclusively, from the point of view of the political center, not of the individual migrants interests. The territorial redistribution of the work force was, in Stephen Kotkin's words, "viewed as an integral part of central planning"27 and in this sense it represented one of the major mechanisms promoting growth in the planned economy. This view on the essence of Soviet migration policies is also advanced by supporters of the Internal Colonialism theory. Collin Mettam and Stephen Wyn Williams, in particular, claim that Soviet "industrial development founded on the interests of the core. . . [had a serious impact] on the spatial distribution and the ethnic composition of peripheral populations."28 Thus the territorial movement of the population was implemented with no regard to the social or cultural needs of migrants. These features of Soviet labor policies are also emphasized by Blair A. Ruble, who writes that economic migrations in the USSR were "driven more by bureaucratic and administrative policies and directives than by market forces or individual preference."29 Even such political mechanisms as imprisonment in labor camps and exile were considered a way to create a supply of very cheap and socially unprotected labor.30 Indeed, the abundance of such a labor force, available at practically no cost to the state and lacking any political or civil rights, allowed the development of production in regions and under conditions that would not have been economically sustainable otherwise.

The large-scale resettlement programs resulted in increasing population heterogeneity. In a number of republics, drastic changes took place in the ethnic and religious structure of the population, due to the outflow of the native population and the inflow of Russian-speakers. For example, the share of the Latvian population in Latvia decreased from 75.5 percent in 1939 to 52 percent in 1989 (the time of the last Soviet census, serving thus as a reference point for most of the comparisons), while the share of Russians increased from 10.6 percent to 34 percent.31 The share of Estonians in Estonia declined from 88.1 percent in 1934 to 61.5 percent in 1989, simultaneously with the increase of Russians' share from 8.2 percent to 30.3 percent.32

In Kazakstan, the share of the ethnic Kazakhs decreased from 82 percent in 1897 to 39.7 percent in 1989, while the share of Russians increased from 16 percent to 37.8 percent33 (see table 1).

In general, Kazakstan represents the most drastic example of Soviet nationalities and migration policies. In all, about 6.2 million people immigrated to Kazakhstan during the Soviet period.34 As a result of that policy, if before the establishment of Soviet power there were no more than 1.5 million Europeans in Kazakhstan, by the middle of 1991 there were already 8.9 million members of European ethnic groups in the republic.35 Simultaneously, the Kazakh ethnic population either decreased or its growth was slowed down by the discriminatory, or at times even genocidal, policies of the central Communist government.36

Migration policies in Kazakhstan and other republics—such as the removal of native populations from the Baltic states and the centrally channeled in-migration of Russian-speakers—were based on both economic and political considerations, including the conscious change of the ethnic population structure in particular regions. The centrally defined industrialization projects; the inflow of the repressed to Siberia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and the Russian North in the 1930s; the removal of native populations from newly acquired territories in the 1940s and their replacement with ethnic Russians and members of other, considered more reliable, ethic groups; and the *Tselina (Virgin Lands)* program in Kazakhstan in the 1950s are among the best known of such large-scale resettlements.

Another, and especially humiliating, aspect of Stalinist policies was the application in the ethnic sphere of the collective guilt principle. Officially introduced into the Russian Criminal Code and legal practice in 1934, this principle resulted in the suppression of whole national groups, the disappearance of a number of ethnic state formations, and large-scale enforced resettlements. These processes started in the 1930s with some politically motivated deportations of Moslem ethnic groups inside Central Asia and of Poles from Ukraine and Belorussia in 1936-1938; intensified in 1939-1941 with the incorporation into the USSR of the Baltic states, Eastern Poland, and Moldova; and reached a climax during and after the Second World War. The Volga Germans were removed from the areas of their traditional settlement after August 1941. During 1943-1944, they were followed by the Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Karachais, Balkars, Bulgarians, Greeks, Meskhetian Turks, Koreans, Poles, Finns, and Kurds. Enforced resettlements and abolition of certain ethnic federal units continued through 1946. Among those "removed" were 400,000 Poles, 120,000 Koreans, and more than 1 million Germans.37 Immediately after the war, large groups of the native populations from the Baltic states, Moldova, Western Ukraine, and Western Belorussia were resettled.

Significant groups were moved out of the territory of the Russian Federation. From the Northern Caucasus alone, about six hundred thousand Kurds, Karachais, Balkars, Ingush, and Chechens were exiled to remote areas of Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the Russian Far North, and Siberia.38 Their position was further aggravated with the adoption on 26 November 1948 of the decree of the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On the Criminal Responsibility for Escaping the Places of Compulsory and Permanent Settlements of the Persons Settled into the Remote Region of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War." This decree enforced lifetime residence on resettled persons and imposed a twenty-year prison term on anyone attempting to escape.39 The administrative divisions of seven exiled peoples, covering more than one hundred fifty thousand square kilometers and populated initially by about 2 million people, were abolished and the lands were settled by other ethnic groups, creating the foundation for deep ethnic prejudices and the territorial conflicts of the recent period.40

The enforced population movements also included labor deportation of the Soviet population by the German occupational authorities during World War II and the reversed movement of these people and of former Soviet POWs, many of whom were subsequently purged by the Soviet government and sent after the war to labor camps and into exile (the so-called special settlements). Pavel Polian estimates the overall number of the deported in 1920-1952 at approximately 15 million, of whom 6,015,000 were deported inside Soviet territory, and 8,960,000 were forced to cross the international border.41

Group repressions were partly reversed only after Stalin's death in 1953. In the period between 1954 and 1967, most of the repressed peoples were allowed to return to their ethnic homelands, which usually regained their previous legal status in the federation. But a number of nations, such as Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, and Volga Germans, did not recover their territories, settled by that time by other ethnic groups. They were still considered partially guilty or at least threatening to the stability of the state, and not deserving an absolute pardon.

Large-scale immigration to the ethnic regions, given Moscow's overwhelming economic, political and cultural control of the ethnic periphery, led to the deepening of political problems. The Russian-speakers who moved to the national regions mostly ignored local cultures. According to the 1989 USSR census, only in two of the Soviet union republics (Ukraine and Lithuania) could more than a third of the Russians who lived there speak a local language fluently (see table 2). In six other republics, this share was between 10 and 30 percent. In five republics, less than 5 percent of Russians were fluent in a local language, and in Kazakhstan, out of more than 6 million ethnic Russians, only 54,000, or less than 1 percent, spoke fluent Kazakh.42 Meanwhile, for the local population fluency in Russian became an important precondition not only for political, but also for a professional career or for receiving a good education.43

Among the local titular ethnic groups, the shares of Russian-speakers and of those who considered Russian their native language, also were high (see table 3). In Belarus, for instance, 19.7 percent of the members of the titular nationality considered Russian their native language.44

Interethnic relations in the republics were further aggravated by the character of industrialization and urbanization during the Soviet period—quick, directed by the political center, and ignoring ethnic borders or local traditions and interests. As a result of centrally defined industrialization and the inflow of industrial and managerial personnel from other parts of the country, the number of Russians and of other Russian-speaking, mostly Slavic, ethnic groups in urban centers and among local professional elites and industrial workers far exceeded their representation in the general population. By 1989, Russians were the majority in the capitals of two out of fourteen non-Russian ethnic union republics (Kazakhstan and Kirgizia), and between 20 and 50 percent of the population in nine (see table 4). At the same time, Russians' share in the overall population exceeded 20 percent in five republics (and was the highest in Kazakhstan, at 37.8 percent). Out of thirty-two ethnic units of the Russian Federation, Russians' share exceeded 75 percent of the urban population in eight ethnic units (see table 5). In sixteen units, it was more than 50 percent, and only in eight units was it less than a half of the urban population (including Daghestan—the only unit where this share was below 20 percent). By comparison, Russians' share exceeded 75 percent of the total population in only two units (Khakassia and Jewish Autonomous Oblast). This share was more than a half in fifteen units, and was less than a half in the other fifteen.45 Thus Soviet policies essentially produced socio-class divisions on the basis of national origin: blue- and white-collar, non-titular ethnic urban groups *versus* the local rural population.46 A large portion of the Russian-speaking urban population worked at centrally administered enterprises or institutions, not linked in a managerial sense to the local economies. These population groups were also frequently supplied by the central ministries, thus even in the socioeconomic respect being cut off from the local ethnic population.47 This tendency was especially visible in the capitals and major administrative centers that required large numbers of managerial personnel. Such contrasts in ethnic composition between urban and rural populations also increased the anti intellectual orientation of some future nationalist populist movements.

Overall, Moscow's discriminatory ethnic policies and its neglect of local cultures resulted in the formation of strong negative views by other nations on the role of Russians in the republics, laying the foundation for a stable association between anti centrist and anti-Russian feelings. The latter emerged as attempts at cooperation with German authorities during the Second World War, and later in periodic protests (Georgia in 1958 and 1972; Tselinograd, Kazakhstan, in 1979; Kazakstan and Yakutia

in 1986).48 In the republics, this atmosphere promoted the growth of alternative, primarily nationalistic ideologies and assisted in the quick dissolution of the USSR after the beginning of political liberalization.

Simultaneously with policies that generated interethnic tensions, formal adherence to the principles of national self-determination and ethno federalism led to the development of ethnic assertiveness by numerous population groups living in Soviet territory and secured benefits for local ethnic elites. Donald Horowitz was among those who recognized the systemic roots of this internal tension. He concluded that when state borders overlap the boundaries of ethnic settlements, monopolization of the distribution of state benefits by titular ethnic groups, or, to be more specific, by their governing ethnic elites, may result. In the Soviet case, these elites represented the ethnically based Communist *nomenklatura* that used its power to influence the further expansion of local elites and their loyalties.

The new ethnic professional and cultural elites were expected by the regime to be interested in strengthening the central power and the existing sociopolitical system as protectors of their own privileges. The development of such elites, meanwhile, also created pressure on local labor markets of highly qualified jobs. The result was the increased dissatisfaction among members of ethnic elites with their career opportunities and greater competition between them and local Russian-speakers. From this point of view, the creation of the "autonomous ethnic homelands, [designed to provide] control over the politicization of ethnicity," in the long run laid the foundation for the expression of local interests and the development of future nationalist movements.49

Soviet policies went even further, shaping, in Graham Smith's words, "'statelets in embryo,' with complete governmental institutions, national symbols, and continuous traditions of cultural production in their own vernaculars" and diversified ethnic elites.50 Indeed, while being especially brutal and centralist, Soviet totalitarianism attempted, through its mass orientation and the use of the media, education, and modern technology, to control and politically indoctrinate the entire population. This required the spread of education (simultaneously technocratic and ideologically indoctrinated) and the creation of diverse, local ethnic elites presumably dedicated to the central Communist leadership. This trend became especially pronounced in the post-Stalinist years, during the transition to a post totalitarian political structure and the general weakening of the Soviet economy and the regime's ideological and political controls of the Brezhnev years (the so-called p*eriod zastoia* or the period of stagnation). At this stage, local elites were given a high degree of independence in personnel and educational policies, allowing them to promote members of their ethnic, clan, and regional groups into privileged positions. Noting this trend, Eric Hobsbawm writes that "Marxist movements and states [and, it can be added, ethnic federal units within such states] have tended to become national not only in form but in substance, i. e. nationalist" in the sense of promoting the interests of

titular ethnic groups as opposed to those of the central government and the local ethnic minorities, or of the Communist movement in general.51 Especially important was the increasing local control in the post-Stalinist years over education, and especially, the training of local bureaucrats.

The Soviet federal system, with its hierarchical structure, played a primary role in the legal differentiation of ethnic groups; hereafter, the opportunities for development of an ethnic culture depended on the group's position in the complex structure of Soviet federalism. Describing this system, Philip Roeder concluded that because ethnic cadres' control of resources increases with their rank in the hierarchy, "a nationality subordinate to the republic of a different titular nationality may find its resources and life chances limited."52 The hierarchical division of ethnic groups became especially visible during the post-Stalinist, politically more relaxed period, from 1953-1985. The partial decentralization and liberalization of the regime expanded the powers of local ethnic elites, allowing them to grant preferential treatment to "their" groups by restricting educational and career opportunities for non-titular minorities. These quota-based policies, officially oriented toward stimulating the development of local elites and cultures, became a mechanism of differentiation and discrimination against local, non-titular minority groups and simultaneously assisted in the creation of power bases for titular ethnic elites. Philip Roeder candidly describes these local policies as "discriminating against. . . [minority populations]. The minorities within the homelands of other nationalities (including the 'exclave' minorities, such as Jews and Russians) were the greatest losers from inter-republic redistribution" of wealth and power.53 In Graham Smith's opinion, these policies provided the titular nationalities with "preferential access to higher education and to party membership which contributed to the nativisation of a local political leadership."54 Meanwhile, the rapid expansion of the educational system on all levels and the appearance of educated ethnic elites served to some extent as factors complicating interethnic relations. Roeder, for example, thinks that the inability of new educated elites to obtain positions and material benefits corresponding to their new educational status both produced their dissatisfaction with existing political arrangements and stimulated intra-republican policies of "ethnic succession."55 Essentially, local governments sponsored the intensive replacement of Russian-speaking professionals with those from titular ethnic groups.

In 1989 in Buriatia, an autonomous ethnic republic of the Russian Federation, for instance, the share of the titular nationality among upper-level management reached 36.7 percent compared to its share in the population of 24.0 percent. In Tatarstan, another of Russia's ethnic autonomous republics, the respective shares were 64.1 percent and 48.6 percent.56 In Kirgizia in 1989, there were 197 Kirgiz and 105 Russian research workers and university professors per 10,000 employees of each of these nationalities. For those working in the fields of literature and arts, these figures

were 129 and 67; physicians, 205 and 98; and lawyers, 38 and 16.57 While the Russians' share in the urban population was around 40 percent, they accounted for 29 percent of those engaged in literature and journalism. At the same time, Russians, constituting 21.5 percent of the population of Kirgizia in 1989, accounted for 60 percent of industrial engineers and 57 percent of turners, being increasingly pushed into the industrial sphere.58 Thus, during the post-Stalinist period the "cultural division of labor" was reversed in many ethnic regions, resulting in increasing interethnic competition for high status positions even before the beginning of *perestroika*. This produced dissatisfaction among both ethnic and Russian-speaking educated elites and hurt especially the members of smaller minority groups that had no titular ethnic republics.

The situation was further aggravated during the economic decline of the 1980s, making the educated elites the driving force of discontent in the ethnic republics and creating ethnically based tensions. Such tensions began to develop on two levels: between the republican titular ethnic groups and the local Russian-speaking elites (perceived as the representatives of the Soviet center and the beneficiaries of its policies) and between the republican centers and the local indigenous minorities, who also started to demand recognition of their special status and rights. The existing multilevel ethnofederal structure frequently channeled such struggles of "ethnic cadres of 'minorities' subordinate to the union republic of another nationality... [into] demands over the 'status' of their homelands within the federal hierarchy."59 Thus changes in the ethnic structure of the republican elites created challenges to the very foundations of the Soviet state organization.

These trends stimulated the emigration of Russian-speakers from the ethnic republics, primarily to the Russian-speaking regions of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus, and an increase in the percentage of the titular nationalities in the general population and especially among the political and professional elites of many ethnic regions. One of the visible results of this process was the change in the direction of a number of migration flows. Beginning in the 1970s, Russians and Russian-speakers started to leave the most nationalistic and culturally distinct republics of the USSR and a number of ethnic regions of the Russian Federation: in 1959-1974, Russia's population loss to other Soviet republics amounted to 2.1 million. But, since 1975, the internal Soviet migration balance of the Russian Federation became positive: between 1976 and 1990, net immigration amounted to 2,534,000.60 In 1979-1988, Armenia alone lost about 33 percent of its Russian population; Azerbaijan, about 25 percent; and Georgia, 15 percent.61

The Communist Elites and Nationalism

The struggle of emerging elites for employment and social status corresponding to their qualifications underscores the importance of economic factors in the development of nationalism. Writing fifty years ago, Karl Deutsch stressed that nationalism can be viewed in modern competitive society as a guarantor of "group preference[s, reducing]. . . outside competition for all sorts of opportunities, from business deals to marriages and jobs."62 In the Soviet case, however, national consciousness was developing in the framework of a centralized economy and an ethnofederal structure that emphasized interethnic administrative divisions and created closed ethnic systems of privileges. With liberalization, ethnic elites identified the struggle for national rights with control of local economies and raising the status of their federal units and, later, with complete independence. These goals have to a large extent been substituted for those of genuine democratization, preventing or slowing the growth of civic societies. While this political trend was quite in accord with Rupert Emerson's characterization of nationalism as the "insistence upon the centrality of the national community and upon the latter's right to make the state the sovereign organ of its identity and will,"63 the one-sidedness of this process in the FSU created serious complications for democratization, especially from the point of view of guaranteeing minority rights. Nationalist development in the USSR was oriented primarily toward protecting the privileges of newly forming ethnic elites, ignoring the interests of both the population in general and, more specifically, of various minority groups inhabiting the future NIS. Thus the growth of nationalism did not lead by itself to the democratization of Soviet society.

It is important at this point to look at different roles that nationalism may play before and after independence. The initial role is that of a revolutionary ideology and movement fighting the colonial or imperial metropole. Then, with the achievement of independence, nationalism of the titular nation, claiming initially to represent the interests of the whole population, has the potential of becoming a means of protecting the monopolist power of ethnic elites in the new state, especially if the nation is perceived in exclusive, primarily ethnic terms. The activities of a nationalistic movement, claiming the exclusive representation of a titular ethnic group and trying to "play the nationalist card" in order to gain popular support, can produce a negative response from the new minorities. This response is based on both the precedent created by the success of the nationalistic movement of the new core nation, and the frequent substitution of the official nationalism of the imperial power by another official nationalism, this time of a newly forming state, which it perceives as a future, "unrealized," nation-state.

The new nationalism is frequently no less intolerant of minorities than that of the former imperial nation and can by itself become a destabilizing factor, weakening the legitimacy of the emerging state and creating the foundation for rejection of the new

system by local minority groups. Indeed, the post dissolution states are frequently characterized by the harshness of their nationalizing policies.64 Anthony Smith explains this tendency by the fact that while "internal as well as inter-state pressures have compelled all nations to homogenize their citizens culturally, . . . smaller nations. . . have [especially] often resorted to a more closed type of society and authoritarian regimes."65 This peculiarity can be partially explained by the fear of losing the authenticity of the national culture and control over local economies given the proximity of the former metropole. Also frequent are measures to limit the influence of the post imperial Diaspora and emphasize the independence and legitimacy of the new state. (The case of the NIS is especially complex and atypical because Russia, the former imperial core, is both located next to the previously subordinate periphery and dominates it because of the size and configuration of its territory, often limiting for the new states access to other countries; its economic and military potential; and the size and influence of its ethnic Diaspora in the FSU.) Such policies, in turn, can lead to a result opposite to the desired one and stimulate the self-assertive nationalism of the new minorities. After the dissolution of previously centralized multiethnic state, this interaction of the official nationalism of the new core nation with the emerging nationalisms of its ethnic minorities is usually complicated by a third factor—the policies of the former imperial power, which may be the mother country of an important minority group in the new state. Brubaker characterizes this situation as a triadic relationship among the newly forming nation-state, national minorities, and their external national homelands "to which the minorities 'belong' by ethnonational affiliation but not legal citizenship."66 The interplay of these three groups of factors to a large extent defines the effectiveness of state- and nation-building and minority accommodation policies in the NIS.

The important role of the former Communist *nomenklatura* in most NIS and the preference given during the transition to privatization and state- and nation-building as opposed to democratization and the development of civic society pose important questions concerning the compatibility and linkage of nationalism and democracy. Leah Greenfeld, for instance, recognizes that with time, "the original equivalence between. . . [nationalism] and democratic principles was lost."67 Kohn also sees the distinction between the two, explained, in his opinion, by "the lack of national unity [perceived in primarily ethnic terms,] which in virtually all the new countries threatens disruption and is met by enforced centralization."68 In practice, the recognition of the usefulness of such centralization often leads either to attempts to build a homogeneous titular nation through forcing ethnic minorities to accept new identities associated with the dominant nation, or to policies excluding them from social and political life and encouraging their emigration or, in extreme cases, to their extermination. Such a one-sided exclusionary,

or, on the contrary, forcefully inclusionary (and eventually assimilatory) policy may actually stimulate nationalistic feelings among the ethnic minorities, weakening the legitimacy of the new state and complicating the creation of a desired nation-state.

Solving the problem of multiple identities depends directly on the approach of NIS governments to the issues of state- and nation-building and, in particular, on what kind of nation they want to create. With the partial exception of the Russian Federation, all the post-Soviet states at present bear the names of their core nations.69 Not all of them, however, can be rightfully called nation-states. In reality, the boundaries of nations and their titular states practically never completely coincide. The creation of a nation-state, nevertheless, represents the most frequent and clearly defined goal of the majority of nationalist movements. Even if it is presumed to be unrealistic, this goal serves as a consolidating idea, allowing forces otherwise divided in their political and socioeconomic views to unite. The real political goal therefore consists of finding a balance between the concept of a nation-state as a unifying idea and that of a real political goal—the task closely associated with choosing between the ethnic and the civic visions of the forming nation. Giving priority to rapid nation-building instead of inclusive state-building and the creation of civic society has a direct impact on the position of minority groups and their willingness to recognize the new state and can potentially lead to the deepening of existing cleavages. Indeed, Samuel W. Lewis writes that the "deliberate discrimination by dominant groups is a much more important source of minorities' disadvantages and grievances than are the cultural differences that divide minorities from majorities."70 The refusal by minorities to accept the new political reality or their deliberate exclusion from social and political life would weaken the legitimacy of the new state, strengthening the non-democratic tendencies in its development. Donald Horowitz emphasizes in connection with this situation that "democracy is exceptional in severely divided societies, and the claim has repeatedly been advanced that democracy cannot survive in the face of serious ethnic divisions."71 Hence tolerance and inclusive policies toward the minority groups during the period of democratic transition are becoming extremely important.

During *perestroika,* public opinion surveys indicated the existence of relatively high degrees of tolerance towards ethnic groups in the USSR. In January-February 1989, 76.9 percent of those surveyed in nine ethnic units of the USSR and the Russian Federation treated their compatriots equally, regardless of their ethnic origin, while 8.6 percent claimed that ethnic issues were irrelevant for them. Eighty-four percent were satisfied with the condition of interethnic relations in their region; 44 percent positively evaluated interethnic marriages; 55.8 percent had relatives of other nationalities; 88 percent had friends belonging to other nationalities. Only 8.2 percent viewed incoming persons of other nationalities negatively, and 8.7 percent thought that only the people belonging to the titular nationality could live in their region.72

Nevertheless, even the partial liberalization of the regime resulted in the return of previously suppressed intergroup and interregional claims and the beginning of new migration flows. This quick change seems also to indicate the active work of some local ethnic elites, directed at worsening interethnic relations. The first large-scale event of this kind was the dispute over the Nagornyi Karabakh Autonomous Oblast between Armenia and Azerbaijan. By the end of 1989, 180,000 Armenians had to leave Azerbaijan, and 170,000 Azerbaijanis had to leave Armenia. These events were followed by the intensified emigration of Russians and other members of non-titular nationalities from the ethnic republics. In 1989, Russia had a positive inter-republican migration balance of 162,600 people, and in 1990, 287,300 (the balance was periodically negative only in exchanges with the fellow Slavic republics, Ukraine and Belorussia). Of the migrating Russians, 75 percent moved to Russia, and about 20 percent to Ukraine.73 While Russians represented the dominant ethnic group among the migrants (69.3 percent of those who migrated to Russia in 1990), other Russian-speakers also tended to leave the ethnic regions, moving either to their titular republics or to Russia. Already during 1979-1988, for example, the number of Moldovans in Russia increased by 69 percent (while in Moldova the increase was respectively 10.5 percent); Georgians and Armenians by 46 percent (10.3 and 13.2 percent); Azerbaijanis, 2.2 times (by 24 percent); Uzbeks and Turkmen, 1.8 times (by 34 percent); Kyrgyz, 2.9 times (by 33 percent); and Tajiks, 2.1 times (by 46 percent).74 External emigration intensified at the same time. In 1989, 228,000 people were allowed to emigrate from the USSR. This group represented 30 percent of all those allowed to emigrate during 1973-1989.75

Nomenklatura and the Post-Communist Transition

The failure of the August 1991 coup attempt in the USSR led to the dismantling of the centralized Soviet structure, the ending of the Communist Party's monopoly of power, and the weakening of the repressive apparatus in some of the NIS. In this sense, the real result of the coup attempt was the dissolution of the Soviet Union and formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in December 1991. However, the speed of this process, the weakness of organized democratic political forces, the destruction of the federal state framework, and the absence of a tolerant political culture increased many other dangers. Organized and executed from the top, the dissolution left power primarily in the hands of local Communist elites on the level of both the NIS and Russia's federal units. These elites were mostly interested in rapid privatization, often ignoring the political aspects of post-Communist transition. Hence the transitional policy was aimed at retaining both economic and political power in the

hands of the former *nomenklatura*, with the emphasis frequently on nationalism and the creation of nation-states. The dissolution, quick and questionable from the legal point of view, also did not provide any guarantees of minority rights.

In the framework of these new policies, the exclusive rights of titular ethnic groups were given priority over the rights of individuals or other population groups—the process that Linz and Stepan describe as substitution of "democracy building... [by] ethnocracy building."76 Philip Roeder, in his turn, also emphasizes the exclusionary, in both political and ethnic terms, character of the policies of the new states:

"in confronting the 'participation dilemma' the post Soviet oligarchies sought to suppress political forces that might tempt oligarchs to appeal outside the oligarchy for allies. Indeed, the oligarchies were fully as vigilant as the autocracies in suppressing political forces outside the state."77

The exclusion of ethnic minorities, often heavily represented among professionals and intellectuals, from the process of power and property redistribution was designed to weaken the competition for the local elites and to increase the support of the titular majorities for the governing elites. The official nationalism of the ruling group "was accompanied by a desperate grasp for local power by entrenched native elites...dressed up in nationalist garb to preserve their domination and suppress democratic movements."78 The most extreme examples were such countries as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. As Ronald Grigor Suny concludes, even in the relatively more democratically advanced NIS, where the Communist power structure was at least partially replaced by the alternative ones, including "Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and to a lesser degree, Kazakhstan,...the deep infrastructure of clan politics remained in place."79 This trend was also clearly evident in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, where the members of the Communist *nomenklatura* retained economic and political power.

In a number of cases, the formal proclamation of independence was paralleled by the ideological reorientation of the local party organizations toward nationalism without any real changes in either the organizational principles or the personal composition of the upper *nomenklatura.* This was evident in some of the states of Central Asia in the weeks following the coup attempt. Indeed, in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan, the previous ruling Communist parties became ready-made structures for the new populist movements, based on totally different, nationalistic ideologies. The turn to populism was to some extent simplified by the reference in Communist ideology to the issue of class struggle with the constant positioning of "us" *versus* "them," a device viewed as a useful means of political consolidation by many ethnic leaders. One of the major features of their policies is the

search for an enemy, internal or external, who can be blamed for failures in the economic sphere. The activities of ethnic minorities inside the country and of neighboring countries frequently present the most suitable targets for such attacks and justify demands for achieving internal consolidation and stability at any price; it would be enough to remember here the political implications of Stalin's "Building Socialism in One Country" concept.80

The Ethnic Aspects of Transition Policies

Overall, the dissolution of the USSR resulted in a decrease in the number of ethnic minorities. Considering Russians the majority Soviet ethnic group, their share in the 1989 USSR population was 50.8 percent, or 145.2 million out of 285.7 million81 (see table 6). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, fifteen nations with titular ethnic states in the post-Soviet territory accounted for 90.3 percent of the former USSR population (258.0 million). The average weighted share of the NIS titular nations increased to 75.1 percent (68.3 percent, without Russia). The share of ethnic Russians in Russia, 81.5 percent in 1989, was also much higher than it was in the USSR.82 At the same time, there were serious deviations from these average figures in particular NIS, including differences in the share and the role of titular and minority ethnic groups. The share of the titular majority, for example, in 1989 exceeded 70 percent in nine states, was between 50 and 70 percent in six states, and was less than 40 percent in one state, varying in the range of 39.1 percent in Kazakhstan to 93.3 percent in Armenia83 (see table 7). The current post-Soviet situation is characterized by a practical absence of any ethnically "clean" territories or religiously homogeneous populations and by the existence of numerous interstate border claims (about 70 percent of the inter-NIS borders are incompatible with historical and ethnic settlements of particular nations) and ethnic prejudices.84

By 1989, 54.3 million citizens of the former USSR lived outside their titular national regions.85 This group included 43.4 million representatives of fifteen major nations having their titular administrative units in the post-Soviet territory.86 Among those living outside their administrative ethnic borders were 25.3 million Russians, or 17.4 percent of the whole Russian population (see table 8). About 70 percent of them were concentrated in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In five republics—Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Russians constituted more than 20 percent of the population.87 About 4 million representatives of non-Russian ethnic groups whose national state entities were located in the Russian Federation also lived outside Russia.88 At the same time, two of Russia's seven major ethnic groups numbering more than a

million each, now have their titular ethnic states in the area outside Russia. These are Ukrainians, ranked third in Russia in 1989 with 4.4 million, and Belorussians, ranked sixth with 1.2 million.89

Another important factor influencing the formation of post-Soviet societies and, specifically, the inclusiveness of their nation-building policies, is the frequency of the interethnic and inter-confessional marriages. In 1989, 14.7 percent of families in Russia and 17.5 percent in the former USSR had mixed ethnic composition (see table 9). In five of the former Soviet republics—Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Latvia—the share of such families exceeded 20 percent.90 The high proportion of ethnically mixed marriages might serve as a factor promoting ethnic peace and acceptance of minorities, as happened in Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, in a number of NIS, such as Estonia, Latvia, the states of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, where the new governing elites define "nation" primarily in ethnic terms, ethnically mixed couples and their children find themselves in an especially complex position.

The future of interethnic relations also depends on the degree of inclusiveness of the new states' ethnic policies and the particular concept of nation-building they adopt. Some, including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and, to a lesser degree, Kazakhstan, attempt to pursue, at least formally, the concept of a civic nation. In states that adopt the ethnic concept, the emphasis is on measures giving preferential status to titular ethnic groups and discriminating against minorities. Thus the processes of state- and nation-building in the NIS are developing simultaneously with changes in the relative position of particular ethnic and other population groups, especially in that of Russians living in the former ethnic republics of the USSR.

In general, two population groups seem to be the most threatened by recent political changes. The first includes members of the previously dominant nation, that is, Russians (though it would be more correct to also include in this group those Russian-speakers who live in the former Soviet ethnic republics and have their titular states in the post-Soviet states or the ethnic federal units of the Russian Federation). Essentially, this group includes most of those who came to the non-Russian areas during the Soviet migrations; it is thus perceived by the ethnic populations, or is presented by the local elites, as being somehow affiliated with Russia and the former Soviet regime. In reality, such migrants represented not only Communist bureaucracies, but people of various professional affiliations and ethnic, social, and educational backgrounds. The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 has changed the position of Russians and many Russian-speakers living outside Russian borders from a privileged majority to that of an ethnic and religious minority. The breakdown of Moscow's monopolistic power, national revivals, proclamations of independence, and substitution of national languages for Russian

have caused deep dissatisfaction among the Russian-speaking minorities and anxiety for their social and physical security. This has resulted in high rates of emigration by members of such minority groups.

The second minority category threatened by the recent changes includes those groups of Russian-speakers that do not have their own national territories in the post-Soviet area. Indeed, the nationalizing policies of the new states can also be directed against those Russian-speaking members of non-titular minority groups who do not belong to the previously dominant nation and who came to the ethnic regions in the wake of the early Russian and Soviet migrations, and their descendants. They are frequently left without citizenship rights or any legal protection. While these groups benefited previously from the preference given to the Russian language and the high, although consistently declining, share of Russian-speakers among local elites,91 now they have found themselves in the position of a new ethnic minority. Such minority groups, especially the small ones, have lost their previously recognized special status and, in some instances, their territorial administrative units in the countries created after the dissolution of the USSR.

Political liberalization had a multidimensional impact on particular ethnic groups even in those cases where minorities' rights were generally tolerated and protected by the state. The elimination of the Communist system of prearranged quotas increased the shares of local majority groups in legislatures of the NIS and the ethnic federal units of the Russian Federation. The new parliamentary majorities frequently ignore the interests of other ethnic groups. Especially seriously hurt are previously protected small ethnic minority groups who lack effective support networks. Many such minority groups completely lost representation in the governing bodies. Simultaneously, the concentration of power in the hands of one faction of the local elite weakens the legitimacy of the NIS governments and political systems and creates serious ethnic tensions. Considering this situation, Monty Marshall, for instance, claims that the most visible result of the USSR dissolution is "that the lesser minorities have lost the potential protection afforded by the central state authority in their relations with [the NIS and Russia's] regional governments." In contrast to Russians and other major post-Soviet ethnic groups, potentially able to obtain the support of their titular homelands, the lesser minorities "will continue to be the least likely to be able to organize effectively for their own defense and political promotion...[thus becoming] political pawns, bargaining chips, and the rationale for irredentist claims and border disputes." Marshall concludes that "the new governments of the CIS republics...have a long way to go to prove that they are even as democratic and free (in respect to the status and security of systemic minorities) as the systems they have replaced."92 These lesser minorities include a number of large ethnic groups, such as Germans, ranking in 1989 ninth in Russia with 842,000 (fifteenth, in the USSR), and Jews, ranking in 1989 fourteenth

with 537,000 (or, respectively, nineteenth in the Soviet Union), as well as Gypsies, Greeks, and Poles93 (see table 6). It is not surprising that these groups, some of which have titular states outside the former USSR, show the highest rates of external emigration from the Russian Federation and the post-Soviet area in general. In 1993, Germans accounted for 53.5 percent of the external emigration (see table 10). While Russians ranked second with 24 percent, Jews were in the third place, 15.8 percent. Even though Russians in 1998 for the first time became the largest group of external emigrants from the Russian Federation to the "Old Abroad" (36.4 percent of the migrants of this category in 1998, and 40.4 percent in 1999), Germans and Jews still ranked second and third with 35.2 percent (32.8 percent in 1999) and 9.1 percent (10.6 percent) respectively.94 This category also includes ethnic groups who were purged and exiled in Stalin's time, such as Meskhetian Turks, Crimean Tatars, Koreans, and Kurds.

Based on their treatment of ethnic minorities, the NIS can be grouped into three categories. The first includes those states that adopted the so-called zero-option approach and provided full citizenship to all the persons permanently residing within their borders at the moment of acquiring independence: Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.

The second category comprises Lithuania, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan—the states that, although providing all their residents at the moment of independence with citizenship rights,95 emphasize their ethnic orientation and favor the titular nationality. Kazakhstan, for example, automatically granted Kazakh citizenship to all Kazakhs living around the world (while denying the right for dual citizenship to residents of Kazakhstan) in an attempt to increase the titular nationality's political influence and its share in the country's population and electorate.96 The new language law requires that all non-Kazakhs97 learn and pass a Kazakh language exam before 2006 (and Kazakhs, by 2001) as a precondition for obtaining or retaining a governmental job.98 These measures indeed resulted in the increasing ethnic Kazakh immigration to Kazakhstan and the intensive outflow of minority groups from that country. During 1991-1997 alone, Kazakhstan received 164,000 ethnic Kazakh immigrants, of whom 93,000 came from the NIS and 62,500, from Mongolia.99 At the same time, during 1991-2002, Kazakhstan left 28 percent Russians; 30 percent Ukrainians; 64 percent, Germans; and 24 percent, Tatars.100 As a result of this process, in 2001, ethnic Kazakhs became the numerical majority, accounting for 53.4 percent of the country's population101 (see table 7).

The constitution of Lithuania allows any ethnic Lithuanian to settle in that country and, while claiming that "there shall not be a State religion in Lithuania," also specifically recognizes "traditional Lithuanian Churches and religious organizations."102

Finally, a number of states, primarily Estonia, Latvia, and, selectively, the states of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, follow an openly discriminatory policy toward minorities. In Latvia and Estonia, citizenship policies are based on "restored state" approach, introducing strict requirements for obtaining citizenship even for members of minority groups that were born and lived their whole lives in their territories. Although Latvia in real terms represents a bilingual, multiethnic society—48 percent of its population was non-Latvian in 1989103 (decreasing to 42.3 percent in 2000104)—close to a third of its permanent population (32 percent in 2000) lost the right of citizenship.105

The situation in Estonia is even more complicated, although in general, Estonians' share in the population is higher: 61.5 percent in 1989 compared to 38.5 percent of the Russian-speakers, including 30.3 percent ethnic Russians106 (in 2000, the respective shares were 67.9 percent, 32.1 percent, and 25.6 percent).107 Nevertheless, in Tallinn in 1989, there were 53.3 percent non-Estonians, while in the northeastern part of the country the share of the non-Estonian population was above 80 percent. In Ida-Virumaa county, for example, non-Estonians, most of whom lacked Estonian citizenship, comprised 81.5 percent of the general and 87.1 percent of the urban population.108

In 2000, only 80.1 percent of the permanent population of Estonia held that country's citizenship. While practically all ethnic Estonians were citizens, for non-Estonians this figure was less than 40 percent. The fact that 12.3 percent of the population were the people without any citizenship, clearly suggests that for many of them the lack of Estonian citizenship was not voluntary.109 Simultaneously, the government has placed serious limitations on the political and economic rights even of those non citizens who were born and spent all their lives in Estonia, but cannot acquire citizenship because of discriminatory legislation. The constitution of Estonia establishes that "positions in State and local government shall be filled by Estonian citizens," making the hiring of a non citizen resident an exceptional case. The constitution also prohibits non citizens from participation in political parties and proclaims that certain "categories of property in Estonia...are reserved for ownership by Estonian citizens."110 Roeder characterizes such systems as "exclusive republics," comparing them with the South African Republic of the *apartheid* period.111 The ethnic policies of Estonia and Latvia seem to be especially exclusive and discriminatory considering the willingness of large sections of the Russian-speaking populations in those countries to learn the official languages and to accommodate themselves to local cultures and societies. In Latvia, for example, more than 18 percent of Russian children and 42 percent of those from non-Russian minorities attend Latvian schools (compared to only 2.7 percent and 15.7 percent respectively in Kazakhstan).112 This type of ethnically based discrimination was essentially described (and criticized) a long time ago by Karl Deutsch,

who concluded that "if assimilation is unsuccessful, despite the individual's efforts to accept the new culture in place of the old, the reason lies usually with the community which is taken for a model, or in which assimilation is sought."113 The situation is further aggravated by the fact that large sectors of the Russian-speaking population were previously working as white-collar employees and have lost their jobs as a result of the ethnic succession, or they were employed by centrally run industrial enterprises that have lost their contracts and fired the work force. Hence their unemployment levels far exceed the national averages. In April 1997, Russian-speakers comprised 88.6 percent of the unemployed in the aforementioned Ida-Virumaa county of Estonia.114 Considering the slowly, but steadily increasing numbers of Russian-speakers among the citizens of the Baltic states,115 such policies can be politically destabilizing, creating a serious, ethnically based divide of the countries' population.

Ethnic discrimination is clearly identifiable in the personnel policies of many post-Soviet states. In 1994, when the share of Kazakhs in the population of Kazakhstan was 44.3 percent, members of major Slavic groups 43 percent, and other minorities 12.7 percent, their representation among high-level officials of the government and presidential administration was respectively 74.3 percent, 22.9 percent, and 3.1 percent.116 By the end of the 1990s, the share of Kazakhs among those employed in science and management exceeded 80 percent, and in culture, 70 percent.117

Combined with the increasing differentiation of the post-Soviet states in terms of their economic reform strategies and living standards, discriminatory policies result in the intensive emigration of ethnic minority groups: during 1989-2000, the Russian Diaspora in the post-Soviet area outside Russia declined by 4.7 million or 18.5 percent (see table 11). This outflow includes large numbers of highly qualified specialists and people belonging to the most productive age groups: in 1998, among the adults who became forced migrants or refugees to Russia, 17.9 percent had university diplomas and 34.3 percent either completed a technical college or had some university education. Only 0.3 percent of the people in this group did not graduate from a high school. The same year, people belonging to the economically active age groups comprised 57.2 percent of forced migrants or refugees to Russia; 27.9 percent were children.118

State- and Nation-Building Strategies, Minorities, and Migrations

Emigration represents one way in which minority groups reject hostile political environment. If the new majorities insist on an ethnic definition of nationality and do not accommodate ethnic minorities, the latter view migration as an important means of coping with the new situation. This approach is sometimes less costly for the minority than attempting to protect its rights through peaceful protest or starting a struggle for

regime change or secession. Colin Pooley and Ian Whyte conveniently characterize migration as "an important diagnostic feature [of society,]...one set of social practices which can be adopted when structural constraints place pressure on an individual or family."119 The same authors also emphasize the "potentially traumatic" character of such reaction to the changing social environment, making migration one of the most extreme forms of dealing with the new reality.120 Migration in this sense indicates that accommodation to the new conditions is either impossible or more socially costly than movement to another country.

Thus the scale and structural characteristics of post dissolution migration flows make them useful measures of the degree of tolerance toward minorities of the NIS governments and of the openness to minority groups of other ways of accommodation.121 Migrations develop against the background of the processes of nation- and state-building, with many nationalistic groups considering an ethnically homogeneous state to be a political ideal and a practical goal. From the point of view of the rulers pursuing such a goal, the existence of autonomous interests and groups handicaps the creation of unified nations and nation-states. The policies aimed at achieving this ideal lead to numerous violations of human rights, aggravating the position of national minorities.

A number of factors can be viewed as stimulating the present post-Soviet migrations. They include: the attempts by some NIS leaderships to form nation-states on the basis of the ethnic definition of nationality using policies that favor titular nationalities and discriminate against ethnic minorities; the loss of status and privileges by Russian-speaking elites and general populations, causing their dissatisfaction with the new political regimes; the increasing linguistic and cultural differentiation among ethnic groups, resulting from the resurgence of nationalism and the official emphasis on the languages and cultures of the titular nations; the increasing gap between the NIS in terms of the population incomes and the levels of socioeconomic development; the decline of living standards and growing unemployment, aggravated by the deliberate policies of "ethnic succession"; and the military conflicts in a number of NIS, pushing out of those countries even groups that are not directly threatened by the warring factions (as happened previously to Russian-speakers in the conflicts in Georgia, Karabakh, and Tajikistan).

A number of other factors prevent or slow down such migrations: the impoverishment of potential migrants, complicating their movement among the NIS; the exhaustion of the backlog of potential migrants due to long-term migration; the economic crisis, resulting in the weakening of welfare services and shrinking employment opportunities in states that might receive migrants;122 the growing hostility to immigrants (even ethnic co nationals) in the receiving countries; and the legal provisions in both the countries of emigration and immigration that complicate movement among the NIS,

receiving a particular status, and transportation, sale, or registration of property. Thus, tightly interwoven political and socioeconomic conditions are among the factors that either stimulate or prevent the development of migration flows.

Migration in the post-Soviet region can be divided into three major periods. The first, immediately following the dissolution of the USSR (1991-1992) was marked by the outflow from Russia of all the NIS titular nationalities (except for Armenians). During this short period, political factors, such as the fear of the loss of citizenship of their newly formed titular states, dominated the migrants' goals.

In the second period (1993-1995), emigration from Russia declined and immigration intensified. This trend concerned both Russians, who were frequently discriminated against in the new states, and other Russian-speakers and representatives of all the NIS titular nations, motivated by both economic (relatively higher living standards) and political (instability in many NIS) considerations.

The third period started in 1996. It has been marked by a steady decline and a general leveling off of migration activity due to political stabilization in many NIS, moderation of governmental policies toward minorities, a shrinking pool of potential migrants, and the unfavorable situation for migrants in Russia and some other receiving countries. Thus the relative significance of economic factors in the formation of migration flows is increasing simultaneously with the decline in importance of political factors.

The dissolution of the USSR resulted initially both in the intensification of interstate migration flows and in their reorientation primarily toward Russia. The increase in net migration to the Russian Federation was based primarily on the decline of emigration from that country to the NIS: in 1989-1998, emigration from Russia decreased more than two times as compared to the 1980-1988 period.123 As a result of this change, during 1991-1995 alone, Russia received from the NIS more migrants than in the previous fifteen years—the period when the Russian Federation already had a positive balance in the inter republican exchange. In 1989, Russia received 124 immigrants from other republics per 100 emigrants. In 1994, the ratio reached its highest point of 495:100,124 declining to 385:100 in 1998125 and 283:100 in 1999.126

In 1994—the peak year of the population inflow to Russia—that country received 1,146,000 migrants, with the net immigration amounting to 915,000.127 In subsequent years, the scale of immigration to Russia somewhat decreased. Overall, during 1989-1998, migration-based population growth in Russia amounted to 4,226,000 (8,004,000 immigrated to the Russian Federation and 3,778,000 left the country).128 For 1989-1998, Russia had a positive migration balance with all the post-Soviet states (see table 12). While the ratio of emigrants and immigrants was close to 1:1 in exchanges with Belarus and Ukraine, 1:1.4 with Moldova, and 1:2.6 with Lithuania, it was between 1:3 and 1:5 for most other NIS, reaching 1:5.1 in exchange with Georgia and 1:6.8

with Tajikistan.129 The 1999 data show that while Russia's migration balance became negative in exchange with Belarus, in most cases, the gap between immigration and emigration flows has further increased, reaching 1:8.2 in exchange with Uzbekistan.130

Russia's positive intra-FSU migrational balance in reality could be even larger, because many immigrants prefer not to register with the Russian state authorities.131 At the same time, economic hardships, political discrimination against migrants in the receiving regions, as well as some degree of accommodation toward minorities by local governments resulted in the decline of immigration: the number of immigrants to Russia, 350,000 in 2000, becoming 3.3 times smaller than in the peak year, 1994.132 In 2001, this number has further declined, to 72,000.133

In 1998, 42.4 percent of immigrants to Russia came from Kazakhstan and 22.6 percent from Ukraine. Other major regions of emigration were Central Asia, accounting for 16.5 percent of migration inflow, and the Transcaucasus, 12.1 percent.134 During 1989-1998, the Baltic countries lost between 10 percent (Latvia) and 13 percent (Lithuania) of the local Russians, and the countries of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, between 23 percent (Kyrgyzstan) and 56 percent (Armenia). For Kazakhstan, the figure was 16 percent, but the size of the Russian Diaspora there (24.5 percent of all the Russians living in the FSU outside Russia) resulted in Kazakhstan generating 35 percent of all Russian immigrants to the Russian Federation. Central Asia, accounting for 13 percent of the Russian Diaspora, provided 32 percent of the migration inflow, while the Transcaucasus, accounting for only 3.1 percent of the Diaspora, provided 12.5 percent of all Russian immigrants.135

Although ethnic Russians formed the major component of the new immigration wave to the Russian Federation, their share was steadily declining (as was also the case with the post-Soviet migration flows in general): from 79.1 percent in 1989-1993 to 63.4 percent in 1994-1998136 and 57.2 percent in 1999 (see table 13). Russian immigration from the NIS reached its climax of 612,400 in 1994.137 By 1999, this figure decreased to 135,600,138 primarily because of the relative exhaustion of the backlog of migrants, the economic and political troubles in Russia (such as the two Chechen wars and the economic and financial crises of 1997 and 1998), and the complex position of immigrants and refugees.139 Russian statistical authorities expect that between 2002 and 2016, only 1,309,000 people will migrate to the Russian Federation from the NIS.140

In 1997, Russia received 73 percent of all CIS immigrants, while accounting for only 19 percent of emigrants.141 The existence of relatively better conditions, especially economic, in Russia in comparison with most other NIS (excluding the Baltics), seems to be proved by the net-migration to Russia of the NIS titular nationalities, clearly visible even before the dissolution of the USSR. While the period between 1990 and 1992 was marked by intensive migration of all the major nationalities, except for

Armenians, to their titular republics, in 1993 this trend was reversed again, and by 1994, Russia had a positive migrational balance for all the NIS titular nationalities.142 Ukraine and Belarus had positive balances during 1989-1993, but beginning in 1994, those two countries acquired a slightly negative balance, though only because of their periodic loss of population to Russia.143

During 1994-1999, Russia received 710,000 people belonging to the NIS titular nations: 39 percent were Ukrainians; 28 percent Armenians; and 11 percent Azerbaijanis.144 After 1995, the relative share of Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Moldovans in this migrational inflow to Russia declined, while the shares of Azerbaijanis and the titular nations of Central Asia increased.145 In general, the present ethnic structure of the immigration inflow to Russia is similar to that existing before the dissolution of the USSR—which could be seen as a sign of political stabilization in the region.146 At the same time, there are visible variations in the ethnic structure of the immigration inflow from particular NIS, indicating differences in their political and economic situations. Immigrants from Armenia in 1997, for example, included 6 percent Russians and 85 percent Armenians; from Azerbaijan, 29.6 percent Russians, 46.5 percent Azerbaijanis, and 10.3 percent Armenians; from Georgia, 26.1 percent, Russians, 46 percent Georgians and Armenians, 6.6 percent Ossetians, and 4.1 percent Azerbaijanis.147

Meanwhile, comparison of the 1989 USSR census returns with later data indicates the existence of some important common trends in the evolution of the ethnic structure of the NIS population. Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine remain the only states in the FSU where the migration balance is either positive or close to zero. As a result of migration, in all the NIS (with the exception of those three dominantly Slavic states) there is a clear tendency toward the increase of titular ethnic groups' shares simultaneously with the decrease of those of both Russians and other ethnic minorities. In Ukraine, the shares of these three population groups remained relatively stable, and in Russia and Belarus, the share of the titular ethnic group has slightly decreased simultaneously with the increase in the share of other, non-Russian minority groups.148 These changes seem to indicate the differences in treatment of minorities among particular post-Soviet states.

Along with migrations in general, the increase in the number of refugees and forced migrants presents an especially acute political problem.149 The existence of refugees in the Soviet Union was officially recognized for the first time in 1990, after the massacres of Armenians in Baku and Sumgait (Azerbaijan) and of Meskhetian Turks in Ferghana (Uzbekistan). By the time of the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, the number of forced migrants, mostly from Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, stood near 1 million.150 By the end of 1997, the overall number of refugees and forced migrants in the CIS stood at 3.4 million. About half of them resided in

Russia, and close to a quarter in Azerbaijan.151 These numbers then started to decline steadily as a result of both a decrease in the number of new migrants and changes in their legal status.152 The latter included providing large numbers of refugees with citizenship in the receiving countries (primarily in Azerbaijan) as well as discriminatory measures that complicated the process of obtaining or retaining refugee status.

The official registration of refugees in the Russian Federation started with the creation of the Federal Migration Service on 1st July, 1992 (it was eliminated as an independent governmental agency in May 2000 by the new administration of President Vladimir Putin). Three hundred thirty thousand refugees arrived in 1993, the peak year.153 In I998, refugees represented 21 percent of the overall number of migrants from the NIS.154 By the end of 2000, the overall number of refugees and forced migrants of various categories in Russia stood at 1,341,525 and was steadily declining for the same basic reasons as in the CIS in general. By the end of 1999, for instance, 2,950,000 residents of the NIS applied for and acquired Russian citizenship.155

During 1992-1997, 23 percent of migrants belonging to these categories came to the Russian Federation from Kazakhstan; 16 percent from the ethnic units of the Russian Federation; 15 percent from Tajikistan; 14 percent from Uzbekistan; 9 percent from Georgia and Azerbaijan each; and 14 percent from all the remaining NIS combined.156 At present, the majority of refugees (81 percent) and forced migrants (69.5 percent) continue to come from Kazakhstan and Central Asia.157 The inflow of refugees depends on the situation in particular NIS. For example, in 1998 the share of refugees and forced migrants was 46 percent among immigrants from Estonia; 41 percent from Tajikistan; 34 percent from Kazakhstan; 27 percent from Uzbekistan; 19 percent from Georgia; and 17 percent from Latvia. In addition, in 1999, there were 173.2 thousand internal forced migrants registered in the Russian Federation, escaping ethnic conflicts developing in the Russian territory.158 At the same time, the inflow of refugees and forced migrants from Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan has declined due to both the socioeconomic pressures in Russia and the exhaustion of the backlog of potential refugees in those countries.159

While refugees settle all over Russian territory, their impact on the internal Russian situation is uneven and depends to a large extent on the scale of forced migration and the ethnic characteristics of the local and the incoming populations. A large portion of these people spends five or more years in Russia.160 Sixty percent of refugees live in the cities.161 Primarily, refugees settle in and around Moscow and in some border regions, including the ethnic ones. In 1997, Moscow and Moscow Oblast accounted for approximately 50 percent of all refugees in Russia, a situation that created serious social and political tensions. The problem was further aggravated by the fact that only 14,000 of these people were officially registered, to avoid dealing with the Russian authorities or paying registration fees.162 Indeed, the position of refugees is seriously

complicated by discriminatory legislation, adopted by most NIS toward both leaving and arriving refugees. The limitations include restrictions on the sale and purchase of housing, prohibitively high customs duties on the moving of property, and refusal to acknowledge the existence of refugees. Kazakhstan, for instance, until quite recently denied that any of the people either located in its territory or leaving it were refugees. Meanwhile, among Russians living in Kazakhstan, the share of those willing to move to Russia increased from one-fifth in 1994 to one-third in 1997.163

The share of Russians among the refugees migrating to Russian territory grew from 63 percent in 1992-1993164 to 76 percent in 1996.165 The combined share of Russians and members of other ethnic groups having their titular states in Russian territory in the overall forced migration to Russia was at that time 87 percent.166 By 1998, Russians accounted for 74.3 percent of all refugees and forced migrants located in the Russian territory. Among other major groups, Tatars comprised 4.2 percent; Ossetians 3 percent; Chechens 1.7 percent, and Germans 1.6 percent. The most numerous titular ethnic groups from the CIS in the Russian Federation were Ukrainians and Belorussians, accounting for 7 percent of refugees, and Armenians, 1.1 percent.167

Meanwhile, there are visible contrasts between certain regions and ethnic and religious groups in the intensity of migrations. Among other factors, these differences are based on the cultural peculiarities of particular groups. It is not highly probable, for example, that members of the major ethnic groups of Central Asia will migrate to Europe in large numbers. Their presence in the European Soviet republics, as well as their overall territorial mobility, was traditionally very low (see table 14). Indeed, ethnic violence and governmental policies have resulted in the fact that in 1989-1998 more than a quarter of the Russian population of Central Asia (including more than a half in Tajikistan) departed from those regions. During the same period, 16 percent of Russians living in Kazakhstan left that country.168 Central Asia provided 58.9 percent of the migration inflow to the Russian Federation in 1998. At the same time, the share of the titular ethnic groups in the overall migration wave to Russia was only 10 percent.169 No less important are racial and religious factors and the willingness of particular politicians in Russia and some other NIS to use them in their political campaigns. So, regarding the massive outflow of the Russian-speaking population from Central Asia and a number of other NIS, the global trend (except for Russia) seems to be oriented toward the formation of the more ethnically homogeneous European and Asian subregions.

The situation in the Transcaucasus is slightly different than in Central Asia. The Russian and Russian-speaking populations were leaving that region already at the end of the Soviet period, before the beginning of hostilities. The Russian-speakers' emigration further intensified with the beginning of *perestroika* and the consequent dissolution of the USSR. In 1989-1998, 43 percent of the Russian population left

Georgia; 45 percent, Azerbaijan; and 56 percent, Armenia. The region is also characterized by high emigration rates of the titular ethnic groups, primarily to Russia or out of the post-Soviet area.170 The peoples of the Transcaucasus comprised 45 percent of the non-Russian emigration to the Russian Federation in 1994-1998 (including 28.2 percent, Armenians). During the same period, the Armenian population of Russia increased by 44 percent.171

In terms of potential for emigration, the post-Soviet states (excluding Russia) can be divided into six groups. The first group comprises Ukraine and Belarus, both having culturally close populations, not distinguishing their residents by ethnicity, and tolerant toward their large, Russian-speaking minorities. While retaining an emphasis on ethnic distinctions, Russia itself could be placed into this category, as could be the non-Slavic Lithuania. Although the scale of migration between these countries and Russia is large, emigration and immigration flows are relatively close in size, and migrations are based primarily on socioeconomic, not political factors. If socioeconomic conditions in the region improve, migration flows between those countries and Russia can be expected to stabilize and become approximately equal in size. At the same time, possible is the continuation of emigration of smaller minority groups, such as Jews from Ukraine and Poles and Lithuanians from Belarus, or the return to Ukraine of Crimean Tatars.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan form the second group of states. Those two countries have large Russian-speaking diasporas and at least formally follow some democratic procedures. Legally, both provided all their permanent residents in 1991 with citizenship, and both guarantee the cultural and political rights of minorities. At the same time, governmental policies include an emphasis on ethnic national development and measures to increase the share in the population of the titular nationality and its representation in the governing bodies and among the elites. Thus the movement of people between those countries and Russia is based on both socioeconomic and political factors. While migration flows can be expected to remain large and directed primarily toward Russia (along with the external emigration of some ethnic and religious groups, such as Germans, Jews, Koreans, Greeks, Kurds, and Poles), sizable Russian-speaking minorities will likely remain.

The third group includes the two states of Central Asia—Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—that have the most authoritarian political systems in the FSU. Their Russian-speaking minorities consist of professional elites and industrial personnel, who are important for the local economies. Thus the new governments should be interested in retaining these groups, while restricting their independent political activity. The rigid authoritarian regimes generally provide for short-term stability and some degree of protection of minority groups. At the same time, both the increasing emphasis on nationalism and the ethno-religious character of the emerging opposition cause

dissatisfaction among minority groups and enhance their desire to leave. Hence in the long run, Russian-speaking emigration can be expected to continue, with some professionals coming later on the basis of provisional labor contracts.172

The fourth group of NIS is comprised of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and Tajikistan—the states where military conflicts over ethnic or religious issues erupted in the 1990s or are still ongoing. Many of these countries are also characterized by the highly nationalistic governmental policies. Most of the Russian-speaking minorities have already left those states.173 Economic problems and political instability also result in the emigration to Russia of local minorities and members of the titular nationalities. Thus those countries can be expected to become more ethnically homogeneous, with ethnic aliens coming primarily to fulfill provisional labor contracts, and with a simultaneous, significant labor emigration of the titular nationalities, especially skilled professionals.

The countries of the fifth group, Latvia and Estonia, are marked by economic and political stability, relatively high living standards, and a fast integration into the European economic, political and military structures. At the same time, they have large Russian-speaking minorities and deny the majority of these people citizenship rights. While minority groups do not accept the majority policies, many are willing to stay because of the high living standards, and most of those inclined to leave have already emigrated. Thus the intensity of voluntary, politically motivated emigration can be expected to decline, and the share of labor and professional migrants to increase. Nevertheless, the position of the Russian-speaking minorities will remain an important destabilizing factor in both the internal political life of those countries and in their relations with Russia, especially considering the fact that the shares of these minority groups among those countries' citizens are slowly but steadily increasing.174

Finally, the sixth group consists solely of Moldova, a country combining features typical of a number of other NIS. While it retains a functioning democratic system, majority policies for a long time emphasized the exclusive, ethnic character of the new state, with particular population and political groups opting for unification with Romania. On the contrary, the policies of the current leftist government, including providing the Russian language with an official status, are viewed by these groups as anti national. Hence the political atmosphere in the country remains tense. An additional complicating factor is the de-facto division of the country and the existence of the so-called Transdniester Republic, politically dominated by the Russian-speaking minorities. As long as such a division exists, the potential for politically motivated migrations, both external and internal, remains in force.

The Future of Minority Policies and Migrations in the Post-Soviet Region

Although the grim predictions of migrational catastrophe in the NIS, expressed after the dissolution of the USSR, did not fully materialize, migration does represent one of the major factors defining the political and socioeconomic development of Russia and other NIS. The effects of the post-Soviet migration trends seem to be particularly complex in Russia, which is the major recipient of migrants and, especially, of refugees. In addition to being the major post-Soviet country of immigration, the Russian Federation also generates large-scale emigration flows175 and acts as a transit point for those attempting to reach the West. Russia thus finds itself playing simultaneously three different roles in the chain of migration. The issue has particular significance because immigration at present partly offsets losses in the demographic as well as the professional structure of the population—losses that result both from the emigration of highly-qualified professionals to the West and from their "internal emigration" into activities not corresponding to their education and professional qualifications.176

Indeed, since 1992, immigration is the only source of the population growth in the Russian Federation, compensating in 1992-1994 for up to 80 percent of the losses resulting from the natural decrease of population, 40 percent of these losses, in 1996-1998, and about 20 percent, in 1999.177 Sixty-four percent of the immigrants belong to the economically active age groups compared to 59 percent in the Russian population.178 In 1997, 19 percent of refugees and forced migrants located in the Russian territory had university diplomas.179 In addition, in 1998, ethnic Russians accounted for 60.8 percent of the migration-based population growth in Russia, while members of other titular groups of the Russian Federation comprised another 9 percent.180

However, neither Russia nor other NIS were fully prepared to deal with the new migration wave. The post dissolution position of the Russian government, in particular, was to a large extent reactive, marked by a mostly negative approach to immigration and immigrants181 and based on a general view that the migration problem was of secondary importance. The results of this approach were frequent revisions of the organizational structures designed to deal with migration flows;182 inadequate budget allocations; and a chronic under-fulfillment of even those budgetary goals. In 1994-1998, for instance, the Federal Migration Service received only 47.9 percent of its designated budget.183 Of special importance also is the weakness of the legislative base of the migration policy, a typical problem in Russian politics.184

Such an approach to the issue of migration is not unusual: while the impact of new migration flows is multidimensional, their negative aspects are ordinarily especially visible. Indeed, the danger of destabilization resulting from the rapid demographic changes caused by large numbers of immigrants, many of whom are professionals who can compete with their local colleagues, is apparent even in countries whose political systems are based on a long-term consensus.185 No less important is the cost of migration expressed in human suffering and the break up of traditional ties. The pressure on social welfare services186 and the growing crime rates,187 the influx of alien ethnic groups and the swelling illegal immigration,188 as well as information about the (mis)treatment of Russian-speaking minorities in the NIS 189 as articulated by both the mass media and various political groups,190 negatively influence public opinion in the receiving countries and the policies of a wide spectrum of political movements, including the most liberal. This influence can be seen in the conservative shift of Russian governmental policies; in Yeltsin's and, more recently, Putin's approach to solving the Chechen crisis; in the parliamentary campaigns against foreign adoptions and alien religious groups and NGOs; in the text of the new Russian Citizenship Law and the Law on the Status of Foreigners in the RF; and in the "anti-Caucasian" crusades that were initiated in Moscow in 1995, 1999 and 2002 in the wake of the Chechen wars and terrorist activities by the federal government and the Moscow city administration. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that both the NIS media and the politicians frequently follow the path that is simultaneously sensational and anti immigrant, emphasizing primarily the negative impact of immigration on their societies and creating hostile image of an ethnic immigrant.

The deterioration of inter-ethnic relations and the development of large-scale migration flows in the FSU can indeed have a serious destabilizing effect for the whole Eurasian region. It is significant that migration flows are increasingly motivated by economic conditions and directed outside the post-Soviet area,191 resulting in both the loss of important academic and professional elites by the NIS192 and the creation of potentially serious socioeconomic and political pressures on the receiving countries. At the same time, immigration has many positive aspects. Immigration assists in the return of ethnic co-nationals to their historic homelands. The experience of Western Europe and the countries of traditional immigration (such as the United States) also seems to indicate that, in the long run, immigration can raise the level of tolerance and weaken existing prejudices by increasing the ethnic heterogeneity of the population and promoting cultural exchanges and inter-group marriages. Immigrants bring with them important skills and are frequently eager to take jobs rejected by the local population. The example of the Baltic states also demonstrates the ability of large sections of minority groups to accept as legitimate the host countries' politically stable

and economically prosperous regimes even in cases of obvious political discrimination. Economic stability can therefore serve as an important factor for both political legitimization of the new states and control of migrations in the FSU.

While the economic aspects of migration are important, the most visible consequences of the problem of post-Soviet migrations are political, as are the solutions. In addition to the previously discussed organizational and financial weaknesses of Russian governmental agencies designed to deal with the problem of migration, the situation is further complicated by the general underestimation of the significance of migration policies and the weakness of civic societies in the NIS. As a result, ethnic minorities and migrants find themselves facing the overwhelming power of a frequently hostile state that has neither the desire nor economic ability to help them, with few if any protections provided by other branches of government or by nongovernmental agencies. Hence two factors—one external and one internal—can assist in solving the problems faced by minorities in the FSU and thus can also support the regulation of migration flows in the region.

First, international cooperation in protecting minorities and regulating migration flows in the region appears to be of special importance. The CIS has solved some legal problems and has provided an organizational infrastructure for interstate cooperation involving the regulation of refugee flows and illegal immigration, yet it has not become an effective mechanism for protecting human rights and harmonizing national migration policies. Also important in this sense are the fear of Russia and the influence of Russian-speaking minorities by many NIS governments, preventing them from providing equal status to such minority groups and accepting the supervisory role of the CIS structures.

Therefore the development of a network of bilateral and multilateral agreements becomes increasingly important for regulating of interethnic conflicts, channeling migration flows, and resolving humanitarian issues. International organizations, including the International Organization on Migration, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other agencies of the UN, OSCE, the Council of Europe, as well as various NGOs can also play a vital role. An important step in this direction was made in 1996, when the Regional Conference on the Problems of Refugees and Other Involuntary Displaced Migrants in the CIS assembled in Geneva.

Nevertheless, however effective international cooperation can be in protecting minority rights and regulating new migration flows, the second—and most importantly, long-term solution of these problems will be found in internal democratic reforms in Russia and the other NIS, primarily concerning minority politics and the development of an independent civic society193 and market economy.194 The international community can also have a positive role in this process, insisting on protecting the rights of minorities in the NIS, based on "a profound redefinition of the role of the state

in the international system,"195 which would involve changes in the treatment of such issues as sovereignty and state and minority rights. Indeed, stabilization of the minority and migrational situations in the FSU could be achieved through quick and effective inclusion of the new sovereign states in the international system. Their interest in political recognition—joining Western economic groupings, receiving investment and technology, signing international agreements in the economic, political, and humanitarian spheres—can become effective means of encouraging democratization and protection of minority rights in the region.196 The political success of the world community, or its universally recognized organizations, in regulating interethnic tensions developing in the region may weaken their negative effects and assist in the creation of a new climate in international relations.197

Conclusion

Even though many current migration problems in the FSU are rooted in previous historical periods (both Soviet and pre-Soviet), some of the most important factors defining the development of recent migration flows originate in the modern state- and nation-building policies of the NIS. The new political elites in most of these states opted for a limited version of reform during the transition period, deliberately excluding large segments of non-titular populations from the processes that accompanied the political and economic post-Communist changes.

Thus both the solution of the minorities' problem in the NIS and the effective regulation of new migration flows would require internal political reforms, aimed at weakening the overwhelming power of the state and of entrenched ethnic elites. The latest migration trends attest to the emergence of some important shifts in the policies of the post-Soviet states. Especially significant are the general decline of migration activity and the growing role of socioeconomic factors of migration. Although these changes indicate the increasing gaps among the NIS in terms of living standards and levels of socioeconomic development,198 they also show some degree of political accommodation to minorities in these countries and the small backlogs of mobile minority populations.

Still, the growth of pluralist societies and decentralized market economies in Russia and the other post-Soviet states remains the practical way to create both economic and political incentives for the protection of minority rights, preventing internal political tensions and large-scale external migrations. The development of an effective legislative base in the fields of minority guarantees and migration policies, creation of an independent judiciary and the meaningful division of power as well as the growth of independent public organizations and mass media represent important stepping stones in this process.

National sovereignty is not in and of itself adequate to protect minority groups and may even compromise their protection. The willingness to incorporate such groups199 represents an important component of the democratic transition and formation of civic societies in the post-Soviet area. Such willingness serves not only as a means of preventing large-scale migrations in the FSU, but also directly influences the overall effectiveness of the democratization processes in the NIS.

TABLES

Table 1
The Ethnic Russian Share in the Population of the Former Soviet Republics (%)

Region	1897	1926	1959	1989	1999
Russia	75.5	77.5	83.3	81.5	80.6
Ukraine	9.6	7.3	16.9	22.1	17.3200
Belarus	6.2	5.9	8.2	13.2	11.4
Kazakhstan	11.7	20.6	42.7	37.8	30.0
Moldova	6.4	9.4	10.2	13.0	11.6
Latvia	8.0	10.3	26.6	34.0	29.6201
Lithuania	5.1	2.6	8.5	9.4	6.3202
Estonia	3.9	3.8	20.1	30.3	25.6203
Armenia	4.8	2.3	3.2	1.6	0.2
Azerbaijan	5.3	9.5	13.5	5.6	1.8
Georgia	5.7	3.6	10.1	6.3	2.6
Kyrgyzstan	2.6	11.7	30.2	21.5	12.5
Uzbekistan	0.9	4.5	13.5	8.3	6.0204
Turkmenistan	3.0	7.7	17.3	9.5	2.0
Tajikistan	1.0	0.7	13.3	7.6	1.1205
FSU, Total	44.2	46.9		54.6	50.8

Sources: Mikhail N. Guboglo, ed., *Natsional'nye protsesy v SSSR* (Moscow: Nauka, 1991), 141, 191-209; Vladimir M. Kabuzan, *Russkie v mire: Dinamika chislennosti i rasseleniia (1719-1989). Formirovanie etnicheskikh i politicheskikh granits ruskogo naroda* (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Russko-Baltiiskii informatsionnyi tsentr "BLITS," 1996), 279; *Natsional'yi sostav naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991), 5-19; "Perepis' 28.12.1922," *Demoscope* 1, no. 33-4 (10-23 September 2001), http://www.demoscope.ru; "Saparmurat Niiazov: turkmeny sostavliaiut 91% naseleniia Turkmenii," *Demoscope* 1, no. 37-8 (8-21 October 2001), http://www.demoscope.ru., "17% of All Residents of Ukraine Are Russians," *Johnsnon's Russia List*, no. 7050 (6 February 2003), http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson., Mikhail Tul'skii, "Istinnoe litso demograficheskoi katastrofy," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 19 July 2001, 3; Mikhail Tul'skii, "Itogi perepisi 2001 goda v Litve,"

Demoscope 2, no. 81-2 (23 September-6 October 2002), http://www.demoscope.ru; A. G. Vishnevskii, ed., *Naselenie Rossii 1999: Sed'moi ezhegodnyi demograficheskii doklad* (Moscow: Tsentr demografii i ekologii cheloveka, Institut narodnokhoziaistvennogo prognozirovaniia RAN, 2000), 34; Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, *Rossiia: Migratsiia v raznom masshtabe vremeni* (Moscow: Tsentr izucheniia problem vynuzhdennoi migratsii v SNG, 1999), 21.

Table 2
Knowledge of Local Languages by Russians Living in Post-Soviet States and the Ethnic Republics of the Russian Federation* (1989 Census Data)

Union Republic or Russia's Federal Unit	Russians Fluent in Local Languages, (Thousands)	Share in Republic's Russian Population, (%)
Union Republics		
Ukraine	3,899.2	34.3
Belarus	358.5	26.7
Uzbekistan	75.9	4.6
Kazakhstan	54.1	0.9
Azerbaijan	56.7	14.4
Moldova	66.5	11.8
Kyrgyzstan	11.2	1.2
Tajikistan	13.8	3.5
Armenia	17.3	3.4
Turkmenistan	8.5	2.5
Georgia	80.9	23.7
Lithuania	129.3	37.5
Latvia	201.7	22.3
Estonia	71.2	15.0
Republics of the Russian Federation		
Adygea	0.5	0.2
Altai	0.8	0.7
Karachaevo-Cherkessia	0.6	0.3
Khakassia	0.0	0.0
Bashkortostan	4.0	0.3
Buriatia	2.2	0.3
Chechen and Ingush Republics**	1.1	0.4

Chuvashia	9.5	2.7
Daghestan	1.8	1.1
Kabardino-Balkaria	1.4	0.5
Kalmykia	0.3	0.2
Karelia	2.0	0.3
Komi	8.4	1.2
Mary-El	4.8	1.4
Mordovia	4.8	0.8
North Ossetia	3.0	1.5
Tatarstan	17.8	1.1
Tyva	0.6	0.6
Udmurtia	14.1	1.5
Sakha (Yakutia)	8.8	1.6
Autonomous Okrugs		
Agin-Buriat AO	0.5	1.5
Nenets AO	0.0	0.0
Komi-Permiak AO	2.3	4.1
Khanty-Mansi AO	0.1	0.0
Yamalo-Nenets AO	0.1	0.0
Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets) AO	0.0	0.0
Evenk AO	0.0	0.0
Ust'-Orda AO	0.6	0.7
Koriak AO	0.0	0.1
Chukchi AO	0.0	0.0
Autonomous Oblast		
Jewish AO	0.0	0.0

Sources: *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991), 78-141; *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia RSFSR: po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 g.* (Moscow: Respublikanskii informatsionno-izdatel'skii tsentr, 1990), 154-737.

Notes:

- Names and status of particular ethnic federal units of the Russian Federation are given in accordance with the 1993 Constitution
- The 1989 USSR census provides data for a unified Chechen-Ingush autonomous republic; in 1992, it was divided into separate Chechen and Ingush republics.

Table 3
Fluency in Russian Among the Titular Nationalities of the Former Soviet Republics, 1989 (%)

Republic	Spoke Russian Fluently	Considered Russian as Their Native Language
Ukraine	71.7	12.2
Belarus	80.2	19.7
Moldova	57.6	4.3
Georgia	32.0	0.2
Armenia	44.6	0.3
Azerbaijan	32.1	0.4
Kazakhstan	64.2	1.4
Kyrgyzstan	37.3	0.3
Uzbekistan	22.7	0.4
Tajikistan	30.5	0.5
Turkmenistan	28.3	0.7
Lithuania	37.6	0.3
Estonia	34.6	1.0
Latvia	68.3	2.6

Source: *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991),
78-1

Table 4
Titular Nationalities, Russians, and Other Ethnic Groups in the Capitals of the Former Soviet Republics (1989 census data)

Republic	% of the Total Population			% of the Capital's Population		
	I	II	III	I	II	III
Russia	81.5	—	18.5	89.7	—	10.3
Ukraine	22.1	72.7	5.2	20.9	72.5	6.6
Belarus	13.2	77.9	8.9	20.2	71.8	8.0
Uzbekistan	8.3	71.4	20.3	34.0	44.2	21.8
Kazakhstan	37.8	39.7	22.5	59.1	22.5	18.4
Azerbaijan	5.6	82.7	11.7	16.5	66.0	17.5
Moldova	13.0	64.5	22.5	25.3	51.3	23.4
Kyrgyzstan	21.5	52.4	26.1	55.7	22.9	21.4
Tajikistan	7.6	62.3	30.1	32.4	39.1	28.5
Armenia	1.6	93.3	5.1	1.9	96.4	1.7
Turkmenistan	9.5	72.0	18.5	32.3	50.9	16.8
Georgia	6.3	70.1	23.6	10.0	66.1	23.9
Lithuania	9.4	79.6	11.0	20.2	50.5	29.3
Latvia	34.0	52.0	14.0	47.3	36.5	16.2
Estonia	30.3	61.5	8.2	41.6	46.8	11.6

Source: *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991), 5-8, 34-140.

Note: Column I: Russians; Column II: titular nationality; Column III: other ethnic groups.

Table 5
Russians and Titular Nationalities
in the Ethnic Units of the Russian Federation (1989 census data)

Federal Unit	% of the Total Population			% of Urban Population		
	I	II	III	I	II	III
Republics						
Adygea	68.0	22.1	9.9	75.4	14.1	10.5
Altai	60.4	31.0	8.6	82.1	12.0	5.9
Karachaevo-Cherkessia	42.4	40.9	16.7	59.7	25.2	15.1
Khakassia	79.5	11.1	9.4	85.5	5.5	9.0
Bashkortostan	39.3	21.9	38.8	51.1	14.5	34.4
Buriatia	69.9	24.0	6.1	75.0	17.3	92.3
Daghestan	9.2	—	90.8	18.1	—	81.9
Kabardino-Balkaria	31.9	57.6	10.5	43.4	43.0	13.6
Kalmykia	37.7	45.4	16.9	41.9	49.9	8.2
Karelia	73.6	10.0	16.4	77.1	7.6	15.3
Komi	57.7	23.3	19.0	64.5	14.5	21.0
Mary-El	47.5	43.3	9.2	63.4	26.1	10.5
Mordovia	60.8	32.5	6.7	71.9	22.1	94.0
North Ossetia	29.9	53.0	17.1	35.0	49.3	15.7
Tatarstan	43.3	48.5	8.1	50.8	42.1	7.1
Tyva	32.0	64.3	3.7	52.6	41.2	6.2
Udmurtia	58.9	30.9	10.2	68.1	19.8	12.1
Chechen and Ingush Republics	23.1	70.7	6.2	44.7	46.0	9.3
Chuvashia	26.7	67.8	5.5	40.0	54.7	5.3
Sakha (Yakutia)	50.3	33.4	16.3	67.8	12.8	19.4
Autonomous Okrugs						
Agin-Buriat AO	40.8	54.9	4.3	61.6	32.7	5.7
Nenets AO	65.8	12.0	22.2	75.6	2.3	22.1
Komi-Permiak AO	36.1	60.2	3.7	45.5	51.4	3.1
Khanty-Mansi AO	66.3	1.4	32.3	66.3	1.1	32.6

	I	II	III	I	II	III
Yamalo-Nenets AO	59.2	4.2	36.6	63.2	1.0	35.8
Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets) AO	67.1	13.2	19.7	79.2	1.9	18.9
Evenk AO	67.5	14.0	18.5	73.0	9.8	17.2
Ust'-Orda AO	56.5	36.3	7.2	62.6	31.1	6.3
Koriak AO	62.0	16.4	21.6	74.3	9.3	16.4
Chukchi AO	66.1	7.3	26.6	72.3	0.8	26.9
Autonomous Oblast						
Jewish AO	83.2	4.2	12.6	84.3	5.9	9.8

Sources: *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia RSFSR: po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989g.* (Moscow: Respublikanskii informatsionno-izdatel'skii tsentr, 1990), 102-53.

Note: Column I: Russians; Column II: titular nationality; Column III: other ethnic groups.

Table 6
The National Composition and Dynamics of the Former USSR Population (1959 and 1989 census data)

Ethnic Group**	1959 (000s)	1959 %	1989 (000s)	1989 %	1989:1959
Russians	114,114	54.6	145,155	50.8	127.2
Ukrainians	37,253	17.8	44,186	15.5	118.6
Uzbeks	6,015	2.9	16,698	5.8	277.6
Belorussians	7,913	3.8	10,036	3.5	126.8
Kazakhs	3,622	1.7	8,136	2.8	224.6
Azerbaijanis	2,940	1.4	6,770	2.4	230.3
Tatars	4,918	2.4	6,649	2.3	135.2
Armenians	2,787	1.3	4,623	1.6	165.9
Tajiks	1,397	0.7	4,215	1.5	301.7
Georgians	2,692	1.3	3,981	0 .4	147.9
Moldovans	2,214	1.1	3,352	1.2	151.4
Lithuanians	2,326	1.1	3,067	1.1	131.9
Turkmen	1,002	0 .5	2,729	1.0	272.4
Kyrgyz	969	0 .5	2,529	0 .9	261.0
Germans	1,620	0 .8	2,039	0 .7	125.9
Chuvash	1,470	0 .7	1,842	0 .6	125.3
Latvians	1,400	0 .7	1,459	0 .5	104.2
Bashkirs	989	0 .5	1,449	0.5	146.5
Jews	2,177	1.0	1,378	0.5	63.3
Mordovians	1,285	0.6	1,154	0.4	89.8
Poles	1,380	0.7	1,126	0.4	81.6
Estonians	989	0 .5	1,027	0 .4	103.8
Chechens	419	0 .2	957	0.3	228.4
Udmurts	625	0.3	747	0.3	119.5
Maris	504	0.2	671	0.2	133.1
Avars	270	0.1	601	0.2	222.6
Ossetians	413	0.2	598	0.2	144.8
Lezghins	223	0.1	466	0.2	209.0
Koreans	314	0.2	439	0.2	139.8
Karakalpaks	173	0.1	424	0.1	245.1
Buriats	253	0.1	421	0.1	166.6
Others*	4,161	2.0	6,819	2.4	—
Former USSR, Total	208,827	100.0	285,743	100.0	136.8

Source: *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991), 5-6.

Note:
Only nations numbering more than 400,000 in 1989 are listed.
The titular ethnic groups of the Soviet union republics are given in *Italics*.

Table 7
Titular Nationalities, Russians, and Other Ethnic Groups in the Population of the Former Soviet Republics (1989 USSR, 2001 National census data and Estimates)

Republic	1989			2001		
	Population, Millions	Russians, %	Titular Nationality, %	Population, Millions	Russians, %	Titular Nationality, %
Russia	147.0	81.5	—	144.0	80.6	—
Ukraine	51.4	22.1	72.7	48.9	17.3	n/a
Belarus	10.2	13.2	77.9	10.0	11.4	81.2
Uzbekistan	19.8	8.3	71.4	24.9	6.0	n/a
Kazakhstan	16.5	37.8	39.7	14.8	30.0	53.4
Azerbaijan	7.0	5.6	82.7	8.1	1.8	90.6
Moldova	4.3	13.8	64.5	4.3	11.6	n/a
Kyrgyzstan	4.3	21.5	52.4	5.0206	12.5	64.9
Tajikistan	5.1	7.6	62.3	6.3	1.1	79.9207
Armenia	3.3	1.6	93.3	3.8	0.2	n/a
Turkmenistan	2.5	9.5	72.0	5.5	2.0	91.0
Georgia	5.4	6.3	70.1	4.1208	2.6	n/a
Lithuania	3.7	9.4	79.6	3.5	6.3	83.4
Latvia	2.7	34.0	52.0	2.4209	29.6	57.7
Estonia	1.6	30.3	61.5	1.4210	25.6	67.9
FSU, Total	285.7	50.8	—	—	—	—

Source: Sources: Vladimir M. Kabuzan, *Russkie v mire: Dinamika chislennosti i rasseleniia (1719-1989). Formirovanie etnicheskikh i politicheskikh granits ruskogo naroda* (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Russko-Baltiiskii informatsionnyi tsentr "BLITS," 1996), 279., "Naselenie Gruzii po perepisi sostavilo lish' 4,1 milliona," *Demoscope* 2, no. 91-2 (2-15 December 2002), http://www.demoscope.ru., "Naselenie Kirgizii perevalilo za 5 millionov chelovek," *Demoscope* 2, no. 91-2 (2-15 December 2002), http://www.demoscope.ru., "Naselenie stran SNG na konets 2001 goda," *Demoscope* 2, no. 55-6 (18 February-3 March 2002), http://www.demoscope.ru., *Natsional'yi sostav naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991), 5-19., "Perepisano 48860 tysiach zhitelei Ukrainy," *Demoscope* 2, no. 49-50 (1-20 January 2002), http://www.demoscope.ru., "Predvaritel'nye itogi perepisi v Armenii," *Demoscope* 2, no. 55-6 (18 February-3 March 2002), http://www.demoscope.ru., "Saparmurat Niiazov: turkmeny sostavliaiut 91% naseleniia Turkmenii," *Demoscope* 1, no. 37-8 (8-21 October 2001), http://www.demoscope.ru., Anatolii Topilin, "Demograficheskaia situatsiia v stranakh SNG," *Demoscope* 2, no. 63-4 (15-28 April 2002), http://www.demoscope.ru., Anatolii Topilin, "Strany Sodruzhestva stanoviatsia vsye bolee monoetnichnymi," *Demoscope* 2, no. 63-4 (15-28 April 2002), http://www.demoscope.ru., Mikhail Tul'skii, "Etnicheskii i yazykovoi sostav naseleniia Latvii po perepisi 2000 goda," *Demoscope* 1, no. 53-54 (4-17 February 2001), http://www.demoscope.ru., Mikhail Tul'skii, "Itogi perepisi naseleniia Tadzhikistana," *Demoscope* 1, no. 37-8 (8-21 October 2001), http://www.demoscope.ru., Mikhail Tul'skii, "Itogi perepisi 2001 goda v Litve," *Demoscope* 2, no. 81-2 (23 September-6 October 2002), http://www.demoscope.ru., Mikhail Tul'skii, "Podvedeny itogi perepisi naseleniia Estonii," *Demoscope* 1, no. 33-4 (10-23 September 2001), http://www.demoscope.ru., "Za mesiats do kontsa 2001 goda postoiannoe naselenie Rossii sostavilo 144 milliona chelovek," *Demoscope* 2, no. 53-4 (4-17 February 2002), http://www.demoscope.ru.

Table 8
Concentration of the Major Post-Soviet Ethnic Groups in Their Native Countries (1989 census data)

Ethnic Group Native	Lived in the the Republic (%)	Lived Outside the Republic, (%)	Lived Outside Republic (000s)
Russians	82.6	17.4	25,289
Ukrainians	84.7	15.3	6,767
Belorussians	78.8	21.2	2,131
Uzbeks	84.7	15.3	2,556
Kazakhs	80.3	19.7	1,601
Azerbaijanis	85.7	14.3	965
Moldovans	83.4	16.6	557
Kyrgyz	88.2	11.8	299
Tajiks	75.3	24.7	1,043
Armenians	66.7	33.3	1,539
Turkmen	93.0	7.0	192
Georgians	95.1	4.9	194
Lithuanians	95.3	4.7	143
Latvians	95.1	4.9	71
Estonians	93.8	6.2	64

Source: *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991),
5-19.

Table 9
Nationally Mixed Families in the Former Soviet Republics (1989 Census Data)

Republic	Families, (000s)	Nationally Mixed Families (000s)	%
Russia	40,246	5,916	14.7
Ukraine	14,057	3,556	25.3
Belarus	2,796	688	24.6
Uzbekistan	3,415	434	12.7
Kazakhstan	3,824	914	23.9
Azerbaijan	1,381	109	7.9
Moldova	1,144	281	24.6
Kyrgyzstan	856	141	16.5
Tajikistan	799	118	14.8
Armenia	559	21	3.8
Turkmenistan	598	80	13.3
Georgia	1,244	152	12.2
Lithuania	1,000	128	12.8
Latvia	732	201	27.5
Estonia	427	74	17.3
USSR, total	73,078	12,887	17.5

Source: L. Semenchuk, "Poistine odna sem'ia," *Pravda*, 24 February 1991, 3.

Table 10
Major National Groups Among the Emigrants from Russia, 1993 1999

Nationality	1993 (000s)	%	1995 (000s)	%	1998 (000s)	%	1999 (000s)	%
Russians	21.3	24.0	28.8	28.8	29.3	36.4	34.5	40.4
Germans	47.5	53.5	51.3	51.3	28.3	35.2	28.0	32.8
Jews	14.0	15.8	12.8	12.8	7.3	9.1	9.0	10.6
Others	6.0	6.7	7.1	7.1	15.5	19.3	13.8	16.2
Total	88.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	80.4	100.0	85.3	100.0

Sources: A. G. Vishnevskii, ed., *Naseleniie Rossii 1999: Sed'moi ezhegodnyi demograficheskii doklad* (Moscow: Tsentr demografii i ekologii cheloveka, Institut narodnokhoziaistvennogo prognozirovaniia RAN, 2000), 140; A. G. Vishnevskii, ed., *Naseleniie Rossii 2000: Vos'moi ezhegodnyi demograficheskii doklad* (Moscow: Tsentr demografii i ekologii cheloveka, Institut narodnokhoziaistvennogo prognozirovaniia RAN, 2001), 115-16.

Table 11
The Regional Distribution of the Ethnic Russian Population in the USSR, 1897-2000

	1897	1917	1926	1939	1959	1989	1996	2000
Ethnic Russians, Thousands	55,457	76,507	78,357	100,609	114,114	145,155	n/a	n/a
Lived Outside the Russian Republic, Thousands	4,501	7,652	5,764	10,681	16,250	25,289	23,130	20,614
Lived Outside the Russian Republic, %	8.1	11.1	7.9	11.9	16.6	17.4	n/a	n/a

Sources: Vladimir M. Kabuzan, *Russkie v mire: Dinamika chislennosti i rasseleniia (1719-1989). Formirovanie etnicheskikh i politicheskikh granits ruskogo naroda* (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Russko-Baltiiskii informatsionnyi tsentr "BLITS," 1996), 279., Vladimir Mukomel', "Migratsionnyi potentsial i perspektivy immigratsii sootechestvennikov iz gosudarstv SNG i Baltii," *Etnopanorama* no. 3 (2001): 47., *Natsional'yi sostav naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991), 5-19., S. S. Savoskul, ed., *Russkie v novom zarubezh'e: migratsionnaia situatsia, pereselenie i adaptatsiia v Rossii* (Moscow: Institut etnologii i antropologii RAN, 1997), 23., Mikhail Tul'skii, "Istinnoe litso demograficheskoi katastrofy," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 19 July 2001, 3.

Table 12
Russia's Migration Exchange with the NIS, 1980-1999

	1980-1988			1989-1998			1999		
	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III
Western States	3,822	4,243	1:1.11	2,291	2,639	1:1.15	82.3	101.9	1:1.24
Belarus	535	590	1:1.10	377	380	1:1.01	19.2	11.6	1:0.60
Moldova	286	330	1:1.15	165	232	1:1.41	4.2	9.0	1:2.14
Ukraine	3,001	3,323	1:1.11	1,749	2,027	1:1.16	58.9	81.3	1:1.38
Transcaucasus	492	821	1:1.67	297	1,195	1:4.02	8.7	50.2	1:5.77
Azerbaijan	220	385	1:1.75	160	525	1:3.28	3.8	15.9	1:4.18
Armenia	88	159	1:1.81	52	236	1:4.54	2.3	14.7	1:6.39
Georgia	184	277	1:1.51	85	434	1:5.11	2.6	19.6	1:7.54
Central Asia	814	1,081	1:1.33	439	1,810	1:4.12	11.8	72.1	1:6.11
Kyrgyzstan	178	239	1:1.34	115	394	1:2.43	3.7	10.4	1:2.81
Tajikistan	121	171	1:1.41	59	400	1:6.78	1.8	12.1	1:6.72
Turkmenistan	96	140	1:1.46	52	165	1:3.17	1.2	8.0	1:6.67
Uzbekistan	418	531	1:1.27	213	851	1:4.00	5.1	41.6	1:8.16
Kazakhstan	1,155	1,602	1:1.39	656	2,031	1:3.10	25.0	138.5	1:5.54
Baltic States	337	285	1:0.85	95	329	1:3.46	1.9	4.0	1:2.11
Latvia	142	121	1:0.85	37	150	1:4.05	.6	2.1	1:3.50
Lithuania	95	84	1:0.88	33	85	1:2.58	.7	1.0	1:1.43
Estonia	100	80	1:0.80	94	25	1:3.76	.6	.9	1:1.50
NIS, total	6,620	8,032	1:1.21	3,778	8,004	1:2.12	129.7	366.7	1:2.83

Sources: A. G. Vishnevskii, ed., *Naselenie Rossii 1999: Sed'moi ezhegodnyi demograficheskii doklad* (Moscow: Tsentr demografii i ekologii cheloveka, Institut narodnokhoziaistvennogo prognozirovaniia RAN, 2000), 125., A. G. Vishnevskii, ed., *Naseleniie Rossii 2000: Vos'moi ezhegodnyi demograficheskii doklad* (Moscow: Tsentr demografii i ekologii cheloveka, Institut narodnokhoziaistvennogo prognozirovaniia RAN, 2001), 109.

Notes: Column I: emigration, in thousands; Column II: immigration, in thousands; Column III: ratio emigration/immigration.

Table 13
The Ethnic Structure of the Net Immigration Flows to Russia from the NIS, 1989-1999

Nationality	1989-1993 (000s)	1994-1998 (000s)	% of total	1999 (000s)	% of total
Russians	1158.7	1751.6	63.4	135.6	57.2
Ukrainians	-32.1	256.2	9.3	18.9	8.0
Belorussians	5.6	25.4	0.9	-0.6	-0.3
Armenians	127.5	184.5	6.7	16.6	7.0
Azerbaijanis	-1.7	70.3	2.6	8.2	3.5
Uzbeks	-8.1	16.9	0.6	2.1	0.9
Kazakhs	-27.6	19.4	0.7	2.7	1.1
Georgians	0.8	38.4	1.4	3.1	1.3
Tajiks	2.0	23.3	0.8	3.0	1.3
Others	239.0	375.7	13.6	47.4	20.0
Total	1,464.1	2,761.7	100.0	237.0	100.0

Source: A. G. Vishnevskii, ed., *Naselenie Rossii 1999: Sed'moi ezhegodnyi demograficheskii doklad* (Moscow: Tsentr demografii i ekologii cheloveka, Institut narodnokhoziaistvennogo prognozirovaniia RAN, 2000), 132., A. G. Vishnevskii, ed., *Naseleniie Rossii 2000: Vos'moi ezhegodnyi demograficheskii doklad* (Moscow: Tsentr demografii i ekologii cheloveka, Institut narodnokhoziaistvennogo prognozirovaniia RAN, 2001), 110.

Table 14
The Regional Concentration of the Major Nationalities of Kazakhstan and Central Asia (1989 Census Data)

Nationality	Thousands	Lived in Native Republic	Lived in Kazakhstan and Central Asia
Kazakhs	8,136	80.3	91.9
Kyrgyz	2,529	88.2	97.6
Tajiks	4,215	75.3	98.8
Turkmen	2,729	93.0	98.3
Uzbeks	16,698	84.7	97.2

Source: *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991), 94, 102, 126, 130, 136.

Table 15
Major Recipient Countries of Migrants from Russia, 1989-1999 (000s)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1995	1997	1998	1998 %	1999 %211
Total emigration from Russia	47.6	103.6	88.3	102.9	100.0	83.5	80.4	100.0	100.0
Germany	20.6	33.1	33.9	62.7	72.8	52.1	49.2	61.2	48.8
Israel	22.0	61.0	38.8	22.0	12.7	14.4	16.9	21.0	33.5
USA	0.7	2.3	11.0	13.2	9.0	12.5	10.75	13.4	10.2
Others	4.3	7.2	4.6	5.0	5.5	4.5	3.55	4.4	7.5

Sources: A. G. Vishnevskii, ed., *Naseleniie Rossii: Chetvyertyi ezhegodnyi demograficheskii doklad* (Moscow: Tsentr demografii i ekologii cheloveka, Institut narodnokhoziaistvennogo prognozirovaniia RAN, 1997), 156., A. G. Vishnevskii, ed., *Naselenie Rossii 1999: Sed'moi ezhegodnyi demograficheskii doklad* (Moscow: Tsentr demografii i ekologii cheloveka, Institut narodnokhoziaistvennogo prognozirovaniia RAN, 2000), 139., A. G. Vishnevskii, ed., *Naseleniie Rossii 2000: Vos'moi ezhegodnyi demograficheskii doklad* (Moscow: Tsentr demografii i ekologii cheloveka, Institut narodnokhoziaistvennogo prognozirovaniia RAN, 2001), 115-6.

Endnotes

The author would like to express his gratitude to a number of colleagues who advised him in the process of work on this manuscript: Professor Barbara Ann Chotiner of the University of Alabama, whose advice was invaluable and helped lay the conceptual foundations of the research, and Professor John Vile, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Middle Tennessee State University, who has spent a lot of his time looking through numerous revisions of the paper. I would also like to thank all those who read the manuscript and gave their comments, including Professor Donna Bahry of Pennsylvania State University, Professor Sergei Khrushchev of Brown University, Professor Ronald Linden of the University of Pittsburgh, and Professor Hugh Ragsdale, formerly of the University of Alabama. The research could not be possible without consultations and statistical materials graciously provided by my Russian colleagues, Dr. Irina Malakha, Dr. Vladimir Mukomel, and Dr. Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Galina Vitkovskaya from the Moscow office of the International Organization on Migration, and Konstantin Zatulin from the Institute for the CIS Affairs of the Moscow City Government, and I would like to express my deepest appreciation of their help. The research was conducted with the financial support, provided in 2001 and 2002 by the Middle Tennessee State University Summer-Salary Faculty Development Research Grants.

NOTES

1 Roman Szporluk, "Introduction: Statehood and Nation Building in Post-Soviet Space," in Roman Szporluk, ed., *The International Politics of Eurasia* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), vol. 2, *National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the States of Eurasia*, 4.

2 Some analysts view this situation as a positive, stabilizing feature of the modern transition. Szporluk, for instance, concludes that it allowed the largest NIS to avoid both the internal and the inter-state military conflicts, especially those involving Russia as the dominant regional power and the external homeland for the bulk of post-Soviet minorities (*Ibid.*, 15).

3 Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, *Forced Migration in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union*, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 22 May 1996, 1, 10. Russian sources speak about close to 300 territorial claims (both official and unofficial) that arose during 1988-1996 in the post-Soviet space, of which at least 140 retain their importance at present. Of those, around twenty resulted in military clashes, and six, led to regional wars (Pavel Polian, *Ne po svoei vole...: Istoriia i geografiia prinuditel'nykh migratsii v SSSR* [Moscow: OGI-Memorial, 2001], 183).

4 Katherine Verdery, "Nationalism and Nationalist Sentiment in Post-Socialist Romania," *Slavic Review* 52 (Summer 1993): 182.

5 Reliable members of the Communist elite, allowed by the regime to hold important positions of power.

6 Philip G. Roeder, "Varieties of Post-Soviet Authoritarian Regimes," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 10 (January-March 1994): 62.

7 The Russian term for the NIS (excluding Russia), formed as a result of the USSR dissolution (as opposed to the "Old Abroad").

8 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 392.

9 *Ibid.*, 254.

10 Congress, *Forced Migration*, 4, 9. The Russian governmental sources also sited in 1998-1999 the post-Soviet migration potential of twenty and even twenty-four million people ("Kontseptsiia gosudarsvennoj migratsionnoj politiki Rossijskoj Federatsii: Proekt," *Migratsiia v Rossii* 1 [October-November 1999]: 11., Sergei Khetagurov, "Regulirovat' protsessy migratsii v interesakh grazhdan i Rossii," *Migratsiia v Rossii* 2 [April-May 2000]: 4., Galina Vitkovskaya and Sergei Panarin, eds., *Migratsiia i bezopasnost' v Rossii* [Moscow: Interdialekt+, 2000], 169). In 1989-1999, Russia alone received eight million migrants from the post-Soviet states, with migrational

inflow expected to be on the level of two to three hundred thousand annually until approximately 2015 (Aleksandr Blokhin, "Nasha kontseptsiia odnoznachna—povernut'sia litsom k nuzhdam pereselentsev," *Migratsiia v Rossii* 2 [December 2000]: 2., "Obsuzhdaem 'Kontsetsiiu gosudarstvenoj migratsionnoj politiki RF,'" *Migratsiia v Rossii* 2 [January 2000]: 20).

11 Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), 561.

12 Gregory Gleason, "The Federal Formula and the Collapse of the USSR," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 22 (Summer 1992): 162. An important factor represented also the territorial continuity of the Russian Empire and later, the USSR.

13 Benedict Anderson describes this policy as an attempt at "stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire... [in order to promote] 'Russification' of the heterogeneous population of the Czar's subjects..." (Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* [London: Verso, 1983], 82).

14 Although the time of *perestroika* (1985-1991) is usually also considered a part of the Soviet period, it is discussed here separately, as a transitional stage, characterized by the disintegration of the major elements of the traditional Soviet model, the growing independence of the ethnic republics, and the formation of the nationalist movements.

15 Though country-specific, Wilson's statement included such proposals as "readjustment [of borders]...along clearly recognizable lines of nationality... [and providing the peoples of multiethnic empires with] the freest opportunity of autonomous development" (Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* [Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984], vol. 45, 537).

16 Meanwhile, even in most of those countries that officially proclaimed the achievement of national self-determination and democratization as their political goals, these objectives were not fully implemented. The majority of the new states were unable to develop stable democratic institutions and to guarantee minority rights. In reality, the final outcomes of the dissolution processes in those countries became the creation of primarily ethnically based states, leading to the formation of new minorities, to a large extent consisting of the representatives of the former politically dominant nations, and the development of large-scale ethnically and politically motivated migrations.

17 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Communist Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs* 68 (Winter 1989/1990): 2.

18 See, for example, Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 13; Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 5; and Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Nations* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), 171.

19 Gleason, "The Federal Formula," 144-5.

20 Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 29, 37-8.

21 T. H. Rigby, "Stalinism and the Mono-organizational Society," in Robert Tucker, ed., *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation* (New York: Norton, 1977), 53-8.

22 Characteristic in this sense is Stalin's famous 1945 statement, describing the Russian people as "the most outstanding nation of all the nations forming the Soviet Union[,]...the leading force...among all the peoples of our country" ("Vystuplenie tovarishcha I. V. Stalina na priyeme v Kremle v chest' komanduiushchikh voiskami Krasnoi Armii," in I. Stalin, *O Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soiuza* [Moscow: Kraft+, 2002], 151).

23 Polian, *Ne po svoei vole,* 61-2. See also Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940-1990*, expanded and updated ed. (Berkeley, California: University of Los Angeles Press, 1993), 104.

24 Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 33.

25 Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development* (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1975), 33-9. See also L. S. Perepyelkin, "Istoki mezhetnicheskogo konflikta v Tatarii," *Mir Rossii* 1 (1992): 95.

26 By the end of the Communist period, the USSR included fifteen union republics as well as twenty lower positioned autonomous republics, seven autonomous oblasts, and ten autonomous okrugs (districts). Each ethnic unit had its titular nationality (or nationalities) and a specified set of symbols of statehood or national autonomy. Most of the lower-positioned ethnic units were located in the territory of the Russian Federation (RF) (sixteen autonomous republics, five autonomous oblasts, and all ten autonomous okrugs). The post-Soviet Russian Federation also retains the complex ethnofederal structure: along with fifty-seven Russian-speaking units, it includes thirty-two ethnic units: twenty-one republics, ten autonomous okrugs, and one autonomous oblast. In 1989, in these ethnic units lived 22 percent of the RF population (*Natsional'yi sostav naseleniia SSSR* [Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991], 9, 34-48).

27 Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 103.

28 Collin W. Mettam and Stephen Wyn Williams, "A Colonial Perspective on Population Migration in Soviet Estonia," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27 (January 2001): 133-4.

29 Ruble specifically emphasizes the impact on the territorial movement of the Soviet labor resources of such policies as "a system of residency permits *(propiska)*; [limitations on the movement of rural residents based on] internal passport system; [forced migrations of the purged people; and creation of settlements in] otherwise unsustainable locations." In his opinion, many of these measures were aimed at meeting "the needs of central planers" (Congress, *Forced Migration*, 35-6). The introduction of the internal Soviet passports in 1932 served as one of the most effective measures, enhancing bureaucratic control over the population movement as well as simplifying governmental policies of ethnic, social and political cleansing.

30 Characteristic in this sense is the statement of the head of the Northern Krai (Region) Party Committee Sergei Bergavinov, who wrote to Stalin in March 1930 that the exile to the North of hundreds of thousands of *kulaks* (purged former well-to-do peasants) "would be...not only

solving the problem of the Region's colonization, not only securing the Region's giant enforcement with labor resources, but also... [promoting] the development of new areas' productive forces..." (Cited from: N. A. Ivnitskii, *Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie: nachalo 30-kh gg.* [Moscow: Magist, 1996]: 228).

31 John B. Dunlop, *Will a Large-Scale Migration of Russians to the Russian Republic Take Place Over the Current Decade?* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution, 1993), 19; Misiunas and Taagepera, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence,* 353; and *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR,* 8, 16, 19.

32 Mettam and Williams, "A Colonial Perspective," 140; *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR,* 8, 16, 19.

33 Vladimir M. Kabuzan, *Russkie v mire: Dinamika chislennosti i rasseleniia (1719-1989). Formirovanie etnicheskikh i politicheskikh granits russkogo naroda* (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Russko-Baltiiskii informatsionnyi tsentr "BLITS," 1996), 279., Gulnar Kendirbaeva, "Migrations in Kazakstan: Past and Present," *Nationalities Papers* 25 (December 1997): 742, 749., *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR,* 8.

34 M. B. Tatimov, *Immigratsionnaia volna priekhavshikh v Kazakhstan evropeiskogo naseleniia po dannym demograficheskoi i immigratsionnoi statistiki (chislennost' vsekh v "ekhavshikh za period XVII, XVIII, XIX i XX vekov)* (Almaty: Gylym, 1994), 1-3.

35 M. B. Tatimov, "Regulirovanie migratsionnykh protsessov," in M. M. Suzhikov, ed., *Mezhnatsional'nye otnosheniia v Kazakhstane: teoriia i praktika regulirovaniia* (Almaty: Gylym, 1993), 135.

36 As a result of collectivization alone, between one and two million Kazakhs died of hunger and exhaustion while a similar number moved out of Kazakhstan (including escaping to the neighboring countries) (Polian, *Ne po svoei vole,* 79).

37 Nikolai Bugai, "By the decision of the USSR government," *Moscow News,* no. 26, June 1991, 6.

38 "A map of unrest in the USSR," *Moscow News,* no. 11, March 1991, 8.

39 Viktor Zemskov, "Spetsposelentsy (po dokumentatsii NKVD - MVD SSSR)," *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia* 17 (November 1990): 9.

40 The position of these ethnic groups may be illustrated by the fact that by the end of the Soviet period, only 3 percent of the Soviet Germans graduated from the universities in comparison with 13 percent among ethnic Russians and 50 percent among the Soviet Jews (Leonid Pochivalov, "Vstretimsia na chuzhbine?" *Literaturnaia gazeta,* 25 March 1992, 9).

41 The latter group included 3.2 million of those expelled from the USSR or deported as slave labor by the German authorities and 5,760 thousand, the Soviet citizens returned (many forcefully) to the USSR after the end of World War II and the nationals of Germany and Eastern European countries, brought to the USSR during that period as forced labor by the Soviet authorities (Polian, *Ne po svoei vole,* 239-40). In his turn, Viktor Zemskov estimates the post-War reversed

migration to the USSR at 4.2 million (Viktor Zemskov, "Rozhdenie 'vtoroi emigratsii'. 1944-1952 g.g.," *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia* 17 [April 1991]: 8).

42 *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR*, 78-141.

43 The range of the representatives of republics' titular nationalities fluent in Russian was in 1989 between 28.3 percent in Turkmenistan and 80.2 percent in Belarus. In five republics (Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Latvia), this share exceeded 50 percent (*Ibid*).

44 *Ibid.*, 78-90.

45 *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia RSFSR: Po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989g.* (Moscow: Respublikanskii informatsionno-izdatel'skii tsentr, 1990), 34-153.

46 In a relatively urbanized Uzbekistan, for example, the share of Uzbeks among the industrial workers at the end of the Soviet period was about 35 percent, while their share in the general population in 1989 was 71.4 percent (Aleksei Malashenko, "Novye orientatsii Tsentral'noi Azii," in B. Koppiters, E. Remakl', and A. Zverev, eds., *Etnicheskie i regional'nye konflikty v Evrazii.* vol 3: *Mezhdunarodnyi opyt razresheniia etnicheskikh konfliktov* [Moscow: Ves' mir, 1997], 212., *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR*, 92). In Kazakhstan in 1987, the share of ethnic Kazakhs among the industrial workers was 18 percent; and in the coal and metallurgical industry, 8 percent ("Postanovlenie TsK KPSS o rabote Kazakhskoi respublikanskoi partiinoi organizatsii po internatsional'nomu i patrioticheskomu vospitaniiu trudiashchikhsia, 1 iiulia 1987g.," in *KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s''ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK.* 9th ed. [Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury], vol. 15: 1985-1988, 433).

47 In Kazakstan, for instance, by 1 January 1993, non-Kazakhs made up 75.8 percent of the total work force. In the Mangushlak Oblast, having more than a half of the ethnic Kazakh population, the titular nationality accounted for only 4 to 12 percent of the industrial work force (Kendirbaeva, "Migrations in Kazakhstan," 748-9).

48 Russian sources claim that overall, in 1956-1982 alone (*i. e.* during the post-totalitarian, relatively more liberal stage of the Soviet political development) there were about thirty instances of large-scale ethnic disturbances in the USSR (Gennadii A. Bordiugov, "Etnicheskie konflikty. Opyt sozdaniia bazy dannykh," in Paul Goble and Gennadii Bordiugov, eds., *Mezhnatsional'nye otnosheniia v Rossii i SNG: Seminar Moskovskogo tsentra Karnegi* [Moscow: ITs "AIRO-XX," 1994], vol 1: 1993-1994, 24).

49 Roeder, "Soviet Federalism," 220-1.

50 Graham Smith, "Federation, Defederation and Refederation: from the Soviet Union to Russian Statehood," in Graham Smith, ed., *Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge* (New York: Longman, 1995), 163.

51 Eric Hobsbawm, "Some Reflections on 'The Break-up of Britain'," *New Left Review* 105 (September-October 1977): 13.

52 Roeder, "Soviet Federalism," 218.

53 *Ibid.*

54 Graham Smith, "Federation," 159.

55 Roeder, "Soviet Federalism," 213-4.

56 *Sotsial'noe razvitie SSSR, 1989: Statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991), 63.

57 Sergei S. Savoskul, ed., *Russkie v novom zarubezh'e: Sredniaia Aziia: Etnosotsiologicheskii ocherk* (Moscow: Institut etnologii i antropologii RAN, 1994), 32-5.

58 A. G. Vishnevskii, ed., *Naselenie Rossii 1996: Chetvyertyi ezhegodnyi demograficheskii doklad* (Moscow: Tsentr demografii i ekologii cheloveka, Institut narodnokhoziaistvennogo prognozirovaniia RAN, 1997), 139.

59 Roeder, "Soviet Federalism," 220-1.

60 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1996*, 6, 13.

61 A. G. Vishnevskii, ed., *Naselenie Rossii 1999: Sed'moi ezhegodnyi demograficheskii doklad* (Moscow: Tsentr demografii i ekologii cheloveka, Institut narodnokhoziaistvennogo prognozirovaniia RAN, 2000), 134.

62 Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1953), 76.

63 *Emerson, From Empire to Nation*, 215.

64 Hannah Arendt even considered the (ethnically based) nation-state system as incompatible with the principle of human rights and claimed that this system was responsible for the formation of new population categories, which she characterized as "victim groups...most symptomatic of contemporary politics" and frequently overrepresented among the refugees and forced migrants. Arendt saw the politically motivated formation of these groups as the major cause of large-scale flows of migrants and refugees in the post-dissolution period (Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, new ed. [New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973], 275, 278).

65 Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 219.

66 Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 44.

67 Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), 10.

68 Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 277.

69 The Russian political vocabulary distinguishes between "russkii" (ethnically, linguistically Russian) and a more inclusive, "rossiiskii" (civic Russian, belonging to the Russian state). The

latter term, used in the name of the Russian Federation ("Rossiiskaia Federatsiia"), is supposed to emphasize its civic, ethnically inclusive character.

70 Samuel W. Lewis, "Foreword," in Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), vii.

71 Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 8, 681. See also Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972), 12., and Barry Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," *American Political Science Review* 91 (June 1997): 253.

72 *Sotsial'naia i sotsial'no-politicheskaia sitsuatsiia v SSSR: sostoianie i prognoz* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1990), 23.

73 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1996*, 144-5.

74 *Ibid.*, 146-7.

75 *Sotsial'naia i sotsial'no-politicheskaia sitsuatsiia v SSSR*, 42.

76 Linz and Stepan, *Democratic Transition*, 69-70.

77 Philip G. Roeder, "Post-Soviet Regimes," 83. See also Valerie Bunce, who argues, considering the domination by the Communist *nomenklatura* of many important offices and the governmental control of the media, that the end of the Communist Party hegemony should not by itself be seen as a transition to democracy (Valerie Bunce, "Should Transitologists Be Grounded?" *Slavic Review* 54 [Spring 1995]: 113, 119).

78 Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993), 156.

79 *Ibid.*

80 As Eric Hobsbawm notes, "in post-communist societies ethnic or national identity is above all a device for defining the community of the innocent and identifying the guilty who are responsible for 'our' predicament" (Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality.* 2nd ed. [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982], 174).

81 *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR*, 6.

82 *Ibid.*, 5-19.

83 *Ibid.*, 5-8.

84 "A map of unrest in the USSR."

85 On average, in 1989 31.7 percent of the population of the ethnic republics belonged to non-titular ethnic groups (*Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR*, 5-19).

86 *Ibid.*, 156.

87 *Ibid.*, 5-8.

88 In 1989, outside their titular republics also lived 6.8 million Ukrainians (15 percent of the Ukrainian nation), 2.6 million Uzbeks (15 percent), 2.1 million Belorussians (21 percent), 1.6 million Kazakhs (20 percent), and 1.5 million Armenians (33 percent)(see table 8). More than six million people did not have their titular ethnic states or autonomous formations in the former USSR territory (*Ibid.*, 156).

89 *Ibid.*, 9-11.

90 L. Semenchuk, "Poistine odna sem'ia," *Pravda*, 24 February 1991, 3. In general, during the Soviet period, the share of the ethnically mixed marriages had a tendency to increase: in 1959, for example, to this category belonged 10.2 percent of all marriages in the USSR, and in 1979, 14.9 percent (Yu. V. Arutiunian and Yu. V. Bromlei, eds., *Sotsial'no-kul'turnyi oblik sovetskikh natsii* [Moscow: Nauka, 1986], 153). Meanwhile, there existed serious inter-ethnic and inter-confessional differences in the frequency of the mixed marriages, which were more typical for the European population, especially Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. In 1988, 16 percent of the Russian men and 17.2 percent of the Russian women were married to the persons of a different nationality. For Ukrainians, these figures were even higher—respectively, 33.4 percent and 33.5 percent; and for Belorussians, 38.6 percent and 38.1 percent. At the same time, for the Moslem Uzbeks the respective figures were 6.6 percent and 5.0 percent; and for Kazakhs (living in an especially ethnically heterogeneous environment), 7.5 percent and 7.2 percent (*Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1989 gody: statisticheskii ezhegodnik* [Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1990], 35). The shares of the mixed marriages even declined during the 1970s in three Moslem republics: Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. In general, mixed marriages were more typical for the Europeans and Christians, and were especially rare between Christians and Moslems (Arutiunian and Bromlei, *Sotsial'no-kul'turnyi oblik sovetskikh natsii*, 153).

91 It is necessary to mention here the existence of variations in views on the position of Russians. Some analysts claim that the formal "leading" status of that nation did not correspond to reality and did not provide adequate benefits to its members. In the opinion of Roman Szporluk, the particularly difficult situation of Russians in the post-dissolution period originates in the fact that "They were used to being 'the leading nation' in the USSR, but they were also an object of manipulation and a victim of political manipulation—their identity made and remade by the party" and remaining poorly defined even at present (Szporluk, "Statehood and Nation Building in Post-Soviet Space," 7). Brubaker also states that to describe Russians as the "ruling nationality" of the USSR is misleading. While Russians indeed "were a favored nationality in certain respects, and they were clearly a *Staatsvolk*, the state-bearing nationality, of the Soviet Union,...they were not a ruling nationality in the same sense" as those of the major European multinational empires (Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 172).

92 Monty G. Marshall, "States at Risk: Ethnopolitics in the Multinational States of Eastern Europe," in Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 205-6, 209.

93 *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR*, 9-11.

94 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1996*, 156; Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 140.

95 Some of the countries in this category, while declaring the language of the titular nation as the state one, also provided Russian language with the status of the language of international intercourse as a compromise measure, designed to simplify the accommodation of the Russian-speaking minorities.

96 The same was done by many other NIS, for example, by the Baltic states. The difference, meanwhile, is that officially, Kazakhstan usually emphasizes its multi-ethnic character. Among other constitutional features of the countries of that category, frequent are the requirements for the presidential candidates of perfect command of the native language (Kazakhstan) and the prohibition of the ethnically or religiously based political parties (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan). On the other extreme, the 2002 RF Citizenship Law withdrew most of the privileges from the ethnic Russians, the members of other Russian indigenous ethnic groups, or the former USSR citizens applying for the Russian citizenship.

97 60.3 percent of the population in 1989, of whom only 1.5 percent (148,000) were at that time fluent in Kazakh language (*Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR*, 102-3).

98 Even among ethnic Kazakhs, 1.2 percent in 1989 were not fluent in Kazakh, while 1.4 percent considered Russian as their native language. In Ukraine, 98.4 percent of Russians and 12.2 percent of Ukrainians considered Russian as their native language. For Ukrainian, the respective figures were 1.6 percent and 87.7 percent (*Ibid.*, 78-9).

99 Elena Sadovskaia, "Migratsionnye protsessy i migratsionnaia politika v Kazakhstane," in Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, ed., *Migratsionnaia situatsiia v SNG* (Moscow: Tsentr izucheniia vynuzhdennoi migratsii v SNG, 1999), 124.

100 "Perevod deloproizvodstva na kazakhskii yazyk," *Demoscope* 1, no. 47-8 (17-30 December 2002), http://www.demoscope.ru.

101 Anatolii Topilin, "Strany Sodruzhestva stanoviatsia vsye bolee monoetnichnymi," *Demoscope* 2, no. 63-4 (15-28 April 2002), http://www.demoscope.ru.

102 "The Constitution of Lithuania of 25 October 1992," in Peter Raina, ed., *The Constitutions of New Democracies in Europe* (Cambridge, England: Merlin Books, 1995), 147-8.

103 *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR*, 124.

104 Mikhail Tul'skii and Uldis Ushatskis, "Itogi perepisi naseleniia Latvii," *Demoscope* 1, no. 33-4 (10-23 September 2001), http://www.demoscope.ru. The Latvian legislation also bans from seeking an elective office any Latvian citizen who is or was affiliated with the Soviet or other military or security organizations ("The Constitution of Latvia of 15 February 1922." Annex 1: "Law on Elections of the Fifth Saeima," in Raina, *The Constitutions of New Democracies*, xvi, 133).

105 While the share of citizens among Latvians was in 2000 99.6 percent, for Russians this figure was 42 percent, for Jews, 54.2 percent, for Ukrainians, 29.1 percent, and for Belorussians, 22.4 percent (Tul'skii and Ushatskis, "Itogi perepisi naseleniia Latvii"). Meanwhile, even in 2002,

Russians accounted for 43.5 percent of the population of Latvia's capital, Riga, while the share of Latvians was 41.5 percent (compared to respectively 47.3 percent and 36.5 percent in 1989)(*Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR*, 124., "V Rige russkikh do sikh por bol'she, chem latyshei," *Demoscope* 2, no. 91-2 (2-15 December 2002), http://www.demoscope.ru).

106 *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR*, 140. In both countries, present is also a clear division of population into the ethnically dominated rural areas and the mixed or dominated by the Russian-speakers major urban centers. In 1989 in Estonia, for instance, the share of Estonians in the urban population was 51.2 percent compared to the Russian-speakers' 48.8 percent while in the rural areas these shares were respectively 87.4 percent and 12.6 percent (Mettam and Williams, "A Colonial Perspective," 141).

107 Mikhail Tul'skii, "Podvedeny itogi perepisi naseleniia Estonii," *Demoscope* 1, no. 33-4 (10-23 September 2001), http://www.demoscope.ru.

108 *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR*, 140., Mettam and Williams, "A Colonial Perspective," 144.

109 Mikhail Tul'skii, "Podvedeny itogi perepisi naseleniia Estonii."

110 "The Constitution of Estonia of 28 June 1992," in Raina, *The Constitutions of New Democracies*, 53-6. It should be noted, though, that Estonia recognizes some rights of the ethnic communities, including the right to have their own educational institutions and to choose the language of instruction and the right to use their native languages for internal communication with the governmental authorities in those localities where the majority of permanent population is non-Estonian. The electoral legislation also permits voting of non-citizen permanent residents in the local elections (though simultaneously prohibits them from holding an office)("The Constitution of Estonia of 28 June 1992," 54-56, 76, 80-1). The Constitution of Lithuania also emphasizes that "ethnic communities of citizens shall independently administer the affairs of their ethnic culture, education, organizations, charity, and mutual assistance. The State shall support ethnic communities" ("The Constitution of Lithuania of 25 October 1992," in Raina, *The Constitutions of New Democracies*, 148).

111 In Roeder's opinion, such systems, "accountable to a restrictive selectorate,...resemble, but fall short of, democracy to the extent that they exclude parts of the adult population from the selectorate." While the governing elites of such states solicit popular support of "their" population groups, "they seek to establish or maintain their advantage in politics...against leaders of other segments of the adult population...A stable exclusive republic may depend on successfully anathemizing the excluded population so that no participants will want to ally with them." Roeder lists two different political approaches, existing in the FSU: barring the parties representing the former Soviet pro-center elites from the political process under the pretext of their potentially subversive or anti national character, or disfranchising particular population groups (including the ethnic ones), likely to back such parties (Roeder, "Authoritarian Regimes," 63, 68, 84-7). Juan J. Linz also wrote previously about the plausibility of the "paradox of democracy combined with racial domination" and characterized the regimes of this type as "racial democracies" (Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in F. I. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds., *Macropolitical Theory* [Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Westley Publishing Company, 1975, vol. 3], 179).

112 Pal Kolsto, "Is Kazakhstan being Kazakhified?" *Analysis of Current Events* 9 (November 1997): 4.

113 Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1953), 90. Eduard Ponarin also emphasizes "the forbidding attitude" of the native Baltic populations, "which hardly favours such assimilation" (Eduard Ponarin, "The Prospects of Assimilation of the Russophone Populations in Estonia and Ukraine: A Reaction to David Laitin's Research," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52 [December 2000]: 1535).

114 Mettam and Williams, "A Colonial Perspective," 147.

115 During 1995-2002, in Latvia, for instance, naturalized were 59 thousand residents. Of those, Russians comprised 69 percent; Belorussians, 10 percent; and Ukrainians, 8 percent ("Latviiskoe grazhdanstvo v poriadke naturalizatsii poluchili 59 tysiach chelovek," *Demoscope* 3, no. 95-6 [1-19 January 2003], http://www.demoscope.ru).

116 Kolsto, "Is Kazakhstan being Kazakhified?" 3. The March 1994 elections to the Kazakh legislature also resulted in ethnic Kazakhs, accounting for 41 percent of the electorate, acquiring 60 percent of the parliamentary seats, while the shares of Russians and other minorities were respectively 27.8 percent and 12.2 percent (S. S. Savoskul, ed., *Russkie v novom zarubezh'e: migratsionnaia situatsia, pereselenie i adaptatsiia v Rossii* [Moscow: Institut etnologii i antropologii RAN, 1997], 169).

117 V. Kurganskaia, "Kazakhstn: Yazykovaia problema v kontekste mezhetnicheskikh otnoshenii," *Tsentral'naia Aziia i Kavkaz* 6 (May 1999): 25.

118 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 152. Among those Russians who contacted the Russian Embassy in Tashkent in 1994, expressing their desire to emigrate to Russia, 38 percent comprised engineers, technologists, technicians, and programmers; 17 percent, highly-qualified industrial workers; and 28 percent, educators and professionals. Forty percent had university diplomas (Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossi 1996*, 139-40).

119 Colin G. Pooley and Ian D. Whyte, "Introduction: Approaches to the Study of Migration and Social Change," in Colin G. Pooley and Ian D. Whyte, eds., *Migrants, Emigrants, and Immigrants: A Social History of Migration* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 1, 13.

120 *Ibid.*, 13.

121 Migration flows, meanwhile, are not only a criterion, but also a factor of political life: the outflow and inflow of migrants influence the transitional processes in the NIS and their socioeconomic and political stability, changing the population ethnic, demographic, and employment structures and affecting the functioning of social welfare mechanisms of particular countries and regions.

122 In Russia in 1997, more than 40 percent of economically active migrants having Russian citizenship could not find jobs corresponding to their professional qualifications, while 23 percent were engaged in non-qualified jobs. Eighteen percent could not find any job. The level of

unemployment among migrants with university diplomas was twice the average in the Russian Federation (Vitkovskaya and Panarin, *Migratsiia i bezopasnost' v Rossii*, 99).

123 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 125.

124 *Informatsionno-analiticheskii biulleten'* 1 (1997): 34, 61.

125 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 127.

126 A. G. Vishnevskii, ed., *Naselenie Rossii 2000: Vos'moi ezhegodnyi demograficheskii doklad* (Moscow: Tsentr demografii i ekologii cheloveka, Institut narodnokhoziaistvennogo prognozirovaniia RAN, 2001), 109.

127 *Informatsionno-analiticheskii biulleten'*, 34.

128 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 125. According to Vladimir Mukomel', net migration to the RF amounted to 3.8 million during 1991-2000 (Vladimir Mukomel', "Migratsionnyi potentsial i perspektivy immigratsii sootechestvennikov iz gosudarstv SNG i Baltii," *Etnopanorama* no. 3 [2001]: 47).

129 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 125.

130 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 2000*, 109.

131 *Informatsionno-analiticheskii biulleten'*, 34.

132 Migration to Russia from Estonia declined drastically in recent years, 29 times in 2000 as compared with 1992-1993; from Lithuania, 20 times; and from Kyrgyzstan, 9 times (Mukomel', "Migratsionnyi potentsial," 47, 51).

133 "Migratsiia sokrashchaetsia povsemestno," *Demoscope* 3, no. 95-6 (1-19 January 2003), http://www.demoscope.ru.

134 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 130.

135 *Ibid.*, 134, 136.

136 In 1994-1998, 23.7 percent of immigrants to the Russian Federation belonged to other NIS titular nations (*Ibid.*, 132).

137 Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, "Russkii vopros," *Migratsiia* 1 (1996): 7, 9.

138 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 137., Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 2000*, 110.

139 According to the speaker of the State Duma (Russian parliament) Gennady Seleznyev, only about 20 percent of the immigrants received any kind of state assistance in the Russian Federation (Gennadi Seleznyev, "Pereselentsam i bezhentsam—gosudarstvennuiu zabotu," *Migratsiia v Rossii* 1 [October-November 1999]: 6).

140 *Predpolozhitel'naia chislennost' naseleniia RF do 2016 g.: Statisticheskii biulleten'* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi komitet Rossiiskoi Federatsii po statistike, 2001), 146. An average (moderate) version of the forecast.

141 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 146; "O migratsionnoi situatsii v strane," *Statisticheskii biulleten'* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi komitet Rossiiskoi Federatsii po statistike, August 1998), no. 6, 82-87.

142 In 1997, Russia started losing Belorussians to Belarus and Lithuanians, to Lithuania (Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, "SNG cherez prizmu migratsii," *Migratsiia* 3 [June-December 1998]: 7). In 1998, Belarus also acquired a positive balance in exchanges with Russia of Russians and Ukrainians. Russia also started to lose Estonians to Estonia (Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 133).

143 Timothy Heleniak, "Going Home: Migration Among the Soviet Successor States," *Analysis of Current Events* 9 (June 1997): 5.

144 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 2000*, 111.

145 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1996*, 146-7.

146 At the same time, new political and economic factors influence the development of migration flows. In 1995, for example, the ethnic Russian immigration to Russia decreased by 37 percent (while the overall immigration of other ethnic groups decreased by 25 percent)—the phenomenon that Russian analysts directly link to the beginning of the First Chechen War and the desire of many young men to avoid the compulsory military conscription (Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1996*, 145-7; Zayonchkovskaya, "Recent Migration Trends," 349). In 1998, the year of deep financial crisis, net migration inflow to Russia also decreased by 17 percent (Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 130).

147 Zayonchkovskaya, "SNG cherez prizmu repatriatsii," 7.

148 In Russia, the share of ethnic Russians has decreased from 81.53 percent in 1989 to 80.58 percent in 1999 (Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 34).

149 Using the definition approved by the United Nations in 1967, a *refugee* is "any person...[located] outside the country of his nationality...because he has or had well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion and is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the government of the country of his nationality [here, citizenship]" (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, *The Refugee in International Law* [Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1983], 5-6). Post-dissolution Russian legislation distinguishes among *refugees*, forced to cross the international border and lacking citizenship of the receiving country; *forced migrants*, compelled to cross the international border and having citizenship of the receiving country; and *displaced persons*, who were forced to move inside the borders of their country (Vladimir Mukomel', "Vynuzhdennaia migratsiia v SNG," *Migratsiia* 2 [January-March 1997]: 7). The introduction of the last category was required by Russia's situation as an ethnically based federation, in which some of its citizens

and legal residents were forced by circumstances to move within the borders of the Russian Federation, but between its federal units.

150 Galina Vitkovskaya, "Forced migrants," *Moscow News,* no. 11, March 1992, 11.

151 Zayonchkovskaya, "Recent Migration Trends," 350. In 1997, Russians represented 64 percent of refugees and forced migrants residing in the Russian territory (Zayonchkovskaya, "SNG cherez prizmu repatriatsii," 9). Some authors give much higher estimates of the number of refugees in the Russian Federation—about 2.5 million and even close to 4 million. See, for instance, Galina Zabelina, "Regional'nye konflikty i migratsiia naseleniia," in Igor' Ushkalov, ed., *Migratsionnye protsessy v transformiruemom obshchestve* (Moscow: AO "Epikon," 1997), 112-3; and B. S. Khorev, ed., *Noveishie izmeneniia vo vnutrennei i vneshnei migratsii naseleniia v Rossii i ikh ekonomicheskoe znachenie* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1994), 63.

152 The number of refugees and forced migrants in the FSU declined from 2.6 million in the beginning of 1998 to 1.8 million at the end of 2000 (Mukomel', "Vynuzhdennye migratsii," 6, 36).

153 *Informatsionno-analiticheskii biulleten'*, 35-6, "O migratsionnoi situatsii v strane," no. 6, 86.

154 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 149.

155 "Obsuzhdaem 'Kontseptsiiu," 21.

156 "O migratsionnoi situatsii v strane," no. 6, 86.

157 *Informatsionno-analiticheskii biulleten'*, 35-36.

158 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 151-52.

159 *Informatsionno-analiticheskii biulleten'*, 35-36.

160 "Polmilliona inostrannykh grazhdan nezakonno nakhodiatsia v Rossii," *Izvestiia*, 29 December 1993, 1.

161 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1996*, 148.

162 Igor' Ushkalov and Irina Malakha, "Regional'nye krizisy i konflikty kak factor migratsii naseleniia," in Igor' Ushkalov, ed., *Migratsionnye protsessy v transformiruemom obshchestve* (Moscow: AO "Epikon," 1997), 93.

163 One Russian source estimates the potential Russian migration at approximately 4 million, of which Russia can absorb about 3 to 3.5 million, and Ukraine and Belarus—most of the others (Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 138). In the opinion of Vladimir Mukomel', the overall migration potential of the NIS population is 7.5 million, of whom 5.2 million are interested in migrating to Russia. Of those, 3.0 million are Russians and members of other Russia's titular groups (Mukomel', "Migratsionnyi potentsial," 50).

164 Ol'ga Vorob'eva, "Natsional'nyi sostav vynuzhdennykh pereselentsev i bezhentsev v Rossii v 1992-1995g.g." *Migratsiia* 1 (1996): 39.

165 Elena Mishina and Ol'ga Skorobogat'ko, "Vynuzhdennaia migratsiia v tsifrakh," *Migratsiia* 2 (January-March 1997): 35.

166 *Ibid.*

167 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 152.

168 *Ibid.*, 134. It is interesting to note that about 20 percent of the leaving NIS Russians settled in Ukraine and Belarus (Zayonchkovskaya, "SNG cherez prizmu repatriatsii," 9).

169 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 132.

170 *Ibid.*, 132, 134.

171 Heleniak, "Going Home," 4-5.

172 Russian source estimates that out of approximately two million Russians still remaining in Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, up to 1.5 million can potentially emigrate from the region (Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 137-8).

173 In general, regardless of the policies of particular governments, the Islamic regions of Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Russia (especially Chechnia, Daghestan, and Ingushetia) generate the most intensive Russian emigration—more than 80 percent. During 1991-1995, Tajikistan alone left more than 250,000 Russians (Zabelina, "Regional'nye konflikty," 113-4). At present, no more than 100,000 Russians remain in Tajikistan, and about 300,000, in the Transcaucasus (Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999*, 137).

174 By 1996, approximately ¼ of the permanently residing in Estonia Russians acquired that country's citizenship. In Latvia in 1999, 42 percent of that country's Russians were Latvian citizens (S. S. Savoskul, *Russkie novogo zarubezh'ia: vybor sud'by* [Moscow: Nauka, 2001], 252-3).

175 In 1993-1998, emigration from Russia outside the post-Soviet area amounted to 531.5 thousand (Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999,* 140).

176 During 1986-1997 alone, the number of people employed by the Russian research organizations decreased 2.4 times: from 3.4 million to 1.4 million (Nikolai Sautin, "Udivliat' mir luchshe v Rossii," *Migratsia v Rossii* 2 [February 2000]: 13). By 1999, only a quarter of 240,000 people having doctoral or master's degrees, worked in their professions (Sergei Smorodkin, "U poslednei cherty," *Migratsiia v Rossii* 1 [October-November 1999]: 31).

177 Ol'ga Vorob'yeva, "Trud i migratsia: transformatiia zaniatosti naseleniia i migrationnykh protsesov v Rossii v 90-kh godakh," *Migratsiia v Rossii* 2 (December 2000): 47. This aspect of the modern migration flows is important for the majority of the post-Soviet states: most of them, with the exception of Azerbaijan and four states of Central Asia, are currently losing population. As a

result of the unfavorable demographic trends and out-migration, during 1991-2001, the CIS as a whole has lost 1.6 million, or .6 percent of its population (Anatolii Topilin, "Demograficheskaia situatsiia v stranakh SNG," *Demoscope* 2, no. 63-4 [15-28 April 2002], http://www.demoscope.ru). The situation in the Baltic states is even more extreme: the annual population loss in Latvia is .6 percent, and in Estonia, 1.1 percent—the highest figure in the world ("Estonia—samaia bystro vymiraiushchaiaia strana mira," *Demoscope* 2, no. 91-2 [2-15 December 2002), http://www.demoscope.ru).

178 Unfortunately, even immigration is losing its ability to compensate for the huge demographic losses that Russia is currently facing: the compensation ratio declined to 17 percent in 1999; 22 percent, in 2000; and 7.7 percent, in 2001 ("Na postsovetskom prostranstve sformirovalis' poliusa 'pritiazheniia' i 'vytalkivaniia," *Demoscope* 2, no. 51-2 [21 January-3 February 2002], http://www.demoscope.ru., "Migratsiia sokrashchaetsia povsemestno"). In the first half of 2003, the compensation ratio was just 4.7 percent ("Chislennost' naseleniia Rossii – 144,5 milliona chelovek" (*Demoscope* 3, no. 123-4 [25 August – 7 September 2003], http://www.demoscope.ru).

179 Vitkovskaya and Panarin, *Migratsiia i bezopasnost' v Rossii*, 128.

180 Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999,* 131.

181 Characteristic in this sense is the newly-revised in 2000 Russian National Security Concept, considering "uncontrollable migration" as one of the factors promoting "the strengthening of nationalism, political and religious extremism, ethnoseparatism and creat[ing] conditions for the emergence of conflicts" (Cited from: Vitkovskaya and Panarin, *Migratsiia i bezopasnost' v Rossii*, 49).

182 After the abolishment of the Federal Migration Service in May, 2000, dealing with the issue of migrations is one of subdivisions of the RF Interior Ministry.

183 Valerii Brovkin, "FMS Rossii: itogi 1999," *Migratsiia v Rossii* 2 (April-May 2000): 7.

184 According to Vladimir Nikitin, Chair of the Duma's Subcommittee on the Ties with Compatriots and Migration Policy, in 2000, Russian migration policies were guided by thirteen federal laws, seven Presidential decrees, fifty-six governmental orders and numerous other acts, frequently contradicting one another and in some cases, violating the RF international obligations (Vladimir Nikitin, "Pereselencheskaia obshchina na pravovom pole," *Migratsiia v Rossii* 2 [April-May 2000]: 12). Nikitin also notes that the governmental commission on migration policies was sequentially chaired by five different deputy prime-ministers, met only once, and was dissolved two years after its creation ("'Kruglyi stol' v Gosdume RF: Problemy migratsionnoi politiki v sovemennoi Rossii," *Migratsiia v Rossii* 2 [December 2000]: 8).

185 At the same time, the loss of the ethnic, racial, religious and cultural heterogeneity, resulting from the large-scale emigration and initially perceived as achievement by the nationalistic leaders, in the long run can by itself become a serious problem, stimulating non-democratic, exclusive tendencies in the states' political and cultural development.

186 According to Vladimir Mukomel', expenses required for settling one million immigrants in the Russian territory exceed the annual RF budgetary expenditures on education, health care, fundamental research, culture and the arts (Mukomel', "Migratsionnyi potentsial," 51).

187 In 1998 in Moscow, for instance, migrants accounted for 26.8 percent of all registered crimes and were involved in 35.2 percent of crimes involving dealing drugs (Vitkovskaya and Panarin, *Migratsiia i bezopasnost' v Rossii*, 283, 296).

188 Russian governmental sources claim between 700,000 and 1.5 million illegal immigrants from approximately sixty states in the Russian territory (Vladimir Volokh, "Nezakonnaia immigratsia: prichiny i sledstviia," *Migratsiia v Rossii* 2 [January 2000]: 35).

189 The Armenian massacres in Baku and Sumgait (Azerbaijan) in 1990 illustrate the destabilizing impact of the arrival of large numbers of the fellow ethnic immigrants and refugees (in this particular case—Azerbaijanis expelled from the Nagornyi Karabakh district) on inter-ethnic relations and political situation in general.

190 It seems that the NIS' state agencies, political movements, and the mass media share responsibility for creating negative stereotypes of migrants (including those of "persons of Caucasian nationality" and the "Chinese threat") and emphasizing primarily the negative, crime-related aspects of immigration. In 1999, the then head of the Russian Federal Migration Service has even proclaimed that "population migration represents the most significant and important challenge to the very existence of the Russian state" (Vladimir Kalamanov, "Rossiia bol'she ne mozhet zhdat'..." *Migratsiia v Rossii* 1 [October-November 1999]: 10). For a discussion of this problem, see Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, ed., *Migratsiia i informatsiia* (Moscow: Tsentr izucheniia problem vynuzhdennoi migratsii v SNG, 2000).

191 For the CIS in general, the annual external emigration amounted to approximately 300,000 in 1991-1995, and 200,000-250,000 in 1996-1997. In 1997, 42 percent of emigrants from the CIS went to Germany; 19 percent, to Israel; and 12 percent, to the US (Zayonchkovskaya, "SNG cherez prizmu repatriatsii," 7). The annual emigration from Russia, after slightly exceeding 100 thousand people in the first half of the 1990s, declined to 85.3 thousand in 1999. In 1999, 48.8 percent of the Russian emigrants went to Germany; 33.5 percent, to Israel; and 10.2 percent, to the USA (Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 1999,* 139-40., Vishnevskii, *Naselenie Rossii 2000*, 114-5) (see table 15).

192 During the 1990s, between 70 and 80 percent of the world-class Russian mathematicians and about 50 percent, physicists-theorists left for the West (Sautin, "Udivliat' mir," 13). Among the immigrants from Russia, 23.2 percent have university diplomas; another 24.2 percent studied at a university or have a two-year college degree (E. S. Krasinets, *Mezhdunarodnaia migratsiia naseleniia Rossii v usloviiakh perekhoda k rynku* [Moscow: Nauka, 1997]: 13). People with university diplomas or some university education account for 60 percent of the Russian immigrants to Australia; 59 percent, to Canada; 48 percent, to the US; and 32.5 percent, to Israel (Vitkovskaya and Panarin, *Migratsiia i bezopasnost' v Rossii*, 128).

193 The development of the independent from the state minority and migrant organizations represents an important aspect of this social and political evolution. At present, more than 4,000 migrant organizations function in Russia, although most of them remain weak and lacking proper

legal base (Vladimir Kalamanov, "Nasha novaia strategiia," *Migratsiia v Rossii* 1 [October-November 1999]: 4).

194 Public opinion surveys conducted in the NIS by Sergei Savoskul indicate that Russian-speaking minorities increasingly give preference to employment in the private sector as less subject to governmental discrimination and regulations in many spheres, including language and cultural policies (Savoskul, *Russkie novogo zarubezh'ia: vybor sud'by*, 106, 225).

195 Bunce, "Should Transitologists Be Grounded," 119-21.

196 An important stepping stone in this process represents the decision to admit three Baltic States into NATO and the European Union.

197 For the discussion of the evolution of the international cooperation in the field of post-Soviet migrations, see: Vladimir Mukomel', "Vynuzhdennye migratsii v kontekste migratsionnykh protsesov i migratsionnoi politiki stran SNG: etapy razvitiia," in *Vynuzhdennaia migratsiia* (Moscow: MAKC Press, 2001), vol. 6.

198 In March 2002, the highest average monthly salary in the CIS was in Russia, $134. In Ukraine it was $52, while in Tajikistan, just $10.6 ("Zarplata v stranakh SNG," *Demoscope* 2, no. 77-78 [26 August-8 September 2002], http://www.demoscope.ru). Taking the CIS average as 100, the highest GDP per capita was in Russia and Belarus, 134. In Ukraine, it was sixty-three, while in Tajikistan, just nineteen ("Sokhraniaiutsia bol'shie ekonomicheskie razlichiia mezhdu stranami," *Demoscope* 2, no. 61-2 [1-14 April 2002], http://www.demoscope.ru).

199 The achievement of this goal can require the development of a wide spectrum of institutions, aimed at accommodating the minority interests. Linz and Stepan, for instance, write that "in a multinational setting, the chances to consolidate democracy are increased by state policies that grant inclusive and equal citizenship... [and] explore a variety of nonmajoritarian, plebiscitarian formulas..." Along with federalism, such potential forms of minority accommodation can involve "a variety of publicly supported communal institutions, such as media and schools in different languages, symbolic recognition of cultural diversity, a variety of legally accepted marriage codes, legal and political tolerance for parties representing different communities..." (Linz and Stepan, *Democratic Transition*, 33-4).

200 2001 data.

201 2000 data.

202 2001 data.

203 2000 data.

204 1995 data.

205 1995 data.

206 2000 data.

207 2000 data.

208 2002 data.

209 2000 data.

210 2000 data.

211 The 1989-1998 figures are based on the data of the Russian State Committee on Statistics, referring to those Russian citizens who officially abandoned their housing registration (*propiska*) in Russia. The 1999 figures are based on the potential emigrants' requests for exit permits, submitted to the Ministry of the Interior.