The Rise and Fall of “the Extraordinary Measures,” January–June, 1928: Toward a Reexamination of the Onset of the Stalin Revolution

Roberta T. Manning
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"The extraordinary measures" is a phrase frequently encountered in scholarly literature to describe the onset of mandatory grain procurements in the USSR at the end of 1927 and the first tentative steps toward the collectivization of agriculture. Newly declassified archival materials, however, indicate that the extraordinary measures entailed more than a change in economic policy. Rather, contemporaries applied this label to the first of a series of mass police operations, that is, mass arrest campaigns undertaken by OGPU, the Soviet political police, against the countryside in the prewar years. The extraordinary measures thus heralded the onset of Stalin's Terror.

The adoption of such policies followed hard on the heels of the 1927 war scare, the defeat of the Left Opposition within the Communist Party, and a growing economic crisis that threatened to undermine the political stability of the Soviet state. Efforts to address this crisis by abandoning the market economy of the NEP and using political repression to obtain food supplies for the urban population provoked considerable resistance within society and among the officials of the Soviet party-state. Opposition among officials to such policies went considerably beyond the Party Right and at times involved key Stalinists. In the course of this political conflict, party moderates occasionally proved victorious, and Stalin paradoxically did not always get his way, at least in the short run. Even more surprisingly, key leaders of the Party Right, it turns out, advocated mass arrests of "grain speculators" even before Stalin did, although rightist leaders were soon horrified by the indiscriminate arrests and violations of human rights that then ensued. In any case, the Party Right seems to have parted ways with Stalin initially not so much over economic policy, as we have hitherto assumed. Rather, they came to oppose Stalin's economic policies out of opposition to the repression that this new course seemed increasingly to require.

The grain procurement campaigns also set off a major wave of peasant disorders in the USSR. Even in 1928–29, rural unrest matched if not exceeded in volume and intensity the agrarian rebellions of the 1905 Revolution. The national OGPU reported 2,581 incidents of peasant unrest of all sorts—mass disorders, arson, acts of terrorism, political leafleting, and illegal meetings—in 1928 and 12,763 such incidents in 1929, compared to 3,228 in 1905 and 2,600 in 1906, according to the tsarist Department of Police. To be sure, these initial revolts were far overshadowed by the massive upsurge of rebellions in the opening months of 1930, described so well in the works of Lynne Viola. In 1930, 13,754 mass disorders and 13,794 terrorist acts occurred in the Soviet countryside, mostly in the first five months of the year, as millions of peasants rose up against forced collectivization and dekulakization.

While peasant rebellions shook the Soviet countryside for three years, a
persistent, behind-the-scenes struggle unfolded among the nation’s leaders over the ever-growing volume of repression. In 1928, forces seeking to limit repression included not only the Party Right but also leaders of the Soviet judiciary, the party faction in the Presidium of the All-Union Central Soviet Executive Committee (VTsIK), and at times a majority of the Communist Party Central Committee as well. These conflicts remained largely unknown to historians, before the opening of Stalin era archives. The political struggles of 1927–28 and the complex interrelationship between the conflicts at the base and apex of Soviet society cast new light on the onset of the Stalin (or Cultural) Revolution and the political defeat of Stalin’s one-time allies and erstwhile opponents, the Right Opposition within the Communist Party.

The 1927–28 procurements campaign and the rise and fall of the extraordinary measures are examined here on the basis of newly available party, state, and OGPU documents, in an attempt to understand the conditions under which the Stalinist police state emerged, its functioning at this early stage of its development, and the resistance within the Communist Party leadership and Soviet society to such methods of government, which was much, much greater than the better known and often studied German resistance to Hitler.

The Grain Crisis

The grain collection crises of 1927–29 were more of a genuine subsistence crisis than scholars have hitherto realized. The Soviet countryside failed two years in succession to relinquish enough grain to meet the nation’s basic domestic needs, estimated in April 1928 to amount to 685 million puds. But only 627.1 million puds of grain were collected from the 1927 harvest and 570.8 million from the somewhat greater 1928 harvest, as table 1 demonstrates.

The government responded by imposing compulsory grain procurements, which increasingly resembled outright requisitioning, that is, compulsory “sales” at state-established prices well below market prices. Crop failures in the main grain-producing regions, Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus, which normally produced two-thirds of the grain marketed in the USSR under the NEP, accounted for the shortfall. The government had little recourse but to try to make up the deficit by seeking grain further afield in Siberia and the Urals, which experienced record harvests in 1927 and 1928. These remote areas, however, possessed only rudimentary procurement organizations, transportation, and milling and storage facilities. Grain could be extracted here only with considerable effort and delays. The documents of this period describe the food situation as “tense,” “difficult,” or “very tense” with good cause, since Soviet authorities at times had on hand
little more than six weeks' supply of provisions for the major industrial centers and the Red Army. Under these conditions, little or nothing remained from the 1927 and 1928 crops to export in exchange for the massive machine imports required by the First Five-Year Plan, which officially went into effect at the end of 1927. By 1929, it was clear that repeated grain crises imperiled Soviet industrialization and the Five-Year Plan.

Table 1. Soviet Domestic Grain Needs, Grain Harvests, Procurements, and Exports, 1925–1929, in puds
(one pud=36 English pounds)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harvest year</th>
<th>Harvest (billion puds)</th>
<th>Procurements (million puds)</th>
<th>% of Food Grain Procured</th>
<th>Net Grain Exports (million puds)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>515</td>
<td></td>
<td>147.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>661.8</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>185.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>627.1</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>570.8</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>14.6 (imported)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>986.7</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1928 domestic grain needs, estimated by Mikoian: 685 million puds
1929 domestic grain needs, estimated by Stalin: 500 million puds


The methods by which the government procured grain varied over time, depending upon the amount of food in government hands, policy conflicts among Soviet leaders, and passive and overt peasant resistance, including revolts and attacks on officials. Hitherto scholars generally believed that Soviet leaders did not face up to the dismal food situation until the end of 1927 or even the beginning of 1928, when reports of faltering procurements first appeared in the press. Months before then, however, growing shortages were candidly discussed in classified
documents and communications of the government and party. Already by September 1927, OGPU reports on the countryside noted peasants reluctance to market grain. The agency attributed the situation to a number of factors—growing concern for recently planted winter crops, the industrial goods famine that was exacerbated by hoarding in the wake of the recent war scare, and peasants’ hopes that state-established grain prices, which had recently been lowered, would subsequently rise. OGPU reports also noted growing numbers of fights among peasants over land, always a sign of hard times, and large-scale food riots in Uzbekistan, where crowds of hungry peasants besieged the towns, demanding bread and looting storehouses.

The Response of Soviet Leaders

On October 3, 1927, A. I. Mikoian, deputy member of the Communist Party Politburo and head of the Commissariat of Internal Trade, raised the issue of faltering procurements. He suggested that planned grain exports be reduced from 195 million puds to 90 million, a level that was subsequently cut back even further, to 19.8 million puds. Efforts were made to revise the First Five-Year Plan to take into account the possibility of bad harvests, a contingency not considered earlier. Stalin and Foreign Minister Chicherin pushed once again unsuccessfully for the relaxation of the state monopoly of foreign trade, in hopes of eliciting foreign loans that would alleviate the need for grain exports.

Other Politburo members responded to the problem by espousing a crackdown on private trade, which they held responsible for the shortfall in procurements. On October 12, Nikolai Bukharin called for a “reinforced offensive against capitalist elements and, first of all, the kulak” in a speech to a Moscow provincial trade-union conference, reported in Pravda. The new “offensive” also figured prominently in Molotov’s report on the countryside to the Communist Party Central Committee Plenum of October 21–23, 1927. Such policies were endorsed by the plenum, after an acrimonious exchange of opinions with Left Opposition spokesmen, who criticized the growing bread lines and demanded a forced grain loan of 150–200 million puds from the wealthiest 10 percent of peasant households. The party leadership’s crackdown on “capitalist elements” may well have been prompted not only by current economic difficulties but also by the need to blunt opposition criticism and undercut the left’s appeal by stealing some of its thunder at a critical point in the political struggle within the party. After all, the Left Opposition had long predicted a “kulak grain strike,” aimed at overthrowing the Soviet regime, and advocated curbs on kulaks. In any case, the October 1927 Central Committee Plenum decided to expel opposition leaders,
Trotsky and Zinov’ev, from the Central Committee for factionalism, after Trotsky expressed doubts that the party leadership had really altered its course.\(^\text{18}\)

Shortly after the plenum, the Soviet cabinet, the Council of Peoples’ Commissars (Sovnarkom) drafted a top-secret decree in line with Bukharin’s and Molotov’s proposals. A draft of this decree circulated among Soviet officials under the name of the Sovnarkom chairman, Aleksei Ivanovich Rykov, generally considered a moderate and a political ally of Bukharin’s. This measure provided the basis for what was later known as “the extraordinary measures.” The draft decree authorized the Soviet political police, the OGPU, to arrest not only private traders (torglovtsy) who engaged in speculation or violated state procurement prices for food and industrial raw materials, but also Soviet officials who aided, abetted, or tolerated such activities. The OGPU was allowed to make such arrests “administratively,” outside regular judicial channels, without first securing permission from the prosecutor, as normally required under Soviet law.\(^\text{19}\)

The OGPU, characteristically, immediately petitioned the government to extend its powers even further. On October 29, Genrikh Yagoda, deputy head of the OGPU, wrote Soviet Premier Rykov, complaining that the courts were taking up to two to three months to process cases against speculators brought by his agency. “What is needed,” Yagoda argued, “is swift repression, which will have an immediate healthy effect on the market.” He urged Rykov to amend the decree and allow the OGPU not only to arrest but to sentence speculators administratively, outside the courts and judiciary.\(^\text{20}\) Yagoda’s request was granted several months later, when food supply problems reached crisis proportions.

**Stalin’s Resignation**

The draft decree to crack down on private trade was not immediately adopted, because the ever-elusive Stalin paradoxically opposed such policies, although he subsequently embraced repressive, extralegal measures more enthusiastically than anyone else. But in his political report to the Fifteenth Party Congress (December 2–19, 1927), Stalin said nothing about the “reinforced offensive against the kulak,” espoused by his Politburo colleagues and endorsed by the congress, and he criticized those comrades who think it is possible and necessary to put an end to the kulak through administrative measures, through the GPU: they say you just have to publish a decree and start. This would be easy but far from realistic. We have to deal with the kulak through economic policies and on the basis of Soviet legality. And Soviet legality is not an empty phrase. This does not exclude, however, the use of certain necessary administrative measures against
the kulak. But administrative measures should not supplant economic measures.21

Stalin somehow hesitated to become the historic Stalin. Even in the first flush of victory over his much detested rival Trotsky, now ousted from both the Central Committee and the party, Stalin startled his supporters by resigning for the third time in as many years from the post of general secretary (gensek). At the December 19, 1927, Central Committee Plenum, held in the wake of the party congress, Stalin not only raised the forbidden issue of Lenin’s long suppressed Testament, which called for his removal from his post, but he insisted, “Now it is time to heed Lenin’s instructions. I ask the plenum to liberate me from the post of Central Committee General Secretary. I assure you, Comrades, the party will only gain from this.”22 Truer words were probably never spoken. But each time that Stalin sought to resign, the future victims of his Terror rushed head-on like lemmings and insisted that he remain in this position. First Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinov’ev in 1925 and then Rykov two years later asked the Central Committee to reject Stalin’s proposal, and that assembly unanimously agreed. Did these doomed leaders remembered those fateful moments as they fell, struck down by the executioner’s bullet or the assassin’s axe on Stalin’s command?

In December 1927, Stalin, stymied twice already, told the Central Committee if they would not accept his resignation, they should abolish the post of general secretary instead. He declared that he was willing to serve as an ordinary secretary without any greater power than the rest. He insisted that the party no longer needed a general secretary with the defeat of the opposition, and he reminded those assembled, “Before the Eleventh Congress, we did not have this institution.”

Once again, poor Rykov spoke up swiftly to rebut him, pointing out that great Lenin himself had created the post of general secretary and placed Stalin in this position. In the end, Stalin’s last-ditch efforts to avoid his destiny were once again unanimously turned down.23 Most Central Committee members present lived to regret their action, as they too perished in 1937–38 at Stalin’s hands. Could things have really turned out any differently? And what exactly prompted this bizarre initiative on Stalin’s part? Was he seeking to prove that he was not power-hungry, as the detested Trotsky claimed? Or was he merely playing catlike with his associates, with sheathed claws, before reaching out and striking a fatal blow? Or did Stalin himself harbor inner doubts, like Lenin earlier, that he, now unchallenged, might misuse the vast powers of his post? Sphinxlike Stalin keeps his secrets even now.
The Crisis Worsens

The Fifteenth Party Congress terminated in the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinov’ev from the Communist Party after they organized demonstrations on the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution. The tense food situation precluded any toleration of such actions. By then exhausted, malnourished women were beginning to faint in the ever larger, angry, round-the-clock breadlines that appeared in all too many towns. A leaflet, intercepted by the OGPU in Tver in mid-December summed up the mood of these bleak queues: “There is no butter. Not long ago, there was flour. There is no kerosene. They have deceived us.” Leaflets protesting Trotsky’s, Zinov’ev’s and Kamenev’s expulsion from the party were picked up by the police in the depths of the countryside, demonstrating that the defeated opposition had not surrendered and could well make a political comeback in these desperate times.

Politburo decrees described the situation as “extraordinarily dangerous” and warned, “The industrial centers and consuming provinces are threatened with starvation,” as procurements fell sharply in November and continued to decline. By December 1, only one-third of annual domestic food requirements (220.2 million puds of grain) had been secured from the 1927 harvest, compared to 340.1 million puds the previous year. On December 14 and again on December 29, the distressed Politburo ordered local party organizations to secure a “decisive turnabout” in grain collections in the near future. The government shipped up to 70 to 80 percent of available industrial goods to the grain procuring regions, “at the expense of the towns and the consuming regions” in hopes of stimulating grain sales by offering peasants goods to purchase. Local authorities prepared to collect in full any and all payments owed the state—taxes, insurance premiums, consumer cooperative membership dues, repayment of loans, and all arrears—in hopes of forcing peasants to sell grain to cover these payments.

Local party organizations hesitated to assume these new responsibilities. Some petitioned to increase grain prices instead. On December 29, the Politburo declared price rises “intolerable” and banned discussion of the issue any further in the soviets, party, and press. To ensure that central directives were heeded, the Politburo dispatched senior officials from the Central Committee and the Council on Labor and Defense (STO) to the main grain-procuring regions with power to override local party and state decisions that contradicted Politburo decrees. In many areas, special “troikas” were established with emergency powers to rule by decree outside the normal operating procedures of the party and state.
By January 1, the grain situation had not improved. Only 300 million puds had been collected from the 1927 crop thus far, leaving the nation substantially short of its domestic grain requirements of 685 million puds. Little more than two months remained before the spring thaw (raputnitsa) set in and rendered roads impassable and procurements impossible to extract for well over a month. Under these conditions, the desperate Politburo sanctioned a series of “extraordinary measures.” On January 4, 1928, it condemned “the intolerable slowness” with which local Communists heeded its commands and established a commission headed by Stalin to draft yet another Central Committee appeal. This directive, issued January 6, threatened local officials with dismissal if grain procurements weren’t “turned around” within a week. It ordered “cruel methods of punishment” applied to peasants, especially kulaks in arrears in their payments to the government, and announced that “special repressive measures” against “kulaks and speculators who violated agricultural prices” were required.

These “special repressive measures” were not spelled out by the Politburo, but they included an as yet unannounced mass police operation against “kulaks and grain market speculators,” launched by the OGPU on January 4. On that date, provincial OGPU chiefs in the grain-producing regions received orders “to arrest immediately with the agreement of the provincial Party committee the largest grain dealers and the most recidivist grain traders (less of the latter) who disrupt procurement prices and violate the rules of commerce and transport regulations. Also arrest the managers of state farms who sell to private traders.” The OGPU was empowered, as Yagoda proposed earlier, to arrest such persons and process their cases extrajudicially, via its own Special Conferences of police officers. Over the course of the next week, these orders were amended piecemeal and the range of individuals to be arrested was steadily expanded, as was usually the case with such OGPU operations. Among those added were persons speculating in the tokens (talony) given out to those who turned in grain procurements, which could be used to purchase otherwise unavailable consumer goods and/or provide evidence that procurements were delivered.

On January 10, village kulaks were also included among the new categories of individuals earmarked for arrest, although such arrests were to be handled in a different manner, since the OGPU was woefully understaffed in the countryside. A single, isolated OGPU officer not infrequently served two or three rural raiony (counties) at this time, especially in far-off Siberia, one of the regions singled out for the most intensive procurement efforts. The provincial OGPU chiefs were consequently informed that “the arrests of kulaks and village
grain speculators are not to be carried out by the OGPU but with the help of the militia and prosecutors. Such cases will be turned over to the courts.” Moreover, “in the courts a small number of these cases should be handled as show trials, with the agreement of the provincial party committee.”36 Because these cases were turned over to the courts, arrested “kulaks” could appeal their sentences, unlike individuals tried by the Special Conferences. In this way, their plight could be called to the attention of the party and state leaders. Many, as we will see, availed themselves of this right.

In addition the OGPU was given a free hand to dispense with the Left Opposition, as it had been clamoring to do for months. On January 17, an unwilling, resisting Trotsky was carried out of his Moscow apartment by force and shipped off to exile in distant Alma-Ata. A delighted Stalin wrote “Ha! Ha!” on the margins of the report of this incident. Deportations of other oppositionists soon followed.37 The grain crisis evidently provoked a general crackdown on individuals and groups who did not see eye-to-eye with the government. The crackdown soon extended to urban managers and specialists with ties to the old regime, after the Shakhty case, already under investigation by the Donbas OGPU at the end of 1927, reached the USSR Supreme Court in May 1928.38

Not all Communists, however, approved the new hard-line tactics. On January 14, Stalin and Politbure member and First Secretary of Ukraine SSR, S. V. Kosior attacked such attitudes in a telegram to local party organizations in the chief grain-procuring regions:

Many Communists think that one cannot touch speculators and kulaks, since this will alienate the middle peasant. This is a very rotten way of thinking of all rotten thoughts, which some Communists have in their heads. It is just the opposite. In order to establish our price policy and achieve a decisive turnabout in procurements, it is necessary to strike a blow at speculators and kulaks right away. It is necessary to arrest speculators, kulaks and others who disorganize the market and price policy. Only then will the middle peasant understand that any prospect of a rise in grain prices is a fantasy dreamed up by grain speculators, that the speculator and kulak are enemies of Soviet power, that it is dangerous to connect their fate with the fate of speculators and kulaks, and that he, the middle peasant, must fulfill his duty as the ally of the working class.39

The telegram pointed out that the annual spring thaw would soon interrupt the flow of grain to the industrial centers and insisted that “brutal pressures” and “cruel directives” were required to overcome the situation. Because the most important regions for the current procurement campaign were Siberia and the Urals, “Pressure here needs to be dreadful [otchayannyi] since here are our last reserves.” To impose such pressure, Stalin and Mototov immediately left Moscow
to direct procurements in these key regions.\textsuperscript{40} Stalin arrived in Novosibirsk on January 18, where he found collections badly lagging and local leaders dubious that the January procurement plan of 60 million puds could be fulfilled. He concluded, “The only way that one can make up for lost time is with brutal \textit{zverskii} pressure.”\textsuperscript{41} Stalin began by pressuring a meeting of the Siberian regional party committee (\textit{kraikom}) into unanimously adopting the procurement plan it had earlier rejected. The committee assigned quotas to the counties and sanctioned widespread arrests of kulaks and officials who aided or tolerated speculators and allowed violations of Soviet price policies. The press was to give these arrests and all resulting show trials wide publicity, along with the articles of the law utilized (Articles 107, 105, and 60 of the USSR criminal code). Kulaks in arrears in their tax payments were to be prosecuted under Article 60, which allowed authorities to fine offenders and inventory and auction off their property to cover their arrears.\textsuperscript{42}

Stalin ordered an additional four to ten kulaks per county (\textit{raion}) arrested immediately as “speculators” and their grain reserves confiscated under Article 107. Not only those who actually “speculated”—who purchased and sold grain with an eye to driving up prices—were earmarked for arrest, but also individuals who simply withheld large amounts of grain from the market and refused to sell at low, state-established procurement prices.\textsuperscript{43} Article 107 had never before been employed against peasants who refused to sell their produce. Hitherto this law was restricted to urban grain dealers who had accumulated large stockpiles of grain.\textsuperscript{44} But already on January 13, even before Stalin arrived in Siberia, the local OGPU chief and prosecutor advocated the use of Article 107 in such a manner. Stalin vigorously applauded their efforts and pointed out that Article 107 had been applied elsewhere with “splendid results.”\textsuperscript{45} When S. I. Zagumennyi, chairman of the board of the Siberian Agricultural Bank, questioned the efficacy of arresting peasants who withheld grain, Stalin replied, “We want to kill in the middle peasant faith in the prospect of a rise in grain prices. How can we kill this? By means of Article 107. . . . How does the middle peasant think? He thinks, ‘It would be good if they paid more but here is a dark business. Petrukha is in jail; Vaniushka is in jail; they could put me in jail too. No, it is better if I sell grain. One cannot ignore Soviet power.’”\textsuperscript{46} According to OGPU arrest data, in January and February 1928, article 107 was employed against peasants who withheld their grain from the market in only three regions of the country—Siberia, the Urals and the Northern Caucasus, all areas where Stalin and his closest associates (Molotov, Andreev, and Mikoian) directed procurement efforts.\textsuperscript{47}

Stalin spent much of his two-week stay in Siberia (January 18 to February
visiting the Altai, the Siberian breadbasket, where the most intense collection efforts were directed. He also met with leaders in eastern Siberia and in the south, where state-established prices were being violated, driven up by the short harvest in neighboring Kazakhstan. Everywhere, Stalin ordered officials to apply “brutal pressure” to extract grain, while maintaining “firm prices.” He argued with local Communists who considered procurement plans excessive and questioned the use of Article 107 against kulaks who withheld grain. He threatened to dismiss officials who could not handle their responsibilities and promised that 25 percent of the grain confiscated from kulaks would be turned over to the village poor and to weak, middle peasants.

Earlier Stalin left economic matters in the hands of Soviet Premier Rykov, focusing his attention on foreign policy, the Comintern, and the struggle with the opposition instead. But now out in the wilds of Siberia, faced with an economic crisis the able Rykov could not handle, Stalin began to formulate economic policy on his own for the first time. He attributed the nation’s grain problems to the fragmentation of peasant holdings after the 1917 Revolution. He suggested that a network of large, mechanized, collective and state farms, created “gradually” over the course of the next several years, could prevent “kulak sabotage” in the future by providing the state with a third of the grain required to feed the workers and the Red Army. He also began to stress the dominant role of the state in the economy even under the NEP and declared that a NEP in which state did not “regulate the market” was tantamount to “the restoration of capitalism.” Stalin and his erstwhile moderate allies began to part ways.

Stalin’s harsh methods produced immediate results, however. On his whirlwind tour of Siberia, he visited Barnaul district (okrug), the site of major peasant revolts fifteen months later. Here grain procurements rose 501 percent at the end of January 1928 after fifty-four “kulaks”—three to five per county, somewhat less than Stalin had recommended—were arrested for “speculation” as currently defined, that is, for refusing to sell grain at low, state-established, procurement prices. On February 3, a satisfied Stalin left Siberia, a new convert to the kind of administrative-police methods that he not so long ago disparaged. Upon his arrival in Moscow, he informed Siberian party leaders that they were now doing so well that he intended to raise their collection target for February from 14 to 22 million puds! By then, the horses and cattle of some poor and middle Siberian peasants were being confiscated and auctioned off for the nonpayment of taxes. In Kamenskii okrug, peasants who did not fulfill their procurement quotas (zadaniia) were locked up in cold sheds until they agreed to pay. Not surprisingly, the local population began to talk of “sowing only for themselves,” reducing the area cultivated come spring.
Nonetheless the new "brutal" policies were effective in extracting grain, as Stalin repeatedly pointed out. Twice as much grain was obtained nationwide in January as in December. Procurements continued to climb in February and March, thanks to the assignment of quotas to regions as in the days of War Communism and ever-growing arrests. Throughout the USSR, 6,854 persons were arrested by the OGPU in January and February in "mass operations in connection with the grain procurement campaign." The arrested consisted of 5,720 private traders and 882 "kulaks," imprisoned under Article 107 for withholding grain, as table 2 indicates in addition to 252 soviet and cooperative officials, who had allegedly aided and abetted speculators by allowing state-established prices to rise. In March and April, another 8,187 "kulaks" and private traders were arrested by the OGPU, regular police, and judicial organs combined, resulting in over 16,000 arrests connected with procurements by the end of April, and almost 20,000 arrests by June 15 when the "operation" officially ended. Arrests were overwhelmingly concentrated in the principal grain-producing regions, particularly the Northern Caucasus, Ukraine, Siberia, and the Urals, which collectively accounted for two-thirds of the arrests in January and February 1928. Arrests there later declined when intense procurement efforts spread to other grain-growing regions. (The consuming regions were not required to conduct procurement campaigns until midway through 1928.)

Extrajudicial tribunals, Special Conferences of OGPU officers, tried 30 percent of the 4,930 private grain traders arrested in the first six months of 1928. The Special Conferences heralded the special "troikas" that processed cases in the Soviet countryside outside the courts whenever "speedy justice" was demanded in times of crisis, like the 1929 grain procurements campaign, dekulakization, the 1932 famine, and the mass operation against "kulaks and criminals," authorized by Stalin and Ezhov in July 1937, which continued until late 1938 and seems to have accounted for the bulk of the 681,692 executions carried out in the USSR in 1937–38. With the introduction of the "extraordinary measures," the door was opened to the use of extrajudicial methods against individuals who had committed no crimes, a terrible precedent for the future, when what had been "extraordinary" in 1928–29 became all too ordinary indeed.

Local data suggest that the actual number of arrests in the countryside during the first half of 1928 may have been significantly higher than the national OGPU statistics cited above. Growing numbers of peasants, arrested for "anti-Soviet agitation" (under Article 58.10), were only rarely included in the OGPU reports on the mass operation, since use of Article 58, which covered counterrevolutionary offenses, was not specifically sanctioned by the national OGPU leadership at this time. Rather, such arrests resulted from ever more violent peasant resistance to heightened procurements efforts and spreading repression. Also, national
Table 2. “Kulaks” and Private Traders Arrested During the Grain Procurement Campaign, January–June 1928

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrest Category</th>
<th>Jan. 4–Feb. 28</th>
<th>Jan. 4–April 6</th>
<th>Jan. 4–April 13</th>
<th>Jan. 4–June 15</th>
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<tr>
<td>Private traders arrested by the OGPU, Article 107</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>in the grain market</td>
<td>3,187</td>
<td>4,650</td>
<td>4,930</td>
<td>4,930</td>
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<td>in the leather market</td>
<td>1,742</td>
<td>2,694</td>
<td>2,964</td>
<td>2,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in other markets</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>5,720</td>
<td>8,135</td>
<td>8,685</td>
<td>8,685</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Kulaks” (witholders of grain), Article 107</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrested by the OGPU</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>2,002</td>
<td>2,016</td>
<td>2,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrested by judicial organs</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4,095</td>
<td>4,195</td>
<td>4,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>6,097</td>
<td>6,211</td>
<td>6,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Kulaks,” Article 58 (counter-revolutionary crimes)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrested by the OGPU</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>3,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrested by judicial organs</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>3,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total arrests</td>
<td>6,602</td>
<td>15,041</td>
<td>15,828</td>
<td>18,279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 567, 258, 439, 466, and 563.

OGPU reports only rarely included arrests made by local militia and prosecutors acting independently. Yet these sorts of arrests increased over time, as table 2 demonstrates.

An analysis of OGPU operations in the Urals in the first half of 1928 indicates that most of those arrested under Article 107 (60.5 percent) were not “speculators,” however broadly defined. They were individuals who had engaged
in “anti-Soviet agitation” against grain procurements, possessed anti-Soviet and White guard pasts, or had served prison terms as “white bandits” or participants in anti-Soviet uprisings in 1918 and 1921. A similar proportion (60.5 percent) of so-called village kulaks, arrested by the OGPU in Ukraine and Northern Caucasus from January to June 1928, were charged with “anti-Soviet agitation” under Article 58.10. Such arrests stemmed from the desire of the local OGPU, in a time of crisis, to get rid of individuals who had caused political trouble in the past and/or might be expected to do so again in the future. Such concerns had little to do with the party leadership’s interest in frightening peasants into turning in grain.

Indeed, the pattern of arrests in the Urals suggests that some local units of the OGPU did not engage in actual investigations. They preferred to remain in their offices and conduct mass operations by leafing through old files and OGPU reports on public opinion, which often quoted individuals who spoke out against the government. Such practices continued well past 1928, since such shoddy methods were rooted in the understaffing of the police, which continued throughout the 1930s. Such investigatory methods, together with the widespread tendency to define kulaks historically, by their economic status in the past, rather than the present, might explain why so many of the “kulaks” arrested in the first half of 1928 were actually poor and middle peasants. This fact came to trouble growing numbers of party leaders, as success in collecting grain eroded the sense of emergency at the top of the Soviet political system.

Opposition to extralegal methods and “violations of the class line” began to surface in leadership circles in mid-February. Reports poured into the center that authorities had confiscated the last horse or cow of some poor and middle peasants for trivial tax arrears, at times as low as seventy or eighty kopecks. Schools expelled children if their parents failed to turn in their grain quotas, and officials in some areas collected state loans by beatings, brandishing firearms, and threatening arrest or exile at the hands of the OGPU. Local courts sanctioned improper arrests and illegally confiscated grain, livestock, farming equipment, and mills from those convicted, especially in Siberia. In Zinov’ev okrug, Ukraine, authorities organized a show trial of “individuals who failed to pay the single agricultural tax.” Twenty-one of the twenty-three defendants were poor peasants, although the village poor were explicitly exempted from this tax on the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution in November 1927. The organizers of the show trial terrified the defendants by telling them, “We will drink your blood so we can drive about in automobiles.” Procurement agents complained to Moscow that local authorities closed markets and established roadblocks to prevent peasants from taking grain outside their native raion or...
rural soviet to procurement depots in nearby railroad stations, since grain delivered there did not count toward local quotas. Grain collected locally, however, had to be hauled to the railroad station at government expense.70

Everywhere, individuals imprisoned under Article 107 for withholding grain could not understand why they were arrested. Surely it was not a crime to keep grain in one's own shed for a rainy day? Why should such commonplace practices subject one to searches and arrest at the hands of the OGPU, who burst into homes waving firearms, yelling, searching for grain, and issuing threats: "Your son already sits in jail and we will take you away . . . and if not we will shoot." B. Bondarenko of Kazakhskii raion, Aktiubinskii province, who was arrested this way, received a year in prison and the confiscation of a considerable amount of property, including eight bulls, three horses, seven cows, four calves, two thousand puds of wheat, a cart, a threshing machine, and a mill. When the judge announced the sentence, Bondarenko asked the court to explain why he was convicted since he was not guilty of any crime. The judge retorted, "Our goal is to dekulakize you," the first official use of this sinister term found in our documents, two years before such policies were officially sanctioned by the central Soviet government.71

Yet fewer than half of those arrested in the main grain-procuring regions in the first six months of 1928 were classified as kulaks by the OGPU.72 Persons officially listed as kulaks accounted for only 452 of 1,017 arrests in Ukraine (January 1–June 8, 1928), 1,087 of 2,661 arrests in the Northern Caucasus in the same period, and 272 of 903 arrests in the Urals (January 1–March 1). Only in Siberia did individuals described as kulaks comprise the majority of those arrested—1,304 out of 1,489 individuals arrested between January 1 and March 15, 1928. But even here, the numbers of arrested "kulaks" tended to decline over time, and the number of those classified as middle peasants rose, especially in May and June, a development noted in other regions as well.73

**Opposition to Repression Within the Soviet Party-State**

As news of abuses and "violations of the class line" trickled into Moscow, some party leaders moved to check the rising tide of illegality. Rumors circulated among what remained of the Left Opposition that a rift had developed between Rykov and Stalin after the latter's return from Siberia.74 But whatever differences existed among the nation's leaders were soon papered over by a campaign against "excesses." The Politburo launched this campaign on February 13, with an announcement that the grain crisis was over but excesses in carrying out the orders of the center had occurred. In the future, Article 107 was to be applied
only to genuine kulaks, defined as peasants with grain reserves of at least 2,000 puds (72,000 pounds). State loans must not be collected by force, and in collecting arrears, local officials should concentrate on the more prosperous strata of the village while giving advantages to poor and weak middle peasants. The Politburo, denying that it had abandoned the NEP, concluded that the only way to avoid difficulties was to "stick to firm prices," realize that procurements were the business of the entire party, utilize Article 107 against speculators, and "apply all means to squeeze funds out of the village." 75

Soviet leaders, whose official positions exposed them to complaints and appeals for clemency from the localities, however, were increasingly alarmed about how the procurement campaign was being conducted. More and more information from the countryside trickled into Moscow and showed that notwithstanding Politburo orders, "excesses" continued. The officials most concerned about human rights and the violation of Soviet law included Soviet Premier Rykov; Pravda editor Bukharin; the Communist Party faction (ppo) in the VTsIK Presidium, which had powers to grant pardons and amnesties; and the judicial leaders of the largest Soviet republic, the RSFSR:—the commissar of justice, M. N. Ianson; the prosecutor, Nikolai Krylenko; and V. Chelyshev, chairman of the Criminal Cassation Commission of the RSFSR Supreme Court, which had the task of reviewing appeals against lower court decisions. These men and institutions began to monitor the ongoing grain-procurement campaign in hopes of exposing and checking "excesses," particularly as these applied to the village poor and to weak, middle peasants. As Bolsheviks, they were not concerned about the human rights of "kulaks" any more than Stalin or the Left Opposition, but they wanted to limit repression to genuine kulaks with more than 2,000 puds of grain. Frustrated in their endeavors to achieve these goals, these "principled" Bolsheviks soon found themselves involved in a concerted struggle to end the extraordinary measures and release at least some of the victims. The struggle against repression began in February, escalated in March, and culminated at the April and July 1928 plenums of the Communist Party Central Committee.

Pravda began to expose irregularities in the procurement campaign with a February 12 article by Mikoian, who mentioned the use of Article 107 in print for the first time, demanded an end to "harmful, unlawful" roadblocks by the militia, and insisted that "the struggle with the kulak" must proceed on "the basis of Soviet legality" and not spill over to middle peasants. On February 23, 1928, Ianson issued a circular that described the extraordinary measures as "temporary," due to expire at the end of the current agricultural year. He ordered local prosecutors to rescind illegal orders given in the course of the procurement
campaign and prosecute the officials responsible.  

Increasingly, however, the campaign against abuses centered in the VTsIK Presidium, the executive organ of the Soviet legislature, headed by “the All-Union Elder,” Politburo member Mikhail Kalinin, a former peasant who took a particular interest in what transpired in the countryside. Kalinin was renowned, like Soviet Premier Rykov, for taking letters of complaint and appeals addressed to him seriously and citing them effectively at Politburo meetings, to the dismay of staunch Stalinists, like Molotov. The latter commented disparagingly in April 1928 at a conference of provincial party secretaries: “If letters come addressed to Rykov or Kalinin, they cannot leave them unanswered. Of course neither Comrade Rykov nor Comrade Kalinin read these letters as they should be read; these should be examined, keeping in mind that often kulaks write Moscow in the guise of poor peasants. You see, kulaks know better than anyone else how to maneuver around Moscow.”

The prominent role played by the VTsIK Presidium in the campaign against repression, however, owes even more to the noted Soviet jurist Shmuel Fainblit, the party secretary of the VTsIK Presidium, than to Kalinin. Fainblit, a longtime staff member of the Legal Department of the Workers-Peasant Inspectorate and a close associate of the legendary Aron Soltz, the Communist Party’s “conscience” on legal matters, was another person, who could not leave letters and appeals unanswered. And he, too, was unable to read like Comrade Molotov. Fainblit utilized his legal skills and long experience as an investigator of official crimes to prepare a series of moving reports on the situation in the countryside that strengthened the hand of those trying to restore a semblance of legality to the village. On March 8, the VTsIK Presidium established a special subcommittee to review appeals from the countryside—the Commission on a Partial Amnesty for Persons Convicted in Grain-Procurements Cases. Fainblit played a major role on this commission, reviewing pleas for clemency and summarizing the results of the commission’s work. In the first week of its operation, the commission received 154 appeals, 66 of which (43 percent) came from Siberia and 33 (21 percent) from the Northern Caucasus, two of the three regions singled out for the most intensive procurement efforts. Of those who appealed, the commission classified 38 percent as kulaks, 31 percent as prosperous peasants, and 25 percent as middle peasants. But less than half (47 percent) possessed over one thousand puds of grain at the time of their arrest, which meant that relatively few met the Politburo’s criteria for kulaks—two thousand puds of grain.

While Article 107 allowed the confiscation of grain stocks from “speculators,” considerable amounts of other property—livestock, farming
equipment, mills, and quantities of cash—were taken from the peasants at the
time of their sentencing. In seven cases, the court seized all the defendants’
grain and property, leaving their families destitute. Only rarely did such families
retain enough grain to tide them over until the new harvest; and all too often,
they were left without the means to farm their land, which was against the law.
Moreover, the appellants complained that the “swift justice” meted out left them
with no time to call witnesses or prepare an adequate defense. All were shocked
by the severity of their sentences, which averaged well over a year in prison for
acts, like refusing to sell grain at state-established prices, that were not crimes
under the NEP. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Commission
on Partial Amnesty upheld court verdicts in only nine cases (18 percent) of the
first fifty appeals reviewed.79

Fainblit’s study indicated that “excesses” were far more extensive and
serious than senior officials had hitherto realized. He responded by consulting a
variety of documents from other government agencies—OGPU reports, Supreme
Court summaries of grain procurements cases, and peasant letters to Kalinin and
the press—in an effort to determine whether the cases reviewed by the commission
were typical. He concluded that “excesses” appeared to be the rule, not the
exception, in the current procurement campaign. Stunned, Fainblit hastily
prepared a report on the mood of the village on March 17. The report concluded
that recent policies had seriously alienated the peasantry from the Soviet regime.
Under the pressures of repeated collection campaigns and the severity of sentences
handed out to those arrested, poor and middle peasants had begun to accept
“kulak arguments” that the Soviet regime did not serve peasant needs. In record
numbers, peasants were persuaded that they had no choice but to organize chapters
of the Peasants Union to defend their interests or rise up in rebellion and form a
fifth column in case of war.80 Official directives criticizing illegalities were no
longer sufficient. The extraordinary measures must end once and for all, and the
victims of these policies should be amnestied. Use of Article 107 should cease
immediately. Peasants arrested in the course of the procurement campaign should
be released, except, of course, for “proven kulaks and recidivist [zlobnyi] grain
speculators.” But sentences of those people, too, should be cut in half, and the
government should pay poor and middle peasants for all confiscated grain.
Buildings, small peasant enterprises, livestock, and tools seized from poor and
middle peasants must be returned to their owners. Local officials, who chronically
violated the party line should be held responsible before the law, but those who
committed excesses under extenuating pressures (due to the opposition of the
kulachestvo) should be given party warnings and transferred to other regions.81

Fainblit concluded that party members did not realize what was actually
happening in the village and should discuss this issue. He immediately raised this question in his own primary party organization, the Communist faction in the VTsIK Presidium, which endorsed his proposals and drafted a legislative project to end the use of Article 107 against peasants and grant a broad amnesty to peasants thus arrested. They planned to introduce this bill in the forthcoming session of VTsIK, the Soviet legislature, scheduled to meet on April 10.

By the end of March, other central institutions also moved against the extraordinary measures. Procurements were now proceeding well, yet alarming reports of injustices continued to pour in from the countryside. Under these conditions, the RSFSR Supreme Court ordered the release of persons convicted under Article 107 with short sentences so they might participate in spring sowing, thus putting into effect an amnesty more limited that the one favored by the Communist faction in VTsIK. On March 26, a joint session of Rykov’s Council of Ministers and the VTsIK Presidium, in an effort to reduce the growing prison population, ordered the Commissariat of Justice to instruct local judges in how to interpret the law and dispense sentences. Commissar Ianson, Prosecutor Krylenko, and Chairman Chelyshev, of the RSFSR, responded two days later with a joint directive to judges, explaining how the legislation utilized in the procurements campaign should be applied. They maintained that Article 107 applied only to kulaks and prosperous peasants who were trying to raise prices, not to the peasantry as a whole. Fines should be proportional to the wealth of the household and must not ruin family farms. Prison terms should be used only in exceptional cases. Those who withheld grain from the market but committed no other offenses should receive at most short prison terms and confiscation of their surpluses. The directive criticized the growing use of Article 58.10 (anti-Soviet agitation) and insisted that this measure applied only to “persons with counterrevolutionary intentions,” not those, “who by their social essence are not enemies of Soviet power but who are themselves victims of kulak agitation.”

By March 31, two highly placed OGPU officials joined the campaign against excesses, outraged that local authorities were threatening peasants with arrest and exile by their agency. T. D. Deribas, chief of the OGPU Operational Services Administration (SOU OGPU), and N. N. Alekseev, chief of the Information Department, ordered local OGPU operatives to investigate cases of threats and beatings of poor and middle peasants by officials collecting the peasant loan and self-tax. Officials who violated the law were to be arrested and turned over to the courts or to the OGPU’s own Special Conferences.
The April 1928 Central Committee Plenum

In this way, by April 6–11, 1928, when the Communist Party Central Committee convened, growing numbers of highly placed Soviet officials in a variety of key central institutions had come to believe that the extraordinary measures should be discarded or scaled down, now that procurements were running well ahead of the previous year. While the Shakhty case occupied much of the committee’s attention, the first item on the agenda was the grain-procurement campaign. The discussion, which focused on excesses and was characterized by a good deal of what Stalin called “vigorous self-criticism,” terminated in a vote to end the extraordinary measures and prohibit the use of Article 107 against peasants who withheld grain from the market.88

But the plenum recognized that the exceptional circumstances existing in January required extreme measures to prevent hunger in the cities. The party leadership therefore reserved the right to employ such techniques in the future, should grain shortages occur.89 The Central Committee, however, soundly condemned illegalities and “violations of the class line” and ordered that officials who applied Article 107 to poor and middle peasants or engaged in requisitioning be punished. Immediately after the plenum, some offending officials were put on trial and a few were even executed, as Bukharin pointed out approvingly in a report to the Leningrad party organization a few days later.90

The opponents of the extraordinary measures emerged from the April 1928 Central Committee Plenum apparently triumphant. But efforts to secure amnesty for those already convicted under these measures failed. On April 10, when VTsIK convened, the Communist faction in its Presidium, under Fainblit’s direction, introduced legislation to free peasants arrested during the grain-procurements campaign except for “recidivist speculators and proven kulaks” who withheld large amounts of grain from the market.91 Although Rykov and Kalinin strongly supported this measure, Molotov and the provincial party secretaries, who comprised a large bloc of VTsIK deputies, opposed the amnesty and argued that the release of “speculators” would render further collection efforts more difficult.92 In the end, VTsIK rejected Fainblit’s bill. The meeting also rejected, for lack of funding, proposals to pay peasants procurement prices for all grain confiscated up to 500 puds.
The Second Round of the 1928 Procurements Campaign

Shortly thereafter, on April 19, Commissariat of Trade officials, responsible for keeping track of procurements, informed the Politburo that grain collections had fallen sharply in the first two weeks of April. They attributed this to “the demobilized mood” of local party officials after the April plenum. The Politburo, which had recently decided to resume grain exports, essential to the success of the Five-Year Plan, hurriedly convened a series of conferences of provincial party secretaries to discuss how grain collections might be increased. Meanwhile the leadership resolved to employ “maximum economy” in the distribution of grain stocks and began to reduce food supplies for the major cities for the first time.

The first Politburo conference on procurements on April 24 consisted of provincial party secretaries from the Central Agricultural Region (CAR) and the Volga. These were areas that hitherto had not been earmarked for intensive grain collection, since the 1927 harvest ran below average in the CAR and far below average in the Volga. Molotov and Mikoian, who chaired the conference, informed the delegates that anywhere from 30 to 70 percent of the winter crops had perished in the steppe regions of Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus, the center of last year’s short harvest, where much of the nation’s wheat was grown. Peasants in these regions had been expecting a massive failure of winter crops for months, but party leaders earlier disparaged such reports as “kulak propaganda.” To make matters worse, spring arrived late in 1928, with cold, damp weather that delayed sowing, destroyed newly planted crops, and required widespread replanting, which was impossible without substantial seed loans that further strained available grain stocks. As a result, the government had little choice but to collect another 100 million puds of grain from the 1927 harvest in May and June, months when supplies generally gave out on the eve of the new harvest. If the party failed to accomplish this task, Molotov declared, the towns, army, and government would run out of food before September 15, the earliest date when significant amounts of grain from the 1928 harvest were likely to be available, given the delay in sowing. Even then, the government would have to reduce food supplies in the cities and the consuming regions yet again through “cruel economy.”

Molotov and Mikoian insisted that the needed grain existed in the countryside and could be extracted by “pressure,” applied by a remobilized party organization. Most of the provincial party leaders present, however, disagreed. With few exceptions, they denied that there was any surplus grain in their regions. Neibakh, one of the Volga secretaries, said, “We can’t do this not because we
don’t want to. We can’t. It’s not there.” Riabinin of Tambov declared, “Our peasant province doesn’t have it.” None looked forward to the renewed campaign. Rabinin pointed out that local peasants already were avoiding party members: “They say, ‘Spare us . . . You take and take and give us nothing.’” He pointed out that all the constant campaigning was literally driving local officials crazy. One of his subordinates had lost his mind filling out five-day statistical reports for Mikoian and now was confined to a mental hospital, where he spent his time adding up endless columns of meaningless figures.

While the provincial party secretaries did not want another procurement campaign, all agreed that without Article 107 there was no way to extract additional grain. Taxes and loan payments were almost all in, leaving the government with few financial levers to squeeze out grain. Many secretaries insisted that the Politburo-established norm for kulaks—2,000 puds of grain reserves—should be reduced, because “such kulaks” did not exist in their provinces. To facilitate use of Article 107, some advocated norms as low as 300 to 500 puds. Like Stalin, the provincial party leaders emerged from the first procurement campaign convinced of the efficacy of repression and not at all reluctant to apply it to resolve economic problems.

The provincial secretaries went on to criticize the center, which had restricted the use of Article 107 and allowed VTsIK to discuss an amnesty for convicted grain speculators. Some lambasted the Supreme Court for overturning local court decisions in grain-procurement cases. One provincial secretary demanded that discussions of “excesses” in the press should cease, since such talk contributed to “the demobilized mood.” Party Secretary Gilinskii, who was singled out for criticism for failing to fulfill his procurement quotas, attributed his problems to “directives from TsIK and Comrade Rykov,” that limited the use of Article 107. Secretary Riabinin of Tambov declared, “the only way to take grain is to use extraordinary measures, Article 107,” and he called for the arrest of two to three “kulaks” per volost (canton or ward), considerably more than Stalin had demanded earlier in Siberia. Outraged by recent moves to punish officials who violated the law in collecting procurements, Riabinin declared, “If anyone should be put on trial for excesses, the entire provincial party committee is at fault, not just low level officials [rabotniki].”

At the conclusion of the conference, Molotov and Mikoian announced, despite all the testimony to the contrary, that the meeting proved that the required grain was out there for the taking. But, in an attempt to abide by the recent Central Committee directive, they suggested that provincial leaders should try to find other means to collect grain besides Article 107. They warned against excesses and justified the review of grain-procurement cases by the Supreme
Court. They insisted that "unjust verdicts" must be reversed and maintained that the center had to investigate illegal acts and complaints. Yet Mikoian suggested that "if gentle measures don’t work, we will use crueler ones." Molotov declared that the 2,000-pud grain norm for kulaks could not be reduced. But he added that perhaps a 1,000-pud grain reserve after sowing was equivalent to 2,000 puds earlier. He pointed out that at any rate, the Central Committee had yet to punish anyone who violated the Politburo’s norm for kulaks!

While Molotov and Mikoian clearly spoke out of both sides of their mouths, the Politburo did so too at this time, in a strange resolution, adopted on April 26, that reflected the developing split within the party leadership. The resolution announced that grain procurements had ground to a halt, due to "the demobilized mood" of local officials, who were resting on their laurels. "Instead of the absolutely necessary elimination of excesses," the resolution stated, "there is a complete refusal to use repressive measures against the village elite." The Politburo insisted that 100 million puds of grain had to be extracted from the countryside over the course of the next two months. One hundred percent of state loans, the self-tax, and cooperative dues must be collected from the peasants. "To increase pressure on kulak elements and private traders who repeatedly speculate in large amounts of grain," local party organizations must "apply the Central Committee directive on Article 107, while decisively correcting excesses and preventing their repetition." On April 6, the Central Committee Plenum had voted to discard the extraordinary measures, but it reserved the right to employ them again if necessary. Now, with the onset of a new grain crisis, provincial leaders were free to do whatever they needed to collect grain. The procurement conferences showed to what lengths provincial leaders would go under incessant pressure from above to collect grain at a time when peasant reserves were depleted, no grain could be obtained for any price in many villages, and farmers and their families were terrified of relinquishing their remaining grain stocks in light of the massive failure of winter crops in the chief grain-producing regions.

The second round of grain procurements in May and June 1928 proceeded "in a sea of illegality," as the Communist faction in the VTsIK Presidium put it. Rough treatment, arrests, and violent seizures of grain became the order of the day, as mass searches for grain raged throughout the Northern Caucasus, Siberia, the Volga, the CAR, and Ukraine. Grain-procurement agents scourgèd the countryside in pursuit of "excess grain," waiting until the man of the house was out and the women, who were less likely to put up effective resistance, were home alone. Threats of violence and the brandishing of firearms were commonplace. Occasionally a woman who hesitated or resisted when asked
where the family grain was hidden was hit on the head with a revolver. One woman, subjected to this treatment, ran away terrified, fell in a well, and drowned. Government agents told the peasants: “If you will not give us your grain, we will put such pressure on you that not only grain will be squeezed out, but blood will flow from your fingernails.” Strong pressure was even applied to regions where the village poor were already eating substitutes for lack of grain. Everywhere the brunt of the renewed procurement efforts fell primarily on poor and middle peasants.

Armed Komsomols measured surpluses “by eye” and did not listen to peasant protests that grain should be weighed. In the Northern Caucasus, where 40 percent of the winter crops had failed, families were left with as little as fifteen pounds (funty) a month per eater until the new crops were harvested. In Voronezh, peasant reserves were limited to twenty puds per household (720 pounds) regardless of family size or the number of household livestock. In Volynskii okrug, Ukraine, a twenty-member family was left, after requisitioning, with only three puds (98 pounds) to tide them over until the new harvest, in an area where 80 percent of the winter crops had perished. When one family complained that their remaining food supplies would run out in two weeks, they were informed, “you need to eat less.” When peasants said they had no grain to feed their chickens and cows, they were told, “Let them croak.” In one raion in the Don okrug, where harvests and grain quotas were most out of line, the raion soviet executive committee representative and rural soviet chairman issued orders to take all the grain and flour from the disenfranchised population (lishentsy), leaving them with nothing to eat.

Officials collected grain by force and chicanery. They called men to the rural soviet to be “worked over,” locked up, and harangued around the clock to turn in grain. In one village, people were incarcerated in a former latrine for days and marched about the village at night, threatened and cursed by activists who taunted those who could or would not pay, calling them “counterrevolutionaries” and “enemies of Soviet power.” In the Kuban village of Ternovskoe, a Komsomol forced three prosperous peasants to crawl like crabs, “drink like dogs,” kneel and pray to God, and lie on the roof, in an attempt to torture and humiliate them into turning in grain. Illiterate women were tricked or coerced into signing legal agreements to turn in a certain amount of grain. One woman who had two puds of grain (seventy-two pounds) to feed eight persons until the harvest signed a contract to turn in two to five puds of grain. In the Tambov village of Tokarevka, a widow, threatened with arrest under Article 107, relinquished six of her last twelve puds of grain; in Novorossisk, villagers sold their property and fled to Persia when officials threatened to use Article
107; in Voronezh, rumors that Article 107 might be applied frightened peasants so that they rushed to turn in their grain stocks, leaving entire wards without any grain reserves at all.123

Procurement agents, too, were placed under considerable pressure. One agent arrived in the village of Lapatino and presented the rural soviet chairman with the following order:

Land Society Representative Oderov comes to conduct a search. You should help him. Take the collected grain to the collection station. Land Society Representative Oderov will be held responsible under Article 185 of the criminal code in case of weak work. You must fulfill a quota of one hundred puds. The search will begin on June 10.

If a citizen possesses surpluses of fifty puds, immediately confiscate his property under Article 107 of the criminal code.

The rural soviet chairman wrote Kalinin, asking, “Is this a proper order?”124

Under these conditions, rural Communists and soviet officials in record numbers shunned grain-procurement assignments, although such conduct increasingly cost them their positions and party cards. In the hungry Northern Caucasus, entire Komsomol cells, led by their secretaries, refused to participate. One secretary declared, “We will never occupy ourselves with grain procurements. We don’t have any grain, but even if we did, we would not haul it away, because the government only knows how to quarrel with us so we will give nothing.”125 But other officials took the lead in pressuring peasants to relinquish grain that they actually needed. Burning with patriotic zeal to fulfill procurement plans, however out of line with local possibilities, they blatantly ignored central directives against excesses, especially those banning the use of Article 107 or limiting its application to persons with 2,000 puds of grain or more. Whenever peasants showed such officials the decrees, issued by Premier Rykov or TsIK, that condemned such practices, the functionaries replied, “They only write this, but they give orders differently” or “TsIK is one thing but we are something else.”126

Arrests slowed considerably after the April 1928 Central Committee Plenum, as table 2 indicates, but soared precipitously in May and June with the onset of the new round of procurements. After the Central Committee decided to abandon the extraordinary measures on April 6, arrests under Article 107 by the OGPU dropped sharply and then trickled out altogether. Local authorities, however, began to apply Article 107 with ever-greater zeal against peasants who
failed to turn in grain. Threats to use Article 107 were even more commonplace. Such arrests were not reported to the center, unlike earlier, since provincial officials were well aware that some national leaders opposed the use of Article 107. Yet in May and June, sporadic data indicate that arrests under Article 107 were significant in the localities. Indeed, individual villages occasionally experienced mass arrests of individuals who would or could not turn in grain quotas. The rural soviet chairman and three Komsomols in the village of Novo-Labinskii (Kuban) decided to arrest all peasants who failed to turn in their quotas. Eighty-five persons were thus arrested between May 27 and May 30, before raion authorities intervened and halted this local initiative. Authorities arrested fifteen non-turner-overs in the village of Shipovo in Penza province. In the Don okrug in a four-day period (May 30–June 3) five arrests occurred under Article 107 alone; fifty-five such arrests took place in Siberia in April and another thirty-five in June. As grain stocks ran out, OGPU dispatches increasingly reported mass arrests of people who had no grain and, hence, could not possibly relinquish any. In the Don okrug, where some of the worse abuses seemed to occur, the militia took middle peasants into custody on no charges at all or on totally absurd charges, like “sabotage.”

To make matters worse, arrests under Article 58, which applied to counterrevolutionary crimes, shot out of control in May and June in reaction to a sharp rise in peasant disorders and attacks on officials. Local authorities also began to realize that use of Article 58.10 (anti-Soviet agitation) was a good way to get around restrictions placed by the center on the utilization of Article 107. Between May 1 and June 15, the OGPU alone made 2,451 arrests under Article 58, while arrests by the OGPU under Article 107 ceased (see table 2). Of the arrests under Article 58, 2,278 were for “anti-soviet agitation” and 173 (all in Ukraine) were for terrorism. Local authorities also increasingly arrested individuals who spoke out against government policies, particularly procurements, as sporadic local data indicate. The OGPU chief in Siberia, Zavodskii, reported that in June alone some Siberian okrugi had arrested as many as forty to fifty peasants for “anti-Soviet agitation.”

To be sure, these were extreme examples, singled out in OGPU and VTsIK reports on “excesses.” But haphazard, arbitrary actions that violated human rights and the center’s laws, instructions, and intentions were commonplace in the second round of the 1928 procurements campaign. Throughout the country, thousands of peasants, although not officially arrested, were locked up for a day or two by the rural soviet to be “worked over”—harassed or frightened into turning over their grain supplies to the government. Increasingly those “locked up” or arrested were poor and middle peasants. The Politburo’s April 26
orders to collect 100 percent of tax and other arrears also fell heavily on poor and weak households, long considered the regime’s most reliable allies in the village. Soviet laws on such collections were most draconian. Authorities confiscated the property of those in arrears and auctioned it off to pay the amount owed plus hefty fines for nonpayment. Before the 1928 grain-procurement campaigns, such laws applied only to the more prosperous peasants, while local officials, with the connivance of national authorities, overlooked the mounting arrears of poor peasants. Indeed, party leaders sought to turn the tax in kind (the unified agricultural tax) into a graduated taxation system, from which increasing numbers of the village poor were exempted altogether. Leniency for the poor, however, ended abruptly after April 26. Growing numbers of weak middle peasants and the village poor began to sell their only cow or horse to pay their arrears to avoid having all their property confiscated and auctioned off. In many cases, forced sales of vital agricultural resources left many peasant households unable to farm all together.135

The number of peasants thus rendered destitute and desperate by state requisitioning, zealous collection of arrears, and court action to confiscate property under Articles 107 and 58 steadily grew. The result was an unintended, bizarre form of expropriation, a sort of de facto “dekulakization” that spontaneously manifested itself in the Soviet countryside well before de jure dekulakization officially began. Moreover, such desperate, newly impoverished peasants left the village in record numbers, seeking outside work as peasants normally do in hard times.136 The rising volume of out-migration overwhelmed the resources of the towns and convinced key party leaders that rapid industrialization at a pace hitherto not even contemplated was the only solution. Occasionally unemployment and food riots erupted among desperate peasant migrants at railroad junctions in distant Siberia and Kazakhstan where, rumor had it, food supplies were more plentiful than back home. Yet neither jobs nor food could be found in either place.137 Other peasants, no longer capable of farming on their own, began to join collective farms in ever larger numbers138 and in the process convinced Stalin that “a great breakthrough” in peasant attitudes toward collective farming had occurred. By responding to the grain-procurement crisis with the extraordinary measures, the party leadership opened a Pandora’s box of new, unanticipated problems. Their response to these problems created still greater problems that undermined social stability and required ever-greater applications of repression. In this way, spontaneous, de facto “dekulakization” led inexorably to de jure dekulakization.

Illegal arrests, mass searches, and widespread violations of human rights, however, failed to provide the government and the cities with sufficient grain
and instead provoked a major wave of peasant rebellions, the worst since the introduction of the NEP. May’s procurements proved no better than April’s, and over time the amounts collected declined, as supplies ran out and mass searches and arrests increasingly yielded no results at all. To make matters worse, much of the grain in government hands remained in the depths of the countryside in distant Siberia. Here lack of transportation and fears on the part of local officials that local peasants might revolt or food supplies would run out before the new harvest came in delayed shipment. Since the Soviet Union normally did not rely on Siberia for food exports, storage facilities there were primitive or nonexistent, and all too often, much of the grain collected stood outside in heaps and was rained upon, spoiled, or simply stolen.

The Food Crisis in the Countryside

The food shortages proved worst of all in rural areas, which were thrown back on their own resources, with little or no help from the center. By May, internal commerce ground to a halt throughout much of the countryside. The six-month-long campaign against speculation closed local markets and bazaars. Shelves in the cooperative store stood empty. Shipments of goods proved rare, and no grain could be purchased in many places at any price. Peasants who somehow managed to hold onto surplus grain through all the campaigns refused to sell even small amounts, fearful of arrest under Article 107. Yet the village poor, even in the best of times, normally ran out of food in the spring and purchased grain from their more prosperous neighbors for labor or money to tide their families over until the new harvest. Now the poor had nowhere to go. Prosperous peasants and kulaks, who survived the regime’s “crackdown on capitalist elements,” told them to “go, let your government feed you; we will not give you a pound,” thus voicing their deep-seated resentment at the favoritism hitherto shown the poor by the Soviet regime.  

On June 12, a Ukrainian couple wrote their son in the army: “There are searches for flour. Whoever has three puds is left one, and two are taken away. Already for three weeks we have had no bread. Lines stand outside the cooperative store—rich, poor, Russians, Jews.” Another couple wrote, also from Ukraine, “Already for a week now, we have sat as hungry as dogs.” A family from Belorussia informed a third soldier, “We live completely without bread. We eat substitutes. We are dying from hunger.” A group of poor peasants in Penza province appealed to Moscow for aid on May 9: “In view of the grave situation, we are frightened. It is time to sow our crops but there is nothing to sow with. We have sold our last cow so we would not perish from a hungry death.”

28
representative of the local rural soviet verified that this letter was true. But the fact that these peasants could sell their cow and buy bread indicates that some commerce was still occurring there, which was not the case in the grain-producing regions subjected to the most intense procurement efforts.

Central authorities moved belatedly to rectify the situation. On May 26, the Politburo ordered markets reopened and threatened to punish officials who did not obey. On June 5, Ianson, the RSFSR commissar of justice, directed prosecutors at all levels of government to rescind orders by local officials to close markets and prosecute officials who failed to comply. But markets once closed are not so easily revived, especially when orders to open them come with instructions “not to slacken the struggle against speculation.” Central authorities also sought to expand local food supplies by extending the milling tax (garntsovoye sbory) to all mills and declared that the proceeds from this tax were to be utilized as local food aid for the poor. But much of the tax had already been spent on other purposes (like seed loans), since only 25 percent was initially set aside for poor relief.

The Angry Village

So the village poor, long deemed the Soviet government’s most loyal ally in the countryside, took the advice of “kulaks” and turned to their government for food, first individually and then in groups that over time increased in size. In May and June 1928, rural soviets, local cooperatives, peasant committees of mutual aid (K Kov), and even occasional county-level institutions, like the raion party committee or raion soviet executive committee, were besieged on a daily basis by hungry, increasingly desperate supplicants, bags in hand, saying, “Give us grain. You have taken it from the kulaks but give us nothing, and we will perish from hunger.” In Kamenskii okrug, Siberia, one poor peasant woman beseeched a raion official: “Give us bread. You raked out grain from the peasants, and now they don’t give it to us and our children sit hungry. If you do not give us bread, we will take our starving children and leave them with you and let you feed them as you know how. And if you do not help, it is time for us poor to confer together and gather together and destroy the storehouses of the rich.”

Poor peasants also utilized committees of the poor and other political organizations, sponsored by the Soviet government, to present the authorities with collective demands and appeals. Committees of poor peasants sent delegations to district and provincial soviet executive committees and demanded that the grain collected by procurements must remain in the localities and be distributed to the poor. In Siberia, where such actions on the part of the poor
appeared the most widespread, they seemed to have actually have influenced
government policy, since, as we have seen, much of the grain collected there
remained unshipped, to the distress of the center. Such concessions, however,
failing to erode opposition to procurements. In the village of Ponomarevo, in
Biiskii okrug, Siberia, a meeting of poor peasants adopted the following
resolution: "The grain reserves in the village will not be turned over to the
government. Whoever takes grain to the cooperative, we will take it back." On May 28, a poor peasant meeting in the village of Karchigaza, Kungurskii
okrug, Urals, actively resisted efforts by the militia to remove 210 puds of grain
from the village. The disorder continued until the local grain-procurement
representative requested and received "five rifles" from the raion soviet executive
committee.

Not just the poor but all villagers proved increasingly ill-disposed toward
the authorities as a result of six months of almost continual procurements, tax
collection, searches, and arrests. In May and June 1928, village meetings
convened to discuss grain procurements were often disrupted or closed down by
local authorities, fearful that they could not muster a vote in favor of procurements.
Ever more frequently, peasants of all social strata began to talk openly in public
places, like meetings and bazaars, about insurrections, revolution, and the beating
and killing of local officials, even in the presence of party members and the
police. Some speakers in village assemblies (skhody) declared that they looked
forward with enthusiasm to war, invasion, and the return of the Whites from
abroad. The latter sentiment seems to have been largely confined to the Northern
Caucasus, however, where significant numbers of local people had fled with the
Whites at the end of the Civil War. A man, identified by the OGPU as a kulak,
said, "Soon there will be a revolution and first of all we will punish the rural
soviet chairman and then pass out the grain." A middle peasant, dissatisfied
with the resumption of grain procurements, declared, "Let’s get our pikes and
become partisans." In Biiskii raion, a poor peasant entered the rural soviet
and told the chairman, "Give grain to us poor peasants. If not, we will take it by
force. We will go first of all to the party secretary, and if he does not give us
grain voluntarily, we will kill him. We must take all the grain and establish a
clean soviet power, without Communists."

Peasants spoke out even more frankly in anonymous threats that
proliferated at this time. One individual in the Kuban (Northern Caucasus) wrote
the elder of his Cossack village after a number of fellow villagers had been
arrested, "Watch out! We will come soon for your cursed soul and everyone
will blow out your eyes and slaughter you... You watch out! It will be easy to
cut you down. Blood will flow in rivers, and we will drink it." In June 1928,
the OGPU compiled what they claimed was (and actually seems to be) a representative sample of threatening letters and political proclamations from the restive Kuban, a hotbed of peasant rebellions in May 1928.\textsuperscript{161} In this collection, threatening letters outnumbered political proclamations and leaflets two to one. Anonymous letters came predominantly from individuals who identified themselves as former supporters of the Soviet regime—red partisans who now described themselves as “enemies of Soviet power,” or what the authorities liked to call “non-Party Bolsheviks,” who were now equally estranged. One such individual wrote:

Comrades Party members!

You torture the people, the Cossacks, and now the poor and middle peasants—they are not kulaks. Soviet power was created for proletarians. But you don’t see this and rob the unhappy poor and force them to pick up stakes and take bread and money from your pockets. You don’t treat us well; you rob us. If you don’t stop treating the poor this way, you will not rule for long. The poor already understand that the Party won’t help us.

You told us to drive out our enemies then we would live well and be free. Capitalism is better. None of us suffered from it. Now under peoples’ power, we are hungry. If this regime continues, the people will be ruined.

If you don’t stop collecting from us, we will have to pick up our stakes and fall upon the Communists. Excuse me, this is badly written. I am badly educated.\textsuperscript{162}

While most of the political proclamations in the OGPU collection attacked grain procurements, 20 percent supported the return of the Whites and another 20 percent favored the Left Opposition. A leaflet in this collection, issued by the Left Opposition, declared:

Citizens of Russia, Oppressed by the Communist Party!

Fires have broken out in Moscow and Leningrad. The commune burns. The administration is in the hands of the toiling non-Party people. The Party has ruined us for ten years and turned wealthy Russia into a poor nation. . . .

Peasants have been transformed into slaves. State farms, which make no profits and do not pay their hired hands, have taken over the noble landlords’ lands, and the toiling peasants suffer without land.
Throw out that Party! Don’t support it! Everyone should go and liberate Trotsky, Zinov’ev, and Kamenev. They are our roses of saviors and our salvation from violence. Soldiers, do not defend the Party people, robbers of your economy. Down with the hated Party! Long live Trotsky, Zinov’ev and Kamenev!163

While angry, antiregime leaflets, letters, comments, and appeals circulated in the village, available food stocks, depleted by procurements, began to run out, and peasants became increasingly desperate. A group of peasants in Belorussia, an area that traditionally imported much of its food, approached soldiers on maneuvers and inquired, “At whom are you shooting? Shoot at us. Everyone will die. Soviet power doesn’t give us grain.”164 Peasants in other Belorussian villages cornered soldiers and demanded, “Why are you silent at meetings? Why don’t you speak up? We are dying of hunger!”165 In May and June, the now ubiquitous crowds in the village streets grew larger and angrier. Crowds of forty to fifty poor peasants, predominantly women, milling around the rural soviet building and the local cooperative, demanding bread, became everyday sights in many villages, especially in Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and Siberia. It was in those milling crowds of increasingly hopeless women, desperate to feed their children that the last wave of the Great Russian Peasant War of 1902–1930 began to swell and crest.

**Peasant Rebellions**

Peasant unrest of all sorts—mass disorders, acts of terrorism against officials, and political proclamations and anonymous threats—had been running around 100 to 150 incidents a month since the start of the grain-procurement campaign in January. The number surged to 199 in April, 300 in May, 342 in June, and 231 in July, before subsiding until procurements once again resumed in the autumn. Most worrisome for the authorities was the sudden upsurge in mass disorders, riots, and uprisings (volynki or yuxtapositions) that accompanied the onset of the second round of procurements in May and continued into June and July.166 The participants in these rebellions were, according to all reports, predominantly poor peasants, hitherto regarded as supporters of the regime. To make matters worse, the authorities realized that the basic ingredient of these revolts could be found almost everywhere, in thousands of villages across the vast Soviet Union in those ever present milling crowds of hungry, desperate women. OGPU reports showed time and again that it took only the sudden appearance of a much hated official, news of some excess on the part of the local bureaucracy, rumors of revolts elsewhere, or plans to ship grain out of the village.
to turn crowds like these into rebellions.

The last big wave of peasant revolts had swept over the nation in the winter of 1920–21 with the great Tambovshchina and the other peasant “wars” that followed hard on the heels of the Russian Civil War (1918–20). Unrest subsided with the end of grain requisitioning and the restoration of a market economy (NEP). As a result, only thirty-one mass disorders took place in the USSR in 1926 and thirty-two in 1927, as table 3 demonstrates. The mass disorders of these years more often than not took the form of attempted lynchings (samosud) of thieves at bazaars, followed by clashes with the police when the latter intervened to make arrests.

Table 3. Active Forms of Peasant Unrest in the USSR, 1925-30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass disorders</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>1,307</td>
<td>13,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>1,604</td>
<td>6,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist acts against Soviet officials and activists</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>9,137</td>
<td>7,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>2,169</td>
<td>12,048</td>
<td>27,586</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Excludes leaflets, proclamations, and anonymous threats.
Sources: TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 8, del. 329, 198–212; fond 2, op. 5, del. 389, 109–111; and fond 2, op. 8, del. 679, 36–72 (the latter document is used here for 1930 alone).

In May 1928, however, the number of mass disorders suddenly escalated to 185 with the beginning of the second 1928 procurements campaign. In June, another 225 such rebellions occurred, and in July, 93 (see table 4). In little more than three months, a total of 503 mass rebellions occurred, about three times as many disorders as occurred during the Poltava and Kharkov rebellions of 1902 that shook the Imperial Russian government on the eve of the 1905 Revolution. In both cases—Kharkov-Poltava in 1902 and the May–July revolts of 1928—hunger, rooted in crop failures, was a major cause of unrest (as was the case in the revolution of 1905–06 too). Unlike the 1902 rebellions, that were directed against the gentry and their estates, the 1928 revolts were political from the onset, directed against the institutions and personnel of the Soviet party-state. The 1902 disorders (and those of 1905–06) involved attacks on the property, not
the persons, of the landowners. But in 1928 the revolts almost always resulted in violence against individuals, threats of violence, and crowd justice in the form of lynching and beatings of government representatives and Soviet activists. These peasant rebellions soon subsided, as did the Kharkov-Poltava revolts earlier. But in 1928 the revolts abated only after the party changed its policies toward the countryside at the July 1928 Plenum of the Central Committee, over the strong objections of the party’s leader, Joseph Stalin.

Table. 4. Peasant Unrest in 1928

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Mass Disorders</th>
<th>Acts of Terrorism</th>
<th>Political Proclamations &amp; Threatening Letters</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>709</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,027</strong></td>
<td><strong>845</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,581</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 8, del. 679, 40.

Moreover, even after the mass disorders abated in the summer of 1928, terrorism and threats against low-level Soviet officials and political activists continued to mount from month to month, culminating in February–May 1930 in the massive wave of rebellions that accompanied collectivization and dekulakization and once again forced Stalin’s government to beat a hasty, albeit temporary retreat.  

OGPU reports collected by the project, The Tragedy of the Soviet Village, contain descriptions of 52 of the 410 mass disorders reported to the national
OGPU in May and June 1928, including twenty-one that took place in the Kuban okrug, Northern Caucasus, between April 26 and May 27. (The Kuban was one of the major centers of unrest at this time, along with Ukraine.) Since official interest in peasant revolts waned as these rebellions subsided in the wake of the Central Committee Plenum (July 4–11), very little data on the July rebellions can be found in central archives. The reports we do have, however, indicate that the agrarian revolts of May–July 1928 were basically food riots or attempts to halt procurements. Efforts of overzealous local officials to collect grain and other payments to the government via mass searches, mass grain seizures, or the mass imposition of fines for concealing taxable property generally triggered the revolts. Participants consisted predominantly of poor peasant women. Men and other village social strata also participated but to a lesser degree. Twelve of the twenty-one revolts in the Kuban, singled out for study by the OGPU, involved only women, although women took part in all the Kuban disorders. The size of the crowds in our sample varied from seven individuals to one thousand, with the median size running around seventy-five to one hundred participants per rebellion.

In May–June 1928, crowds of predominantly poor peasant women halted searches of peasant homes and chased the offending grain-procurement officials out of town, pursuing them with sticks and stakes, crying, “Beat them! They are robbing us!” Crowds threatened officials if they did not receive food aid. They forced their way into cooperative stores and beat salesmen. They broke into storehouses and distributed grain. They halted grain shipments from their village by surrounding the wagons and in two cases stopped trains carrying away local procurements. In Armavir okrug, Northern Caucasus, one hundred women showed up, armed with sticks and cleavers, to march on the railroad station, crying, “The grain will not leave the station!” After abortive negotiations with the assistant raion soviet chairman and grain-procurement agents, the disappointed crowd left the station to hunt down the rural soviet chairman and “settle up with him.” The chairman managed to elude his pursuers by hiding until a thunderstorm dispersed the crowd. The women, however, reassembled the next day and milled about around the station, shouting, until evening.

The crowds were mostly unarmed, but at times they appeared with sticks, stakes, clubs, stones, and in the case mentioned above, even cleavers. In two incidents in Siberia, men in the crowd, armed with rifles, assassinated a village party secretary and a raion Komsomol secretary, wounding the latter’s companion as well. These shootings took place amid mass protests against searches and the evaluation of taxable property. In the course of the twenty-one Kuban disorders of April 26–May 27, peasants launched four attacks on the militia and tried to
lynch a rural soviet chairman. In three cases, they attacked the militia while it was conducting searches, and in the fourth case, ambushed a militiaman while he was walking through the bazaar. \textsuperscript{178} Attacks, lynchings, attempted lynchings, and threats of lynching were an integral part of the Russian peasant rebellions of 1928–30. Violent acts committed in the course of peasant rebellions accounted for a significant proportion of what the Soviet leaders of this time called “kulak terror.” By June 1928, according to the Siberian OGPU chief Zavodskii, attacks on rural officials, whether or not committed in the course of rebellions, inevitably involved groups of peasants, not just isolated individuals, as earlier.\textsuperscript{179}

Occasionally, crowds drove local political authorities out of the village, and in at least one case they elected a new political authority. Such events rarely occurred in the 1905 Revolution. In June 1928, a series of seven to eight women’s revolts (bab’i bunty) broke out in Slavogorodskii okrug (Siberia) and resulted in the temporary overthrow of Soviet power in some of the rebellious villages. Local authorities, unnerved by unemployment riots in a nearby town, fled the villages in panic to escape lynching at the hands of angry women, outraged by the high fines imposed on poor and middle peasants who concealed taxable objects. Order was restored only with the arrival of a detachment of armed Communists from outside the okrug, since local authorities could not muster the resources and will power to quell the rebellions.\textsuperscript{180}

In Terskii okrug (Northern Caucasus) four hundred peasants (three hundred of them women) participated in a rebellion that continued for several days. Crying, “We are hungry; we will not let the grain be carted away,” the crowd ordered the authorities to open the grain storehouse. When the latter refused, the crowd elected a “troika” of three women to lead them, modeled after the troikas established by officials to conduct the procurement campaign. The troika decided to end grain procurements immediately and opened the storehouse to determine how much grain remained. Cries then went up among the crowd, “They haven’t taken away the grain and if they try to do this, they will be beaten or disfigured.” The crowd continued to mill around outside the rural soviet for several days, led by their troika. Local authorities then convened a mass meeting to air the crowd’s complaints about taxes, grain procurements, and local institutions and officials. In the course of the discussion, some concessions were evidently made, because the crowd dispersed peacefully on “the explanation of a pro-Soviet Cossack.” Subsequently, however, the OGPU arrived to investigate the affair. The police concluded that “anti-Soviet elements” caused the rebellion, since one of the three troika members was the sister of a former tsarist officer, shot in 1927 as a “hostage” during the war scare with England.\textsuperscript{181} Quite likely this woman and perhaps others were arrested, although
we possess no follow-up report on this case.

Rebellions often terminated in the arrest of so-called instigators or leaders, generally individuals with politically suspect backgrounds (like former Whites or kulaks). Arrests were more likely to occur whenever officials were killed or injured or when protests continued for some time and/or proved particularly violent. Twenty-six persons were arrested, for example, after a shot from a protesting crowd killed the secretary of a rural Communist Party cell. But arrests did not always take place, and pacification, whether or not it involved arrests, was usually accompanied by efforts on the part of Soviet officials to listen to the crowd, let them vent their spleen, and move to rectify at least some of the community’s grievances and concerns. OGPU reports on peasant disorders often took the side of the peasants and attributed the unrest to “excesses” among local officials. One OGPU agent, present on the spot when a rebellion occurred, ended the revolt by distributing grain. In this way, vestiges of negotiation, compromise, and concessions as well as repression were integral features of the pacification process in May–June 1928. The tsarist regime, however, had reacted very differently to peasant unrest; negotiation was definitely out of the question, and the army was used routinely. In the fifty-two cases of revolts in May–June 1928 collected by our project, armed force was used in only two instances: authorities sent “five rifles” to break up a blockade established by poor peasants to prevent grain shipments from leaving their village; and an “armed detachment of Communists” from outside the area arrived in Slavgorodskii okrug to quell disorders after local authorities fled in panic. But the Red Army was not involved in the suppression of any of the 1928 peasant disorders that we have studied.

The Leadership Backs Down

On May 26, 1928, amid spreading revolts, a shaken Politburo met to take stock of the situation and formulate plans to tide the nation through until the new harvest. Agricultural specialists reported that 81 percent of the winter crops had perished in Ukraine and 22 percent in the Northern Caucasus, while 90 percent of the spring crops in Ukraine had to be replanted, further eroding grain stocks and delaying the new harvest. Under these conditions, the Politburo halted further grain shipments from the increasingly hungry and turbulent Ukraine, describing the situation there as “very grave.”187 Half the nation’s grain normally came from Ukraine. To compensate for the loss of Ukrainian grain, the Politburo authorized the Peoples’ Commissariat of Trade to supply the internal market by drawing on all the reserves of the mobilization fund (mobfond), a special grain reserve set aside for use in time of war. Depletion of this fund

37
would leave the nation without any grain reserves whatsoever. Even then, the Politburo had little choice but to reduce food supplies for the major cities once again. Small towns, including many raion capitals, were cut off from central supply altogether without any advance notice because, the Politburo decided, the center would henceforth supply “only the largest cities and workers’ centers.” Politburo members were dispatched to the localities to direct procurement efforts, and procurements for central supply (rather than local use) were initiated in the consuming provinces for the first time.

At the same time, the Politburo authorized “further cruel cutbacks” in food rations. The Commissariat of Trade cut the amount of flour shipped to the consuming provinces in half, while supplies to the producing regions were reduced by a third. By June 5, the Commissariat of Trade was besieged with telegrams and delegations from communities throughout the nation, insisting that they could not possibly live under the new ration norms. Bread continued to be sold freely in the larger cities and workers’ settlements, although migration into Moscow was limited to prevent the influx of migrants from the less well supplied small towns and the countryside. In small towns not covered by central supply, an ad hoc system of rationing spontaneously developed, although ration norms and methods of distribution varied widely from community to community. In Rybinsk (Iaroslavl province), where bread lines formed at 8:00 A.M. and continued until 9:00 P.M., one and a half kilograms (3.3 pounds) of black bread were distributed per family each day, regardless of family size. In Verkhneuralsk in the Urals, where rations amounted to only one kilogram a day per family, rumors circulated that a desperate woman, unable to feed her children, took them to a food cooperative and abandoned them there. In the town of Melenki, which appeared better organized and supplied, two kilograms (4.4 pounds) a day were distributed by ration books. Here, lines formed at 2:00 A.M. and continued all day. Parents who had to work sent young children to take their place in line, and every day exhausted children were rushed to the hospital, half dead. In Odessa, a major city in the Ukraine not supplied by the center, authorities distributed one pound of bread per “soul” a day, an inadequate amount for anyone performing physical labor.

The July 1928 Central Committee Plenum

The rising tide of peasant unrest in May–July 1928 strengthened the political hand of Soviet leaders who sought to curb repression earlier and were now determined to do away with the extraordinary measures for good. Such policies no longer ensured an adequate grain supply for the cities and had set off
growing numbers of peasant disorders. On July 4–11, 1928, the Communist Party Central Committee convened amid a faminelike situation in Ukraine, angry bread lines in the lesser towns and cities, rising peasant unrest, and unemployment riots in Moscow, Leningrad, Kazakhstan, and Siberia. While party leaders congregated in the capital, crowds of desperate, hungry women continued to mill about the streets of countless villages, gathering on a daily basis outside rural soviet headquarters, the local cooperative store, and other government institutions to demand bread. No doubt, many of the old revolutionaries at the helm of the Soviet party-state were reminded of those other women in Petrograd eleven years earlier, who stood in breadlines for days on end, finally lost their patience, and toppled a three-hundred-year-old monarchy.

Under these conditions, the July plenum addressed the situation in the countryside. The delegates, save for Stalin, Kaganovich, and few others, were deeply troubled by what the usually hard-nosed Andreev called "the deterioration in our relations with the peasantry." Speakers generally agreed that the extraordinary measures should be abandoned and grain prices allowed to rise in order to extract produce from the village. Some even suggested that industrial prices should be reduced at the same time, since the terms of trade ran against the countryside.198

Stalin, isolated and outvoted, vehemently opposed any changes in price policy, maintaining that a rise in grain prices would hinder the development of industry. He argued, along the lines of Trotsky and Preobrazhenskii earlier, that the Soviet Union lacked external sources of investment, like loans or colonies that might be exploited to finance industrialization. Funds for industrialization could only be obtained via a "surtax" or "tribute" extracted from the peasantry through a state-controlled price structure that inflated industrial prices and deflated agricultural prices. Industrialization and the future well-being of the village required such policies. Stalin insisted that the fragmentation of peasant holdings after the Revolution caused the grain problem and that gradual, voluntary collectivization was the solution. He denied that such policies would undermine the peasant-worker alliance on which the Soviet system rested. He called for a new worker-peasant alliance, based on metal and machinery to raise agricultural production, rather than the old alliance based on textiles and other consumer goods. He stressed the need for a rise in agricultural production and the accumulation of grain reserves for use during crop failures and war. Stalin insisted, "The extraordinary measures saved the nation from a general economic crisis . . . [and] people who think we can avoid extraordinary measures in the long history of our Party are wrong."199

Bukharin retorted that the government must raise agricultural prices
immediately, because the extraordinary measures had to be discarded once and for all. These policies, which were justified when they were originally introduced, no longer yielded any economic advantage but were turning “broad circles of the peasantry against the government.” Bukharin pointed to the rising tide of terrorist acts and rebellions in the countryside. He questioned the official figure given the plenum of 150 rebellions and cited the remarks of Comrade Sapov at the recent meeting of the Ukrainian Central Committee that 50 mass disorders had occurred in his okrug alone along with peasant demonstrations in the towns. Bukharin declared that if the extraordinary measures remained in force any longer, a kulak-led peasant revolution would inevitably topple the Soviet regime.

On July 10, the Communist Party Central Committee overwhelmingly supported Bukharin, not Stalin. Over Stalin’s fervent objections, the July plenum adopted a proposal introduced by Molotov to end the 1927–28 agricultural year by ending the extraordinary measures and “correcting prices . . . as a concession to the middle peasant.” The plenum condemned those who would make the extraordinary measures permanent, since such policies threatened the worker-peasant alliance on which the Soviet system rested. The meeting sanctioned a system of “flexible prices” that varied by crop and region, thus moving back toward a market economy and away from the “firm price” policy, espoused so fervently by Stalin. This decision signaled a major political defeat for Joseph Stalin.

The plenum decisions were immediately incorporated into Soviet law via a series of decrees issued by Sovnarkom, the judiciary, and the OGPU. On July 14 the RSFSR prosecutor, Krylenko, ordered prosecutors to halt illegal searches, forced grain seizures, and the closing of markets by rescinding the orders that sanctioned such policies. If local authorities refused to comply, he said, prosecutors should appeal such decisions all the way up to Krylenko himself. Officials who resisted orders would be arrested. All judicial cases involving the use of Article 107 against poor and middle peasants (as defined by the Politburo earlier) should be immediately terminated; and in the future, Article 107 should not be used against peasants who withheld grain from the market.

On July 19 Sovnarkom, under Rykov’s direction, ordered the forthcoming procurement campaign to be conducted without recourse to the extraordinary measures, which were directed against speculators and kulaks but had fallen by mistake on “broader strata of the peasantry.” Forced requisitioning and restrictions on the marketing of grain would cease immediately. Prices would be allowed to rise and would vary by crop and by region. The next day, the OGPU issued a similar decree, informing its operatives that the next procurement campaign was to be conducted very differently from the last one. Even the amnesty,
championed by Fainbilt and the Communist faction in the VTsIK Presidium, was finally adopted. On August 7, N. M. Ianson, the RSFSR commissar of justice, ordered all poor and middle peasants convicted under Article 107 released from prison. Unlike earlier, such orders were heeded this time. Soviet leaders who wanted to rein in repression had apparently prevailed.

The Failure of the New Moderate Course

The new moderate course proved even less effective than the extraordinary measures. Less grain was collected from the somewhat larger 1928 harvest than the previous year, as table 1 above demonstrates. Instead of exporting grain, as the Five-Year Plan required, the Soviet government imported grain. Even then, food stocks ran out. By February 1929 the authorities introduced rationing in the major industrial centers for the first time. The new ration norms amounted to 300 to 900 grams per “eater” per day, very low for a nation that consumed primarily grain products. As usual, the situation was worse in the countryside. In the spring of 1929, the Politburo received reports of hunger-induced bloating and deaths from starvation among the rural population in the consuming provinces and areas with crop failures, and many villages lacked sufficient seed to plant the new crop. Forbidden to utilize the extraordinary measures, local officials began to employ the “social pressure” methods of the traditional peasant chairvari and samosud to extract grain, after the center agreed to allow a share of the grain collected to remain in the localities as food aid. Those who failed to turn in procurements were mocked, humiliated, tarred, forced to run the gauntlet, locked up in cold sheds, deprived of food and sleep for days on end, and marched about the village wearing placards that identified them as “agents of Chamberlain,” the British Prime Minister. Greater violations of human rights thus transpired in the spring of 1929 than earlier. Once again, peasants responded with an upsurge of rebellions, and attacks on officials mounted, as table 5 shows.

Moderate policies had obviously failed and discredited the Party Right in the eyes of the Soviet leadership. The April 1929 Central Committee Plenum consequently reversed its stance of the previous year and endorsed “organized pressure” to collect procurements over the staunch opposition of Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskii, who insisted on grain procurements without extraordinary measures. The plenum then proceeded to remove Bukharin and his ally Tomskii from their official positions as editor of Pravda and head of the Soviet trade union organization.

When the 1929 harvest proved even lower than 1927 and 1928, Stalin decided to collect grain by force. By then, many raion-level officials were
reportedly going hungry.212 Under these conditions, the OGPU received orders in September 1929 to conduct another mass operation against those who resisted the new campaign, as the Politburo decided to speed up procurements from the 1929 harvest and collect them in full by January 1–February 1, 1930. To facilitate grain collections, OGPU operatives combed the countryside arresting “anti-Soviet

table. 5 Peasant Unrest in 1929 by Month and Forms210

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Mass Disorders</th>
<th>Acts of Terrorism</th>
<th>Political Proclamations &amp; Threatening Letters</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>1321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1157</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>1846</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>2,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1295</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>1,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,307</td>
<td>9,065</td>
<td>2,391</td>
<td>12,763</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 8, del. 679, 40.

groups” and “organizations.” Special detachments were dispatched to “Pugachev country,” the middle and lower Volga, the traditional seedbed of peasant revolts in Russia.213 By November 4, 28,344 “economic criminals” and “counterrevolutionaries” had been arrested by the OGPU.214 Erstwhile opponents of repression within the party leadership, frightened by the rising tide of peasant rebellions and attacks on officials, rallied to the support of Stalin’s government. The Commissariat of Justice ceased to combat repression and suggested articles of the law (including Article 107) under which procurements cases might be prosecuted.215 Rightist leaders recanted and embraced Stalin’s policies in November 1929, fearful that continued opposition would undermine the regime in a time of crisis and condemn the industrial centers to starvation.216 The foes of
Stalinism within and without the Soviet party-state could not make common cause for long.
Notes

The author would like to thank the NEH, IREX, Boston College, the Social Science Research Council and the Stalin Era Archive Project of the University of Toronto for their support of the research and writing of this essay. I am also deeply indebted to the staff of the international project, "The Tragedy of the Soviet Village," whose collective research provided much of the information on which the essay is based. This project, organized by V. P. Danilov, Lynne Viola, and me, with a staff of forty historians from six nations—Russia, the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Australia, and South Korea—is the most ambitious effort currently underway to explore the newly declassified materials on the Stalin era. The project has access to all the major central Moscow archives, including the still essentially closed Presidential Archive and the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service (FSB), as the KGB now calls itself. The project recently published the first two volumes of a projected five-volume documentary history of the Soviet countryside in the pre-war Stalin years: Tragedii sovetskoii derevnii: kollektivizatsiia i razkulachivanie: dokumenty i materialy, 1927-1939, vol. 1, 1927-1929 (Moscow: Rossppen, 1999), and vol. 2 1929-1930 (Moscow: Rossppen, 2000). Yale University Press plans to publish a four-volume English language edition, derived from the Russian series.


3. NEP stands for New Economic Policy, the market-driven mixed economy that prevailed in the USSR in 1921-1928 and replaced the centralized, state-directed economy of the initial postrevolutionary years at the end of the Civil War (1918-21).

4. S. M. Dubrovskii, Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v revoliutsii 1905-1907 g.g. (Moscow, 1956), 67; Tsentral'nyi Arkhiv Federatsii Sluzhby Bezopastnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii. (henceforth cited as TsA FSB RF), fond 2, op. 8, del. 679, 40. Dubrovskii's statistics come from the tsarist Department of Police (the Land Department of the Ministry of the Interior) and are based primarily on the reports of the provincial governors. His data is comparable to the FSB report utilized here, which is also a national police compilation derived from reports of the provincial OGPU representatives. The kinds of activities classified as "peasant disorders" by both agencies are remarkably similar, since both Dubrovskii and the OGPU viewed peasant unrest as a manifestation of "the class struggle."

There is reason to believe in both cases that the national statistics cited here may actually understate the incidence of unrest, since data in local archives for 1905-06 or in the reports of the local OGPU for 1928-29 often amount to more than the national aggregate data in.
Dubrovskii’s studies and in the OGPU report. Recent Russian studies of the agrarian rebellions of 1905-07 based on local archives indicate that the total number of peasant disorders in this period amounted to as much as three to five times Dubrovskii’s figures (18,000–26,000). See M. S. Simonov, “Krest'ianskaia dvizhenie v 1905–1907 g. v sovetskoi istoriografii,” Istoriicheskie zapiski, vol. 5 (Moscow, 1975), 212 (18,000 peasant rebellions); V. G. Tiukavkin, “Istoriicheskie itogi izuchenii razmakha krest’ianskogo dvizheniia v period I–oi russkoi revoliutsii,” Problemy istoriografii i istochnikovennia istorii trekh rossiiskikh revoliutsii: Sbornik statei (Moscow, 1987), 32 (22,000–26,000 revolts); and L. T. Senchakova, Krest’ianskoe dvizhenie v revoliutsii 1905–1907 g. g. (Moscow, 1989), 254 (25,823 peasant disorders in two years, 1905–1906).


6. Historians tend to regard these crises as superficial, if not artificially provoked, and easily remedied, a product of the following factors: (1) misguided pricing policies; (2) a goods famine, exacerbated by hoarding set off by the 1927 war scare; (3) unbalanced economic development that favored industry; and (4) the high volume of agricultural exports required by the First Five-Year Plan. In so thinking, scholars have been unduly influenced by arguments advanced in 1928 by the Right Opposition, particularly Bukharin. I agree not so much with Bukharin as with Rykov and Preobrazhenski, who believed that the prime cause of the grain crises was demographic, since the USSR possessed over 20 million more citizens than the tsarist empire, while grain production only amounted to 87 percent of prerevolutionary levels. See A. I. Rykov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia (Moscow, 1990); Evgenii Aleksandrovich Preobrazhenskii, “Zametki ekonomika na ‘Zametki ekonomika,’” TsA FSB RF (we were given no archival citations for this document); and Paul Gregory, Russian National Income, 1885–1913 (Cambridge, 1982), 102–21, 194.

7. A. I. Mikoian, the head of the Soviet trade organization Narkomtorg, deemed that 685 million puds were required to supply the industrial centers, the consuming provinces, and the Red Army, while providing seed loans and famine relief to areas with crop failures.Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’noi i Politicheskoi Istorii (henceforth cited as RGASPI, formerly RTsKhIDNI), fond 17, op. 165, del. 13, 9–10. Grain-producing provinces had to take their food supplies from local organizations, like mills, mill trusts, and local cooperatives. Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki (henceforth cited as RGAE), fond 278, op. 1, del. 2057, 48–49.

In the spring of 1929, Stalin lowered estimates of the amount needed for domestic consumption to 500 million puds (or 8.1 million metric tons), a figure often cited in scholarly works as Soviet domestic grain needs. Stalin advanced this figure at a time when only 470 million puds had been collected from the 1928 harvest. I. Stalin, Sochineniia (Moscow, 1953), 12: 87. By then, however, grain supplies allotted the larger cities had been repeatedly reduced, although the urban population was rapidly growing, as peasants left areas plagued by crop failure and/or overly zealous procurements. Rationing was introduced in many major towns and cities, while the lesser cities, including the raion capitals, were cut off from central supplies; consuming areas, which had been dependent on imported grain since the end of the eighteenth century, had to fend for themselves. Under these conditions 500 million puds actually amount to starvation rations. The earlier Mikoian estimate is more in line with the nation’s actual grain needs. RGAE, fond 5240, op. 9, del. 208, 19–20; Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (henceforth cited as GARF), fond 353s, op. 165, del. 16, 43; and del. 8, 15–17.
8. The procurement statistics used here apply to central procurements only, exclusive of the milling tax, decentralized procurements, and other extractions retained in the localities and utilized for local needs. The figures cited are the final calculations made after the end of the agricultural year and were found in GARF, fond 5446, op. 10, del. 832, 82–84; and TsA FSB RF, fond 66, op. 1, del. 185, 287–90, and fond 2, op. 7, del. 523, 258–61. Figures published in the Soviet press at this time and cited in the works of R. W. Davies tended to run somewhat higher. These figures, which also can be found in the archives, seem to be based on initial, overly optimistic estimates made just as the new agricultural year began, on the eve of or during the harvest.

9. GARF, fond 5446, op. 10, del. 832, 84.

10. RGASPI, fond 17, op. 3, del. 663, 4, and del. 683, 16–18; GARF, fond 353s, op. 16s, del. 16, 43. Even before the procurement crises and the hoarding unleashed by the 1927 war scare, Soviet food supplies were so strained that Glavlit, the censorship agency, prohibited all discussion of food problems in the press, in a circular issued April 16, 1927. TsA FSB RF, fond 66, op. 1, del. 174, 162.

11. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 5, del. 394, 114, 118–21. Fears for the winter crop were not misplaced, as these crops failed miserably in 1928 in the same areas that had experienced short harvests the previous year.

12. Ibid., and RGAE, fond 478, op. 1, del. 2057, 165–167. Conflicts were provoked by land surveying (zemleustroistvo) and traditional rivalries among Cossacks and peasants in the volatile Northern Caucasus.

13. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 5, del. 394, 114. In calculating domestic grain needs, Mikoian allocated 30 million puds for famine relief to Central Asia and the Caucasus, where crops had failed. RGASPI, fond 17, op. 165, del. 13, 9–10.

14. RGAE, fond 5230, op. 9, del. 102, 45–49; GARF, fond 5446, op. 10, del. 1001, 142.


18. Ibid., 36.

19. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 56, del. 567, 5. This decree was dated October 1928.

20. Ibid., 1–4.

22. RGASPNI, fond 17, op. 2, del. 335, 3–5. Stalin may have been initially inspired to resign by the publication abroad of Lenin’s Testament and other secret party documents by Max Eastman, and American supporter of Trotsky. For the Eastman Affair, see Lars T. Lih, Oleg Naumov, and Oleg KV. Khlevnik; eds. Stalin’s Letters to Molotov (New Haven, Conn., 1995), 69–94. Stalin actually “resigned” four times. The last “resignation” occurred at the end of 1932 at the height of the Great Famine, in the wake of his wife’s suicide and the calls of Syrtsov, Lominadze, and Riutin for his resignation. Isaac Deutsher, Stalin: A Political Biography (Oxford, 1966), 333–34.

23. RGASPNI, fond 17, op. 2, del. 335, 5–7


25. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 5, del. 384, 15–36.

26. GARF, fond 5446, op. 10s, del. 100, 141–42.

27. RGASPI, fond 17, op. 3, del. 663, 4, and del. 666, 10–12 and 22–24.

28. Ibid., 12. A STO decree of December 25, 1927, declared that price rises were intolerable and ordered a cutback in the money supply in an attempt to curb inflation. RGAE, fond 478, op. 1, del. 2057, 163.

29. RGASPI, fond 17, op. 3, del. 666, 22–24; and RGAE, fond 478, op. 1, del. 2057, 160.

30. The previous year, 428 million puds had been collected by January 1. Stalin, Sochineniia, 11, 101–12; “Iz istorii kollektivizatsii,” Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1991, no. 5, 195; Bukharin, Put’ k sotsializmu, 270; and RGASPI, fond 17, op. 165, del. 13, 9–10. Izvestiia TsK KPSS was a publication of the Communist Party Central Committee under Mikhail Gorbachev that published key documents to fill in what Gorbachev called “the blank pages” of Soviet history. The article cited here contained numerous documents from Stalin’s 1928 trip to Siberia to oversee grain collection. It was published in two installments.

31. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1991, no. 5, 193–95. An English translation of this document can also be found in James Hughes, Stalinism in a Russian Province: Collectivization and Dekulakization in Siberia (London, 1996), 250–51. Molotov in his conversations with Felix Chuev maintained that there was a resolution, adopted on Stalin’s suggestion before his trip to Siberia, authorizing special repressive measures against kulaks, including confiscation of grain and even the execution of those who failed to meet their procurement quotas. Albert Reis, ed., Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev (Chicago, 1993), 242. Our project has found no such document. Molotov quite likely confused this period with later times.

32. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 567, 498.

33. Ibid., 498–504.
34. This was true throughout the prewar Stalin era. See Roberta T. Manning, *Government in the Soviet Countryside in the Stalinist Thirties: The Case of Belyi Raion in 1937*, Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, 301, (Pittsburgh, 1984), 9, 16.


36. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 567, 499.


40. *Ibid.*. This telegram can also be found in RGASPI, fond 17, op. 3, del. 669, 20–26.


42. *Ibid.*, 202. The fines imposed by law were not insignificant but amounted to the arrears owed for first-time offenders and ten times the amount owed for repeated offenders, who could also be sentenced to jail or compulsory labor for up to a year.


46. *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, 1991, no. 6, 211.

47. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 567, 358.


52. GANO, fond 2, op. 2, del. 289, 33–39.

54. Ibid., 215–16.


56. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 567, 358.

57. Ibid., 258, 439, and 466.

58. Ibid., 498–504.


64. Ibid., 515–24.

65. Ibid., 503–04.

66. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 567, 515–24.


68. GARF, fond 353s, op. 16s, del. 6, 16–17.

69. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 597, 22–27; and Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, 2: 756.

70. GARF, fond R–5446, op. 55, del. 2749, 441.

Terms like “kulak,” “middle peasant,” “poor peasant,” etc. are used here and throughout this essay as socio-legal categories, determined by the state, a sort of Soviet style soslovnost, which might or might not have any bearing on actual social-economic status. Such legal categories determined whether or not one received entitlements or was discriminated against, if not persecuted, by the Party-state. Politburo leaders, however, seemed to believe that these legal categories corresponded to social-economic realities.

73. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 567, 498–504.


76. GARF, fond 353s, op. 16s, del. 6, 16–17.

77. RGASPI, fond 17, op. 3, del. 683, 89.


80. The Peasants Union was an organization originally created in the 1905 Revolution and was sometimes affiliated back then with the SRs and (more rarely) the Kadets. Roberta T. Manning, *The Crisis of the Old Order in Russia: Gentry and Government* (Princeton, N. J., 1982), 122–23, 150, 164, 241, 254, and 451.

81. GARF, fond 374, op. 27, del. 1556, 14–22.

82. *Ibid*.


84. GARF, fond 353s, op. 16s, del. 6, 16–17.

85. Solomon, *Soviet Criminal Justice*, 67–68. Solomon, however, misunderstood the intent of this measure. He viewed it as an effort of the center to restrict the freedom of the local judiciary, whereas it appears in the context of our documents to be a response to gross violations of the law and of human rights by local judges and prosecutors during the 1928 procurement campaigns.

86. GARF, fond 353s, op. 16s, del. 6, 16–17.

87. TsA FSB RF, fond 66, op. 1, del. 184, 330.

88. GARF, fond 374, op. 27, del. 1556, 114–23; and TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 599, 381.
89. Stalin, *Sochinenii*, 11: 46-47, and Bukharin, *Put k sotsializmu*, 284. For a discussion of these arrests, see TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 599, 390-95.


91. GARF, fond 374, op. 27, del. 1556, 114-15.

92. RGASPI, fond 17, op. 165, del. 13, 17, 49, and 96-97.

93. Ibid., op. 3, del. 165, 8.

94. Ibid., del. 683, 1-2.

95. RGAE, fond 5340, op. 9, del. 203, 19-29.

96. Ibid., 4.

97. Ibid., 1-18.

98. RGASPI, fond 17, op. 165, del. 13, 36, 44, 45, 50-53, 63.

99. Ibid., 44, 53.

100. Ibid., 24, 30, 43.

101. Ibid., 10-20, 22-24, 27, 32, 49, 53, 30, 57, 61, 63, 73.

102. Ibid., 24, 27, 30, 32, 43.

103. Ibid., 49.

104. Ibid., 5

105. Ibid., 28, 57.

106. Ibid., 57.

107. Ibid., 78.

108. Ibid., 78-101.

109. Ibid., 80.

110. Ibid., 98.

111. Ibid., fond 17, op. 3, del. 684, 18-20.
In undertaking these searches, local authorities availed themselves of a new decree, issued jointly by the Commissariats of the Interior and Justice on May 3, 1928. This decree allowed rural soviet members and chairmen to conduct searches and confiscate evidence on the vote of the rural soviet without the presence of the OGPU or militia, whenever there was reason to believe that evidence involved in a crime was being concealed on the premises. The wording of the decree indicated that it applied to crimes like murder, theft, arson, and bootlegging. The specific articles of the law to be utilized were enumerated in the decree. Article 107 was not on the list. But local authorities increasingly employed the decree to collect grain procurements utilizing Article 107, first under the pretext of searching for weapons and bootlegging stills and then without any pretext whatsoever. For the text of the decree, see Sovetskaia iutitsiia, 1928, no. 19, 581–82.

The disenfranchised consisted of former “exploiters,” “non-toilers,” and “class aliens,” who were deprived of the vote by the 1918 Constitution of the Russian Federation. The numbers thus stigmatized grew over time. Such individuals were subjected to various disabilities like higher taxes and exclusion from higher education. The disenfranchised also figured disproportionately as victims of Stalin’s Terror in the 1930s. V. I. Tikhonov, V. S. Tiazhel’nikova, I. F. Iushin, Lishenie iz biratel’nykh prav v Moskve v 1920–1930-e gody: Novye materialy i methody obrabotki (Moscow, 1998).
127. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 599, 391, and 394.

128. Ibid., 393.

129. GARF, fond 374, op. 27, del. 1556, 127–28.

130. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 599, 391–95.

131. Ibid., del. 567, 466, 500, and 503.

132. GANO, fond 2, op. 2, del. 261, 65.

133. Ibid., 464–74.

134. GARF, fond 374, op. 27, del. 1556, 114–17.

135. Ibid., 98–109. For a discussion of Soviet agricultural taxes in the 1920s, see Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, 2: 757–60, and Bukharin, Put' k sotsializmu, 435. The Party Right strongly supported tax exemptions for poor peasants and was responsible for a measure, adopted on the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, that freed 35 percent of villagers, the poorer elements, from agricultural taxes all together, beginning in the 1928–29 tax year.

136. RGASPI, fond 17, op. 165, del. 13, 49–52.

137. RGAE, fond 5240, op. 9, del. 208, 25; and GANO, fond 2-P, op. 2, del. 261, 26, and del. 292, 60–61.

138. The number of collective farms and collective farmers doubled between October 1, 1927, and July 1, 1928. The largest growth was in areas singled out for procurements, like the Don okrug. RGAE, fond 7733, op. 5, del. 157, 131–43.

139. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 599, 464–67.

140. Ibid., 381–82.

141. Rations in the villages varied greatly, depending on local harvests, the size of local grain-procurement quotas, and the zeal of local officials. At a result, at the beginning of June, the Northern Caucasus village of Adler in Chernomorskii okrug enjoyed rations that would be the envy of many small towns—two kilograms of flour a month and two kilograms of bread a day—distributed to citizens by ration books. In large parts of nearby Don, Kuban, Armavirsk and Tersk okrugi, however, grain was unavailable. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 599, 371–78.

142. Ibid.

143. Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv (henceforth cited as RGVA), fond 9, op. 28, del. 68, 38.
144. GARF, fond 375, op. 27, del. 1556, 127.
145. Ibid., fond 353s, op. 16, del. 6, 41.
146. GARF, fond 377, op. 28, del. 2072, 325.
147. Ibid., fond 353s, op. 16, del. 6, 39.
148. RGAE, fond 5240, op. 9, del. 208, 23. The milling tax was introduced in April 1928, to bring grain and flour prices more in line and prevent peasants from getting around procurements by grinding their grain into flour, which sold at a higher price. Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, 2: 757–60.
149. RGAE, fond 5240, op. 9, del. 191, 39–41.
150. TsA FSB RF, fond 1235, op. 140, del. 1108, 1.
151. Ibid., fond 2, op. 6, del. 599, 387, and 472–74.
152. Ibid., fond 1235, op. 140, del. 1108, 1–3.
153. Ibid., fond 2, op. 6, del. 599, 381–82.
154. Ibid., 387.
155. GARF, fond 374, op. 27, del. 1556, 127.
156. Ibid., 373–76.
157. Ibid., 385.
158. Ibid., 386.
159. Ibid., 387.
160. Ibid., 138–39.
161. Ibid., 136–40. The monthly reports of the provincial OGPU, which quoted such letters and proclamations at length, indicate that the Kuban collection did, indeed, contain a representative sample of such materials.
162. Ibid., 139.
163. Ibid., 136. This appeal was dated January 24, 1928, a week after Trotsky was exiled from Moscow.
164. RGVA, fond 9, op. 28, del. 68, 41.
165.  Ibid., 40

166. One Soviet era study, based on party archives, concluded that 1,400 terrorist acts were committed in 1928. *Voprosy istorii*, 1960, no. 4, 63.


168. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 8, del. 679, 40, and op. 5 del. 394, 64–65, 72–141.


170. For this see Viola, *Peasant Rebels Under Stalin*. In this period alone 13,793 mass disorders took place.

171. All but three of the fifty-two disorders, on which we have data, were provoked by food shortages or procurements. Two others were directed against land surveying (*zemleustroistvo*), in one case, surveying for a collective farm. The third was a protest against the conversion of the local church into a school. GANO, fond 2-R, op. 2, del. 292, 65–68.

172. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 599, 111–12.

173. Ibid., 464–74, 345, 111–12.


175. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 599, 111–12; GARF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 374, 127, 111–12, 371–78.

176. GARF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 374, 371–78.

177. GANO, fond 2-R, op. 2, del. 292, 63–64.

178. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 599, 111–12.

179. GANO, fond 2-R, op. 2, del. 261, 48–56, and del. 292, 64.

180. Ibid., del. 261, 7–9.

181. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 599, 371–78. When White Guards (Russian emigres) assassinated the Soviet ambassador to Poland, P. L. Voikov, on June 7, 1927, hard on the heels of Great Britain’s severance of diplomatic relations with the USSR, the Soviet government ordered the execution of twenty “White guards” in Soviet prisons as “hostages” to deter further White attacks on Soviet personnel. Subsequently more “hostages” were executed, as the OGPU launched a mass operation against “monarchists,” “White guards” and “alien elements.” In the process 9,000 “former people” (noble landowners, Whites, kulaks, bourgeois, clergy, and private traders) were arrested as “agents of London” and/or the Whites or as members of an alleged “British spy network.” This operation was followed in July by another OGPU operation directed against
“village counterrevolutionaries” in border areas long in the hands of the Whites during the Civil War, like Ukraine, Belorussia, the Far East, the Northern Caucasus and the Caucasus. *Tragedia sovetskoi derevni*, 1: 22–26 and 77–82. These were the first “mass operations” of the Stalin era, that is, mass arrest campaigns handled outside the regular judiciary that our project has found.

182. GANO, fond 2-R, op. 2, del. 292, 60–64.

183. *Ibid.*, del. 261, 1–68; and TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 599, 371–75.

184. TsA FSB RF, fond 1235, op. 140, del. 1108, 3–4.


186. The army rarely intervened in peasant disorders in 1929–30 and then only on the initiative of local commanders, seeking to rescue local Communists from angry crowds. Such intervention was condemned as an “overreaction” on the part of the military command, which sought to keep the Red Army out of civil strife. TsA FSB RF, fond R-9414, op. 1, del. 1944, 17–25; and RGVA, fond 3, op. 28, del. 166, 8–11.

187. RGAE, fond 5240, op. 9, del. 208, 23–24.

188. GARF, fond 353s, op. 16, del. 6, 40.


190. *Ibid.*, fond 353s, op. 16s, del. 6, 41; and RGAE, fond 5240, op. 9, del. 208, 28.

191. These consisted of Moscow, Leningrad, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Vladimir, Iaroslavl, Kostroma, and Karelia. RGAE, fond 5240, op. 9, del. 208, 19–22; and GARF, fond 353s, op. 16, del. 6, 40–43.

192. RGASPI, fond 17, op. 113, del. 643, 2, and del. 626, 6; and RGAE, fond 5240, op. 9, del. 208, 22–24.

193. GARF, fond 353s, op. 16, del. 6, 41.


195. RGVA, fond 9, op. 28, del. 69, 37–43.

196. GARF, fond 374, op. 27, del. 1556, 98–102.


198. RGASPI, fond 17, op. 2, del. 375, (chast’ II), 50–66.

200. RGASPI, fond 17, op. 2, del. 375, (chast’ II), 50–62.
201. Ibid., 60–66.
202. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 567, 515–16.
203. GARF, fond 353, op. 16, del. 16, 48–50.
204. Carr and Davies, *Foundations of a Planned Economy*, 1, pt.1: 84.
205. TsA FSB RF, fond 66, op. 1, del. 243, 243.
206. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 6, del. 567, 515–24; *Sovetskaia iutitsiia*, 1929, no. 13, 303; and GARF, fond 1235, op. 140, del. 1042, 35.
207. GARF, fond 353s, op. 16s, del. 8, 15–17.
208. TsA FSB RF, fond 3, op. 7, del. 86, 83–89.
209. Ibid., fond 2, op. 7, del. 524, 101–03, and del. 254, 118, 120–22; GARF, fond 1235, op. 141, del. 113, 98–08.
210. A Soviet era article, based on local archives, claimed that 30,000 terrorist acts occurred in 1929 in the RSFSR, considerably more than the OGPU found for the USSR as a whole. *Istoriia SSSR*, 4, 1 (1970): 607. Even various central OGPU sources vary on the number of disorders, as a close comparison of tables 3, 4, and 5 indicates.
212. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, del. 8, op. 679, 40.
214. TsA FSB RF, fond 2, op. 7, del. 42, 1.
215. *Sovetskaia iutitsiia*, 1929, no. 34, 808.
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