Contesting the Malyn Massacre: The Legacy of Inter-Ethnic Violence and the Second World War in Eastern Europe

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Abstract

On the morning of July 13, 1943, a German anti-partisan formation surrounded the small village of Malyn and its Czech and Ukrainian inhabitants. The soldiers gathered the entire village population in the town square and, after a document check, proceeded to lock them inside the town church, school and their homes. The soldiers then set fire to these buildings and shot them with machine guns. By the end of the day, Malyn ceased to exist. On the surface, the Malyn Massacre appears as just another ghastly crime committed by a brutal occupying force. Yet, a closer look at archival sources, popular discourse, and scholarly literature on Malyn reveals a much different picture – and a murkier one. In total, there are over fifteen different versions of what happened in Malyn that day. The ethnic identities of the units that accompanied the Germans vary from account to account, as do the details of the crime, the justification for the reprisal, and even the ethnicity of the victims. In analyzing materials from over ten archives in six countries and four historiographical-linguistic narratives, in addition to field research in Ukraine and the Czech Republic, this article explains why so many disparate claims about the Malyn massacre exist. I specify four discursive landscapes about Malyn (Soviet, Ukrainian, Polish, and Czech) and detail how and why each of these has come to construct their own version(s) of Malyn in relation to larger grand narratives about the war in the East. This microhistory also underscores how the trauma and legacy of wartime inter-ethnic violence casts a long shadow over the current understanding of the war and highlights the daunting task scholars face writing the history of this region and time period.
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Early in the morning on July 13, 1943, Ludmila Činková, a seventeen-year-old Czech resident of Malyn, Ukraine, tended cattle in a field near her village. As she walked through the fields, a woman ran frantically toward her. She told Ludmila that the Germans had just begun surrounding the Czech and Ukrainian sectors of the village of Malyn. Weeping, she pled that Ludmila return with her to the village for safety.

As Ludmila and the woman approached Malyn, a German anti-partisan task force of an estimated twenty vehicles and hundreds of soldiers began to cordon off both the Ukrainian and Czech sections of the village. The detachment dismounted in a nearby forest about three to four kilometers from Malyn and armed themselves with grenades, rifles, sub-machine guns, and machine guns. Following a protocol played out that spring and summer in villages all over Volhynia, the Germans rounded up the villagers with the claim they would be registered in the town square. As they went from home to home, the Germans reassured the villagers: “The Czechs are gut [good]—we only came here to see if they are any bandity [Soviet partisans] and examine your documents. Afterwards you are free to go home.” When the people of Malyn asked if the children could stay home, they replied that they “needed everyone, young and old.” The soldiers even told the elderly and sick, “We also need you, but you’ll be the first to leave.”

The soldiers also raided the local hospital. A nurse, Olga Trikhleb, reported: “A few Germans burst in and asked us who was in the hospital.” She continued:

The [Germans] found two sick Ukrainian men…and screamed at them, “Bandits, bandits” [bandity] and took them from the hospital. We were treating an old Soviet officer, Lieutenant Sergei Ladygin, a resident of Leningrad. The Germans shouted at Ladygin, “Communist, Communist” and also took him with them….The Germans took our doctor Otto Gross, his wife Sofia Gross, and their thirteen-year-old children….and the ambulance workers Afanasiia Omel’chuk and his wife Elena In all, the soldiers forcibly removed fifteen sick people who had been waiting for the doctor. Other patients who were too sick to move were left in their hospital beds. Olga and a few patients luckily escaped by hiding in the hospital cellar during the chaos.
The soldiers drove the Czech population from their homes to the Ukrainian section of Malyn, where they and the Ukrainian residents were gathered together to have their documents examined. First, the soldiers divided the population by gender. A group of mostly Czech women, children, and the elderly, was taken back toward Czech Malyn and deposited in a neighbor’s yard. Ludmila Činková, who had by now returned from tending her cows, was among them. She recounted, “Those who were taken to the yard of Josef Dobrý did not stay there long. They were immediately put in barns and sheds. Taking advantage of the confusion I jumped over the fence and hid in a garden.”

Back in Ukrainian Malyn, the Germans took the men to a nearby field, examined documents again, and then separated the men by nationality—Czechs, Ukrainians, and a few Poles. At this time, the soldiers took about twenty mostly teenage men to help ransack the village’s livestock. Among them were Josef Martinovský and his son Alois, Jan Činka and his son Viktor, and Vladimír Řepík. The Germans originally only chose Josef and not his son, but acquiesced to Josef’s refusal to participate without him. Josef’s insistence saved Alois’ life. Řepík recalled their task:
We were forced to gather together the gear and harness the horses to the carts. We began to load the pig carcasses on the cart and hold pigs from behind while the Germans shot them with sub-machine guns. We cleaned the pigs and laid them in the cart. There was a lot of livestock swimming in the pond. The Germans began to shoot at them, then ordered us go into the water and gather the dead livestock. Fearing for our lives we gathered together all of the dead livestock and put them in the cart as well.\footnote{13}

The village’s remaining men were locked inside a school and an Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian section of Malyn.\footnote{14} The majority of men in the school were Czech, whereas the majority of men in the church were Ukrainian. There was a small number of women and children in these buildings, too. In all, there were about 155 people in the church and somewhere between 50 and 80 people in the school.\footnote{15} Václav Uhliř was one of the Czech men locked inside the church:

\ldots Among us was a sick woman, Věra Helíxová, who was being held up by her husband, Vladimír…Among us were four elderly men…In the hallway, the Germans put down straw. We began to worry but still did not understand what was going to happen to us. Next, two older German officers came to the door of church, looked at us and left without saying a word. As they left, the German soldiers began to throw grenades through the church door. I was quickly thrown against the wall. There were strong explosions from the grenades. Many men were killed and injured. The injured let out heart-wrenching cries. We were completely defenseless. Nobody knew what to do. After the Germans were done throwing grenades, they opened fire on us with submachine guns [avtomaty]. I was shot in the leg. After the machine guns stopped, they set fire to the school. Many people were still alive and they made awful cries. Along with twenty others who were also lightly wounded, I jumped out the window. The Germans opened fire on us again. I was shot four times in my leg. I fell behind a small hill and held my breath to play dead. A German saw me bloodied and decided I was dead. The remaining 20 people who had
jumped through the window with me were machined gunned down by the Germans.  

Figure 1: The church following the massacre, 1943. Courtesy of Josef Řepík.

In addition to the school and church, the soldiers put about 60 women, children, and elderly in a nearby barn of a Ukrainian resident near the buildings and another 30 women, children, and elderly in the cow barn of Pavel Veliky. Vladimír Řepík, who was returning to the Ukrainian section of Malyn with the livestock guarded by German soldiers, watched this scene:

As we returned to Malyn we encountered a ghastly picture: the school, the church, and other buildings were ablaze with our family and friends locked inside, while the Germans were firing on them with tommy-guns. We heard the horrible screams of frightened people. We saw men jumping from one window of the school. The Germans caught all of them and killed them on the spot.
Meanwhile, the nurse Olga Trikhleb and her patients hid in deathly silence in the hospital cellar:

From the cellar we were able to hear that the Germans wanted to look for something in the hospital. Two Germans came over to the cellar. One German came down into the cellar and took the butter lying on the shelf, at which point he noticed us and quickly went upstairs. The second German came in and lit a match to look at us. Everyone was frightened and we begged the German not to kill us. He said nothing and went back upstairs and threw a grenade through the open door. There was a strong explosion. Everything became silent in the cellar. After the explosion the entire cellar filled with smoke. It was very hard to breathe, but all of the patients kept silent, careful not to make a noise and give us away. The
Germans waited nearly ten minutes and after not hearing any sounds from the cellar they left.\textsuperscript{19}

The soldiers put the patients who had been removed from hospital into Bedřich Činka’s barn and then set the buildings on fire.

Near the hospital, Ludmila Činková watched in horror as the Germans forced women and children into the villager Josef Dobrý’s barn, sprayed it with machine gun fire, and shot and stabbed anyone trying to flee the blaze.\textsuperscript{20} Residents from the neighboring village of Zamczysko later reported they could hear the screaming.\textsuperscript{21}

![Figure 3: Remains of sheds and barns in the yard of Josef Dobrý, 1943. Courtesy of Darina Martinovská.](image)

As the village burned, the soldiers split the young men with the livestock into two groups, sending one to the neighboring village Olyka and other towards the village P’iane.\textsuperscript{22} A storm that broke out during the journey allowed several men, including Josef Martinovský and his son, to escape. In Olyka, a local Pole helped Jan Činka and Vladimir Řepík escape.\textsuperscript{23} Upon returning to Malyn, Martinovský found the bodies of his wife and daughter. Jan Činka searched for his wife and son, finally finding them in a burned barn.
He later recalled: “My wife, Marie Činková, was holding my eight-year-old son Václav in her arms. I was able to identify him by the buckle of his little boots...”

In the days following the massacre, many Czechs from neighboring villages came to Malyn to search for their loved ones. One such person was Vladimír Morávek, a forty-seven-year-old peasant from the neighboring village of Mal’ovane:

I traveled to Malyn to learn the fate of my sister Věra Bešta, 44, her husband, Josef Bešta, 55, their daughter Marie, 16, and their two other daughters. When I arrived in Malyn I saw a horrific scene: charred corpses, pieces of unburned body parts, and bones laid among the broken-down, burned-out buildings. I began to look for my sister and I was able to find her among a number of corpses in a shed. I had to identify her by her gold tooth (since she had dentures in her upper jaw). I was unable to identify her by any other signs or by her facial features since her corpse was so badly burned. She was lying face down. There were visible traces of scraped-away earth where she [had clawed with her hands] to save herself from the fire and suffocation from the smoke. I was unable to find her first daughter amongst the many burned children’s corpses. I found her second daughter in another barn severely burned, lying face down. I managed to recognize her by a pile of books, which she used to read when she took the cows out to graze. I found my sister’s husband about 30 to 40 meters from the school. When the massacre began he tried to run but was immediately shot and killed. He had one wound in the back of his head and another in the palm of his hand.
Ludmila, who survived the massacre hiding in the gardens, effectively captured the immense sense of loss of both Czechs and Ukrainians: “My mother, father, and two older married sisters with their children, were all burned to death. I am now left completely alone, without my family and my kin.”

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In total, between 532 and 603 people were killed during the reprisal action. Of these, it is likely that 374 victims were Czech, 132 Ukrainians, and 26 Poles. Only ten of the village’s 120 homes remained intact, the rest, hundreds of barns, sheds, and storehouses, had been torched. By the evening of July 13, 1943, the village of Malyn had ceased to exist.

In the Museum of the Great Patriotic War in Kyiv there is an imposing sculptural representation of Ukraine on a wall. On the map, tiny light bulbs mark every village destroyed during the war. Even with this enormous visual aid, it is still difficult to comprehend the sheer devastation and loss that accompanied the destruction of over 450 villages that took tens of thousands of lives in the span of less than four years. While few would argue that Malyn does not warrant a spot in the pantheon of martyred European villages, unlike other much more well-known massacres in Lidice, Khatyn’,
Sant’Anna di Stazzema, or Oradour-Sur-Glane, the Malyn massacre has garnered little attention in the West. Malyn, which is rarely mentioned in English-language publications, is just one of many villages that have faded into background, another causality of the brutal war in the east.

While Malyn does not carry the international cache of these other massacres, it is possible to find more information about what happened on July 13, 1943 from a variety of archival and primary sources and published literature in Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, and Czech. However, any hopes of finding vestiges of a cogent narrative describing the fate of Malyn in the historical record or in scholarly literature were dashed. There are at least fifteen competing versions across a wide spectrum of sources explaining why the village was destroyed and who destroyed it in every imaginable type of Ukrainian, Czech, Polish, Russian and Hebrew historical source—from testimonies of Volhynians to scholarly works from three different countries.

Here is a preview of the reasons given as to why the Germans and their collaborators destroyed the village: Czechs and/or Ukrainians aided Soviet partisans; the presence of a Soviet partisan in the hospital; the Germans found out Malyn’s Ukrainians and/or Czechs aided Ukrainian nationalists; the presence of a Jewish doctor in Czech Malyn; Czechs hid Jews; a denunciation by the Ukrainian nationalists to the Germans; a denunciation by Poles to the Germans because the village was supported the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainska Povtanska Armii, UPA); Czechs murdered local Germans (also known as Volksdeutsche); a Ukrainian provocateur worked for the Germans and lived in the village as a Ukrainian nationalist; the presence of Soviet POWs; or Malyn was simply mistaken for another village marked for destruction. Surely all these explanations cannot be true.

There is even less clarity as to who was involved in Malyn’s destruction. There are well over fifteen different versions of the perpetrators’ identity: the Germans figure in almost every account, though sometimes as the SS, SD, the Gestapo, or in combination. The German’s accomplices include: Austrians, Hungarians, Poles, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Russians, local Germans, Volhynian Poles, Poles from Poland, Poles from Germany (Silesians), and Uzbeks in a dizzying number of amalgamations. Depending on the source, the Volhynian Poles came from the villages of Zamczysko, Narutowka, Konstantynówka, or Bożkiewicze. The Ukrainians, according to various sources, were from a mobile Schutzmannschaft unit, stationary local Schutzmannschaft, and even former Nachtigall members. In some accounts, the most infamous Red Army defector,
General Andrei Vlasov and his Russian Liberation Army (Russkaia Osvoboditel’naia Armiiia, ROA) were included as well. Depending on the source, these military units originated from the towns of Dubno, Luts’k, Rivne or Olyka. Even the ethnicity of the victims themselves change—sometimes there are more Poles killed, other times there are no Ukrainians.

This article’s goal is to make sense of contesting descriptions about the violence in Malyn. The first task is to chart the complex pattern of “remembering and forgetting” about the massacre to make these conflicting stories more intelligible. To do so, I identify four discursive landscapes, Soviet, Polish, Ukrainian, and Czech, from the source materials which provide different perspectives on this singular event. I undertake an excavation of each of these landscapes individually, but I also discuss how they interrelate, share information, ignore and act against one another. It should be noted that I have not been selective in my choice of sources for each of these groups, but rather comprehensive—I examine all references to Malyn I have encountered over a decade of research for this article.

A close examination will show that Soviet, Ukrainian, and Polish narratives have all exploited and appropriated the story of Malyn. After a brief discussion of how the Soviet narrative was used for political purposes, I turn to the main focus of this article: post-Soviet Ukrainian and Polish narratives. After the dissolution of the Soviet empire, new narratives about the war have proliferated in Eastern Europe as a result of the democratization of public and intellectual discourse and the opening of Soviet archives. Historian Tony Judt has argued that the post-1989 period saw a “revival of memory” since the postwar period left a great deal of the “unfinished business” from the war. To a large extent, the Soviet Union helped keep a lid on the Pandora’s Box of suffering and inter-ethnic animosity that plagued Volhynia during the war. Soviet historians crafted a simplistic narrative of harmony between the two nations and demonized any Ukrainians connected to the OUN-UPA movement, all the while glossing over the general complexities of the wartime years.

Over the past two decades, a deluge of new academic and popular works has populated the cultural landscape in Ukraine. Sadly, the breadth and often candor of the debate has not been commensurate with the quantity of new works. Ernst Renan’s quip that belonging to a nation entails both forgetting as much as it does remembering is relevant to this story. The prevailing tendency in both scholarly and popular discourse has been to create a sanitized history of the war that presents the incipient Ukrainian...
nation and its people as strictly victims of both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. This victim narrative has left little room for a critical appraisal for Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust and ethnic violence during the war, the role of the Ukrainian nationalist movement (in particular the most radical group from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Stepan Bandera wing known as OUN-B) and collaboration with the Germans during the war. Instead, a number of writers have appropriated Malyn to admonish the Soviets, Poles, and Germans for their actions against Ukrainians and to co-opt the victimhood of the Czechs into a larger narrative of Ukrainian statehood.

The story of post-communist Poland is similar in many ways. Since the end of communism, the Giedroyc-like doctrine of ignoring aspects of inter-ethnic violence in places like wartime Volhynia has ceased to be a reality. With a new license to speak out about the trauma of the war in Volhynia, a number of civic organizations and authors from the Kresy community (Poles from Second Republic of Poland’s eastern territories who now live in Poland) have produced an impressive number of books and events that call attention to the plight of Volhynian Poles during the war, and most importantly for them, the Ukrainian nationalist-led ethnic cleansing campaign against them. Much like the Ukrainian narrative, many of these works do include important details about the war that were either ignored or excised from Soviet narrative, but their framing and use are less than ideal and often unbalanced. Polish writers, like their Ukrainian counterparts, are loathe to present Poles as anything other than victims where many were both victims and perpetrators of ethnic violence.

A caveat on the organization of these narratives is necessary: though I arrange and group the various engagements with Malyn in this article, the logic behind it is far from arbitrary. On a whole, most Polish authors blame Ukrainians for the reprisal, whereas most Ukrainian authors finger Poles, making it both possible and reasonable to work within this schema. Despite these detectable trends, these landscapes are not necessarily uniform or homogenous—there is no one “Czech” or “Ukrainian” narrative about Malyn. The organization of this analysis still allows for and demonstrates variegated strains of remembering within each of these landscapes. Interlocutors within a certain discourse may disagree with one another, but even when they do it is important to note they often do so using problematic sources and an ethnic or national lens. A wide range of participants, whether they are victims of the reprisal, bystanders from wartime Volhynia, journalists, professional historians, or other interested parties contribute to each landscape—they all are attended to in the text or at the very least, in the footnotes.
The section of the article is chronologically and thematically organized: it begins with the Soviet narrative landscape, the first to discuss Malyn, and then moves on to juxtapose the Ukrainian and Polish narratives, and finally, concludes with the Czech narrative.

The article will begin with a history of Malyn in order to explain its multi-ethnic character and situate it within the larger context of Volhynia with particular attention to the ethnically inflamed environment during the Second World War. Following the background on Malyn and Volhynia, there will be a discussion of the details surrounding the perpetrators of the Malyn reprisal. In this section all of the available source material and evidence to date will be presented so the reader can properly orient the following narratives and see how each one selectively picks and chooses to construct their ethnic or national narrative. The following section will then recount each of the Soviet, Ukrainian, Polish, and Czech narratives in detail. The article finishes with three reflections about what Malyn tells us about the legacy of the war and inter-ethnic violence in Eastern Europe today.

**A Brief History of Malyn**

"Plowed fields, roads, sun, ripening wheat, we trample the fields, the harvest is poor, stunted grain crops, many Czech, Polish, and German settlements hereabout."

- Isaac Babel’s diary entry July, 18 1920

The village of Malyn first appeared in the written record in 1545, but the name likely originated from a village elder (starosta) named Malynskyi who lived in the Luts’k area a century earlier. Information about Malyn during the 16th and 17th centuries is scant aside from brief references in the correspondence between quarreling Polish landowners and Orthodox Church figures.

A wave of Czech immigrants arriving in the 1860s and 1870s split Malyn into two ethnic enclaves. Due to a shortage of land and economic issues in Bohemia, roughly fifteen-thousand Czech peasants migrated to the western borderlands of the Russian empire between 1868 and 1874. The Czechs were enticed to come to Volhynia because land was cheap and farming conditions were favorable. The Tsarist government facilitated the colonization process in order to weaken the political power of Polish landlords and encourage the economic development of the vastly underdeveloped region. The government had a contentious relationship with the Poles dating back to the partitions of Poland at the end of the 18th century when it absorbed Volhynia from the
Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth along with its Polish nobility. Poles remained the largest land-owning class in the region despite being outnumbered by the Ukrainian peasantry and repeated efforts by the Tsarist authorities to strip them of their privileges.\textsuperscript{52}

Czechs fit well in the Volhynian socio-economic order. With Jews and Poles primarily located in cities and responsible for trade, commerce, and artisanship, Czechs took up land in the countryside alongside Ukrainians and other small minorities of local Germans. The agricultural expertise they brought from Bohemia, along with capital to buy equipment, allowed them to flourish in the region up to the Second World War. They maintained good relationships with both their Ukrainian neighbors and Polish and Jewish business partners in the cities and towns. Tsarist authorities likewise did not antagonize them. By the early 1920s over 25,000 Czechs lived in Volhynia (roughly 1.77 percent of the Volhynian population).\textsuperscript{53}

In 1871, twenty Czech families from Bohemia (namely the Rakovník, Žatec, and Louny areas) arrived in Malyn. These families bought a number of plots just west of what would become known as “Ukrainian” Malyn.\textsuperscript{54} By 1889, the Czech population had already grown to 900 in Czech Malyn.\textsuperscript{55} Malyn was no different than other Czech colonies in the region. They often fared better than their Ukrainian neighbors thanks to the size of their plots, superior technology and farming methods. Even in the case of Malyn, where the two villages buttressed one another, the Czechs lived better than the Ukrainians. Despite the economic disparity, there is little evidence of ethnic hostility between the two groups in the seven decades prior to the war. Though this is hardly a comprehensive survey, surviving members of the community on both sides speak fondly of their time together in Malyn.\textsuperscript{56}

The First World War and the revolutionary epoch brought tumult to Malyn. The village was caught in the crosshairs of the Austrian and Russian Imperial armies and later the Polish and Soviet armies. A number of Malyn’s Czechs were conscripted into a Czech regiment of the Austrian army in 1915 and fought until 1918.\textsuperscript{57} Evacuated by a German and Hungarian regiment in 1915, many of Malyn’s Czech residents lived outside the village until the end of hostilities. After Brest-Litovsk, the Czechs returned home to their village, which had been laid ruin and looted as a result of the war. Little is known about the fate of the Ukrainian villagers in Malyn during this period.\textsuperscript{58} Following the end of the Polish-Soviet war in 1921, most of Volhynia and Malyn became a part of Second Republic Poland.
Figure 6: Class photograph from interwar Poland, likely 1936. Courtesy of Josef Řepík.

Though there was increased inter-ethnic tension between Poles and Ukrainians in Second Republic Poland, many of Malyn’s Czechs considered the interwar Polish rule to be tranquil and productive.\textsuperscript{59} During this time, Czech Malyn received cultural and financial support from the Czechoslovak government. Major technological advancements such as access to electricity, a post office, and a telephone were also added to the village, which added economic growth.\textsuperscript{60} Along with technology, new political ideas also came to the small village of Malyn. According to one resident of Ukrainian Malyn, who later became a key nationalist figure in Volhynia, the Ukrainians in Malyn came under “considerable influence of Communist ideas” at this time, so much so that it was difficult for the Malyn priest, Hryhorii Mostovych to live and work there.\textsuperscript{61} Throughout the region, competing ideologies of communism, socialism, and nationalism (often of the exclusionary integral variant) began to stir the Ukrainian peasantry, especially the younger generation, who became increasingly disaffected with Polish rule and the socio-economic order.\textsuperscript{62}

After the start of the Second World War, the Soviet Union occupied much of the western borderland region, including Volhynia. Before the Soviets took power, however, Ukrainian nationalists attacked Polish officials in Malyn and killed the head of the
police. During Soviet rule, the Czech school was closed and a number of Czechs were deported to Siberia. The Soviet regime also repressed a number of Ukrainians and Poles in Malyn as well during this short interlude. Soviet authorities deported the Ukrainian priest Mostovych and other family members at this time.

Following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Volhynia remained under the Nazi military administration for the summer of 1941. However, in fall 1941 as the German civil administration took over, Malyn became a part Ostrozhets’ rayon, which was subordinated to the Dubno County Commissariat run by Gebietskommissar (County Commissar) Walter Brocks. Friedrich Vogel, the chief agronomist (Kreislandwirt) for Ostrozhets’ rayon was based in Ostrozhets’ for most of the war and was the German who had the most contact with the Malyn villagers.
The first two years of the war were relatively quiet for Malyn except for two incidents in summer of 1941. In August 1941, the Germans took five suspected Soviet activists from Malyn, likely all Ukrainians, to Ostrozhets’ where they were murdered. In another incident in late June 1941, the brother-in-law of Sonya Papper (Sorah Fayge Kulish) went to Olyka to speak with his rabbi. Two armed Ukrainian men abducted him in Malyn along the way. According to two Jewish families who lived in Ukrainian Malyn, the Ukrainian men tortured the brother-in-law to death in the nearby forest. The men also attacked two Jewish male relatives, but they lived to recount the story.
of these minor incidents, the only other disturbance came when the Germans sent 60 Malyn residents to Germany in summer 1942 as Ostarbeiter (or forced laborers).71 Malyn residents claimed there was no police force in the village, mainly due to its small size.72 The Ukrainian auxiliary police force in Ostrozhets’ probably would have been the only group that exercised any control over the village. Evidence of this can be found in an account by Josef Řepík, who recalled seeing a Ukrainian policeman from Ostrozhets’ execute an escaped Jew in Malyn near the Martinovský mill.73 Volhynian Czechs were aware of the mass extermination of Jews in Volhynia, as it was happening to their neighbors in places like Ostrozhets’ and Olyka. While there are no specific accounts of Malyn’s Czechs harboring Jews, postwar Jewish testimony routinely mentions the heroism of Volhynian Czechs in helping Volhynian Jews.74

The dynamics of the Nazi occupation in Volhynia drastically changed by the time of the reprisal against Malyn. By spring 1943, the Volhynia region became the central location of partisan warfare in Ukraine. Estimates ranged from 50,000 to 70,000 Soviet partisans swarming through the Volhynian forests and marshes.75 To aid their nomadic life, which mainly consisted of camping in Volhynia’s vast forests, these partisans often sought sustenance and support from local villages like Malyn.

The Germans’ response to the partisan problem was indicative of their occupation in the east—by the vicious wiping out of villages. A series of escalating directives from Hitler and the Nazi leadership throughout 1942 and into 1943 called for even more violent retribution against civilian populations for partisan warfare in occupied territories. A December 16, 1942 order issued by Field Marshal Keitel captured the brutality of German policy by this stage of the war: “The troops are authorized and required to use every means in this struggle without restraint, even against women and children, so long as it leads to success.”76 Similar orders made it clear to German commanders that they had carte blanche in dealing with locals suspected of aiding partisans. The Germans destroyed Malyn as part of this merciless occupation policy.

In the spring and summer 1943, an equally violent ethnic cleansing campaign and civil war-like conditions accompanied the burgeoning (counter) insurgency in Volhynia. By spring 1943, the Bandera-wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) created the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (or UPA) from former auxiliary policemen and other members of the population.77 One of its first tasks was to “kill all Poles, Czechs, and Jews on the spot.”78 The Volhynian Poles were the key targets of this ethnic cleansing campaign and the UPA murdered somewhere between 50,000 and 60,000 in 1943 alone,
and an estimated 70,000 and 100,000 in all of western Ukraine by the end of the war. Under threat of UPA violence or simply out of self-interest, many Volhynian Poles joined German stationary and mobile auxiliary police forces. Many of these attacked Ukrainian villages in kind. Locally organized Polish self-defense (samoobrona) forces and forces from abroad like the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK), the official army of the Polish government-in-exile, actively engaged the UPA and carried out revenge killings of Ukrainian civilians. Consequently, by spring 1943, Volhynia was engulfed in a “civil war” under the auspices of an increasingly violent foreign occupation.

For the most part, the Czechs remained neutral in the ethnic hostilities, despite being in the center of this “nationally inflamed environment,” as one Czech historian observed. Neutrality, however, was not always easy. The UPA often acted against those unwilling to cooperate, including Czechs, as one UPA report indicated: “The Czechs from the colonies of Krupa-Hranytsia [Krupá Hranice] and Mal’ovane [Malovaná] established contact with the Poles and Germans and informed them of our units in the area. We have publically executed a number of these informants (seksoty).” In other instances, Czechs were forced to join the UPA at gunpoint, such as in the village of Kalynivka (Kalinovka), where Iosif Golechek’s son was taken in 1944. As a result of the attacks from the Germans and other nationalist groups, some Volhynian Czechs participated in their own self-defense organization called Blaník with the support of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile. Blaník protected Czech villagers, sometimes cooperated with Soviet partisans, and fought against Ukrainian nationalists.

In the wake of the Nazi retreat in 1944, many Blaník members and other Volhynian Czechs joined the newly formed 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps and helped drive the Germans back to Berlin. After the war, a 1947 agreement between Czechoslovakia and the Soviets transferred almost all of the remaining Volhynian Czech population to Czechoslovakia. Most Czechs were reportedly happy to comply. In 1947, the two Malyns again became one.

**Identifying the Perpetrators of the Malyn Massacre**

Before delving into the complex narrative landscapes of the Malyn Massacre, we should first look at the earliest sources of information on the reprisal to clarify what is known and not known. Two key collections of testimonies about the Malyn reprisal were compiled immediately following the end of the war. The first is material from the...
Extraordinary State Commission (Chrezvychainiaia Gosudarstvennaia Komissiia, ChGK). As the Red Army reoccupied Eastern Europe in 1944, commissions comprised of local party and government figures (and sometimes the police) collected countless testimonies about the occupation from villagers all over Ukraine. The quality of the commission’s work often depended upon the dedication of the oblast’ or raion commissions (in Malyn’s case, the Ostrozhetskii raion level committee), which had a great deal of autonomy in collecting material before it was sent to higher-ups and vetted.

The commission interviewed both Czech and Ukrainian survivors and victims’ families on February 28, 1944. On the whole, the testimonies provide a detailed account of the day’s events, but often omit specifics about the units involved, and instead strictly refer to the perpetrators as “German-fascist invaders.” In many instances the testimonies share similar syntactic structure. The omission of any mention of collaborators could have been as simple as a lazy stenographer or, more directly, the result of orders to play down the role of local collaborators. It is also possible that the witnesses chose not discuss the identity of the non-German perpetrators. However, an unrelated two-page ChGK report from a neighboring village, Velyka Horodnytsia, did reference a detachment of “Germans and Poles [who] robbed” Malyn. This is the only reference to potential collaborators in ChGK materials.

A Lieutenant-Captain in the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps, led by the famous Czech General Ludvík Svoboda collected the second set of testimonies. This three-page so-called “Svoboda Report” was based upon seven interviews with only Czech survivors and summarized the reprisal on April 3, 1944. The 1944 pamphlet Nezapomeneme, pomstíme! (We Will Not Forget Our Revenge), published the report and the testimonies in full.

Although three of the seven Czech witnesses also gave testimonies to ChGK, they were more forthcoming about collaborators in the Svoboda report. Take for instance, the testimony of Josef Martinovský. In his ChGK testimony, Martinovský only mentioned Vogel and a German solider. But then he told the Svoboda report commission: “There were a few soldiers who spoke Polish well. One spoke Czech, but he was in the black uniform of a Ukrainian policeman. Some of them also spoke Russian. Others were Poles in civilian clothing, but with weapons…Some Poles from the German municipal police (Schutzpolizei) from Olyka also took part in the destruction of property and the robbing of possessions.” In his own book published about Malyn in 1945, Martinovský also implicated Ukrainians, writing that “traitors [odpadlíci]” of “various nations…whether
they spoke good Polish, Ukrainian, Russians, or even Czech” were involved in the reprisal and that the “traitors of these nations [Ukraine and Poland] participated in the butchering of the Czechs of Malyn.”

Martinovský was not the only one to point out collaborators in the Svoboda Report testimonies. Another Malyn survivor, Václav Kinšt, heard a soldier speak Czech and also noted: “A Pole, a former police officer from the Polish police in Buškieviči [Božkiewicze] named Paczkowski, was probably among the Germans.” Jan Činka recalled that there were “White Russians [bělogvardějci] and Poles among the Germans from Nerotůvka [Narutówka]…Some Germans spoke broken Czech.”

Antonín Žrout, however, remarked, “There were also some Ukrainians dressed in the black uniforms of the ‘Schutzmänner.’” Interestingly, like the ChGK reports, the final Svoboda report only mentions Germans and omits references to ethnic collaborators.

The presence of local collaborators among the Germans should not come as a total surprise. By early 1943, in Reichskommissariat Ukraine there were an estimated 20,000 men in roughly 60 indigenous (meaning locals) mobile police battalions; 14,163 in indigenous municipal or city police; and 54,794 men in indigenous rural police forces. To get better a sense of these numbers in relation to Germans serving in the police: another 1942 estimate shows 8700 indigenous policemen compared to 2800 Germans in cities (a ratio of 3 to 1) and in the countryside 42,600 indigenous policemen compared to 3700 Germans (a ratio of 11 to 1). The ratio of indigenous police to Germans overall in 1942 was roughly 5 to 1. By early 1943, it is likely this ratio climbed to 10 to 1.

These numbers imply that it was difficult for the task force that destroyed Malyn to be composed of solely Reich Germans or even local Germans. It is likely that local Gendarmerie or police auxiliaries under German command participated in the reprisal. And it is completely possible that both Poles and Ukrainians were present in these units, a point missed by all of the interlocutors in the Soviet, Ukrainian, Polish, and Czech accounts. Moreover, other national groups could have participated in these units as well. For example, one Kremenets’ resident described a multiethnic task force that appeared in his town in 1943 as follows: “SD units, field gendarmerie, a part of the Totenkopf division, Ukrainians, Poles, Lithuanian Schutzmänner [sic] and units from the notorious ROA.” This is hardly the clean division of ethnic collaborators that we will see in many of the accounts discussed below.
There are only scant clues as to the identity of the German unit in charge. Martinovský noted seeing an emblem of a jumping deer on the German vehicles that showed up in Malyn.¹⁰⁶ He and others also described the death’s head symbol on the helmets of many soldiers.¹⁰⁷ These clues imply that there was likely an SS presence. Martinovský claimed that the units originated from Olyka and Luts’k, but it is impossible to confirm this. He was also certain that Friedrich Vogel, the agronomist in Ostrozhets’ rayon, was involved in coordinating the reprisal, likely in conjunction with the Luts’k county commissar Heinrich Lindner and Dubno county commissar Walter Brocks.¹⁰⁸

Another method to identify the units involved would be to look at similar reprisals that occurred shortly before or after the Malyn reprisal. German units also attacked a cluster of three Ukrainian villages, Velyka and Mala Horodnytsia, Vorsyn, and Ialovychi (and possibly two or three other villages), all located within 15-18 kilometers of Malyn, during the week of 11 July.¹⁰⁹ Although Martinovský claimed that the Malyn perpetrators were involved in the Horodnytsia attacks and there is a reference in a ChGK report to Poles from Luts’k participating in the robbery of Horodnytsia, there is no other information to confirm this assertion nor does this help identify the German component.
In yet another wrinkle to the storyline, the Germans attacked a Polish village named Ludwikówka located roughly 32 kilometers from Malyn during the same week. The only information on the participating detachment’s identity comes from Polish writers (from the Kresy community) who claim that the perpetrators were Germans, Ukrainian police, and Vlasovites. One of their sources used to make these claims, a Volhynian Pole, noted that the units that destroyed Ludwikówka also destroyed Malyn. Unfortunately, these claims cannot presently be verified with concrete evidence. If it was indeed the same German unit with local collaborators that destroyed Ludwikówka, this surely would further complicate the picture. This unit would have participated in murdering innocent Czechs, Ukrainians, and Poles, thereby undercutting Ukrainian nationalist writers who emphasize the complicity of Polish policemen and the Ukrainian ethnicity of Malyn’s victims.
Without a German document ordering the reprisal or a comprehensive postwar criminal investigation, it is impossible to know for certain which German unit was involved and which local groups collaborated. To make any definitive claims in this direction would only be conjecture. Given the evidence from early Czech testimonies, which on a whole appear to be the least politically motivated piece of evidence, it is possible and likely that both Polish and Ukrainian police were present in some type of battle group (*Kampfgruppe*) led by Sipo-SD men from KdS Rivne. However, it is simply impossible to know from the given evidence whether the Polish police were from small Polish villages in the area surrounding Malyn, Luts’k, or Olyka. Likewise, whether the Ukrainian police were local or from another region is not knowable without names and biographies. That said, the larger point is that even if Poles or Ukrainians were present, claiming that the local ethnic groups somehow “led” the reprisal or were responsible for its initiation completely misunderstands the dynamics of occupation—a point I will further elaborate on in the conclusion.

Finally, it is difficult to make any definitive claims about the rationale for the reprisal. While it is known from Malyn’s Czechs that Soviet partisans led by Sidor Kovpak did stop in Malyn for food and supplies in late June 1943 and that the “cultured” Czechs acted “warmly” towards the partisans, whether the Czechs openly supported the partisans is up for debate. It is possible that the Germans learned of the presence of Soviet partisans and used this was the reason for the reprisal. It is also possible that the reprisal was planned long before Kovpak arrived in Malyn. There is no evidence at present, however, to support the claim that the villages were targeted for supporting Ukrainian nationalists.
**Soviet Malyn: Druzhba Narodov, Druzhba Zhertv**

In the immediate postwar years, Soviet authorities in Ukraine did not supply a definitive narrative of Malyn’s destruction. Except for one small local report, ChGK focused solely on German perpetrators. Early Party correspondence from Rivne oblast’ in 1944 suggested that Malyn was destroyed because a partisan was being treated in the town hospital.\(^{118}\) The origin of this detail is unclear and it was subsequently muted after 1944, likely due to a greater effort to avoid implicating partisans as a cause for the reprisal.

By 1946, Soviet and Czechoslovak authorities began holding commemoration events for Malyn. In the Czechoslovakian town of Žatec, a ceremony was held for the unveiling of a memorial for Malyn. General Svoboda was in attendance. With the population transfers of some 33,000 Volhynian Czechs to Czechoslovakia by May 1947, Czechoslovakian authorities renamed the small town of Frankštát in the Šumperk district to “New” Malyn (or Nový Malín) on July 13, 1947, the fourth anniversary of the tragedy.\(^{119}\) Over one hundred Volhynian Czechs, including some former Malyn residents, were resettled there. Photographs show parades in Nový Malín with war veterans and Volhynian Czechs marching side by side along with massive placards displaying the rubble of Malyn.\(^{120}\)

By the 1950s, the Soviet narrative for Malyn morphed from a vague crime of “German fascism” to that of German fascism and “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.” In the spring of 1959, twelve mass graves were discovered in Malyn and neighboring villages, reportedly containing over 200 victims of UPA terror. While Malyn, like many villages in Volhynia, experienced some minor attacks by the UPA and other bands in the spring and summer of 1943, there is absolutely no evidence to support the claim that the UPA murdered some 200 residents of Malyn. Though some former residents returned to Malyn after the war, there was no one left to kill after the July 1943 reprisal. These small details, of course, hardly swayed local Soviet Ukrainian leaders eager to denigrate the Ukrainian nationalist movement.

Rivne city and oblast’ officials dug up the bodies (likely the bodies from the Malyn reprisal) and held a grandiose funeral, attended by an alleged 25,000 people from all over the oblast’. At the funeral ceremonies the local party secretary of Ostrozhetskii raion, K. P. Novakovets’, declared, “We will never forget, nor forgive the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists and the horrors [they committed].” He added, “We will strengthen...
the unbreakable brotherhood of Soviet Ukraine and we will strengthen the unbreakable brotherhood of Russian, Ukrainian, and other nations of the USSR.”

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Malyn remained a symbol of the joint suffering between the Czech, Ukrainian, and Russian people. Various delegations travelled between Ukraine and Czechoslovakia to commemorate the anniversaries of the massacre. At one such commemoration in 1979, the Czechoslovak delegation visiting Malyn presented the town with gifts from the citizens of Lidice and Nový Malín. An article, entitled “The Eternal Flame of Malyn” in the Rivne regional newspaper, Chervonyi Prapor, describes how “near the graves of our brothers—the victims of fascism and Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, a meeting took place between Soviet and Czechoslovakian nations.” Here we can clearly see how Malyn served as a unifying symbol of druzhba narodov (friendship of nations) for these “brother” nations who suffered both at the hands of Ukrainian nationalists and the German fascists. One is tempted to even rename this druzhba zhertv (friendship of victims), given the way victimhood was used between these Eastern Bloc countries.

Figure 7: Monument in Nový Malín installed in 1972 on 30th anniversary of the massacre. Courtesy of Darina Martinovská.
The Soviet narrative for Malyn even found its way into English-language propaganda pamphlets intended for Anglo-American audiences. In a polemical pamphlet, *Judas’s Breed*, author Yuri Melnichuk recalled how he “stood beside opened mass graves or wells filled with the corpses of his countrymen who were victims of the terror of the OUN...in the village of Malin alone, these butchers burned some 900 Ukrainians and Czechs, threw 223 peasants into a well to die a slow death, and buried another nine innocent people alive.”

Obvious improvisations were not left solely to the pamphleteers. A document collection ironically entitled, *History Teaches a Lesson*, reprinted a letter from Bishop Platon of Rivne to present to a Western audience the crimes of the Ukrainian nationalists at Malyn. The Western reader, however, would be unaware that the editors excised the sections of Platon’s letter where he blames the massacre on the “non-Christian” (*nekhrystiian*) Uzbeks and Poles, and not on the Ukrainian nationalists.

**Ukrainian Malyn: The Malyn Tragedy is Ukraine’s Tragedy**

For many Ukrainian historians, journalists, and historical actors, the prevailing version of Malyn is that a Polish police division under German command helped commit the reprisal. Although other groups are occasionally added to the equation, such as Uzbeks or local Germans, Poles are always singled out as the primary culprits. As we will see, unlike the Polish and Czech discussions, the nationalist-minded Ukrainian writers typically take only Ukrainian sources into account. And just as we will see with the Polish version, the reprisal is framed within the context of the Volhynian civil war. The ethnic enemy is often presented as the culprit of this massacre with little or no solid evidence.

Before examining contemporary interlocutors, we should first look at the accounts of historical actors from the war. Despite Malyn’s appropriation by many contemporary Ukrainian writers, wartime sources generally do not provide any clear description of the events in Malyn, especially with regard to the perpetrators. The earliest references to Malyn appear in Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) documents. Three situational reports (these were internal correspondence between units) from the summer and fall of 1943 recorded in the Luts’k area do not mention Poles or any other collaborators. One of the reports curiously blamed a “Jew doctor” for “provoking” the Germans into attacking the village, after which he managed to escape to Olyka. On the contrary, the
aforementioned doctor was burned alive—along with his wife and two children—during the massacre. One report also tied Malyn to another reprisal in Liahkiv—a Polish village in a different county, possibly the result of confusing the village Novomalyn with Malyn.\textsuperscript{128}

However, the UPA clearly found some propaganda value in Malyn and quickly sought to exploit the massacre for its own political purposes. In September 1943, the UPA produced a leaflet intended for Czechs reading: “Recently, the Germans in league with the Poles tortured and murdered the Czechs in Malyn in the Dubno region by ghastly burning alive the victims in the village ruins.”\textsuperscript{129} By 1945, leaflets claimed that Polish “imperialists” and Germans killed 850 Ukrainians (no mention of Czechs) in Malyn.\textsuperscript{130} A number of contemporary Ukrainian writers have used these reports, newspapers and leaflets to implicate Poles without scrutinizing their vast discrepancies, posing any serious questions about their reliability, or bothering to cross-reference them with additional sources.\textsuperscript{131} Contemporary Ukrainian writers have replicated the ways in which the UPA sought to politicize and use the Malyn atrocity over and over again up to the present.

There are two key memoirs from wartime Volhynia: one from UPA soldier Danylo Shumuk and the other from a priest of the Autocephalous Church, Maksym Fedorchuk. Although their accounts vary, both Shumuk and Fedorchuk accused Poles of participating in the reprisal. Shumuk accused the Poles of actually leading the Germans into the reprisal—which is highly unlikely—and he included other wildly incorrect details.\textsuperscript{132} Fedorchuk’s diary, on the other hand, actually provided information about the civil war in Volhynia, namely the ethnic cleansing of Poles by the UPA. However, of all the Ukrainian accounts of the Malyn reprisal, Fedorchuk’s is probably the least creative.\textsuperscript{133} Both Shumuk and Fedorchuk relied on hearsay and neither provided any conclusive evidence as to which units were involved in the reprisal.

The last wartime source is the widely cited “Platon letter.” This unpublished source was written by Bishop Platon from the Kremenets’-Rivne diocese to the metropolitan of the Ukrainian autocephalous church in Luts’k shortly after the reprisal on July 20, 1943.\textsuperscript{134} In the letter, Platon accused the “state police” (an ambiguous phrase), “non-Christian” Uzbeks, and “foreign” (inorodtsii) Poles for participating in the reprisal.\textsuperscript{135} The basis for Platon’s accusations is uncertain and the general tone of letter makes it a questionable source; yet many cite it without reservation. Ironically, as shown above, both the Soviets and Ukrainians have used the letter to assign guilt for the crime.
A number of contemporary parties, both scholarly and journalistic, have written about the Malyn reprisal. Probably the best-known scholar of wartime Volhynia is the Kyiv-based historian Volodymyr Serhiichuk. In his edited document collection, *Poliaky na Volyni* (Poles in Volhynia), Serhiichuk cited Vasyl’ Kvasha, supposedly a resident of a nearby village, to prove Polish culpability. Kvasha “recalled” that Poles took part in the massacre and that they sang Polish nationalist songs on the way home from Malyn. Serhiichuk does not say who Vasyl’ Kvasha is, where he was born, and why he would have any specific knowledge about the massacre. Serhiichuk also used one of the UPA “situational reports” to implicate the Poles not only in the Malyn reprisal, but also in reprisals against five other villages though these reports do not mention Poles at all. Serhiichuk repeats the same approach in *Trahediia Volyni* (The Tragedy of Volhynia) where he uses an UPA report to implicate Poles though it makes no mention of them.

Lev Shankovs’kyi and Wolodymyr Kosyk make two more references to Malyn. Importantly, both Shankovs’kyi and Kosyk were involved in the nationalist movement during and after the war. Shankovs’kyi was affiliated with Mykola Lebed’s UHVR. Kosyk had a lifelong affiliation with the Bandera wing of the OUN and was the OUN-B representative in Franco’s Spain in 1930s and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations or ABN representative to Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist China in the 1950s. Despite this participation, their work is widely cited on a host of contentious issues, including the civil war in Volhynia. Their backgrounds compromise the objectivity of their work on the OUN and UPA, and their treatment of Malyn serves as just another example. For instance, Shankovs’kyi implicated the Poles in the destruction of Malyn with no evidence to support his claim. Kosyk, on the other hand, only implicated the Germans in his text. However, Kosyk reprinted an UPA newspaper, which appeared twice in the *Litopys* collection, once in Ukrainian and once in German. Neither of the *Litopys* citations of this newspaper included the line cited by Kosyk in his text: “The Germans and Poles burned down Malyn with all its citizens.” Kosyk fabricated the line for ideological reasons.

In 2003, Malyn appeared in a publication compiled by L’viv based scholar Iaroslav Isaevych in conjunction with the I. Krypiakevych Institute of Ukrainian Studies and the National Academy of Sciences in Ukraine. The book includes research, documents, and oral testimonies on the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. Throughout this work, the problematic intersection of memory, politics, and history can be clearly seen. All of the testimonies presented on Malyn come from Ukrainians and each one accuses only the Poles for the crime. More perplexing, the editors excluded the dates of when the
testimonies were taken, so the reader is left to wonder whether they were provided during or immediately after the war or in post-Soviet Ukraine.

One particular testimony by Ivan Vainer, a Ukrainian who lives in present day Malyn and witnessed the reprisal, deserves to be quoted at length:

After the pogrom, the older people asked…, ‘Who burned down Malyn?’ As I remember myself, the alleged Germans, who destroyed Malyn, also robbed us and they spoke Ukrainian!...People said, ‘They could not have been Germans. And Ukrainians would not have killed their own people…That must mean they were Poles from Konstantynivka [Konstantynówka]. The Poles lived among Ukrainians, went to Ukrainian schools, and studied Ukrainian’…Some claim it was the Banderivtsy [UPA] that helped the Germans kill the Czechs. But this isn’t true, because the Banderivtsy lived peacefully together with the Czechs. They understood each other. On that day, the Banderivtsy tried to save the Czechs and Ukrainians.144

Who are the people that claim the UPA participated in the reprisal? Was Vainer told this by the interviewers? Fortunately, I had the opportunity to interview Vainer as well. Vainer explained to me that even though the soldiers spoke to him in “perfect Ukrainian,” he thought these might be local Poles who learned to speak Ukrainian by attending Ukrainian schools. In contrast to his confident accusations in the testimony above, Vainer later told me it was “possible” that Ukrainians were also in the detachment.145 When I asked how he knew they were Poles from Konstantynivka, he said he did not know. And when I asked about various versions of the event, Vainer never mentioned the involvement of the UPA.

The Vainer testimony was not the only one in which dubious interviewing techniques appear in the Isaevych volume. In an interview, Rostyslav Solonevs’kyi, a Ukrainian from Vovkovtsi, takes umbrage with the Volhynian Czech Jiří Hofman and his writings on the war—particularly Hofman’s claim that the UPA occasionally attacked Czechs. Solonevs’kyi claimed he never saw the UPA attack minorities, suggesting instead that this was likely the work of the NKVD.146 How a seventy-three-year-old peasant, who is being presented as a witness to the war, is familiar with rare contemporary Czech language publications on the war is never explained.147 If the
interviewers were feeding the interviewees the information, this fact should have been included in the transcripts.

Pushing beyond the sole implication of Poles in the massacre, Ukrainian writers have also labored to blame Soviet partisans as well. Vasyl’ Kvasha (likely the same Vasyl’ Kvasha cited by Serhiichuk) and Serhii Kachynsk’y i both claimed that Soviet partisans “terrorized” the people of Malyn, stole their goods, and promised to protect them from the Germans, only to hide in the forest and watch while the Germans destroyed Malyn. Nothing besides circumstantial evidence that Soviet partisans under Dmitrii Medvedev and Sidor Kovpak attacked other villages in the region is cited to prove these claims. Had they consulted Czech sources, they would have found this claim to be untenable. Other unsubstantiated improvisations include various falsehoods about Polish collaborators, an accusation that Kovpak’s men killed 15 people in Malyn, and an insinuation that an UPA unit tried to defend Malyn during the reprisal.

Finally, in recent years the most radical revision of the Malyn narrative from any contributor came from the former UPA soldier, Stepan Semeniuk, who published an article about Malyn in the radical right-wing journal, Natsiia i Derzhava. Semeniuk went so far as to claim that “Czechs [of Malyn] actively supported the Ukrainian independence movement” and wanted to join the OUN. He argues their support for Ukrainian nationalists was the justification the Germans used for the reprisal. There is little to no evidence in the historical record to back this assertion for Malyn, let alone other Volhynian Czech villages. However, there are accounts of Czechs supporting their Polish neighbors in ethnic strife against Ukrainians, in addition to protecting Jews from Germans and Ukrainians, which Semeniuk does not acknowledge in any way. As for Czech open support of the UPA, there is no evidence for this claim and it also contradicts various reports of attacks on Malyn residents by UPA units. In addition, Semeniuk, like others, has claimed the UPA tried to defend Czechs and Ukrainians against the reprisal task force, though he has provided no evidence to prove this, nor did he mention there is evidence to the contrary. In the end, placing Malyn’s Czechs within the Ukrainian nationalist struggle then allows Semeniuk to co-opt and re-inscribe Malyn’s victimhood into the radical Ukrainian nationalist narrative of the war. Hence it is no surprise that for nationalist interlocutors like Semeniuk the “Malyn tragedy” thus becomes “Ukraine’s tragedy.”

Semeniuk’s ploy to co-opt Malyn for the nationalist community went hand in hand with political machinations in the region during the post-Soviet era. Rivne oblast’
civic nationalist groups circulated a leaflet in the summer 2003 in response to the meeting in Volhynia between Ukraine’s president Leonid Kuchma and Poland’s president Aleksander Kwaśniewski. The gathering represented an effort by the two presidents to reconcile tensions over the ethnic cleansing campaign, as well as Operation Vistula in which Polish authorities resettled over 150,000 Ukrainians living in Poland to Ukraine in 1947. In the leaflet, the organizations also laid claim to Malyn. The leaflet read: “The Rivne region remembers the bloody deeds of the 102nd and 107th Polish Schutzmannschaft battalions. The people of Malyn in Mlynivshchyna region…were victims of these German puppets.” Alongside Malyn, a number of other Volhynian villages were listed, which the Poles allegedly destroyed. The leaflet declared that Volhynian Poles murdered 100,000 Ukrainians during the war—a fantastical assertion. The leaflet ended by celebrating the leader of the ethnic cleansing of Poles in Volhynia, Dmytro Kliachkiv’skyi.

**Polish Malyn: Omnipresent Ukrainian Police**

Polish historians and writers have not shied away from the Malyn reprisal either. Generally, the Polish narrative of Malyn has been crafted by a number of writers from the Volhynian Kresy community. For these writers, the war in western Ukraine cannot be separated from the Ukrainian nationalist ethnic cleansing campaign that claimed tens of thousands of Polish lives. This event casts a long shadow over the Polish treatment of Malyn. In the Polish accounts, we will see how Malyn revolves around the same ethnic axis as it does for the Ukrainian writers, though from the opposite direction.

The father-daughter tandem of writers, Władysław and Ewa Siemaszko, have undertaken the most extensive examination of the Malyn reprisal. Władysław, a former member of the Home Army in Volhynia, began working on Volhynia in the late 1980s as part of a joint project with military historian Józef Turowski. In this 1990 publication, the first reference to Malyn in a Polish work, the authors noted, “The Germans burned to death 603 Polish and Czech inhabitants of the village of Malin,” excluding the Ukrainian victims and ignoring the fact that only 26 victims were Polish.

During the 1990s, the Siemaszkos then undertook a ten-year project to document the ethnic cleansing of Poles in Volhynia. While the project yielded 1,865 instances of ethnic cleansing and a great deal of important research, the book has a number of methodological problems causing western scholars to only cite the book with caution.
Still, the Siemaszkos’ analysis of Malyn, though problematic, is more nuanced than their Ukrainian counterparts. The Siemaszkos examined a wide range of sources on Malyn, from eyewitness testimonies to archival documents. The pair even reached out to the Czech community and engaged with Volhynian Czech historiography. Despite culling a wide range of material, the Siemaszkos conclude that the guilty parties were Germans, Ukrainian police, and Vlasovites.163

A closer examination of the Siemaszkos’ sources reveals doubts about this claim. The Siemaszkos relied heavily upon the testimony of Roman Kucharski, a Volhynian and an AK veteran. How Kucharski proved any of these assertions is not clear from the Siemaszkos’ sources or citation method. Here we can see a direct parallel with Serhiichuk and the use of Kvasha—the reliance on a specific ethnic group to provide the “right” storyline. The Siemaszkos also cited a number of Czech authors, none of whom specify the ethnicity of the collaborators. Included in the citations is Martinovský, who as we already mentioned, implicated both Ukrainians and Poles.

The Siemaszkos are not alone in their shortcomings. Another Polish writer, Adam Peretiatkowicz,164 has also claimed Ukrainian responsibility for the reprisal.165 Similar to Ukrainian historians’ attempts to accuse Soviet partisans for the reprisal, Peretiatkowicz blamed the reprisal on a supposed “denunciation” by Ukrainian nationalists. He tenuously claimed evidence of Ukrainian participation in the reprisal by noting that many Ukrainians served in the Vlasovite divisions. In the end, he settled on the German Wehrmacht, SS division, and Vlasovites as the perpetrators who destroyed Malyn. Furthermore, he claimed that a number of the Ukrainian villagers left Malyn before the reprisal since they were “warned in advance” about the foreboding massacre. Like many of his Ukrainian contemporaries, Peretiatkowicz provided no citations or evidence to support any of these assertions.166

The case of Malyn has sucked into its vortex even the most well-intentioned of scholars. The respected Polish historian Grzegorz Motyka’s treatment of Malyn is a case in point. In an introduction to a testimony by a Volhynian Polish policeman in the Polish journal Karta, Motyka posited Polish participation with German forces in the reprisal. To support this admission, Motyka used less than reliable sources, the works of Shankov’s’kyi and Kosyk, as already discussed, former members of the Ukrainian nationalist movement and, unsurprisingly, deniers of OUN/UPA crimes in Volhynia. Motyka also cited the dubious Platon letter, in which Platon accused the “un-Christian” Poles and Uzbeks of the crime based on hearsay.167 Four years later, Motyka revisited
Malyn at greater length in another scholarly article. Here Motyka only cited one new source—the Fedorchuk diary (discussed above). Motyka acknowledged that some discrepancy exists between Ukrainians and Czechs accounts on the matter of Polish complicity, but his further discussion of sources is rendered futile given that he only consults a fraction of the available sources on Malyn.\textsuperscript{168}

Though flawed in its methodology, Motyka’s admission of Polish participation in the Malyn reprisal is symbolically important in that it showed an Eastern European historian willing to break from the bonds of the highly contentious exchange that plagues the current state of historiography. This can likely be attributed to the fact Motyka is a professionally trained, unbiased historian. This admission, however, did not win him praise from certain Polish figures. He initially received a rebuke from Dr. Adam Cyr of the Auschwitz State Museum in the pages of \textit{Karta}.\textsuperscript{169} Cyr derided Motyka’s use of Ukrainian sources, referencing instead a conference in Poland where the Volhynian Czech Jaroslav Mec reported that Czechs had always known that the Ukrainians—and not the Poles—committed the crime (Mec will be discussed shortly).\textsuperscript{170} Another Polish colleague, Andrzej Solak, also took umbrage at Motyka’s insinuations.\textsuperscript{171} Using only the Siemaszkos’ sources and Mec’s comments—without providing any new source material—Solak dismissed Mec’s claims as apostasy.\textsuperscript{172}

In summary, the shape of the Polish narrative is very similar to that of the Ukrainians. Eagerly positing Poles as the true victims of Volhynia, this speaks to some Poles’ continued claim of Volhynia as Polish territory. In order to defend their status as victims (and not perpetrators), the Poles join hands with the certain elements of the Czech community to validate their claims. Although Polish writers could rely on the many Soviet texts vilifying Ukrainian nationalists to substantiate their claims, these sources—as vestiges of totalitarianism—remain completely out of bounds. Consequently, the only real victims of the event—the Czechs—are deemed reliable sources.

**Czech Malyn: “The Lidice of Volhynia”**

The Volhynian Czech reckoning of Malyn began immediately following the reprisal when the survivors returned home to bury their dead and continues to the present day. At first glance, the Czech narratives about Malyn almost seems to lack depth, especially when compared to their more colorful Ukrainian and Polish counterparts. Most accounts focus primarily on commemoration, with little discussion of possible local
collaborators. Given the trauma this population endured during the first half the twentieth century in Volhynia and the subsequent transition to a strange new home in postwar Czechoslovakia, the focus on commemoration is not entirely surprising. Still, if we peel back some layers of the Czech narrative, we can see cross-pollination with the ethnicized versions of their former Volhynian neighbors.

As has already been discussed, various Czech Malyn survivors gave testimonies to both the Soviet and Svoboda commissions in Volhynia in 1944. Many of these testimonies implicated local populations in aiding the Germans, though these testimonies have been largely forgotten over the decades. Two Czech publications on Malyn appeared before 1947 when nearly all of the Volhynian Czechs left Soviet Ukraine in the population exchange with Czechoslovakia. However, the only major publication in the immediate postwar was *Kronika Českého Malína* by Josef Martinovský in 1945, in which he described the history of Malyn from its inception until its demise. Martinovský, whose family played a prominent role in Malyn’s history and owned the village mill, lost his wife and daughter in the reprisal. Though the book focused primarily on the culpability of the Germans, Martinovský included two cryptic references to the involvement of the Ukrainians and Poles.
After Martinovský’s return to Czechoslovakia, the secret police arrested him in 1950 for being a member of an “illegal organization of Volhynian Czechs.” His family believes the denunciation could have only come from within the Volhynian Czech community. Though he was released, the event dissuaded him from writing on Malyn for some time. In the 1970s Martinovský began examining the atrocity further. According to his daughter, he always wanted to know which units were involved in the reprisal and sought justice. He or his family never reconciled the fact that no one was tried for their participation in the reprisal.

For the remainder of the Soviet period, there appears to have been little inquiry into what happened in Malyn. Instead, Volhynian Czechs continued to participate in a number of commemoration ceremonies at the monuments in Nový Malín, Žatec, and Malyn itself. As already discussed, these events were held largely under the banner of
družba narodov with a heavy dose of militarism, celebrating the role of the Soviet Union and, in particular, the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps in vanquishing the Nazis.

A growing interest in Malyn emerged after 1989, and a number of new publications were completed, mostly from members of the Volhynian Czech community and a few Czech scholars. These new works and memoirs rarely touch upon contentious issues regarding local collaborators. Instead, they generally direct their anger at the “fascists” or simply the “Germans.” Nevertheless, the focus remained on commemorating and remembering not only what happened to Malyn but the Volhynian Czech community as a whole. The Volhynian Czechs often refer to Malyn as the “Lidice of Volhynia,” echoing the Czech tragedy during the Nazi occupation. This moniker partly serves as an effort to portray Malyn as a “symbol of suffering for the Volhynian Czechs” and partly as an effort to integrate Malyn into a larger Czech narrative about wartime suffering. One Czech author noted that Malyn long “remained just a tragedy for the Volhynian Czechs”—since the fall of the Soviet Union, an effort has clearly been made to change this.

Still, below the surface, there are some fissures within the Volhynian Czech community and Malyn helps expose them. Take, for example, the matter of Jaroslav Mec,
who factored into Polish accounts of Malyn. At a conference in Poland, Mec reportedly declared, “I have never read such information [of Poles participating in the pacification of Malyn]. From the beginning, when our people moved from Volhynia we were in contact with each other and talked about those difficult times. Nobody, at any point, had any doubts that this atrocity was undertaken by the Germans with the help of the Ukrainian police.”

During interviews conducted in Prague in 2010, I asked why Jaroslav Mec was the only Czech to go on record in recent years accusing Ukrainian policemen of being solely responsible for the destruction of Malyn and why Polish authors have been so eager to cite him. The sole remaining survivor of Malyn, Josef Řepík, and Martinovský’s daughter told me that Mec was a Volhynian native of Polish-Czech background, who studied and worked in Poland after the war and was a communist during the Soviet period. They thought his political and national allegiances explained his relationship with the Poles, his inclination to exclude Poles from the reprisal and his focus on Ukrainians as the sole perpetrators. In general, Řepík and Martinovský’s daughter felt that he did not speak for their community.

Discussions about Jiří Hofman, another prominent Volhynian Czech who wrote a great deal about the Volhynian Czechs, revealed other tensions. Hofman, also a Volhynian native, served in Svoboda’s army and then in the Czechoslovak Ministry of Defense after the war. He was also a member of the Czech Communist Party. Some of the Volhynian Czech community felt his work on Volhynia overemphasized the issues of ethnic conflict and fixated on the crimes of “nationalist” groups. Despite this tendency, Hofman never implicated either the Poles or Ukrainians in the Malyn reprisal. He has also been reluctant to accept that the reprisal had anything to do with Soviet partisans, despite the fact that this remains Volhynian Czechs’ sole explanation. In many ways, Hofman’s emphasis on ethnic conflict and reluctance to blame Soviet partisans, even indirectly, echoes the Soviet narrative about Malyn.
A counterfactual may be helpful here: if Martinovský had been allowed to speak more freely about Malyn in the immediate postwar years or the Svoboda testimonies had been more widely publicized, would the Volhynian Czech community have a more acute interest in the ethnic angle to the reprisal? I would argue likely not. In my interviews with Josef Řepík, the issue of ethnic collaboration, as in much of the post-Soviet literature in Czech, did not figure greatly at all.¹⁸⁸ He recognized that some in the community were aware of the possible presence of Poles and Ukrainians in the reprisal, but as Řepík remarked in the interview: “It doesn’t matter whether they were speaking Ukrainian or Polish—they were bad people. There is a general understanding among the Czech people that these people were criminals.”¹⁸⁹ Make no mistake, the Volhynian Czech community today still seeks justice for those involved and has made efforts to find evidence in archives, but the focus has primarily remained on the German culprits—not their neighbors.

**Unfinished Business: The Contested Legacy of Malyn**
We can gain purchase on three important issues by examining case studies like Malyn: first, an understanding of the centrality of war and ethnic violence in the contemporary Eastern Europe social and political landscape; second, an awareness of the methodological and historiographical challenges facing future scholarship in this contentious field; and third, the deficiency in how the West, and in particular, Germany, has grappled with the legacy of the Nazi occupation of Eastern Europe and sought to amend these injustices.

Speaking to the first point, the examination of these four discursive landscapes, Soviet, Ukrainian, Polish, and Czech, presents Malyn as a sort of Rorschach test in Eastern European history. A writer or interlocutor perceives Malyn according to his or her background or political orientation (and as we have seen these do not always perfectly align). Thus, Malyn serves as a powerful metaphor for the legacy of inter-ethnic violence in wartime and postwar Eastern Europe. It reveals how the “creative forgetting” of the Soviet period continues to haunt the discourse surrounding the war. The Polish Kresy community still seeks justice for the violence they endured in Volhynia, while attempting to deflect any discussion of the crimes of the AK and the repressive nature of interwar Polish policies. Ukrainians likewise pursue justice for the devastation they endured during the Soviet occupation of Volhynia before and after war, as well as for German crimes, while endeavoring to deflect inquiry into the role of the auxiliary police and the UPA in the Holocaust. Furthermore, Ukrainian nationalist writers seek to lionize the efforts of the UPA as a catalyst for an independent Ukraine. Finally, Volhynian Czechs attempt to keep the memory of their kin alive—many of whom were caught in the middle of a ruthless occupation and civil war in which they had no stake. The lack of reckoning with Malyn until the early 1990s has finally come to the fore and Malyn is a symbol of its power and importance in contemporary discourse.

The existence of multiple narratives of a singular massacre in the Eastern European borderlands is not limited to Malyn. The story of Malyn can be easily read alongside other infamous violent incidents where there are competing narratives of what occurred during these turbulent years, such as the 1941 L’viv pogrom, the 1941 Vinnytsia prison massacre, the 1941 Jedwadne pogrom, or the 1943 Khatyn’ massacre. What makes Malyn unique among these examples is that it was only tangentially an act of inter-ethnic violence. Malyn was destroyed as a result of a ruthless colonial policy which targeted civilians at a rate previously unseen in modern European history. Malyn’s Czechs and Ukrainians, according to the available evidence presented here, were not
murdered because of revenge or ill will by their Polish or Ukrainian neighbors. On the contrary, this massacre was part of a highly coordinated large-scale attack on a civilian population orchestrated by the German occupation authorities, in particular the SS and police apparatus. Whether or not potential local collaborators in the detachment, be they Ukrainians or Poles, deserve culpability for their participation in the crime is a separate question altogether. Yet, to present Malyn as primarily an act of ethnic violence is incorrect. Thus, we arrive at the ultimate irony: in a sea of ethnic violence, an atrocity not caused by local ethnic animus has somehow morphed into such in the public imagination and scholarly debate some seventy years later. There is perhaps no more powerful an example of how the residue of ethnic violence continues to color most discourse on the war.

As a result, we should expect to find more Malyns, not just in Volhynia, but throughout the region, given the violence that accompanied the countless border changes, nations, political regimes, and demographic calamities that occurred in Eastern Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. This is already the case for Volhynia where it seems like the soil itself is terrible at keeping secrets. In one recent example, 367 bodies were found near a prison in Volodymyr-Volyns’kyi, a small town in Volhynia. Both Polish and Ukrainian experts have rushed to claim the bodies as those of Polish POW’s murdered by the NKVD in 1940. Many outlets have even dubbed the shootings the “Volhynian Katyń” to echo the infamous of shooting of Polish officers at Katyń. However, other evidence, such as the type of casings and fact that the original NKVD victims were identified and reburied already in 1941, potentially points to these victims as Jews who were killed by the Germans and their Ukrainian accomplices. The joint Polish-Ukrainian collusion in this case speaks to the obvious political cache attached to finding murdered Polish officers for the Kresy community and the desire for Ukrainian authorities to downplay the role of the Ukrainian auxiliary police in the Holocaust. Volodymyr-Volyns’kyi is not alone, as other mass graves and instances of pogroms from the Holocaust continue to be uncovered in Ukraine. These will likely stoke more debate and battles over their memory.

Second, the case of study of Malyn illuminates a host of methodological and historiographical obstacles in writing histories of violence in multi-ethnic regions like wartime Volhynia. One major finding the exploration of these different narratives reveals is the dire need for the professionalization of the academic field in Eastern Europe. What is remarkable about the interlocutors I have discussed is that it is nearly impossible
to tell if a writer is a trained historian, amateur historian, a journalist, or even a first-person account. In some cases, writers not trained as professional historians have created works more erudite than trained academics.\textsuperscript{196} In other accounts, participants pass themselves off as objective observers (Shan’kovskyi or Semeniuk, for example).\textsuperscript{197} To make matters even worse, other writers and scholars from both Eastern Europe and the West, including some well-intentioned scholars like Motyka, then cite these sources without identifying the authors’ backgrounds, either out of ignorance or because they seek to purposely mislead readers. A democratization of archival access, rigorous peer-review, and more interaction and collaboration with the international scholarly community would serve as much needed correctives.\textsuperscript{198}

The lack of communication between different historiographical traditions and disciplines is also troublesome. Most of the histories presented here, whether they are “scholarly” or journalistic, are written within ideological echo chambers. Take for example the work of Volodymyr Serhiichuk and Volodymyr Viatrovych—both trained historians from Ukrainian universities with access and the expertise to incorporate Polish scholarship and sources into their work. Yet when it comes to Malyn they readily ignore evidence that conflicts with their intent on blaming Poles and routinely cite only Ukrainian sources. If Malyn serves just as a passing reference in their overarching mission to evidence Polish brutality and culpability, then one can only imagine the extent to which intentional omissions occur with regard to evidence.\textsuperscript{199}

Perhaps the most vexing methodological problem Malyn highlights is the use of testimony and memory to push nationalist agendas. A number of Ukrainian and Polish scholars have conducted field-work that aims to mimic social science research with interviews of local Volhynians to support their extremist claims about wartime ethnic violence. The Siemaszkos’ colossal project documenting the ethnic cleansing of Poles has popularized this practice of “going to the people” in Eastern European literature in the post-Soviet period.\textsuperscript{200} The idea behind this practice is that the greater “truth” value of first-person, local voices more effectively legitimize larger claims about the conflict than archival documents. The problem arises when this practice is done without rigor and care, or circumvents peer review examination for validity and reliability. This can be seen in the Malyn case. The Ukrainian historian Serhiichuk managed to find Volhynian Ukrainians who supported the Polish perpetrator thesis, while Polish historians managed to find Volhynian Poles who supported the Ukrainian perpetrator thesis. Both authors went to the more “authentic” Volhynian people and got the answers they wanted.
This impasse in local memory and testimony brings Eric Hobsbawn’s observation of memory as a “slippery medium” to mind. It is improbable that all of these Ukrainian and Polish witness recollections are accurate given the contradictions between them. However, testimony or memory is not the problem in and of itself. Memories are only as slippery as the hands that collect them. Historians need to carefully unpeel the layers of obfuscation and recognize the often nationalized and ethnicized narratives that can plague scholarly writing. These narratives even seep into primary sources only to reappear in historical literature in a feedback loop. When scholars isolate and interrogate these sources alongside archival and other forms of evidence, they construct a stronger and more accurate historiography. Just like its integration into Holocaust studies, when used judiciously, testimony can certainly enhance our understanding of ethnic conflict and other violent events from the wartime borderlands.

Make no mistake, cases like Malyn can lead scholars down postmodern meanderings, since “double memory” or “multiplicities of memory” make it easier to declare there are many “truths” to Malyn: a Polish truth, a Ukrainian, and so on. Considering Jeffrey Burds’ statement that “a historian’s motives will be impugned no matter how diligent the research,” it is tempting to opt out of the difficult work of untangling these narratives’ many threads and simply present all of them as constructive. However, I contend that such escapism does a disservice not only to the historical profession, but to the victims of such atrocities. Do we honestly think that the people burned alive in that school believed there were multiple “truths” about what was happening to them? Are the Volhynian Czechs today still searching for the truth about what happened or do they accept multiple truths? Dispassionate work is not only possible, but necessary to tell the stories like Malyn’s.
To the third and final point, the Western silence surrounding Malyn and many similar ravaged villages is not merely an accident of omission. Rather it is part of a larger act of forgetting the genocidal war in the east. Though European and North American scholars have shed much light on the Nazi’s brutal occupation in the east, and particularly on the Wehrmacht’s anti-partisan campaigns in Ukraine and Belarus, this scholarship has sparked little advocacy for compensating survivors and the Ukrainian state, nor has it sparked a call for legal proceedings.\textsuperscript{207} Despite recent closer examinations of the German occupation of the east, most notably the forced labor system (\textit{Ostarbeiter}), more work is required to document the over 400 villages like Malyn destroyed in the east and to identify the perpetrators.\textsuperscript{208}

This oversight would not appear so flagrant if not for the attention paid to similar massacres that occurred in wartime Western and Central Europe. For example, as of 2011, German officials were still kicking in doors and raiding homes to find and prosecute the perpetrators of the Oradour-sur-Glane massacre in France.\textsuperscript{209} Further, until it was eventually dropped, as of 2012, the German government was still officially
investigating the Sant’Anna di Stazzema massacre in Italy. Many of these villages, like Lidice in the Czech Republic, now possess well-funded museums and exhibits to commemorate their legacies. These martyred villages have also garnered attention in the diplomatic arena such as when German President Joachim Gauck visited both Lidice and Oradour-Sur-Glane in 2013.\(^\text{210}\) The disjuncture in how these massacres are commemorated and remembered in Western and Central Europe versus Eastern Europe is not lost upon those working at these commemoration sites. During a personal tour of the powerful Lidice complex and museum, a guide told me, “A Lidice occurred practically every day during the war in Ukraine.”\(^\text{211}\) While no one would claim that the villages of Central and Western Europe do not deserve commemoration, the elaborate commemoration sites and practices as well as international coverage stand in stark contrast to the poverty-stricken and forgotten Ukrainian villages like Malyn. Outside of articles in the small regional Volhynian newspapers, few, if any, take note of the somber pilgrimage Volhynian Czechs take each July from the Czech Republic to Ukraine to commemorate the dead.

While the Cold War made international inquiry into war crimes behind the Iron Curtain a cumbersome, if not at times impossible, affair, there is no such excuse now that the German government has open access to archives and materials in Eastern Europe.\(^\text{212}\) If a disproportionate amount of violence occurred on the Eastern Front during the war, with its majority occurring in Ukraine (and Belarus), then the compensation and quest for justice should be commensurate.\(^\text{213}\) One family from the Sant’Anna di Stazzema massacre expressed this yearning for justice well in 2004: “We are not interested in revenge. But the absence of justice has weighed heavily on us. What we want is truth and justice. We want a little moral reparation.”\(^\text{214}\) The family members of Malyn’s victims, as well as the families of many similar villages in Ukraine, would like a “little moral reparation” as well.

A Museum for Malyn

“Memory is a sort of anti-museum: it is not localizable.”\(^\text{215}\)

You can travel to Malyn today, but it is entirely a postwar reconstruction. You enter the town on the same cobblestone roads as the Nazi detachment did in 1943. Upon first glance, you can see what appears to be just another dilapidated village in the Ukrainian countryside. There are small homes, decaying neglected fields, a church rebuilt
with money from abroad, and even a small one-room building marked “klub” in handwritten Ukrainian. But if you look closer at the monuments in this nondescript rural village, you can clearly see the pockmarks of the violence from the twentieth century.

![Monument to Malyn's Czechs in the Czech cemetery, 2013. Author.](image)

Starting from the old Czech cemetery, which is now just open fields, on the Czech side of Malyn you encounter a monument for the Czech victims. Their lives and names are commemorated in both Czech and Ukrainian in the black marble. Ukrainian names are missing. As you travel towards the entrance of the present day village center you can see a stoic, socialist realist Soviet monument commemorating the Great Patriotic War. A statue of a bearded peasant gazes into the distance, while his wife mourns the death of one son at his right leg and their small child clutches his left. The inscription reads, “We, the victims, have given our own lives so you can live prosperously.” At the far end of the village, where the church once stood and Malyn’s victims are buried, you will see two monuments. Just beyond the green lawn that covers the mass grave, there is a striking steel flame inscribed with the date July 13, 1943. In front of it sits a newly installed monument to the Ukrainian nationalist fighters and Ukrainian victims of Malyn. The Czech names are missing.
Sixty years later, even the memorial landscape in contemporary Malyn mirrors the discursive landscape surrounding the reprisal. The villagers of Malyn, neighbors, friends, and acquaintances who lived side by side for generations and even died together—have now been separated in place, memory, and commemoration at the expense of propagating a homogenous national memory. Is this how the victims of the massacre would want to be remembered—as victims from separate nations or ethnic groups, rather than citizens of Malyn or Volhynia?²¹⁶
Even if we wanted to counter this trend by building our own, more inclusive museum for Malyn—how would we accomplish this? How many rooms would we need? In what language would we write the exhibits? More importantly, where would the museum be located? In contemporary Malyn, Ukraine? Or in Nový Malín in the Czech Republic? Moreover, how might we narrativize this museum? Would we tell its story using the Czech, Ukrainian, Polish, or Soviet narratives? Could all of the different contributors to Malyn’s memory work together to honor the victims in a meaningful way?

If we can rescue anything from the morass of this atrocity for our museum, perhaps it would be the simple, yet powerful image of neighborly solidarity Václav Uhliř provided after he escaped through the burning window of the Malyn church:
I cautiously looked around and saw that there were no more Germans. I bound my leg with my shirt and crawled [away from the school]. I then tried to look for some help. I crawled to a nearby Ukrainian cottage, which fortunately had not been burned down. Once there, I lost consciousness from blood loss and shock. I don’t know how long I laid there. The owner of the cottage, who fled when the Germans arrived, eventually came home. In the darkness he came and helped me, giving me further treatment. “Please harness the horse and take me to my sister in Knerut,” “I can’t—I don’t have a horse—the Germans took it.” The Ukrainian then carried me on his back to my sister’s home. I probably grew heavier over time, since I’m not a small person. He had to stop and rest several times. Despite being shot four times in the calf by a machine gun and not receiving adequate medical care, I healed. However, I walk with a permanent limp.  

Jared McBride
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2. The prewar Polish voivodeship (województwo) of Volhynia comprised eleven counties (powiat) consisting of 8-15 rural communities (gmina) and municipalities. Województwo can also have various meanings in English, but I use it only to mean urban area. Under Soviet occupation, starting in September 1939, the leadership expanded Voivodeship Volhynia to the north, lopped off a former county in the south, and divided the territory into two oblasts – Rivne and Volhynia – which were made up of raions, somewhat larger than the gminas, but still much smaller than the now disbanded counties. When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, Rivne and Volhynia oblasts were combined with Proskuriv oblast’ to form the General District Volhynia-Podolia (Generalbezirk) and the county-level administration was reinstated in the form of county commissariats (Kreis- or Gebietskommissariat), roughly along the lines of the former Polish counties, but using the standing Soviet raions instead of the former Polish gmina. The General District Volhynia-Podolia also received a strip of Belarusian land in the north and regained the southern county that the Soviets had allotted another oblast’. During interwar Polish rule, Malyn was located in the Gmina Malin, Powiat Dubno. During the brief Soviet occupation of the region from 1939 to 1941, Malyn was a part of Ostrozhets’ raion, Rivne oblast’. After the beginning of the Nazi occupation in 1941, it was located in Ostrozhets’ Rayon, County Commissariat Dubno, Wolhynien und Podolien Generalbezirk, Reichskommissariat Ukraine. In the early postwar Soviet period (1944-1959), it was again a part of Ostrozhets’kyi raion and then became a part of Mlyniv raion after Ostrozhets’ raion was eliminated. In the post-Soviet era (post-1991) it remains a part of Mlyniv raion, Rivne oblast’. Also take note that Malyn should not be mistaken with another village by the same name in neighboring Zhytomyr oblast’.

3. Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [hereafter cited as GARF], f. R-7021 [Chrezvychainaiia gosudarstvennaia komissiia po ustanovleniiu i rassledovaniiu zlodeianii nemetskio-fashistskih zakhvatichkov], op. 71, d. 1, ll. 112-3; Nezapomeneme, pomstíme! (Moskva: Vydavatelství cizojazyčné literatury, 1944), 20.
4. Throughout the article, I will use the Ukrainian transliteration of “Malyn” based on the Library of Congress standard. As will be discussed, there was a Czech section of Malyn – often called a colony (or kolonie in Czech) – and a Ukrainian section, usually referred to as a village (or derevnia in Ukrainian). The Czechs referred to Malyn as Český Malín, though the original name of the settlement was Kolonie Česká. Throughout the article I add all relevant linguistic variations on the village names when possible given the multi-ethnic nature of the region. For instance, if a Polish village is referred to by its Czech name in a quotation, I will provide the Polish variation as well. In the case where a Polish village does not exist anymore I leave the village name in Polish and do not use a Ukrainian variation on the name. It could be considered a political act to Ukrainianize Polish village names, especially ones destroyed by Ukrainian nationalist groups. I, therefore, avoid this practice as much as possible.

5. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, l. 123.

6. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, l. 123.

7. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, l. 123.

8. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, ll. 108-11.

9. There were an estimated 75 people in this group. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, l. 112.

10. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, l. 113.

11. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, ll. 105-7, 114-6; GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 61, ll. 31-3; Nezapomeneme, pomstíme!, 12-14, 20-5. Antonín Činka was also in this group. See his oral testimony: Antonín Činka, April 26, 2006, Paměť Národa Archiv, Prague, Czech Republic [hereafter cited as Paměť Národa].

12. Author interview with Josef Řepík and Darina Martinovská, July 26, 2010, Prague, Czech Republic.

13. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, l. 105.

14. The Ukrainian school was formerly the Polish gmina administrative building during the interwar period. The school in Czech Malyn was burned down in 1942.

15. Correspondence with Josef Řepík, 2014. The most precise numbers come from Josef Řepík who lost his family in the reprisal and has researched the history of Malyn over the past sixty years. Řepík noted a total of 59 people in the church of which 16 tried to escape, whereas another survivor Václav Uhliř noted 80 people in the school of which 20 tried to escape.

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17. Correspondence with Josef Řepík, 2014.

18. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, l. 105.

19. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, l. 123; For Filípek’s testimony see: Bohumil Filípek, September 22, 2010, Paměť Národa.

20. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, ll. 113, 119, 123. Řepík notes that a total of 139 people died in Czech Malyn, most in the barn and shack of Josef Dobrý. Correspondence with Josef Řepík, 2014. Zamczysko is a Polish village that does not exist in Ukraine anymore, therefore I have left the name in Polish and will do so for the remainder of the article. For its location see the map and for more on the village’s history see: http://wolyn.ovh.org/opisy/zamczysko-01.html (accessed January 27, 2015).


22. P’ianie (or Pjanie) was a Ukrainian village with some Polish families located south-west of Malyn that does not exist anymore. The village name was also spelled Pjane in Polish. For more information see: http://wolyn.ovh.org/opisy/pjanie-01.html (accessed January 27, 2015).


25. The Czech version is Malovaná.

26. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, l. 128.

27. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, ll. 117, 119.

28. The two sets of numbers come from ChGK and the Svoboda report. ChGK reports that a total of 603 people were killed with a breakdown of 194 men, 204 women, and 205 children. See GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, l. 136. The Svoboda report tallies a total of 532 people including 374 Czechs (104 men, 161 women, and 105 children), 132 Ukrainians, 26 Poles, 4 Czechs from other villages. See Nezapomeneme, pomstíme!, 10. Other calculations of the number of dead vary from source to source. For a list of the names of victims see: Jiří Hofman, Jaroslav Vaculík, and Václav Širc, Volynští Češi v prvním a druhém odboji (Praha: Český svaz bojovníku za svobodu, 1999), 231-6 and Martinovská, Řepík, Český Malín, 30-7. It is not unusual that victim numbers vary. As in the case of other infamous atrocities during and after the war, such as Huta Pieniacka, Khatyn’, and Pawłokoma, there is great debate over the number of victims. This is no surprise given that the “bookkeeping” was usually manipulative, incomplete, and self-serving.
29. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, l. 136.


32. Nina Mykolaichuk, interviewed by historian Mikhail Tyaglyy, October 29, 2011, Ostrozhets’, Ukraine. The author thanks Tyaglyy for sharing these transcripts.

33. For works that chronicle these martyred villages in Ukraine, see: Leonid Horlach, Iurii Zbanats’kyi, et al., Dzvony Pam’iat: Knyha Pro Trahediui Sil Volyni, Zhytomyrshchyny ta Rovenshchyny Znyszchenykh Fashystamy a Roky Viiny (Kyiv: Rad. Pys’mennyk, 1987); S.V. Butko, ed., Ukrainia Pid Natsysts’koiu Okupatsiei Spalen Sela (1941-1944 rr.): Anotovanyi Pokazhchyk (Kyiv: DP NVTs “Priorytety,” 2012). Malyn was not the only Czech village to be targeted during German reprisals. For attacks on other Volhynian Czech villages such as Moskovština, Niva Hubínská, and Michna-Sergejevka see: Hofman, Volynští Češi v prvním a druhém odboji, 303-11.


36. The various incarnations of these claims are discussed throughout the article.

37. The first three villages do not exist anymore and the names are presented in Polish. Bożkówicze (or Bozhkevychi in Ukrainian) is now called Novoselivka. For maps of interwar Poland that include the locations of these villages see: *Strony o Wołini*: http://wolyn.ovh.org/.


39. Nachtigall and Roland were two small units, both less than battalion size, comprised of Ukrainian nationalists (OUN-B members) that were trained by German military intelligence before the invasion of the Soviet Union. Combined, the units were called the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Nationalists (Druzhyna Ukrains’kykh Natsionalistiv, DU/N) and were led by Rikhard Iaryi, a key leader of the OUN-B. They followed behind the Germans during the initial attack on the Soviet Union and participated in crimes against local populations. After the units disbanded in autumn 1941, with few exceptions, their members went to serve in Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201, which participated in partisan warfare in Belarus. On Roland/Nachtigall, see: John Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2nd Edition (New York, Columbia University Press, 1963), 73-4; Bolianovs’kyi, *Ukrains’ki Viis’kovi Formuvannia*, 41-73; Franziska Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!”: Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 1928-1948 (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2007), 130-2. For an exculpatory interpretation of the units, see...


44. The Giedroyc doctrine is named after the Polish émigré writer and activist Jerzy Giedroyc who, along with Juliusz Mieroszewski, in the 1970s argued for a rapprochement between East European and East-Central European countries, especially with regard to territorial claims in the postwar era.


53. Spector, *Holocaust of the Volhynian Jews*, 11. Grzegorz Hryciuk, Przemiany narodowościowe i ludnościowe w Galicji Wschodniej i na Wołyniu w latach 1931-1948 (Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2005), 136. The 1921 Polish census counted 25,405 Czechs in the Wołyński Województwo and 30,628 of the total Republic population (or 0.12% of the total population). The 1931 census does not show much change and counted 28,465 Czechs in Wołyński Województwo and 38,097 in the Republic (or 0.12% of the total population). For the censuses see: Główny Urząd Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, *Skorowidz miejscowości Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* - *Tom IX - Województwo Wołyńskie* (Warszawa: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 1923); Główny Urząd Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, *Drugipowszechny spis*

54. For an overview of pre-20th century Malyn see: J.A. Martinovský, Kronika Českého Malína (Praha: Orbis, 1945), 9-54.

55. Ponomarenko, Dzvony Pam’iat’i Malyny, 5.

56. Author interview with Ivan Vainer, August 20, 2011, Malyn, Ukraine; Author interview with Josef Řepík and Darina Martinovská, July 26, 2010, Prague, Czech Republic.

57. Some Volhynian Czechs potentially served Russian’s special Czech unit known as Česká družina, which was formed in Kyiv in 1914.

58. Martinovská, Řepík, Český Malín, 1-3; Martinovský, Kronika Českého Malína, 22-31; Hofman, Volynští Češi v prvním a druhém odboji, 11-62. For an example overview of the civil war period in Eastern Europe see: Prusin, The Lands Between, 72-97.

59. Author interview with Josef Řepík and Darina Martinovská, July 26, 2010, Prague, Czech Republic.

60. Martinovský, Kronika Českého Malína, 32-54; Komasarik, Malyn, 13, 18.

61. This information came from Leonid Mostovych, one of the nationalist brothers (the other being Mykola) from Malyn. Their father was the Orthodox parish priest for Malyn. See Leonid’s memoirs: Leonid Mostovych, Stezhkamy Doli (Kyiv: Literatura Ukraïna, 2012), 6. The Soviet encyclopedia claims Malyn resident M.F. Radzyvil served in the underground area raikom and there was a Sel’roby presence in the village by 1929 as well. Mialovyts’kyi, Istoriia mist i sil, 424.

62. For an account of this time period see the unmatched monograph: Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).


64. Martinovská, Řepík, Český Malín, 4. For a pro-Soviet account of this period, see O. F. Fedorov, Vinok bezsmyrta: Kniga-memorial (Kyiv: Politizdat Ukrainy 1988), 398-9.

65. For Polish accounts of Soviet rule in Malyn see testimonies in Hoover Institution Archive, MID, box 209, folder : Jan Cybulski (2612); Karol Jarosz (2889); Antoni Ostapnič (2908).

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http://carlbeckpapers.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/cbp.2016.203 | Number 2405
66. Mostovych, Stezhkamy Doli, 6-7, 43.

67. The Nazis used Gebiet and Kreis interchangeably when talking about this administrative level in the occupied territories. Here I have decided to use County Commissariat as the translation.


69. Komasarik, Malyn, 29.


72. Author interview with Ivan Vainer, August 20, 2011, Malyn, Ukraine.

73. Author interview with Josef Řepík and Darina Martinovská, July 26, 2010, Prague, Czech Republic.

74. The phenomenon of Volhynian Czech heroism during the Holocaust remains an understudied topic, in addition to the heroism of Volhynian Baptists as well. On Czech heroism see: Spector, Holocaust of the Volhynian Jews, 252; Kalman Shmirgold, interview 32616, USC Shoah Foundation testimony; Sonia Resnick-Tetelbaum, interview 9702, USC Shoah Foundation testimony; Bessy Krauser, interview 28633, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.

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77. On the recruitment and creation of the UPA, see: McBride, “A Sea of Blood and Tears,” 258-313.

78. N.F. Slobodiuk, a member of the UPA’s security service (SB). See GARF f. 9478, op. 1, d. 133, ll. 76-96.


80. For a harrowing memoir that recounts such attacks from the Polish side, see: Waldemar Lotnik, Nine Lives: Ethnic Conflict in the Polish-Ukrainian Borderlands (London: Serif, 1999). On Polish retaliation, see: Grzegorz Motyka, Ukraїnsька Partyzantka, 324-7; Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations,172-7. For extremely biased sources that do however contain some pertinent information on joint German-Polish attacks on Ukrainian villages, see: Oleksandr Denyschuk, Zlochyny pol’s’kykh shovinistiv na Volyni (Rivne: PPDM, 2003); Volodymyr Serhiichuk, Poliaky na Volyni u roky Druhoї svitової viiny: dokumenty z ukraїns’kykh arkhivіv i pol’s’ki publikatsiі (Kyiv: Ukrains’ka Vidavnicha Cпілка, 2003).


82. Vaculík, Dějiny volýnských Čechů, Vol. 3, 167; For the most extensive works on the war period, see: Hofman, Volynění Češi v prvním a druhém odboji; Jaroslav Vaculík, Volynění Češi v protifašistickém zápase (Praha: Český svaz protifašistického zápase, 1987).
83. Krupa-Hranytsia is now known as Krupa. Mal’ovane exists today as well, though neither village has any more Czechs.

84. Report from the Luts’k okrug: Tsentral’niy Derzhavniy Arkhiv Vyshchyk Orhaniv Vlady Ta Upravlinnia Ukrainy [hereafter cited as TsDAVO], f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 124, ark. 23. A SB member of the UPA admitted to murdering Czechs in Mlyniv, see: GARF, f. 9478, op. 1, d. 398, ll. 2-6. For a list of Czechs killed by the UPA, see: Hofman, *Volyňští Češi v prvním a druhém odboji*, 317-24. For other references to UPA attacks on Czechs, see: Siemaszko and Siemaszko, *Ludobójstwo*, T. 2, 1079-81; Motyka, *Ukraińska Partyzantka*, 283; Václav Širč and Josef Foitík, *Minulost zavátná časem: kronika Českých Dorohostají a přilehlých osad Libáňovky a Mášlenky* (Louny: Český svaz protifašistických bojovníků, 1987), 47.

85. Kalinovka is the village name in Czech. The UPA also murdered Golechek’s son-in-law, a Pole. See Tsentral’niy Derzhavniy Arkhiv Hromad’s’kykh Ob’iednani Ukrainy [hereafter cited as TsDAHOU], f. 63, op. 1, spr. 100, ark. 20-1. Allegedly, a very small group of Czechs fought on the side of the UPA, but there is little evidence to support this claim. See: Volodymyr Serhiichuk, “Natsional’ni formuvannia u Skladi UPA,” *Drohobyts’kyi Kraезnavchyi Zbirnyk*. Spetsvypusk (Drohobych, 2002), 59-60; Motyka, *Ukraińska Partyzantka*, 283. On the issue of forced or coercive recruitment in the UPA, see: McBride, “A Sea of Blood and Tears,” 300-12.


89. The key testimonies and documents concerning Malyn can be found in two locations: GARF, f. R-7021 op. 71, d. 1, ll. 105-43, including ten eyewitness testimonies, two expert opinions, and four photographs of the ruins of Malyn following the reprisal. A second batch of documents that includes another five eyewitness testimonies and two expert reports, can be found at GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 61, ll. 9-10, 31-43. There is reference to Malyn in another ChGK testimony, namely a local priest named Mikhail Nosal’ here: GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 61, ll. 46-7. ChGK materials can also be found at DARO, f. 534, op. 1, spr. 4, ark. 184-9.

90. DARO, f. 658, op. 1, spr. 30, ark. 3-4.


92. It is important to note that I am the only scholar to have attended to these testimonies in any fashion.

93. Compare *Nezapomeneme, pomstíme!,* 20-25 with the GARF testimonies: GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, ll. 105-43.


95. *Nezapomeneme, pomstíme!,* 17.

96. *Nezapomeneme, pomstíme!,* 14.

97. *Nezapomeneme, pomstíme!,* 24-6.

98. While I will examine other testimonies later in this article, it is important to isolate and point out these testimonies. As the earliest testimonies taken from Czechs who survived the massacre, they are likely the most reliable eyewitness testimonies we have.

99. Pohl noted 19,000 men in mobile battalions. However, this number can be revised up to 20,000 when we consider there were 60 battalions with an average strength of 360 men per battalion. These numbers are based on the research of Ray Brandon. The author thanks Brandon for sharing them. Dieter Pohl, “The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews under German Military Administration and in the Reich Commissariat Ukraine,” in The Shoah in Ukraine, 55; Tessin, *Ordnungspolizei,* 64-7, 104-6; Pohl, “Ukrainische Hilfskräfte,” 255.


102. Spector, *Holocaust of Volhynian Jews*, 175. Spector gives the ratio of 11,870 indigenous policemen to 1,407 Germans, but it is not clear what he is citing when he uses Tessin’s work here.

103. See “Viis’kovi Informatsii” reports from the Ukrainian underground on December 20 and 26, 1943 and another from early 1944, which clearly show Polish police and Ukrainian *schutzmänner* still working together under German command in western Ukraine in TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 3a, ll. 55-60, 70 cited in Serhiichuk, *Poliaky na Volyni*, 339-42, 346-8, 354-8.

104. A teenage Jewish boy, Michael Greenstein, who hid in the home of a Volhynian Baptist, Petro Pavlovsky, reported seeing the detachment that destroyed Malyn on its way back from the reprisal. As he looked through a crack in a barn door, he noted there were “Horvatim” under German command. This translates to “Croats” from Hebrew. Greenstein either thought the groups was actually Croatians or perhaps he simply called nationalities or ethnic groups whose languages he did not understand “Croats” as some type of colloquial moniker. It is unlikely there were actually Croatians in this particular group, but his testimony does point to the fact other national groups, perhaps multiple ones were among the units involved. It is a tantalizing clue into the identity of the perpetrators, but since Greenstein is dead little follow-up can be done. The author thanks Zvi Gitelman for his linguistic insight on this issue. See Michael Greenstein [Grinstein], April 1961, Yad Vashem Archive, O.3/1819. The Greenstein testimony is cited by Spector. Spector, *Holocaust of the Volhynian Jews*, 253.


106. This marker matches symbols for certain units like the 46th infantry division, but there is no reason to believe this division was in Volhynia at this time. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, l. 114. Regarding the reference to some of the Germans speaking broken Czech to Malyn’s villagers, it is possible there were some local Germans (Volksdeutsche) or even Sudeten Germans in this particular task force who would have had such linguistic capabilities.

107. There is a small chance that the death’s head unit present at the reprisal could have been troops from Commander of the Waffen-SS Russia South and Ukraine (Befehlshaber der Waffen-SS Russland-Süd und Ukraine), but this is unlikely.

108. GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, l. 114; Nezapomeneme, *pomstíme*!, 24-5; Hofman, *Volynští Češi*, 237-9. It is certainly possible that Martinovský had a role in organizing or carrying out the reprisal, as there is precedent for this in other occupied zones. For example, Chiari highlighted the role of Kreislandwirts in occupation violence in Belarus. Bernhard Chiari, *Alltag hinter der Front: Besatzung, Kollaboration und Widerstand in Weißrußland 1941-1944* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1998), 55 (fn.210).
109. Horodnytsia and Ialovychi still exist today, though Mala Horodnytsia was subsumed into Velyka Horodnytsia. They are located in Mlynivs’kyi raion. There is no evidence Vorsyn (spelled Worun in Polish) still exists. Like the Malyn reprisal there is a great deal of conflicting information on the nature of these reprisals in the documentary record, including the dates and identify of the perpetrators. See GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 1, ll. 92-100, 114; GARF, f. R-7021, op. 71, d. 62, l. 9; TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 124, ark. 14, 18; Evhen Tsymbaliuk, Mlynivshchyna na Mezhi Tysiacholit’: Frahmenty litopysy vid davyny do s’hodennia (Luts’k: Volyns’ka oblasna drukarnia, 2001), 200-1; Nadiia Korniichuk, Volyn’ u Dobu Lykholit’ (Luts’k: Volyns’ka oblasna drukarnia, 2010), 164, 167.

110. The Polish village Ludwikówka, which was located in the Mlynivs’kyi raion area, does not exist anymore and cannot be found on contemporary maps. This rendering is in Polish. For information on Ludwikówka see: Strony o Wołniu: http://wolyn.ovh.org/.

111. A Soviet partisan intelligence report, which incorrectly attributes the Malyn reprisal to aerial bombardment, also notes an attack on Uzhynets’. Given that Uzhynets’ was not attacked and lays adjacent to Ludwikówka, it is likely that the report was referring to Ludwikówka. See TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 22, spr. 41, ark. 81-8. The document is reprinted in Volodymyr Serhiichuk, Radians’ki Partyzany proty OUN-UPA (Kyiv: Ukrains’ka Vydavnycha Spilka, 2000), 93.


113. The author would like to thank Ray Brandon, Dieter Pohl, Martin Dean, Steve Tyas, Eric Steinhart, Waitman Beorn, and Wendy Lower for their expertise and advice on German archives and the search for this possible document. It is also worth noting that there are no trials in East or West German archives against relevant Germans in the military or civilian administration connected to this crime. I also canvassed the archives of the Security Service in Ukraine (SBU) and the Czech Republic Security Services Archive (ABS) for information on Vogel.

Smoking gun documents for these types of reprisals do, in fact, exist. An example of a smoking gun document regarding a crime such as an anti-partisan reprisal can be found in the case of another

114. The Czechs had little incentive to lie in their early testimonies and the Soviets had little incentive to falsify in a virtually unknown publication at a time where local collaboration (of the non-nationalist variant) was rarely discussed in the press. In addition, the fact that another source within the community, Martinovsky, also reiterated the involvement of both Poles and Ukrainians, helps to verify this claim. As an aside to the claim of Sipo-SD and KdS Rivne involvement, there is a small chance a German police battalion could have been used as well.

115. The evidence of Olyka police involvement seems to suggest this, but again, we cannot be certain. It is also possible that some of these police forces or policemen showed up to only after the reprisal to plunder the village.

116. Diary of S. V. Rudnev: TsDAHOU, f. 63, op. 1, spr. 85, ark. 33; See also the reference to the same encounter with Malyn by the partisan V.O. Voitekhovich in *Sto Dniv Zvytiahy: Partyzans’ki zshytky* (Kyiv: Radians’ki Pis’mennik, 1970), 42-4; Interviews with Czech villagers after the war about their encounter with Soviet partisans can be seen in this article: V. Komarovs’kyi, “Vichny Vohon’ Malyna,” *Chervonyi Prapor* (Rivne), July 5, 1983. This underground Polish report also confirms the interaction: Sprawozdanie sytuacyjne NR 11/43 ze środowiskowych i wschodnich województw Polski za lipiec i sierpień 1943 r., z 2 grudnia 1943 r. w: *Sprawozdania krajowe*, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych [Rzadu RP] (London, 1943).

117. Mostovych and a number of other nationalist figures make this claim. Mostovych, *Stežkamy Doli*, 7.

118. TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 46, spr. 306, ark. 36; TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 90, ark. 16.

120. For photos of the monument in Žatec and Nový Malín, see the second edition of the Martinovský book published in the 1983. There is a copy at the Rivnens’kyi Kraeznachyi Muezi, S-1, P-3, Ia-1, Papka 6.


126. TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 125, ark. 4; TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 124, ark. 14, 18; P. S. Sokhan’, et al., eds., Volyn’ i Polissia - UPA ta Zapillia, 1943-1944: Dokumenty i Materialy, Litopys UPA, Nova Seria, Tom 2 (Kyiv and Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1999), 357.

127. TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 124, ark. 14; According to Volhynian Czechs, Otto Gross was a Jewish doctor from Prague who came to Malyn with his wife Sofia and two children before the war. They were all killed during the reprisal, which of course, makes it difficult to understand why he would intentionally have provoked an attack. Author interview with Josef Řepík and Darina Martinovská, July 26, 2010, Prague, Czech Republic.

128. The village Novomalyn neighbored Liakhiv (or Lachów in Polish): Sokhan, Volyn’ i Polissia - UPA ta Zapillia, 357.

130. See the UPA leaflet, “The Struggle of the Ukrainian People Against the Occupation Forces” in UPA v svitlі nimets'kykh dokumentiv, Litopys UPA, Tom 7, eds. Taras Hunczak and Peter J. Potichnyj, Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1983), 181, 237.

131. Most recently, a Ukrainian historian and activist Volodymyr Viatrovych cited one of these reports to implicate the Poles. He did this in spite of the fact that he attended a conference in which an earlier version of this article was presented, explaining that were multiple versions of the Malyn reprisal. See Volodymyr Viatrovych, Droha Pol's'ko-ukrains'ka viina, 1942-1947 (Kyiv: Kyev-Mohylians'ka Akademiia, 2011), 132. For the paper, see: Jared McBride, “Through an Ethnic Lens, Darkly: The Massacre at Malyn, July 1943,” paper presented at the international conference, World War II and the (Re)Creation of Historical Memory in Contemporary Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine, September 23-26, 2009. It is no surprise that Viatrovych presented the Poles as the sole perpetrators given his political background. Viatrovych came to fame when then President Yushchenko put him charge of the secret police archives (SBU). After his tenure in this post ended, he created and led Tsentr doslidzhen' vyzvol'noho rukhu (Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement or TsDVR)—an organization devoted to protecting the reputation of the OUN-UPA. His goal in both positions has been absolute Ukrainian nationalists of participating in both the Holocaust and ethnic violence against Poles. In March 2014, President Poroshenko appointed him head of the Institute of National Memory (Ukrains'kyi Instytut Natsional'ni Pam'iat' or UINP), a move that surely will prevent any progress on dealing with dark issues in Ukraine’s past. Viatrovych has a host of non-peer-reviewed publications that have been soundly criticized by a host of international scholars. See for example: Taras Kurylo and Ivan Khymka, “Iak OUN stavylasia do ievreiv?” Ukraina moderna 13 (2008): 252-65; Per Rudling, “Warfare or War Criminality?” Ab Imperio 1 (2012): 356-81; Andzhei Zemba, “Mifologizirovannaia ‘Voina,’” Ab Imperio 1 (2012): 403-421; Grzegorz Motyka, “Neudachnaia Knyha,” Ab Imperio 1 (2012): 387-402; Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe, “Debating, obfuscating and disciplining the Holocaust: post-Soviet historical discourses on the OUN-UPA and other nationalist movements,” East European Jewish Affairs 43, no. 3 (2012): 199-241; Delphine Bechtel, “Mensonges et légitimation dans la construction nationale en Ukraine (2005-2010),” Écrire l’histoire 10 (Autumn 2012), 52, 55-6; Andrei Portnov, “Istoriia dlia domashnego upotreblennia,” Ukori Istorii XX Vek, March 26, 2012: http://urokiistorii.ru/blogs/andrei-portnov/3149 (accessed December 2, 2014).

For examples of other Ukrainian writers than Viatrovych who blame the Poles based on a limited source-base see: S. N. Tkachenko, Povstanchesaia armiia: taktika bor’by (Moscow: AST, 2000), 287; Volodymyr Trofymovych, “Rol’ Nimechchyn’ ta SSSR v Ukrains’ko-Pol’s’komu Konflikti 1935-1945,” Volyn’ 1943: Borot’ba za Zemliu [Special Issue], The Independent Cultural Journal “JI”, no. 28 (2003), 127; Stepan Makarchuk, “Vtraty Naselennia na Volyni 1941-1947 hh.,” Volyn’ 1943: Borot’ba za Zemliu, The Independent Cultural Journal “JI”, no. 28 (2003), 191-2; Mykola Ruts’kyy, Holhofa: dokumental’na istorychna rospovid’ (Rivne: Svitankova Zoria, 1996), 71-2; Denyshchuk, Zlochyny pol’s’kykh shovinistiv, 113-4; Komasarik, Malyn, 40-53; Korniichuk, Volyn’ u Dobu Lykholit’, 152. The first three sources are from historians, whereas the last four authors are all local Volhynian activists and writers who specialize in kraeznavstvo (or local histories). The last book by Evheniia Komasarik, who attended middle school in Malyn in the 1970s, is the one of two books in Ukrainian devoted solely to the village of Malyn and the
most recent full-length publication on Malyn (2013). These kraeznavstvo studies often tend to be limited in scope of source-base and critical evaluation of sources, but rich in details and biographies of local interlocutors. They can be integrated with caution into academic studies that specialize in micro(histories.

132. Danylo Shumuk, Life Sentence: Memoirs of a Ukrainian Political Prisoner (Edmonton: CIUS, University of Alberta, 1984), 73-4; It is worth noting that even within Ukrainian circles, a number of nationalist historians were not happy with Shumuk’s memoir because he did not follow the OUN-B line on what happened during the war, see in particular: Lev Shankovs’kyi, “‘Spohady D. Shumuka’ U Svitli Faktiv,” Vyzvol’nyi Shliakh, vols. 1-4 (1975).

133. Volodymyr Danyliuk, Virty zanado boliache...Volyn’: Khronika podii 1939-1944 rokiv (Luts’k: Initsial, 1995), 160. Danyliuk is a Ukrainian historian who published the diary of Maksym Fedorchuk, along with this NKVD file from the postwar period. Fedorchuk was prosecuted by the Soviets after the war for collaborating with the Ukrainian nationalists in 1941.

134. TsDAVOU, f, 3833, op. 1, spr. 90, ark. 13. Potichnyj makes reference to Platon letter in a Litopys volume. Peter J. Potichnyj, ed., Pidpil’ni zhurnaly zakerzons’koï Ukraïny, 1945-1947, Litopys UPA, Tom 16 (Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1987), 312. It is important to note that the Litopys editor Potichnyj was a child soldier in the UPA during the war and closely associated with Mykola Lebed’s Prolog circle during the Cold War, like Shankovs’kyi. See National Archives and Record Administration [NARA], RG 263, ZZ-19, Aerodynamics, Box 13, Vol. 19 and Box 19, Vol. 35 and Peter J. Potichnyj, My Journey, Part II (Toronto and L’viv: Litopys UPA, 2010), 72, 75.

135. Platon’s accusation is based on information from a Ukrainian priest, Vasyl’ Chervins’kyi, from the village of Sukhivets’ in Klevan’ raion.

136. Serhiichuk is well-known for his ethnic essentialist views of Ukrainian history. He regularly attacks Polish historians for suggesting ethnic cleansing occurred in Volhynia. Serhiichuk is also a regular contributor to the nationalist newspaper, Shliakh Peremohy. For criticism of Serhiichuk’s work, see: Jared McBride, “To Be Stored Forever” [Book review of Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’: Dokumenty. Statti. Lysty, ed. Volodymyr Serhiichuk (Kyiv, 2011)], Ab Imperio, 1/2012, 434-45; Marples, Heroes and Villains, 228-31.


138. Volodymyr Serhiichuk, Trahediia Volyni: prychyny i perebih pol’s’ko-ukraïns’koho konfliktu v roky Druhoï svitovoï viini (Kyiv: Ukrains’ka vydavnycha Spilka, 2003), 52, 106. See TsDAVOU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 124, ark. 14, 18. The five pages of this document that Serhiichuk used can be viewed in full here: Daria Nałecz and H. V. Boriak, eds.,沃ï, Galice Waśhodnia 1943-1944: przewodnik po polskich i ukrainijskich źródłach archiwalnych (Warsaw: NDAP; Kyiv: PKU, 2003), 375-8 and for Malyn specifically,
375; Another L’viv based scholar, Iaroslav Dashkevych, also agrees with Serhiichuk, though it is unclear on what evidence he bases his assertions. See “L’viv’s’ki naukovtzi proistorychnu pravdu shchodo zbroinoho mizhnational’noho konfliktu na Volyni u 1943 rotsi,” Radio Svoboda, April 12, 2013: http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/899466.html (accessed August 28, 2013).


140. On Kosyk’s background in the OUN-B and criticism of him, see: Per Rudling, “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths,” The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies, no. 2107 (November 2011): 17, 27, 56; Bechtel, “Mensonges et legitimation.” 53. Kosyk studied at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich after the war and then became a professor at the Sorbonne in Paris. He routinely published in OUN-B journal: Vzyvol’nyi Shliakh.


142. Kosyk, Ukraina i Nimechchyna, 379.


144. Isaevych, Volyn’ i Kholmshchyna, 684-6.

145. Author interview with Ivan Vainer, August 20, 2011, Malyn, Ukraine. Also in a recent online article in which Vainer was interviewed he did not mention the Poles. Bohan Dem’ianchuk, “Mynulo 65 Rokiv vid dnia Malyns’koi Trahedi,” Ukraina Moloda: http://www.umoloda.kiev.ua/number/1207/163/42851/ (accessed October 24, 2014). Vainer also appears in Komasarik’s recent book where the Poles are implicated. Komasarik, Malyn, 44-5.

146. The Volhynian Czechs routinely noted being terrified of the UPA, see: Author interview with Josef Řepík and Darina Martinovská, July 26, 2010, Prague, Czech Republic. Jaroslav Peterka, August 22, 2006,
Paměť Národa, June 23, 2009, Paměť Národa. Jelínek was a pastor in Kupičov who helped the save the lives of Poles sought after by the UPA. He referred to the UPA as “the scum of the earth.”


148. It is difficult to verify that this is the same Kvasha since Serhiichuk did not provide a citation or information on Kvasha. It is also worth noting that Kvasha published this article on the website for the radical right-wing Ukrainian organization *Kongress Ukraїinsk’kykh Nacionalistiv* or KUN (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists) – one of the main heir apparent organizations of the OUN-B. When it was founded in 1992 by OUN-B émigrés and led by Roman Zavrych and Slava Stets’ko – the widow of Yaroslav Stets’ko, a key OUN-B leader during the war and Cold War period. To provide insight into the politics of KUN, a KUN leader in 2008 declared that, “The Dnepr will soon be red with the blood of zhydy [kikes] and Moskaly [epithet for Russians].” “Na Ukraїine zhydov i moskalei budut topit’ v Dnepre,” *MIГnews*, November 29, 2011: http://www.mignews.com/news/disasters/cis/291107_130747_15216.html (accessed August 30, 2013). KUN still uses the “blut und boden” flag and is also a member of the pan-European Alliance for the Europe of Nations, a conglomeration of nationalist parties throughout Europe. On KUN see: Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, 196-8.


152. Similarly, many Ukrainian writers try to absolve the OUN and UPA of their ethnic crimes by noting active participation of Uzbeks, Germans, Hungarians, Armenians, and even Jews in the UPA. For discussion, see: McBride, “A Sea of Blood and Tears,” 309-12. As an example, for arguments by contemporary historians that Jews served in the UPA because it was an inclusive army, see: Aleksandr Gogun and Aleksandr Vovk, “Evrei v Bor’be za Nezavisimuiu Ukrainu,” *Korni*, no. 25 (Ianvar’-Mart, 2005): 133-41 and Volodymyr Viatrovych, Stavlennia OUN do ievreiv: formuvannia pozitsuji na ti katastrofy (L’viv: Vydavnytsvo Ms, 2006). For a corrective on the Jewish question, see: Taras Kurylo and Ivan Khymka, “Iak OUN stavylasia do ievreiv,” 252-65.

153. Semeniuk, “Trahediia Malyna.” See an example the Shumuk memoirs. Shumuk asked a fellow nationalist why the UPA did not “come to the rescue” of citizens of the Ostrozhet’s area, the nationalist

154. Semeniuk, “Trahedia Malyna.”


156. There is no evidence to suggest the 102nd was even a Polish battalion.

157. The leaflet is reprinted in Denyschuk, *Zlochyny pol’s’kykh shovinistiv*, 338. The civic groups listed on the leaflet are as follows: *Pidrozdil Ukrains’koho kozatstva “Volyns’ka Sich”*; *Rivnens’ke oblasne Bratstvo voiaiv OUN-UPA*; *Rivnens’ke oblasne tovarystvo politiv’iaziv ta represovanikh*; *Rivnens’ke oblasna ob’edannia vseukrains’koho tovarystva “Prosvita”* im. T.H. Shevchenka; *Rivnens’ka oblasna orhanizatsiia “Molodyi RUKh Rivnenshchyny”*; *Rivnens’ka oblasna orhanizatsiia “Molodizhnyi Natsionalistychnyi Kongres”*; *Rivnens’ka filiia Ukrains’koi Students’koi Spilky*. The list includes veterans’ groups; youth groups, political organizations, and even the civic patriotic organization, *Prosvita* – meaning not just radical groups supported this type of rhetoric.


161. Ewa is an engineer by training and Władysław a lawyer.

162. Note how the victims are presented here, with the Polish victims listed first – this despite the fact there were at most only 26 Poles killed in Malyn during the reprisal. Józef Turowski and Władysław Siemaszko, *Zbrodnie nacjonalistów ukraińskich dokonane na ludności polskiej na Wołyniu 1939-1945* (Warsaw: GKBZHwp. IPN, 1990), 116 [Italics my own].

164. Peretiatkowicz has a doctorate in engineering.


168. For instance, Motyka claims the Czechs never mention Polish complicity, a claim I have demonstrated is clearly not true. He goes on to posit that Ukrainian Malyn was always the real target for the Germans, but provides no evidence to support this claim. See Grzegorz Motyka, “Postawy wobec konfliktu polsko-ukraiński w latach 1939-1953 w zależności od przynależności etnicznej, państwowej i religijnej,” in *Tygiel narodów: stosunki społeczne i etniczne na dawnych ziemiach wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej 1939-1953*, ed. Krzysztof Jasiewicz (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM; Londyn: Polonia Aid Foundation Trust, 2002), 387-8.


170. Jaroslav Mec will be further discussed in the next section.


172. Solak does make an effort to appear even-handed as he claims the crimes of the Polish police under the Nazis should be “investigated,” though he claims many of the units were infiltrated by the Polish underground and their main task was to defend against the UPA “thugs.”


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Hofman, *Volynští Češi*, 300-2; Josef Martinovský, “Zkáza Malína” (Unpublished); His ChGK testimony GARF, f. 7021, op. 71, d. 1, ll. 114-6; His testimony in *Nezapomeneme, pomstíme!*, 24-6; A poem he wrote about Malyn can be found in Iva Heroldová, *Válka v lidovém podání: národně osvobozenecký boj volyňských a jugoslávských Čechů* (Praha: Ústav pro etnografii a folkloristiku ČSAV, 1977), 49-51.

174. In a later undated and unpublished account, “Zkáza Malína,” Martinovský notes that the “wicked Schutzmann” took part in the reprisal, which is largely in line with his earlier comments on the event.

175. ABS, Interrogation file of Josef Alois Martinovský, V-4 Ústí, 1950. For reference to Martinovský in the Blaník file see, ABS, H-140, s.33.

176. Author interview with Darina Martinovská, July 26, 2010, Prague, Czech Republic.

177. See the 1970 Martinovský letter in which he discusses the culpability of the German leadership for ordering the reprisal.

178. Malyn would appear in the occasional Czechoslovakian publication. For example, see: Širc and Foitík, *Minulost zavátá časem*, 47, 72.

179. General Svoboda installed a cornerstone for the Žatec monument in 1946 and the statue was completed in 1958.


181. Efforts have been made by the Volhynian community and the Czech government to record testimonies from the Volhynian Czechs in recent years: see the Paměť Národa (Memory of a Nation) project, which is available online and *Zpravodaj*, a journal published by Sdružení Čechů z Volyně (Association of Volhynian Czechs) in Prague, which regularly contains stories and testimonies from Volhynian Czechs.


183. Hofman, “Český Malín – Lidice volyňských Čechů.”

184. There is no direct citation for this quotation; only a report from the Siemaszkos, who were also in attendance at the conference held in Katowice on May 18-19, 1999. For Mec’s presentation at the
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conference see: Jaroslav Mec, “Wołyńscy Czesi – ofiary terroru” in Ludobójstwa i wygnania na Kresach, ed. Adam Peretiatkowicz (Katowice: A. Peretiatkowicz, 1999), 16. It is important to note that he does not implicate Ukrainians in this text, though he does speak of violence by the UPA against Volhynian Czechs.

185. Author interview with Josef Řepík and Darina Martinovská, July 26, 2010, Prague, Czech Republic.

186. Author interview with Josef Řepík and Darina Martinovská, July 26, 2010, Prague, Czech Republic.


188. Řepík and Martinovská collaborated on the most recent book on Malyn published in 2010, see: Český Malín: Lidice volynských Čechů. There is no discussion of ethnic collaborators in this book.

189. Author interview with Josef Řepík and Darina Martinovská, July 26, 2010, Prague, Czech Republic.


192. On the Nazi occupation of Ukraine as an act of imperialism, colonialism, and empire-building see: Lower, Nazi Empire-Building.


195. For important criticism of higher education and the field of history in Ukraine by a Ukrainian academic who actually works in Poland, see: Andriy Portnov, “Demodernizatsiia istoricheskogo obrazovaniia v postsovetskoi Ukraine. Tezisy k diskussii,” Ab Imperio online blog, May 7, 2011: http://net.abimperio.net/ru/node/1827 (accessed December 2, 2014). For similar criticism of Polish historiography see: Wnuk, “Recent Polish Historiography.”

196. Take for example Siemaszko’s work, which albeit flawed because of certain ideological blinders, contains meticulous research on the ethnic cleansing of Poles that can be carefully incorporated into serious studies of the war. The elder Siemaszko is a lawyer and his daughter an engineer by training. Still, despite their non-history backgrounds, their work on the ethnic conflict is far more erudite and accurate than Volodymyr Serhiichuk, a historian who works at the preeminent university in Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, and a member of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine.

197. Shankovs’kyi and Semeniuk, for example, already discussed.

198. For similar commentary on how Holodomor historiography also suffers from a lack of “integration into global scholarship,” see John-Paul Himka, “Encumbered Memory : The Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 14, no.2 (Spring 2013): 413.


200. For a Ukrainian response to the Siemaszko’s work that also employs local testimonies see the series, Trahedia Ukrain’s’ko-Pols’s’ko Protystoiannia na Volyni 1938-1944 rokiv, edited by Ivan Pushchuk.
This series, which deals the Ukrainian-Polish conflict in Volyn’ oblast’, has published ten volumes from 2009 through 2011.


206. In recent years, the politics of memory has become a burgeoning topic in many historical fields and the field of the Second World War is no different. For an excellent article on national narratives, national identity, and individual memory that should be read along with this article see: Richard S. Esbenshade, “Remembering to Forget: Memory, History, National Identity in Postwar East-Central Europe,” Representations, no. 49, Special Issue: Identifying Histories: Eastern Europe Before and After 1989 (Winter 1995): 72-96. For a non-Eastern European inquires in massacres and memory see: Pamela Ballinger, “Who defines and remembers genocide after the Cold War? Contested Memories of Partisan Massacre in Venezia Giulia in 1943-1945,” Journal of Genocide Research 2, no. 1 (2000): 11-30; Pezzino, Memory and Massacre.

207. In particular, see Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde. Also see footnote 76.
208. There is important oral history being done in this direction. For instance, there is a Forced Labor Archive online where testimonies are viewable, see: https://zwangsarbeit-archiv.de/archiv/?locale=en.


211. I visited the museum in 2010 and took a personal tour of the complex. Many of the Volhynian Czechs I spoke to also echo this point.

212. The failure of the West German government to look into Nazi crimes in the east is a complicated question that has many roots. In postwar West German investigations, attention was generally focused on men from Einsatzgruppen, Police, and SS units, whereas the vast number of Wehrmacht crimes in the east was often overlooked. In terms of investigations into the civil administration in the east, which was also complicit in the reprisals, there were only a few half-hearted trials. Even when there were trials for anti-partisan warfare (or Partisanenbekämpfung) the sentences were few and far between. Take for example case nr.806 in which a soldier from Waffen-SS 10.SS-Inf.Rgt. was sentenced to only four years for participating in the burning of the village Tupice in Belarus in September 1942 (as a part of Operation “Swamp Fever.”). Or another example from case nr.776 in which a soldier from Polizei Pol.Rgt.15 was tried for participation in the destruction of Borisovka in Belarus and was acquitted. Also noteworthy is that these trials occurred much later in the 1970s meaning prosecutors would have had greater access to evidence about German policy in the east. The author thanks Martin Dean for bringing these cases to his attention. For background on the trials the following guide can be consulted, as well as the online Ludwigsburg search engine: C. F. Rüter and Dirk Welmoed de Mildt, eds., Die Westdeutschen Strafverfahren wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945-1997: eine systematische Verfahrensbeschreibung, mit Karten und Registern (Amsterdam & Maarssen: APA-Holland University Press, 1998). The literature on the shortcomings of the postwar German judicial system often focuses on the Holocaust. For a recent work on this topic: Donald M McKale, Nazis after Hitler: how perpetrators of the Holocaust cheated justice and truth (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012).

213. For the most comprehensive account of the Nazi occupation of Ukraine see: Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair. On the brutal anti-partisan war in Belarus see: Ales’ Adamovich, Ianka Bryl’, and Vladimir Kolesnik, Out of the Fire (Moscow: Progress, 1980).


