


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Photograph: courtesy of the Museum of the history of the Lviv Railroad. Lviv.

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Abstract

This article is a micro-history of a restaurant in post- World War II Lviv, the largest city of Western Ukraine. Offering a case study of one public dining enterprise this paper explores changes in the post-war Soviet public dining; demonstrates how that enterprise's institutional structure mediated economic demands, ideological directives, and social conflicts. It argues that the Soviet enterprise should be seen as a nexus between economic system, organization structure of the Soviet state, and everyday lives of Soviet people. The article helps to understand Soviet consumerist practices in the sphere of public dining by looking into complex, hierarchical organizations enabling them.

The Lviv Train Station Restaurant as a Soviet Enterprise, 1944-1980

For Western tourists, “public dining establishments” in the Soviet Union were among the most fascinating and vivid illustrations of the differences between Soviet and Western economic systems. In 1947 John Steinbeck tells of a dinner among his first experiences of Russia at the “magnificent” Hotel Metropole restaurant, where he had to wait “about two hours and a half” for his order.¹ Thirty years later, in 1978, Andrea Lee describes a student cafeteria in Moscow, where “slatternly women wearing stained aprons and white gauze turbans” serving “dried-out sandwiches” and “lethal-looking cookies,” as the first of “many surprises, risks and adventures” awaiting her in the Soviet Union.² Both accounts also indicate that the oddness in their Soviet dining experience originates not so much in the peculiarities of Russian cuisine or Russian cultural habits as in the particular organization of work.

Steinbeck eventually figures out that regulations and the system of accounting are responsible for long waiting times:

Since everything in the Soviet Union, every transaction, is under the state, or under monopolies granted by the state, the bookkeeping system is enormous. Thus the waiter, when he takes an order, writes it very carefully in a book. But he doesn't go then and request the food. He goes to the bookkeeper, who makes another entry concerning the food which has been ordered, and issues a slip which goes to the kitchen. There another entry is made, and certain food is requested. When the food is finally issued, an entry of the food issued is also made out on a slip, which is given to the waiter. But he doesn't bring the food back to the table. He takes his slip to the bookkeeper, who makes another entry that such food as has been ordered has been issued, and gives another slip to the waiter, who then goes back to the kitchen and brings the food to the table, making a note in his book that the food which has been ordered, which has been entered, and which has been delivered, is now, finally, on the table. This bookkeeping takes considerable time. Far more time, in fact, than anything to do with the food. And it does no good to become impatient about getting your dinner, because nothing in the world can be done about it. The process is invariable.³

Steinbeck's account demonstrates that patrons' experiences in a Soviet restaurant were intimately tied to the operations of the restaurant as an enterprise, and via its mediation to the larger economic system. The present paper explores this institutional side of the Soviet post-World War II dining by focusing on one specific Soviet restaurant.

The restaurant discussed in this article was located in Lviv, the largest Soviet city west of Kyiv and Minsk, located in the troubled recently annexed Soviet western borderlands. Such a pointed focus aims to help fill what Donald Raleigh characterizes as “... the greatest lacuna in scholarship on the Soviet experiment: the lack of local studies.”⁴ While the historiography of Lviv has focused on its peculiarities, frequently preoccupied with identity and ideology,⁵ the present paper deals with the more mundane and typically Soviet aspects of the region's history.

Since the very beginning of the “Second Soviet period” in Lviv (1944-1991), institutionally and economically, the city had been thoroughly integrated into the Union-wide political, legal and institutional framework. As Amir Weiner convincingly showed, the whole Soviet Union had to reinvent itself in the aftermath of World War II.⁶ A growing body of literature on post-war “reconstruction” also interprets the latter as the Soviet Union's second beginning.⁷ Since World War II was such an important caesura, Lviv, while belonging to the territories annexed in 1939-1940, was not so different from hundreds of other cities that had to be reintegrated into the USSR after a prolonged period of German occupation, and shared the experience of mass murder, the Holocaust, economic destruction and deurbanization. Moreover, the Soviet Union was a vast

and diverse state. Lviv was special, but so were Tbilisi and Tashkent, Vladivostok and Novosibirsk. For that matter, neither Moscow nor Leningrad were “typical” Soviet cities. Contributing to the study of the Soviet economy’s “regional variation” and “peripheral zones” that has heretofore “received scant attention” from scholars, the present paper approaches regional specificity as a norm rather than aberration.⁸

Unlike most local studies the present paper focuses not only on a particular city, but also on a concrete enterprise—a train station restaurant, one of the nearly one thousand station restaurants in the Soviet Union.⁹ The sphere of Soviet public dining was not uniform and involved a range of dining establishments. Closed cafeteria (*stolovaia*) at enterprises and schools constituted their bulk. The restaurant detailed in this paper, while located at the train station and primarily meant to serve passengers, let in general public as well. In 1969, the Ukrainian republic’s public dining network had nearly 1,380,000 seats, but only a meager 178,000 (13%) were in the eateries open to general public. Since the Soviet norm for the number of open eateries was eighteen seats per 1000 persons, the actual capacity of public dining was one fifth of that norm. For comparison, seats at the workers’ and students’ cafeteria were at 66 percent of their corresponding standard.¹⁰ Despite challenges the disparity between these two sectors of public dining was closing and by 1978 there were 560 closed cafeteria and 475 open eateries in the Lviv oblast. In terms of place-seats those open eateries accounted for 26 percent of all seats in public dining network, and their capacity was now at 40 percent of the expected.¹¹ Evidently, an open segment of the Soviet dining industry was both problematic and dynamic, while its expansion was a characteristic feature of the 1960s and 1970s.

Train station restaurants were a noteworthy segment of the open public dining. They are ubiquitously present in Soviet popular culture. From Ilf and Petrov’s feuilletons of the interwar years that mock those restaurants’ pretensions to entertain instead of offering healthy and nourishing food,¹² to the late Soviet Eldar Riazanov’s *A Station of Two*, in which the station restaurant turns into a microcosm of Soviet society, train station restaurants are an important and recognizable locus of Soviet life.¹³ Vladimir Vysotskii sings about them,¹⁴ while in Venedikt Erofeev’s milestone *Moskva-Petushki* the protagonist embarks on his train journey after being denied a drink at the restaurant of Kursk train terminal.¹⁵ Since the railway was the dominant mode of intercity travel, train station restaurants were the most shared experience of open public dining.

Consumers were not the only ones who saw railway restaurants as representative of Soviet dining. They were well integrated into the organizational structure of public dining. The only difference was that while most eateries belonged to a territorial trust, railway restaurants (with some exceptions) belonged to the trusts servicing railroads—administrative units of the Soviet railway network. The station restaurant in Lviv belonged to the Lviv Railroad’s dining trust, which, in turn, reported initially to the all-Union *glavk* (main office) of public dining and, since 1956, to the republican Ministry of Trade. There were also two intermediaries between the *glavks* and the restaurant. At the all-Union Ministry of Trade this was *Glavdorrestoran* (Main Office of Railway Restaurants) of the South, while at the Ukrainian trade ministry the intermediary was *Ukrdorrestoran* (Republican Office for the Management of Railway Restaurants), which functioned from 1959 to 1987.¹⁶ Just like the rest of Soviet public dining, the restaurant received its supplies from the territorial retail organizations (*obltorgotdel* in our case).¹⁷ The fact that Brezhnev’s personal chef started his career as an apprentice in a provincial train station restaurant, shows that not only organizationally, but also in terms of quality and career perspectives railway restaurants were part and parcel of Soviet public dining.¹⁸

Public dining was part of the service sector, known for being the weakest side of the Soviet economy and a chronic problem for the Soviet authorities. At the same time, along with the stores, farmers’ markets and entertainment venues, they constituted an officially sanctioned public space of Soviet consumption. While there are some excellent studies on Soviet consumption in the 1920s and 1930s and consumer attitudes during the period of late socialism in the Soviet Union and the “socialist bloc,” literature on public dining as part of consumer culture remains scarce.¹⁹ Moreover, studies of Soviet consumption tend to ignore its institutional context.

The scholarship firmly associates the Soviet enterprise, this basic unit of Soviet economy, with the large-scale production and industry.²⁰ Yet small retail and public-dining establishments constituted the absolute majority of Soviet enterprises: 1,055,100 in 1986, against 46,178 enterprises in all branches of industry and 48,600 collective and state farms.²¹ Moreover, the number of public-dining enterprises in the postwar Soviet Union steadily increased, outpacing the growth of the retail sector. Restaurants and canteens, rather than shops, were the spatial embodiment of the Soviet turn to consumption in the decades following World War II.

Table 1. Number of public-dining and retail enterprises in the Soviet Union, 1940–1986²²

Year	Retail enterprises (1000s)	Public-dining enterprises (1000s)
1940	407.2	87.6
1960	567.3	147.2
1970	682	237.3
1980	695.2	302.8
1986	716.3	338.8

The most comprehensive discussion of the organizational structure and evolution of the Soviet retail system, including the dining trade, is Julie Hessler’s *A Social History of Soviet Trade*.²³ This study, however, ends in the late 1940s and offers only glimpses into the workings of individual retail enterprises.²⁴ Aleksandr Pogrebniak’s *History of Trade of the Soviet Period* stretched all the way to 1991, but offers only a cursory and selective discussion of the post-war period.²⁵ The only study that discusses in sufficient detail a concrete post-war Soviet dining establishment is Eric Scott’s article “Edible Ethnicity.”²⁶ Correlating the codification and popularity of Soviet “Georgian cuisine” with ideological and cultural shifts in Soviet society, Scott uses the high-class Aragvi restaurant in Moscow as his case study. None of these studies, however, analyzes the structure and day to day operations of a dining enterprise. The present paper argues that these factors were of profound importance, shaping the experiences not only of managers and workers, but also of public dining as such.

All too often historians present Soviet consumption as a direct encounter between the state and consumers.²⁷ This paper argues that the institutional framework in which consumption took place, one of a Soviet enterprise, shaped consumer practices and the pattern of their change. While offering a case study of one public dining enterprise this paper demonstrates how that enterprise’s institutional structure mediated economic demands, ideological directives, and social conflicts. Dining enterprises in the Soviet Union were part of the food distribution system, providing citizens with cooked meals. At the same time, in a system with low direct taxes, the retail trade, including dining, was an important source of revenue. Soviet enterprise, however, was not only a structural element in the economic system. It was an institution embedded into the organizational structure of the Soviet state. Its economic *raison d’être*—production or distribution and revenue—were inseparable from the ideological functions and social control mechanisms assigned. It was also a complex, hierarchical organization, with all the accompanying tensions, negotiations and dynamics.

As a study of a particular enterprise this paper offers something that Andrew Sloin and Oscar Sanches-Sibony, following William H. Sewell, call “the historical study of economic life.”²⁸ The Lviv train station restaurant in this paper serves as a setting that allows exploration of the “relationship between economic change and contemporaneous transformations in society, culture, law and politics.”²⁹ These domains of social life exist separately only in the world of analytical abstraction being inevitably intertwined in its concrete historical instances. A particular enterprise, as one such an instance, is perfectly suited for the study of this relationship.

Focusing on the enterprise, its institutional dynamics and constraints, this paper analyses restaurant's performance through its most important Soviet indicator—plan fulfillment. Since plans set goals for an enterprise, they also shaped management's strategies as to their fulfillment and had to be accommodated by the workers, whose individual goals did not necessarily coincide with those of an enterprise. Since the language of plans at the level of an enterprise was mostly numerical rather than ideological, this paper takes seriously “quantitative reasoning”³⁰ engendered by the plans. At the same time, it tries not to succumb to “the dominant ideology of quantitative social science” by maintaining its focus on concrete material and experiential consequences of such reasoning.³¹

Besides planning, capital and labor were important determinants of an enterprise's performance. This paper traces how the availability and quality of both changed during the post-war period, and what was their impact on the restaurant. The findings presented here support the thesis that changes in the political leadership and its priorities while an important determinant in this change over time, were not the only one.³² Soviet economy, as well as the broader society, had their own logic and inertia equally important for the explanations offered in this paper.

Finally, wage work in the Soviet economy remained an alienating form of exploitation, absolutely crucial to securing one's livelihood.³³ That work was also organized hierarchically both across economic sectors, and in individual enterprises. While gender and ethnicity are not the main focus of this paper, they, similarly to many other social divisions and conflicts, were unfolding and came under public scrutiny in a concrete institutional context. This paper shows how inequalities based on gender and ethnicity permeated work hierarchies, and were an integral part of the Soviet organization of economy.

Since records of individual retail enterprises are virtually non-existent, this paper will be using the documents of the restaurant's Party organization—minutes of the Bureau and general meetings. Most managers belonged to the Communist Party, while the responsibility of the Party bureau, which always included the enterprise's director, was to oversee not only the ideological work but also the “production process” of a given enterprise. The story below unfolds chronologically, tracing changes, marking important milestones and offering a biography-like account of one dining enterprise.

The 1940s: In Crisis

In the 1940s the restaurant, the city and the rest of the country lived in a shadow of the war, which inflicted immense material destruction and caused massive loss of human life. Since the priority of the Soviet reconstruction was industries producing means of production, everything related to consumption lagged behind.³⁴ Both these factors imposed severe limitations on the resources available to the restaurant, while the state was demanding revenues to meet its fiscal ends. The restaurant was forced to adjust accordingly, making most from the sales of the readily available alcohol, and creating various auxiliary and production facilities. While the rationing ended in 1947 and Soviet incomes exceeded their pre-war (1938) levels in 1948,³⁵ restaurant's performance showed no signs of immediate improvements.

When on July 27 1944 the Red Army captured Lviv, the city's main railway station, including the restaurant, lay in ruins. However, only a few weeks later Lviv Railways reported that “a canteen-restaurant and three kiosks” were operating at the station.³⁶ Most of its original personnel, including chefs and even porters, came to Lviv with the Red Army in 1944. In 1945 the restaurant had a canteen in the functioning part of the terminal, several kiosks set up on the platforms and the terminal square, and two train canteens on the “exemplary Komsomol” trains: the Lviv-Chernivtsi and Lviv-Vilnius.³⁷ The kitchen and the restaurant hall were located in temporary premises next to the station.

Since its new beginnings as a Soviet enterprise in 1944, the Lviv restaurant was more than a place at the station where food was cooked and served to customers. A kitchen and a so-called “restaurant hall” (with tables and waiters) were merely two main components in a complex structure. Its other structural elements were “production shops” (*proizvodstvennye tsekha*), food kiosks and canteens in the terminal and its vicinity, peddlers (*lotochniki*), canteens and restaurants on trains, a central office, warehouses, stables or, later, garages, and even a pigsty.

The main indicator of a restaurant’s performance, as in all other trade organizations in the Soviet Union, was commodity turnover (*tovarooborot*), the sum of all commodities sold by the restaurant, measured against the plan. As in any other Soviet enterprise, “plan” was more than a goal set to achieve. The plan, or rather its “fulfillment,” was the main performance indicator. The plan was the main organizing principle of work and a code that structured all work-related discussions. Besides yearly, there were also quarterly and monthly plans, and plans for all the restaurant’s subdivisions. Workers’ and managers’ salaries during the whole period under discussion depended on how well they fulfilled or rather overfulfilled the plan. Salaries in Soviet public dining were the lowest when compared to other sectors of the Soviet economy--55.9% of an average Soviet salary in 1960, 67.7% in 1970 and 70.6% in 1980.³⁸ Therefore salary increases for overfulfilling the plan were extremely important, while failing to meet the plan, even a monthly one, entailed cuts in monetary compensations.³⁹

The planning process involved complex negotiations between the enterprises, trusts, their republic or Union central offices, ministries of trade, and in the final instance, the *Gosplan* (State Planning Committee). Despite all these negotiations, plans for all the retail organizations were essentially coming from above in the form of directives or instructions.⁴⁰ The lower the position of an organization in this hierarchy the less ability it had to negotiate the plan. The restaurant’s management endlessly petitioned the trust to lower its plans but without much success. The trust had its own plan that had to be fulfilled and distributed among the trust’s enterprises.

Since restaurant’s most important plans involved flows of real cash, the statistics on them are fairly reliable. In the first three quarters of 1946 the restaurant was fulfilling its commodity turnover plan at 102.4 percent, but in the winter of 1946–47 it failed to meet the plan and its director was replaced.⁴¹ The single most important cause behind this failure was food supply shortages caused by the famine of 1946–47.

Since the famine could not be mentioned, the management tried to explain its shortcomings by pointing to the inefficient organization of work. The ensuing discussions, however, proved that the main problem was scarcity of food and insufficient supply. That winter the restaurant kiosks opened later during the day.⁴² Even though the sales clerks from the kiosks, all women, were in the warehouse early in the morning, they spent long hours there waiting in lines.⁴³ Kiosks that were the last to receive goods did not open until 2 p.m.⁴⁴ Some sales clerks spent half of their work time standing in line at the warehouse, while larger canteens had to hire private transportation, paid with cash, to bring goods.⁴⁵ The restaurant had horses, but they were too few and starving.⁴⁶ The tea table did not have sugar, while nearly all patrons were used to taking their tea with sugar to increase their caloric intake. There were no cookies or snacks to purchase with the tea either. Because of that tea table workers complained that they spent their working hours merely watching the tables.⁴⁷

There was no famine in 1946-47 in Western Ukraine’s countryside because villages here had not been collectivized yet. Moreover, Western Ukraine was flooded by starving peasants in search of food from across the old 1939 border.⁴⁸ In the city of Lviv, where the majority of industrial workers had no ties to the local countryside, malnutrition must have been as severe as in other Soviet urban centers outside of the famine’s core area.⁴⁹ The restaurant, as part of the state system of food distribution, suffered as badly as any other urban dining establishments.

The restaurant felt the repercussions of the famine throughout 1947. That year hot meals, available in 1946 in the morning, appeared only in the late afternoon.⁵⁰ The fulfilment of the commodity turnover plan had

not recovered from the winter plunge either. In 1946 the commodity turnover plan was at 91 percent, while in the first quarter of 1947 the plan fulfillment stood at an abysmal 65 percent.⁵¹

Nineteen forty-seven, the year of the last Soviet famine, was also the year when rationing for basic foods was abolished, not to be seen again until the late 1980s. For the restaurant, however, this stabilization proved to be a challenge as well. Whereas during the period of rationing, commercial restaurants served as outlets where food supplementing the ration could be purchased, albeit at a much higher price, beginning in 1947 the station restaurant had to entice customers by other means.⁵² It was especially important since only half of the restaurant's patrons were passengers while the rest were regular city public.⁵³ The abolition of rationing took a toll on the restaurant's plan. The train station restaurant was not the only dining enterprise to experience difficulties under the new circumstances; the entire commercial sector of the Lviv regional trust of cafeteria (*stolovye*) failed to fulfill the 1947 plan.⁵⁴

These were signs of the larger change in the Soviet public dining system. While during the war and postwar rationing period, public dining was a key part of the food distribution system, accounting for 32% of all foodstuffs sales in 1944 and 30% in 1945, by 1950 its share decreased to 24%.⁵⁵ Moreover, that share continued to decline after 1950 for all the consumables, except drinks and confectionery.⁵⁶ Soviet public dining specialists explained this change by the fact that "the demands of the consumers to the retail and public dining networks became much higher."⁵⁷ In fact, from being an indispensable element in food distribution public dining enterprises were turning into an alternative to home cooking, home eating and home drinking. It is not an accident that the structure of the public dining network also changed: the number of cafeterias, restaurants and tearooms dropped by 20%, whereas the number of snack-bars (*zakusochnaia*) and canteens increased by 70%.⁵⁸

The strategy of the restaurant's management for 1948 was to focus on several goods that sold well and to reduce the rest of its offerings.⁵⁹ Since the restaurant was purchasing its own supplies, it had a lot of latitude in the selection of offerings. This meant extremely uneven performance across the board in the restaurant's units. Essentially the bakery shop single-handedly saved the restaurant from total failure, with the sales of bread reaching 144.6 percent compared to the plan, and confections standing at 700.9 percent. The production of non-alcoholic drinks also exceeded the plan, reaching 142.2 percent.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, this did not help the overall plan. The commodity turnover plan was fulfilled only by 89.7 percent and the pure profit (*denezhnye nakopleniia*) plan by 87 percent.⁶¹ The restaurant's performance in 1948 was worse than in 1946.

These problems at the Lviv station restaurant were typical of the postwar Soviet dining trade. In the whole network of public dining in Ukraine in 1948, sales reached only 82.9 percent of the plan.⁶² In order to cope with plunging demand, dining enterprises started to operate retail outlets for refreshments and snacks. The number of establishments serving cooked meals decreased significantly between 1946 and 1953, while the number of canteens, kiosks, and snack bars selling purchased goods increased. Liquors and wines represented the lion's share of goods sold.⁶³

Nearly all restaurants kept smaller snack bars and retail outlets, but train station restaurants were uniquely sprawling. They had outlets not only on the station and in its vicinity but also in train cars, and even on smaller suburban stations that did not have a dining enterprise of their own. In 1948, canteens selling snacks at small, suburban railway stations did 30 percent of the Lviv station restaurant's plan.⁶⁴ That same year street peddlers (*lotochniki*), whose numbers swelled to keep up with the restaurant's sale plan, became a separate unit.⁶⁵ The management encouraged them to move around instead of standing at the same spot and duplicating vendors at stationary kiosks. Sales clerk Lerintseva from the canteen located in the waiting hall for military personnel, afraid that her canteen would close down as unprofitable (i.e. failing the plan), took a basket and started peddling her goods all around the station to compensate for slow sales in the canteen.⁶⁶ (Later the management discovered that Larintseva's interest in keeping her canteen was selfish—she embezzled there 7,000 rubles).⁶⁷ The assortment of goods and working conditions in the shabby and exposed kiosks were almost

identical to those encountered by the peddlers.⁶⁸ The kiosks were not supplied evenly; one kiosk could grab half of the daily supply of pies, while some would not receive even one.⁶⁹

Workers in the restaurant's other divisions complained about similarly unjust treatment. The staff at the shop selling non-alcoholic drinks claimed that their figures were low "because the directors...forced them to reprocess expensive products that [had] lost their salable appearance (*tovarnyi vid*), such as pears, apples, Soviet champagne, candies, chocolate etc." They argued that if, on rare occasions, there was a need for such reprocessing, these products ought to be sold to the shop at their cost price (*po sebestoimosti*).⁷⁰ (This complaint also gives us some idea of the ingredients in Soviet sodas in the late 1940s.) Apparently, the problem persisted because in 1949, the shop fulfilled its production plan by 92 percent but reached only 23 percent of projected profit.⁷¹

In the late 1940s the restaurant's performance suffered as a result of general poverty and the lack of proper premises, equipment, and personnel. The rebuilding of the passenger terminal was taking years, with the completion date moving forward every successive year. A few inadequate available storage facilities could not accommodate the necessary food supplies, the restaurant was understaffed,⁷² and supply was erratic. In April 1948 the restaurant's warehouses contained only 20 percent of the allowed supplies.⁷³ There was no milk or poultry: the restaurant had to purchase these at farmers' markets, but prices there were too high to make these transactions profitable.⁷⁴ Even beer sales in 1948 were only at 50 percent of the plan. The management complained that the brewery was not making regular deliveries, while the brewery said that the restaurant was not returning empty casks on time.⁷⁵ There were monthly cycles of abundance and dearth corresponding to the dates on which the restaurant received its funds from the state bank. At the beginning of every month warehouses were overstocked and the network could not process all the goods, but by the end of the month there was nothing to sell.⁷⁶ There were also seasonal cycles: sales were lower in winter and higher in summer, with greater demand for drinks and snacks.⁷⁷ In theory, hot drinks and warm snacks could boost winter sales, but these items were more labor- and capital-intensive.

Many problems derived from the lack of knowledge about consumer demand, and cost-benefit calculations. There was little science in the restaurant's planning. Planners used gross numbers of the station's passenger turnover and the size of the restaurant to make their projections. In the second half of the 1940s these plans were utterly unrealistic. Other Lviv restaurants were also failing to fulfill their respective plans and did much worse than the closed dining sectors, which could rely on regular work and school lunches.⁷⁸

In comparison with city restaurants, the one at the train station did well. It enjoyed an advantageous busy location and relied on a variety and quantity of vendors it established besides the restaurant proper. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the station restaurant, potential patrons often had no other alternative. Not only passengers but also the city public in general had very little choice. In the late 1940s Lviv, a city with a population of nearly 300,000, had only five restaurants that belonged to four different public-dining trusts.⁷⁹ No matter how small the public looking for a real restaurant was in an impoverished post-war city, the station restaurant was bound to attract its share.

In addition to poorly prepared and unrealistic plans, poor decision-making at the restaurant also took its toll. The management of the restaurant was chaotic. There were stocks of either too expensive or unpopular goods that simply occupied space in the warehouse.⁸⁰ Kiosks received unrealistic plans and were often located next to each other, selling the same type of goods.⁸¹ Kiosk vendors claimed that managers (the administration in the language of the period) expected them to make a plan with sandwiches alone, and even those were not popular. The management decided to make sandwiches on the basis of "Vienna rolls." However, since these were quite expensive the price of sandwiches was also higher than normal (5 rubles apiece).⁸²

In 1948 the restaurant's bakery was baking up to 12,000 of those "Vienna rolls" daily. At one point the managers realized that the restaurant could sell only half of these rolls. Director Laputin signed an order to sell

another half to other oblasts, but the central warehouse of the trust rejected this offer, complaining about the packaging. For that reason, the Secretary of the Party organization and the head of the Cold Dishes shop Kletkin ordered to sell them through the restaurant's own trade network. He boasted that they eventually sold all the rolls, and since the restaurant sold them apiece its profit was higher than that from the originally projected sales to the central supply.⁸³ Even though the price per piece in this transaction was higher, no one calculated the costs of slowdown in the kiosks and of the unsold goods replaced by these buns.

The restaurant's greatest problems, however, were not with selling but with the making of food. In the 1940s the restaurant kitchen, any restaurant's heart, was its most troublesome spot. It was expected to produce 4,300 meals daily but only produced an average of 1,000.⁸⁴ A survey conducted in 1950 observed that the canteens and snack bars of the Lviv Railway did not use the stoves at all with which they were equipped.⁸⁵ In 1948, when the restaurant set up a number of hot food units (*marmitki*), where portable meals from the kitchen were sold, the quality of food was deemed substandard even by undemanding Soviet patrons.⁸⁶ Vendors themselves were returning poorly cooked patties to the kitchen.⁸⁷ The kitchen had problems preparing even the simplest of meals, such as cabbage patties (the cabbage was chopped into too large chunks that did not stew properly).⁸⁸

The deputy director of the Ministry's department, to which the restaurant belonged, who did an inspection tour of Lviv in 1948 described "patrons [who] sit outraged, there is no food, no cooked meals, the manager of production left for a Party meeting and took the storage key with him, leaving the kitchen without food. The restaurant is on the brink of collapse."⁸⁹ The poor performance of kitchens and restaurant's reliance on retail were common in the Soviet dining trade during this period; the plans and rewards systems focused on general commodity turnover and until 1953 did not encourage kitchen production.⁹⁰ Even the Lviv Restaurant in the city center, which had neither the quantity nor variety of the station restaurant's vendors, could not fulfill its kitchen production and instead sold dried fruit and fresh fish.⁹¹

The lack of capital investment and an ongoing reconstruction of the terminal damaged not only the premises' allure, but also kitchen's ability to produce quality meals. In its physical appearance, the restaurant's kitchen "resembled a boiler room more than a kitchen" and was in need of repairs.⁹² To compensate for the lack of capital investment into premises, the restaurant established its own repair shop staffed by mechanics, carpenters, metalworkers, and electricians.⁹³ As Donald Filtzer explains, industrial auxiliary units not directly related to an enterprise's specialization were a response to the dire needs of postwar reconstruction while labor and goods were scarce.⁹⁴ Such units survived well into the 1980s as a cheaper alternative to the notoriously difficult subcontracting process, the results of the nearly total absence of horizontal linkages among enterprises in the Soviet economy, constituting what Filtzer defines as "the overblown auxiliary sector of the industrial work force ... which accounted for half of all workers from the late 1950s to the mid-1980s."⁹⁵

The case of the Lviv station restaurant proves that Filtzer's observations apply equally well to the enterprises of the Soviet service sector. A repair shop, however, was no substitute for proper capital investments. Not only were production and cooking facilities in desperate need of investment funds, so too were much less expensive kiosks and canteens, where employees suffered from the cold in winter and the heat in summer.⁹⁶ After all, while patrons were only guests on the restaurant's premises, the employees spent all their work time there.

In the light of abysmal working conditions and low pay there is little wonder that the restaurant was also plagued by another scourge of the postwar Soviet economy: high labor turnover. In 1947 labor turnover was in the range of 70–75 percent a year.⁹⁷ Since the economy experienced acute labor shortages workers had plentiful opportunities to vote on working conditions with their feet. Because of the labor shortage, some auxiliary positions remained permanently vacant.⁹⁸ In the restaurant, however high labor turnover was on all levels. For example, five restaurant directors succeeded one another between 1945 and 1948. One manager remarked that

“here, like in a hotel, people come, register, leave after a time.”⁹⁹ Personnel managers did not stay long on the job either: in two years alone (1947 and 1948) five cadres inspectors left.¹⁰⁰

The restaurant was not the only organization in Lviv to suffer from high turnover of the executive cadres. Its immediate neighbors—the train station, passengers terminal and police station—all witnessed a rapid succession of superiors.¹⁰¹ Prison sentences accompanied dismissal in several of those cases. The experience of war and concomitant psychological traumas were behind some of these cases. Waiter Lebedev, who was often drunk and work, several times had physical altercations with clients, and once defecated in the middle of the restaurant hall,¹⁰² provided the following explanation: “Very many anti-moral among the Communists are being observed, specifically these occurrences were caused in connection with the war, the facts about anti-moral occurrences were in particular with me too. [sic]”¹⁰³

There was also an issue of quality of the cadres dispatched to the Western borderlands, as well as general atmosphere of lawlessness and disorder reigning in the city.¹⁰⁴ The turnover of the executive cadres at the restaurant, however, was unprecedented even for Lviv. In this case the culprit was not only local conditions, but also the state of the Soviet public dining.

Although plan fulfillment improved in the first quarter of 1949,¹⁰⁵ the rest of the year was disastrous, and the yearly plan was fulfilled only by 84.5 percent.¹⁰⁶ The restaurant was criticized as one of the worst at the general meeting of Lviv Railway’s dining trust.¹⁰⁷ Here it should be noted that during the Stalin years the yearly plans for the restaurant were set very high. For 1949 the commodity turnover plan was 27,320,000 rubles a year, while pure profit was expected to reach 1,655,000 rubles.¹⁰⁸ In 1953 the commodity turnover plan was lowered by 5 million rubles, and it did not reach the 1949 amount until 1960, by which time the city’s population, passenger turnover, and restaurant’s personnel had all increased dramatically.¹⁰⁹ With little investment and high targets, the restaurant functioned in the 1940s mostly as an instrument for squeezing savings out of the populace at little cost.

While ordinary workers complained about the excessively high targets set by the enterprise, the restaurant’s managers could not publicly question the plan once approved, and they looked for explanations elsewhere, usually in the domain of work organization. They often claimed that the main problem was insufficient “control over sales outlets.”¹¹⁰ There was sporadic embezzlement of larger sums (the amounts listed in five cases recorded in 1949 totalled 20,500 rubles)¹¹¹ and ubiquitous petty theft. Sales people in kiosks and buffets were not interested in selling non-alcoholic drinks, preferring to sell beer. The management claimed that non-alcoholic drinks would have sold just as well, but the sales clerks were more likely to make extra personal profit with beer, in form of tips and giving short measure.¹¹²

Finally, there was outright competition from private “speculators.” The restaurant claimed that the *militsiia* was not sufficiently vigilant against them. We know that private “speculation” thrived in the immediate post-war year, offering goods and services state institutions could not provide and half-tolerated by the authorities.¹¹³ But it is also important to remember that in the 1940s privateers were offering the goods available in state retail but at a cheaper price. The restaurant could not compete with them economically—its prices were fixed—and therefore had to suppress speculators with the help of law-enforcement. To make things worse, many sales clerks in the restaurant participated in even more damaging speculation. They sold their own privately purchased goods instead of the restaurant’s, making a personal profit and damaging the restaurant’s plan.¹¹⁴

The management of the railway terminal did not want to cooperate with the restaurant either and was shutting down sales outlets too early.¹¹⁵ Railway officials were interested in maintaining order inside the terminal. That generated conflicts with the restaurant, which sought to entice and hold onto patrons. This tension between the Lviv terminal and restaurant administrations existed on all Soviet railways throughout the whole Soviet period.

The discussions at the all-Union conference of the “active” railway workers in Moscow in 1954 showed that this was a Union-wide problem. Railway officials complained that “trade workers do not comply with any

requests.”¹¹⁶ In Moscow, people were drinking in railway canteens after closing hours for city bars and stores. One railway official from the capital wanted all the terminal dining to stop serving alcohol at 9 or 10 p.m. and complained that all talk of “restaurant culture” was twaddle: restaurant people “are only trying to increase turnover through the sale of vodka.”¹¹⁷ He was not alone in this view: railway terminal workers from the provinces wanted the same thing and blamed restaurants for damaging station property.¹¹⁸ The stationmaster on the Moscow-Belsk line complained that “our terminals have been turned into taverns.”¹¹⁹ Neither the authorities nor the parties involved found any resolution to this tension between the objectives of the railway and railway restaurants and it persisted throughout the Soviet period.

The railway had no power over the restaurants operating on its network, while state authorities needed a viable public dining system. In 1949 the District Party Committee decided to intervene more into the affairs of the Lviv station restaurant and promised all necessary assistance.¹²⁰ The solution to the recurring problems was expansion: another restaurant hall at the terminal¹²¹ and a branch canteen at the airport.¹²² A kitchen for railway workers was opened in the train yards.¹²³ The problem with that expansion was that the restaurant was taking over already existing suitable spaces, while capital investment was not forthcoming. In 1949 some retail outlets even had to be closed down because they were too dilapidated.¹²⁴

The management tried to devise a more efficient system of organizing work,¹²⁵ but indirect evidence shows that efficiency in this case was synonymous with excessive exploitation. Kurguzkin, the secretary of the restaurant’s Party organization, acknowledged that labour laws were being violated: “People work from dawn to dusk; if the oblast union committee finds out about this, we shall all have problems.”¹²⁶ Economic performance was heavily dependent on administrative measures: the higher the authorities involved the greater were the effects, a result of the prescribed preferential treatment by other organizations and enterprises. It is no accident that the Lviv railway station restaurant’s first successful year was also the year when the USSR’s Council of Ministers passed a resolution “On Improving Food Services to Railway Passengers.”¹²⁷ The restaurant fulfilled its yearly commodity turnover plan for the first time in 1951.¹²⁸ This achievement was even more remarkable because that year the restaurant’s main hall was closed for several weeks due to the renovations in the finally rebuilt terminal.¹²⁹

The success also can be explained by two other developments—the shutting down of private semi-legal and illegal enterprises in 1949, and yearly price reductions for basic consumer goods and alcohol in 1948-1954, of which the reduction of 1950 was the most impressive.¹³⁰ While the former eliminated competition, the latter made restaurant goods more affordable.

Although many problems identified in the late 1940s were eventually mitigated, most of the restaurant’s chronic problems remained unresolved in the early 1950s. Most importantly, complaints about the kitchen continued. In 1951 the kitchen’s plan fulfillment was only 60–70 percent.¹³¹ Kitchen workers in turn complained about being understaffed and overworked. Because of the physical inability to meet targets, the kitchen personnel’s actual salary was only 80 percent of the fixed rate.¹³² Ready-made goods, especially alcohol, still dominated sales in during the first years of the restaurant’s successful performance. In 1951, when the oblast trade department cut the restaurant’s allocation of beer by 25 percent, sales plummeted, the plan was put at risk, and the restaurant had to request the old norm.¹³³ Shortages of certain basic foods continued.¹³⁴ Loose discipline went unpunished because of the permanent shortage of labor.¹³⁵ All this encouraged a particular consumer culture. The restaurant could offer premises for social drinking, quick soda and a turnover for needy travellers, but those looking for a nutritious and warm dinner in a congenial place were bound to be disappointed.

The 1950s: A Consumption Breakthrough

While we know that the Soviet system of planned production was largely established in the 1930s, during Stalin's "great breakthrough," the Khrushchev period is seen as "crucial" for the development of Soviet mass consumption.¹³⁶ At the same time it has been argued that the purchasing power of the average worker's salary declined during Khrushchev's period.¹³⁷ In the case of our restaurant stable commodity-turnover performance predated Khrushchev's reforms. The restaurant entered a period of long-lasting plan-fulfillment in 1951. Its management stabilized as well. From 1951 to 1955 the restaurant had the same director, Timofei Miliukha, a wartime commander of a partisan detachment. Canteens at suburban stations were detached from the restaurant and reorganized into a separate enterprise, a move which improved logistics and supervision; such branching of sprawling retail and dining enterprises was quite common. Finally, the terminal's postwar reconstruction ended, providing a much-needed calm and stability to the restaurant's premises.

The restaurant fulfilled its commodity turnover plan for 1952 by 112.2 percent and its profits plan by 120 percent, receiving the third All Union prize in the annual competition of railway restaurants.¹³⁸ There was some trouble during the first half of 1953, when these two indicators dropped to 85.3 and 64 percent, respectively.¹³⁹ This happened because the restaurant hall and some other premises remained closed for more than two months because of renovations (after the shoddy reconstruction ended, the terminal was in need of immediate, additional repairs).¹⁴⁰ Such prolonged closures because of renovations became a recurrent problem. To compensate for the incurred losses, the workload in other restaurant units was increased. Some of them outperformed the plan by 170 percent.¹⁴¹ To achieve this, the management made employees to work six to nine shifts in a row, while the norm was two to three. In one kiosk a woman worked for 20 consecutive shifts—the only breaks she had was when the kiosk was closed for the night.¹⁴²

In 1954 the commodity turnover plan was fulfilled by 106.7 percent,¹⁴³ and in 1955—107.9 percent; profit plans were fulfilled by 126 and 124 percent, respectively.¹⁴⁴ The director Miliukha boasted that, unlike in the past, this time sales had increased "not on account of alcoholic drinks but because of the increase in sales of vegetables, fruits, ice cream, non-alcoholic drinks, and our own production."¹⁴⁵ This was the most important change that happened in the 1950s. A Union-wide reform of Soviet public dining made it possible.

The reform was an outcome of the regime's concern with the living standard and material needs of people. While Natalya Chernyshova argues that the Soviet "consumer revolution" occurred during the Brezhnev years, the promises of the Khrushchev period hardly qualify as "largely rhetorical changes."¹⁴⁶ Even before the proper "Khrushchev era" began real legislative and administrative changes brought about observable improvements in the quality of service offered by the dining enterprises.

Starting in 1953, the salaries of kitchen workers were calculated according to the number of meals cooked, not meal sales. In subsequent years this system was further developed with the goal of encouraging the preparation of labour-intensive meals.¹⁴⁷ In 1954, new and more demanding "assortment minimums" were introduced for canteens and cafes, including those on the railway.¹⁴⁸ In 1955 rights of the enterprise directors in public dining significantly expanded, endowing them with greater powers and flexibility.¹⁴⁹ The same year, the all-Union Ministry of Trade issued direct orders to railway dining enterprises to increase the output and selection of affordable two and three course dinners and to double the output of vegetable meals.¹⁵⁰ Finally, in 1956, there was a joint resolution of the Council of Ministers and the Party's Central Committee ordering the Gosplan and industries to provide public dining with premises, furniture, and kitchen machinery.¹⁵¹

Some scholars misread this turn towards consumption as a radical break with the economic principles of the Stalin's period. The article published in the *Communist of Ukraine* magazine in 1955 argued that in the upcoming period the production of the means of consumption would outstrip that of the means of production. This, however, proved to be a misreading. Party officials chastised Mykhailo Herasymenko, the article's author, he had to repent and retract his conclusions.¹⁵²

While change was in the air and the whole Soviet public dining was being profoundly transformed, many things remained unchanged in the Lviv station restaurant. When needed, it could still rely on its old plan-fulfilling strategy. In 1954, when other public dining enterprises throughout the Soviet Union lost their retail networks, which were transferred to retail enterprises, railway restaurants were exempted.¹⁵³ That year the Lviv train station restaurant actually increased the number of retail outlets and opened five new platform counters.¹⁵⁴ With the expansion of the suburban bus services, a new snack bar was opened on the terminal square, where the main bus station was located.¹⁵⁵ The restaurant's improved performance did not mean smoother horizontal interaction with other Soviet enterprises however. To the contrary, its reliance on its own resources—such as an expanding vegetable and animal farm—only increased.¹⁵⁶

The restaurant's ever increasing labor force was another proof that its growth heavily utilized old methods, which had more to do with physical expansion than intensification. This reached 414 in 1954, an increase of at least a hundred employees over five years,¹⁵⁷ and continued expanding with 455 employees in 1955.¹⁵⁸ Finally, the restaurant's improved economic performance also owed much to the fact that this enterprise had secured a powerful lobbyist in the City Party Committee. In the 1940s Vasilii Voshchinkin had been the restaurant's deputy director and was the founder of its bakery shop.¹⁵⁹ By 1954 he was chairing the Committee's trade department, and the restaurant management acknowledged that he had “helped us a lot on many issues.”¹⁶⁰

Even though economic performance stabilized, the quality of the restaurant's service remained erratic. Because of numerous complaints, the restaurant could not participate in the All-Union competition for best restaurant.¹⁶¹ In 1954, when the government launched a campaign against petty crime in the retail trade,¹⁶² trade inspectors and the economic *militiia* (OBKhSS) began checking the restaurant's network with great vigilance and uncovered numerous violations.¹⁶³ The District Party Committee even issued a special resolution “On the Work of the Lviv Passenger Station Restaurant,” along with personal reprimands and suggestions.¹⁶⁴ At the same time, patrons were concerned not so much with the petty crime in which the employees were engaged, as with the quality of meals and the service. Of the 461 complaints that were submitted to the Lviv public dining network in 1953, only 55 were about shortchanging and similar misdeeds, while 101 dealt with food quality.¹⁶⁵

The restaurant's problems in the early 1950s were exacerbated by a conflict between the director and the restaurant's cadre inspector, Galina Aleksandrova, who came there in 1950. In her capacity as cadre inspector, Aleksandrova worked closely with the Ministry of State Security (MGB), doing background checks on people and providing requested information. Apparently, backed by her connections in the security organs, she also abused her position and intervened in appointments and dismissals.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, Aleksandrova was often absent from work and defended herself with preposterous justifications: “if I am not at work, it means that I am out to check the canteen personnel's domestic arrangement.”¹⁶⁷ The director complained about her absences “under various pretexts,” but also about her professional incompetence: “she does not work with cadres at all, she does not know what is happening, has messed all the [written organization's] orders, it is impossible to work ... She provides to accountants excerpts from orders that do not exist.”¹⁶⁸ When in 1953 Aleksandrova refused to collect money for the symbolic funeral wreath for Stalin and skipped the meeting where restaurant workers were supposed to pay their last honors to Stalin, the restaurant's party organization decided to expel her from the Communist Party and dismiss her from her job.¹⁶⁹ As a self-described “Old Bolshevik,” comrade Selivanov put it: “During those days I, like all our Party and all Soviet people thought of nothing else, but of our beloved leader and teacher comrade Stalin, while Galina Aleksandrova thought only about escorting her male acquaintance, who also intervened, and helped Aleksandrova to avoid the task assigned by the deputy secretary of our party organization.”¹⁷⁰ Selivanov's comments also point to a gender dimension of this conflict—Aleksandrova was the only woman among restaurant's male managers—and Selivanov was questioning her private life:

In the moral and private respect she considers herself clean, she left two husbands. Her last husband, a mayor, according to the comrades, was a respected man, but he left her for poor (*plokhoe*)

behavior. I think that the Party organization has right to enquire why Party member comrade Aleksandrova divorced two husbands.¹⁷¹

The district committee overruled the decision of the restaurant's party organization and Aleksandrova remained in her position. The conflict lingered. For a time both the director and the cadre inspector were suspended; at one point Aleksandrova even wrote a letter to Nikita Khrushchev himself, while terrified district level officials now tried to avoid taking sides.¹⁷² Finally, in 1954 a professional thief was caught in Sverdlovsk. His workbook had a falsified entry signed by Aleksandrova about his alleged employment at the Lviv station restaurant in 1953–1954. Aleksandrova was finally dismissed in 1955, a small local victory of trade managers over security and police organs.¹⁷³

The end of this major conflict in the restaurant's administration enabled a smoother transition from drinks to proper meals. Perishable products and fresh vegetables appeared in the restaurant's menu. There was a new emphasis on seasonal greens (radishes, sorrel, green onions, cucumbers, and tomatoes), never mentioned in the late 1940s–early 1950s. In 1955, trying to encourage consumption of non-alcoholic drinks, the restaurant began to produce and sell bread kvass; it also expanded its assortment of sodas.¹⁷⁴ In 1956 the ministry allowed public dining enterprises to purchase greens for cash at collective farmers' market instead of relying on clumsy trade supply organizations purchasing them directly from collective and state farms.¹⁷⁵ To shorten waiting times and increase the number of patrons in 1956 the restaurant introduced self-serving buffets.¹⁷⁶ At the end of that year it also boasted that there were almost no complaints from customers.¹⁷⁷

Paradoxically, all these gains were accompanied by a major failure: the commodity turnover plan for 1956 was fulfilled at 96.5 percent.¹⁷⁸ This was again due to major renovations that were undertaken on all the premises and newly introduced restrictions on the sale of vodka and beer.¹⁷⁹ Because of these restrictions, daily sales at the bus station buffet and terminal square pavilion dropped from 10,000 rubles to 3 000, and 7,000 rubles to 1,500, respectively.¹⁸⁰ The restaurant tried to compensate for the losses with longer opening hours, frequent supplying, and a greater number of shifts.¹⁸¹ Both the achievements and failings of the restaurant in 1956 were also influenced by the fact that, together with the rest of the Lviv railroad's dining trust, it was transferred from the All-Union Ministry of Trade to the Ukrainian one, a move that wreaked havoc but also sparked a search for optimization.

Major state reforms of public dining, strong lobby in the city hall and consolidated management, all helped in the restaurant's transition to new standards of service. The last major departure from the patterns of the 1940s and the factor of great significance was capital investment. Much needed capital funds and prioritization of work orders came in anticipation of the World Festival of Youth scheduled to take place in Moscow in 1957. Hitherto the Moscow Youth Festival has been analyzed in the context of cultural exchange, public diplomacy and as a carnivalesque event that brought about a "sea change" in the Soviet entertainment industry.¹⁸² But the influx of foreigners into the Soviet Union also had a strong impact on the Soviet hospitality and dining services sector. The sheer number of participants, 34,000, meant that their contact with Soviet public dining could not be accommodated by the few luxurious Moscow restaurants that had served this purpose before. The need to present a satisfactory picture to the mass of foreign guests meant that resources would be invested into a great number of enterprises with which foreign guests were likely to interact.¹⁸³

According to estimates, 30 per cent of all participants were to pass through Lviv on their way to Moscow. Furthermore, Lviv was listed as a tour destination for participants visiting the Soviet capital. As the restaurant's management explained to its personnel, "We, retail workers, will have to meet them first, and on the basis of our service they will judge our culture and civility." The investments entailed an upgrading not only of the restaurant's structural elements but also refrigerators, refrigerator displays, and buffet counters.¹⁸⁴ The restaurant secured new, larger, and more conveniently located warehouses.¹⁸⁵ New equipment was installed in

shops. By 1957 the soft drinks shop increased its production by 20 times: from 10,000 bottles a week to 12,000 a day; now 10,000 bottles could be produced during one regular eight-hour shift.¹⁸⁶

In 1957 the commodity turnover and profit plans were over-fulfilled by 107.6 percent and 104.7 percent, respectively.¹⁸⁷ After the festival ended, the management concluded that the festival guests had been served at a sufficiently high level. There were “two new model kiosks” built on the first platform where foreign-, Moscow- and Kyiv-bound trains stopped.¹⁸⁸ “The entire trade network was renovated and painted. All workers were issued uniforms. Large-scale mass-political work [was conducted] to improve the culture of service, [and] as a result the culture of service significantly improved and was raised to a new level.”¹⁸⁹ The year 1957 was also exceptional because not a single case of embezzlement or violation of Soviet trade regulations was recorded.¹⁹⁰ The restaurant staff had even been sent to serve festival guests at the Chop border station on the Ukrainian-Hungarian border, replacing local workers—a proof of the recognition it achieved with the Ministry.

The enterprise prepared for catering to foreign guests was a sprawling and branched structure. Not counting train car canteens, it consisted of a restaurant seating 180, a snack-bar (*zakusochnaia*) and a pavilion (seating 40 and 28, respectively), three canteens inside the terminal and four on the outside, 15 kiosks, 78 mobile vendors (*lotki* and *telezhki*), one buffet table, one tea table, 4 street tables, and two shops making non-alcoholic beverages and baked and confectionery goods.¹⁹¹ The restaurant continued to grow after the festival, albeit at a slower pace than in the first half of the 1950s. There was an average increase of 15 workers a year in the second half of the 1950s, with the number of employees reaching 483 in 1957.¹⁹²

In the restaurant management’s communications with the authorities, we can detect a certain assertiveness, probably deriving from the important role the restaurant had played during the festival. In 1957 the chair of the restaurant’s Party bureau even dared to direct a gentle reproach at the District Committee: “I understand that the *Raikom* has to supervise such important facilities as *Selmash* [an agricultural machine factory—A.Z.], the Locomotive building plant, the Electric bulbs factory, and other giants, but this does not give the *Raikom* the right to forget us and to neglect the facility of public dining, in which the Party takes such a great interest.”¹⁹³ The restaurant had also moved up in the Soviet ranking system, having been assigned the highest (“above grade”) category. While the other two grades were assigned more or less automatically, based on commodity turnover and the restaurant’s physical dimensions, the “above grade category” was assigned on a case-to-case basis by the republics’ trade ministries. Both local Party committees and the superiors of public dining at the Ministry not only recognized the restaurant’s achievements during the 1950s, but also acknowledged that the enterprise was their reliable partner.

The 1960s: Pacesetters

Capital investment and infrastructural expansion connected with the 1957 festival laid the foundation for the restaurant’s stable growth in the 1960s. There was also a palpable qualitative change in the restaurant. While the 1950s brought to the restaurant properly cooked meals and higher service standards, the 1960s were about sophistication. Chefs diversified the menu and experimented with signature dishes, managers were trying to find for a restaurant a unique individual appearance, while newly installed machinery eased tedious and time-consuming work tasks. A less visible but even more profound change, underlying these easily noticeable alterations, transformed the restaurant’s workforce. The majority of workers were women, just as in the 1940s and 1950s. However, unlike before, in the 1960s the restaurant’s workers were mostly local—i. e. born in Western Ukraine. Even more important was the fact that they were much better educated than their predecessors. Moreover, when allowed to keep larger portion of its revenue, the restaurant developed a system of incentives and benefits, which helped to balance out institutional interests with those of individual workers.

The decade also saw a dramatic expansion of the enterprise's workforce. There were 820 people working at the restaurant in 1968, almost twice as many as in 1954.¹⁹⁴ The impact of greater affordability and accessibility of higher and special secondary education became apparent too. Whereas in the late 1940s the absolute majority of workers had only a primary education, and instead of formal vocational training they had to rely on workplace apprenticeship, by the 1960s the kitchen chefs and specialists in similar positions were trade school graduates.¹⁹⁵ In 1963 more than twice as many of the restaurant's employees had various types of secondary or incomplete secondary education as had only a primary education. At the same time, there were only 15 people with a higher education among the restaurant's 534 workers with some education.¹⁹⁶ Two years later, in 1966, out of 645 employees, only 138 (21 percent) had completed their elementary school education, while 251 (39 percent) had finished some years at a secondary school. Among those with a secondary education a group of vocational school graduates were becoming prominent and numbered 55 (8.5 percent).¹⁹⁷ By 1968, out of 820 workers, only 92 had ended their education at the elementary level.¹⁹⁸

Paradoxically, the 1960s were also a period when the management complained regularly of the lack of younger, educated cadres. Even in 1966 the majority of the restaurant workers had not completed secondary school and lived in villages.¹⁹⁹ Low pay, a disapproving public attitude, as well as suspicions and the constant surveillance Soviet retail was subjected to as the only sector of economy dealing with live cash, discouraged youth from embarking on careers in the food service sector. The ideological priorities of the regime privileging industry over service and production over consumption translated into concrete material disadvantages. Employees constantly complained about being harassed by controllers from multiple agencies. Whereas in 1957 restaurant employees were left in peace to focus on their work, after the Festival the struggle against "violations of socialist trade" (a euphemism for petty crime in the form of shortchanging, short measure and weight, the infamous triad of *obshchet*, *obmer* and *obves*) resumed. Several dozen petty "violations" were discovered every year.

This renewed vigilance, however, went hand in hand with a more liberal approach to punishment in the Soviet legal system, trade violations included. As Oleg Kharkhordin showed, using examples of the *stiliagi* subculture and violators of Party discipline, the new system expected that the offender would be revealed and punished by the collective itself and not by external law-enforcing organs.²⁰⁰ At the same time, reform of legislation and punitive organs coupled with the expectations of self-policing produced confusion among managers of Soviet enterprises.²⁰¹

The restaurant was trapped in a conundrum: On the one hand, cadres had to be screened and selected carefully, with offenders dismissed from the system; on the other, there was no reserve of labor to draw on. In 1959 the cadre inspector complained that he could not find a job that did not involve financial liability for those found guilty of small property crimes and remaining in the restaurant.²⁰² In 1960 the director also complained about contradictory orders: "It was a bit funny that we were accused of insufficient work with the cadres, that we had to kick out people who were violating Soviet trade regulations when after some time another confidential letter comes and says that we should not throw people overboard with their lives, that we should cultivate them."²⁰³

The management decided that the solution was a certain leniency toward offenders, while ensuring that no large embezzlements occurred. Most often petty offenders remained at the restaurant to be "re-educated" in the workplace, especially if they had dependents or came from families with social problems. In 1962 the kitchen boss articulated the pragmatic position of the restaurant management: "We dismiss people for petty violations of trade, but there is no replacement. These days people do not want to work in trade, and they go to work in factories because salaries in the retail trade are very low. We have the same situation in our kitchen."²⁰⁴ In 1963 the director complained again: "Only a few people enter the retail trade, and if someone shows up, it is usually people who have been compromised before. Good trade workers do not remain without work."²⁰⁵

For the restaurant managers interested in expanding their workforce, as this was the easiest way to secure continuing economic performance and also helped to secure full employment, the state allowed them to do so. In 1967, when the restaurant had to send a team as part of the Ukrainian representation to the All-Union Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy, replacements were hired whose employment could not be terminated immediately. Thus for the first time in the restaurant's history it reached a slight surplus of labor.²⁰⁶ The rates of labor turnover showed a great improvement compared not only to the period of postwar reconstruction, but also to the 1950s. In 1960, 19 percent of employees had worked at the restaurant less than three years, and 38 percent had worked from three to five years.²⁰⁷ In 1953, for example, the corresponding numbers were 51 and 17 per cent.²⁰⁸

The restaurant's facilities were also expanding, and a delicatessen (*gastronom*) was opened in 1958, in the aftermath of the festival.²⁰⁹ It also maintained a relatively stable rate of fulfilling plans: 101.8 per cent of the commodity turnover plan in 1958, with a cumulative gross margin (*realizovannoe nalozhenie*) of 17.16 per cent.²¹⁰ In 1959 there was a slight under-fulfillment of the commodity turnover plan (99.3 per cent), but the gross margin compensated for that with 17.35 per cent against the projected 16.45 per cent.²¹¹ The plans became more realistic, while capital investments coupled with increased levels of consumption, made them easier to fulfill.²¹²

It seems that by the 1960s a new consensus emerged, balancing the interests of a dining trust, the enterprise's management and workers on the shop floor. Direct administrative interventions now had a detrimental effect, ruining the precarious balance. Restaurant managers blamed the authorities for problems with the 1958 plan—that year they changed the restaurant director twice.²¹³ The Festival in Vienna, with high demands for the service offered to its delegates, had also interrupted the work routine.²¹⁴

In 1960 sales were again just slightly above the plan, at 101.1 percent.²¹⁵ In 1961 commodity turnover significantly outstripped the projection, reaching 107.2 percent; the gross margin, however, stood at 16.84 percent against the projected 17.06 percent.²¹⁶ When it comes to planning, we see that from 1960 onward, even before the Kosygin reforms prioritizing profit and giving more latitude to individual enterprises, the emphasis was shifting toward greater profitability, and the planned gross margin was slowly increasing. For 1963 it was planned at 18.65 percent, with 19.61 percent achieved.²¹⁷ After Kosygin's reform was introduced, the projected margin was 24.99 percent for 1967, and 25.5 percent was achieved.²¹⁸ The point of equilibrium was 25.5 percent. In 1968, when the gross margin was planned at 25.92 percent, only 25.63 percent were actually achieved.²¹⁹

This increased price margin did not translate into increased profit (*nakopleniia*). In the second half of the 1940s and the first half of the 1950s profits were planned at 6.4 percent of total commodity turnover.²²⁰ In the second half of the 1950s—first half of the 1960s they rose to 8.4 percent.²²¹ The increase was largely achieved by a corresponding increase in the cumulative gross margin from approximately 12 percent to 16–17 percent. Whereas in the second half of the 1960s the cumulative gross margin reached 25 percent, profit plans dropped back to 6.6 percent of the total commodity turnover.²²² The lion's share of the increased gross margin now went into the higher salaries of the expanding workforce and the so-called “social consumption funds,” providing a much needed material incentive to the workers.

The restaurant no longer experienced serious problems with the commodity turnover plan. In 1962 the fulfillment stood at 104.1 percent,²²³ in 1963 it reached 100 percent,²²⁴ 103.4 percent in 1966,²²⁵ and 106.2 percent in 1967.²²⁶ In terms of quality as measured against the expectations of customers and authorities, the restaurant was also performing sufficiently well. It continued to benefit from its strategic location on the main junction of the Soviet Union's most international railroad and from the government's policy on strengthening the dining sector. Another International Festival of Students and Youth was held in 1959. This time it took place in Vienna, and special trains bringing delegates from the Soviet Union passed through Lviv. That year the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

(CPSU) passed a joint resolution “On the Further Development and Improvement of Public Dining,” which was followed by further injections of capital.²²⁷

During the 1960s the restaurant was among the best restaurants in Soviet Ukraine. The restaurant performed well in the socialist competition,²²⁸ and from time to time it held onto its Trust’s Red Banner, while the non-alcoholic drinks’ shop had the honor of being called the Enterprise of Communist Work.²²⁹ In 1967 its team represented the public dining of Ukraine at the All-Union Exhibition (*VDNKh*) during the Week of the Ukrainian SSR organized there. The Ukrainian cuisine that was served proved to be extremely popular with Muscovites. They left more than 2,000 comments about the restaurant and not a single comment was negative. For this performance the restaurant received the *VDNKh*’s first-degree diploma.²³⁰ In 1970 the Ukrainian public dining office chose the restaurant’s team again to serve guests of the agricultural pavilion at the *VDNKh* in Moscow.²³¹

In the 1960s the restaurant developed a number of signature dishes referring to the local traditions (for example, the Lviv Chop, a version of the Wiener Schnitzel), which were seen as evidence of the restaurant’s excellence.²³² In Western Ukraine local dishes were reinvented as part of the restaurant menus, and were developed using the expertise of “old chefs from local population.”²³³ Ukrainian-style meals (even if in name only) dominated the restaurant’s menus in Moscow. The surviving photographs of crowds gathered around the restaurant’s pastry tables testify to the appeal of the confectionery developed by Lviv chefs, even among the residents of the Soviet capital spoiled by the priority supply that Moscow enjoyed.²³⁴

In the 1960s ethnic cuisine becomes a legitimate part of restaurant menus. Moreover, the presence of “signature” ethnic dishes became one of the key criteria of a restaurant’s quality. Many tried to connect this “legalization” of ethnic cuisines in Soviet public sphere with nationalism and heightened sense of national identity.²³⁵ Adrienne Jacobs argues that this was part of the “historical turn” occurring during the Brezhnev era, part of the period’s search for stability and roots, and a reaction to Khrushchev’s turbulent era, with its fascination with Americanism and technology, including technologically prepared foods.²³⁶ Public dining bureaucracy, however, saw ethnic cuisine as a sign of greater sophistication among both restaurant employees and patrons. It was popular not only with tourists but also with locals. The Republic’s main office of public dining encouraged its restaurants to take into consideration “national-historical traditions and customs,” in our case—of the “Ukrainian people.”²³⁷ By 1969 there were 28 restaurants in the national style in the Ukrainian Republic.²³⁸ Their “national style” was not limited to the cuisine. It also dominated in the architectural and decorative solutions developed in the 1970s.²³⁹ The weeks of the Soviet ethnic cuisines would become a norm in the 1970s, and cookbooks with the national cuisines of the Soviet republics also appeared at that time.²⁴⁰

There was no clear-cut caesura between Khrushchev and Brezhnev’s period as regards quality and assortment of the restaurant’s offerings. Both ethnic signature dishes and the greater number of semi-processed foods, kitchen machinery and emphasis on the restaurant’s originality appeared simultaneously. Higher gross margin meant that the restaurant became slightly more expensive, but apparently restaurant patrons were willing to pay more. While the food crisis of the early 1960s was stressful for the Soviet society,²⁴¹ it had no detrimental impact on the enterprise. Shortages of certain products were nothing new or unique to the last Khrushchev’s years. They were a constant feature of the 1940s and 1950s, and would also be experienced in the 1970s.

Precisely in the early 1960s, together with the rest of the Soviet dining trade, the restaurant began adopting technological novelties to increase its productivity. The most important trend was automation of all the processes. In the Lviv train station restaurant automation was small-scale. In 1961 automatic fizzy water dispensers were installed on the platforms, but this was just the beginning.²⁴² The first automatic coffee maker called *Ekspress* was installed in 1962.²⁴³ In 1963 juice dispensing machines appeared.²⁴⁴ In 1967 fizzy water machines made it into the terminal’s canteens.²⁴⁵

Susan Reid showed that Soviet economic realities were a powerful correction to the discourse about technological advance. Electrification and scientific organization of chores in private kitchens were rather “a symbol that failed to materialize”²⁴⁶ The workers at the restaurant also complained that automation was often superficial. Production technology in the kitchens and kitchen-related shops did not change. A foreman from the culinary shop claimed that in the six years that he had worked in the restaurant “we have been writing and talking about mechanizing the shop, but as of now everything still remains on paper.”²⁴⁷

In the restaurant, however, mechanisation was closely connected to investment and ability to procure machinery. The restaurant benefited most not from fancy novelties such as fizz-water machines and dispensers but from the replacement ovens and refrigerators. While the latter did not profoundly alter either cooking or serving, they were far more reliable, easier to operate and had greater capacity.²⁴⁸ Many of these reliable machines came from East Germany or Czechoslovakia,²⁴⁹ another benefit of the country’s greater openness to and closer cooperation with the socialist states of East-Central Europe.

Paradoxically, despite the rhetoric of scientific-technological progress, the restaurant still relied heavily on expansion, as the surest way to improve economic performance. Instead of developing horizontal linkages with more specialized enterprises, the restaurant maintained its auxiliary infrastructure. The pigsty and horse stables that were there in the 1940s not only survived thorough the 1960s, but expanded.²⁵⁰ Own-grown potatoes and vegetables were stocked for winter in ever-increasing quantities.²⁵¹

The restaurant’s trade network and infrastructure also expanded. Three new, permanent platform counters were built in 1959, replacing carry-out tables.²⁵² This time, however, expansion was accompanied by concentration. A group of adjacent specialized warehouses replaced the old ones, which were dispersed over a large area.²⁵³ In 1967 a new 400-ton food warehouse in the station’s largest train yard became the central supply point for all the buffets, cafés, canteens, and the restaurant’s central hall.²⁵⁴ The restaurant also decided to concentrate cooking in a single restaurant kitchen, while its branch buffets, such as the one at the bus station, would use semi-prepared foods brought from the kitchen.²⁵⁵ In 1965 several retail kiosks at the terminal square were closed and a single larger pavilion was opened.²⁵⁶

The restaurant’s expansion, improved infrastructure and machinery meant less hectic working conditions. Optimizing its organization of labor, the restaurant introduced a regular three-shift system in all retail outlets and meals-related production facilities. Vendors, too, now worked from 7 a.m. to midnight in three shifts.²⁵⁷ The three-shift system not only gave workers more free time, it also optimized their salaries.²⁵⁸ In addition, all kinds of financial incentives became standard by the late 1960s, and many employees were awarded regular premiums from special funds.²⁵⁹

The restaurant was now attracting local Lviv residents in increasing numbers as a cozy place to spend an evening at.²⁶⁰ Since its founding, the restaurant had had only a generic descriptive name: The Railroad Restaurant at the Lviv Station.” In 1966 it was renamed as the On the Road (*Dorozhnyi*) Restaurant. Cafés and buffets were also given their own special names, such as the Welcome (*Vstrecha*) Café at the terminal square.²⁶¹ In 1969, for the first time in its history, the restaurant acquired an electrically lit advertising board.²⁶² More realistic plans, better working conditions and technical innovation, more qualified and better paid workforce allowed the restaurant to focus on quality reflected in the kind and range of products offered, and creating a more welcoming atmosphere.

Much of the restaurant’s expansion in the 1960s was connected with the service provided on trains. Previously, the standard on trains had been canteens occupying parts of a regular passenger carriage. Starting in the 1960s, long-distance trains assigned to the Lviv station featured a dedicated carriage-restaurant.²⁶³ Cooking and serving on trains had their own specific features that presented problems different from those experienced at the stationary restaurant on the station premises.²⁶⁴ The expansion of services on trains also inflated the enterprise’s personnel to an unwieldy 820 people,²⁶⁵ with 260 working on trains.²⁶⁶ The restaurant became too

large for a dining enterprise, and in 1969 train restaurants and buffets assigned to the Lviv station became a separate enterprise independent of the station restaurant.

In the 1960 the Lviv station restaurant capitalized on the investments and reputation received in the second half of the 1950s, and used them to attract additional funding. From a peripheral, underperforming and underfunded restaurant of the 1940s it turned into one of the best enterprises of public dining in Soviet Ukraine. The organization of labor improved, restaurant's personnel became better educated and it obtained some technologies that helped to improve its performance. From a generic railway restaurant it turned into a restaurant with a unique, individual face, and interacted as such with both general public and the authorities.

The 1970s: Slowdown

This paper has been arguing that there was no visibly definitive break between the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods when it comes to the operations of a dining enterprise. To divide the history of post-war Soviet public dining by decade may make more sense than to follow a succession of state leaders. Moreover, complex policy changes in the Soviet Union did not occur immediately and simultaneously. The sheer size of the country led to time lags and asynchronies. Many aspects of the restaurant's operations in the 1970s displayed strong continuities with the preceding periods. Even the general economic slowdown, evident also at the level of an individual enterprise, was a logical consequence of previous developments. Power relations at the workplace, and as embedded into the enterprise's hierarchical organization also proved to be strikingly enduring.

Even after the division of 1969, the restaurant remained a large enterprise. In 1969, a new shop of semi-processed products (*polufabrikaty*) opened, and 60 new workers were hired.²⁶⁷ This reflected a Union-wide policy emphasizing semi-processed foods as a way to improve the efficiency of the dining trade and shorten cooking and service times. The preoccupation with semi-processed foods dated back to the 1950s. These foods had to help Soviet public dining to become more efficient, since the primary processing of foodstuffs would move to the food industry. It stemmed from Soviet reflections on Western trends, including convenience and fast foods, which were seen as the most dynamic sector of the dining trade.²⁶⁸ The large-scale implementation of these ideas in public dining, however, took time. Moreover, Soviet public dining was not ready to hand primary processing to the industry—such a processing helped to maintain wider price margin.

The rhetoric of “intensification,” acceleration, efficiency and development based on scientific economics did not disappear either and dominated the discussion of public dining in the 1970s.²⁶⁹ Paradoxically, the emphasis on productivity and profitability did not hinder further growth of the enterprise's workforce, although the pace of its growth did slow down. There were 610 workers in the enterprise at the end of 1969.²⁷⁰ Over the next decade, by 1979, that number increased to 685.²⁷¹ It was part of a Union-wide macroeconomic trend. The 1960s witnessed the most dramatic expansion of labor employed in the dining service—in 1970 it stood at 186% relative to its size in 1960, while the corresponding figure for the 1950s was 162% and for the 1970s—132%.²⁷²

When it comes to the cadres, as befitted the Brezhnev era, the restaurant had a stable management: the director appointed in 1965 remained in his position throughout the 1970s, becoming the restaurant's longest-serving director A. Dedovik. In 1970 a quarter of the restaurant's labour force worked in the heart of the restaurant: its kitchen and hall. One-third worked in numerous buffets and in vendors scattered throughout the terminal and in the neighborhood. The restaurant also maintained vigorous administrative control, with a ratio of one manager to ten workers.²⁷³ The most important structural change took place in the restaurant's production shops. In the 1960s the restaurant lost its bakery and soft drinks shop. The two new shops—the culinary and semi-processed food units—were directly related to meal preparation. The culinary shop took over the

confectionary from the former bakery, while the restaurant now received its bread and sodas from specialized enterprises.

By the 1970s an observable shift also occurred in the ethnic composition of the restaurant's workforce. In the 1940s and early 1950s the restaurant was a typical Soviet enterprise not only in its structure, procedures and menus, but also in the origins of its workforce, which was largely recruited from pre-1939 Soviet citizens. In 1953, 53 per cent of the workers were Ukrainians (the proportion of the city population was close to 44 per cent), 31 per cent were Russians (36 per cent for the city), and the percentage of Jews in the workforce corresponded roughly to that in the city.²⁷⁴ But Ukrainians in these statistics included both "locals" (as those from Western Ukraine, annexed in 1939, were called) and "easterners." By 1970, Ukrainians greatly outnumbered all others. Their percentage in the restaurant was now much higher than in the city (82 per cent vs. 68 per cent), while Russians and Jews were underrepresented (12.9 percent vs. 22 per cent and 2.85 per cent vs. 4.4 per cent, respectively).²⁷⁵

Overrepresentation of Ukrainians was the result of the low social prestige of retail and dining occupations. These jobs were often taken by recent migrants from the countryside or commuters from suburban villages. Throughout the whole period tensions between "locals" and predominantly Russian-speaking "easterners" had a definite class dimension. Throughout the entire period, from 1944 to 1981, all directors and cadre inspectors were pre-1939 Soviet citizens and their families. Documents from the 1950s and 1960s are filled with management's concerns about the "locals," their civilizational "backwardness" and political unreliability. While in the 1970s these complaints became rare, as late as 1980 a Russian speaking Komsomol leader was reproaching older managerial cadres for their disdainful attitude to younger Ukrainian-speaking cadres.²⁷⁶ Starting in the 1960s, "locals" first appeared among medium-level managers. One of the earliest cases was Vira Georgiadi, born in Lviv in 1940, who took over the culinary shop in 1962, but she was also a local born during the Soviet period.²⁷⁷

In the 1970s the policy of hiring better-educated cadres continued. The priority was to employ "young specialists," graduates of specialized secondary and higher schools. Ten such specialists were hired in 1977 alone.²⁷⁸ That was the year when the Ministry of Trade of the USSR issued an order instructing that vacant top management positions in retail and dining enterprises were to be filled only by those with a higher (university/institute level) education. The restaurant had 17 such positions, but only 9 were held by people with the required level of education.²⁷⁹ The situation was indicative of the good career prospects for graduates of institutions of higher learning in the Soviet Union in the 1970s, who gravitated toward other sectors of the economy. People with only an elementary education in 1973 accounted for a mere 12 percent of the restaurant's workforce.²⁸⁰

Besides structural changes in production shops and workforce's composition, the enterprise continued branching. In 1969 the restaurant administration's offices moved into a separate building. Telephone lines were installed, for the first time connecting the restaurant's subdivisions. (Since there were no funds for digging, the employees were mobilized for a *subbotnik*, a Saturday of volunteer work, and they dug 320 meters of cable trenches themselves).²⁸¹ A new café called Breeze (*Veterok*) was opened in 1971, farther away from the terminal.²⁸² It seated 60 people and was located on the site of the semi-processed foods shop, which was convenient from a logistical point of view.²⁸³ In 1971 a buffet attached to the delicatessen was built, creating a joint pavilion with dozens of seats.²⁸⁴ The older semi-permanent structures housing cafes and buffets were upgraded, and new specialized establishments were opened: a *cheburechnaia* serving deep-fried turnovers, seen in the Soviet context as a Central Asian specialty, and a dumpling place (*varenichnaia*), whose combined seatings totalled 210, joined the older snack bar (*zakusochnaia*).²⁸⁵ Cheap, specialized buffets that used semi-processed cafeterias proved to be popular, and in 1973 a sausage snack bar (*sosisochnaia*) was added.²⁸⁶

In terms of plan fulfillment, in the 1970s the standard was to squeak just over the target (1 percent or so), securing additional monetary compensations for the managers and workers with the least extra effort. In

1970 the plan failed in the third quarter “for the first time in many years,” having stalled at 99.7 percent.²⁸⁷ The restaurant caught up only in the last quarter. Again, a new temperance campaign with corresponding restrictions on the sale of alcohol was blamed. Another reason was the flu pandemic that led to a precipitous drop in the number of passengers.²⁸⁸ In 1971 the restaurant continued to struggle with the plan because of the anti-alcoholism measures.²⁸⁹ The year ended with 101.6 percent-fulfillment of the commodity turnover plan.²⁹⁰ But in 1972 the restaurant failed to fulfill the plan abysmally with a 95.6 percent completion rate.²⁹¹ Just like in the past, this failure resulted from the reconstruction of the pavilions and the restaurant hall.²⁹²

After 1972, plan completion stabilized: 102.6 percent in 1973,²⁹³ 101.7 percent in 1974,²⁹⁴ 101.5 percent in 1975,²⁹⁵ 101.4 percent in 1976, 100.3 percent in both 1977 and 1978,²⁹⁶ and 101.2 percent in 1979.²⁹⁷ The decade, however, ended poorly. In 1980, the year of the Olympic Games, the restaurant reached only 98% of the target.²⁹⁸ The 1980s Games were a major “showcasing” event comparable to the 1957 Festival. But while the 1957 Festival brought the restaurant many palpable benefits, the Olympic Games brought none. For the Olympic games of 1980 Lviv was no longer one of the most important transit hubs. Airplanes, rather than trains, were bringing in the Games’ foreign guests. The Games prompted some reconstruction works, but these took longer than expected and affected sales detrimentally.²⁹⁹

By 1980, many problems that accumulated throughout the 1970s had transpired. Following the decisions of the 24th Party Congress in 1971, and in line with the broader discussion of the Scientific and Technological Revolution as means to accelerate Soviet economic and social development, the management announced a new goal: the scientific substantiation of all technological processes together with new methods of planning and economic stimulation of labor productivity.³⁰⁰ Congress mantras had little impact on the dining trade. Despite the discursive concern with science and technology the level of mechanization and automation achieved in the 1960s was not surpassed. A scientific approach to cooking and serving algorithms was a poor substitute for investments.

The economic stimulation of workers continued. In practical terms, the system of incentives and benefits only strengthened and expanded. Starting in 1973, workers began receiving the so-called thirteenth paycheque; a premium paid in December based on their year-long performance.³⁰¹ Moreover, the management seemed to tolerate petty theft at the expense of the clients. Twenty-five violations were recorded in 1973.³⁰² Since the numbers for the rest of the 1970s look very similar, it is very likely that registered violations were artificially capped at this level, while many more went unrecorded and were tolerated silently. In contrast to the 1950s and 1960s, there were no major campaigns against these petty violations in the 1970s. Apparently, they were tolerated as part of an unspoken social contract.

A novel development was the campaign for greater accountability. While attention to minimizing and utilizing kitchen waste was evident already in the 1960s, in the 1970s the management focused on the squandering of energy and water.³⁰³ In 1973 meters for gas, electricity, and water were installed in the kitchen.³⁰⁴ When it came to food waste, in a dramatic reversal from the hungry 1940s, bread became the commodity that was squandered most. Since bread was served with every first and second course, its actual consumption was difficult to monitor. In 1975 a manager claimed that “there is bread in cupboards, in bags, waiters serve bread without asking permission. Some public dining workers are trying to feed pigs on bread.”³⁰⁵ Waiters were reminded to ask customers if they wanted bread, and how much.³⁰⁶ This was part of a more general Soviet problem with heavily subsidized bread. This campaign, however, did not result in any major gains for the enterprise. Maintaining social consensus was far more important, while utilities were still heavily subsidized by the state.

Notwithstanding major policy changes and various campaigns of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev’s periods, the restaurant preserved many features of the system established in the 1940s. As regards auxiliary structures, they not only survived but even expanded. The restaurant maintained a large shop staffed with its

own wood and metal workers, electricians, and plumbers. In the 1970s the restaurant had its own construction department with 25 permanent and 12 contract workers.³⁰⁷ High labor turnover also remained an unsolved problem. Better-trained specialists tended to stay,³⁰⁸ but low-skilled labor, such as sales clerks, waiters, warehouse workers, dishwashers, and janitors, was very fluid.³⁰⁹ In 1973, 95 workers were dismissed and 85 were hired, representing a 13–15-percent annual turnover rate.³¹⁰ Similarly, systematic violations of the “rules of socialist trade” and customers’ complaints could not be eradicated. Periodic shortages of supplies were also a recurring problem, although not on the scale of the 1940s.³¹¹ Seasonal fluctuations still affected the restaurant’s performance.³¹²

These features were a response to larger structural problems with the Soviet economy. Individual enterprise could not get rid of dependency on the state, its only source of investment, over which it had virtually no control. While workers’ wages improved, the growth rate of the commodity turnover in public dining slowed down from 6.1% yearly in 1961–1965 and 8.2% in 1966–1970, to 5.3% in 1971–1975 and 3.1% in 1976–1980.³¹³ Moreover, taken as whole, the Union-wide network of public dining in the 1970s was becoming progressively less profitable.³¹⁴ The economic stimulation, with its emphasis on enterprise’s profitability with a larger share of the profit staying in the enterprise, continued.³¹⁵ At the same time, the state tried to transfer the burden of capital investment to the public dining enterprises themselves, expecting them to accumulate sufficient funds through yearly amortization deductions.³¹⁶ The latter proved to be problematic.³¹⁷ The problem of capital investment was all the more acute because the restaurant’s physical infrastructure had greatly expanded in the 1960s and 1970s, while salaries and benefits drained most of the accumulated funds.³¹⁸

By the end of the 1970s competition from air and motor transport was also taking its toll on the performance of the Lviv train station restaurant. In July 1980 the city’s central bus station moved to a new and massive terminal on the southern outskirts of the city, far away from the train station.³¹⁹ The city’s expansion of the late 1960s and 1970s overloaded existing infrastructure. It brought infamous water shortages, which were felt in the restaurant too. As the secretary of the restaurant’s party organization Iakymiv pointed out, even “the restaurant hall, this face of our enterprise, did not have a sufficient and permanent water supply after the renovation [of 1980].”³²⁰ The 1980 renovations appear to have been shoddier than the restaurant’s previous major reconstructions—the passenger terminal itself was in need of capital reconstruction.

Adding insult to injury, in 1980 the restaurant was downgraded from “above grade” to the regular first category. The exact reasons were not specified, but such decisions were based on the appearance and sanitary conditions of the premises, the restaurant’s design and equipment, and the restaurant’s performance as assessed by inspectors and diners. Besides being a matter of pride, this change had an impact on the restaurant’s price margin and profits, as prices in first-category restaurants had to be lower.³²¹

Another feature of this enterprise that changed little between the late 1940s and the early 1980s was the completely unbalanced gender composition of its workforce. The ratio of women among the restaurant’s employees never dropped below 70 percent.³²² In 1975, toward the end of the period discussed here, it peaked at 80 percent.³²³ Since most men worked in the administration (all the restaurant directors were men), the production shops, and warehouses, the percentage of women in retail branches and in the restaurant hall was even higher. There was not a single woman among the dozen directors that managed the restaurant between 1944 and 1980. Therefore, tensions between the management and workers frequently included a gender dimension. Since jobs in retail were among the lowest paid, this may be viewed as another example of structural gender inequality in all occupations.

It confirms that the encouragement of women’s employment, and in theory equal salaries, coexisted with the expectation that women would remain primarily wives and mothers, contributing to the economy with their unpaid “women’s” work.³²⁴ Scholars have documented lower than men’s earnings of Soviet women.³²⁵ These resulted from women’s concentration in lower-paid occupations and at the bottom of workplace hierarchy. Ironically, the Soviet system of public dining, or “communal nourishment” (*obshchestvennoe pitanie*), which

was created in part “to really liberate women, to truly reduce and abolish the inequality between them and men,”³²⁶ became one of the keystones in a system that perpetuated gender inequality in the workplace. Not only women ended in lower paid occupations, but even in those occupations they were in subordinate positions under the supervision of men.

Conclusions

The specific trajectory of this particular restaurant in the postwar Soviet Union lends itself to several more general observations. The sphere of public food consumption in the Soviet Union was profoundly shaped by the fact that it consisted of a network of public dining enterprises. The nature, goals and actual operations of the enterprises influenced the options available to Soviet consumers and their experience of eating and drinking in public.

The Lviv train station restaurant as a rather typical Soviet dining enterprise retained some features of the early Soviet kitchen factories: It was a large enterprise with multiple retail outlets and production and storage facilities; it had a complete, if not self-sufficient, production chain, starting with the farm plot and ending with the dinner table. Where trade is concerned, for all practical purposes the restaurant enjoyed a monopoly in the vicinity of the station, and in this respect was challenged only by illicit private speculators. The restaurant’s internal structure copied the organization of industrial enterprises. Thus it is no wonder that it had similar problems: low productivity, a tendency to achieve growth through physical expansion, and massive auxiliary structures unrelated to the enterprise’s main activity. Among the other features that were common to Soviet public dining in general was the low social prestige of restaurant work, especially on the lower rungs of the occupational ladder, and a concomitant feminization of the labor force supervised by an all-male management.

Despite these constants, from 1944 to the 1980s the restaurant did change significantly. These changes, however, do not correspond neatly with the changes of the country’s political leadership. The first change was linked with the end of rationing in 1947, when the emphasis shifted from mere food distribution to socializing consumption, even though the latter was often limited to alcohol and tobacco. In 1950, when the Soviet Union reached its prewar level of consumption, major problems with the commodity turnover experienced in the 1940s disappeared. Major administrative interventions that occurred between 1953 and 1956, encouraged kitchen production, improved salaries of the workers, and provided capital investment. These changes endowed the enterprises with greater flexibility and help to translate discursive preoccupation with quality into major improvements of the services offered. The impetus received in the 1950s continued in the 1960s, the restaurant was interested in consumer satisfaction, tried to take consumers’ expectations into account and was largely able to meet those. In the 1970s, however, structural problems of the Soviet economy, including insufficient capital investment, became more manifest, and the enterprise was falling behind the patrons’ expectations.

Since the restaurant was located at the main train station of a large borderland city, its glory days coincided with the era when the Soviet Union opened itself up to foreigners for the first time while railways were still the unchallenged means of long-distance transportation. Its late Soviet waning, on the other hand, was connected with the eclipse of Soviet railway passenger services, with aviation taking long-distance travellers, while buses and automobiles were gaining ground in suburban commuting.

Paradoxically, in the 1940s and early 1950s, when insurgency and counter-insurgency still ravaged the region, particular regional culture was nearly invisible in the restaurant’s work. Only in the 1960s and 1970s were both local specificity and the Ukrainian national tradition rediscovered and reinvented in the restaurant’s offerings, while “locals” became dominant in the restaurant’s workforce. Social divisions and inequality apparent in this enterprise had strong gender and ethnic dimensions throughout the whole period. While the

gender aspect of inequality was common to the whole Soviet dining sphere, its ethnic dimension was due to the specificity of post-war Lviv.

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- 10 Central State Archive of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine (*Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vldy ta upravlinnia Ukraïny*); hereinafter TsDAVOU), f. 4981 (Ministry of Trade of the Ukrainian SSR), op.3, spr.505, a.2
- 11 TsDAVOU, f.4981, op.3, spr.156-157.
- 12 Ilia Ilf and Evgenii Petrov, "U samovara," in *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo khudozhestvennoi literatury, 1961), 310–15.
- 13 Eldar Riazanov's *A Station for Two* (Mosfilm, 1982).
- 14 There are at least three references in Vladimir Vysotskii songs: "privokzalnyi odin restoran" from his "Gorodskoi romans," "bufet vokzalnyi" in "Vysota," and an unidentified canteen on Moscow's "three stations square" in "U menia zapoi ot odinochestva... ."
- 15 Vendikt Erofeev, *Moskva-Petushki* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1977), 8-9.
- 16 In 1987 *Ukrdorrestoran* was transferred from the Ukrainian republic's Ministry of Trade to the all-Union Ministry of the Means of Communications.
- 17 G. F. Shorin, (ed.), *Spravochnik rukovoditelia predpriiatiia obshchestvennogo pitaniia* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo torgovoi literatury, 1956), 119.
- 18 "Dlia sebia variu sosiski." Interview with Nikolai Morozov. 8 October 2012. http://ussrlife.blogspot.ru/2012/10/blog-post_827.html.
- 19 The studies of the interwar consumption include fragmentary discussion of public catering: Jukka Gronow, *Caviar with Champagne: Common Luxury and the Ideals of the Good Life in Stalin's Russia* (Oxford: Berg, 2003); Amy Randal, *The Soviet Dream World of Retail Trade and Consumption in the 1930s* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Such a discussion, however, is often missing from the research on post-World War II consumption: Natalya Chernyshova, *Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev*

Era (London and New York: Routledge, 2013); Paulina Bren and Mary Neuburger (Eds.), *Communism Unwrapped: Consumption in Cold War Eastern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

²⁰ Martin Kragh, “The Soviet Enterprise: What Have We Learned from the Archives?” *Enterprise and Society*, 14:2 (2013), 360–94. The most comprehensive account of workings and evolutions of the Soviet industrial enterprise can be found in Donald Filtzer’s works: *Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: The Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928-1941* (London: Pluto Press, 1986), *Soviet Workers and late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), *Soviet Workers and De-Stalinization: The Consolidation of the Modern System of Soviet Production Relations, 1953-1964* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), *Soviet Workers and the Collapse of Perestroika: The Soviet Labour Process and Gorbachev’s Reforms, 1985-1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

²¹ *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR za 70 let. Iubileinyi statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (Moskva: Finansy i statistika, 1987), 486.

²² *Ibid.*, 486.

²³ Julie Hessler, *A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917–1953* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

²⁴ Hessler consulted the archives of the Moscow Central Department Store, and, as she acknowledges, because of its special status, this store “was at best, a distorted “mirror” of Soviet trade” (Hessler, *Social History of Soviet Trade*, 323).

²⁵ Aleksandr Pogrebniak, *Istoriia torgovli sovetskogo perioda. Novye fakty, suzheniia* (Krasnoiarsk: Krasnoiarskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2001).

²⁶ Erik R. Scott, “Edible Ethnicity: How Georgian Cuisine Conquered the Soviet Table,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 13:4 (Fall 2012): 831–58.

²⁷ As in the study of revolutionary experiments in the dining sphere: Mauricio Borrero, “Communal Dining and State Cafeterias in Moscow and Petrograd,” Musya Glant and Jayce Toomre (Eds.), *Food in Russian History and Culture* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 162-176. The problems if not limited to the studies of consumption. Exploring interaction between system’s discourses and people’s language practices Alexei Yurchak neglects the mediating role of Soviet formal institutions, be they administrative bodies, cultural and scientific establishments or economic enterprises: Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

²⁸ Andrew Sloin and Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, “Economy and Power in the Soviet Union, 1917-1939,” 8.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ William H. Sewell, *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), 349.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Sloin and Sanchez-Sibony, “Economy and Power in the Soviet Union, 1917-1939,” 11.

³³ *Ibid.*, 19-20.

³⁴ Donald Filtzer, *Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 41-42.

³⁵ Mark Harrison, “The Soviet Union after 1945: Economic Recovery and Political Repression,” *Past and Present*, 210 (Supplement 6) (2011): 105.

³⁶ Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine (*Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh orhanizatsii Ukrainy*; hereinafter TsDAHOU), *fond* (hereinafter f.)1, *opys* (hereinafter op.) 23, *sprava* (hereinafter spr.) 1278, *arkush* (hereinafter ark.), 13.

- 37 State Archive of Lviv Oblast (*Derzhavnyi arkhiv L'vivs'koï oblasti*; hereinafter DALO), f. 239, op. 1, spr. 1, ark. 3.
- 38 Pogrebniak, *Istoriia torgovli*, 260.
- 39 Shorin, (ed.), *Spravochnik rukovoditelia predpriatiia obshchestvennogo pitaniia*, 324, 326. Z. S. Khodorova, *Finansy pitaniia i ikh rol' v povyshenii effektivnosti otrasli* (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1978), 58-60.
- 40 M. A. Itin and V. G. Sokolov, *Planirovanie roznichnogo tovarooborota i tovarnykh fondov. Posobie dlia rabotnikov oblastnykh i kraevykh torgotdelov* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo torgovoi literatury, 1954), 4-13. Despite all the reforms, the process changed very little, in the mid-1970s, “an existing practice of planning mostly is based on the data about the level of commodity turnover reached and instructions from the superior body on its increase.” A. A. Fedorov, A. B. Vetsner, “V osnovu planirovaniia – normativy,” E. A. Matiushina and M. I. Pleshanova, (Eds.), *Voprosy planirovaniia i ekonomicheskogo stimulirovaniia na predpriatiakh obshchestvennogo pitaniia. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov* (Moscow: Ministerstvo torgovli SSSR, 1973), 14.
- 41 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 4, ark. 4.
- 42 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 2, a. 3.
- 43 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 4, ark. 3.
- 44 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 4, ark. 3.
- 45 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 4, ark. 3.
- 46 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 4, ark. 3.
- 47 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 4, ark. 3.
- 48 Tetiana Dolynians'ka, “Holod v SRSR 1946-1947 rokiv: retrospektyvnyi sotsial'no-politychnyi analiz,” (Avtoreferat dysertatsii na zdobuttia naukovooho stupenia kandydata istorychnykh nauk) (Chernivtsi: Chernivets'kyi natsional'nyi universytet imeni Iuriiia Fed'kovycha, 2006), 13-14. The number of passengers on the Lviv railroad peaked in 1947, and the railroad management identified “speculators” as the main reason behind this boom: Central State Archive of Public TsDAHOU, f.1, op.24, spr.667, a.11.
- 49 Donald Filtzer, *The Hazards of Urban Life in Late Stalinist Russia: Health, Hygiene, and Living Standards, 1943-1953* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 163-204.
- 50 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 1.
- 51 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 4, ark. 4.
- 52 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark.1.
- 53 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 4, ark. 31.
- 54 TsDAVOU), f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 96, ark. 45.
- 55 Pogrebniak, *Istoriia torgovli*, 163.
- 56 Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSR v 1960 godu. Statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1961), 692.
- 57 Boris Gogol', *Obshchestvennoe pitanie v SSSR* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo torgovoi literatury, 1956), 22.
- 58 D. V. Il'iushenko, “Obshchestvennoe pitanie v SSR v 1941-1965 gg.: vector evoliutsii,” *Molodoi uchenyi*, 2 (2015):403.

⁵⁹ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 1.

⁶⁰ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 2.

⁶¹ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 21.

⁶² TsDAVOU, f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 111, ark. 2.

⁶³ Gogol, *Obshchestvennoe pitanie v SSSR*, 24.

⁶⁴ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 21.

⁶⁵ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark.31.

⁶⁶ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 5.

⁶⁷ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 91

⁶⁸ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 33.

⁶⁹ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, a. 42.

⁷⁰ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 48.

⁷¹ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 80.

⁷² DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 5.

⁷³ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 20.

⁷⁴ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 9, ark. 26.

⁷⁵ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 31.

⁷⁶ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 90.

⁷⁷ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 100.

⁷⁸ In 1949, for example, the Lviv trust of eateries fulfilled the turnover plan by 89.4 percent, but its two restaurants achieved only 75 and 76.7 percent of the plan. TsDAVO, f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 160, ark. 9, 16.

⁷⁹ TsDAVO, f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 226, ark. 128.

⁸⁰ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 9, ark. 3.

⁸¹ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 101.

⁸² DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 9, ark. 10.

⁸³ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 91.

⁸⁴ DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 9, ark. 28.

⁸⁵ TsDAVO, f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 185, ark. 30.

86 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 9, ark. 27.

87 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 53.

88 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 9, ark. 9.

89 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 35–36.

90 Gogol, *Obshchestvennoe pitanie v SSSR*, 24. Reports from the Ukrainian SSR's public-catering network offer ample evidence supporting this thesis.

91 TsDAVO, f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 185, ark. 29.

92 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 9, ark. 21. Dilapidated structures were a common feature of city restaurants during that period. In 1951 the Lviv Restaurant was closed for eight months because the building was in a very bad condition, and two other restaurants that year were undergoing major renovations. TsDAVO, f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 226, ark. 128.

93 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 9, ark. 39.

94 Donald Filtzer, *Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II*, 220.

95 Donald Filzer, "Labor Discipline, the Use of Work Time, and the Decline of the Soviet System, 1928–1991," *International Labor and Working-Class History* 50 (Fall 1996):18.

96 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 9, ark. 38.

97 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 29.

98 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 42.

99 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 28.

100 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 8, ark. 30.

101 TsDAVO, f.1, op.77, spr.287, ark.94; DALO, f.239, op.1, spr.18, ark.53-57; DALO, f.250, op.1, spr.15, ark.35-41.

102 DALO, f.572, op.1, spr.14, ark.18.

103 DALO, f.572, op.1, spr.8, ark.40.

104 Tarik Amar, *The Paradox of Ukrainian Lviv*, 177-179.

105 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 17.

106 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 81.

107 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 24.

108 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 87.

109 Calculated on the basis of data found in DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 24, ark. 25; DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 36; and DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 68, ark. 79. It must be noted that these plans are not entirely comparable because of structural changes. Furthermore, since the number of employees grew constantly in the 1950 and 1960s, there is no doubt that the workload per employee was heaviest in the late 1940s.

110 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 81.

111 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 80.

112 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark.24.

113 Julie Hessler, “A Postwar Perestroika? Toward a History of Private Enterprise in the USSE,” *Slavic Review* 57,3 (1998):516-42; Jeffrey W. Jones, “‘Peoples Without a Definite Occupation’: The Illegal Economy and ‘Speculators’ in Rostov-on-the Don, 1943-1948,” Donald J. Raleigh, (Ed.), *Provincial Landscapes: Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917-1953* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 236-254.

114 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 81.

115 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 52.

116 The discussions at the all-Union conference of the “active” railway workers in Moscow in 1954 showed that this was a Union-wide problem. Russian State Archive of the Economy (*Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki*; RGAE), f. 1884, op. 31, d. 12916, l. 58.

117 RGAE, f. 1884, op. 31, d. 12916, l. 91.

118 RGAE, f. 1884, op. 31, d. 12916, l. 112–13.

119 RGAE, f. 1884, op. 31, d. 12916, l. 149.

120 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 46.

121 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 14, ark. 17.

122 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 14, ark. 5.

123 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 55.

124 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 56.

125 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 18, ark. 2.

126 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 23, ark. 26.

127 TsDAVOU, f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 260, ark. 10.

128 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 23, ark. 37.

129 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 24, ark. 25.

130 Kristy Ironside, “The Value of a Ruble: A Social History of Money in Postwar Soviet Russia, 1945-1964” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2014), 86-89.

131 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 23, ark. 4.

132 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 18, ark. 14.

133 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 23, ark. 36.

134 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 23, ark. 36.

135 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 23, ark. 4.

136 Chernyshova, *Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era*, 2.

137 Miriam Dobson, "The Post-Stalinist Era: De-Stalinization: Daily Life and Dissent," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12,4 (Fall 2011):912; Ironside, "The Value of a Ruble," 103-116.

138 TsDAVOU, f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 259, ark. 59.

139 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 31, ark. 97.

140 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 31, ark. 98.

141 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 31, ark. 38.

142 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 31, ark. 67.

143 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 36, ark. 35.

144 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 40, ark. 54.

145 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 40, ark. 54.

146 Chernyshova, *Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era*, 2.

147 Gogol, *Obshchestvennoe pitanie v SSSR*, 24–25.

148 Shorin, (ed.), *Spravochnik rukovoditelia predpriatiia obshchestvennogo pitaniia*, 23-24.

149 Ibid., 44-46.

150 Ibid., 116-17.

151 Ibid., 3-5.

152 Iurii Slyvka et al., (eds.), *Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini. Zakhidni zemli. Dokumenty i materialy t.2 (1953-1966)*, (Lviv: Instytut ukrainoznavstva imeni Ivana Kryp'iakevycha NAN Ukrainy, 1996), 115.

153 Gogol, *Obshchestvennoe pitanie v SSSR*, 25.

154 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 36, ark. 55.

155 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 37, ark. 14.

156 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 36, ark. 30; DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 41, ark. 6.

157 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 36, ark. 55.

158 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 40, ark. 55.

159 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 12, ark. 9.

160 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 36, ark. 61.

- 161 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 40, ark. 32.
- 162 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 36, ark. 32.
- 163 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 36, ark. 61.
- 164 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 36, ark. 99.
- 165 TsDAVOU, f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 295, a. 20.
- 166 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 31, ark. 21–22; spr. 36, ark. 19, 80.
- 167 DALO, f.572, op.1, spr.36, a.80.
- 168 Ibid.
- 169 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 31, ark. 36.
- 170 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 31, ark. 26.
- 171 Ibid.
- 172 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 40, ark. 59–60.
- 173 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 40, ark. 10.
- 174 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 41, ark. 8.
- 175 Shorin, (ed.), *Spravochnik rukovoditelia predpriatiia obshchestvennogo pitaniia*, 278.
- 176 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 46, ark. 50.
- 177 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 46, ark. 50.
- 178 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 46, ark. 51.
- 179 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 46, ark. 50.
- 180 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 46, ark. 51.
- 181 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 46, ark. 5.
- 182 Pia Koivunen, “The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival: Propagating a New, Peaceful Image of the Soviet Union,” Melanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith, *Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev* (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 46-65; Eleonory Gilburd, “The Revival of Soviet Internationalism in the Mid to Late 1950s,” Denis Kozlov and Eleonory Gilburd, (eds.), *The Thaw: Soviet Society and Culture during the 1950s and 1960s* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 375-391.
- 183 Michael David-Fox described similar “showcasing” in the 1920s and 1930s in his: *Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to Soviet Union, 1921-1941* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
- 184 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 49, ark. 4.
- 185 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 49, ark. 55.
- 186 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 49, ark. 3.

187 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 49, ark. 35.

188 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 49, ark. 36.

189 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 49, ark. 54.

190 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 53, ark. 1.

191 TsDAVOU, f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 357, ark. 172.

192 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 49, ark. 54.

193 DALO, f.572, op.1, spr.49, a.58.

194 DALO, f.572, op.1, spr.78, a.32.

195 DALO, f.572, op.1, spr.53, a.1.

196 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 68, ark. 14–15.

197 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 74, ark. 46.

198 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 78, ark. 48.

199 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 74, ark. 29.

200 Oleg Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 295-297.

201 On the wider confusion resulting from these reforms in wider society, including law-enforcement, procuracy and courts: Brian La Pierre, *Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia: Defining, Policing and Producing Deviance During the Thaw* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 100-101.

202 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 58, ark. 33.

203 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 61, ark. 10.

204 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 66, ark. 11.

205 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 68, ark. 81.

206 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 76, ark. 36.

207 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 61, ark. 47.

208 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 31, ark. 96.

209 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 53, ark. 29.

210 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 53, ark. 49.

211 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 58, ark. 37.

212 Per capita consumption of basic foods increased significantly throughout the 1950s, reaching the level of some Western developed countries. Khanin, “The 1950s—the Triumph of the Soviet Economy,” 1196-1197.

213 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 61, ark. 8.

214 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 61, ark. 26.

215 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 61, ark. 46.

216 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 66, ark.1.

217 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 68, ark. 79.

218 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 76, ark. 34.

219 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 78, ark. 54.

220 My own calculation, based on data from DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 13, ark. 54, 87; DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 31, ark. 97.

221 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr.46, ark. 51; DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 68, ark. 79.

222 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 76, ark. 34.

223 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 66, ark. 52.

224 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 68, ark. 79.

225 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 76, ark. 1.

226 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 76, ark. 34.

227 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 58, ark. 10.

228 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 53, ark. 48.

229 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 66, ark. 30.

230 TsDAVOU, f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 533, ark. 73.

231 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 76, ark.16.

232 TsDAVOU, f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 367, ark. 225.

233 TsDAVOU, f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 167, ark. 473.

234 TsDAVO, f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 594, ark. 20–30.

235 Joyce Toomre, “Food and National Identity in Soviet Armenia,” Maria Glants and Joyce Toomre, (Eds.), *Food in Russian History and Culture*, 198.

236 Adrienne Jacobs, “V. V. Pokhlëbkin and the Search for Culinary Roots in Late Soviet Russia,” *Cahiers du monde russe* 54, no.1 (2013):165-86.

237 TsDAVO, f. 4981, op. 3, spr. 505, ark. 197.

238 Ibid.

239 V. P. Urenev, *Arkhitektura predpriatii obshchestvennogo pitaniia* (Kyiv: Budivelnyk, 1981).

240 TsDAVO, f.4981, op.3, spr.566, a.177. Joyce Toomre, "Food and National Identity in Soviet Armenia," 207.

241 Nataliia Lebina, "Plius destalinizatsiia vsei edy: Vkusovye priorityety epokhi skhrushchevskikh reform: opyt istoriko-antropologicheskogo analiza," *Teoriia mody* 21 (Fall 2011), 213-42.

242 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 63, ark. 31.

243 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 66, ark. 30.

244 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 68, ark. 32.

245 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 75, ark. 9.

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250 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 63, ark. 31; spr. 54, ark. 6; spr. 68, ark. 14.

251 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 57, ark. 2.

252 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 58, ark. 12.

253 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 68, ark. 14.

254 DALO, f. 572, op. 1, spr. 76, ark. 35.

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