The November 1964 Decision Reunifying Industrial and Agricultural Organs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Barbara Ann Chotiner

Center for Russian and East European Studies
University of Pittsburgh
Barbara Ann Chotiner is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama. She is the author of Khrushchev's Party Reform: Coalition-Building and Institutional Innovation. Her other publications on Soviet domestic politics and foreign policy include an article in Soviet Union/Union Soviétique and, with John W. Atwell, a chapter in U.S. Occupation in Europe After World War II.

October 1985

ISSN 0889-275X

Submissions to The Carl Beck Papers are welcome. Manuscripts must be in English, double-spaced throughout, and less than 70 pages in length. Acceptance is based on anonymous review. Mail submissions to: Editor, The Carl Beck Papers, Center for Russian and East European Studies, 4E23 Forbes Quadrangle, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., 15260.
Two years after the November 1962 decision to divide the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) into separate industrial and agricultural organs, the new Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership reunited the party. The reorganization was and remains the most fundamental reform of the Soviet political system since the Great Purges. Restructuring the CPSU "on the production principle" had divided party committees below the union-republican level into industrial and agricultural organizations. Raikoms and some gorkoms were abolished; territorial production kolkhoz-sovkhos administration (TPA) party committees and zonal-industrial party committees were established. The CPSU Central Committee (CC) and its union-republican counterparts acquired specialized bureaus to oversee production in the different economic spheres. As a result of the 1962 reorganization, party involvement in the economy became more frequent and more occupied with details of production. Moreover, partkoms' economic interventions became oriented primarily toward development and guidance through the restructuring of productive relationships, introducing new products and technology, and planning.

However, the 1962 party reform was closely identified with Nikita Khrushchev. Little more than a month after his October 1964 removal as First Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), a Central Committee Plenum considered the structure of party and soviet agencies which had been altered in November 1962. The November 16, 1964 Central Committee session decreed the replacement of industrial and agricultural CPSU organs with territorially-based partkoms. The November meeting also ordained the abolition of functional bureaus of the republican Central Committees, TPA partkoms, and zonal-industrial CPSU committees. Raikoms and some gorkoms would be refounded. Of course, the obkoms
and kraikoms comprised the most important segment of the hierarchy to have been split in November 1962 on a production basis and to be reunified along territorial lines.

Rescission of the 1962 bifurcation was the first major policy departure by the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership which presented the change as a consequence of rejecting Khrushchev's primacy and record. In such a context, the reunification of the local party organs may be viewed largely as the completion of unfinished business, a necessary prelude for the leadership's elaboration of its own program and for the struggle for primacy between Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin. As a prelude, perhaps the new regime's reorganization to end reorganizations can be taken for granted. However, the decision of the November 1964 CC Plenum can also be scrutinized to learn about the elite's views concerning the central institution of Soviet politics, the CPSU, at the beginning of an important era of consolidation and incremental change. Information about inputs into and outputs from the November 1964 Central Committee session and their impact provides a baseline for analysis and some idea of the parameters that began to shape the quest for reform in Soviet politics. Moreover, examining the dismantlement of the bifurcation should also provide insight into one of two post-Stalinist cases of fundamental decision-making about the core of the political system, the CPSU, and the role it plays in Soviet society.

Dissenting views about the role of the Communist Party rarely appeared in print during the two years between the November 1962 Central Committee session and Khrushchev's ouster. Between October 14 and the November 16 Plenum, comments about the party's economic functions were rather restricted. What discussion did appear in the press focused upon three topics. These were the relative importance of the Communist Party in Soviet society, the desirability
of active interventionist methods of CPSU supervision over the economy, and the possibility of introducing Libermanism into production administration.

In the pre-Plenum weeks, press commentary described the Communist Party as having all-around salience for the development of socialism in the Soviet Union. Less than a week before the CPSU Central Committee meeting, Pravda stated that "in current conditions... the role of the Communist Party as the leading and directing force in Soviet society is growing immeasurably." Kommunist and Partiinaya zhizn' editorials discussed improved party work in, or greater CPSU answerability for non-economic as well as economic activity. This emphasis on multidimensional CPSU involvement may be read as denying the validity of according primacy to the party's responsibility for creating the base of a more advanced socio-political system. On the other hand, the unprecedented removal of the party leader on October 14 may have raised questions among citizens and elites about the possible erosion of the CPSU's central position and role in the Soviet Union. Ideologists, publicists, and top politicians may have all wished to counter such perceptions.

Yet, political journalists and apparatchiks continued to press the need for concrete, detailed party guidance of economic operations and development. The Partiinaya zhizn' leader sent to press on November 2 argued that opinions are formed "about the revolutionary character of the party, especially if it is ruling, about its ability to provide leadership of society... not only and not so much by its intentions, declarations, manifestos, but most of all by... what practical results it achieves." Kazakhstanskaya Pravda averred that "[n]ow the basic task in the construction of communism is its material-technical base. That is why the party concentrates its forces... on this very important part of the struggle for
Ekonomicheskaya gazeta similarly declared in italics that "the growth of the leading role of the CPSU in all sections of the national economy is inseparably linked with the tasks of the further development of all economic work." Dmitrii Chesnokov opined that "questions of economic construction, of economic-organizational work have occupied a particular place in the activity of the party and state since the first days of Soviet power."

Another editorial in Partiinaya zhizn' specified a number of particular tasks to be undertaken by CPSU organs:

The first line of struggle for the creation of the material-technical base of communism is economics. On the fulfillment of production plans and tasks, the resolution of such concrete, acute problems as the securing of the profitableness of each enterprise, the overcoming of the lag on the part of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, the introduction of new techniques and advanced technology, the raising of the quality of products put out, the systematic introduction into construction of starting objectives and timely achievement of designed capacity are concentrated now in the care of party committees and their leading organs.

Discussion in leading journals and by a leading ideologist suggests that for at least part of the October 14--November 16 period, the reorganization of local party organs was not a closed issue. Certainly the CPSU Central Committee's economic and organizational periodicals would not so forcefully endorse significant economic activity by the partkoms if the Presidium had already irrevocably decided to introduce a reform aimed at making production intervention less salient.
Moreover, reducing party economic involvement seems likely to have been less than popular with CPSU bureaucrats. A number of middle-level functionaries as well as Presidium candidate Petr Ye. Shelest discussed local party work in the press. Although a Secretary of the Tatar Obkom simply noted the increasing significance of "economics" in rural party activity, the First Secretaries of the Irkutsk Gorkom and the Saratov Industrial Obkom went further. They argued that party intervention was essential for good performance by industrial and agricultural establishments. The gorkom official, I. Shiryayevskii, stated that his organization continued to give its attention to "technology [and] the organization of production." Not only the introduction of new production methods and equipment, but also the restructuring of economic relationships within and between factories, construction sites, and farms had assumed greater salience during the years of the CPSU bifurcation. Moreover, Secretary M. Alferov of the Novosibirsk Industrial Obkom continued another practice of this period--the close linkage of ideological activities to economics. In his article, Alferov lamented that some officials responsible for political socialization and the communication of party doctrine seemed oblivious to the effect that their work should have upon output.

Among functionaries who had or would acquire more exalted political status, Vladimir Shcherbitskii also expressed support for a more interventionist style of CPSU oversight. In an article written five days before the November 1964 Plenum, he described the undertakings of the Dnepropetrovsk Industrial Obkom with regard to plant operations, technological improvements, and assessment of manufacturing economics. Nor did his criticisms of local partkoms' activities differ significantly from those made publicly before the ouster of Khrushchev. Petr Shelest, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist
Party, wrote of efforts to improve farming in his republic. In the same paragraph, Shelest mentioned that "[s]pecial attention is being given to raising the role and responsibility of the party organizations." While numerous functionaries seemed to expect that alterations in the objectives and methods of party supervision effected under Khrushchev would continue to be desired under Brezhnev and Kosygin, the Kazakh Central Committee issued an order based on that assumption. A joint postanovlenie of the republican CC and government required the agricultural obkoms to furnish the two bodies with "materials" regarding the improvement of sheep-breeding. Hence, if a decision to return to a territorial basis of party organization had been taken when Khrushchev was removed as CPSU leader, bodies empowered to issue binding orders to top and middle-level apparatchiks seem not to have received the information. Surely the Kazakh Central Committee would not have promulgated a decree which would have to be altered significantly, and functionaries wishing to advance their careers would not have written articles advancing a defunct party line.

Leonid Brezhnev's utterances shortly after the October 1964 CC CPSU Plenum seem, at least partially, to strengthen the reasoning. At a gathering honoring cosmonauts, Brezhnev said that "[t]he party considers the development of the productive forces of our society, the steady raising on this basis of the welfare of the Soviet people, every conceivable development of socialist democracy as its main tasks." While the new First Secretary did not endorse continuing those activities encouraged after November 1962 and did not address the issue of CPSU structure, Brezhnev did seem to underline the primacy of economic responsibilities for the party. Just such an attitude had been at the basis of Khrushchev's CPSU reorganization and would be discredited by a reunification of the local CPSU committees.
Although a rather substantial number of public statements endorsed an interventionist economic role for the partkoms, some suggestions were also made about reducing the organs' involvement. Acceptance of these latter proposals would, of course, weaken the rationale for the continued existence of agricultural and industrial partkoms formed on the "production principle". Some critics simply wanted local apparatchiks to reduce their meddling in manufacturing, construction, and farming processes. Others seemed to believe that Khrushchev's forced retirement had opened the gate for fully reconsidering the utilization of economic rather than positive administrative tools in guiding productive operations.

Khrushchev had forged his coalition favoring approval of the party bifurcation partly on the basis of anti-Libermanism. The day before the First Secretary proposed his scheme for functionally specialized local party organs to the Presidium of the CC CPSU, Professor Yevsei Liberman's article advocating the evaluation of enterprise performance on the basis of profitability was published by Izvestiya. Liberman premised his suggestion upon enterprise managers' gaining increased prerogatives to determine the use of inputs, investments, and product assortments as well as some freedom to make contracts with customers and suppliers. Were the Central Committee and government to adopt his regulations, not only the prerogatives of ministries and state committees vis-a-vis factory, mine and construction trust heads, but also those of local partkoms would be likely to be reduced. Restricting apparatchiks' ability to meddle in production decisions would lessen the chances of enterprise managers having to make these determinations on non-economic conditions and increase the managers' opportunities to maximize plant profitability.
Between publication of Liberman’s ideas and the conclusion of the November 1962 Central Committee Plenum, A. N. Kosygin and other state economic officials favored production administration on the basis of "cost-accounting." Other members of the party and state elite either advocated increased directive rights over enterprises for ministries and state committees or expressed approval of the rights for production involvement gained by the party since 1953. Members of these latter two groupings spoke or wrote favoring the restructuring of party committees "on the production principle," but Kosygin and his associates avoided the subject. While the Presidium decided that profit-oriented methods of economic direction would not be discussed at the November 1962 Central Committee Plenum, that meeting did approve the party bifurcation. Kosygin and other adherents of Libermanism lost political advantages. However, "cost-accounting" did not vanish from the political agendas during Khrushchev’s remaining years in power, since Liberman’s ideas were tested in individual factories.

Among those desiring reduced production involvement by CPSU organs, Latvian party leader Arvid Pel’she condemned "administration." This may well have been a catch-word for detailed CPSU supervision over production and other activities and hence possibly an expression of the desire for a reduced and/or more coordinative and hortatory role for the party in society. Chesnokov urged that "the art of party leadership consists not in this, to do everything itself." Ya. Kronrod, a Doctor of Economic Sciences, granted that "[t]he party has carried out very major measures for the improvement of party and state leadership of the economy." However, he also suggested that development of the economic system had outstripped these ameliorative steps and that new ones were needed. He then added that "[t]he program of our party repudiates bureau-
cratic administration in the economy." Of course, this reference might also apply to CPSU practice under the bifurcation.

Kronrod then continued to advocate aspects of Libermanism. Another article which had championed economic intervention by the CPSU seemed to indicate that such activity might be combined with the use of cost-accounting methods for regulating production. On November 11, Pravda stated that further development required "construction of all our economic and planning activity... on the correct utilization of the economic laws of socialism." The editorial also declared that

[t]he Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government see their duty in this, to improve the leadership of the national economy...

Now, as never before, has grown the role of economic stimuli in the development of production. Not administration, not 'reorganizations' and re-organizations of the economic organs, but... economic levers should induce enterprises better to use production funds, more carefully to spend raw materials..., more quickly to assimilate new technology, to raise the productivity of labor and the quality of production. ...

Just a few days before, on the anniversary of the October Revolution, Brezhnev had made an almost identical statement about the heightened importance of employing economic levers to upgrade productive operations. He argued that such results could not be expected to result from "institutions" or "reorganizations," but the CPSU First Secretary did not mention special responsibilities or aptnesses of party organizations for upgrading farming and manufacturing.
Brezhnev's change of position and the *Pravda* editorial thus seemed to set the stage for the decisions of the November 1964 Plenum—decisions that a significant current of opinion at local levels of the apparatus and in some Central Committee offices seemed to oppose. This disagreement was expressed both before and after the meeting. The proposal to reunify local partkoms, and thus to undercut the structural rationale for CPSU immersion in specifics of production operations and economic development, originated in the Presidium. Nikolai Podgorny, whose remarks in 1962 had marked him as the most wholehearted supporter of the party reorganization "on the production principle," delivered the main speech detailing suggested measures for re-creating CPSU agencies. Peter Reddaway has argued that Podgorny also supervised implementation of the Plenum's *postanovlenie*.

After the decisions of the November 16, 1964 Central Committee meeting were announced, commentary blossomed. Explored were the reasons for the new reorganization of the Communist Party, actual and potential effects of the structural alteration, and its impact upon aspects of the Soviet political system. The press aired opinions while union-republican central committees held sessions to carry out the mandates of the CC CPSU, industrial and agricultural obkoms and kraikoms undertook unification meetings, and revived territorial partkoms convoked their first conferences. These activities took place in late November and in December and affected the official positions of numerous CPSU Central Committee members, who also gained fora in which to express their views. Yet, few high-ranking leaders joined the press discussion. Moreover, there was neither a clear consensus about the relationship of the party reunification to the development and functioning of the CPSU in the Soviet system, nor clearly-drawn
lines of argument. Articles in the same journal did not necessarily represent a single point of view.

Many authors stated categorically that the re-creation of obkoms and kraikoms on the "territorial production" principle would increase the importance of the Communist Party in Soviet society. However, the writers did not agree how this end was to be achieved. The Pravda editorial about the postanovlenie of the November 16 CC CPSU Plenum stated that the bifurcation was being reversed to "strengthen... the leading role of the party in communist construction."35 Two legal scholars, V. Kotok and V. Maslennikov, took a similar line in Izvestiya, as did a contributor to Partiinaya zhizn'.36 These statements could easily be construed that the territorial party committees would continue to play the significant economic role developed for local CPSU organs during Khrushchev's First Secretaryship—or perhaps even to discharge greater economic functions than before. Kazakh party leaders seemed to be urging such an interpretation by repeating the claim in their Central Committee postanovlenie which ratified the decisions of the all-union plenum.37 Kazakhstanskaya pravda was also allowed to publish an unequivocal remark just a few days after the re-creation of unified local partkoms was announced:

Our party is a party of creators, of builders of our society. Economics, the economy were and remain the main things in its [the party's] practical activity for the fulfillment of the basic task expressed in the short and clear formula: all for man, for the welfare of man.38

Most explanations of the outcome of the November 1964 meeting of the CC CPSU stressed an enlarged role for the party in both the economic and non-economic
sectors of Soviet society. A later Pravda editorial mentioned "improve[ment of] party leadership of all parts of the construction of communism." Other organs--Kommunist, Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, Izvestiya, Sovetskaya Rossiya, and Pravda Ukrainy--indicated that enhanced "economic and cultural" functions and problem-solving capabilities for the party should result from reunifying its local organs.

The reader might conclude that the new Leonid Brezhnev-Alexei Kosygin leadership was not mandating more party intervention in concrete productive undertakings. Since other responsibilities seemed enjoined upon apparatchiks as equally important, the aim might well have been more generalized and/or shallower economic involvement.

Public confusion over the appropriate role for the ruling party was compounded by explanations of the reasons for which another reorganization was necessary in a regime that had come to power to end institutional restructurings. Commentators reminded bureaucrats and citizens that the 1962 establishment of industrial and agricultural CPSU committees violated the party statute or decisions of party congresses since the death of Joseph Stalin. Many authors indicated that a major disadvantage of the bifurcation was party officials' and their organizations' becoming too involved in the specifics of production operations and in economic problem-solving. Thus apparatchiks' indulgence in "administration," their "petty tutelage of economic organs and incompetent interference in their activities," CPSU agencies' "duplicating and substitution for economic and soviet organs" were criticized. Several journals noted that activities of the industrial and agricultural partkoms, local soviets, and social organizations like trade unions had "led to the confusion of the[ir] functions, rights, and duties" and those of "economic organs."

12
The argument that local party organs had become too enmeshed in production management and had employed inappropriate methods in trying to realize policy goals was amplified. Izvestiya stated that "the postanovlenie of the [November 1964] Plenum . . . liquidates the splintering and dissociation in the ideological and organizational work of the party committees." Discussing party work after the November session, Pravda editorialized that "in the foreground should be work with cadres, their selection and ideological hardening, the effective verification of fulfillment, living organizational and educational activity among the masses." Other sources manifested similar concerns about deployment and socialization of party members toward the implementation of policy, verification of policy execution, and greater emphasis upon the activities of primary party organizations which exist largely at places of employment. Emphasis was also placed upon mass political work. Hence, authoritative commentators seemed to be arguing for emphasis upon the CPSU's mobilizational and reality-defining functions. Verification of fulfillment can involve CPSU organizations in ordering and overseeing measures so that state and social agencies more satisfactorily achieve already mandated ends. Therefore, the extent to which reduction of the CPSU's managerial functions was desired is unclear. At the least, verification endeavors permit the Communist Party to preserve its leading role by ensuring that the organization's priorities are realized and not subverted.

Other reflections about the importance of the November 1964 CC Plenum evidenced concern with the centrality of the party's goal-setting activity and with its integrating potential. Partiinaya zhizn' noted that before the 1962 division of party organizations on the production principle,
always in the bounds of this or a different administrative unit was a single party organization embracing all the given territory. The party organ in this territory unified, coordinated the activity of all soviet, economic [and] social organizations, led and bore full responsibility for all sides of political, economic, and cultural life. Each party committee in the limits of its territory saw the perspectives of the development of the krai, oblast', or raion, as a whole. . . .

Both the official report and the discussants at the Moscow Oblast' Party Conference stated that the reunification of local partkoms "will permit [them] better to see perspectives of the development of an economic region as a whole." Pravda and Ekonomicheskaya gazeta made similar observations. Z. N. Nuriev, First Secretary of the Bashkir Obkom, pointed out that a territorially-based CPSU organization could utilize the contributions of individuals from a variety of backgrounds.

However, the concern with the party as a focal point for local social processes had a narrower complement: the disquiet over urban-rural relations which opponents of the 1962 CPSU reorganization seemed to have raised. Nuriev claimed that the "general care and reciprocal responsibility of the communists of city and village for the state of the economy of the oblast' [or] krai was reduced as a result of the division of the party organs into industrial and agricultural" agencies. He warned that between November 1962 and November 1964, "here and there began to be shown relapse of a departmental approach to things." His stricture raises the possibility that difficulties in effective cooperation noted elsewhere may have involved problems other than inadequate patronage assistance by
manufacturing establishments to farms. Perhaps some conflicts of interest between agricultural and industrial partkoms had manifested themselves, and the CPSU's capacity to relate social groups to one another had begun to erode.

Some authors related interest in intensified CPSU performance of political functions to demands for reduced involvement in other spheres. These were primarily industrial production and state activity. Kotok and Maslennikov unequivocally stated that the recombining "industrial and agricultural obkoms [and] kraikoms of the party will promote...overcoming...defects of party leadership of the soviets." Since these government agencies have numerous operating responsibilities, the legal specialists may have been suggesting that the Communist Party's integrating functions could be better discharged, if it were not so involved in day-to-day details.

The demand that the party withdraw at least somewhat from the decisional and administrative ambit of a major institutional complex was more emphatically addressed with regard to the economy. Several authors indicated that this could be improved by less party interference. A Secretary of the Moldavian Central Committee cautioned that "little good came" from the rather intensive involvement of the Froletskii TPA Partkom. A Kommunist editorial on "the scientific approach to the economy" included no mention of local partkoms involvement in farming or manufacturing. Several days following the postanovlenie of the November 1964 Plenum, Professor Yevsei Liberman published another explanation of his ideas for improving economic management. Of course, this discussion did not allude to the CPSU at all.

Other appraisals boldly indicated that Libermanist solutions should reduce the party's role. The Izvestiya editorial on the reunification of the party committees and other organizations contended that
In our time, economic stimuli, economic levers acquire especially important significance in the development of production. Exactly they, and not administration, not the reorganization of the organization, define by themselves the success of economic policy.  

In its article about the outcome of the November 1964 Central Committee session, Ekonomicheskaya gazeta made almost the identical point. A week later in the same paper, G. Pravotorov argued that "economic methods of the leadership of production are incompatible with administration" and that "our party decisively rejects the growth of administration, attempts to develop production by means of unending reorganization." Thus, two influential media—one of which was under the control of Alexei Kosygin's Council of Ministers—raised the possibility that undoing the CPSU bifurcation now cleared the way for reforms of economic administration on the principle of profitability.

The contention that authoritative admission of the erroneousness of the party reform meant that both CPSU and state bureaucracies should withdraw from involvement with many operational aspects of enterprise management encountered opposition. Some of the disagreement suggested that not all members of the party elite were even convinced of the advisability of dismantling the agricultural and industrial party organs. Directly addressing the substitution of economic decentralization on cost-accounting principles for CPSU intervention, Ekonomicheskaya gazeta's editorial of November 25 seemed to disagree with the editorial of the previous week. The later piece suggested that with the introduction of economic instruments for regulating production, there would continue to be a role for partkoms:
The use of economic stimuli and levers means the party committees are called upon systematically to study the economy from the point of view of this—how a given section, part, factory, a given branch of production is fulfilling planned tasks, at what cost the plan is being fulfilled, how profitable is this or that output and all production, what reserves are not being used, and is the system of indicators conducive to its improvement? For economic work, it is necessary to involve the broad masses of workers, most of all the bureaus of economic analysis, the social bureaus of the norming of production, etcetera.65

The passage suggests that partkom would continue to interfere in production, though perhaps on the broader social scale than the regime would emphasize. Moreover, the apparent flip-flop on the issue in Ekonomicheskaya gazeta might suggest conflict in the CPSU Central Committee departments overseeing the economy. Kazakhstanskaya pravda also suggested a role for local CPSU organs in helping factories to achieve better economic performance indices.66 Kommunist indicated that "the party and government are taking measures to ensure the broad application of economic stimuli in the development of production."67

Other contributors to the debate indicated skepticism about the importance accorded organizational arrangements in improving production oversight. Sovetskaya Rossiya warned that

the party insistently requires from all party and economic organs, leaders of enterprises daily, persistently to be occupied with economic work. It is necessary firmly to understand: this is not . . . a kind of
reorganization or reconstruction, it is the style, the method of leadership of industry, the means to higher profitableness. . . .

[Italics in original.]

Partiinaya zhizn' and Kommunist both contended that such well-criticized defects as "petty tutelage of economic organs and incompetent mixing in their activity", as well as "administration and commanding" were not necessarily "connected directly with organizational structure." In other words, the two authoritative CPSU journals may have implied that abolishing production-specialized party organs might not have the desired results. Were the magazines' editors also hinting that they--or other influential figures--were not fully in accord with the decision to reunify the industrial and agricultural part-koms?

This question assumes greater significance when the reader ponders discussions of good party work that appeared in national and republican printed media in late November and in December 1964. Regardless of the newspaper's or journal's position(s) on the significance and desired results of re-creating territorial party organs, articles appeared describing, or encouraging, apparatchiks' achievements in terms that would have been appropriate while the bifurcation was in force. Izvestiya seemed to be in the forefront in approving the results of the November 1964 Plenum and maintaining that they would reduce CPSU involvement in day-to-day problems of manufacturing. Yet, the paper admonished that "cadres of the party . . . should go deeply into production, the economy, the achievements of advanced experience, decide practical questions of economic leadership with a knowledge of things, achieving concrete successes in each sector." Kazakhstanskaya pravda warned:
Practice confirms the very simple truth that . . . where party organizations concretely, with a deep knowledge of things lead the economy of their . . . farms, direct them, genuinely mobilize the people for the fulfillment of state tasks, then production matters will go well. . . . On the contrary, perfectly unjustified difficulties have emerged in the sectors which . . . have slipped out of the field of vision of the party organization. . . .

Pravda Ukrainy made a similar claim. Sovetskaya Rossiya editors also seemed to believe that the bifurcation had been a mistake and that the CPSU might withdraw somewhat from economic oversight. Yet the paper indicated that party apparatchiks should be involved in planning at the factory level. They were also to ensure that manufacturing operations incorporated scientific and technological advances, to eliminate waste and increases in the costs of manufacturing, to improve the quality of finished goods, and to make plan fulfillment a major goal of party work.

Sovetskaya Belorussiya indicated that CPSU agencies in the countryside were responsible for the healthy survival of livestock over the winter and for the delivery of agricultural products. The First Secretary of the Leningrad Agricultural Obkom stated that his organization approved a yearly plan for the introduction of innovations on the farms. Pravda pointed to the necessity of CPSU organizations’ "introduction of advanced experience" in the construction field. In late December, Izvestiya described positively the undertakings of the Murmansk Obkom. Members of its bureau visited two mines and the construction site for a concentrating mill. There the bureau held a session and issued directives which "stipulated organizational-technical measures
for acceleration of the tempo of construction work, the extraction of ore, and the output of concentrate."

Beyond approving instances of party supervision in the Khrushchevian vein, national and regional sources maintained that the 1962 reorganization had engendered significant improvements in the functioning of the CPSU apparatus. These newspapers urged that the achievements should be preserved. Pravda cautioned that "it is important to apply everything valuable from the experience accumulated by party organizations . . . even in the last two years." Ekonomicheskaya gazeta echoed the sentiment, but Sovetskaya Estoniya went further. It stated that "there is no doubt as to the fact that the workers of the partkoms . . . created in 1962 carried out great work for the leadership of industry and the development of agriculture." The CPSU organs were also characterized as "having accumulated rich experience concerning the utilization of effective forms and methods of party work" which had not been "fully exhausted."

Hence, the printed media seemed to reflect a degree of confusion over the desired relationships between the CPSU and economic entities. All of the journals seemed to agree that party interference with the details of farm and factory management was appropriate, even necessary, for successful productive performance. Yet some journals, particularly Izvestiya, Sovetskaya Rossiya, and Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, also seemed to favor the use of economic levers as a viable method of guiding production decisions. Since Libermanist solutions usually are viewed as diminishing local CPSU organs' basis for intervening in enterprise activities, the affiliation of two papers with centrally-located government organs is perhaps significant. As the newspaper of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Izvestiya was connected with Premier Alexei Kosygin.
As the organ of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Republic, Sovetskaya Rossiya was linked to the body's chairman, Gennadi Voronov. He, as well as Kosygin, opposed the party bifurcation; but Voronov had favored greater centralization of the state's economic direction. Probably for this reason, Sovetskaya Rossiya seemed to advocate less direct party involvement in production management without espousing a removal of administrative guidance. The less extreme position of Sovetskaya Rossiya may well stem from its being a publication of the CC CPSU. Ekonomicheskaya gazeta's internally contradictory line and more moderate tone may have derived from its being the Central Committee organ for managers, economists and the like.

The positions taken by the Byelorussian, Estonian, and Kazakh newspapers seem to indicate considerable sentiment among some local party organizations for the greater mandate they had enjoyed under the bifurcation to make operative production determinations and to become involved in a wider range of economic activities. Subnational CPSU elites may have viewed the issue as involving more than guaranteeing economic efficacy. These leaders may have believed that the CPSU, as the immediate guarantor of such performance and as a direct guarantor of material welfare, provided bases for citizens' support of the party's central political role. Some of the backing thus gained might not have been available from their agreement with ideological principles. Moreover, the subnational functionaries may have wished for the additional resources, vis-a-vis other elites, that the apparatchiks' expanded rights to intervene in production had provided.

Whatever the case, the expressed doubts about the relationship between disapproved leadership practices and organizational structure as well as concerns that "valuable experience" not be lost seem
to suggest some opposition to the dismantling of production-specialized party committees. Denials that the apparatchiks' usurpation of other officials' functions stemmed from the creation of industrial and agricultural partkoms seemed a clear signal that some CPSU influentials did not see why the structures could not be preserved. Exhortations to continue practices developed over the past two years and continued positive presentation of CPSU committees' desired activities then suggested support for continuing an intrusive party managerial role.

These indications of opposition to the reunification of the partkoms and to making their economic supervision more a matter of establishing policies, setting parameters, and punishing failures appear corroborated by the courses of party meetings and personnel changes made in late November and in December. Perhaps the most striking event was the removal of the First and Second Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. At the same republican Central Committee plenum that provided the reintegration of urban and rural party organizations, D. A. Kunaev replaced I. Yu. Yusupov; and his deputy, M. S. Solomentsev, was removed from his post. The same session also re-established the Alma-Ata Gorkom and declared the continued existence of republican Bureaus for Industry and Agriculture within the republican apparatus to be "inexpedient." CC CPSU Secretary V. N. Titov—rather than the former or the new First Secretary—inform the plenum about the decisions of the all-union Central Committee the previous month. The Kazakh Central Committee session was held December 7 after outspoken articles had appeared in the republican newspaper, and significantly later than Central Committee meetings in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Georgia. The Estonian Central Committee had held its plenum December 2. Yusupov's removal facilitated reinstatement of a long-time Brezhnev
associate who was more likely to be loyal to the new First Secretary of the CC CPSU. While resistance to party reunification is unlikely to have been the sole cause of Yusupov's fate, the delays and negative comments must certainly have facilitated Brezhnev's gaining approval for the personnel changes from the all-union Presidium.

Other indications of lower-level objections appear in reports about the convocation of new, unified party organs and in discussions about the optimal size of the new raikoms. While many reports about unified obkom and kraikom conferences in the Russian Republic were quite perfunctory, accounts of similar gatherings in Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine generally were detailed. Yet rather notable patterns of reporting emerged: organizational bureaus were elected at all unification meetings of the agricultural and industrial obkoms and kraikoms. The bureaus were to prepare for provincial and territorial party conferences in December 1964. Presumably, the orgbureaus would outline the agenda of the conference as well as suggest the composition of the new CPSU committees and their officials. In news articles about party conferences in twenty-eight oblasts of the three non-Russian republics, the chairmen of fifteen orgbureaus were named. Three were not elected first or second secretary of the new territorially-based partkoms. Discussions of five additional party conferences do not mention an orgbureau chairman but do name the individual delivering the main report. All rapporteurs mentioned were elected obkom secretaries. Yet one must ask why neither chairmen of orgbureaus nor rapporteurs were deemed worthy of note in seven cases, and why a major role in reorganizing an areal party apparatus did not lead to an important CPSU post for some individuals. Were they simply the victims of higher party authorities dispensing patronage to their own followers or to these...
politicos' clients? Or, did the failure of election and press mention mean that orgbureau chairmen had been recalcitrant in carrying out the latest reshuffling and that the rapporteurs' explanations had not properly set out the official line?

Some features of the city and raion party conferences in Estonia and Georgia further reinforce such questions. In these republics, there had been no agricultural and industrial obkoms or kraikoms. In the thirteen of eighteen instances in which Sovetskaya Estoniya named rapporteurs to such meetings, these persons were elected First Secretaries of raikoms or gorkoms.\(^{92}\) An instructor of the CC CPSU Party Organs Department attended the conference of the Gurdzhaanai Raion Party Organization, despite the fact that the Second Secretary of the Georgian Central Committee was present and gave a talk.\(^{93}\)

CPSU Central Committee instructors from the Party Organs Department attended three oblast' party conferences in Byelorussia. Republican party secretary P. M. Masherov spoke at all these meetings, one of which was also visited by an "inspector" of the agricultural department of the All-Union Secretariat.\(^{94}\) Had Masherov and Rodionov of Georgia expressed disagreement with the 1964 reunification? Had there been organizational, personnel, or policy problems that made the process especially difficult in the four areas?

Both Kommunist and Partiinaya zhizn' argued that the re-established raions should encompass the areal jurisdictions of the territorial production administrations that were being abolished. Yet, editorial comments in both periodicals suggested that the republican central committees should give serious consideration to the precise size and boundaries proposed to the CC CPSU for individual districts.\(^{95}\) Kommunist mentioned "break[ing] up some raions."\(^{96}\) Its editors thus seemed to be taking a more favorable
position toward the creation of larger numbers of lower-level positions in the apparatus. The number of raikom positions to be abolished with the creation of TPA partkoms and the placement of apparatchiks who resultingingly lost their jobs appear to have been issues in bargaining over the 1962 CPSU reform. In December 1964, Partiinaya zhizn' observed that "as a result of the unification of oblast' and krai organs, some number of workers will be released. It is necessary to achieve, that owing to this, the raion link and lower organs are strengthened." Hence, directives about careful scrutiny of raikom jurisdictions may reflect interest that sufficient numbers of jobs be available for CPSU functionaries displaced by the re-creation of unified party committees.

Such concerns would seem to have resulted from fears that job shuffling for the second time in two years would produce significant dissatisfaction among lower-level party bureaucrats. Izvestiya cautioned that "it is incumbent to relate with all attention to cadres, to their reasonable placement." Both the party theoretical and organizational journals warned, in connection with the personnel changes, against "any weakening of discipline." CPSU leaders may have been worrying about quite a substantial degree of dissatisfaction: Leonid Brezhnev stated that republican central committees, kraikoms, and obkoms had received permission for the establishment of almost one-third more raikoms than there had existed TPA partkoms.

The circumstances under which the Presidium formally recommended reviving territorial party organizations and Podgorny oversaw their re-establishment suggest that the decisions of the November 1964 Plenum many not have been an automatic result of Khrushchev's replacement by Brezhnev. Nor does the postanovlenie of the November Plenum seem likely to have enjoyed universal or overwhelming support. Testifying to this interpretation are the extensive
discussions, before and after the Central Committee session, supporting an interventionist role for the CPSU in the economy as well as the publicly made claims that organizational structure need not have been the cause of overly managerial supervision by local party organs. Other corroborating evidence would seem to be the agenda of the Kazakh Central Committee meeting and the unusual features of party conferences at and below the obkom and kraikom level in the union republics. Brezhnev's apparent change of position from emphasizing the primary economic responsibility of the CPSU to endorsing the use of economic levers, without mentioning the party organs' functions for assuring production development, also seems noteworthy.

This change of expressions between mid-October and early November raises the possibility that ending the bifurcation of the CPSU became one of the matters for discussion and bargaining in setting the agenda of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. It has been argued elsewhere that Central Committee approval for the 1962 CPSU reorganization was gained largely on grounds other than approval for the measure itself. Indeed, a major reason mentioned by many Soviet elite members for originally acquiescing to the bifurcation was their wish to preserve other policy achievements of the years since 1953. Commitment to significant components of this legacy may have made Presidium members view the continuance of novel party structures as an unnecessary symbol or currency of political change. Moreover, the Presidium members might not view functional specialization of party oversight very kindly if, as was rumored, Khrushchev had earlier in 1964 appointed several of his colleagues to a special "Livestock Commission."103

Kosygin's position in the new collective leadership provided him with a good base for gaining a central place on the roster of public discussion for Libermanist reforms. Not only had there been some
mention of this approach after Khrushchev's replacement as USSR Prime Minister and CPSU First Secretary, but Kosygin also raised the subject in his December speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet.\textsuperscript{104} Since party committees for manufacturing and agriculture were established, at least in part, to obviate the possible introduction of cost-accounting methods for managing industry, abolition of these partkoms might have been perceived as necessary to a viable revival of the Libermanist alternative. Press comments after the November 1964 Plenum would seem to support this interpretation.

Yet, the 1963 harvest also made agriculture a problem area of some concern for the Presidium, and Leonid Brezhnev was later to make the "line of the March 1965 Plenum" an important element of his claim to having improved the Soviet society and economy. Kirill T. Mazurov said that, following the November 1964 Central Committee session, the Presidium began working on the agricultural program approved in March.\textsuperscript{105} Perhaps some trade-off involving new agricultural programs and progress on the improvement of industrial administration also incorporated abolition of party bifurcation—a reform few members of the elite seem to have valued on its own merits. Too, an exchange of this sort also had the advantage of restoring many Central Committee members who had become First Secretaries of agricultural obkoms and kraikoms to the headship of unified party committees.\textsuperscript{106} These restored positions placed the first secretaries in a less equivocal situation vis-a-vis election to the next CPSU Central Committee at the Twenty-Third Party Congress. Apparatchiks likely to be thus advantaged may have received satisfaction in patronage terms that compensated, at least to some degree, for concern over the actual power that CPSU officials would wield in the future.

Perhaps an extension of this trade-off accrued to members of the party elite through Brezhnev's
"stability of cadres" policy. However, to the extent that the 1964 agricultural program and the introduction of profitability-based industrial administration resulted from an exchange involving re-creation of unified party organs, implementation of these economic policies might have been affected by feelings and beliefs about the CPSU. Nikita Khrushchev's tenure as party First Secretary had been marked by an expansion of the CPSU's responsibilities and capabilities to enforce binding decisions, especially in the economy. Establishment of production-oriented part-koms at the November 1962 CC CPSU Plenum as well as the decisions of the December 1953, July 1955, and March 1962 CC meetings and the sovnarkhoz reform had been milestones in this development of the party's roles. Discussion before and after the November 1964 Plenum indicated continued support for some kind of party intervention in agriculture and industry. This backing was indicated not only by middle-level CPSU officials but even writers advocating a reduced economic role for the central political institution in the Soviet Union. Efforts to circumscribe apparatchiks' prerogatives in relation to the creation of the country's economic base might be hampered by several factors. Of course, Politburo members with political bases in the CPSU apparatus might have to consider that acquiescence to such alterations might be unpopular with the leaders' institutional constituencies. Defending their authority, local CPSU bureaucrats might also use their remaining powers to undermine the reforms.107

Another impediment to change in the Soviet system after the removal of Khrushchev might have been the lack of agreement on crucial issues such as the appropriate role for the party in administration and the relationship between organizational structure and performance. Such disagreement manifested itself in discussion of the abolition of agricultural and industrial party committees. Institutional altera-
tion had been a frequent tool for policy improvement in the Soviet Union, as in many other political systems. Disagreement about the relationship between ends and means makes the tool more difficult to use, without even taking into account the problems introduced by the unintended consequences of program and organizational change. Policy-makers must not only consider substantive and procedural questions, but also the nature of relationships between the two. Since the Communist Party began to develop an administrative role in Lenin's time, lack of agreement, among political influentials, on this matter poses further problems for reform. Proposals that would alter the CPSU's regular activities and/or the party's relationships to other institutions may pose "constitutional" questions to be solved, too.
NOTES


3. Institut Marksizma-leninizma pri TsK, KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"ezdov, konferentsii, i plenumov TsK (Moscow: Izdatel' stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1972), 8: 495-496. (Hereafter this work will be cited as KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh.)


5. For a discussion of this concept, see Thane Gustafsson, Reform in Soviet Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982); and Timothy J. Colton, The

6. The author's statement for the first period is based upon reading all or selected issues of fourteen newspapers and journals published from November 23, 1961 to October 14, 1964. These printed sources are Agitator, Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, Izvestiya, Kazakhstananskaya pravda, Kommunist, Kommunist Yerevan), Leningradskaya pravda, Partiinaya zhizn', Pravda, Pravda Ukrainy, Pravda vostoka, Sel'skaya zhizn', Sovetskaya Rossiya, and Zarya vostoka. A number of books were also examined: V. V. Anikin, et al., O edinstve ideologicheskoi i organizatorskoi raboty (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1962); Yu. V. Arutyunyan, V soyuze edinom (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Znanie," 1973); Evgenii Iosifovich Bugaev, Nasha leninskaya partiya (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1963); idem. and Boris Moiseevich Leibzon, Besedy ob ustave KPSS, 2nd ed., rev. and enl. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1964); D. I. Chesnokov, et al., eds., Nekotorye aktual'nye voprosy Marksistko-leninskoi teorii (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo "Vysshaya shkola," 1963); I. I. Groshev, M. L. Kareлина, and K. I. Suvorov, Vospitanie kommunicheskoi soznatel'nosti (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury "Mysl'," 1964); M. P. Karpov and V. M. Zasorin, Pochizdniy v tipografii, Novoe v zhizni, nauke, tekniike, Series I, No. 13 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Znanie," 1963); Mikhail Il'ich Moiseev, KPSS--Organizator moshchnogo pod'ema sel'skogo khozayastva v period razvernytnogo stroitel'stva kommunizma (Moscow: Rosvuzizdat, 1963); D. I. Nadtocheev, M. L. Kareлина, and S. P. Mezentsev, eds., Partiinye organizatsii v bor'be za pod'ema promyshlennosti v gody semiletki (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo VPSh i AON pri TsK KPSS, 1963); V. N.


16. Shiryaevskii, "Tselustremlennost' i delovitost," Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, No. 43 (1964), 8. The quoted phrase was printed in italics in the original.


18. V. Shcherbitskii, "Opirayas na initsiativu i opyt mass," Pravda, 11 November 1964, 2. For a short
comment about negative assessments of parkoms' economic oversight, see Chotiner Khrushchev's Party Reform 264-265.


27. Ibid.


32. "Povyshat’ rukovodyashchuyu rol’ i boesposobnost’ partii," 3; Chotiner, Khrushchev’s Party Reform, 150.


34. Institut Marksizma-leninizma pri TsK, KPSS v rezolvutsiyakh, 8:496; "Povyshat rukovodyashchuyu rol’ i boesposobnost’ partii: Ob Ob”edinenii promyshlennykh i sel’skich oblastnykh, kraevykh partiinykh organizatsii i sovetskich organov," Kommunist, No. 16 (1964), 8; "V interesakh dela," Partiinaya zhizn’, No. 23 (1964), 3; Izvestiya, 25 November 1964, 3, 8 December 1964, 3; Pravda, 20 November 1964, 2, 29 November 1964, 2, 30 November 1964, 2, 2 December 1964, 2, 5 December 1964, 2, 6 December 1964, 2; Sovetskaya Rossiya, 20 November 1964, 2, 16 December 1964, 1, 17 December 1964, 1, 23 December 1964, 1, 25 December 1964, 1, 27 December 1964, 1; Sovetskaya Estoniya, 1 December 1964, 1, 12-30 December 1964; Zarya vostoka, 27 November 1964, 1, 29 December 1964, 2; Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 8 December 1964, 1, 15 December 1964, 2, 22 December 1964, 1, 29 December 1964, 2, 31 December 1964, 2; Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 22 November 1964, 1, 25


41. See, for example, "Prodiktovano zhizn'yu, resheno po-leninski," Izvestiya, 19 November 1964, 1; "Vernost' leninskom zavetam: S Moskovskoi oblastnoi


45. "Vernost' leninskom organizatsionnym printsipam," Pravda, 18 November 1964, 1.


48. Ibid., 5.


54. Ibid.


64. Alexei Adzhubei had been purged as editor of the paper by the time of the November 1964 CC Plenum. See Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin, trans. Helen Katel (New York: The Viking Press, 1969), 407n.


70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., 9; "V interesakh dela," Partiinaya zhizn', No. 23 (1964), 7.

72. For a description of the production-oriented efforts of party officials and their committees between November 1962 and November 1964, see Chotiner, Khrushchev's Party Reform, 215=236, 243-265.


85. This author has argued that party economic involvement was more intensive and affected a broader range of economic functions between November 1962 and November 1964 than before the bifurcation. See Ibid., 215-236, 243-264 passim.

86. "Postanovl enie XI p l enuma TsK Kompart i i Kazakhstan ob itogakh Noyabr'skogo plenuma TsK KPSS," Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 8 December 1964, 1; "Informatsionnoe soobshchение о plenumе Tsentral'nogo komiteta Kompartii Kazakhstana," Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 8 December 1964, 1; "Plenum TsK Kompartii Kazakhstana," Izvestiya, 8 December 1964, 3.


94. I. Mostkov and Ye. Zhukovskii, "Zhivotnovodstva--vazneishii uchastok: S Goimel’skoi oblastnoi partiinoi konferentsii,” Sovetskaya

42


96. Ibid.

97. Chotiner, Khrushchev’s Party Reform, 134.


103. Tatu, Power in the Kremlin, 397 and 397n.

105. Kommunistcheskaya partiya Sovetskogo soyuza Tsentral'nyi komitet, Plenum Tsentral'nogo komiteta Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soyuza: Stanograficheskii otchet (24-26 marta 1965 goda), 73.


107. Joel Moses noted the significance of "horizontal conflict" in this case of the 1964 reunification of the local party organs, when he commented on an earlier version of this study at the 1984 Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.
The Carl Beck Papers
Recent Publications

#301 Roberta T. Manning, Government in the Soviet Countryside in the Stalinist Thirties: The Case of Belyi Raion in 1937. $4.50

#305 Marshall Shatz, Stalin, the Great Purge, and Russian History: A New Look at the "New Class". $4.50

#401 Jonathan Harris, After the Kratkii kurs: Soviet Leadership Conflict over Theoretical Education, 1956-1961. $4.50

#402 R. Craig Nation, Soviet Conceptualizations of the Iranian Revolution. $5.00

#403 William Husband, Workers' Control and Centralization in the Russian Revolution: The Textile Industry of the Central Industrial Region, 1917-1920. $5.00

#404 Vladimir Shlapentokh, Evolution in the Soviet Sociology of Work: From Ideology to Pragmatism. $5.00

#405 David Kemme, The Real and Monetary Impacts of Exogenous Economic Disturbances Upon Centrally Planned Economies: With an Application to Poland. $5.00

#406 Zbigniew Fallenbuchl, The Balance of Payments Problem and the Economic Crisis in Poland. $5.00