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REVOLUTION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Russian Poland 1905-1906

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A. INTRODUCTION

Revolution broke out in the Russian Empire in early 1905 and quickly encompassed both the Russian core and the national minority areas along the empire's borders. Strategically located on Russia's most western flank, the Kingdom of Poland witnessed intense revolutionary activity-- in the cities and in the countryside. The outlines of urban events in Russian Poland in the Revolution of 1905 are quite well-known, those of the rural areas less so. The purpose of this essay is to discover what was revolutionary about events in the Polish countryside in the years 1905-1906-- and what was not.

Definitions of revolution have varying degrees of correspondence with historical reality, debates over such definitions seldom yield consensus and extensive discussions of the concept are generally not very rewarding. Still, a working definition of revolution-- or at least of "revolutionary" is needed. For this paper revolutionary events are defined as attempts to introduce radical, abrupt changes into existing basic social, economic and/or political relationships. It is important to see whether specific developments were in themselves revolutionary and what role, if any, they played in an aggregate, macro-revolution. For rural Poland in the years 1905-1906 six issues lend themselves especially well to the search for answers to the above questions. These issues are: local leadership conflicts; community action; vigilantism; servitudes; agricultural strikes; and the Mariavite movement. To understand these issues it is necessary to briefly describe the emancipation of the peasants in 1864-- and subsequent changes in rural society and the rural economy-- and the nature of authority relationships in the countryside.

B. EMANCIPATION AND RURAL CHANGE

The structure of rural society deriving from the emancipation of 1864 and the gradual changes introduced thereafter had an important influence on rural developments. Even though unsuccessful, the January Uprising in the Kingdom of Poland

(1861-1863) lent urgency to proposals for emancipation there that became part of the broader package of rural reforms introduced in the Russian Empire in the 1860s. Through the March, 1864, emancipation decree applied to the Kingdom of Poland, the Russian government intended to punish the Polish nobles, crush their rebellious spirit and neutralize the peasantry. This led to more favorable terms for the peasants in Russian Poland than for peasants in the rest of the empire. Emancipation granted the peasants ownership of the land they had worked as of 1846, thus modestly increasing the average size of a peasant holding by 5-8%. In addition, land was granted to some 140,000 landless peasants, raising the number of holdings to 678,000. Lands granted to peasants through emancipation could be inherited or purchased only by peasants and from 1891 peasant holdings could not be divided into plots of less than 8-1/2 acres. Emancipation thus gave peasants 43.5% of the land and left the nobles with the remaining 56.5%. The nobles were compensated for their loss of land through a public loan raised through liquidation notes. The rural Polish population, both peasants and nobles, were to repay the loan through an additional land tax levied against all landholders. This special land tax remained in effect after the liquidation bonds were paid off and by 1915 had brought 115,000,000 rubles into the Russian treasury. Emancipation also continued the system of strip holdings and even expanded it through the granting of new holdings composed of scattered strips.[1] Finally, the agreement left some peasants with servitudes (*serwituty*)-- rights to use certain pastures, forests and bodies of water belonging to landed estates (see Section G). Thus the politically-motivated emancipation created a class of peasant landholders, weakened the economic and political position of the Polish nobility and perpetuated backward agrarian techniques.

Between emancipation and the revolution, the structure of land-holding changed in three major ways: peasant land ownership increased at the expense of the nobility; the number of "dwarf" holdings (farms of four acres or less) was reduced; and the average size of holdings decreased. Peasants increased the amount of land they owned through the facilities of the

Table 1: Pattern of Peasant Land Holding, 1866-1914

Size in Morgs	1866	1870	1899	1904	1914
Under 3	23%	22%	15%	16%	19%
3 - 15	37%	41%	45%	66%	54% (3-12)
					16% (12-20)
Over 15	41%	38%	41%	19%	11% (over 20)

Source: Regina Chomac', *Struktura agrarna Krolestwa Polskiego na przelomie XIX i XX w* (Warsaw, PWN 1970), 166-167.

Peasant Land Bank. Peasant holdings increased from 7.9 million *morgs* (approximately 11,000,000 acres) in 1864 to 10.7 million *morgs* (approximately 15,000,000 acres) in 1909, an increase of 36%.[2] Twenty-one percent of the increase came from the settlement of servitudes and 79% from land purchases. By 1909 peasants owned 70% of all agricultural land in the Kingdom of Poland, a significant shift in land ownership.[3] By 1914, the Peasant Land Bank, primarily selling to landless peasants who were probably the sons of well-to-do peasants, created 26,000 new holdings on 667,000 acres of land.[4]

The structure of peasant holdings changed considerably in the four decades after emancipation. Table 1 shows the pattern of peasant land holding, indicating changes over time by size of holding. The data suggests that up to about the time of the revolution the number of "dwarf" holdings was declining slightly and that the decline in the average size of holdings came about largely through the subdivision of large and middle-sized farms. In the decade before the revolution the pattern began to reverse itself somewhat, with a trend toward an increase in both "dwarf" and large holdings.

Table 2: The Rural Economy, 1863-1907

	Agricultural Production (in millions of grain units)	Productivity per hectare of agricultural land (in grain units)	Productivity per person living from agriculture (in grain units)
1863	49.0	6.3	13.1
1870	51.7	6.4	11.4
1881	68.1	8.3	12.8
1888	88.1	9.0	12.9
1899	89.7	9.8	12.5
1907	107.9	11.7	13.4

Source: Irena Kostrowicka, "Changes in Agricultural Production in the Kingdom of Poland in the XIXth and Early XXth Centuries," *Journal of European Economic History* 13 (1-1984), 78, 80.

If peasant landholders were the largest group within the Polish peasantry, agricultural laborers and landless peasants (many of them the adult sons of peasant holders) were a large minority whose numbers were increasing rapidly. (See Section H.) The number of landless peasants grew from 220,000 in 1870 to 1,200,000 in 1901.[5]

The petty gentry (*drobna szlachta/szlachta zagonowa*) formed the other major rural social group. An intermediate group between the estate-owning nobility and the peasants, at the turn of the century they owned 6% of the land, concentrated in northern and northeastern Poland, in the provinces of Lomza (33% of the land), Plock (16%) and Siedlce (13%). The rapid expansion of petty gentry land (an 86% increase between 1864

Table 3: The Rural Economy, 1899-1907

[*per annum* increases, in percent]

Gross Production	2.5
Productivity of Land	2.5
Labor Productivity	0.9
Cropland	0.7
Cereal Yields	2.1
Potato Yields	2.7
Animal Products	1.0
Rural Population	1.8
Rural Population per 100 *hectares* of agricultural land	1.4

Source: Kostrowicka, 95.

and 1894), stabilized thereafter. Denied access to community savings funds and unable to use the Peasant Bank, the increasingly numerous petty gentry ran into economic difficulties. Increased crowding led to expanded emigration, primarily to large cities and their immediate suburbs.[6] Increased economic difficulties were translated into strong petty gentry support for Polonization and national liberation. In general, the existence of a sizeable petty gentry stratum acted as a buffer between the nobility and the peasantry and reduced economic conflict between these two principal rural groups.

The rural economy expanded substantially from emancipation to the First World War (see Table 2), though there were periods of declining growth rates and depression. Agricultural stagnation, despite major increases in cropland, was the principal initial consequence of emancipation. Reorganization of land holding and uncertainty over the future were chiefly

responsible for this agricultural depression that lasted until the 1870s. During the 1870s agriculture recovered due to increased emphasis on livestock production, reduction of fallow and increased use of forms of crop rotation without fallow. Later in the 1880s, Polish agriculture was squeezed by German and Russian protectionist agricultural policies, including two German protective tariffs which virtually eliminated Polish grain exports to Germany and differential railroad tariffs in the Russian Empire which promoted the importation of large quantities of Ukrainian grain and flour into the Kingdom of Poland. However, increased domestic demand associated with rapid industrialization and urbanization partially offset the impact of foreign protectionism.

Despite a series of natural disasters-- harsh winters, heavy rains, flooding and droughts-- from 1900-1904-- the years 1899-1907 saw strong increases in agricultural productivity. (See Table 3.) Overall production grew 20%. Grain and potato production and productivity increased at a much faster rate than did animal production. Cereal yields per acre increased 31% between 1881 and 1911/1913 and potato yields by 56%. Even with crop production increasing at a rate of over 2.5% per year, the Kingdom of Poland remained a net importer of grain, largely because of increased demand coupled with slow increases in grain productivity. Expansion of the dairy industry was the sole bright spot in animal production.[7]

According to the most recent analysis of the rural economy of the Kingdom of Poland, "agricultural progress was realized through better utilization of land resources and improved cultivation methods, but technologies remained labor intensive."[8] Production was increased in part by transferring increasing amounts of uncultivated land into crop land. Fallow as a proportion of arable land decreased from 22% in 1881 to 6% in 1911/1913. Pastures were also transformed into crop lands, as crop rotation without leaving part of the land fallow became more common and increased fertilization, including the beginnings of the use of chemical fertilizers, became necessary.[9]

A modest move toward agricultural modernization also fueled the rural economic growth. The expansion of

agricultural education, beginning with the establishment of a "gardening school" in Pszczelin near Warsaw in 1879, primarily trained estate owners and managers. However, from the late nineteenth century on, the establishment of Pszczelin-type schools made agricultural education available to a number of peasants. Rural publications, especially *Gazeta Swiateczna* (*The Sunday Gazette*), also fostered the spread of agronomic knowledge among the peasants. From the early 1800s the government began to introduce scientific management techniques for the forests which had been disastrously overused since emancipation. Finally, consolidation of land holdings continued, with 40% of peasant land consolidated by the end of the nineteenth century, up from 7% at the time of the emancipation.[10] Occurring largely through sales and purchases rather than through trading strips, consolidation was part of the complex pattern of increased land purchases that characterized rural Poland at this time.

Irena Kostrowicka's recent portrait of the rural economy is at odds with many earlier surveys that suggested that on the eve of the Revolution of 1905 the rural economy of Russian Poland faced serious problems. Clearly the value of agricultural production was growing at a much faster rate than the rural population. The population-to-land ratio rose more quickly than did the increase in cropland, suggesting that the increased wealth was unevenly distributed. However, the slowing of the growth rate for cropland may very well reflect a rural economy moving toward population saturation with fewer opportunities for continued expansion of cropland. The data may also be a statistical distortion. The .7% increase in cropland in 1899-1907 is derived from a much larger base than earlier cropland growth rates and represents a 6% increase in total amount of cropland. In addition, subtracting the number of seasonal migrants from the total rural population would effectively reduce the size of the rural population, meaning that, in reality the effective increase in the rural population was much less than the 1.4% *per annum* calculated by Kostrowicka.

Given local variations in factors such as quality of soil, access to markets and transportation, extent of agricultural

modernization and type of agriculture, macro-level generalizations about agricultural development hide the "losers"; i.e., those rural residents, irrespective of class, whose economic position was not improving. However, given the state of Polish economic history, it is not yet possible to identify the "prospering" and the "suffering." Nor can one be sure how extensively prosperity was shared.

In general, it would appear that the vast majority of rural residents witnessed at least modest improvements in living standards in the decade before the revolution. This may help to explain why, on the one hand, peasants displayed little animosity toward the gentry and why a gentry-peasant alliance could be formed during the revolution, and, on the other hand, why the peasants were willing to and able to play an active role in the revolution.

C. STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY

Authority was exercised by several parallel, yet often competing, hierarchies, all unified in the office of Warsaw Governor-General (hereafter referred to as GGW). Integrated into the civilian bureaucracy was the police force, with its rural center of gravity at the county level, where police officers were directed by the Chief Land Guard of the County. The counties were subvided into police circuits. A third hierarchy consisted of the *gendarmerie*, whose director was the GGW's Aide for Police Affairs. Subordinate to the aide were provincial *gendarmerie*, district *gendarmerie* that covered several counties each and several circuit *gendarmerie* agents operating within each district. Finally, there existed in rural Poland the Commissariat for Peasant Affairs, with provincial, county and circuit level organizations. The office was originally created to carry out emancipation terms and to settle subsequent economic disputes between nobles and peasants. However, the circuit-level commissars increasingly neglected seemingly less important and certainly less exciting tasks, such as land surveying and listening to insoluble arguments between nobles and peasants over tiny bits of land,

and turned to "police" work, especially opposition to illegal rural political activity.

Russian officials at all levels tended to hold similar attitudes toward the exercise of authority in rural Poland. Viewing the Polish countryside as a lesser threat than the cities, the government assigned a lower priority to the maintenance of order in rural areas. Since in the countryside both the state and the citizenry lacked the concentrated power available in the cities, the government was more willing to use persuasion without fear of being considered too weak. At the same time government forces frequently lacked the manpower to employ any other method. Further, Russian attitudes toward Poland were still based on the increasingly outdated idea that a pro-peasant and anti-gentry policy would minimize the dangers of insurrection in the countryside by undermining gentry power and preventing the formation of a unified coalition against the Russian government. Finally, government officials, especially those in higher offices, generally view every illegal act as a political crime.

In addition to a Russian governmental system radiating out from the center,there was a structure of rural self-government. The smallest unit, composed exclusively of peasants, was the village (*gromada*), whose chief executive officer was the elder (*soltys*), elected from among and by those peasants possessing at least three *morgs* (4.2 acres) of land. Several villages plus estate lands and non-peasant settlements formed a community (*gmina*).[11] The community assembly, composed of all adult male owners of atleast three *morgs* of land, elected a mayor (*wojt*) from among owners of at least six *morgs*, a clerk (*pisarz*) and two plenipotentiaries (*pelnomocnicy*), one of whom was usually a nobleman and the other a peasant. The elders were subordinate to the mayor, who usually left day-to-day administration in the hands of the clerk. At quarterly meetings the rural populace elected community officials and decided issues affecting community life, such as education, welfare and, especially, the distribution of the tax burden.

However, Russian authorities limited rural self-government in part out of a fear that the Polish gentry might try to use the community structure as a base for a return to power and in

part because of the government's bureaucratic penchant for uniformity. The most important superviser of rural government was the county chief, who could set aside the results of community elections and order new ones, suspend officials, declare community decisions invalid and convene new community assemblies, at which the peasants were expected to rescind the previous "unacceptable" decisions. The presence of the county chief and a few landguards at community assemblies frequently induced the peasants to act in the prescribed way.

In the countryside the outbreak of the revolution led to the temporary collapse of government power, to extensive questioning of Russian authority and to overt efforts to modify political power relationships within Poland. At times it appeared that no one had any authority, as the Russian government dropped the reins of power and the Poles were unable to grasp them securely.

Eventually Russian officials came to realize that the restoration of authority was essential to the reestablishment of order. Both Russian and Polish sources attest to the incompetence of local officials and the ineffectiveness of local government, a situation eventually remedied by the use of large numbers of soldiers as a security force. Officials complained of the disintegration of their own authority and that of their subordinates. Warsaw Governor Martynov wrote to GGW Maksimovich:

> During the last half year the peaceful flow of peasant life has been interrupted, the authority of the government has been undermined to a considerable degree, laws and government regulations are ignored, person and property are not protected.[12]

The revolution quickly demonstrated the failure of local government. Suwalki Governor Stremoukhov reported that in the fall of 1905 government ceased to function outside of county seats.[13] The Kielce County Chief, Girillovich, admitted in late spring, 1906 that county officials were helpless to combat robberies and armed attacks. Earlier he had reported that he had ordered landguards pulled back into Kielce because rural

Poles simply disarmed them.[14] If the landguards were ineffective and too weak to maintain order, it seemed better to withdraw them, so that the Poles would not realize the government's powerlessness.

Especially subject to incapacity were the local police. Several conditions had led to the weakening of their ability to deal with rural unrest. In Poland there were too few police and landguards to adequately conduct security tasks. In the Polish Kingdom, with a population of 10,438,585 in 1906, there were only 3,378 landguards.[15] On the basis of the 1892 formula of one landguard for each 2,500 rural "souls," there should have been 4,500 landguards in Poland.[16] Recognizing the need for a "richer" formula during a period of revolution, in April, 1906 Interior Minister Durnovo suggested the need for increasing the number of landguards in Poland to 5,700, at a cost of over 700,000 rubles.[17] Having failed to budget sufficient funds for an adequate police system in Poland prior to 1904, the Russian government reaped a dry harvest of thistles during the revolution, as local law enforcement disappeared almost completely, eventually to be replaced by the Russian army.

Emphasizing that it was essential to utilize the military to maintain order, officials foresaw two different strategies for rural Poland: to use military patrols as a means of providing frequent surveillance and of demonstrating the government presence; and to disperse the military in small units throughout Poland. Typical of the first approach was Chelm County (Lublin Province) Chief Khrustsevich's organization of regular Cossack patrols of estates at the time of the spring, 1905 agricultural strikes.[18] The second method was largely a response to the unwillingness of peasants to obey local Russian officials. Thus troops were quartered among recalcitrant villagers, who quickly found the costs of housing the soldiers, as well as their oppressive presence, sufficiently burdensome to induce them to fulfill legal obligations and to pledge to obey the law in the future.[19]

To conclude, the revolution demonstrated the inability of local authorities to maintain order and halt the revolutionary movement. The failure was due to the insufficient amount of

power that the government could mobilize for use in the countryside, the inaccurate Russian perceptions of rural Poland, inept Russian leadership at the local level and the strength of the Polish challenge.

D. LOCAL LEADERSHIP

The struggle between Russian authority and the Polish countryside is relatively easy to document. However, another set of less evident political conflicts occurred within Polish communities and villages. The revolution in rural Poland was not only a protest against Russian authority but represented a challenge to the local Polish authority structures as well. Within the community the struggle for authority passed through two phases: late 1904 to early 1905, when the basic conflict was between those who supported the Russian government, at least tacitly, and those who openly opposed it; and autumn 1905 to early 1906, when the residents of each community were essentially united against Russian forces.

The most important arena of conflict was the community government itself. In large measure, both the community residents and the Russian government recognized the importance of institutionalized power and sought to ensure that those individuals who held community offices were loyal-- either to the Russian government or to the community. Russian officials tried to control the electoral process by refusing to confirm in community offices persons of doubtful loyalty and to pressure elected officials to conform to government dictates. When community officers began to support the Polonization movement (the broad movement to remove Russian linguistic, cultural and institutional influences and replace them with Polish ones) the Russian government found itself in a quandary: to remove the mayor meant either to turn over his duties to the candidate mayor, who, more than likely, was even more pro-community action, or to hold new elections, which would surely bring to power the community "radicals." For the government the only solution seemed to be to use force and to

Table 4: Composition of Community Leadership

Category	X.1904-III.1905	X.1905-III.1906	Change in Percent	Overall Participation
Urbanites	2.9%	6.5%	+3.6	4.7%
Community Officials	14.1%	22.5%	+8.4	19.0%
Nobility	25.7%	15.7%	-10.0	21.4%
Peasants	33.1%	23.7%	-7.4	27.9%
Intelligentsia	1.0%	6.0%	+5.0	3.6%
Miscellaneous and Unidentified	23.3%	25.8%	+2.5	24.2%
Peasants and Presumed Peasants	56.2%	49.2%	-7.2	51.5%

Source: See Note 22

ignore the community government as much as possible in carrying out decisions.

Local residents who supported "community action," especially in late 1904 and 1905 when community officials seldom favored Polonization, also found themselves in a quandary. Community self-government was a major aim of community action and this implied accepting the results of democratic elections (and the mayors had been elected by their peers). Thus the activists had simultaneously to demonstrate their faith in self-government and prevent elected community officials from damaging the Polonization movement. The supporters of community action solved the problem by emphasizing the role of other community officials, especially the plenipotentiaries and the village elders. Frequently

plenipotentiaries and elders led the campaign for Polonization and came to be viewed as trusted "experts," men with considerable knowledge, experience and political skill, and thus capable of providing leadership in the struggle for self-government.[20] A number of assembly resolutions authorized an expansion of the role of the plenipotentiaries and elders, making them responsible for ensuring that the Polonization resolutions were carried out, preventing the mayor and clerk from acting in an arbitrary and illegal manner and communicating to higher officials the decisions of community assemblies.[21]

The mayor also found himself in a very delicate situation. If he did not support community action he would lose "legitimacy" in the eyes of his fellow residents, but if he supported Polonization he might be dismissed, fined or even jailed. In the early phase of the revolution the mayor usually supported the status quo. But by the fall of 1905 the mayor had become a leader of the community movement; perhaps in order to regain the power which had slipped into the hands of the proponents of community action, perhaps because he was no longer frightened of Russian officials. In the first intense phase of community action (fourth quarter, 1904 to first quarter, 1905) mayors comprised only 2% of the leaders. (See Table 4 for a less detailed analysis.)[22] In the early period of the revolution, most community leaders came from within the communities and were, for the most part, peasants, nobles or community officials, especially plenipotentiaries (5.7%) and elders (4.3%). Outsiders (including persons who were not members of the *gmina* as a political institution but who might very well be residents of rural society), whether priests, teachers, students or urban agitators, were seldom identified as playing an active role in Polonization. The main characteristic of community action in the first period of intensity was that it was an indigenous movement, based on local leadership from within the community.

In the second major phase (fall, 1905 to early 1906) two new developments occurred. The isolation began to break down, as urban agitators, priests and school teachers began to play an active role in the movement, parallel to the broadened

politicization of rural Poland. Totaling only 1% of leaders in the first period, the above groups comprised 8.4% of the leaders in the second intense phase. The most dramatic change came in the role of community officials, especially mayors and clerks. Forming 2.5% of the leaders in the first phase, the two groups comprised 11.1% of the leaders in the second period. The role of plenipotentiaries and elders remained at the same level of participation (10.0% in the first phase, 10.4% in the second). All of this suggests that the mayor and clerk, earlier viewed as "lackeys" of the Russian government and opponents of community action, had, in increasing numbers, begun to reacquire authority which had earlier slipped from their hands.

These tentative data seem to confirm the existence of changing power relationships at the local level. Data from 72 communities (approximately 2% of all communities in Russian Poland) where comparative data were available show that in 30 communities (42%) no one in office at the time of one assembly meeting was reelected at the next quarterly meeting, while in the other 42 communities (58%) there was at least partial continuity from one assembly meeting to the next. This would tend to confirm the earlier findings on shifts in leadership at the local level.[23]

It appears that community action also represented a struggle between two rural factions, one represented by the mayor, clerk and those peasants who gave tacit support to the Russian government and another, led by nobles and older-- perhaps wealthier-- peasants, some of whom had fought in or at least remembered the January Uprising, and whose unwillingness to support the Russian government had isolated them from the formal tools of power in the communities. In part, then, emancipation had probably both overthrown the gentry's domination over the peasants and upset the traditional relationships of power and prestige among the peasants. The events of 1905 may have produced an attempt to return to that traditional authority structure, in which one's status and power were based on economic success and traditional family position within the community. The failure to support the community movement led to the *delegitimization* of the authority

of the formal power-holders-- mayors and clerks-- and probably permitted power to flow toward traditional centers of authority, the old village elites and nobles. As the rural revolution continued and broadened, individuals who were not community members (urban/party agitators, teachers, priests, and even agricultural laborers) began to assume an auxiliary leadership role, while at the same time, regular community officers-- mayors and clerks-- regained some measure of support and authority at the expense of the nobles and traditional peasant leaders by favoring the community action campaign. Thus at the local level in the countryside, a revolution may have taken place in 1905-1906, as elected officials first lost control over community affairs and regained their authority only later by shifting from a pro-Russian to an anti-Russian position. Both responses contributed to the collapse of Russian power in the countryside.

E. COMMUNITY ACTION

"*Gmina* (community) action"-- the effort of communities to secure real self-government, to initiate a broader restructuring of political authority and to de-Russify rural Poland-- went through two major periods: late 1904 to early 1905 and autumn 1905 to early 1906. Though its appearance seemed sudden, community action had been prepared by decades of rural propaganda by newspapers such as *Gazeta Swiateczna*, by the gradual formation of a sense of nationalism among many peasants (stimulated by the Russification of rural schools) and by some four decades of participation in village and community political affairs. In addition, increased Russian government "interference" in local affairs brought about by the Russo-Japanese War and the decision of National Democrats to accelerate political action in the countryside, helped produce the community action campaign. The community action movement began in March, 1904 but reached broad proportions only at the assemblies of December, 1904 and January, 1905. In 1905, resolutions supporting Polonization were passed in 983 (76%) of

the 1,291 communities in the Kingdom of Poland. In addition, anti-Russian activities took place in 450 communities after assembly meetings had adjourned.[24] Communities passed resolutions announcing that they would neither pay taxes for services not rendered (e.g., to support Warsaw hospitals) nor subsidize government programs which fostered Russification (e.g., subscriptions to government Russian language publications). Concerned with reducing the government's capacity to influence local decisionmaking, communities began to ban Russian officials from community meetings. In December, 1905 plenipotentiaries at the Kosin assembly meeting (Janow County, Lublin Province) decided that the Poles had had enough of Russian officials, all of whom, the Poles claimed, were both dishonest and superfluous.[25] In Wiazowna (Nowominsk County, Warsaw Province), where over 400 persons had gathered to select a community judge, the chief landguard for the county was verbally abused with the catcall, "let the pigs go to pasture and we will be our own authority."[26] In late winter there was a major effort to Polonize the village schools through strikes, boycotts and economic sanctions against teachers who continued to conduct classes in Russian.

In the spring of 1905 the movement declined, as peasants were preoccupied with plowing and sowing. Community action reached large proportions again during the October, 1905 to January, 1906 period, in response to the massive urban general strike, the October Manifesto, the reintroduction of martial law and widespread agitation in the rural areas by the National Democrats, the Polish Peasant Union (*Polski Zwiazek Ludowy* or PZL) and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS).

This second phase of community action was characterized by broad political goals. The rural populace participated in mass meetings, usually held after church services, went on political marches and used physical force against local government officials. At the same time the regular community governmental structure provided peasants with a forum for expressing four major aims: 1) revamping and modernizing agrarian methods (such as an end to strip holdings); 2) complete independence from the Russian government (amounting almost to a boycott of governmental services); 3) the creation of new political

structures in rural Poland (such as special commissions and alliances of communities in broader organizations); and 4) autonomy for Russian Poland. Community officials came out boldly in support of the movement and sometimes they created county-wide alliances of local officials.

"True community self-government"-- a Polish "declaration of independence"-- was for the Poles the ultimate solution to the relationship between greater and lesser societies but pragmatism dictated more modest objectives. Decentralization was the basic premise of the peasants' political ideas. The stress on the"free *gmina*" and "true *gmina* self-government" derived in part from Edward Abramowski's theories of decentralization. Abramowski suggested in *Zmowa powszechna przeciw rzadowi* (*Universal Conspiracy against Government*) that Poles boycott all government institutions. He espoused a free federative collectivism (*wolny kolektywizm federacyjny*) in which local cooperatives would form the basis of a "cooperative economic republic."[27] Self-reliance and self-sufficiency were logically related to the concept of decentralization.

The peasants sought to reduce their supra-community responsibilities as defined by the government and at the same time to broaden community powers. It was suggested that the community had the right to decide which government decrees were legal, and thus should be obeyed, and which were illegal or irrelevant, and thus should be ignored.[28] The Poles sought to create conditions which would reduce the ability of the Russian officials to influence community government, to restructure the division of responsibilities between the community and the Russian government and to strengthen the community by expanding the franchise to include all adult males, including "dwarf holders," landless peasants and even Catholic priests, rather than limiting it to adult males who owned st least three *morgs* of land.[29] This stress on democratism flowed from the emphasis on self-reliance.

At first the rural Poles sought to reduce the power of county-level Russian authority by more or less direct means, threatening (and sometimes taking steps) to cut off community fiscal support for Russian officials, including money for the maintenance of police and jail facilities, and refusing to

provide transportation for Russian officials. Peasants declared that the community had the right to dismiss Russian officials who acted illegally, with the peasants defining illegality.[30]

However, when direct confrontation failed to eliminate the influence of Russian officials, the peasants, especially in the fall of 1905, turned to a different approach-- they acted as though the Russian government no longer existed. By attempting to avoid all contact with the government, the peasants sought to eliminate the Russian officials' power over rural Poland. This anarchistic behavior, including vigilante activity (to be discussed in the next section), was not a final goal but a means-- a step toward a new, and Polish, government. The most important anarchistic manifestations involved police functions. Peasants refused to report crimes to the police, intending to solve the matters themselves; nobles refused to report agricultural strikes to officials; and a movement to establish local "militias" expanded, in part through the unwitting encouragement of the Russian government which began in the fall of 1905 to shift the largely ineffective rural police to the cities.[31] Peasant efforts to counter the power of local and regional Russian officials were unsuccessful, except in the area of police functions, as the county chiefs retained their supervisory powers over the communities and the government took no action to limit the role of peasant commissars.

Rural Poles also recognized that structure and organization could be powerful weapons. Sensing their own isolation and the powerlessness resulting from being members of individual communities, rural Poles created a number of political structures which reached beyond separate communities. Sometimes special commissions established within the community were charged with supervising community government. In Kutno County (Warsaw Province), where the Commissar for Peasant Affairs, Rybachkov, supported community action and declared that he had no authority in the community, local committees for peasant affairs were established.[32] Frequently plenipotentiaries were authorized to communicate Polonization decisions to nearby communities. At times plenipotentiaries and supervisory committees were authorized to formulate plans

for broader political structures. Sometimes ad-hoc committees formed and acted as county governments.[33]

Such efforts reached a peak in the fall of 1905, with community demands for Polish autonomy and for a hierarchy of representative bodies extending from the local community to a Polish *sejm* (parliament) in Warsaw.[34] In addition, community officials, mayors and clerks, began to meet in county and provincial conferences to decide how to foster Polonization and how to combat government repression. Such conferences took place in Konin, Mlawa, Szczucin, Makow and Plock counties in northern Poland. United action by the Makow County conference led to a county-wide boycott of official duties in early 1906.[35]

The government's immediate response to community action was two-fold: local Russian officials sought to convince the communities that their actions were illegal and to force them to rescind assembly resolutions, while at the same time higher officials sought to prevent unrest from reaching violent proportions. On March 3, 1905 the Warsaw Governor-General Maksimovich issued a decree banning community action and ordering the arrest of participants.[36] Initially, repression not only failed to halt the movement but even fostered the politicization of the Polish peasantry. (Perhaps from the time of emancipation the main goal of Russian policy toward Poland had been to prevent the politicization of the peasantry). Some Russian officials, especially at the county level, suggested that force would fail and that the Russian government must *persuade* the peasants that they could achieve a redress of grievances only by working with the Russian government.[37] However, it appears that the main reason for urging peasants to use legal appeals was to halt immediate disorders and prevent potential ones, in hopes that by the time the government bureaucracy issued a negative decision on the peasants' case their anger would have subsided and the possibility of trouble thus have been averted.

The Russian government was also alarmed by the possibility of a united front between the gentry and the peasants-- an alliance which in fact did develop. From the spring of 1905 local Russian officials harangued the peasants, explaining to

them that community self-government was a ploy by which the nobles sought to regain domination over the peasants, thereby reestablishing "feudalism". In Piatek (Leczyce County, Kalisz Province) county officials informed peasants that a previous Polonization resolution would lead to the return of "feudalism". Believing this, the members of the assembly rescinded the resolution.[38]

In early 1906 the community movement began to collapse. Government repression, the peasants' partial victory (in which goals such as the Polonization of village schools were achieved), disillusionment with the results of community action, the shift to interest in the State Duma campaign, resistance to Polonization by non-Polish minorities in eastern Poland, and the diversionary impact of the servitudes issue, agricultural strikes and the Mariavite movement (all to be discussed later) all contributed to the decline of the community action campaign in the countryside.

Repression was important-- it reestablished Russian control over the Polish countryside. In March, 1906, Weis, Provisional Governor-General of Warsaw Province, issued instructions for pacifying rural areas. County officials were to convince the communities to rescind illegal resolutions and force communities to obey the law. Agitators and trouble makers were to be arrested. In recalcitrant communities, troops were to be quartered in the homes of suspected peasant leaders and withdrawn only after order was restored.[39]

Community action, a short-hand term for the broad movement to reestablish Polish control over Polish public life, developed into the main vehicle for the liberation movement in rural Poland and led to a brief restoration of Polish authority in the countryside. Community action, thus, clearly represented revolutionary action, an attempt to overthrow the Russian government-- an attempt that was temporarily successful.

F. VIGILANTISM

Vigilante activity directed against criminal elements (in Polish, *samosad*) was widespread in Poland during the revolution. The rural populace thrashed about the countryside, beating up and threatening to beat up thieves and suspected thieves. Such actions were more than mere attacks against criminals in response to the government's inability to fulfill its police role. Vigilantism also represented the broader drive for self-government and was based in part on the view that Polish *justice* was superior to Russian *law*. Thus, in breaking that law rural Poles formulated an alternative view of order, one that was "natural" in contrast to the "unnatural" Russian legal system.

Vigilantism had a number of causes. It reflected the inability of the Russian government to deal with crime both because of the general increase in violence and criminal activity associated with the revolution and because of the government's preoccupation with opposing the urban revolutionary movement. Sometimes vigilantism masked local interfamilial conflicts and became an excuse for attacks against non-criminals. Political parties, especially PZL and PPS, also encouraged the *samosad* movement. In a 1905 leaflet, "How should you deal with the government?" ("*Jak sobie z rzadem poradzic?*"), the PZL suggested that the peasants replace the Russian police with peasant self-defense organs:

> We all know full well, that our police are pals of the thieves. If something is stolen and the injured party turns to the police, they either will not make an effort to investigate, or they only pretend to investigate, of course in such a way that they do not find the guilty party.[40]

Obviously the government viewed *samosad* with disfavor. Tsarist officials saw vigilante activity as a "revolutionary plot" to undermine government prestige and punished or threatened to punish those who engaged in *samosady* against criminals. In July, 1905 the chief of Wlodawa County (Siedlce

Province) issued a circular forbidding citizens to take action against thieves. Instead, he urged citizens to report criminals to the authorities. Such reports then led to the immediate arrest of 23 "crooks."[41]

Vigilante actions were especially common from the late fall, 1905 to early 1906 and again in late 1906. The high incidence of *samosady* during the December months may have been related to the Christmas holidays and a seasonal increase in crime and concern about crime. *Samosady* occurred primarily in Warsaw, Lublin and Radom provinces, areas denuded of rural police transferred to the cities where levels of unrest were quite high.

One might suggest that two forms of vigilantism existed--spontaneous and "legal." Most vigilantism was largely spontaneous and unorganized. For example, on November 16, 1905 in Lipsko (Radom Province) a crowd of 100 peasants formed and tried to eliminate thieves in that area but was dispersed by dragoons.[42] Frequently vigilante activity spread from its point of origin to the surrounding area. Sometimes the same group engaged in such actions over a broad region. Sometimes vigilante activity in one area sparked *samosady* in other localities. For example, large numbers of criminals were located in Dylezki (Lublin Province). After two cows were stolen in December, 1905 a crowd of 150-200 went to the home of a family of known thieves, killed two of them and beat up a woman. The crowd then marched to nearby Grady, where they pummeled several Jewish crooks. Two days later in nearby Jezow, peasants killed one thief and beat up two others. The county chief, county landguard chief and a unit of Cossacks restored order, warning the peasants that they would be punished if further *samosady* occurred.[43]

In a number of cases, communities established special "legal" procedures, not authorized by the Russian government, to deal with thieves. Radecznica community (Warsaw Province) established a special peasant committee to prosecute criminals, to whom the death penalty was to be applied.[44] A *samosad* of local residents in Wola Boglowska (Warsaw Province) fined one Konstanty Kosiarkiewicz 40 rubles for receiving stolen property.[45] In January, 1906 six peasants in Przbyszew (Warsaw

Province) constituted themselves as a "Polish" court and sentenced two thieves to five lashes each, to be witnessed by the village elder and two other villagers.[46]

It appears, then, that vigilante activity should be placed in the gray area between criminal activity and political protest. The vigilante movement, especially in its more structured forms, shows a peasantry seeking to create institutions of justice and security that could function as effective alternatives to regular Russian government channels. The ineptness of Russian security organs in rural Poland and their failure to deal effectively with civil crime led peasants to create these "a-legal" systems of justice. The struggle over servitudes and the Mariavite movement represent other forms of "a-legal" rural self-action.

G. SERVITUDES CONFLICT

While radical political changes were both contemplated and attempted in the countryside, economic conflicts, despite being quite widespread and alarming to government officials, did not produce revolutionary changes. This can be seen in both of the main forms of economic conflict, the servitude disputes and agricultural strikes.

From emancipation to the First World War, estate owners and peasant landholders engaged in a running battle over rights to land usage associated with the question of servitudes (*serwituty*). Servitudes were peasant rights of usage to certain meadows, forest lands and waterways owned by the nobility and/or the government. Under serfdom peasants had been permitted to graze livestock on meadows, to cut timber and gather firewood in forests and fish in waterways. According to the terms of emancipation, servitudes were to remain in effect only temporarily and were to be abolished after government commissions had conducted surveys to determine the exact nature of previous servitude and conditions. Through the decisions of these commissions 65% of all landholding peasant families had received grazing rights, 55% the right to gather fuel, 39% the right to cut timber in forests and 22% the right to gather

kindling wood.[47] By 1905 the number of households with servitude rights had declined from 335,171 to 109,785, including 93,114 households retaining forest usage rights.[48]

Seeing the servitudes issue as an opportunity for conducting a pro-peasant, anti-gentry policy, in 1872 the Russian government decided that servitudes should be eliminated through private agreements signed by nobles and peasants and then ratified by the government. In exchange for abandoning their claims to servitudes, the peasants were to be compensated with land by the estate owners.[49] However, alarmed by increasing rural tensions, in the 1880s Russian authorities began to actively push for servitude settlements. While peasants were reluctant to abandon their claims to servitudes, nobles eagerly sought settlement, especially with respect to forest holdings which were increasingly valuable because of rising lumber prices and the increasing scarcity of timber.[50] In addition, more intensive cultivation was turning meadows into plowland while an expansion of livestock increased the need for pasturage. Both of these factors reinforced peasant desire to retain servitudes. Pressure from the government and the gentry led to servitude settlements that transferred 464,740 *morgs* (approximately 625,000 acres) of land to the peasants.[51] Peasant households with servitude rights received, on the average, slightly more than four *morgs* of land (five and one-half acres) for settling with estate owners.[52]

The servitudes struggle involved more than legal settlements, for not only did the two contenders disagree about the terms of settlement, peasants frequently resorted to force to sustain their claims. They illegally logged in estate and government forests, pastured cattle on estate meadows, and on rare occasions took plow lands. Such activities paralleled vigilantism. Though both kinds of action were illegal, they were directed against different foes: vigilante activity against a government unable or unwilling to halt a crime wave and servitudes action mainly against the Polish gentry. Vigilantism weakened Russian authority and thus contributed to political revolution while servitude conflicts divided the countryside, making unified action against Russian power more difficult.

Forest lands were the main target of the peasant attacks. Between 1864 and 1905 an average of 30,000 cases of illegal tree-felling were reported annually.[53] Though the early years of the twentieth century saw a sharp increase in servitude settlements, the most bitter conflicts remained unresolved. Thus, during the revolution the servitudes movement intensified, especially in the southern half of Poland, where most commercial forest properties were located.

The conflict over the use of forests was fostered by increased logging, resulting from expanding export and profit possibilities, by lingering servitudes disputes and by ambiguities in government policy, such as the Ministry of Agricultural and State Properties' decision in the late spring of 1905 to permit peasants to pasture cattle in state forests as long as this did not harm young growth.[54] The peasants sometimes presented their position in community assembly resolutions. For example, at the quaterly community assembly in Wyszkow (Warsaw Province) in late December, 1905, residents called for unlimited peasant usage of state forest lands and announced their opposition to the export of lumber from state forests located in Poland.[55]

Frequently the peasants refused to accept servitude settlements drawn up by the Commissariat for Peasant Affairs. Claiming that the government had been unfair to them, peasants in Chelm County (Lublin Province) rejected a servitudes settlement with Count Liders-Weimarn, even though the agreement already had been concluded by the Commissariat and ratified by the Senate.[56]

Much of the peasant activity in estate and state forests consisted of illegal cutting of timber, which sometimes reached massive proportions, both in terms of the number of peasants participating and the amount of timber cut down. In the first nine months of 1905, illegal logging and pasturing operations occurred in 107 communities. During the last quarter of 1905, illegal logging and pasturing took place in 80 communities. Conflicts over servitudes declined somewhat in 1906 and 1907, when there were instances of illegal logging and pasturing in 85 communities in seven provinces.[57] Illegal logging took place in almost all communities that had retained forest usage

rights. Dividing the number of households with such rights (90,000) by the average number of households per community (1,000) yields 90 communities, thus the above estimate.[58]

The situation seemed most severe at the state forests in Radom Province, where lawlessness and terrorist activity by party battle groups was generally more intense than in the rest of Russian Poland, and at the Zamojski Estates in Lublin and Siedlce provinces, where forests covering some 250,000 acres were coveted and illegally logged by peasants from some 148 villages.[59] That illegal peasant logging was generally an organized action is suggested both by the large number of peasants involved and by the fact that village elders frequently led such operations.[60] Peasants, suggesting that the wood was both rightfully theirs and essential to their survival, used force against forest guards, policemen and estate officials who tried to halt the illegal logging.[61]

Peasants also interfered with logging efforts conducted by the estates and contract lumbering firms. Sometimes, as in May, 1907 at the "Starogrod" estate of one Kisielewski in Lukowice (Warsaw Province), peasants refused to permit lumberjacks into designated logging areas.[62] Sometimes when lumbermen were already at work in the woods, peasants demanded a halt to logging operations, threatening to use force otherwise. In one instance in March, 1905, 20 peasants demanded that workers from the A. Franke lumber firm halt logging in a Zamojski forest. The lumberjacks refused, so the next day some 50 peasants appeared, confiscated the tools of the lumberjacks and drove them from the forest.[63] When they could not stop logging operations, the peasants' strategy was to prevent teamsters from transporting the logs out of the forests. In January, 1906, peasants at the Myszyniece forest (Lomza Province) first sought to require the wagoneers to pay five rubles each for the right to transport timber. When this ploy failed, the peasants threatened to beat up the teamsters unless they unloaded the timber they had been hired to cart from the woods. The drivers unloaded the wagons and fled.[64]

The servitudes conflict over forest usage fused with and was affected by broader issues such as the conservation of overused forests and the expansion of timber exports. The

struggle for pasturage, on the other hand, had only local resonance. Based almost entirely on the narrow issue of servitudes, many of the cases of illegal pasturing derived from disputes which had remained unresolved for decades. Typical were the May, 1906 events in Wolka community (Lublin Province). By an agreement between peasants from the village of Turka and Adam Bielinski, owner of the "Zagrody" estate, 30 *morgs* had been set aside for pasturage for the peasants. Dissatisfaction had first surfaced in 1899, at which time the peasants had complained that the meadow land was too far from the village. During the revolution, the peasants began to pasture cattle on Bielinski land located closer to the village. Simultaneously, they began to demand that Bielinski either give them land close to the village or cancel servitudes by granting them, instead, 50 *morgs* of land. The peasants claimed that the estate owner had plenty of land and thus should willingly share the land with the peasants, who did not. Fearing increasing unrest, the local landguard also suggested that Bielinski give the peasants the 50 *morgs* of land and cancel servitudes. After the peasants pastured 90 head of cattle on his lands and beat up his agricultural laborers who tried to drive the cattle away, Bielinski took the issue to court.[65] In general, the estate-peasant clash took place over the usage rather than the ownership of land, though in a few cases peasants actually took possession of gentry and state lands. Overall, there were fourteen cases of peasant seizure of land (including eleven instances in Lublin Province), though only some were related to the servitudes.[66] In what was perhaps the most blatant instance of land seizure, peasants tore down boundary markers at the properties of Zamojski in Wlodawa County (Siedlce Province) destroyed crops on 76 *morgs* of land and put up new, "correct" boundary lines in late April, 1905. In early May, Voeikov, vice-governor of Siedlce Province, led troops to the area and threatened to use them to reestablish the old boundaries. Reluctantly, and in spite of the opposition of village women, the peasant men restored the old boundary lines.[67]

Servitudes-- a source of irritation and conflict since emancipation-- continued to cause tension in the rural areas

during the revolution. These insoluble economic conflicts, exacerbated by rising lumber profits and by the increasingly tenuous peasant existence resulting from several consecutive years of poor harvests, hampered both economic modernization and weakened political links between the nationalistic gentry and the peasants. Though the disorders resulting from servitudes sometimes necessitated government intervention, they neither radicalized the peasantry nor contributed to rural revolution.

H. AGRICULTURAL STRIKES

More dramatic than the conflict over servitude rights, the agricultural strike movement pitted agricultural laborers, sometimes with political party support, against the rest of rural Poland, including the Russian government and the Polish gentry. Agricultural strikes also brought to the surface nationality conflicts, especially in eastern Poland, where in addition to Poles there were land-owning German "colonists" and Lithuanian and Orthodox (East Slavic) peasants and agricultural workers. For example, when Czarnowski became director of the gigantic Zamojski Estates in November, 1905 he replaced Orthodox personnel with Poles and conducted anti-Russian agitation among Polish peasants employed by the estates. Estate officials also accused Orthodox priests of inducing Orthodox peasants to engage in illegal logging operations at the estate.[68] In the summer of 1906, Polish agricultural laborers clashed with peasants of Orthodox faith at the Posadow estate in Lublin Province. The administrator of the estate, Miedrzecki, a Polish nationalist, sought to convert the Russian Orthodox "Ruthenians" (the term used by the local Russian Orthodox priest) to Catholicism and treated Polish Catholic workers better than Russian Orthodox ones. Poles received higher pay than "Ruthenians" for the same work and were paid immediately, while Orthodox workers had to wait weeks. Miedrzecki also denied the "Ruthenians" servitude rights, fined them for illegal pasturing and confiscated their cattle. Under the leadership of the local Orthodox priest, Egorov, 83

"Ruthenian" peasants signed a pledge not to work at the Posadow estate.[69]

Almost all elements in the countryside recognized the harsh impoverishment that faced many segments of the agricultural labor force. However the main issue came to be not what should be done about the poverty of agricultural workers, but who was to have the right to decide on improvements and whether agricultural workers should be permitted to mobilize on their own behalf.

The situation of the agricultural laborers was quite complex. Their numbers were quite large, comprising 15-20% of the population of rural Poland and encompassing both landholding and landless peasants.[70] There were many types of hired agricultural workers, ranging from supervisory personnel and skilled artisans such as blacksmiths, to field workers, making generalizations difficult. Most permanent field workers provided not only their own labor in exchange for use of some land, but were also required to feed and house an additional young worker (the *posylka* system). Single youths without land were the other main type of permanent agricultural worker. In addition, seasonal day laborers, both landowners and the landless, were hired at peak periods of work-- at sowing, mowing and harvest times. For many agricultural laborers life was extremely harsh, as they faced longer than dawn-to-dusk days, a harsh fine system and physical punishment, and wretched living conditions.[71]

The widespread agricultural strike movement in 1905-1906 suggests that dissatisfaction was mobilized in an effort to improve conditions, especially increased remuneration and the elimination of *posylka*. It is difficult to estimate with any accuracy the number of agricultural strikes in 1905-1906 and their numbers have almost surely been understated. For example, Polish historians have suggested that approximately 750 estates in 298 communities (23% of all communities) were struck in 1905 and 660 in 1906.[72]

Strikes in the year 1905 were concentrated in March (87% of all 1905 agricultural strikes took place in that month) and primarily in eastern and central Poland, especially in Lublin, Siedlce and Warsaw provinces.[73] Strikes occurred primarily in

those areas where there were relatively large numbers of large estates and landless peasants, where political party activity was most extensive and where there were few opportunities for seasonal labor migration abroad. Most strikes occurred at large estates. There were about 1,300 large estates (more than 1,400 acres) and 3,200 medium-sized estates (420-1,400 acres) in the Kingdom of Poland in 1905. There were also about 4,500 smaller estates (under 420 acres), employing few if any agricultural laborers. Estimates that about one-fourth of all estate land was plow land would yield 1,300 estates with over 350 acres of plow land and 3,200 with 100-350 acres of plow land. Probably at least half of all large estates may have been struck in 1905. Further, there were some 600 large estates and 900 medium-sized ones in Lublin, Siedlce and Warsaw Provinces, the center of the strikes. The vast majority of large estates in these provinces were probably struck in 1905.[74] Strikes spread in a contagious fashion as groups of striking agricultural workers marched from estate to estate initiating strikes and gathering up new strikers into ever-larger bands. Beginning on March 19, groups of agricultural laborers from Krasnostaw County (Lublin Province) crossed into Zamosc County (Lublin Province) and initiated strikes. Strikers were expected to participate in the initiation of six strikes, then were permitted to return home.[75] In this way the size of the band could be maintained and yet no workers would be too far from their home estates. Requiring strikers to join the march ensured that the strike at a specific estate would remain in effect, enabled the marching strikers to develop an awareness of goals and of their own power and provided sufficient manpower to ensure that a strike could be successfully initiated at the next estate.

In general the spring strike movement was peaceful, with violence generally limited to a few broken windows, a few blows directed against estate officials who refused to join the marchers, and attacks against agricultural laborers who refused to strike. Only one major clash took place between strikers and authorities-- the "Lanieta Massacre" in Kutno County (Warsaw Province) where 22 were killed and at least 15 were wounded.[76]

Polish historians have disagreed on the question of the extent of organization and the nature of leadership of the spring, 1905 strike wave. Archival evidence seems to support those who see the movement as largely spontaneous with leadership provided by the agricultural workers themselves. The movement spawned leaders, at least at the local level; men who called on workers to strike, presented demands to owners and monitored the strike marches.

If initially strikes were spontaneous, what led agricultural laborers to strike? Most strikes in 1905 occurred in March because of the conjunction of several factors. Many farm workers endured wretched work and living conditions. They may have been influenced by revolutionary events, such as factory strikes, especially those in the sugar refineries located in the countryside, but more probably by the more immediate *gmina* movement. Strikers must have understood that one of the optimum moments for striking was just before spring planting. Finally, rapid expansion of the strike movement was made possible, in part, by the slow response of the gentry and the government. After March the estate owners and Russian authorities developed the capacity to react more quickly and more effectively, thus preventing the outbreak of another massive strike movement.

We have a clearer idea of the nature of the demands which strikers made. In general workers sought improved economic conditions, especially increases in wages and in the size of the *ordynaria* (in-kind payments). Almost universally, demands were made for pasturage for two cows instead of one and an increase in the land allotment for growing potatoes. Crowded and primitive living quarters evoked protests from workers who demanded separate quarters for each family and less crowded conditions in communal barracks for single workers. A special target of striking agricultural workers was the *posylka* system, for laborers found the requirement that they feed and house an extra temporary work-hand at their own expense quite burdensome.[77] There was little interest in "humanitarian" issues, no concern with restructuring "labor-management" relationships, no demands for redistribution of the land and no expression of interest in problems outside the estate.

In general, owners-- under pressure from strikers, Russian officials and nationalist groups-- made concessions in the area of wages, *ordynaria* and land usage but ignored other demands. The first wave of rural strikes, thus, brought economic improvements to the agricultural laboring stratum and developed in them some sense of solidarity and an awareness of their potential power.

The strike movement probably had a greater impact on the attitudes of estate owners. The agricultural strikes were a major stimulant to estate owner organization and became a source of concern to nationalists seeking to create a unified rural Polish bloc whose activities were to be directed against the Russians.

The spring, 1905 agricultural strikes found estate owners unprepared and unsure of how to deal with the movement. Disorganized, isolated and sometimes frightened, owners frequently gave in to workers' demands. Less commonly, estate owners began meeting to formulate a common anti-strike program. This stress on organization and unity became "management's" main weapon against future strikes. The Agricultural Section of the Warsaw Society for the Promotion of Russian Trade and Industry provided leadership, issuing general guidelines. These guidelines became the basis for more specific plans drawn up at the county or province level.[78] For example, at the end of March, estate owners in the Lomza Province Agricultural Society decided to raise wages of agricultural laborers when the new contract year began in January, 1906. They also agreed not to hire any agricultural laborer who left an estate because of a strike, thus establishing a black list directed against strikers.[79]

Thus in the spring of 1905 the response of estate owners to strikes was varied. Fear of disorder and fear that the agricultural cycle would be disrupted, bringing them financial ruin, generally motivated owners to make concessions. Less frequently owners sought to oppose the strikes, sometimes calling for government assistance. The gentry also began to search for organizational forms with which to counteract the power implicit in agricultural strikes.

If the spring of 1905 was the scene of a spontaneous wave of strikes rolling across Poland, in the following spring widespread party agitation, improved gentry organization and greater government willingness to use the army against the agricultural workers gave the strike movement a rather different complexion. After considerable agitation by political parties, the strike movement reached a peak in March and April, 1906 and was strongest in Warsaw, Lublin and Radom provinces. In contrast to the strikes in 1905, which were largely the spontaneous result of actions by the agricultural laborers themselves, the strikes in the spring of 1906 came about largely through agitation by the political parties, especially the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and primarily in the above provinces. Led by its Rural Section (*Wydzial Wiejski*), PPS sent out agitators who first conducted a survey of conditions among agricultural laborers.[80] After the survey was completed, PPS drew up rather modest "model" sets of demands, hoping thereby to assure victory almost everywhere and thus avoid the creation of a disillusioned, passive agricultural labor force. A summary of the PPS leaflets shows a continued emphasis on improved economic conditions (including higher wages), a more detailed list of *ordynaria* and a shorter work day. There was perhaps greater emphasis on humanistic concerns: humane treatment by landowners and officials; the firing of officials who hit peasants; three months' notice for dismissal; estate responsibility to pay doctor and medical expenses; estate owner responsibility to pay community school taxes; the right of each worker to retain his own passport; elimination of the *posylka* system; and better housing conditions.[81]

Despite the mammoth party effort, the spring 1906 strike movement was generally less volatile and less successful than the spring 1905 strikes had been. An exception to this was the limited introduction of "black strikes" in which agricultural laborers refused to feed livestock or milk cows and prevented the transportation of milk and other products from estates. Typically, strikers gained slight improvements in economic conditions but had almost no success in securing other goals.

One can see several reasons for the comparatively small number of strikes and the modest strike gains. The Russian government acted with much greater vigor and effectiveness than during the previous spring. Central government and provincial authorities were prepared for the strike, having previously decided to use force to halt strikes and having deployed substantial numbers of soldiers in the countryside.[82] Generally the mere show of force-- the presence of Cossack and army units-- was enough to prevent or halt strikes. The level of arrests, in spite of the increased activity of police and the military, was much lower than in 1905. The threat of repression was so effective that actual repression was seldom necessary.

Also, there was much greater unity among estate owners, who had already agreed on how to respond to strikes and threats of strikes. This search for institutional structures was an on-going process, beginning in the summer and fall of 1905, intensifying just before spring, 1906 and continuing throughout the course of the spring strike. Some groups of owners, such as the Warsaw Agricultural Society, opposed concessions entirely; others, such as the organization of estate owners in Warsaw County, refused to make concessions under pressure from strikers.[83] However, most estate owners' associations, led by the Agricultural Section of the Warsaw Society for the Promotion of Russian Industry and Commerce, favored concessions. There was general agreement on the need for increasing economic remuneration (both wages and *ordynaria*), better housing, humane treatment of workers, free medical aid and the establishment of schools and nurseries.[84]

This willingness to grant concessions was informed by broader principles. There were to be no negotiations by individual estate owners; instead negotiations were to be conducted by estate owners' groups, especially those operating at the county level. "Management" was to be in complete control of the negotiating process, with emphasis on *giving* concessions to the agricultural laborers in a way that would produce a quiescent, loyal agricultural work force and not disrupt or weaken the owners' patriarchal role. In a number of cases owners made concessions to prevent strikes from breaking

out and this too somewhat blunted the strike movement. Thus, ironically, the securing of modest gains without strikes muted rural radicalism.

The National Democrats (ND), the strongest political force in the countryside, strongly supported the gentry and the estate owners' organizations. With much of its rural membership composed of gentry, ND was especially concerned about the strike movement. At the beginning of the spring, 1905 strike movement, the nationalists had called on owners to make major concessions to agricultural laborers, simultaneously calling on workers to remain orderly. As the strikes continued, the nationalists increasingly stressed the need for order and deemphasized the call for improvements in workers' conditions.[85] By the fall of 1905 the National Democrats' Peasant Section (*Wydzial Ludowy*) was active in the organization of conferences of owners which would oppose strikes and suggest new pay levels for workers.[86] During the spring of 1906, ND continued to give primary emphasis to peaceful settlement of differences between owners and workers, mainly through the latter's acceptance of concessions formulated at owners' conferences.[87] Increasingly, ND began to use force in rural Poland, even though it had called on agricultural laborers to eschew its use. Nationalist battle groups began to appear at strike sites in July, 1906, with the intent of frightening or forcing workers to return to the fields.[88]

Peasant landholders supported the gentry rather than the agricultural laborers during the spring of 1906, as peasants generally opposed agricultural strikes or adopted a rather neutral attitude. They were sometimes willing to perform essential work at struck estates, acting as strike breakers.[89]

Finally, the agricultural laborers themselves seemed incapable of or unwilling to participate as actively as before. PPS suggested that the workers had little education, that they had little capacity for acting independently-- in short that they had little "class consciousness."[90] Government sources, on the other hand, suggest that the agricultural laborers were generally satisfied with their condition, especially because of the gains made during 1905, and were afraid of the Russian

military, especially the Cossacks. Krasnostaw County Chief Usherenko suggested:

> In spite of an energetic propaganda effort, the strike was unsuccessful, thanks entirely to the rationality and sobriety of the agricultural laborers who accept their situation and do not support the strike. Last year's example of the swift crushing of the agricultural strike destroyed the rural workers' faith in the efficacy of strikes.[91]

After two successive spring strike movements among the permanent agricultural workers, other agrarian groups-- the temporary agricultural laborers hired for summer mowing and harvesting-- became strike participants. Comparatively large numbers-- landless peasants, small holders and peasants' sons-- participated in the strikes during the summer of 1906. These strikes took place primarily in areas which had not been the scene of much agricultural strike activity previously or in areas where wages and *ordynaria* were highest.[92] Strikes began in Tomaszow County (Lublin Province) in mid-June and gradually encompassed parts of Warsaw, Siedlce, Lublin (100 strikes) and Kalisz provinces. By late July the movement had collapsed, though officials recorded 29 strikes in Lublin province in August.[93]

Once again PPS sent out agitators to try to initiate strikes just before harvest. PPS suggested later that its activities were more limited than in the spring and that it had made tactical errors, failing to focus its energies on major points of rural unrest. Thus, many strikes such as the widespread strikes encompassing almost all estates in Gostynin and Sochaczew counties of Warsaw province, occurred without the distribution of PPS strike literature and without direct PPS agitation.[94] Perhaps, too, because of expanded activities and the small number of experienced cadre parties sent into the countryside, a large number of inexperienced urban agitators were unable to "reach" the agricultural laborers.

When day laborers struck, estate owners tried to hire other workers to complete the mowing or harvesting and this led

to clashes between strikers and strike breakers.[95] Generally, day laborers demanded higher wages and shorter hours and sometimes, based on PPS agitation, asked for a fourteen-hour work day, including three hours for meals. PPS called for a raise of 10 kopecks for those who had previously received 20-40 kopecks a day and 15 kopecks for those who had formerly worked for 45-80 kopecks.[96] The summer strikes were thus narrower in focus, with a main stress on economic issues, especially wages, and only scattered demands for restructuring rural economic relations.

Usually the summer strikes were victorious.[97] Despite less worker militancy, a lower level of party support, increased owner organization and increased government interference, the strikes were successful. This was due to the modest nature of demands, the common background of strikers, generally from the same village, which lent awareness and solidarity to the movement, and, more importantly, the timing of the strikes which made necessary an immediate settlement to prevent the ruin of or decline in the quality and value of crops. Thus, even more so than during the spring sowing season, the harvest period was one in which the estates were especially vulnerable.

If the activity of political parties was weaker than in the spring, strikers more isolated and strikes less cohesive, estate owners were much better organized. For example, in Leczyce County, where the strike movement attracted considerable support, estate owners met on July 11, finally deciding not to make any concessions unless absolutely necessary and not to call in troops.[98] Eventually Leczyce owners established a strike mediation committee (*rozjemcza delegacja strajkowa*), as did owners in Blonie and Kutno counties in Warsaw Province.[99] There are some indications that the summer strikes-- largely a conflict between landed peasants and nobles-- exacerbated rural tensions, further dividing nobles and peasants, and that administrative personnel (many of whom were from the lesser gentry), sensed that close ties of paternalism had been severed, with agricultural laborers no longer displaying loyalty to the estate.[100]

The organization of estate owners led generally to accepted standards of behavior, both among agricultural laborers and among estate owners and administrative peronnel. If estate owners expected their workers not to strike, laborers expected to receive the conditions agreed upon by estate owners' organizations and assumed the right to strike if their conditions were below-standard.[101] During the summer, gentry organizational efforts were expanded. For example, norms set by the Lublin Agricultural Society were used to induce workers to return to work at estates in Lublin County.[102]

Finally, during the fall of 1906, estate owners organizations shifted their attention from concessions and methods of granting them to how to eliminate the strike threat in the future. An idea which received widespread support and implementation was the firing of worker activists, as suggested at a September, 1906 conference of Lublin Province estate owners.[103]

Thus, rather gradually, in the effort to deal with agricultural strikes, owners came to establish a loose form of collective bargaining, one which especially favored the owners; for the collectivity was almost entirely confined to the gentry, and the bargaining procedure was imposed upon agricultural laborers by the owners. However, a general set of rules was developed for determining estate-worker relations, rules which did take into consideration the needs of the laborers.

What had become apparent by the summer of 1906 (the seeds of which could now be seen to have been planted by the spring, 1906 strikes) was the increasing rationalization of the economic conflict through the formation of estate owners' organizations. These set conditions or agreed to terms drawn up in conjunction with elected representatives of agricultural laborers. Thus, there had been introduced into rural Poland a form of collective bargaining, favorable to "management"-- a system which would reduce rural worker militancy (while improving their material condition) and strengthen the Polish gentry's control over rural Poland.

Increasingly, peasant landholders assumed a position of support for the gentry rather than the agricultural laborers.

During the spring 1905 and 1906 strikes, peasants generally opposed agricultural strikes or adopted a rather neutral stance. As in the Naleczow area, peasants sometimes were willing to perform essential work at struck estates, acting as strike breakers.[104] In other cases peasants displayed a lack of interest in the strikes. The situation became much more complex during the summer of 1906. In a number of cases the strikers were peasants hired temporarily to mow or help with the harvests. In such cases peasants found themselves in opposition to estate owners.[105] At other times, however, peasants took the place of striking agricultural laborers, thus assisting owners.[106] Peasants generally opposed strikes or at least did not support them during spring plowing and sowing but during the summer mowing and harvest seasons, peasants hired to engage in such activities were an important element in the strike movement, while peasants who were not working at such tasks, sometimes replaced strikers, probably for financial reasons.

The widespread agricultural strike movement had neither revolutionary goals nor radical consequences. Striking agricultural workers sought modest improvements in working and living conditions; they almost never called for a radical restructuring of land ownership and violence was seldom a part of the pattern of strike activity. Though government officials lost much of their power in the countryside during the revolution, agricultural strikes played a minor role in this collapse of Russian authority.

The agricultural strike movements actually contributed to a weakening of the revolutionary potential in rural Poland in several ways. This economic strife split rural Poland, making it more difficult to maintain political unity. Even the peasant landholder-gentry alliance was weakened by the mid-summer strikes of agricultural day workers, some of whom were land-owning peasants. It was very difficult for the gentry to maintain their leadership over a peasant class, some of whom were engaged in economic action against the gentry. Conflict within the peasantry also weakened the possibility of rural unity. Finally, gentry energies were diverted from the broader political and national struggle as they dealt with

agricultural strikes. The resolution of estate owner-agricultural laborer conflict led to the creation of mechanisms that largely eliminated the probability of a return to large-scale strike activity. Finally, the formation, revitalization and strengthening of gentry organizations at the county, provincial and "national" levels, created to deal with agrarian unrest, came too late to aid the Polonization movement which had peaked earlier and had now begun to decline.

I. THE MARIAVITE CONTROVERSY

Rural Poland was also the scene of a violent religious conflict between the established Roman Catholic Church and a dissenting sect that became known as the Mariavites. The Mariavite movement was both part of the crisis in values through which Poland was going during the Revolution of 1905 and a component of rural violence. This second aspect provides evidence on the complex nature of rural revolution.

The Mariavite movement originated with Felicja Kozlowska, a former Clarissite nun. In the 1890s Kozlowska was given to spiritual visions. First she believed she was directed to create a corps of priests as an alternative to the corrupt Polish Catholic clergy and to depend on the support of the Virgin Mary and especially Our Lady of Perpetual Succour, a Byzantine cult that had begun in the thirteenth or fourteenth century.[107]

From the early years of the twentieth century, when the priest Jan Kowalski became a "bishop" of the sect, it began to attract broader support. In 1903 the cult went public and sought recognition from the Papacy. After the pope ordered the group's dissolution, Kozlowska's flock fell apart, reviving again after the tsarist Toleration Decree of April, 1905.

Temporarily, the movement was able to draw into its ranks about 10%-15% of the total membership of the Polish Catholic Church.[108] That the movement was able to expand so extensively was due both to its ability to exploit rural dissatisfaction with the low standards of the Catholic clergy and the support the sect received from the Russian government.

The Mariavite ideological appeal, encompassed two themes--a critique of the Catholic clergy and the formulation of an alternative set of behavior patterns. In general, the Mariavite priests offered themselves as clerics dedicated to their parishioners' spiritual needs. Rejecting their own material comforts, claiming celibacy, and proclaiming an apolitical stance, the Mariavites were a challenge to the monopoly-bred complacency of the Polish Catholic hierarchy and priesthood.[109]

With its ideological position clearly formulated, the movement revived with the promulgation in late April, 1905 of the tsarist Toleration Decree, which permitted open recruitment to various religions and thus provided the Mariavites with a loose legal cover. The suspension of seven Mariavite priests by the Roman Catholic hierarchy in February, 1906 led the sect to conduct a three-pronged attack against the Roman Catholic Church. Once again, the Mariavites attempted to secure papal sanction but were unsuccessful. Denied the support of one high authority, the pope, the Mariavites turned to another power, the Russian tsar and his officials in Poland. Throughout 1906, Mariavite priests and their supporters used force to capture parishes led by the Polish Catholic clergy and to retain those under their own control. The relationship between the Russian government and the Mariavite movement and the battle between the Mariavites and Catholics for control of individual parishes both provide insight into the question of revolution in the countryside.

The Mariavite appeal to the Russian government included several demands. Claiming loyalty to the autocracy and opposition to the "patriotic" movement, the Mariavites asked that the responsibility for keeping vital records be transferred from ecclesiastical to secular officials, that the Russian state prevent the Polish Catholic Church from deposing Mariavite priests and that the Russian government recognize the Mariavites as a legal church.

In spite of close ties with the Polish Catholic hierarchy and the disorder and illegality implicit in Mariavite activity, the Russian state was disposed to sanction Mariavite activity for several reasons: in general the Mariavites strongly condem-

ned the political activities of patriotic priests and attacked socialists and anarchists who wanted "God-less truth"; the sect opposed or boycotted rural movements, ranging from peasant self-help and cooperatives to deRussification; and the Mariavite movement diverted the energies of the "patriotic" priests and masses from revolutionary activity.

This initial government position was reflected in the commentary of the Blonie County chief (Warsaw Province), who reported in April, 1906, "Considering that the [Mariavite] movement in its political and social relationships is not only not an enemy, but is even useful [to us], I suggest that we act in accordance with the Imperial *Ukaz* of April 17 [30], 1905."[110] Neutrality based on the Toleration Decree actually meant refusing to halt Mariavite attempts to capture Catholic parishes.

As conflicts between Mariavites and Catholics reached local courts, the judges, who came from the Polish nobility, generally decided against the Mariavite position. Frequently community courts decided to remove Mariavite priests from churches and to return the structures to Roman Catholic control. The courts also ordered court police (*pristavii*) to enforce such decisions.[111] Powerless to reinforce the courts' decisions, the court police requested the aid of Russian landguards or the army. Viewing such situations as "dangerous," in March, 1906 Warsaw Governor-General Skalon decided that the Russian government was not responsible for carrying out the decisions of community courts and that such actions violated the Mariavites' right of religious freedom, even though the sect had not yet been legally recognized. Further, the Governor-General informed his subordinates that they should try to convince the community courts not to eject Mariavite priests from their parishes. Finally, the Governor-General suggested that the government must remain neutral in the controversy, doing everything possible to prevent disorders and conflicts between Catholics and Mariavites.[112] Claiming that their primary responsibility was to maintain order, Russian officials interpreted this to mean halting Catholic acts of violence against Mariavites and ignoring Mariavite attacks on the Catholics.

Finally, with the revolution drawing to a close, on November 28, 1906, the Russian government legalized the Mariavite Church, requiring it to abandon the Catholic Church property it controlled and authorizing it to build its own houses of worship. In December, the Mariavites withdrew from Catholic churches and began to form separate Mariavite parishes.

Given the government's initial ambiguous response to the Mariavite petitions, the latter saw force as the only alternative left open to them. Clashes between Catholics and Mariavites flared up in the spring of 1905, reached a peak from February through June, 1906 and occurred only infrequently thereafter. Conflicts centered on whether a Catholic or Mariavite was to be parish priest and which group was to control local church facilities. For instance in Ceglow (Warsaw Province), Catholic priests tried to eject the Mariavite cleric, Wiechowicz, but his Mariavite supporters, viewing him as a new Hus or Luther, guarded him night and day.[113]

Major clashes took place in Leszno (Warsaw Province) in mid-March, 1906. Two Catholic priests, peasants, local community officials and the owner of the "Zaborowek" estate, Wodzynski, came to Leszno to close the Mariavite church headed by Adam Furmanik. Two thousand Mariavites, many of them workers from the "Michalow" sugar refinery, gathered and attacked the Catholics with clubs. Twenty persons were injured in the clash.[114] On April 22, 1906 a crowd of Catholics, led by three priests, gathered in Zaborow and marched toward the Mariavite parish of Leszno. In this clash between Catholics and Mariavites, three persons were killed and thirty-two wounded, including three Catholic clerics and one Mariavite priest.[115] Dismissed from his Ciechanow (Plock Province) parish because of his Mariavite ties, the priest Zebrowski tried in March, 1906 to return to his former post, and this incited renewed conflict.[116] Zebrowski was involved in another major conflict that occurred in Blonie in mid-April, 1906. Fifteen hundred Catholics from Rokitno, led by Zielin- ski, the vicar of the Blonie parish, marched to Blonie where Zebrowski was holding services for a group of 200 Mariavites. In the ensuing battle,

sixteen were injured and Zebrowski was forced to flee to Warsaw.[117]

Clashes such as these demonstrate the volatility of the Catholic-Mariavite conflict and suggest that a peaceful solution of the controversy was not seriously considered by either side. Purportedly in the name of toleration but actually for political reasons, Russian authorities espoused policies that contributed to increased rural violence. The Russian government was thus willing to tolerate rural violence that might contribute to the decline of the "patriotic" movement in the countryside. The split within the Catholic Church did weaken the Polish national movement. The conflict diverted energies from the struggle against the government and gave it an opportunity to weaken the patriotic camp through support of religious dissent.

On the other hand, the Mariavite effort to overthrow the powerful established Catholic Church was revolutionary. With Russian assistance the Mariavites strengthened their position through force and mass action. Without Russian support the Mariavites would have been quickly and decisively crushed by the Catholics. The Mariavite movement thus demonstrated the complexity of the revolution in the Polish countryside.

J. CONCLUSIONS

What was and what was not revolutionary about events in rural Poland, 1905-1906? Russian authority was driven from the countryside, at least temporarily. Confused, badly outnumbered and generally quite incompetent, Russian officials largely abandoned the countryside, preferring to make their stand against the urban revolution. A pro-Russian presence -- in the form of existing institutions of local government-- might have been maintained. However, local Polish government in rural Poland was taken over by anti-Russian forces, replacing-- again, temporarily-- loyalist office holders. Community action created the beginning of an alternative political system to be constructed from the ground up. Vigilante activity, a combination of crime and political

action, to some degree sought political change, a restructuring of the system of criminal justice, and at the same time demonstrated the weakness of the Russian government in the countryside. All of these changes added up, temporarily, to a radical restructuring of authority relationships in the countryside, in a sense, to political revolution.

It would be easy to explain the ultimate failure of the rural political revolution by emphasizing the changed role of Russian power: a greater determination to crush opposition; deeper understanding of the nature of opposition, especially due to improved intelligence capability by the *gendarmerie;* and the presence of much larger numbers of soldiers after the Russo-Japanese war. However, the complexity of Polish rural history rules out seeing the revival of Russian power as the main reason political revolution ultimately failed in the Polish countryside.

Ironically, the main reasons for the collapse of the political revolution are to be found in developments whose main goals were not political: the servitudes conflict, agricultural strikes and the Mariavite movement. Of the three, only the Mariavite movement had revolutionary goals, in this case the overthrow of the established church. Servitude actions and agricultural strikes sought modest changes in rural economic relationships. All three movements were sometimes violent and thus disrupted Russian control over the countryside. However, in each of these cases violence was not sufficiently intense to provoke the Russian government into massive retaliation. In fact, the government gave tacit support to Mariavite violence. Further, all of these activities demonstrated the lack of internal unity in the countryside, the weakening of gentry (and thus "patriotic") leadership, the inability to focus on political revolution to the exclusion of other problems, and the diversion of energies from political action.

In the servitude disputes, violence was directed not against an alien government but against the native political elite, the gentry. Servitudes thus split the peasantry and gentry into opposing economic camps and required some gentry to spend their time dealing with peasant incursions onto their property rather than engaging in political activity.

The agricultural strikes marked a major mobilization of rural manpower but again this potentially powerful force was directed against the gentry and not against the Russian authorities (who, at least in 1905, were not very energetic in opposing the agricultural strikes, and thus were not seen by agricultural laborers as the major foe.) Eventually the gentry organized to counteract strike activity but did so too late for those organizations to be transformed into oppositionist structures. The agricultural strikes demonstrated the complex variety of fractures in rural Poland; for not only was there a gentry-peasant conflict, there was also tension and conflict between landed and landless peasants and between Poles and members of ethnic minorities.

Finally, the Mariavite movement created a deep chasm between the anti-Russian Catholic majority and the militant, somewhat pro-Russian Mariavite minority. Though the Mariavite controversy intensified Catholic opposition to the Russian government, the movement, more importantly, diverted powerful emotional energy away from the direct political struggle with Russian authority.

In effect, the political revolution and the economic and religious conflicts cancelled each other out. More than Russian power, the inability to effectively focus on the Russian "enemy," the diversion of energies away from political action, the lack of rural internal unity, and the weakening of gentry leadership all combined to prevent the political revolution from having more than temporary success.

Five major changes occurred in the Polish countryside during the Revolution of 1905. The revolution led to general rejection of Russian authority and brought about a substantial decline in Russian power. Rural education was Polonized, sustaining the shift away from the acceptance of Russian authority and contributing to the development of non-Russian alternatives. The revolution further deepened the process of politicization of the peasantry. At the same time, the revolution created an opportunity for rural residents to organize themselves to seek specific objectives. Finally, challenging the monopoly of the Catholic Church, a minority broke away to create a separate church. The first four changes were to have

a major impact on the role and direction of the Polish countryside in the independent Poland created after the First World War.

NOTES

1. Stefan Kieniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969), 177-81; Helena Brodowska, "Spory serwitutowe chlopow z obszarnikami w Krolestwie Polskim w drugiej polowie XIX w.) ("Servitude conflicts between peasants and estate owners in the Kingdom of Poland in the second half of the nineteenth century"), *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 63 (4/5-1956), 286.

2. Jan Rutkowski, *Historia gospodarcza Polski*. T. II: *Czasy porozbiorowe (An Economic History of Poland*. Volume II: *The Post-Partition Period*) (Poznan, 1950), 296.

3. Kieniewicz, 223; Stanislaw Lubicz, *Sprawa Wloscianska w Polsce porozbiorowej (The peasant question in post-partition Poland*) (Krakow, 1909), 323-324.

4. Kieniewicz, 182, 224; Brodowska, "Spory Serwitutowe," 286.

5. Kieniewicz, 182,225; Stanislaw Kalabinski and Feliks Tych, "Rewolucyjne ruchy chlopskie w Krolestwie Polskim w latach 1905-1907," ("Revolutionary peasant movements in the Kingdom of Poland in the years 1905-1907"), *Nowe Drogi* 9 (8-1955), 48.

6. Chomac, 70-73.

7. Irena Kostrowicka, "Changes in Agricultural Production in the Kingdom of Poland in the XIXth and Early XXth Centuries", *Journal of European Economic History* 13 (1-1984), 84, 89.

8. *Ibid.*, 93.

9. *Ibid.*, 89-90.

10. Rutkowski, 283.

11. I have translated *gmina* as "community" rather than the narrower administrative term "commune" to suggest that the

gmina was more than a political unit, that it frequently possessed a subjective quality of unity.

12. General-Gubernator Warszawski, Archiwum Glowne Akt Dawnych, Warsaw (hereafter: GGW), 103714, k. 5.

13. A. L. Sidorov, *Vysshii pod'em revoliutsii 1905-1907gg: Vooruzhennye vosstaniia noiabri'-1905 goda* (*The climax of the revolution of 1905-1907: the armed uprisings in November-December, 1905*) (Moscow, 1962), IV, 782-783.

14. GGW 104359, k. 187.

15. Stanislaw Kalabinski and Feliks Tych, *Walki chlopow Krolestwa Polskiego w Rewolucji, 1905-1907* (*Peasant struggles in the Polish Kingdom in the Revolution of 1905-1907*) (Warsaw, Panstnowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe [hereafter PWN], 1958-1962), II, 90. The three volumes in this series contain some 3,000 documents on rural Poland in the Revolution of 1905-1907.

16. A. K. Drezen (ed.), *Tsarizm w bor'be s revoliutsiei 1905-1907 gg: sbornik dokumentov* (*Tsarism in the struggle against the Revolution of 1905-1907. A collection of documents*) (Moscow, 1936), 55-56, *Ibid.*, 58-60.

17. *Ibid.*, 151; *Ogniwo* III (2-1905), 37.

18. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, I, 213.

19. *Ibid.*, 255-56; GGW 103744 k. 304.

20. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, I, 110.

21. Warszawski Gubernialny Zarzad Zandarmerji, Archiwum Miejskie m. st. Warszawy (hereafter, WGZZ), 1708 k. 25: GGW 103727, k. 51.

22. Material for this data on local leadership comes from reports on community meetings in the archives of the Warsaw

Governor-General, the gendarme records for Piotrkow, Plock Siedlce and Warsaw provinces, the sources reprinted in Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki Chlopow*, and various secondary materials. This survey yielded information about the class and/or occupation of 1,846 persons identified as "leaders" of community action, as well as, less frequently, age, land ownership and local office. The data were not generated by random sampling techniques and therefore are not statistically valid. However, the information is probably sufficiently accurate to sustain the generalizations based on it.

23. The limited available data on ages of community action leaders points toward the same conclusion. Government reports gave ages for only 21 of 1846 identified leaders (a sample too small for any definitive analysis). The range of their ages was 26 to 80, the mean age 51 and the median 48, while fewer than 25% were under 40.

24. Stefan Brzezinski, *Polski Zwiazek Ludowy (The Polish Peasant Union)* (Warsaw, Ludowe Spotdzielnie wydawnicae, 1962), 17-18.

25. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, II, 207.

26. M. S. Simonovaia, *Vtoroi period revoliutsii 1906-1907 gody, chast' tret'ia. oktiabr'-dekabr' (The second period of the revolution, 1906-1907, part three. October to December)* (Moscow, 1963), IV, 678.

27. Witold Stankiewicz (ed.), *Czasopismiennictwo ludowe w Krolestwie Polskim, 1905-1914 (Peasant publications in the Kingdom of Poland, 1905-1914)* (Warsaw, PWN 1957), 34-36.

28. WGZZ 1744, unpaginated; GGW 103727 k. 57.

29. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, I, 1125-1127.

30. GGW 106671, k. 7.

31. Simonovaia, IV, 722; GGW 104483, k. 5-6.

32. GW Gubernator Warszawski, Archiwum Glowne Akt Dawnych (hereafter, GW) I 1/1905 *Tajny*, k. 35-36.

33. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, I, 468-69

34. WGZZ 1774, k. 20.,

35. GGW 104344, k. 46, 48-49, 94.

36. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, II, 530.

37. *Ibid.*, I, 74.

38. *Ibid.*, I, 64.

39. GGW 104339, k. 251-52; GGW 104351, k. 91.

40. Brzezinski, 275.

41. GGW 103753, k. 148: Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, II, 191.

42. GGW 103747, k. 136.

43. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, II, 189-90.

44. Sidorov, IV, 693-94.

45. WGZZ 1736, k. 123.

46. WGZZ 1736, k. 92

47. Kieniewicz, 178.

48. Zofia Mazurek, "Sytuacja ekonomiczna i spoleczna na wsi lubelskiej po reformie uwlaszczeniowej 1864" ("The economic and social situation in the Lublin countryside after the

emancipation reform of 1864") *Annales Universitatis M. Curie-Sklodowska* (Sectio F), 9 (1954/1957), 228.

49. *Ibid.*, 179.

50. Zofia Mazurek, "Walka chlopow Ordynacji Zamojskiej o prawa serwitutowe w koncu XIX wieku" ("The struggle of peasants at the Zamojski Estates for servitude rights in the late nineteenth century") *Annales Universitatis M. Curie-Sklodowska* (Sectio F) (1957/1960), 12-13.

51. Kieniewicz, 225; Helena Brodowski, "Spory serwitutowe chlopow z obszarnikami w Krolestwie Polskim w drugiej polowie XIX w" ("The servitudes' conflict between peasants and estate owners in the Polish Kingdom in the second half of the nineteenth century") *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 63 (4/5-1956), 288; Mazurek, "Sytuacja ekonomiczna," 229.

52. Albin Koprukowniak, *Ruchy rewolucyjne na wsi lubelskiej w latach 1905-1907* (*The revolutionary movement in the Lublin countryside in the years 1905-1907*) (Lublin, Wydawnictno Lubelskie, 1967), 25.

53. Kieniewicz, 228.

54. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, I, 435.

55. WGZZ 1708, k. 24-25.

56. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, I, 169-170.

57. Stanislaw Kalabinski and Feliks Tych, "Walki mas chlopskich w Krolestwie Polskim w rewolucji 1905-1907" ("The Struggle of the peasant masses in the Polish Kingdom in the Revolution of 1905-1907") *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 62 (4/5-1955), 54-55, 61.

58. Helena Brodowska, *Ruch chlopski po uwlaszczeniu w Krolestwie Polskim, 1964-1904* (*The peasant movement after*

emancipation in the Kingdom of Poland, 1864-1904), (Warsaw, PWN 1967), 171-172, for data on the number and size of communities.

59. The Zamojski Estates, the largest private holding (approximately 450,000 acres) in Russian Poland, covered one-fourth of Lublin province as well as parts of Siedlce Province. Sixty-two percent of unsettled servitudes involved the Zamojski Estates. See Koprukowniak, 163.

60. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, III, 328-329.

61. GGW 103722, k. 97-98.

62. WGZZ 2569, k. 200.

63. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, I, 259-260.

64. GGW 104344, k. 121.

65. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, III, 170-171.

66. Helena Brodowska, "Wplyw rewolucji 1905-1907 roku na rozwoj swiadomosci chlopow polskich," ("The impact of the revolution of 1905-1907 on the consciousness of the Polish peasants"), *Roczniki Dziejow Ruchu Ludowego* 19 (1977/78), 28.

67. GGW 105047, k. 37-40.

68. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki Chlopow*, II, 172-173, 233-234.

69. *Ibid.*, III, 184-186.

70. Kalabinski and Tych, "Rewolucynje ruchy," ("Revolutionary movements"), *Nowe Drogi* 9 (8-1955), 48-49.

71. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, III, 767. Reprint of the results of a survey sponsored by the Polish Socialist Party of 17,000 agricultural laborers.

72. Kalabinski and Tych, "Rewolucynje ruchy", 66-68; Koprukowniak, *Ruchy rewolucyjne*, 60, 150; Brzezinski, 18.

73. Koprukowniak, *Ruchy rewolucyjne*, 57; Kalabinski and Tych, "Rewolucyjny ruchy," 51; Koprukowniak, "Wystapienie chlopskie w gubernii lubelskiej podczas rewolucji 1905-1907 roku" ("The peasant uprising in Lublin Province during the revolution of 1905-1907"), in Zygmunt Mankowski (ed.), *Rewolucja 1905-1907 na ziemi lubelskiej* (*The Revolution of 1905-1907 in the Lublin Lands*) (Lublin, Wydawnictwo Lubelskie 1966), 33.

74. For data on the number of estates see Chomac, 174-175, 178 and Krzysztof Groniowski, *Kwestia agrarna w Krolestwie Polskim, 1871-1914* (*The agrarian question in the Kingdom of Poland, 1870-1914*) (Warsaw, PWN 1967), 58-59, 79.

75. WGZZ 951, k. 46: GGW 103743, k. 124; Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, I, 182-183.

76. WGZZ 951, k. 34, 37-38; GGW 103728, k. 37, 48-50.

77. GGW 103729, k. 53; Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, I, 52, 147; Koprukowniak, *Ruchy rewolucyine*, 72-73.

78. *Ogniwo* III (9/22.IV.1905), 354.

79. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, I, 428-429.

80. *Ibid.*, III, 693.

81. GGW 103709, k. 93-95.

82. GW I 1/1906, k. 191-192; GGW 104582, k. 14; Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, III, 606-607, I, 956; Koprukowniak, *Ruchy rewolucyjne*, 102-103.

83. *Kurier Warszawski* (No. 109, 21.IV.1906), 1; (No. 124, 6.V. 1906), 1.

84. Koprukowniak, "Obszarnicy lubelscy a ruch rewolucyjny na wsi w latach 1905-1907" ("Lublin estate owners and the revolutionary movement in the countryside in the years 1905-1907"), *Annales Universitatis Marie Curie-Skladowska.* (Sectio F) 17 (1962), 263; Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, III, 396, 671, 674.

85. *Kurier Warszawski* (No. 78, 19.III.1905), 1; *Polak* V (V.1905), 69-70.

86. Wieslaw Piatkowski, "Stosunek partii politycznych w Krolestwie Polskim do kwestii agrarnej w latach 1905-1907" ("The relation of political parties in the Kingdom of Poland to the agrarian question in the years 1905-1907"), *Zeszyty Naukowe. Uniwersytet Lodzki.* Seria III: Nauki economiczne, zeszyt 16 (1967), 203-204.

87. Koprukowniak, "Obszarnicy lubelscy," 264.

88. *Robotnik* (No. 159, 4.VIII.1906; No. 160, 9.VIII.1906); Koprukowniak "Obszarnicy lubelscy," 264.

89. *Kurier Warszawski* (No. 89, 30.III.1905), 6.

90. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, III, 606-607.

91. *Ibid.*, III, 156.

92. *Ibid.*, III, 49.

93. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, III, 708; Koprukowniak, *Ruchy rewolucyjne*, 129, 138-139.

94. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, III, 56-57, 707.

95. *Ibid.*, III, 191-192.

96. *Ibid.*, III, 56-67, 797.

97. *Ibid.*, III, 406.

98. *Ibid.*, III, 49.

99. *Ibid.*, III, 637-638.

100. *Ibid.*, III, 638-639.

101. *Ibid.*, III, 233.

102. *Ibid.*, III, 228, 233.

103. Koprukowniak, "Obszarnicy lubelscy," 269.

104. *Kurier Warszawski* (No. 89, 30.III.1905), 6.

105. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, III, 191-192.

106. Koprukowniak, *Ruchy rewolucyjne*, 144.

107. Jerzy Peterkiewicz, *The Third Adam* (London, Oxford University Press 1975), 16.

108. I have made this estimate on the basis of the following data and assumptions. The number of Poles in the Kingdom of Poland in 1905 was some 8,000,000 (with an adult population of 4,000,000). I am assuming that contemporary estimates of Mariavite strength refer to adults. The journal *Krytyka* estimated that there were 250,000 Mariavites in Russian Poland at the end of 1907 (6% of the Catholic population). By that time the number of Mariavites had already begun to decline. In February, 1906 the Bishop of Plock calculated that there were 30,000 Mariavites (20%) and 120,000 Catholics in his bishopric. The 1906 Franciscan mission to Poland recovered 30,000 Mariavite medals in Siedlce Province and 11,000 in Lublin Province. The principal account of the mission indicates that there was little Mariavite influence in the Dabrowa and Old Polish Basins-- the other major region of the mission's work. *Krytyka* also suggested that the Mariavites had substantial

support in major textile centers in Piotrkow Province, such as Lodz and Zgierz. The Mariavite movement was strongest in populous Warsaw Province, where Mariavite crowds of up to 2,000 frequently used force to take over parishes. Overall, then, it would seem reasonable to estimate Mariavite peak strength at 10-15% of the Polish population. See GW I 54/1906 k. 43; *Krytyka* 9 (2-1907), 121; 9 (10-1907), 223; Czeslaw Bogdalski, *Misje braci niniejszych sw. Franciszka w. Krolestwie Polskim w roku 1906 odbytu* (*The mission of the Franciscan Friars to the Kingdom of Poland in the year 1906*) (Warsaw, 1907), 110-112.

109. GW I 54/1906, k. 13, 50, 81-82, 92-93. The entire volume of over 660 pages of documents is devoted to the Mariavite question.

110. GW I 54/1906, k. 13.

111. GW I 54/1906, k. 553.

112. GW I 54/1906, k. 546, 548, 553.

113. WGZZ 1721, k. 116-117; GW I 54/1906, k. 82-83.

114. GW I 54/1906, k. 201, 205.

115. GW I 54/1906, k. 217-225.

116. Kalabinski and Tych, *Walki chlopow*, III, 400.

117. WGZZ 1736, k. 243.