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Japanese-Soviet Relations Under Gorbachev

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About relations with Japan. Here, too, signs of change for the better are being noticed. It would be good if this turn does take place. The objective position of our two countries in the world is such that it requires extensive cooperation on a healthy, realistic basis and in an atmosphere of tranquility unburdened by the problems. A start was made this year. There was an exchange of visits by Ministers for Foreign Affairs. On the agenda is an exchange of visits at the highest level.

Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok, July 29, 1986

If your doorbell rings, you open the door and invite your guest into your living room.

Yasuhiro Nakasone, December 3, 1985¹

A restrained relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan — great military and economic powers and geographically close neighbors in Northeast Asia — is an international anomaly of considerable magnitude. Resolution of this anomaly has been delayed for the last 40 years by several factors, some bilateral and others involving third parties. Yet, it would be surprising if the two nations were anything but restrained and suspicious of each other. Historically they fought each other in East Asia since the turn of the century. The two countries have very little in common in social, political, and cultural spheres. For this and other reasons, the Soviet image in Japan is extremely unfavorable. Yet the growth of both nations' power — militarily for Moscow and economically for Tokyo — has gradually and steadily increased the mutual necessity for improving relations. Given Soviet military strength in the Pacific, Tokyo has attempted, without much success, to have its relations with Moscow in a "self-confident and unhostile" manner.² Moscow's policy toward Tokyo was somewhat inactive, if not negative, resulting in more damage to itself than to the Japanese. Recently this policy appears to be changing. This

essay examines the probable causes of this change, actual processes of improvement, remaining obstacles, and future prospects.

Possible Motivations

In the face of domestic economic stagnation, widespread social apathy, and a widening technological gap vis-a-vis the West, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has initiated a new Soviet diplomacy. Clearly shown in statements and actions since his coming to power in March 1985, the Gorbachev leadership appears to be seeking to integrate domestic and foreign policy in a mutually reinforcing combination, stressing particularly that Soviet international relations should be subordinated to the prime task of economic modernization at home in full recognition of the multipolar and interdependent character of contemporary international relations.³ For this reason, strained Soviet relations with Japan are no longer tolerable for Gorbachev. He has to reconsider Japan, as Japan has become in fact *Pax Nipponica*, passing even the United States as the richest country in the world. The economic leverage of Japan, the world's most competitive economic power and biggest creditor, observes Ezra Vogel, is likely to grow and to be used in pursuit of neomercantilist objectives.⁴ Clearly therefore both Moscow and Tokyo have much to gain, particularly in economic relations, from each other. They are, as American economists Ed A. Hewett and Herbert S. Levine note, "the most natural trading partners."⁵ For this reason, Gorbachev has sought to improve relations with Japan in his Vladivostok speech, July 1986:

Economic cooperation is of mutual interest. This especially concerns our coastal regions, which already maintain business contacts with Japanese firms. *We may discuss the question of establishing joint enterprises in contiguous and nearby regions of the USSR and Japan.* Why not also establish long-term cooperation in the investigation and all-round exploitation of ocean resources? Why not link together the programmes for the peaceful study and use of outer space? The Japanese, it seems,

have a method of making relations more dynamic: it is called '*economic diplomacy*.' This time let it serve Soviet-Japanese cooperation.⁶

Moreover, Japan has a powerful military-industrial potential that the USSR can ill afford to ignore any longer. Japan has already indicated its plan to participate in the U.S. SDI program. Gorbachev's Vladivostok initiative toward Japan has, therefore, a similar inner logic in regard to improving relations with China: the sooner, the better. Japan's burgeoning economic ties with China⁷ are particularly alarming to Moscow. Given the increasing protectionist sentiment in the United States, prospects for improving relations with Moscow are equally appealing to Tokyo. In fact, seen from Tokyo, normalizing relations with Moscow is the last unfinished diplomatic task for Japanese diplomacy since the post-war era. Nakasone, like Deng, had initially responded positively, but failed to make significant progress during his five-year tenure as the Japanese prime minister.

For Japan, Nakasone, perhaps the most articulate and outspoken political leader of the postwar period and often regarded as the "weather-vane," tried harder than any of his predecessors to globalize Japanese economic-foreign policy.⁸ His predecessors, without much success, attempted to establish what is often called "multi-directional" diplomacy for similar purposes. But after having brought his hitherto isolated island country onto the center of the world stage, Nakasone failed to reach out and touch Moscow.

Sources of Linkage

Two crucial factors affect Japanese-Soviet relations. First is the China factor. This was largely neutralized by the 1978 Sino-Japanese normalization treaty, a treaty that had been vehemently opposed by Moscow over the so-called "anti-hegemony" clause, and substantially improved Sino-Soviet relations subsequently. The Sino-Japanese normalization, it should be recalled, came about in September 1972, after Richard Nixon's historic

trip to Beijing in February 1972. In the case of China, Tokyo went faster and further than Washington for it was not until 1979 that Washington finally normalized relations with Beijing. At any rate, there appears a compatible mutuality of interests in the Beijing-Tokyo-Washington triangle, primarily based on a mutually perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union.

But relations with the U.S. pose a basic dilemma for both Moscow and Tokyo. Seen from Tokyo, the delay of Gorbachev's visit to Japan, although anticipated in January 1987 throughout Japan, has been primarily caused by his preoccupation with superpower relations. The Soviet Union under Gorbachev, Hiroshi Kimura observes, "pays more attention to its policy toward Japan,"⁹ as evidenced by words and deeds, both of which will be examined in more detail below. In his Vladivostok speech Gorbachev characterized Japan as "a power of top-level significance."¹⁰ The exchange of foreign ministers' visits between Moscow and Tokyo in 1986 was a clear demonstration that not only the Soviet Union but also Japan realized the increasing necessity of improving mutual relations. Yet paradoxically enough because of its increasingly favorable economic position vis-a-vis Washington, Japan's need for the U.S. does not necessarily diminish but increases. Tokyo needs to strengthen, not weaken, economic-political-military ties with Washington in order to cope with increasing Soviet military buildup in the Pacific and to be able to negotiate with Moscow not out of weakness but from a position of strength.

Perhaps it was for this reason that Nakasone, during his January 1983 visit to Washington, described American-Japanese relations as *unmei kyodotai* — a community bound together by a common destiny.¹¹ He emphasized the same theme during his next Washington visit, in April 1986, claiming that "the cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States is expanding its truly global dimensions and is ever growing in importance."¹² Not unexpectedly, a continued intimate American-Japanese relationship has been stressed by Japan's new prime minister, Noboru Takeshita — Nakasone's handpicked successor. Consistently following

the legacy of Nakasone was a theme also emphasized by Takeshita's foreign minister, Susuke Uno, Nakasone's reliable protégé. Yet, paradoxically, the harder Japan tries to be intimate with the West, the more frictions and stresses result. Thus the Japanese *haragai* (gut-feeling) is that though they may be prosperous, they are still largely isolated. On the 42nd anniversary of the end of World War II, the *Mainichi Daily News* editorial reminded its readers that Japan has become a nation of "abundance and isolation." Former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has characterized modern Japan as "a nation without a friend." Some see this as reflected in the Japanese attitude and knowledge that they will never be Westerners no matter how Westernized they might become.¹³

In improving Japanese-Soviet ties, American-Soviet relations are vital for two reasons. First, without progress in Moscow-Washington connections, Tokyo risks increasing Washington's fear and apprehension in improving relations with Moscow. Washington's successful *détente* with Beijing in 1972 was essential for Tokyo's subsequent efforts to normalize relations with China. Second, progress in Soviet-American relations has meant a reduction of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) from the Asian-Pacific region. Yet it is not the United States that has been restraining Japan, but rather the superpower relationship itself that has placed a serious Soviet initiative towards Japan on hold.¹⁴ Clearly realizing this, Tokyo fully supports superpower summit diplomacy. Nakasone stressed that the momentum for American-Soviet dialogue, spurred by the November 1985 Gorbachev-Reagan Geneva summit should move forward steadily. At the same time, Japan, as a rising power, is not likely to rule out the possibility — highly remote and unlikely at the present — that the global balance of power will not remain indefinitely in Washington's favor. It is by no means inconceivable that Tokyo, as it gradually becomes more independent of Washington, will be increasingly perceived in Washington as moving closer to Moscow. This will become much more apparent with the gradual erosion of America's economic power.¹⁵ Moreover the Japanese ruling elites have historically operated under their centuries-old

traditional principle, *nagai mono ni makareru* (do not offend the powerful). Tokyo's Herculean task is to improve relations with Moscow without causing fear and apprehension in the United States.¹⁶ The course to be selected for Japan, the *Mainichi Daily News* told its readers in August 1987, must be coexistence and co-prosperity and at times "coexistence and cosuffering."¹⁷

At any rate, the prospects for improving Soviet-Japanese relations appear somewhat brighter since the November 1987 announcement of Gorbachev-Reagan meetings — first in the United States in December 1987 and second in the Soviet Union in 1988. How much progress can we realistically expect in the Japanese-Soviet relationship? Would it follow the pattern of the Beijing-Tokyo-Washington triangle? The key variable is of course the Soviet-American relationship. In other words, could it possibly become comparable with the Sino-American relationship? Unless and until the former becomes as compatible as the latter, the Moscow-Tokyo-Washington triangle is hardly likely to be as harmonious as the Beijing-Tokyo-Washington triangle.

How can the Soviet-Japanese relationship be improved? Would Takeshita be strong enough to renew the invitation to Gorbachev, provided Gorbachev would be willing to reconsider visiting Japan? Or perhaps the new Japanese prime minister would be more inclined to meet with Gorbachev in Moscow. From Gorbachev's perspective, why Japan first, why not Beijing? Perhaps a meeting with Deng would be more desirable for his own internal modernization drive. Would it be possible to improve relations between Moscow and Tokyo at the foreign ministers' level? After all, summit diplomacy is not necessarily the panacea. Takeshita's foreign minister Uno, having been held as a prisoner of war in Siberia for two years, speaks Russian and Chinese.¹⁸ One sure way to anticipate the uncertain future is to examine the past.

Exchange of Foreign Ministers' Visits

Immediately after assuming power, Gorbachev appointed Edward Shevardnadze to replace Andrei Gromyko¹⁹ as the Soviet Foreign Minister in July 1985. Gorbachev expressed his view at the Supreme Soviet in December 1985, that there was a realistic possibility of improving relations with Japan. In return, Nakasone responded positively, in his 1986 new-year's message, by declaring that "I would like to see 1986 be a year of strengthening of friendly relations between Japan and the USSR, and to have it mark the beginning of long-term and stable intercourse between our neighboring countries."²⁰ The Soviet media began to stress the need to learn Japan's modern technology, characterizing Japan as the land of the rising sun. Describing Gorbachev as "intelligent and dignified" to the Japanese Diet, Nakasone wanted a proper visit to Japan by the young Soviet leader.²¹ Such a visit was certainly regarded as a feat for Nakasone and he expected to produce tangible results from his own return visit to Moscow, thereby completing the unfinished Japanese diplomatic task during his tenure.

To prepare for a possible Japanese-Soviet summit, the countries' foreign ministers exchanged visits. Gorbachev dispatched his newly-appointed Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze to Tokyo — the first such visit by a Soviet foreign prime minister in ten years.²² Incredible as it may seem, no top Soviet leader has ever visited Japan, while several Japanese prime ministers and foreign ministers have visited Moscow on different occasions.²³

Shevardnadze's five-day visit (January 15-19, 1986) to Japan — one of his first major diplomatic journeys — turned out to be a moderate success. He arrived amid very tight security and demonstrations by more than 700 right-wing groups. Some 6,000 Japanese riot police posted at street corners and checkpoints blocked demonstrators from approaching Haneda Airport where he landed, the guest house where he stayed, and the Soviet Embassy.²⁴ Yet, unlike previous contacts, going back several decades, when senior Soviet officials had frequently offended the

Japanese sense of politeness with a series of snubs and overt threats, the new Soviet Foreign Minister's diplomatic conduct was, by and large, pleasing to the Japanese. Shevardnadze's extensive talks (eleven hours) with his counterpart, Shintaro Abe, and friendly discussion with Nakasone clearly demonstrated a fresh Soviet effort towards improving relations with Japan. These had chilled when Japan had imposed sanctions after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the crackdown by Soviet-backed government on the Polish trade union, Solidarity.²⁵

Shevardnadze, unlike Gromyko, did not refuse to discuss the territorial issue with Abe. In fact, they reportedly talked about it for more than three hours. They agreed to resume long-suspended negotiations on a peace treaty by regular annual meetings between them in Moscow and Tokyo by stating that in keeping with the agreement accorded in the Joint Soviet-Japanese Statement of October 10, 1973, the two ministers held talks on the signing of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty, including the questions which might make up its contents.²⁶ The reference to the 1973 communiqué had been vehemently rejected by Gromyko for the past ten years, thus preventing discussion of the territorial issue. At the same time Shevardnadze and Abe signed agreements on taxation and trade payments covering the period from 1986 to 1990, extended a temporary accord on cultural and educational exchanges, and most importantly, arranged for two summits between Gorbachev and Nakasone to be held first in Tokyo and later in Moscow.²⁷ Nakasone reportedly told Shevardnadze that "it is really time."²⁸ While the extent of their discussion on the territorial question is not known, it was still the most significant step taken by both countries in recent years, showing the potential for improving much strained relations.

In addition, the Soviet foreign minister assured his host that he would study, from a 'humanitarian standpoint' Japan's request for visits to ancestral graves by Japanese (originally more than 16,000) who had been displaced from two of the disputed islands occupied by the Soviet Union in 1945 (Habomai and Shikotan; the other two being Kunashiri and

Etorofu). Such Japanese visits had been suspended in 1976 as relations between the two nations had deteriorated.²⁹ Apparently, Shevardnadze impressed the Japanese with his mild but firm manner during his first trip. Reportedly he talked softly in public for the most part, smiled a great deal, and at his news conference at the Japan Press Club in Tokyo even tried a mild joke or two. For all the diplomatic maneuvering, however, Shevardnadze made it clear that Moscow had no intention of modifying its firm stands, including that on the northern islands.³⁰

In contrast with these moderate accomplishments, Shevardnadze's protest over Japan's planned involvement in the U.S. SDI research was not well received in Japan. This was seen by Tokyo as very much reminiscent of Moscow's vehement opposition to the 1978 Sino-Japanese treaty of normalization because of the so-called "anti-hegemony" clause. There was very little, if anything, that Moscow could possibly have done to eliminate the clause. In fact, because of Moscow's clumsy and exaggerated negative reaction, an anti-Soviet Sino-Japanese posture was greatly solidified. Tokyo's SDI involvement was raised again, but only mildly, by Gorbachev during Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe's Moscow visit.³¹

Abe's return visit to Moscow took place during May 29-31, 1986, less than six months after Shevardnadze's visit to Tokyo. In comparison, the Moscow atmosphere during Abe's return visit was much more intimate. Gorbachev personally took time to receive Abe in the Kremlin, receiving a personal message from Nakasone. The Soviet leader reportedly informed Abe that "*we have made a principled political decision to utilize all possibilities for developing and improving relations with Japan in all areas, regardless of its relations with other countries.*"³² Departing somewhat from the past, he suggested that, in Moscow's perspective, Soviet-Japanese bilateral relations have become too important to be affected by third countries. He also proposed to his guest to solve "bilaterally" the issue of medium-range nuclear missiles, insisting that for the Soviet Union to destroy its missiles in the eastern part of the USSR aimed at Japan, the

U.S. should also destroy its corresponding nuclear weapons aimed at the USSR from Japan and its coastal waters. Yet, on the territorial question, Gorbachev appeared steadfast as he declared that mutually beneficial bilateral Soviet-Japanese relations can be established only on a "basis of reciprocity, *with the understanding that no one will tamper with the results of the Second World War or the inviolability of borders.*"³³ Promising to consider Japanese requests for commercial fishing in the Soviet economic zone and for visiting ancestral graves in the disputed islands, Gorbachev asked Abe to convey to the Japanese leadership and people the Soviet desire "to seek paths to greater mutual understanding and cooperation" without "perfidious designs."³⁴

Thereafter Shevardnadze hosted a luncheon for Abe.³⁵ Recalling his first visit to Tokyo in January, the Soviet foreign minister stated "we did not try to set up the maximum possible programs and we did not dramatize our differences, but patiently and with goodwill we tried to find ways to bring our two positions closer."³⁶ The Moscow joint communiqué issued at the end of Abe's visit was much longer, more specific, and somewhat more positive in comparison with the Tokyo statement. On a bilateral level, both sides confirmed their plans for summits in Tokyo and Moscow between Gorbachev and Nakasone as it had been agreed in January in Tokyo. They also reaffirmed their previous agreement to hold annual consultations at the foreign ministers' level; and accordingly Shevardnadze accepted an invitation to visit Japan sometime in 1987. They also decided to establish an annual discussion at the level of deputy foreign ministers; the next such meeting would take place in Moscow. They indicated their willingness to continue to work toward concluding a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty. Both sides also agreed to promote further expansion of trade and economic relations. They pledged to support the Soviet-Japanese Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Honoring Abe's request, Shevardnadze announced that the Soviet Union would allow Japanese citizens, without entry visas, to travel to the

troubled islands to visit their ancestors' graves.³⁷ Subsequently, fifty-six Japanese visited their ancestors' graves in August 1986.³⁸

The Moscow communiqué also recognized, on a multilateral level, the necessity of working together to reduce tensions in the Asian and Pacific region. They stressed that "constructive assistance for the efforts of countries situated there on the basis of respect for their independence would serve the cause of peace and stability in that region."³⁹ Mindful of the Chernobyl nuclear accident, both sides agreed on the need for international efforts, including a search for ways to enhance the roles and capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Finally they expressed satisfaction with the progress of the work based on the Soviet-American-Japanese agreement announced at the Gorbachev-Reagan summit in Geneva in November 1985 to enhance the safety of flights in the northern part of the Pacific after the Korean Airline tragedy in September, 1985.⁴⁰

Meanwhile Moscow-Tokyo relations appeared to be improving simultaneously along with Moscow-Beijing relations. The reasons for this are not difficult to find. Moscow has a territorial dispute with Tokyo over the northern territory, and with China three "obstacles" prevent the improvement of relations — the stationing of a large number of Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and Soviet support for the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. The Soviet needs for capital and high technology, while much greater than anything that the Chinese could possibly offer, can be compared with Soviet needs for improving political relations with Beijing. Of course, as noted, steadily improving Soviet-Chinese relations greatly facilitated the improvement of Soviet relations with Japan and vice versa.

In between these two foreign ministers' visits, two closely related events in April 1986 deserve our attention. The first was a Japanese trade mission to Moscow, invited by Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, who, in March 1986, in his ambitious but frank report on the guidelines for

economic and social development
in 2000, proposed that

We hold that in the modern world, economic and technical ties and cooperation are *necessary*. For us they are a condition for peaceful good-neighboring relations and for increasing national economic strength.

Faithful to its policy of peaceful coexistence, the developed capitalist countries apply to practically all countries the same principles, and so on.

By arguing that it means, "the first thing we must do is to increase the production of raw materials," he indicated that economic relations would be restricted to areas of mutual interest and deficiencies."⁴³

To eliminate them, he was exclusively directed toward economic cooperation given the complex relationship, as we noted.

The Japanese trade mission representatives at the 25th anniversary of the formation of the Free Trade Area on Economic Cooperation in 1990, their counterparts, during their visit to the Hammer Center. Among others, Mitsui, Nippon Steel, and Komatsu trade officials explained

ment that openly injected the politico-military element by suggesting that Moscow would welcome an all-Asian forum to create a nuclear-free zone in the Asian and Pacific region.⁵³

At the same time, the Soviet document, fully recognizing the growing economic strength of the Pacific Basin centered around Japan and the four Asian NICs (newly industrialized countries: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan),⁵⁴ indicated Moscow's desire to be part of the region by declaring that:

The Soviet Union is deeply convinced that the establishment of broad cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual advantage among all countries of the Asian and Pacific region, regardless of differences in their social systems, is in the fundamental interest of the states in this part of the world and will facilitate a restructuring of international relations on an equal, democratic basis. *Our country is prepared to take a very active part in this regional peaceful cooperation and to use for this purpose the economic, scientific and technical potentials at its disposal.*⁵⁵

Soviet readiness to join in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) was reiterated by Gorbachev in his July 27 Vladivostok speech, claiming that "it is conceived of not according to a bloc, anti-socialist pattern."⁵⁶ Academician Yevgeny Primakov, Director of the Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations,⁵⁷ was in Japan, reportedly sounding out the possibility of an observer status for the Soviets in the November 1986 PECC plenary meeting in Vancouver, Canada.⁵⁸ While the Primakov mission was not welcomed by the Japanese foreign ministry, Saburo Okita, a prominent figure in the PECC and a former Japanese foreign minister, reportedly resisted strong pressure from the Japanese foreign ministry. Subsequently, for the first time, Moscow sent an observer to the (PECC) plenary meeting in Vancouver, November 16-19, 1986.⁵⁹

For a while, prospects for Gorbachev's Tokyo visit became much brighter with Nakasone's stunning election victory in July, 1986.⁶⁰

Nakasone's victory and the weaknesses of any possible successors not only bolstered his strength,⁶¹ but they even extended his tenure as prime minister — by prolonging his presidency of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party — for another full year until October 1987. Apparently this extraordinary arrangement was made so that Nakasone could accomplish what he called "truly historic achievements," one of which undoubtedly was to improve much strained Soviet-Japanese relations.⁶² For this major task, Nakasone immediately replaced his Foreign Minister Abe, who reportedly had his own ambition to achieve the historical mission, with one of Nakasone's own protégés, Tadashi Kuranari.⁶³

Before and after the decisive election, Nakasone reportedly utilized all available means — allegedly more unofficial than official⁶⁴ — for a summit with Gorbachev in Japan. Disregarding a reluctant and suspicious foreign ministry bureaucracy, he dispatched to Moscow, in June 1986, Ichiro Suetsugu, who maintains close links with influential Soviets. This was followed by Academician Yevgeni Primakov's visit to Tokyo to explore a possible compromise on the territorial issue.⁶⁵ Still some other observers even speculated that Nakasone's "real agent" was Michael Deaver, who until recently was the high-powered but controversial Washington lobbyist who, while on President Reagan's staff, forged close ties with former Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington, now a party secretary and the director of international affairs of the CPSU's central committee. Nakasone's reported use of Deaver was intended to reduce any possible U.S. anxiety over a possible Japanese-Soviet summit.⁶⁶ Internally, Nakasone assigned the task of preparing Gorbachev's Tokyo visit to Kazutoshi Hasegawa who, after serving as Nakasone's secretary, returned to the foreign ministry as deputy head of the European affairs bureau covering the Soviet Union.⁶⁷

The primary task for arranging Gorbachev's Tokyo visit was largely handled by the able Soviet Ambassador to Japan Nikolai Solovyev and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa. As a clear indication of his new overture to Japan, Gorbachev sent a highly competent young

diplomat to Tokyo. Solovyev, a professional diplomat fluent in Japanese is, in his own words, "two generations younger" than some of his predecessors.⁶⁸ In his first press conference at the Japan National Press Club, he put his own upbeat gloss on Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech, claiming that the important thing "is to treat each other patiently and level-headedly ... to bring our people closer" despite the fact that "both our countries have a complicated heritage from the past."⁶⁹

Paraphrasing Gorbachev's statement to Abe in May 1986, the Soviet ambassador stated that it was not for the Soviet Union to tell Japan what kind of relations it should have with China and the United States so long as they would not increase tensions in the region. He stressed that there are many fields — economic, political, and cultural — where the Soviet Union and Japan could cooperate for mutual benefit. Concerning possible joint ventures with Japanese industries, which was mentioned in the Vladivostok speech, Solovyev said that Moscow would be interested in seeking simple projects in the initial stage, such as processing of marine resources, timber processing, and rice growing.⁷⁰ Solovyev's diplomatic behavior was certainly refreshing to the Japanese who were much more accustomed to what Hiroshi Kimura characterizes as "a self-defeating, provocative diplomacy."⁷¹ Solovyev's predecessor, Dimitri S. Polyansky, in contrast, had held his first press conference in four years on March 5, 1980.⁷²

Gorbachev's Vladivostok Speech

More than anything else, Gorbachev's July 1986 Vladivostok speech symbolized his serious intention to break from the past and to start anew. In this effort, he has sought to "reckon with realities."⁷³ In all probability, it will go down in history as one of his most significant speeches. Fully cognizant of Japan's growing economic power, Gorbachev proposed to improve relations with the entire Pacific region centered around Japan. His primary emphasis appeared to be more on geo-economics than on

ideology and military matters. No other Soviet leader ever attempted such comprehensive reconciliatory overtures. His predecessors lacked his courage and vision.

Gorbachev spent a whole week in the Soviet Far East — his first trip to the region — visiting Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Komsolok-na-Amure, and Khabarovsk. His unscheduled person-to-person encounters with ordinary people at every stop and his surprisingly frank speech in Khabarovsk on July 31 on domestic policy issues were every bit as historic and significant as his earlier comprehensive speech on economic and foreign policy in Vladivostok.

Why did he go to the Soviet Far East? What did he intend to accomplish? On his arrival in Vladivostok, July 25th, he said, "I want to see everything for myself, and then say something, and not only to you."⁷⁴ What he saw, judging from what he said, was not all good. Despite heavier investment, the Far Eastern economy, he complained, was growing "much more slowly than the national economy as a whole."⁷⁵ Why? He said it was because of a "life of inertia, resistant to restructuring and accelerating" even in the middle of what he called a major "whirlwind of changes ... when the new is intermingling with the old, and pillars of life that only yesterday seemed unshakable are giving way."⁷⁶

"Who is responsible and what must be done about these problems?" They are caused, in the final analysis, by what he characterized as "*political shortsightedness*" on the part of certain high officials⁷⁷ — "*the most costly mistakes as they affect the economy, people's mood, and all of society.*" Because of them, he declared, "many problems have accumulated in the country."⁷⁸ To cope with these problems, Gorbachev called for improving the Soviet Far East economy by "*all-out intensification on the basis of scientific and technical progress by developing active economic relations with all other Pacific countries.*"⁷⁹ In this regard, Gorbachev stressed the importance of improving relations with Japan and the newly industrializing countries (NICs).

Gorbachev was not the only leader who visited Vladivostok. Leonid Brezhnev was there in November 1974 to confer with Gerald Ford.⁸⁰ Previously Nikita Khrushchev also had been there in 1954 to inspect the Soviet Pacific Fleet at Golden Horn. Yet, unlike them, Gorbachev did not say much about the military in his Vladivostok speech. In striking contrast with his predecessors, there was less saber-rattling.

Perhaps the most controversial part of Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech was his proposal for a Pacific security conference modeled on the Helsinki formula. At the end of his lengthy speech, he stated that:

we would like to propose a conference, in the mold of the Helsinki conference, to be attended by all countries gravitating toward the Ocean. When an agreement is reached on its convocation (if an agreement is reached, of course), it will be possible to establish the place for this conference. *Hiroshima is a possible option.*⁸¹

It was a highly ambiguous, vague proposal, repeating much of his May 21, 1985 speech welcoming Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.⁸² Gorbachev's May 1985 proposal was viewed by Washington observers as "an old one but the context is new."⁸³ Yet given the site proposed — Hiroshima — Gorbachev's call for a security conference was not taken seriously but seen as patently propagandistic. Despite the fact that he broadened the agenda with much more flexibility, Gorbachev's proposal caused an angry Japanese reaction.⁸⁴ At any rate, unlike the earlier Brezhnev proposal, Gorbachev's scheme appeared directed less against China than against the U.S. military presence in Asia.⁸⁵ Gorbachev was, in fact, harsh on the U.S. for having "the militarized Washington-Tokyo-Seoul triangle."⁸⁶ Yet, he refused to believe that the "*military-industrial complex is omnipotent.*"⁸⁷

After the Vladivostok speech, Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa visited Tokyo (August, 1986). In order gain maximum Japanese public support, Kapitsa's trip was carefully timed to coincide with Japanese visits to their ancestral graves on the northern islands. As the tangible benefit of im-

proving Soviet-Japanese relations, a group of fifty-six Japanese, including forty-six former islanders, left on August 22 on a four-day journey, sailing on the *Nemuro Hokkaido*, an 892-ton chartered ship, with hundreds of people seeing them off at the port. This was the first visit to ancestral graves on the islands which Moscow had permitted without official entry visas in eleven years. Reportedly most of the Japanese were selected older people, for many of whom this would be the last opportunity to visit their family tombs.⁸⁸ After Soviet troops landed on the islands in September, 1945, Moscow had expelled some 16,000 Japanese living there. In 1964 Moscow began allowing Japanese who had family members buried there to make brief visits without passports or visas. Visits for the purpose of tending graves, an important part of Japanese religious tradition, continued from 1964 to 1975. But in 1976, with relations worsening, Moscow demanded that Japanese visitors obtain visas. The visits then stopped as the Tokyo government refused to have its citizens apply for Soviet entry visas as this would imply Japan's admission that the islands were part of Soviet territory.⁸⁹

Even before a specific date was, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reportedly told his Japanese counterpart when they met in New York, in September 1986, that any question, apparently including the territorial issue, could be discussed after a date for Gorbachev's visit to Japan had been fixed. Ambassador Solovyev went one step further, on September 29, by suggesting that the issue could have a positive outcome after the summit. Kapitsa reportedly stated, on October 29, that the Kremlin was preparing for Gorbachev's visit to Japan, but failed to provide an exact date. Solovyev was reported to have returned to Moscow on November 11, two days before a Japanese-Soviet working meeting in Moscow on November 13-14 to finalize agreements for Gorbachev's pending Japan visit.⁹⁰

Meanwhile Kapitsa's visit was widely reported throughout Japan. Reacting to announced preparations "under way" for Gorbachev's visit to Japan in January 1987, Nakasone expressed his enthusiasm, declaring that

"I do have a strong sense of responsibility to fulfill what I have promised to the public which gave me an unexpectedly strong political mandate in the last general election."⁹¹ At the same time, observing that Gorbachev attached greater importance to Japan, Nakasone declared "If Mr. Gorbachev visits Japan, it is quite reasonable for a Japanese prime minister, though that does not necessarily mean myself, to return a visit to Moscow."⁹² Yet Gorbachev's planned trip to Japan did not take place. A brief *Pravda* commentary accused Japan of allegedly whipping up "unfriendly, chauvinistic feeling" against the Soviet Union.⁹³

Had there been a Gorbachev-Nakasone summit, could it possibly have broken the protracted deadlock between Moscow and Tokyo? Certainly it would have warranted a place in the history books. Nakasone was aware that the late Prime Minister Eisaku Sato had won back the Okinawa islands from the U.S. in 1969, for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in the late 1970s; and Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and the late Masayashi Ohira were able to normalize relations with China during their terms. Nakasone was clearly casting about for a similar diplomatic coup in order to gain a place in history.

This was not to be. It still remains curious that Gorbachev's scheduled trip did not take place. In all probability, the postponement was less the result of an "unfriendly" Japanese attitude as claimed by Moscow than of bureaucratic mishandlings by both sides. For some reason, foreign ministry officials of both countries, particularly of Japan, were less than supportive of a Gorbachev-Nakasone summit. Probably fearing his foreign minister's personal jealousy, Nakasone replaced Abe in late July, 1986, with one of his protégés, the less-experienced Tadashi Kuranari. Still the *Gaimusho's* (Japanese foreign ministry) Soviet desk officials were reportedly skeptical, claiming that "Russia is a nation who sees diplomacy in terms of half or whole centuries; a prime minister [Nakasone] who has only one year to go simply can't accomplish anything — rather he will be a toy in Russian hands."⁹⁴

At any rate, Gorbachev's postponement of the much-speculated Japan visit coincided with the replacement of Mikhail Kapitsa with Igor Rogachev as a Soviet deputy foreign minister in January, 1987. Thereafter, Kapitsa was appointed acting head of the Institute of Oriental Studies. Nakasone originally planned to visit Washington early in January and then to host Gorbachev's Japan visit. Instead Nakasone became the first Japanese premier to make a foray into Moscow's own backyard — Finland, East Germany, Poland, and Yugoslavia — hoping to gain insights on how Moscow's diplomacy would likely develop under Gorbachev, and perhaps when Mr. Gorbachev appeared to be pulling back from the proposed visit, to show Moscow that Japan is not without influence among Moscow's closest neighbors and allies.⁹⁵

For successful policy changes, any leadership needs two basic prerequisites: a firm control over bureaucratic decision-making machinery and sustained internal supports for new policy initiatives. The foreign policy of a nation is a very complicated and complex phenomenon, resulting not only from calculated strategic interests, but also from pulling and hauling among individuals with differing perceptions of and stakes in national security, domestic, organizational and personal interests.⁹⁶

Unresolved Issues

What are the outstanding issues between Moscow and Tokyo? Three basic issues still remain: the northern territories, trade, and security questions.

No other single issue has raised as much controversy, emotional national pride, and entanglement as the northern territorial issue between Moscow and Tokyo. To Tokyo the issue is one — if not the major — stumbling block in improving relations with the Soviet Union.⁹⁷ The issue concerns a group of four islands — Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai.⁹⁸ At the end of World War II the Soviet Union, in accordance with the Yalta Agreement, took over the islands, as the United States oc-

cupied Okinawa; this was confirmed by the 1952 San Francisco Treaty. The Japanese claim that, inasmuch as Japan was not a party to the Yalta accord and the Soviet Union was not involved in the San Francisco Treaty, the islands are occupied illegally by the Soviet Union. While the Japanese argument appears somewhat flawed, the issue is not so much a legal as a highly charged political issue. The issue, therefore, is not likely to be resolved to the complete satisfaction of both sides. Acknowledging this reality, the late Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin suggested, in his 1967 Moscow meeting with then Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki, the possibility of concluding an interim measure — without spelling it out in detail — toward an eventual peace treaty.⁹⁹

The issue gained much more attention since the U.S. return of Okinawa in 1969.¹⁰⁰ In the spring of 1969, the Tokyo government announced that the four islands would appear as Japanese territory on all maps. Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka declared, in a Diet speech in June 1973, that "the postwar era does not end until the northern islands are returned to Japan."¹⁰¹ He even dared to suggest buying the four islands from the Soviet Union.¹⁰² Kazushige Hirasawa, an adviser to Prime Minister Miki, recommended, in a 1977 article published in *Foreign Affairs*, that while Japan should not renounce its claim to the islands, the whole issue ought to be postponed until the twenty-first century.¹⁰³ The Hirasawa proposal met with a largely negative response from the Japanese foreign ministry, and no action was taken. In the early 1980s the Japanese government was similarly negative about Soviet proposals that the two countries should negotiate a treaty of good neighborly relations or alternatively implement confidence-building measures, thus decoupling the issues of a peace treaty and the northern territory.¹⁰⁴ Yet there are some Japanese observers, Hiroshi Kimura informs us, who support the so-called "exit theory," seeing the territorial issue as a goal to be reached as a consequence of improved Japanese-Soviet relations.¹⁰⁵

Why are both sides so adamant in holding to their positions about a group of four islands at the expense of potentially mutual benefits? One

of the reasons is undoubtedly national pride. In a sense, both countries have become prisoners of their own past. On the high, holy ground of nationalism and self-righteousness, they now base their legitimate claims to territoriality. Another practical reason for inaction on both sides is the relatively limited incentive for Tokyo. Rightly or wrongly, Tokyo believes that by insisting on its claim, it has much to gain but little to lose in terms of national pride. Even if they surrendered their claim, the Japanese do not expect substantial benefits in return. Moscow, on the other hand, would now, under Gorbachev's leadership, expect something in return from Tokyo in exchange for giving up its claim.

Meanwhile, Moscow has fortified the four islands. The Soviet Union systematically began to build up not only strategic nuclear forces but also conventional, particularly naval, forces. The construction of military outposts on Kunashiri and Etorofu was part of the effort to control the exits from the Sea of Okhotsk and make it an inland sea. The newer naval ships on the Soviet Pacific Fleet, including the Kiev-class carrier *Minsk*, have been introduced to increase the fleet's anti-submarine warfare capability and the deployment of the Backfire bombers is designed to operate against the carriers of the U.S. 7th Fleet.¹⁰⁶ In 1983, some thirty MIG-23 fighter-bombers were reportedly deployed on Etorofu between August and late September.¹⁰⁷

It is quite clear that Soviet policy toward Japan went beyond making hostile statements, by resorting to thinly-veiled military threats to discourage Tokyo from closer links with Washington. Soviet Army Chief of Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Orgarkov, in an interview with the *New York Times* on March 7, 1983, revealed for the first time that 108 SS-20s were deployed in the Far East. Andrei Gromyko, then the Soviet Foreign Minister, declared on April 2 that these missiles were specifically aimed at Japan, Okinawa, and South Korea, and warned that unless Tokyo strictly observed its three-point non-nuclear principles, Japan would become the target of Soviet nuclear attack.¹⁰⁸

From the above, therefore, it is quite clear that the territorial controversy still remains as an unresolved issue between Moscow and Tokyo. Yet how this crucial issue is going to be settled is far from clear. What appears certain, however, is that Gorbachev cannot possibly avoid discussing the territorial issue in his new diplomacy toward Japan. Already this was clearly indicated, a few days after the Vladivostok speech, to Soviet Ambassador to Japan Nikolai Solovyev by the head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's European Affairs Bureau, Takehiko Nishiyama, who informed the ambassador that Japan could not accept Gorbachev's Vladivostok assessment.¹⁰⁹ Some observers speculated that Gorbachev may offer Tokyo just Habomai and Shikotan — the two islands closest to Hokkaido — along with a possible Soviet concession for Japanese fishing rights in the seas off Hokkaido.¹¹⁰

Trade is a second unresolved issue. While the crucial question is its separability from the territorial issues, it contains much potential. In the past Japan insisted, not always successfully, on linking the two issues, whereas the Soviet Union demanded their separation. Regardless, this is Gorbachev's *primary objective* in his new overture toward Japan and Japanese leaders likewise are well aware of its fundamental importance. With this in mind, Gorbachev offered an economic olive branch: *economic diplomacy* to serve Soviet-Japanese interests.¹¹¹

Yet a successful future trade negotiation will likely be influenced by a number of internal and external factors. To begin with, it is certainly linked closely with Moscow's global "economic detente." As part of his comprehensive new economic strategy — to learn and earn from market economies — Gorbachev is attempting to integrate much of his troubled Soviet economy into the fast-moving world economy. Having even settled recently old Tsarist debts to London, Moscow has been aggressively seeking to join international financial institutions: the GATT, IMF, and even OPEC.¹¹² A twelve-man Foreign Economic Relations Commission, a supercommittee of ministers to be headed by Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Kamentsev and primarily to be responsible for world-wide joint

ventures with capitalist countries, started to function on January 1, 1986.¹¹³ Certainly Moscow considers Tokyo as one of its primary targets in globalizing economic activities. Even now, Japanese banks are the largest suppliers of funds to Moscow's East European allies. While much has been speculated, Gorbachev's world-wide economic venture will likely go through numerous trial-and-error processes that will be inevitably affected by the United States; and this in turn will certainly influence the prospects for a Soviet-Japanese trade relationship. Much more fundamentally, Gorbachev would have to liberate economics from politics, thereby establishing a decentralized, pluralistic economic structure to maximize the benefits from any possible improved trade with Japan.

Secondly, trade will be determined by the degree of the Japanese business community's interests. These interests seem to be increasing, although very slowly, primarily because of the stagnated domestic economy under export slowdown as a result of surplus yen¹¹⁴ (over 40% appreciation relative to the dollar during the October 1985 to October 1986 period),¹¹⁵ the loss of the Middle East market, increasing caution in Japan's China investment,¹¹⁶ and most of all increasing fear of protectionism in the U.S. Even before Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech, the Japanese business community expressed a cautious interest in Soviet joint ventures. This was indicated, as noted above, in the April 17, 1986 Soviet-Japanese joint communique at the end of the tenth Japan-Soviet Business Cooperation Committee meeting.¹¹⁷ Since Gorbachev's joint venture invitation in Vladivostok in July, more than a dozen Japanese firms (including major Japanese firms such as Marubeni Corp., C. Itoh and Co., Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Mitsui & Co., Mitsubishi Corp.) have signed joint ventures with Moscow in various industries on the basis of the Soviets holding a 51% share and the Japanese 49%.¹¹⁸ Japan's Sakhalin Oil Development Corporation also reportedly proposed, in September 1986, to resume negotiations with the Soviet foreign trade ministry. The project, initiated in 1972, is to explore oil and natural gas (liquefied natural gas) in the Odoptu and Chivo sections of northern Sakhalin in the Sea of Okhotsk.¹¹⁹

Japanese firms, at the present as in the past, have tried, without much success, to invite American firms to invest together in the Soviet Union to minimize risk in such undertakings in the Soviet Union and to reduce "unnecessary" U.S. fear and apprehension.¹²⁰ Thus, the extent of American participation remains largely uncertain. It has also been observed that many Japanese firms appear somewhat hesitant and puzzled — fully aware of their agonizing experiences in China — largely because of the Soviets' lack of understanding of the finer points of joint ventures: managerial skills, profit-sharing, employee training, the role of the trade unions and the Communist Party within such joint ventures. How these critical issues will be clarified is far from certain at the present time.

Finally, Soviet-Japanese trade negotiations, as noted above, will likely be less and less influenced by the United States and China. Mindful of American and Chinese reactions, the Japanese business community has been very actively globalizing trade opportunities, particularly in the Soviet Union. Participating in the largest industrial fair ever in Moscow, during October 15-24, 1986, a large number of Japanese business firms jockeyed for the edge as the old Soviet trading system is about to be replaced with a new one, making it much easier for Japanese firms to expand business opportunities. The fair was reported to have attracted 50,000 people daily.¹²¹

A third and final issue between Moscow and Tokyo is security. The immediate Soviet objective would be to limit and reduce the military value of Japan to the United States. During his discussion in May 1986 with Shintaro Abe on medium-range nuclear missiles in the Pacific, Gorbachev already indicated readiness to seek "a solution to this problem together with Japan."¹²³ In practical terms, this could possibly mean his desire to initiate arms control measures in the Pacific where there have not been any such serious control efforts, in contrast with the efforts in Europe where Moscow and Washington have been discussing those issues through various channels. Perhaps with this in mind, Gorbachev proposed, in his Vladivostok speech, a "Pacific conference, modeled on the Helsinki con-

ference [of 1975] with the participation of all countries having a relationship with the ocean."¹²⁴ Yet Gorbachev's strange suggestion of Hiroshima as a possible place for such a conference, even without any prior consultation with Tokyo, made the Japanese highly suspicious, if not resentful, of his initiative.¹²⁵ How much the Helsinki model could be emulated in the Pacific region remains somewhat questionable as it has been observed by Academician Yevgeni Primakov that security problems in the Pacific region "are much more pronounced than anywhere else."¹²⁶

If Gorbachev is really serious about taking advantage of Japan's peace movement and improving relations with Tokyo, he would have to reconsider the continued military buildup in the Pacific and particularly in Etorofu and Kunashiri. Seen from Tokyo, failure to do so would only make the Japanese more cynical and suspicious of his Vladivostok initiative. His predecessors' military buildup failed to produce commensurate political payoffs in Japan.¹²⁷ In fact, it has been largely counter-productive thus far.

Gorbachev's attempt to be serious about the security issue was somewhat revealed in his surprisingly radical nuclear arms proposal at the Reykjavik pre-summit with Reagan, October 11-12, 1986.¹²⁸ While both China and Japan previously demanded "concurrent and proportional" reductions of Soviet SS-20 nuclear missiles in both Asia and Europe, Japanese Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari, on September 9, 1986, expressed a more flexible stand by suggesting that Soviet SS-20s in Asia did not pose a major threat to Japan because they are allegedly aimed mainly "only" at China, and the U.S. nuclear deterrent in Asia is sufficient to counteract Moscow's Asian deployment. This meant that Tokyo did not want Moscow to open the door to press the issue of U.S. missiles in Asia, which many observers regard as a Pandora's box.¹²⁹ Gorbachev, in his press conference immediately after the Reykjavik pre-summit on October 12, claimed to have proposed to start negotiations "right away, [to] air our complaints and find solutions [in Asia]." He specifically proposed "a freeze on those [INF] missiles and the holding of talks to decide what to

do with them."¹³⁰ More specifics have been discussed and concluded at the Gorbachev-Reagan summit in December 1987 in Washington, D.C.

Future Perspectives

At the start of this essay we observed that the strained Moscow-Tokyo relationship is an international anomaly of considerable magnitude. Yet, their historical animosity and cultural differences notwithstanding, the two neighboring countries in the Pacific seem to be growing gradually aware of the mutual necessity for better relations. How long will it take to improve relations? Can Gorbachev accomplish this historical task? When will his visionary proposal to make Vladivostok the "window of the East" so that "ships of every flag and nation will hail" Russian shores as dreamed by Pushkin come true?¹³¹ These and related questions will be analyzed in this final section within the context of Gorbachev's Vladivostok initiative toward Japan.

The Vladivostok initiative appears to be a part of Gorbachev's "new thinking" that has been gradually developed, and is still developing,¹³² recognizing that the Soviet Union cannot remain competitive unless its people are given a stake, unless the intelligentsia come to the support of the efforts, and unless the stifling bureaucracy is exposed and neutralized. This is Gorbachev's ambitious gamble, what Seweryn Bialer calls a "giant experiment."¹³³ For Gorbachev, Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner say, "there is no turning back."¹³⁴ Stressing a comprehensive and holistic vision of the new thinking, Gorbachev explained "new realities of the nuclear age" to the 27th Communist Party Congress of the Soviet Union in February 1986, in his Vladivostok speech of July 27, 1986, and to the International Forum at the Kremlin on February 16, 1987.¹³⁵

Among the most interesting concepts that Gorbachev has stressed is "common security." At the end of the Geneva summit with Reagan in November 1985, the Soviet leader expressed his profound conviction that less security for the United States would not necessarily mean more

security for the Soviet Union.¹³⁶ He elaborated on this theme in his address to the 27th Party Congress by claiming that "security can only be mutual It is vital that all should feel equally secure, for fears and anxieties of the nuclear age generate unpredictability in politics and concrete actions."¹³⁷ In speaking to the international guests at the Kremlin in February 1987, he went straight to his primary concern: the survival of humanity in the nuclear age. "The destinies of the world and the future of humanity have concerned the best minds in various lands ever since man first thought of the morrow."¹³⁸ He wasted no time warning that "there would be no second Noah's ark for a nuclear deluge."¹³⁹ At the heart of Gorbachev's new thinking, undoubtedly influenced by the Chernobyl nuclear accident, is the realization "that since Hiroshima and Nagasaki world war ceased to be a continuation of politics by other means,"¹⁴⁰ rejecting thereby Clausewitz's frequently quoted observation. In contrast to previous Soviet leaders who prided themselves in having achieved nuclear parity with the United States, Gorbachev stressed "... the human race has lost its immortality. It can be regained only by destroying nuclear weapons."¹⁴¹

A strikingly similar theme was stressed by Nakasone. Stressing the need for Japan to become an "international nation," the former Japanese prime minister said that "a Gorbachev regime is worth watching very closely. Japan must reexamine and establish a policy toward the Soviet Union.... We may have an excellent opportunity to promote nuclear disarmament, thereby expediting the improvement of East-West relations in general."¹⁴² The nuclear threat to the Japanese, the first nuclear victims, is understandably not simply a matter of nuclear allergy. It is *their* collective and historical living nightmare; and their anti-nuclear sentiment is fundamental and as real as it can be.

Second, Gorbachev observed, logically linked with the first issue is the growing trend of globalism. Stressing increasing "interdependence" in the development of contemporary international relations away from rivalry and competition, he said, "the Soviet Union and the Soviet people con-

sider themselves part of an international community. The worries of all mankind are our worries, its pain is our pain and its hopes are our hopes."¹⁴³ Unlike his predecessors who emphasized primarily social contradictions and inevitable class struggle, Gorbachev stressed, despite all the differences, "we must all learn to preserve our one big family of humanity."¹⁴⁴ He reminded the international audience gathered at the Kremlin of his having invited Asian and Pacific countries [in his Vladivostok speech] "to search jointly for each and all in that huge and rising region of the world, for mutually advantageous and equal cooperation."¹⁴⁵

The concept of globalism and interdependence has been previously advocated by the Japanese as well. The Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu, according to Saburo Okita, originated as early as the 1930s the so-called "Flying Geese Movement"¹⁴⁶ which worked to encourage Japanese participation in the international division of labor. Projecting into the 21st century, the Industrial Structure Council of Japan noted in its interim report of February 1986, that "*the world is moving from the age of Pax Americana to the age of Consortis*" when Japan must harmonize by taking a big step towards becoming an "international-minded state."¹⁴⁷

Finally, Gorbachev has stressed resolving regional conflicts. While it is too early for an overall evaluation of his Vladivostok initiatives, settlement of protracted regional conflicts has been singled out to be most important. The identical theme was stressed by Gorbachev to his international guests in the Kremlin in February 1987 when he said "settlement of regional conflicts is a dictate of our time.... Let us search and act together.... A fair political settlement of regional conflicts is prompted by the same logic of an inter-related and integral world, logic which also requires the solution of other global problems such as food, ecology, energy, and worldwide literacy, education and medical care."¹⁴⁸

These "new realities" appear, though incredibly idealistic, potentially conducive to improving Japanese-Soviet relations. Yet Gorbachev claims the basic foundation for his world vision "is more than ever determined by domestic policy" in order to concentrate on domestic improvement of the

country.¹⁴⁹ The Japanese, while still skeptical of Gorbachev's reforms and suspicious of how they would be actually implemented, seem willing to recognize the seriousness of Gorbachev's efforts to put the Soviet house in order by providing the benefit of the doubt. Moreover, the Japanese business community, as noted above, cannot possibly ignore potential and real economic opportunities in Siberia and the Soviet Far East, particularly given Japan's steadily increasing trade frictions with the United States and Western Europe,¹⁵⁰ and cooling relations with China.¹⁵¹

Could Gorbachev conceivably utilize these situations in enticing Japan to expand economic relations with the Soviet Union? Such opportunities, although they potentially exist, appear somewhat limited. Constraining elements may include, among others, the limited size of the Soviet market in comparison with the enormous size of markets in the West and in China, Japan's steadily increasing direct investments in the West, and expanding global joint ventures with Western business firms. Even within the new Soviet joint venture law, announced in February 1987,¹⁵² there are serious contradictions. Essentially, it seeks to rely on markets while still emphasizing central planning, the party, and the trade unions. These conflicting elements are likely to prove as incompatible in the Soviet Union as elsewhere.

In the final analysis, Gorbachev's ability to rectify the strained Soviet relationship with Japan is yet to be tested. In all probability, his efforts are also likely to be affected by the outcome of his domestic reforms and Japan's reciprocity. Tokyo's responsiveness, in turn, is likely to be influenced not only by its increasing trade difficulties with the West but also by Gorbachev's fortunes in improving relations with Washington. Perhaps it may be for this reason that Japan supports Soviet-American nuclear arms control, anticipating it will eventually improve the Soviet-American political climate. This in turn can facilitate Japan's positive response to Gorbachev's initiatives. Perhaps we may recall that, when President Richard Nixon improved relations with Beijing by signing the Shanghai Communiqué in February 1972, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka went fur-

ther than Nixon by fully normalizing relations with China. Given Japan's closer relations with the United States than Sino-American relations, as noted above, Japan's Washington linkage becomes that much more crucial for Gorbachev's efforts to improve relations with Japan. Therefore, Gorbachev's improving relations first with the United States becomes that much more important for his efforts to normalize relations with Japan. This would, in turn, be affected by Washington's response.

Still Gorbachev appears to be emphasizing bilateral efforts to improve relations between Moscow and Tokyo, not to be affected by a third party or parties. When and if he visits Japan, what kind of a gift (*podarok* in Russian, *omiyage* in Japanese) can Gorbachev bring with him? He cannot possibly come empty-handed. Can he possibly suggest, for instance, dividing the four troubled northern islands between Moscow and Tokyo? Can he perhaps propose to establish a joint development project over the four islands with the Japanese? Even if Tokyo accepts such a joint venture, it will first require Moscow to dismantle military installations on those islands. Yet this may eventually resolve the so-called northern territorial problem, thereby inviting Japan to invest in the Siberian development. Presented properly, Japan may find it hard to refuse such an offer for a Soviet-Japanese joint development project. Such a prospect, nevertheless, is not likely to be in the near future.

Notes

1. Novosti Press Agency, 1986; *Christian Science Monitor*, December 3, 1985.

2. The Comprehensive National Security Study Group, *Report on Comprehensive National Security* (Tokyo: The Comprehensive National Security Study Group, 1980), p. 10. Initially organized by the late Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, its Chairman, Professor Masamichi Inoki, along with a group of prominent Japanese academic and business leaders, submitted a major foreign policy document.

3. A provocative set of suggestions; see Institute for East-West Security Studies, *How Should America Respond to Gorbachev's Challenge? A Report of the Task Force on Soviet New Thinking* (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, Inc., 1987).

4. Ezra F. Vogel, "Pax Nipponica?" *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1986), 767.

5. Cited in Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, *The Soviet Union in the Third World, 1980-1985: An Imperial Burden or Political Asset?* A Report prepared by Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 103.

6. *Pravda*, July 29, 1986. Emphases added.

7. China, in fact, has now become Japan's second largest trading partner.

8. Hiroshi Kimura, "The Soviet Military Buildup: Its Impact on Japan and Its Aims," *The Soviet Far East Military Buildup*, ed. by Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka (Dover, Massachusetts: Auburn House Publishing Company, 1986), 109.

9. For his comprehensive analysis on Gorbachev's new initiatives in East Asia, see his "Soviet Focus on the Pacific," *Problems of Communism* (May-June 1987), 1-16.

10. *Pravda*, July 29, 1986.

11. Cited in *Ibid.*

12. Cited in *Department of State Bulletin* (July 1986), 54.

of international trade customs on the part of China are the primary reasons for the unwillingness of Japanese business to make heavy investment commitments to China. For details see "Japanese are wary of increasing China investment," *Japan Economic Journal*, November 15, 1986.

117. *Ibid.*, April 26, 1986.

118. *Ibid.*, November 15, 1986.

119. *Japan Economic Journal*, September 13, 1986.

120. The Tyumen oil development is a good example. For details, see Curtis, 147-174.

121. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, November 15, 1986. Similar Japanese industrial fairs, much smaller in scale though, have been held annually throughout the Soviet Far East, rotating in different cities. I noted in Irkutsk and Khabarovsk that usually the waiting lines were several miles long. They were highly popular with Soviet citizens.

122. Michael McGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), 168.

123. *Pravda*, May 31, 1986.

124. *Ibid.*, July 29, 1986.

125. Awanohara, "Moscow's flattery leaves Tokyo unmoved," 37.

126. "A Major Step Forward," *Pravda*, January 5, 1987.

127. Ralph N. Clough, "Commentary on Japan-Soviet Relations," *Japan Economic Survey* (October, 1986), 10.

128. Somewhat different, if not conflicting, reports by Reagan by Gorbachev are found in *New York Times*, October 15, 1986.

129. Daniel Sneider, "Asian arms concerns could stymie the talks in Iceland," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 10, 1986.

130. Mikhail Gorbachev, *The Results and Lessons of Reykjavik* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986), 12.

131. *Pravda*, July 29, 1986.

132. Serge Schmemmann observes that "*Glasnost* is an integral part of the grand scheme" in "*Glasnost: Between Hope and History*," *New York Times Book Review* (April 26), 1987, 12. On the other hand, Sergei

The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, Robert A. Scalapino (ed.) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 162.

102. Chalmers Johnson, "Japan: Moscow's High-Tech Card," A Special Lecture Presentation: Interpreting Soviet Objectives in the Pacific Basin, Wilson Center, Washington, DC, November 21, 1986.

103. "Japan's Emerging Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* (October 1975), 155-171.

104. For further details, see my "Warming Up Soviet-Japanese Relations," 86-88.

105. "Soviet Focus on the Pacific," 9.

106. For details, see my "Warming Up Soviet-Japanese Relations," 90-91.

107. *Ibid.*

108. *Ibid.*

109. Susumu Awanohara, "Moscow's flattery leaves Tokyo unmoved," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (November 13, 1986), 37.

110. Awanohara, "Will Nakasone rush in," 35.

111. *Pravda*, July 29, 1986. Emphases added.

112. *Christian Science Monitor*, August 28, 1986; *Wall Street Journal*, October 8, 1986. For an in-depth analysis of the Soviet joint venture law, see George Ginsburg, "Joint Ventures in the USSR," *PlanEcon Report* (September 18, 1986), 1-12. A Soviet explanation is provided by Y. Shcherbina, Chairman of AMTORG Trading Corporation, in his presentation to a luncheon forum on U.S.-Soviet Trade Relations, October 23, 1986, Washington, DC.

113. *Pravda*, September 24, 1986.

114. "Japanese Economy Showing Signs of Stagnation Under Export Slowdown," *Japan Economic Journal*, November 8, 1986.

115. Martin Felstein, "Bailing Out Tokyo," *Wall Street Journal*, November 25, 1986.

116. According to a recent Foreign Ministry survey, the lack of proper appreciation of technologies offered and absence of proper understanding

Kim's visit to Moscow, October 22-26, 1986. *Rodong Shinmun* (Workers' Daily, the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea), October 31, 1986. While an exact date for the Pyongyang visit was not announced, it should be recalled that Shevardnadze had visited North Korea after his trip to Japan in January, 1986.

91. *Japan Times*, August 22, 1986.

92. *Ibid.*

93. January 23, 1987.

94. "A Soviet-Japanese Summit," *Tokyo Insider* (August 20, 1986), 6.

95. *The Guardian*, January 24, 1987; *Christian Science Monitor*, January 14, 1987.

96. Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," *Classics of International Relations*, John A. Vasquez (ed.) (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1986), 114.

97. As expected, most Japanese observers are almost unanimous in their claim. Some of the noted analyses include: Fuzi Kamiya, "The Northern Territories," 121-152; Hiroshi Kimura, "The Soviet Proposal on Confidence-Building Measures and the Japanese Response," *Journal of International Affairs* (Summer 1983), 81-104; Uda, 45-68. Professor Masamachi Inoki, President, Research Institute for Peace and Security, regards it as "a piece of bone stuck in the Soviet-Japanese throat," in my private conversation with him, Tokyo, summer, 1983.

98. For a Soviet view, see K. E. Cherevko, "SSHA i tak nazvaemaia problema severnykh territorii," [USA and the so-called northern territorial problems], *SSHA* [USA] (No. 9, 1981), 47.

99. Cited in *Yomiuri Shinbun*, July 23, 1967.

100. For a detailed study on the subject, see Chihiro Hosoya, ed., *Okinawa Reversion*, Occasional Paper No. 12 (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: International Studies Association, 1977).

101. *Japan Times*, June 30, 1973, cited in Gerald Curtis, "The Tyumen Oil Development Project and Japanese Foreign Policy Decision-Making,"

75. *Ibid.*, July 29, 1986. The full text of Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech can be found in Appendix C.

76. *Ibid.*

77. Specifically, the State Planning Committee, State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, the Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy, the Ministry of the Coal Industry, the Ministry of Power and Electrification, and a number of other departments. *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

78. *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

79. *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

80. Gerald R. Ford, *A Time To Heal* (New York: Harper & Row, Publisher and The Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 1979), 213-219.

81. *Pravda*, July 29, 1986. Emphasis added.

82. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 22, 1985. For an analysis of the speech, see Robert G. Sutter and Richard Cronin, "Soviet Leader Gorbachev Calls for Collective Security in Asia – Possible Implications" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 1985).

83. *Ibid.*

84. Because of Gorbachev's mention of Hiroshima, a well-placed Soviet UN official was allegedly reprimanded by the Japanese UN office. Conversation with Soviet UN official, New York, September 25, 1986.

85. U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1986* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 139.

86. *Ibid.*

87. *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

88. Most Japanese media paid much attention to this event. *Japan Times*, August 22, 1986.

89. *International Herald Tribune*, August 15, 1986; *New York Times*, August 23, 1986.

90. Yu Qing, "Japan: New Trends in Its Relations with USSR," *Beijing Review* (November 10, 1986), 11. Presumably in conjunction with his scheduled Japan visit, Gorbachev had already accepted an invitation to visit Pyongyang, offered by North Korean President Kim Il Sung during

Alexander Yakovlev, played a prominent role at the Reykjavik conference. Paul Quinn-Judge, "Gorbachev's counselors," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 27, 1986.

66. *Tokyo Insider* (August 20, 1986), 6.

67. Awanohara, "Will Nakasone rush in," 43.

68. From the perspective of Soviet diplomacy toward Japan, Nikolai Solovyev is undoubtedly one of the most capable ambassadors, along with Oleg Aleksandrovich Troyanovsky, the new Soviet Ambassador to China. After graduating from prestigious Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania while his father was the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Troyanovsky joined the Soviet foreign service. Subsequently he had served in London and Tokyo before assuming his assignment to the UN. From New York he was moved to Beijing early in April. *Pravda*, April 4, 1986. This highly seasoned diplomat may miss the global center stage of diplomacy at the UN in New York. Yet, seen from Moscow, assigning two capable envoys – Troyanovsky in Beijing and Solovyev to Tokyo – appears to be a highly significant move, indicating clearly Moscow's serious intention to improve relations with the two East Asian countries.

69. *Daily Yomiuri*, August 1, 1986.

70. *Ibid.*; *Christian Science Monitor*, August 1, 1986.

71. Kimura, "Soviet Military Buildup," 113.

72. Fuji Kamiya, "The Northern Territories: 130 Years of Japanese Talks with Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union," *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, ed. by Donald S. Zagoria (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), 150.

73. His overall approach has become strikingly similar to that of the Chinese leadership that has been emphasizing the sifting of truth from facts. For a brief analysis, see my essay, "Soviets ponder opening port of Vladivostok," *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 1, 1986.

74. *Pravda*, July 26, 1986. On arrival at the airport, he was met by D. N. Gagarov, First Secretary of the Maritime Territory Party Committee, and others.

56. *Pravda*, July 29, 1986.

57. Previously he had been the head of the Oriental Institute. As a very prominent academic figure in Moscow, he frequently travels abroad, particularly in Japan and the United States. Reportedly he played an important role in the Reykjavik summit. He has been recently elected to be a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. *Christian Science Monitor*, October 27, 1986.

58. Awanohara, "Will Nakasone rush in," 36.

59. A senior diplomat from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Canada and a TASS correspondent observed the conference. Both Beijing and Taipei, as full members of the PECC, attended the Vancouver conference. *Free China Journal*, November 10, 1986. Given its market-oriented and non-governmental nature, Soviet full participation, unless and until Moscow makes substantial economic structural modifications, appears highly unlikely.

60. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party took its biggest share of the vote since 1963 and won the largest number of parliamentary seats ever. After the election, *Economist* characterized Nakasone as "Super-san." (July 12, 1986), 9.

61. Keiichiro Kuboniwa, "Weaknesses of successors bolsters Nakasone strength," *Japan Economic Journal*, September 27, 1986.

62. Hideki Tomizawa, "Nakasone to carry Soviet card into high-stakes world politics," *Japan Economic Journal*, August 9, 1986.

63. "A Soviet-Japanese Summit: Nakasone's Final Claim for Fame?" *Tokyo Insider* (August 20, 1986), 6.

64. *Ibid.* The Japanese Foreign Ministry, for instance, was reportedly posing the greatest obstacle to Nakasone's achieving closer ties with Moscow. This will be discussed in much more detail below.

65. An often speculated compromise suggests that the four disputed islands would be divided evenly between Moscow and Tokyo in exchange for the normalization of relations with a peace treaty. This will be discussed in more detail below. Reportedly Primakov, as a close aid to

Gorbachev's coming to power in March 1985. By September of that year they had resumed serious joint venture discussions on Sakhalin projects for oil, natural gas and other natural resources. *Japan Economic Journal*, September 13, 1986.

47. For the detailed background of the document, see my article, "Soviets ponder opening port of Vladivostok," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 1, 1986. During my trip to the USSR in July 1986, I was told by several Soviet specialists that the document was a highly watered-down version of a much more positive statement on Pacific Basin economic cooperation.

48. I have seriously questioned the existence of such a grand plan in my essay, "A Pacific Community: A Myth or A Reality?" *Problemi Dal'nego Vostoka* (January 1986), 60-72.

49. The complete text is found in *Pravda*, April 24, 1986.

50. Nowhere, at any time, has anyone ever publicly advocated exclusive membership in the Pacific Community for military or political purposes. Perhaps the most articulate piece on the subject is a speech by Yasuhiro Nakasone in June 1985 in Canberra, Australia. The complete text is found in Foreign Press Center, *Statements and Opinions on Pacific Cooperation* (Tokyo: Foreign Press Center, 1985), 11-19.

51. For a detailed analysis, see Roy Kim and Hilary Conroy, *New Tides in the Pacific* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987).

52. United Nations, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, 41st session, *Report of the Economic and Social Council Question of Peace, Stability and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Review of the Implementation of the Declaration of the Strengthening of International Security, Development, and International Cooperation*, July 15, 1986.

53. *Pravda*, April 24, 1986.

54. *Pravda*, April 24, 1986.

55. *Ibid.* Emphasis added. In fact, the Soviet government is said to have been considering the creation of a Committee on the Pacific Community, to be headed by a deputy foreign minister.

33. *Pravda*, May 31, 1986. Emphasis added. Of course, Gorbachev was referring to the Northern Territories; this we shall discuss in greater detail below.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.* Also present, besides the Soviet foreign minister, were P. N. Demichev, a candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Anatoly Dobrynin, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, A. K. Antonov and G. I. Marchuk, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

36. *Ibid.*

37. The complete text of the Soviet-Japanese joint communique is found in *Izvestia*, June 2, 1986; a translation of the condensed text is found in Appendix B.

38. See discussion, pp. 18-19.

39. *Ibid.* It was speculated in Seoul that there had been discussions of the Korean issue, including the repatriation or visit to Korea of Korean residents of Sakhalin, the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, and the resumption of the Korean dialogue. *Korean Herald*, May 18, 1986.

40. As of August 15, 1986, a new linkup of Soviet, Japanese and American air traffic controllers aimed at preventing a disaster like the 1983 downing of a Korean airliner was reported to go into operation. *Japan Times*, August, 10, 1986.

41. Reprints from the Soviet Press (May 15-31, 1986), *Report on Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the period ending in 2000*, by N. Ryzhkov, 55-56. Emphasis added.

42. *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Pravda*, April 19, 1986.

45. Quoted in *Japanese Economic Journal*, April 26, 1986.

46. *Ibid.* Emphasis added. While it is beyond the scope of this essay, Soviet-Japanese economic relations have become much more active since

21. Cited in Susumu Awanohara, "Will Nakasone rush in where some fear to tread?" *Far Eastern Economic Review* (November 13, 1986), 34.

22. I mistakenly suggested in my "Warming Up Soviet-Japanese Relations," *Washington Quarterly* (Spring 1986) 85, that no Soviet foreign minister had ever visited Japan.

23. Yasuhiro Nakasone, "Foreign Policy and Constitutional Views," *Journal of International Affairs* (Summer 1983), 3. The only Russian leader ever to visit Japan was Nicholas II in May 1891. On his voyage to Vladivostok, he went to Japan, and while he was enjoying sightseeing in Otsu, a resort at the southern corner of famous Lake Biwa, he suffered a totally unexpected attack by a Japanese police guard. Unharmful but terribly scared, he immediately returned to Russia. I have learned much about this fascinating historical episode from Yong Shik Shin's lengthy unpublished paper, "A Reconsideration of the Otsu Incident and Its Implications," prepared for a graduate seminar at the University of Pennsylvania under Professor A. V. Rasianovsky. I am grateful to Professor Hilary Conroy for a copy of the paper.

24. *New York Times*, January 16, 1986.

25. *Los Angeles Times*, January 20, 1986.

26. The complete text of the Soviet-Japanese joint communique is found in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, January 20, 1986, a translation of which appears in Appendix A.

27. *Ibid.*

28. Cited in *New York Times*, January 20, 1986.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*; *Pravda*, January 20, 1986.

31. *Pravda*, May 31, 1986.

32. *Pravda*, May 31, 1986. Emphasis added. Third parties have often taken advantage of Soviet-Japanese estrangement. For a detailed analysis, see my essay, "Warming Up Soviet-Japanese Relations," *Washington Quarterly* (Spring, 1986), 88-90.

13. Peter F. Drucker, "Japan's Choice," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1987), p. 940.

14. *Ibid.* Some cynics even suggest that because of its fear of Japanese-Soviet detente and of Soviet-West European detente, Washington has been slow in improving relations with Moscow.

15. U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, in his recent thoughtful essay, suggests that "we not only can never say never; we can never think never." "U.S. Defense Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1986), p. 687. A provocative essay is provided by Professor Paul Kennedy, "The (Relative) Decline of America," *The Atlantic Monthly* (August 1987), pp. 29-38.

16. A latest case in point is the Toshiba controversy. Because of the alleged sale of high-tech naval equipment to the Soviet Union, the U.S. Senate not only imposed a two-year sanction but also sought financial compensation in court. A detailed analysis of the U.S. Senate action is provided in the *Wall Street Journal*, July 1, 1987. Seen from Tokyo, the U.S. Senate sanction was largely viewed as part of Washington's effort to keep the Japanese high-tech industry under U.S. control. A prominent editorial of the *Japan Economic Journal* observed that "while the preservation and strengthening of the Western alliance is of course a crucial element, *so too is the preservation of Japan's rights and interests in the field of advanced technology.*" "Rethinking National Security" (August 8, 1987). Emphasis added.

17. *Mainichi Daily News* editorial, "Abundance and Isolation," August 16, 1987.

18. Uno's book, *I Was a Prisoner in Siberia*, was published in 1948 and was made into a film three years later.

19. For some reason, Gromyko paid much less attention to Japan but concentrated, with good reason, on Soviet relations with the United States. This was resented by Japanese government officials as well as academics.

20. *Japan Times*, January 2, 1986.

Rogov, a Soviet academic representative attached to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC, suggested that the "new thinking" is a developing concept borrowing ideas from others; commentary to a panel sponsored by the American-Soviet Relations Section, the International Studies Association convention, Washington, DC, April 17, 1987.

133. "Gorbachev: Risking all for reform," *U.S. News & World Report* (April 27, 1987), 50.

134. In my interview with them in their Moscow apartment, February 19, 1987; Mortimer B. Zuckerman's conversation with them, "*Glasnost*," *U.S. News & World Report* (April 20, 1987), 31.

135. While I personally listened to the relatively short speech, February 16, 1987, at the Kremlin, I am still struggling to digest it. A theoretical Soviet analysis on the "new thinking" is found in Anatoli Gromyko and Vladimir Lomeiko, *Novoye myshleniye v yaderny vek* (New Thinking in the Nuclear Age) (Moskva: mezhdynarodnie otnosheniya, 1984). For a comprehensive analysis of Gorbachev's Forum speech, see "Analysis of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's Speech to the Forum 'For a Nuclear-Free World, For Survival of Mankind,'" Moscow, February 16, 1987, prepared by the staff of the American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations, Washington, DC.

136. Cited in Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, *Reagan and Gorbachev* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 184.

137. Cited in *Ibid.*

138. Gorbachev, "... For Survival of Humanity," 1.

139. *Ibid.*, 2.

140. *Ibid.*, 6.

141. *Ibid.*

142. Yasuhiro Nakasone, "The New Asia-Pacific Era: A Perspective from an International Nation — Building for the 21st Century," *1986 Britannica Book of the Year* (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1986), 11-12.

143. *Ibid.*, 16.

144. *Ibid.*

145. *Ibid.*, 8.

146. Saburo Okita, "Prospect of the Pacific Economics," *Pacific Economic Cooperation: Issues and Opportunities* (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1985), 21.

147. Planning Subcommittee, Industrial Structure Council Coordinating Committee, *An Outlook for Japan's Industrial Society Towards the 21st Century* (Tokyo, 1986), 2-3. Emphasis added.

148. Gorbachev, "... For Survival of Humanity," 15-16.

149. *Ibid.*, 5. The identical view was expressed in his first interview with *Time* (September 9, 1985), 29.

150. The Reagan administration's tariff imposition, on March 27, 1987, of \$300 million worth of Japanese imports was editorially protested by the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal*, April 17, 1987.

151. The cooling process has been particularly significant since the resignation of Hu Yaobang as Chinese Communist Party leader in January 1987. *New York Times*, April 16, 1987. Foreign investment in China fell by 40 percent in 1986. *Economist* (April 18, 1987), 69.

152. The complete text of the new Soviet joint venture law is found in *Moscow News* (February 22-March 1, 1987), Supplement. Major difficulties and limitations of reforming the economy are analyzed by Timothy J. Colton, *The Dilemma on Reform in the Soviet Union* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., rev. and expanded edition, 1986).

APPENDIX A

Joint Soviet-Japanese Communiqué

Pravda, January 20, 1986

Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR paid an official visit to Japan from January 15 to 19, 1986, at the invitation of the Japanese Government.

During his stay in Tokyo, he had a meeting with Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan, during which the Prime Minister reiterated the invitation conveyed earlier to Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, to pay an official visit to Japan. Eduard Shevardnadze expressed gratitude for the invitation, and handed over to Nakasone a message from Mikhail Gorbachev, inviting the Head of the Government of Japan to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union.

By way of holding a regular consultative meeting, the USSR Foreign Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Shintaro Abe, held several talks to discuss Soviet-Japanese relations and international problems of mutual interest.

The two sides stressed that the development of relations between the USSR and Japan on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit, equality and non-intervention in one another's internal affairs accorded with the common interests of both countries and would also make a major contribution to peace and stability in Asia and the world over.

The two ministers noted the major importance of political dialogue between the leading figures of the USSR and Japan. They reaffirmed their readiness to hold regular consultations in the future as well, at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, scheduling them at least once a year, alternately in Moscow and Tokyo. Eduard Shevardnadze invited Shintaro Abe to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union in 1986, while the Japanese Foreign Minister conveyed an invitation to the USSR Foreign Minister to pay an official visit to Japan in 1987. The invitations were accepted with gratitude by both sides. The dates of the visits are to be agreed on through diplomatic channels.

Both sides also positively appraised the practice of annual consultations at the level of Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and came out in favor of going ahead with plans for this. The next consultation is to be held in Moscow at a date agreed on by the two sides.

In keeping with the agreement accorded in the Joint Soviet-Japanese Statement of October 10, 1973, the two ministers held talks on the signing of a Soviet-Japanese peace

treaty, including the questions which might make up its contents. They agreed to continue these talks during the next consultative meeting in Moscow.

Both sides expressed their intention to further promote an expansion of trade and economic relations between the USSR and Japan on the basis of mutual benefit. The ministers signed an agreement on goods turnover and payments between the USSR and Japan for the period from 1986 until 1990, as well as a convention between the Government of the USSR and the Government of Japan on precluding double taxation with regard to income taxes.

It was agreed to hold annual consultations on trade and economic matters on a higher level, with a view to holding such a meeting in Moscow this year between a Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR and a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan at a time convenient for both sides.

Taking into consideration the agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of Japan on fishing off the coasts of the two countries and the agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of Japan on cooperation in the field of fisheries, both sides agreed to continue making efforts in the future toward their successful implementation. They came out in favor of a constructive discussion of all questions pertaining to the said agreements on a mutually beneficial basis and with due account of long-term cooperation between the two countries in the field of fishing.

The two ministers exchanged documents on extending the period of validity of the exchange of letters on cultural cooperation between the USSR and Japan of January 27, 1972.

The two sides appraised the results of the talks on the conclusion of an agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of Japan on cultural contacts and expressed an intention to promote their earliest possible completion.

In compliance with Article 3 of the agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of Japan on cooperation in science and technology, the two sides agreed to convene the 3rd session of the Soviet-Japanese commission on cooperation in science and technology by the end of 1986, at a time convenient for both sides.

In connection with the question raised by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Shintaro Abe, concerning visits by the Japanese to places of burial of their relatives, the Soviet side stated that, guided by humanitarian feelings, it will examine that question with the proper attention.

The ministers noted the enormous importance of the development of international cooperation in the uses of thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humankind.

Both sides stated with satisfaction that the USSR, Japan and the USA had reached agreement on a series of measures to enhance the safety of flights over the northern part of the Pacific and on devising steps to implement them.

The ministers had a frank exchange of views on key issues of the international situation concerning both countries, including issues of ensuring peace and disarmament, as well as some regional problems.

The two sides arrived at a unanimous opinion concerning the need to promote the consolidation of positive trends in world developments in the future as well as by expanding bilateral dialogue on international problems.

The ministers highly assessed the joint Soviet-American statement on the results of the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in Geneva on November 19 to 21, 1985, and said they regarded it as the beginning of a dialogue for improving the international situation.

Both sides put forward their assessments of the situation taking shape in the Asian Pacific region and stressed that assistance to the efforts of the countries of Asia and the Pacific on the basis of respect for their independence would promote peace and stability in that region.

Both sides positively appraised the practice of consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and Japan on international problems and agreed that it would be continued.

They also noted that the talks and meetings held during the visit of Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, to Japan passed off in a businesslike atmosphere and were useful to both sides.

APPENDIX B

Joint Communique Stresses Continued Efforts To Increase Economic Ties; Cultural Agreement Signed

The Current Digest Of The Soviet Press,
vol. XXXVIII, No. 22

JOINT SOVIET-JAPANESE COMMUNIQUE. (*Pravda*, June 2, p. 4; *Izvestia*, p. 5. 1,400 words. Condensed text:) At the invitation of the Soviet government, Shintaro Abe, Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, was in the Soviet Union on an official visit from May 29 to 31, 1986.

S. Abe was received by M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Key problems of the international situation and fundamental questions concerning the status of Soviet-Japanese relations and prospects for their development were discussed during the talks, which were held in a spirit of frankness.

S. Abe confirmed Japanese Prime Minister Y. Nakasone's earlier invitation to M. S. Gorbachev to pay an official visit to Japan. The Soviet side reaffirmed its invitation, from January of this year, to the Japanese Prime Minister to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union.

By way of holding a regular consultative meeting, E. A. Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, and S. Abe, Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, held talks, during which questions of bilateral relations and international problems of mutual interest were discussed.

Noting the efforts that both sides have made to improve Soviet-Japanese relations, the Ministers confirmed their interest in the further improvement of these relations on the basis of the principles of mutual advantage, equality and noninterference in internal affairs. They emphasized that such development of relations is in keeping with the interests of both countries and would be a major contribution to the cause of strengthening peace and stability in Asia and throughout the world.

Attaching great importance to political dialogue between the leaders of the USSR and Japan, including regular consultations at the Foreign Ministers' level, the Ministers reaffirmed the agreement to continue to hold such consultations at least once a year, alternate-

ly in Moscow and Tokyo. Shintaro Abe, Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, confirmed the invitation to E. A. Shevardnadze, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, to pay an official visit to Japan in 1987 for the next consultative meeting. This invitation was gratefully accepted. A specific date for the visit will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

The Ministers gave a positive appraisal to the practice of annual consultations at the level of Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs and called for its continuation. The next such consultation will take place in Moscow, at a time agreed upon by the two sides.

The practice of consultations between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and Japan on international problems also received a positive appraisal. The two sides agreed that this practice will continue.

In keeping with the accord registered in the joint Soviet-Japanese statement of Oct. 10, 1973, the Ministers continued the talks that took place in Tokyo in January of this year regarding the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty, including questions that could make up its content. They agreed to continue these talks during the next consultative meeting in Tokyo.

Building on the results of Soviet-Japanese intergovernmental consultations on trade and economic questions and the 10th conference of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet Committees on Economic Cooperation, both sides expressed their intention to promote further expansion of trade and economic relations between the USSR and Japan on the basis of mutual advantage, including increased efforts to find new forms of cooperation that were proposed at this conference.

The two sides agreed to continue efforts to successfully implement the agreement between the governments of the USSR and Japan on mutual relations in the field of fishing off the coasts of both countries and the agreement between the governments of the USSR and Japan on cooperation in the fish industry, based on the principle of mutual benefit.

In accordance with Art. 3 of the agreement between the governments of the USSR and Japan on scientific and technical cooperation, the two sides confirmed their earlier agreement to convene the third session of the Soviet-Japanese Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation during 1986, at a time convenient for both sides.

In connection with requests by S. Abe concerning visits by Japanese citizens to places where their relatives are buried, the Soviet side stated that it is prepared in principle to regard such requests favorably, with the intention of reviewing pertinent questions through diplomatic channels in the light of this discussion.

The Ministers expressed satisfaction with the signing, on May 31, 1986, of an agreement between the governments of the USSR and Japan on cultural relations, as well as an

awareness that the two sides must cooperate so that relations between the two countries continue to develop on the basis of this agreement and in accordance with the principle of reciprocity.

There was a frank exchange of opinions between the Ministers on key questions of mutual interest concerning the present international situation, including the ensuring of peace and disarmament, as well as on some regional problems. ...

Both sides spoke of the need to continue efforts aimed at easing tensions in the Asian and Pacific region. In this connection, they supported steps to organize contacts and talks in the region and agreed that an atmosphere conducive to their further invigoration must be created. They stressed that constructive assistance for the efforts of countries situated there on the basis of respect for their independence would serve the cause of peace and stability in that region of the world. ...

The Ministers reiterated their common understanding that nuclear power is an important source of energy for present and future generations; mindful of the fact that ensuring its safety is a most important task, they reached a consensus on the need for international efforts, including a search for ways to enhance the role and capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Ministers also supported a proposal to convene an authoritative international conference under the auspices of IAEA, for the purpose of discussing the entire set of issues; they noted that it would be appropriate to involve the UN and such international organizations as the World Health Organization and the United Nations Environmental Program in this conference.

The two sides noted the great importance of developing international cooperation in the peaceful uses of thermo-nuclear fusion for the good of all mankind.

Both sides expressed satisfaction with the progress of work based on the accord between the USSR, the US and Japan on a number of measures to increase the safety of flights in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean and on the elaboration of measures for their implementation.

The two sides noted the businesslike and meaningful character of the meetings and talks that took place during the visit of Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Abe and confirmed their usefulness for both countries.

APPENDIX C

SPEECH BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV IN VLADIVOSTOK, JULY 28, 1986

*Novosti Press Agency Publishing House,
Moscow, 1986*

Comrades,

I have long wanted to visit the Far East. This is not only because one is naturally drawn to places where he has never been and is motivated by a desire to see what he has never seen. It is also because one cannot have a complete picture of our Homeland, its past, present and future without getting to know your vast and beautiful part of the country.

The Far East is always associated in our thinking with the enormous expanses of the Soviet Union, stretching from the Baltic and Black seas to the Pacific, as well as with the courage, industry and fortitude of the people who have settled and defended this land, and with the novelty and scope of today's work. It was with special warmth that Vladimir Ilyich Lenin spoke of the city of Vladivostok, calling it "one of our own towns."

The feat of valour accomplished by our compatriots, the pioneers who have blazed the trail to the Pacific, will forever remain in the people's memory. The storming of Spassk and Volochayevka, the energetic development of the territory at the time of the first five-year plans, and the soldierly exploits of the border-guards on those sacred frontiers will never be forgotten. The gallantry of the Far Eastern divisions and Pacific seamen who fought at Moscow and Stalingrad and in the final battles of the Second World War in the East will also live forever in the nation's memory.

History is made by people. The history of the Far East brings to mind the names of the intrepid pioneers Dezhnev, Khabarov and Nevelskoy. It is also associated with the glorious names of Lazo, Postyshev, Sukhanov, the Sibirtsev brothers, Bonivur, Chasovitn, Blukher and Uborevich. I would like to mention among those who inspire others by their example today Party and Civil War veteran Ivan Andreyevich Chuprynin; Hero of Socialist Labour Yuri Petrovich Volkov, captain of fishing vessels; Hero of Socialist Labour Anatoly Andreyevich Belov, leader of a hull-building team; Galina Vladimirovna Merkulova, head of a team of finishers and alternate member of the CPSU Central Committee; and

Nikolai Nikolayevich Dubinin, holder of the honorary title of People's Teacher of the USSR.

The Far East, celebrated by Arsenyev and Fadeyev, has always been and will forever remain dear to the heart of every Soviet person. I am glad of this opportunity to visit Maritime Territory, to see how you live and work, and to learn what is being done here today and what will be done here tomorrow, particularly since the Far East and Siberia have been assigned a special place in the plans put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress.

I have had quite a few businesslike and interesting meetings, both pre-planned and impromptu, at factories, on ships, at institutes and, finally, simply on the street these last few days. These have been useful, frank and friendly. The talking has been straightforward, as it should always be when discussing the business at hand, especially the current job of restructuring.

Our meeting today is in honour of a very special occasion: Vladivostok is being presented with the Order of Lenin. The city has been awarded this highest distinction for the achievements of its working people in economic and cultural advancement and for its great contribution to Far Eastern economic development.

I am very pleased to carry out the instruction of the Central Committee of our Party and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. (*The audience applauds as Mikhail Gorbachev attaches the order to the city's banner.*)

From the bottom of my heart I congratulate you and all the people of Vladivostok, recipient of two orders. The Order of Lenin on your banner is a well-deserved award, earned by the dedicated and strenuous labour of this beautiful city's remarkable people sailors, ship-builders, fishermen, workers in the mechanical engineering and the power industries, construction and transport personnel, scientists, physicians and teachers, veterans and young people alike. This honour is rightfully shared by the border-guards, the troops of the Far Eastern military district and the seamen of the Red-Banner Pacific Fleet. It crowns the fine accomplishments of the many generations who have done much to settle, protect and develop the country's Pacific coast.

Vladivostok today is a modern industrial, cultural and scientific centre, a major port, the heart and soul of Soviet Maritime Territory and one of the most notable cities in the country as a whole. May the Homeland's award be a fresh inspiration for you.

Please accept the congratulations of the Party's Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet government, their wishes for success in your work and for further great accomplishments in the life of the city, its work collectives and every family.

Comrades,

It has now been over a year since the April Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee and close to five months since the 27th Party Congress. This time has been marked by an active search for new approaches to solving the problems that have arisen in Soviet society and by principled assessments of our achievements and failures alike.

We now have a wide-ranging long-term programme of action to accelerate the country's social and economic development, which takes into account both our own aspirations and the more important trends in world development. We also have more detailed guidelines for the shorter term — the State Plan for the 12th five-year development period, which has been drawn up following an in-depth analysis of the state of affairs and a probe for reserves and ways and methods of ensuring dynamic development for Soviet society.

The time has come for us to look to ourselves for the fulfilment of the plans. We must be strict in this, making no allowances for anybody. The results of the nation's economic performance in the first half of the year have already been summed up. They show that the positive trends initiated in the economy are gaining momentum, even if they are not of equal strength throughout. We have been able to impart greater dynamism to economic processes and to raise production growth rates and labour productivity. Measures to improve the situation in mechanical engineering, the fuel and energy sector, the agro-industrial complex, the iron-and-steel industry, the chemical and petrochemical industries, and other sectors have begun to take effect.

Social tasks have also been tackled better. More housing has been built, and a greater number of social and cultural facilities have been made available. Where the local authorities work resourcefully and energetically, the population has become better provided with foodstuffs, manufactured goods and consumer services. Changes like these can only be welcomed.

But let us be frank, comrades: these pleasing and encouraging shifts have been achieved primarily as a result of measures to tighten up labour, state and planning discipline. We have imposed higher standards on how the plans are worked out and met, demanded greater order in production, begun to work better and effectively cracked down on drunkenness — and the positive results have been quick to show.

Though the indices for the six months are basically good, growth rates in some sectors dropped in May and June, and a number of ministries failed to cope with their plans. An irregular rate of production is still a major problem, as is rather inefficient use of what we have. There has been no apparent improvement in the quality of goods, which, you know, is our common problem.

This all leads to one definite conclusion: the qualitative change needed to truly consolidate the trend for accelerated growth has yet to take place. But then I think you understand and will agree that it could not have come about, considering the fact that the vital economic, social, organizational, ideological and other measures are just beginning to come into force and cannot, of course, have an immediate effect. Consequently, the increased rates of national economic growth are not yet stable and perhaps, as I have said, we cannot yet expect them to be so.

Therefore it is inadmissible now to go to either of the two extremes. It is naive, and harmful, to assume that since economic indicators have improved, the effort to restyle our work has already begun in real earnest and is proceeding at full tilt everywhere. This is still far from the case. In a number of regions and economic sectors, they are just talking about the work of restructuring but making no progress.

It is equally inadmissible, however, to give in to the difficulties of restructuring and to the resistance or indifference of those accustomed to drifting with the tide and working in the old manner. As was rightly stressed at the 27th Party Congress, we are embarking on a difficult job and setting ourselves realistic but challenging goals which can only be attained if we learn from life, constantly ponder its experience, lessons and new developments.

We are in effect only beginning this work, successfully in some areas and not so successfully in others. The further we go, the more clearly we see the complexity of our task and the enormity of the workload at hand. But we cannot we shall not back out, as we simply have no alternative to the acceleration strategy. I have said this on many occasions and I would like to repeat it once again here in Vladivostok.

Of course, we must not, by either prodding or poking people, awake in them a desire to act against the laws of social development or to try somehow to get around and "outwit" those laws and objective conditions. In pursuing a policy of restructuring, the Party and its Central Committee proceed from a different premise the need to get to know those laws more quickly and thoroughly and competently take them into account in our activities, and the pressing need to remove all impediments and obstructions artificially created on this road.

The tangible, objective results achieved in the first six months of the five-year plan period testify to the Soviet people's support of the acceleration policy, and they have expressed this support in the most valuable way through practical action.

Here in Vladivostok, as elsewhere, I have also been carrying out what may be called my new duties; I have been asking people one and the same question: are they clear on the

policy worked out by the Party and presented to the nation, or do they have doubts? I have been pleased to hear people here on Far Eastern soil speak out emphatically in support of the Party's people-oriented policy, a policy followed in the interests of every Soviet family and every Soviet person, in the interests of the country's future. It is essential that this support, this popular resolve to grapple with difficulties and eliminate them, should be used to full effect and with the greatest possible return to fulfil the tasks set forth by the 27th Congress of the CPSU. It is in this light, comrades, that I would like to touch upon some of the issues of development in the Far East and consult you, as a continuation of the discussions I have been holding for the third day with you Far Eastern people, on how we can more quickly transform this region and put its riches at the service of the Soviet people and more fully satisfy the needs of those living here.

The Far East has been traditionally referred to as the country's outpost on the Pacific. This is certainly true. But this view of the region is no longer broad enough. Maritime Territory and the Far East should be made into a highly-developed economic complex.

I see that you are very ready to tackle this task. I think that, perhaps, you who have lived here for years or even decades, know even better that the full-scale development of the Far East is not an easy job. But since you have responded so favourably to what I have said, you must be confident that we are equal to this task now. The real basis for this is everything that has been done in the past years. A major scientific and production potential has been formed here. Large factories representing all industries have been built. Mines, electric power stations, new railroads, ferry crossings and ports have been commissioned. Hundreds of thousands of hectares of land have been improved. The USSR Academy of Sciences has set up an affiliate in the Far East with its own network of research centres. Skilled workers and specialists have been trained.

As a result, the industrial output here has nearly trebled in the past two decades, agricultural production having risen by more than 50 per cent. Today the Far East accounts for 40 per cent of the country's fish catches. In the past four five-year plan periods, 62 million square metres of housing have been built— enough to accommodate the population of Vladivostok about seven times over. While the growth in the labour force remains insufficient, the population has grown by 40 per cent in the past 20 years. In short, the country's economy now has an extensive base on the Pacific.

Guided by the principles of the 27th Congress and the acceleration policy, we should, however, ask ourselves squarely: do the pace of economic and social development, the performance of scientific institutions and the scope of research work in the Far East today

really correspond to its growing role and the new targets set up by the Party? Is the potential amassed here really being used efficiently enough?

The strategy of accelerating social and economic development also demands a new regional policy. In this strategy the Party stresses the need to give priority to the development of eastern regions. Therefore we should, among other things, take a careful look at the economic prospects of the Far East. This should be done promptly, in the light of the region's special significance.

This should be done without delay also because the Far Eastern economy has begun to show growth rates below those of the national economy as a whole, though it would seem this should be the other way round. As a result, the region's share in the country's production, far from increasing, is diminishing. The lag in solving social problems, especially in housing, has become more pronounced. I have heard quite a few remarks and suggestions on this score directed at the Party's Central Committee and the Soviet government. These remarks have been justified.

It cannot be said that the development of the Far East has been neglected. Over the past few years the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR have taken decisions specifying measures to advance the power industry, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy and coal mining, to further develop fisheries, forestry, the wood-working industry, transport and other economic sectors, to increase the production of rice and soya, to restructure the countryside, and to improve the state of affairs in the cultural field. So far, unfortunately, much of what was planned has been badly executed.

This reflects a failure to understand the role and significance of the Far Eastern economy and, in the final analysis, the political short-sightedness of some highly-placed officials at the State Planning Committee and the State Committee for the Supply of Materials and Equipment; the Ministries of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy, Coal Mining, Power Development and Electrification; and a number of other departments. The government agencies of the Russian Federation and those on the local level also bear a large part of the blame.

We have to amend the situation in a fundamental way, make certain that growth accelerates rather than slows down, and change over from extensive development factors to all-out intensification through scientific and technological progress. It is essential to slash the time it takes to solve problems and sharply increase the contribution of the Far East to the country's economic potential. Above all, this requires that priority be given to raising the standard of living in the Far East, substantially improving working conditions and the provision of housing, foodstuffs and manufactured goods, and upgrading the entire so-

cial sphere. The latter is clearly lagging, though it is of key importance to having people settle down in the Far East and ultimately has a bearing on the pace of its development.

The task now is to work out a concept for long-term Far Eastern development under a uniform state regional policy. This concept should obviously be embodied in a comprehensive programme. Its aim will be to create a highly efficient economic complex in the Far East, which will have a solid resource, science and production base of its own, optimum economic makeup and well-developed social infrastructure, and will become an organic part of the nationwide and international division of labour. Much has been done in this respect in the process of drafting the five-year plan. It is strenuous and will require quite an effort to fulfil.

However, this is just the beginning of the work to speed up the development of the entire region. Not to get ahead of what should be analysed in detail by the experts with the participation of the broad public, I shall look at just a few of the most important trends in this work.

First, the geographic position of the Far East itself predetermines the course for setting up there a highly developed complex of branches of industries connected with tapping the resources of the ocean. For many reasons the country's fisheries will be increasingly shifted to the Far East. Substantial funds have been invested to set up a large-capacity fishing fleet in the area. Meanwhile, the equipment of on-shore services considerably lags behind. Mechanization of arduous work is at a low level. As a result, a considerable part of expensive vessels are idle or not effectively used. The capacities of the repair base, storage facilities, fishing ports, and processing enterprises are chronically insufficient. In a word, serious measures are needed across the board to develop the fishing industry in the Far East. Special attention must go to producing biologically active substances from sea products. This trend is developing in other countries and has proved highly effective.

Second, the issue of the comprehensive use of the rich natural resources of the region. The attention of the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy must be directed to the potentialities of the Far East. Geologists have established that the region abounds in large deposits of non-ferrous metals, gold and silver, and many other valuable elements and minerals. Their mining and processing can be widened substantially if approached in a thrifty and confident way. We must begin working in earnest on the development of large-scale non-ferrous metallurgy in the Far East. Complete production cycles for manufacturing various finished products must be created here. The Far East should no longer be regarded solely as a raw material base. I think that you should not put up with this. This should be well realized in the central administrative bodies: I mean those on the all-Union

and Russian Federation levels. We must use the territory's huge raw material reserves to build complete-cycle enterprises here and produce at least semi-finished products, or, even better, finished goods. What I have said about non-ferrous metallurgy applies even more so to the Ministry of the Timber and Pulp-and-Paper Industry, which must decisively begin the intensive processing of timber. In this connection, there are large-scale economic development tasks posed in the zone of the Baikal-Amur mainline. A special decision of the Central Committee and the government on this matter is now being drafted. You face major undertakings in this area, too.

Third. A chronic lag in the fuel and energy complex of the Far East is holding back other branches of industry and must be overcome quickly. You must not live without looking to the future, expecting that no matter what fuel and energy assistance will come to the social sphere came in for sharp criticism at the Party Congress. This is an old ailment. It has also become widespread in a number of eastern areas of the country, including the Maritime Territory. Some 7.7 million people inhabit the vast territory of the region. Nearly half of all food is brought here. In the past 20 years the per capita output of milk, potatoes and vegetables has dropped in the Far East. Many officials in territories, regions, areas, districts and farms have resigned themselves to low harvests, small yields of milk and slow weight gain in cattle, as well as to receiving supplies of fodder from other areas. Even the proposals for the plans for the next 15-20 years envisage increasing the food supply to the Far East through deliveries from other regions of the country.

I think this is a shortsighted line. There is one way out: to create a highly developed agricultural base and food industry in the area. For these purposes we must vigorously develop all branches of the agro-industrial complex, specifically the fertilizer industry, on the basis of intensification technologies, and cooperate with neighbour countries in the solution of agricultural tasks.

A tense situation has formed in the region as regards housing construction and the construction of social and cultural amenities. This is a hindrance to the settlement of those who arrive here for permanent residence. I think that the responsibility for such a state of affairs must be shared with the local bodies by the appropriate ministries and departments, both all-Union and Republican.

I have reproved the authorities of the territory mainly for the insufficiency of what they are presently doing for the development of the social sphere. At any rate it falls short of the actually existing need. But I think that a substantial part of this reproof should be addressed to Moscow-based departments. Many of them are most lavish when it comes to the development of production facilities in quite different spheres, but are very sparing in

the funds allocated to develop the social sphere. As a result, manufacturing capacities are set up, but there is no one to use the production potential in a really efficient way. This is one of those 'tricks' that cost the state dearly. Such is the political appraisal of that phenomenon.

You have a wonderful land, beautiful sea, unique nature, rich mineral springs. As I was flying to Nakhodka today the fog faded, the clouds vanished and the sun appeared and I saw the picturesque country from mid-air. The hills, the Golden Valley, and the ocean are close by. This produces a great impression. It is truly a wonderful land.

The Far East must become one of the leading health resorts of the USSR, a major centre of domestic and international tourism, including oceanic and high latitude tourism. This, by the way, would also replenish resources for accelerating construction in cities and villages.

Yesterday, on my way to a Young Pioneer camp, I met a group of holiday-makers. It turned out that the group included people from different parts of the country. And what is interesting is that for many of them it was not the first visit to this place. They have come to love this land and its nature. Their unanimous advice was to promote holiday facilities here.

The reason for the present situation is clear. Unsatisfactory construction of housing and social and cultural amenities is explained by a lack of the necessary basis, a lag in construction facilities, the weakness of collectives of builders. This can no longer be tolerated. If dealing with social matters is vitally needed for the whole country, this is two or three times as applicable for the Far East.

What should be done to overcome the difficulties which have accumulated over the years? Both central and local bodies are to blame for this. So, action has to be taken simultaneously from above and below in order to remedy the situation. I can assure you that the CPSU Central Committee and the government will be urging the All-Union and Republican ministries to tackle the problems of the eastern areas of the country, including your territory.

The Soviet Far East has an unforgettable past, and, I am sure, a glorious future. This is a territory of vast natural wealth, huge social and economic possibilities, and great international prospects. It depends on you and, of course, on the attention of the central bodies, how we will run the affairs of that very important region of the country and what results we will achieve.

I understand that the remarks made, and the sharpness with which the problems were formulated, are not totally appropriate to today's occasion. But such is the constructive

Leninist tradition: to look ahead while addressing what has been done. The most important thing now is not to lose our sense of perspective, to lay the foundation for scaling new heights. The main thing is to concentrate on your future tasks arising from the decisions of the 27th Congress. And I believe that even such a festive occasion as the presentation of a high award is suitable for this kind of approach, including critical analysis.

These are our common plans and concerns, comrades. They show the Soviet Union's true intentions better than any verbal subterfuges. However much the ruling forces of imperialism may try to distort them, we have said openly and honestly and will continue telling all peoples and governments: yes, we need peace; we again and again issue the call to end the arms race, stop nuclear madness and eliminate nuclear weapons, and to search persistently for a political settlement to regional conflicts.

We are witnessing phenomena of paramount importance. The realization that there should be **peace for all** is forcefully grasping the minds of the peoples even where the governments continue to think that weapons and war are tools of politics. It is precisely for all, since a nuclear war would not be a clash of only two blocs, two confronting forces. It will lead to a global disaster, in which human civilization will be threatened with destruction.

Our initiatives on nuclear disarmament, on a considerable reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces, verification, and creation of a healthier international atmosphere were met in different ways.

The friendly countries have expressed support for them. The countries of the socialist community regard them with good reason as a component part of the general policy of socialism in the world arena. And not only because these initiatives have been coordinated with them, not only for principled internationalist considerations, but also because we are both engaged in a purely peaceful undertaking -- the perfection of our societies. The salutary process of our drawing closer together is intensified on that basis, economic integration is filled with new contents, concrete steps are made to create joint plants and amalgamations, human contacts are broadened. In a word, a progressive, mutually beneficial process of deepening cooperation and fraternity among the peoples of the community is under way.

The developing world shows much interest in our plans and intentions -- both internal and international ones. We note that many developing countries wish to expand and deepen economic, scientific and cultural cooperation with the Soviet Union. We are prepared for that.

It would be fair to say that the Western public at large and representatives of the business community who have a realistic view of things, who do not suffer from anti-communist paranoia and do not associate themselves with profits from the arms race, regard our plans seriously and with interest. They also stand for peace and cooperation, for the development of healthy economic, scientific and cultural ties with the Soviet Union. We welcome such an approach.

Yet, in many capitalist countries the tone is set, as before, by forces that have been in the past and will in the future be blinded by animosity towards socialism, by imperial ambitions or close links with the war business. And this business, as is known, is extremely voracious and ruthless. Yesterday it needed millions, today it needs billions, and tomorrow it will need trillions. It will never start manufacturing, of its own free will, toys for children instead of missiles. Such is its nature.

The ruling circles of the USA and some countries allied to it are trying either to picture our peace initiatives as sheer propaganda or to make it appear that only the Soviet Union stands to gain from them. Yes, we stand to gain from disarmament, if we are to use that expression, just as all peoples whose governments now spend billions on the arms race stand to gain from disarmament. Yet, this is only a part of the truth. I will even say, a small part of the truth. The most important truth is that our initiatives stem from a profound concern for the future of mankind.

In the face of nuclear threat it is absurd and criminal to act according to an old, already dead scheme: what is good for the socialist countries must be rejected. Here one can clearly see class narrow-mindedness, a primitive ideological mechanical approach, and the growing political influence of militarism. Yet, I am not inclined to believe that the military-industrial complex is omnipotent. We see that the world public realizes ever more clearly the danger of militarism. We see that in the United States, too, despite the constant whipping up of chauvinistic sentiments, a sense of realism is growing, and the realization is deepening that the source of military threat to the USA is not the Soviet people, not the socialist countries, not the peasants of Nicaragua, not the faraway Vietnamese or Libyans, but its own arms manufacturers, the irresponsible politicians serving them, and the adventurist military.

Of course we are aware that the arms race, which is gaining momentum, serves not only the aims of making superprofit and of war preparations, but also and this is not of the least importance — other immoral aims, which are essentially to exhaust the Soviet Union economically, frustrate the Party's course for achieving a further rise in the living standards of the people, and hamper the implementation of our social programme. We also

know who are those that continue to cherish the hope of bringing about a planned, systematic destruction of the USSR and of other socialist countries, using to that end economic, moral-psychological, propaganda, political and military methods.

But it can be said that this is a futile attempt; it always has been and still is today. The time has come to reckon with the realities rather than to make policy on the basis of illusions and misconceptions. If no accords are reached, this will not bring relief to the world, no tranquility will set in. Fear will not disappear until some rulers in the West give up the attempts, which are perhaps consoling for them, but fruitless, and above all dangerous, to bring the Soviet Union to its knees, split the socialist society and hamper our advance.

The time urgently demands a new understanding of the present stage in the development of civilization, of international relations, of the world. The world is full of contradictions, it is complex, but it is objectively united by bonds of interdependence. International relations are such that, with all the differences and clashes of interest, one can no longer live according to the millennia-old traditions of "fist law". And civilization has demonstrated an unprecedented strength of the human mind and human labour and at the same time its own fragility, its vulnerability to the forces released by the human genius but placed at the service of destruction.

All that dictates the need for and makes urgent a radical break with many customary attitudes to foreign policy, a break with traditional political thinking, traditional views on problems of war and peace, on defence, on the security of individual states and international security. In this connection it is clear that our radical, global, in the full sense of the word, proposals such as the programme for the elimination already in this century of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, a total ban on nuclear weapons tests, a ban on chemical weapons, proposals on cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, and a whole set of other proposals, concern the whole world, all countries.

The main problem confronting mankind today — that of survival — is equally acute and urgent for Europe, Africa, America and Asia. Yet in each part of the world it looks different. Therefore, while being here, in Vladivostok, it is natural to look at international policy issues from the Asian-Pacific standpoint.

Such an approach is justified for many reasons. In the first place, a greater part of our country's territory lies east of the Urals, in Asia — in Siberia and the Far East. It is here that many national tasks put forward by the Party Congress will be carried out. Therefore, the situation in the Far East as a whole, in Asia and the ocean expanses adjoining it, where

we are permanent inhabitants and seafarers of long standing, is to us of a national, state interest.

Many major states of the world, including the USSR, the United States, India, China, Japan, Vietnam, Mexico and Indonesia are situated on the enormous expanses of this territory extending over almost half of the earth. Here are situated states which are considered to be medium-sized ones, but are rather big by European standards – Canada, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, and tens of comparatively small and tiny countries. Some of them have a history covering millennia or many centuries, others have formed in modern times, and still others have formed quite recently.

Asia, which woke up to a new life in the 20th century, has enhanced world progress with its diversified and unique experience in the fight for freedom and independence. This is not only history. This is a living legacy forming an important part of the foundations of the current political realities in this part of the world.

Every country has its own social and political system with all conceivable shades, its own traditions, achievements and difficulties, its own mode of life and beliefs, convictions and prejudices, its own understanding of spiritual and material values. Each country has something to be proud of and something to uphold in the treasure-house of human civilization.

This impressive diversity, this colossal human and socio-political massif calls for close attention, study and respect. We know well from our own, Soviet, experience what an immense creative force a renewed sense of national dignity becomes, what a constructive role is played by the national identity of a people in its organic interrelationship with other equal and free peoples. This process is now on the rise in Asia and the Pacific region: everything is in motion here, far from everything has settled. The new mixes with the old. A way of life which seemed unshakable only yesterday is giving way to the whirlwind of changes – social, scientific and technical, and ideological. This is, I would say, yet another period of renaissance in world history, a period harbouring a huge potential of progress. And progress not only for Asia and Oceania.

Which direction will socio-economic and political development take in the region? What processes will prevail in inter-state relations? These issues will largely determine the destinies of the whole world.

Socialism is an inalienable factor in the large-scale and complex changes taking place in this region. It gained firm positions in Asia as a result of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the victory over fascism and Japanese militarism, as a result of the great Chinese revolution, as a result of the consolidation of the new social system in Mongolia,

in the land of Korea whose people displayed outstanding steadfastness in the struggle for the socialist future of their country, and then in Vietnam and Laos. But it is also in Asia where it met with the most brutal and cynical counteraction. Vietnam is the most graphic example of this. Its heroic experience, the lessons of its victory over imperialism accentuated once again the irresistible force of the ideas of freedom and socialism.

Here, in Asia, the concept of non-alignment, a movement which now includes more than a hundred nations, emerged. It is trying to come up with its own response to the challenge of the time, is actively working for overcoming the world's division into military blocs and is seeking its own ways of reducing the nuclear threat. In rejecting and condemning exploitation, the policy of aggression and neocolonialism, the non-aligned movement is urging mankind to work for unity, for cooperation in combating hunger and the acute poverty of hundreds of millions of people.

The great India, with its moral prestige and traditional wisdom, with its specific political experience and huge economic potentialities, is the recognized leader of this movement. We highly value its contribution to establishing standards of equal co-existence and justice in the international community. Friendly relations between the USSR and India have become a stabilizing factor on a world scale.

Japan has turned into a power of foremost importance. The country which became the first victim of American nuclear weapons has traversed a great path within a brief period, and has achieved outstanding successes in industry, trade, education, science and technology. These successes are due not only to the organizing ability, self-discipline and energy of the Japanese people, but also to the "three non-nuclear principles" which officially underlie its foreign policy, although lately — and this must be emphasized — they, as well as the peaceful provisions of Japan's Constitution are being circumvented ever more openly.

But we also see many other things in Asia and Oceania. The fact that the peoples' dignity was insulted by colonialism, the legacy of poverty, illiteracy and backwardness, along with profound prejudices, preserve conditions for mistrust and hostility between peoples, including peoples living within one state. Imperialism takes advantage of the difficulties and prejudices, which leads to local conflicts, ethnic and religious strife and political instability.

Wherever independence becomes a tangible international value and a threat to the exploitative interests of imperialism emerges, it resorts to its favourite methods: economic blackmail, intrigues and plots against the leadership of the country in question, and interference in internal affairs; it backs separatists and finances and even directly arms counter-

revolution and terrorists. Punjab, the Tamil problem, with attempts being made to turn this problem against India too, the undeclared wars on Kampuchea and Afghanistan, the annexation of Micronesia, interference in the Philippines, and pressure on New Zealand provide enough examples showing how the contemporary mechanism of imperialist intervention and diktat works.

The experience of history, the laws of growing interdependence and the need for economic integration urge one to look for ways leading to agreement and to the establishment of open ties between states in the region and beyond it. These states have tens, hundreds of glaring problems, problems inherited from the colonial past and emerging out of contradictions of present-day development. And these states are being dragged into blocs; the freedom of utilizing their own resources is being curtailed. They are being forced to increase their military budgets, and are being drawn into the arms race and the militarization of the economy and the entire social life.

All this deforms the processes of internal development, creates tension and, naturally, hampers a normalization of relations between nations and states.

The Soviet Union is also an Asian and Pacific country. It is very much aware of the complex problems facing this vast region. They concern it directly. This is what determines its balanced and comprehensive view with regard to this huge part of the world where a large number of different nations and peoples are concentrated. Our approach to it is based on a recognition and understanding of the existing realities in the region.

At the same time our interest is not a claim to privileges and a special position, or an egoistic attempt to strengthen our security at someone else's expense, or a search for advantages to the detriment of others. Our interest is in the pooling of efforts and in cooperation, with full respect for the right of each nation to live as it chooses and resolve its problems on its own in conditions of peace.

We are in favour of building together new, fair relations in Asia and the Pacific.

Recently I have had many meetings with leaders of European states, with various political figures of European countries. I cannot help comparing the situation in Asia with that in Europe.

On the whole the Pacific region has not as yet been militarized to the extent Europe has. But the potentialities of its militarization are truly immense, and the consequences are extremely dangerous. One only needs to look at a map to be convinced of this. Major nuclear powers are situated here. Large land armies, navies and air forces have been established. The scientific, technological and industrial potential of many countries — from the western to the eastern fringes of the ocean -- makes it possible to step up any arms

race. The situation is being exacerbated by the preservation of conflict situations. Let us not forget: it is in Asia that American imperialism waged two biggest wars since 1945 -- the war in Korea and the war in Indochina. In the last four decades there is hardly a period of even a few years when the flames of war did not blaze in one or another part of the Asian and Pacific region.

In Europe, whether it is working well or not, the Helsinki process of dialogue, negotiations and agreements is under way. This creates a certain stability and reduces the probability of armed conflicts. In the region under consideration this is absent, or nearly absent. If something has changed lately, it has not been for the better. Since the second half of the seventies the USA had undertaken large-scale measures to build up armed forces in the Pacific Ocean. The militarized triangle of Washington, Tokyo and Seoul is being set up under its pressure. And although two out of three nuclear powers in the region -- the People's Republic of China and the USSR -- pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the United States has deployed nuclear weapon-delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads in one of the zones of crisis -- in the Korean Peninsula, and nuclear weapon-delivery vehicles on Japanese territory.

One has to state that militarization and the escalation of the war threat in this part of the world are taking place at a dangerously fast pace. The Pacific Ocean is turning into an arena of military and political confrontation. This is what gives rise to growing concern among the peoples living here. This is alarming also for us from all points of view, including for consideration of security in the Asian part of our country.

The Soviet Union's policy towards Asia and the Pacific region is an integral part of the general platform of the CPSU's international activity worked out by the April Plenary Meeting and the 27th Congress. But a platform is not a chart that can be applied to any situation. Rather it is a set of principles and a method based on experience.

How, then, should one envisage the process of establishing international security and peaceful cooperation in this vast region?

First of all, in keeping with its principled policy as approved by the 27th Congress, the Soviet Union will try to invigorate its bilateral relations with all countries in the region without exception. We shall strengthen in every way friendship and promote many-sided relations with the Mongolian People's Republic, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Kampuchea. We regard relations with our friends, built on the principles of equality and solidarity, as an integral part of overall Asian and Pacific security.

At present, for instance, a question of withdrawing a substantial part of Soviet troops from Mongolia is being considered jointly by the Soviet and Mongolian leadership.

We are prepared to expand ties with Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Brunei, the Republic of Maldives, and the youngest independent participants in the region's political life. With some of these — Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, the Kingdom of Tonga, Fiji, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of Nauru, Tuvalu and the Republic of Vanuatu — we already maintain diplomatic relations.

Speaking in a city which is but a step from the People's Republic of China, I would like to dwell on the most important issues in our relations. These relations are extremely important for several reasons, starting with the fact that we are neighbours, that we share the world's longest land border and that for this reason alone we, our children and grandchildren are destined to live near each other "for ever and ever".

Of course, there is more to the question than that. History has entrusted the Soviet and the Chinese peoples with an extremely responsible mission. Much in international development depends upon these two major socialist nations.

Relations between our two countries have improved noticeably in recent years. I would like to reaffirm that the Soviet Union is prepared — at any time and at any level — to enter into discussion with China on additional measures for establishing an atmosphere of good-neighbourliness. We hope that the border dividing us (I would prefer to say linking) will become in the near future a line of peace and friendship.

The Soviet people respond with understanding and respect to the objective advanced by the Communist Party of China — to modernize the country and build in the future a socialist society worthy of a great people.

As far as it is possible to judge, the Soviet Union and China have similar priorities — to accelerate social and economic development. Why not support each other, why not cooperate in implementing our plans wherever this is clearly to the benefit of both sides? The better our relations, the more we shall be able to share our experience.

We note with satisfaction that a positive shift has become visible in economic ties. We are convinced that the historically established complementarity between the Soviet and the Chinese economies offers great opportunities for expanding these ties, including in the border regions. Some of the major problems of cooperation are literally knocking at the door. For instance, we do not want the Amur, which runs along the Chinese-Soviet border, to be viewed as a "water barrier". Let the basin of this mighty river untie the efforts of the Chinese and the Soviet peoples in using the river's rich resources for mutual benefit

and in building water-management projects. A relevant inter-governmental agreement is already being jointly worked out. And the official border could pass along the main ship channel.

The Soviet government is preparing a positive reply concerning the question of assistance in building a railway connecting the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region with Kazakhstan.

We have suggested cooperating with China in space exploration, which could include the training of Chinese cosmonauts. The opportunities for mutually beneficial exchanges in the sphere of culture and education are great. We are prepared for and sincerely desire all this.

On relations with Japan. Signs are emerging indicating a turn for the better here as well. It would indeed be a positive development if the turn did take place. The objective position of our two countries in the world demands profound cooperation on a sound and realistic basis, and in a calm atmosphere free from problems of the past. A beginning was made this year. Foreign ministers exchanged visits and an exchange of top-level visits is on the agenda.

Economic cooperation is of mutual interest. The main issue here is our coastal regions which already have business contacts with Japanese firms. It is possible to discuss the question of establishing joint enterprises in adjacent and near-by regions of the USSR and Japan. Why not establish long-term cooperation in the investigation and comprehensive use of the ocean resources, why not correlate programmes of the peaceful study and use of outer space? The Japanese, it seems, have a method of making relations more dynamic which is called "economic diplomacy". This time let it serve Soviet-Japanese cooperation.

The Soviet Union also shares the border with the United States in the Pacific region. It is our next-door neighbour in the literal meaning of the word, with only seven kilometres dividing us — the exact distance between the Soviet island of Big Diomedes and the American island of Little Diomedes.

We recognize clearly that the United States is a great Pacific power. Primarily because a considerable part of the country's population lives on the shores of this ocean, the western part of America, gravitating towards this area, is playing a growing part in the country's development and is a dynamic force. Furthermore, the United States, undoubtedly, has important and legitimate economic and political interests in the region.

No doubt, without the United States and its participation, it is not possible to resolve the problem of security and cooperation in the Pacific Ocean to the satisfaction of all na-

tions in the region. Regrettably, Washington has thus far shown no interest in this issue. It is not even contemplating a serious talk on the Pacific issue. If the issue is taken up, it inevitably leads to the trodden path of the "Soviet threat" and to sabre-rattling corroborating this myth.

Our approach to relations with the United States is well known. We are for peaceful, good-neighbourly, equitable relations, and mutually beneficial cooperation which offers, incidentally, considerable opportunities in the Far East as well as in the Pacific.

A few words concerning the most important aspect of our relations with the united States at present — on the termination of the arms race. Since the Geneva meeting the Soviet Union has put forward many large-scale proposals on the entire range of problems involved in reducing and eliminating arms and verifying this process. We have not noticed any movement to meet us even half-way. In fact, our proposals met the same response as before the Geneva summit.

In an attempt to overcome the standstill, we went a step further: new large-scale proposals of compromise were put forward in my June letter to the President of the United States. When visiting here, in the Far East, I received a reply from President Reagan. The reply sets one thinking and we have begun to study it. We shall treat it with responsibility and attention. The most important thing from our point of view is the extent to which the proposals contained in the letter meet the principle of equal security and whether they make it possible to reach effective joint solutions in ending the arms race and preventing its spread into outer space. We shall determine our further steps accordingly.

As far as a new Soviet-US summit meeting is concerned, I can repeat: we favour such a meeting. But we are resolutely against interpreting the accords reached at the previous meeting in Geneva as a promise to have more meetings. No. The main thing on which we agreed last time with President Reagan and what we signed is the consent to strive for the normalization of relations between the USSR and the USA and for the improvement of the international situation, and to speed up the course of talks on the reduction of armaments. This should also be the purpose of a new summit meeting.

We frequently hear from abroad all kinds of stories to the effect that the Soviet Union is building up its military power in the east of the country. Let me state with full responsibility: we are not doing anything and shall not do anything over and above the level that corresponds to the minimal requirements of our own defence, and the defence of our friends and allies, especially in the light of the American military activity not far from our and their frontiers.

This applies in full measure to the medium-range missiles. Those who do not want to see the lessening of world tensions continue to allege that we will be able to move our SS-20 missiles from the west to the east and from the east to the west. This is why I emphasize one more time -- we suggest that both American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe **be eliminated**. Eliminated -- not moved somewhere else. This quite clearly promotes the interests of the Asian countries as well.

I would also like to state that the Soviet Union is a dedicated advocate of disbanding the military groupings, renouncing the possession of military bases in Asia and the Pacific Ocean and withdrawing troops from the territories of other countries. The USSR is a member of the Warsaw Treaty; but this is a European defensive alliance and it operates strictly within the stipulated geographical limits. In our turn we are strongly opposed to the US attempts to extend NATO's "competence" to the entire world, including Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

Our views about security in the Asian-Pacific region did not come out of thin air. They take into account the experience of the past and of today. The principles of "Pancha Shila" and of Bandung have not sunk into oblivion. The positive examples of the truce in Korea, the 1954 Geneva meeting on Indochina, the Indo-Pakistani agreement in Tashkent live on in diplomatic experience. Nowadays, too, we have witnessed the efforts of a number of states to solve in practice common economic problems and the attempts somehow to regulate conflicts. In the activities of the ASEAN and in bilateral ties many positive steps have been taken. After the plan for a "Pacific community" had been rejected, the discussions began on the idea of a "Pacific economic cooperation". We approached this idea without bias and we are ready to join in the deliberations on the possible foundations of such cooperation; this is, of course, if it is not conceived in a forced, bloc-oriented, and anti-socialist pattern, but is rather the result of free discussion without any discrimination. The sufficiently vast arsenal of scientific and political ideas on the issue of establishing a new world economic order and the experience of integration in the West and the East could become a solid foundation for such discussions.

For an objective, however remote, we would like to propose a conference, in the mold of the Helsinki conference, to be attended by all countries gravitating towards the Ocean. When an agreement is reached on its convocation (if an agreement is reached at all, of course) it will be possible to establish the place for this conference. Hiroshima is a possible option. Why should that city, the first victim of nuclear evil, not become a "Helsinki" for Asia and the Pacific Ocean?

In summary, I would like to emphasize that we stand for integrating the Asian-Pacific region into the general process of establishing a comprehensive system of international security proposed at the 27th Congress of the CPSU.

What are our concrete views on this issue?

First of all, the issues of **regional settlement** inevitably arise. I'll speak of Afghanistan separately. Now let me speak of South-East Asia and Kampuchea. The Khmer people sustained terrible losses. That country, its cities and villages were victims of American bombing raids more than once. Through its suffering that country has earned itself the right to choose its friends and allies. It is impermissible to try and draw it back into its tragic past, to decide the future of that state in the distant capitals or even in the United Nations.

Here, as with other problems of South-East Asia, much depends on the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations. It is a sovereign matter of the governments and the leadership of both countries. We can only express our interest in seeing the border between these socialist states become again a border of peace and good-neighbourly relations, in seeing friendly dialogue resumed and the unnecessary suspicion and mistrust removed. It seems that the moment is right, and all of Asia needs this change.

In our opinion, there are no insurmountable obstacles in the way of establishing mutually acceptable relations between the countries of Indochina and ASEAN. Given goodwill and the absence of foreign interference they could solve their problems which would simultaneously benefit the cause of security in Asia.

There is a possibility for not only relieving the dangerous tensions in the Korean peninsula, but also for beginning the solving of the national problem of the entire Korean people. As far as the truly Korean interests are concerned, there are no sensible reasons for evading a serious dialogue which has been proposed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Second. We are for blocking the proliferation and build-up of **nuclear weapons** in Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

As is known, the USSR has pledged not to increase the number of medium-range nuclear missiles in the Asian part of the country.

The USSR supports proclaiming the southern part of the Pacific a nuclear-free zone and urges all nuclear powers to guarantee its status in a unilateral or multilateral way.

The implementation of the proposal of the DPRK for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Korean peninsula would be a significant contribution. The idea of creating such a zone in South-East Asia has aroused well-deserved attention. **Third.** We propose

to start talks on the reduction of the activity of **naval forces** in the Pacific, in particular, nuclear-armed ships. Restriction of the rivalry in the sphere of anti-submarine weapons, specifically, the arrangement to refrain from anti-submarine activity in certain zones of the Pacific, would help strengthen stability. This could become a substantial confidence-building measure.

In general, I would like to say that if the United States gave up its military presence, say, in the Philippines, we would not leave this step unanswered.

We remain strongly in favour of resuming the talks on establishing **the Indian Ocean as a peace zone**.

Fourth. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the radical **reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Asia** to the limits of reasonable sufficiency. We realize that this problem should be tackled gradually, stage-by-stage, by starting with one certain region, say, the Far East. In this context the USSR is prepared to discuss with China concrete steps aimed at the commensurate lowering of the level of land forces.

Fifth. The Soviet Union believes that it is high time to switch to practical discussions on confidence-building measures and on the non-use of force in this region. Simpler measures could serve as the beginning, for instance, measures for the security of sea lanes in the Pacific, and for the prevention of international terrorism.

A conference to discuss and work out such measures could be held in one of the Soviet maritime cities. By the way, with time the question of opening Vladivostok to visits by foreigners could be solved. If the situation in the Pacific actually changes for the better, Vladivostok could become a major international centre, a commercial and cultural centre, a city for festivals, sports events, congresses, and scientific symposiums. We would like it to be our window opened widely on the East. And then the words of our great Pushkin "the ships of every flag and nation will hail our shores" will apply to Vladivostok as well.

And in conclusion, about Afghanistan. It was declared from the rostrum of the 27th CPSU Congress that we are ready to recall Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan at the request of its government. As is known, the Party now firmly adheres to the principle that words should be confirmed by deeds.

Having thoroughly assessed the current situation and having held consultations with the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Soviet leadership has adopted the decision which I officially announce today: six regiments will be returned home from Afghanistan before the end of 1986 – one armoured regiment, two motorized infantry regiments, and three anti-aircraft artillery regiments – with their regular equip-

ment and armaments. These units will be returned to the areas of their permanent deployment in the Soviet Union, and in a manner that these moves will be obvious to all those who take an interest in this.

Taking this serious step, of which we informed the states concerned in advance, including Pakistan, the Soviet Union is striving to speed up and give further impetus to a political settlement. The Soviet Union expects that those who organize and implement the armed intervention against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, will correctly understand and duly appreciate this unilateral step we have taken. It must be answered by the curtailment of outside interference in the affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Certain progress has been achieved recently at the Afghan-Pakistani talks held through the mediation of a representative of the UN Secretary-General. As soon as a political settlement is finally worked out, the recall of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan can be accelerated. Schedules for their stage-by-stage recall have been agreed upon with the Afghan leadership.

But all who encourage and finance the undeclared war against Afghanistan and from whose territory it is waged, should know that if the intervention against the DRA continues, the Soviet Union will come to the defence of its neighbour. This position stems from our internationalist solidarity with the Afghan people and from the interests of the Soviet Union's security.

We support the policy of the present Afghan leadership aimed at national reconciliation and at widening the social base of the April National-Democratic Revolution. This includes the creation of a government in which would participate those political forces that have found themselves beyond the country's borders but who are prepared to participate sincerely in the nationwide process of building new Afghanistan.

Comrades,

The present generations have inherited many difficult and painful problems. In order to reach a solution to these problems it is necessary to get rid of the burden of the past, to seek new approaches, guiding oneself by one's responsibility for the present and the future.

The Soviet state calls upon all Asian and Pacific nations to cooperate for the sake of peace and security. Everyone who strives towards these goals and who hopes for a better future for one's people, will find that we are willing to talk and are honest partners.

Mankind is living through a difficult and dramatic time. But it has a reserve of strength, which allows it not simply to survive, but also to learn to live in a new, civilized

world, in other words, to live without the threat of war, and to live in freedom, when the highest criterion will be mankind's benefit and the maximum development of the individual's abilities. But this requires a persistent struggle against the common enemy – the threat of universal annihilation.

Mobilization of the existing potential of common sense and the partnership of reason are now more important than ever before to stop the slide towards catastrophe. Everyone can rest assured, all peoples in all countries, that our resolve to do our utmost for this cause remains unchanged.

This, in brief, is the state of our domestic affairs at present and the state of the general international situation, in the development of which the Asian and Pacific part of the world is to play an ever increasing role. We should draw practical conclusions from all this in order to act ever more vigorously to rebuild and improve our life.

Although there are no direct analogies in history, similar situations do arise. Therefore, we find past experience useful and edifying. In the article, "Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution" Lenin wrote:

"We have already started the necessary changes in our economic policy and already have some successes to our credit; true, they are small and partial, but nonetheless they are successes. In this new field of 'tuition' we are already finishing our preparatory class. By persistent and assiduous study, by making practical experience the test of every step we take by not fearing to alter over and over again what we have already begun, by correcting our mistakes and most carefully analyzing their significance, we shall pass to the higher classes. We shall go through the whole 'course'..."

This is Lenin's advice, comrades, and a sample of his analysis with its typical depth, clear thinking and self-criticism. We are advised how we should act in the present situation, how we should go about rebuilding, so that we might complete the whole course successfully and bring our country to a qualitatively new level. It is our duty to make full use of Lenin's wise counsel.

I wish you every success and achievement in putting our plans into effect. I wish you happiness, good health and all the best in life.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the people of the Soviet Far East for their kind words of trust and support, for their recommendations and suggestions, and for their warmth and cordiality. Thank you, comrades.

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