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The Bear and the Eagles

Soviet Influence in The 1970 and 1980 Polish Succession Crises

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Introduction

The extent and dynamics of Moscow's control over its East European neighbors have always been of considerable interest to Western analysts. The nature of this influence has become particularly important as the Soviet Union has, within certain parameters, condoned a modicum of East European flexibility in domestic and foreign policy since the mid-1960s. One of the most intriguing areas in the study of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe is Soviet-East European crisis management, and particularly the extent to which the Soviets can affect the outcome of crises their allies face.

Most analyses of Soviet-East European crises are based on a descriptive approach to these events, an approach in which the analyst presents all the various factors he or she thinks are pertinent to understanding the process of the problem or crisis and the results therefrom. While this sort of approach can yield important insights about a particular Soviet-East European relationship and about Soviet-East European relations in general, it is often not sufficiently systematic. One is frequently hard pressed in evaluating research based on this approach to understand how the analysis of the problem or crisis is being structured — how the writer understands the relationship and importance of the various sub-issues of the crisis. The structure of a descriptive approach often can be inferred from the evidence cited or judgments offered, but an analysis where this approach is explicit can provide better insights and less confusion about the actual dynamics of the event or issue being discussed.

The following analysis attempts to provide such systematization in assessing Soviet influence in the 1970 and 1980 Polish successions. Examining a series of issues where Poland and the Soviet Union had potentially conflicting objectives, this analysis attempts to assess how successful the Soviets were in convincing the Poles to adopt the Soviets' views on the important issues. While one may question whether a bilateral influence relationship can be understood as the sum of its parts, I contend that the
framework used here imparts rigor to the analysis by clarifying from the outset the operative hypotheses and assumptions.

A more systematic approach to understanding Soviet-East European crises is important not only for understanding Soviet-East European relations, it is also clearly an important first step for anyone interested in developing theory about Soviet-East European political relations or about the operation and use of influence in general. Elsewhere I have discussed the implications of Soviet-Polish relations for influence theory, but in this analysis I intend to work primarily at the building-block level. The principal goal here is to take a microanalytical look at the two succession crises.

To examine the extent of Moscow's influence on the Polish succession crises of winter 1970-71 and early fall 1980, I have chosen to look at several facets of the sequence of events in each period. For the 1970-71 crisis, these areas are: the riots and the government's control of them; the government turnover that occurred during the week of rioting; and the measures taken to pacify the populace after the immediate period of rioting. For the 1980 succession, the events examined are: the Gierek administration's handling of the strikes; the cabinet changes Gierek made in late August 1980; Gierek's fall; and the selection of Kania as his successor. While influence, usually understood as a continuing phenomenon, cannot neatly be discussed in terms of specific issues, such separation does provide a helpful framework for systematic analysis of these crises.

For the 1970-71 crisis, the basic conclusion I reach concerning management of the riots is that the Soviet Politburo may have urged Gomulka to resolve the situation by peaceful means but was unsuccessful in this attempt. On the succession issue I conclude that the leadership in Poland and the Soviet Union realized that Gomulka was not managing the civil disturbances effectively and had to be removed without much delay. Likewise, it appears that both the Poles and the Soviets supported the election of Gierek, but his succession happened so rapidly that the Soviets probably did not have many opportunities to communicate their
preference on this matter. Regarding the final question of Soviet economic aid in the post-succession period, the evidence suggests that the Poles in February 1971 apparently convinced the Soviets that substantial economic assistance was necessary at a time when the Soviets were not planning aid in addition to what they had already promised in a December 1970 agreement.

Regarding the Soviets’ interest in an early, conservative settlement to the August 1980 strikes, it is clear that although the Soviets strongly communicated this preference to the Poles, they were unsuccessful in achieving this objective. On the issue of the August 24, 1980 cabinet changes, there do not seem to be any indications that the Soviets communicated strong preferences to Gierek. Gierek may have checked with the Soviet leadership before he made these changes, but there are no clear suggestions of influence on this development. Concerning Gierek’s fall in September 1980, it appears that the Soviets clearly communicated their lack of support for Gierek’s administration, particularly after the strike agreement, but that the Polish Politburo and Central Committee also supported Gierek’s removal. As was the case in the 1970 crisis, there was also accord on the question of the successor, but it is possible that Kania’s attractiveness to the Soviets may have increased his appeal to the Poles.

For the analysis of each succession period, I define influence to occur successfully when one nation communicates to another objectives that are different from those of the target nation, and the target nation later assumes those objectives. To distinguish between influence and coercion, I assume influence may include threats of the use of force, either military or economic, but not the application of such force. This examination of influence will necessarily overlook elements of influence operating over both a broad range of Soviet-Polish interactions and over an extended period of time around the successions. Rather, the focus of the following study is the use of Soviet influence during two crises when one might expect Soviet influence to have been most significant.
Methodology

Applying the definition of influence to the winter crisis of 1970-71, I offer four hypotheses:

1. Influence occurred if the Soviets can be shown to have caused the Poles and specifically PZPR First Secretary Wladislaw Gomulka to undertake more extensive efforts to curtail the riots and pacify the rioters than he was employing at the outset of the crisis.

2. Influence occurred if it can be proven that the Soviets were directly responsible for Gomulka’s being voted out of his position as First Secretary, a change which would not have happened or would not have happened as fast if the Soviets had not provided their input.

3. Influence occurred if the Soviets can be shown to have been instrumental in the selection of someone as Gomulka’s successor who was not earlier considered a prime candidate for the office he obtained.²

4. Influence occurred if it can be proven that the Poles acquired more economic assistance from the Soviets than the Soviets had earlier planned to provide.

For the 1980 succession period, the hypotheses are similar:

1. Influence occurred if the Soviets can be shown to have convinced the Polish government to instruct the delegations negotiating with the main committees of the strikers to take positions which were more in accord with Soviet preferences than with those of the Polish leadership.

2. Influence occurred if it can be proven that the Soviets orchestrated the cabinet changes made in late August 1980.

3. Influence occurred if it can be proven that the Soviets successfully directed Giersz’s ouster, a development which would not have occurred or would not have occurred as fast if the Soviets had not provided their input.

4. Influence occurred if the Soviets can be shown to have been instrumental in bringing to power as Giersz’s successor someone who was not earlier considered a prime candidate for the office he obtained.
Before discussing the criteria to be used for determining influence in this case study, a few theoretical comments need to be made about the measurement of influence among Warsaw Pact nations. The main problem here is the distinction between influence exercised in non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios. Because most East European ruling elites are, to a greater or lesser extent, politically, economically, and militarily dependent on the Soviet Union, few cases of clear conflict present themselves for the study of influence. The Soviet Union indeed has occasionally been at odds with its East European allies, but these incidents have been relatively infrequent. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the possibility that the Soviet Union exercises influence if it convinces one of the bloc nations to take certain actions sooner than the nation had planned.

Such a scenario has distinct elements of cooperation, but the time factor may truly constitute a potential element of conflict. Because few major conflicts are likely to occur, observation of influence here in the Soviet-Polish relationship will utilize this assumption about time differentials as a basis on which to judge the occurrence of influence. Similarly, one must keep in mind that since the Soviets exercise influence in Eastern Europe in a variety of subtle ways, Soviet influence during the two crises examined here may have occurred at levels for which the criteria I use do not provide good measures.

The basic data used here to assess influence are policy statements and speeches by leaders of both countries, as well as articles in the Polish, Soviet, and Western presses. The policy positions presented in speeches and articles will be analyzed for both their substantive content and the tone in which they were delivered. Commentaries in the Western press are used because they provide information on dynamics of possible currents of influence.
Part I: The 1970 Succession Crisis

Preface to the 1970 Crisis: Polish Economic Problems

The economic difficulties which led to the price increases around which the 1970 unrest coalesced had two major sources. One was the systematic problem of poor resource allocation; the other was the harsh weather which devastated Polish agricultural production in 1969 and 1970. One of the main reasons the economy was in trouble in 1970 was poor planning on the part of the government economists, plus political problems connected with inner-party strife. After bureaucratic infighting between political-economic hardliners and reformers during the latter part of the 1961-1965 Plan, the economy was in serious need of reform. Many reforms attempted in the late 1960s, for example, failed because hardliners in the bureaucracy impeded the implementation of the reforms, thus discrediting these much-needed improvements and inhibiting economic growth at the same time. Under attack from the conservatives led by Mieczyslaw Moczar in 1968, the 1966-1970 Plan began to suffer, exacerbating the problems affecting the management of the Plan.

By the end of 1968, the economy was in one of its periodic crises with (by this time) familiar symptoms. There was significant over-investment of scarce capital, resulting in numerous unfinished projects and projects that greatly exceeded their original cost estimates. Employment under this five-year plan presented additional problems. By the end of 1968, employment outside agriculture already totaled 9.4 million workers, only .3 million short of the limit set to be reached in 1970. This overemployment not only led to reduced labor productivity, but it also resulted in a large above-plan expansion of the wage fund. The wage fund itself had not been programmed for a significant increase because of the difficulties in balancing expenditures and revenues for the population; in 1969 real wages increased only 1.2 percent, a minuscule amount.
Combining this problem with the problems of inefficient management and unfulfilled quotas, it is easy to understand why industry was not able to surmount many of the problems it faced.\(^4\) A related problem previously suggested is that there was a large gap between supply and demand of consumer items. A frequent result of planned economies, the shortage of desired consumer goods, most notably meat and high-quality consumer items, was to have important political significance in late 1970.

In addition to this systemic problem with industry, there was also a significant problem in the agricultural sector. The harsh winters of 1969 and 1970 had drastically curtailed fodder production; consequently, cattle production in 1970 decreased by about 950,000 head and swine production by 260,000 head in comparison with the 1969 levels. As a result, purchases of livestock were about 100,000 tons less in the second half of 1970 than in the first.\(^5\) Additionally, the total grain harvest was significantly lower in 1970 than in the past years, with some areas harvesting about 220 lbs. per acre less than was harvested in the previous year. The total harvest in 1970 amounted to about two-thirds of that in 1969.\(^6\)

The reductions in the grain harvest meant that deliveries of grain to processors for flour, bread, etc. dropped heavily in 1970. In fact, by only September, grain deliveries were down by 700,000 tons. When the effects of the weather are combined with the effects of insufficient agricultural investment because of misplanning, it is easy to understand the seriousness of the agricultural problems the government faced during the months prior to the price increases.\(^7\) Not only was the government headed for trouble with regard to the supply of meat and grain for the consumer, but it was going to encounter additional problems because of its intent to make domestic cutbacks in this supply in order to export meat for hard currency.\(^8\)

The only practical recourse available to the Poles was to increase their grain imports from the Soviet Union and their meat imports from the Soviet Union and other countries. The Soviets at that time had been supplying the Poles annually with 1 to 1.2 million tons of grain, but Soviet
policymakers were not disposed to granting further exports to Poland because of the difficulties with their own supply of grain. It became clear to the Poles that further grain imports from the Soviet Union were unlikely; it also became clear that the possibility of importing from other countries was slight. Gomulka made public this unsatisfactory economic picture in a September 6 speech. At that time, he apparently was unsure of the possibility of economic assistance; otherwise, it is likely that he would have mentioned it. This uncertainty enhanced the possibility that the Poles would have to inaugurate stringent domestic policies to deal with these economic problems without assistance from abroad.

Explanation of the Price Changes

The basis for the price reform is fairly simple. As Boleslaw Jaszczuk explained the situation to the Sixth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee on December 14, the fact that "retail prices bore no reasonable relation to the costs of production was responsible for incorrect proportions between the prices of food articles and in trial articles and within the groups of these articles." The government was subsidizing stock breeders with funds amounting to 6.5 billion zlotys per year while only receiving about 3.4 billion zlotys in sales. This difference meant that the government was losing about 3 billion zlotys ($125 million) annually. Meat prices were therefore increased so that demand would be brought into greater symmetry with supply.

On the other hand, manufactured goods were selling at a fairly slow rate because price far exceeded demand. With the introduction of technological advances and larger production runs, the price of manufactured goods needed to be decreased to make them more attractive to consumers. Increased revenue from the higher prices for food products would amount annually to about 11.2 billion zlotys while decreased
revenues from the lowered prices on industrial goods would amount annually to about a 12 billion zloty loss.\textsuperscript{11}

Effective on December 12, meat prices were increased an average of 17.6 percent, cheese 25 percent, flour 16 percent, fish 11.7 percent, milk 8 percent, coal 10 percent, and leather goods an average of 20 percent. Prices of radios were decreased 19.2 percent, washing machines 17 percent, some medicines 31 percent, synthetic fibers 15 to 30 percent, and light bulbs 32.2 percent.\textsuperscript{12} Furthermore, subsidies totalling 920 million zlotys were granted to low income families and to families with numerous children. This move, basically to shape the structure of consumption closer to that which would be found in a market economy, was presented as very necessary for the effective functioning of the state. Jaszczuk added that only "absolutely essential" price changes had been made.\textsuperscript{13}

Given the problems that the economy was experiencing, the reforms presented by Jaszczuk appeared reasonable to policymakers. Considering the country's need for hard currency and the primacy it assigned to industrial versus consumer goods, it was a logical step to divert meat products from domestic to foreign markets. Clearly, the government did not consider that the reaction would be as strong as it was. The specific reasons for the severity of the reaction are discussed below, but it is important here to note why the government did not anticipate the reaction.

First, the political situation in Poland seemed most appropriate for the intended changes. The 1968 political tensions involving the students and the serious factional struggling in the party had for the most part dissipated. Probably the most salient factor affecting the political climate then was the December 7 signing of the treaty with West Germany in which the FRG recognized Poland's Oder-Neisse line and the Nazi atrocities perpetrated against the Poles in World War II. This treaty settled a major controversy which had impeded Poland's relations with Western Europe since the end of the war. Foreign Minister Stefan Jedrychowski, the main Polish negotiator, signalled the government's satisfaction with the treaty in his remarks that the signing of the treaty
ended "an epoch in relations between the two nations" and that it "con­
stitutes a lasting basis for normalizing relations" between the two states. He added he was convinced that the treaty would be significant "not only for our nation but for the peace of Europe."14

Two other political developments are important as they formed the basis for the Gomulka group's sanguine perception of current Polish politics. One factor was that relations with the Soviet Union were positive, as that country was in full support of the Polish-FRG rapprochement. The Soviets had signed a treaty with West Germany just that August. Finally, there was relief in Eastern Europe in 1970 that political tensions had abated somewhat in Czechoslovakia. By that time, Gustav Husak had largely completed the "normalization" of Czechoslovak politics without extensive difficulties.15

Still, the Polish people reacted violently to the price changes. This reaction indicated that the country's leaders had not accurately assessed the potential reception of the changes. Therefore, one conclusion to be drawn even before considering in detail the people's reactions to the price changes is that the government did not have a very substantial perception of popular sentiments towards economic matters, especially sentiments concerning the possibility of price increases.

To present the reactions of the Polish citizens to the increases and to determine the extent to which the Soviets influenced the government to quell the riots, it is first necessary to understand why the people reacted as violently as they did. It is necessary to construct this perspective to explain why the Gomulka government was unsuccessful in restoring order to the disturbed cities.

Bases for the Reaction to the Increases

Although the riots developed a political character, they at first arose from economic dissatisfaction. The economic nature of the citizens' disgruntlement originated from two sources. First, meat is a much desired
consumer item in Poland, and the Poles already were having to content
themselves both with occasional meat shortages and with having no meat
at all on Mondays. As explained by an economist writing in *Zycie Gospar-
darcze* in November 1970, the demand for meat was increasing almost
parallel with income. Given such inelasticity of demand, it should have
been a foregone conclusion that price increases were going to have severe
consequences for the consumer. Exacerbating the situation were
problems resulting from the poor harvests, and the Poles’ preference for
meat during Christmas, especially ham for the traditional Christmas Eve
dinner. It is thus understandable that a turbulent reaction would be
forthcoming.\(^{16}\)

Urban consumers were to suffer more than rural ones, as the increases
for the former were not offset by the procurement payments the farmers
received. Furthermore, since the previous increase in meat prices in 1967
had been modest, it cannot be said that the Poles were accustomed to sub-
stantial increases in meat prices.\(^{17}\) Adding to the distress of the citizens
was the fact that the lower prices on manufactured goods did not make
their poor quality any more palatable. There had never been great
demand for manufactured goods from Polish industries, so the price
decreases for manufactured goods in no way compensated for the in-
creases for food.\(^{18}\)

The second source of popular dissatisfaction with the increases was the
economic pressure created by the wage incentive system planned for full-
scale application at the beginning of 1971. This wage incentive system,
authorized by the Central Committee in May 1970 and put into effect on
a trial basis during the following month, met significant opposition from
the workers. As Jasczuk explained the system, the new scheme was to link
workers’ remuneration to greater efficiency and lower costs in production,
better use of machines, etc.\(^{19}\)

There were several principal problems with the incentive plan. First
the workers’ chances of receiving bonuses were in part determined by the
effectiveness of the managers. Because the incentives were based partly
on production efficiency and total output, the workers felt that there were numerous factors in the plan beyond their control. Second, the plan was extremely complex, with the result that many plant managers did not themselves fully understand it. Finally, the plan represented a significant change from the earlier incentive system which had enabled workers to receive incentives based solely on the quantity of their work. Usually the quotas were set low so that the workers received bonuses frequently. Because the new bonuses would be based on quality as well as quantity, the workers would no longer be assured of their "guaranteed bonuses". With food prices increasing and wages potentially decreasing, workers therefore felt themselves in a "two-way economic squeeze," the government seemed to them to demonstrate considerable insensitivity to their needs.

Soviet Reaction to the Riots

There are four factors to consider in assessing the riots and Soviet influence in calming them: 1) the seriousness of the disturbances; 2) the reactions of the Soviets to the turbulence; 3) the attitudes of the Polish government toward the riots; and 4) the measures the Polish government pursued to control the unrest. If it can be shown that the situation was sufficiently unstable and that the Polish government demonstrated an inability to control the problems, then one can assert that the Soviets would likely have taken steps to effect a resolution of conflict. The initial discussion of governmental control of the riots will focus on the Gomulka group. Gierek's handling of the unrest will be discussed in a following section. The chronology of events from December 12 to December 20, the date of Gierek's ascension to power, is of critical importance for these questions, but I will note only those details which significantly bear upon the influence relationship.

The first hint of price increases came on Saturday, December 12, 1970, when they were presented by Jaszczeuk to the Politburo and subsequently
passed. That same day, Stanislaw Kociolek, a Politburo member and First Secretary of the Gdansk PZPR branch, travelled to Gdansk, allegedly to discuss the new wage incentive plan with the workers. In reality, his main purpose was to explain the implementation of the price rises to be announced that evening. The workers, who expected from Kociolek some redress of grievances concerning the incentive system (numerous other areas, such as Katowice, had received redress), were incensed to learn of the increases.

Forsaking their jobs on Monday, December 14, about 1,000 workers from the Gdansk shipyards left their work area, where they had been having a political meeting, and marched to the party voivodship committee headquarters. When they did not receive any sympathy from party officials, they marched to other parts of the city, including the radio station, where they were unsuccessful in having their complaints broadcast. The group returned to party headquarters that night more bitter than they had been earlier in the day and burned the building down.

The group grew on Tuesday when longshoremen and factory workers joining it caused it to swell to over 3,000. The situation Tuesday became greatly aggravated when shipworkers still on the job attempted to join the demonstrations and were fired upon by militia and army troops. Helicopters were used during this confrontation to direct the fire of the military personnel and to drop tear gas canisters on the crowds. When later on Tuesday elements of the crowd, now numbering over 10,000, burned down the railway station and began vandalizing stores, the army occupied the city and established a curfew. Travel to Gdansk was restricted as was telephone communication. The Gdansk unrest, which basically lasted from December 14-16, spread to other cities before it ceased.

The turbulence spread first to Gdynia, where strikes beginning on Tuesday became violent the following day, and several people were killed. Other cities in the area such as Sopot and Slupsk also experienced riots. Moreover, the riots began to develop a mass appeal as housewives joined the shipworkers and longshoremen. Curfews were also instituted in these
other cities, as were bans on public meetings. Communication with and travel to these cities was cut off as well, and around several of the port cities, foreign merchant vessels were required to wait for unloading further out in the harbor. Violence and strikes eventually spread inland; disturbances were reported in Elbag and Poznan on the 16th and Szczecin and Krakow on the 17th. There were rumors of strikes in Warsaw, but none materialized.

Several hundred people were killed and over 1,000 people wounded in the areas of the greatest disturbances, in addition to the damages which totalled over $15 million. Perhaps the worst tragedy occurred in Gdynia on the 17th. There on the evening of December 16, Stanislaw Kociolek issued an order encouraging workers to return to their jobs the following day. Many complied with this order, but when they proceeded to walk from the city railway station to the shipyards, they were fired upon by the militia. Apparently Kociolek had reversed his order during the evening and had not been able to communicate it adequately to the people. Politburo member Zeno Kliszko, whom Gomulka had sent to the area to help restore order, hindered Kociolek’s staff in publicizing the order to stay home.  

Reaction of the Polish Government

Gomulka’s attitude to the deteriorating situation was apparently both secretive and unyielding. Although information began to arrive in Warsaw concerning the disturbances in the late morning or early afternoon of the 14th, Gomulka did not call meetings of either the Central Committee nor the Politburo to consider the matter. There was a plenum of the Central Committee in progress at the time, but no official statement of the unrest was delivered until sometime in the afternoon. When knowledge of the problem became widespread, Gomulka labeled the disturbance counterrevolutionary and refused to consider the possibility that the unrest was initiated by workers with legitimate complaints. Gomulka had
commented the previous weekend, when asked about the increases, that the populace would be expected to grumble somewhat, but he asserted that they on the whole would take the change in the same passive way as they had the nation’s employment problems and the incentive plan when it was initiated. 24

Given this attitude toward popular sentiments concerning the increases, it is easy to understand that markedly negative reactions to the changes would be interpreted as illegitimate demands by the working class. This attitude is especially well reflected in Radio Warsaw and Trybuna Ludu reports on the violence. Both of these party organs initially termed the demonstrators "hooligans and adventurers", "scum", and "enemies of the state". 25 It was, in fact, not until Gierek came to power that it was admitted that those involved in the unrest were workers, housewives, etc.

As is clear in the initial presentation of the events of the first few days, the measures pursued by the government were coercive and reactionary. The army units were ordered in against the rioters from the very first day of the disturbances, and although this move of Gomulka’s was logical given the perception of the problem, it was a highly inappropriate measure considering the true nature of the agitation. Understandably, the confrontations in which Poles were firing upon Poles provoked severe criticism of the government. This uncircumspect approach to handling the problem was probably given its most significant embodiment in Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz’s speech on Thursday, December 17. Speaking of "hostile forces endeavoring to create new seats of anarchy," Cyrankiewicz pointed out that the regime had been compelled to restore order and had used armed police against the demonstrators in the "supreme interests" of the "nation as an entity." These supreme interests, he continued, included the interest of each of the citizens and "of every Polish family." 26

This attempt to justify the killing of civilians in the interests of the state further clarified the misperception of the turmoil caused by the price increases. Cyrankiewicz pursued the government’s misguided policies fur-
ther when he authorized the "militia, security services, and other cooperating organs" to use "all the legal means of enforcement, including the use of weapons" against those causing disturbances.27

Considering Gomulka's initial reaction to the disturbances, his use of the military, his evaluation of the malcontents, together with the similar views and policies presented by Cyrankiewicz, it appears clear that the Gomulka government did not have much control over the situation as it was developing from the 14th to the 17th. Furthermore, in Szczecin and Gdynia during the period when it appeared that a nationwide strike was indeed burgeoning, it was very clear that local party officials had lost control of the situation.28 The destruction of several party headquarters buildings by arsonists accentuates this conclusion. Given Soviet concern about maintaining stability, it seems likely that the Soviets would have felt compelled to act during these few days.

The Soviet Response

The Soviets had two divisions in Poland totalling 10,000 men apiece. One was located near Lignica in southern Poland and the other in northwest Poland, not far from the Baltic Sea. The Soviets apparently chose not to put these divisions on alert. Fearing the consequences if they invaded, Soviet policymakers acted cautiously, not even ordering the men to leave their barracks.29

Nevertheless, there were significant Warsaw Pact activities occurring around Poland. Western travellers and Western intelligence services reported significant military movements in the GDR during several days previous to the 19th aimed at sealing off areas of unrest. Large armored columns were reported moving around Rostock, where sympathy demonstrations for Polish workers had taken place, and around Posewalk, some 25 miles west of Szczecin. These movements may have been intended partly as an indication to the Polish populace and government of what might ensue if calm were not restored to Poland. The Poles certain-
ly knew of the large numbers of Soviet troops in the western Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR, and they also undoubtedly realized that the Soviets would not hesitate to use these troops if the situation became much more unstable.\textsuperscript{30}

The Soviets indeed did have a significant amount to lose if the Polish disturbances spread; not only would they have problems in Poland, but also difficulties might have occurred in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Furthermore, there was the possibility of losing the initiative with West Germany. Helmut Schmidt, then FRG Minister of Defense, commented that the German government "regarded with alarm" the disturbances and that the continued Polish rioting would stall German ratification of the treaty by adding weight to the criticisms of conservative German politicians.\textsuperscript{31} The Soviets would not have intervened militarily in Poland to protect the initiative with West Germany, since doing so would clearly have been counterproductive. The Soviets were, however, very interested in keeping this initiative alive. It is certainly conceivable that they would have exerted what pressure they could to check the worsening crisis before it damaged or destroyed this initiative.

Judging from their military activities, it may be said that the Soviets were indicating their preference that the situation be rectified faster than the Gomulka government was doing at the time. It is possible, of course, that this mobilization was simply a standard Soviet procedure in the event of trouble in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, taken in conjunction with other manifestations of Soviet concern for stability in Poland to be presented later, it seems plausible that this move was intended as a signal to the ruling elites in Poland.

This likely attempted exertion of influence for the cause of stability was accompanied by other clear indications from the Soviets that they wanted Polish problems solved sooner than the Gomulka government seemed to have been able to solve them. It was discovered after that eventful week that in response to a plea for assistance from Gomulka, Brezhnev had sent a letter or telegram to the Polish Central Committee.
Gomulka received this letter on or about the 17th and had subsequently hidden it. The letter advised the Central Committee that "the present problem must be solved by political and economic means," i.e., not by force. Whether the letter itself had been sent before or after the Cyrankiewicz speech on the eve of the 16th makes little difference, as the government had employed force against the dissidents before such use became a stated policy. If it had been sent after the speech, it would only have emphasized the divergence of views.32

Was the Soviet government successful in its attempt to influence the Polish government to calm the riots sooner than it had planned and without the use of violent means? This question is a difficult one to answer for several reasons. First, the question itself more specifically asks if Gomulka actually did issue orders on the 17th or 18th, before his hospitalization on the afternoon of the 18th for hypertension and a mild cerebral hemorrhage, requesting that Polish authorities attempt to calm crowds quickly by other than military means. This question cannot be definitively answered because of insufficient information, but the possibility of such orders seems unlikely given the strength of his misperception about the reasons for the riots and the fact that he hid Brezhnev's letter from the Central Committee.

A second complicating factor is that many of the trouble spots had considerably calmed by the morning of the 18th, so that Gomulka might not have deemed it necessary to issue orders of the requested nature even if he had agreed with them. In addition, he probably considered this calmness to be a result of the heavy-handed approach.33 In any case, the fact that the atmosphere was still tense in the affected areas would have provided adequate reason for not issuing such orders, if only for safety’s sake.

Even assuming that no one of the Central Committee had discovered Gomulka’s hidden letter by the evening of the 19th, when Gierek was all but voted into office, the conclusion is inescapable that the Politburo and Central Committee realized that Gomulka was not doing an effective job
and that there were many rumors in Warsaw at that time speculating on the severity of Soviet displeasure with Poland's domestic situation. To the extent that the Politburo and Central Committee realized that a better job could be done if Gomulka were out of office, they probably also would have agreed with the Soviet request. It is hard, though, to separate the conclusion of the Politburo concerning calming the riots from the conclusion to oust Gomulka and replace him with Gierek. It is very likely that they saw the removal of Gomulka as the main step in calming the riots.

Finally, it is likely that the group which ushered in Gierek shared exactly the same concern regarding the riots as the Soviets and that they would continue trying to calm the agitation using the same measures and timetable Soviet leaders desired. With these assumptions, one would note that successful influence to calm the riots was not exerted as there was no conflict of views between the Soviets and the majority of Polish Politburo and Central Committee members. Considered in its simplest form, however, the conclusion can be drawn that the influence attempt directed specifically at Gomulka to manage the crisis without force failed because of his intransigence.

The 1970 Governmental Changeover

To determine whether the Soviets may have influenced the PZPR leadership to change its first secretary, it is necessary to attempt to answer two questions: Did the Soviets consider a governmental coup in Poland as instrumental to furthering their own goals, and if so, did they take any actions implementing this opinion?

Given the probable Soviet failure to persuade Gomulka to pursue a more reasonable policy toward the disaffected workers and his subsequent incapacitation under all the pressure, it seems likely that the Soviets did consider Gomulka unable to carry out the tasks at hand. Although some Western analysts had speculated that the Soviets would not encourage a
governmental changeover in an East European crisis because of its destabilizing effects, many Western analysts thought that the Soviets would readily agree, if not suggest, that a leader incapable of effective management be removed.34

It is difficult to separate Soviet interest in Gomulka’s ouster from interest in Gierek’s appointment, but there are a number of indications, in addition to the Soviet irritation with Gomulka’s unyielding approach to the riots, that they perceived Gomulka as increasingly unfit for the job as the first secretary. It is indeed true that Gomulka had been a loyal supporter of the Soviet Union. Although he seemed like a troublesome liberalizer at the outset of his tenure, his policies became progressively more conservative, so that by the early 1960s, there were no problems of the sort experienced in Hungary in 1956. Gomulka guided the nation in support of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA throughout the 1960s, and he had lent verbal and military support to the Czechoslovakia invasion of 1968.

As late as February 1970, he had been hailed by Kremlin leaders as a "great friend of the Soviet Union" and a "consistent internationalist-Leninist." He had furthermore been lauded as having "rich experience, knowledge, and energy," in short, a model leader for "Poland, the socialist community and all international Communist and workers’ parties."35 Considering this support for Gomulka, then, was it only his misperception of the rioters and his inept use of armed force that put him in disfavor and caused the Soviets to conclude that he had to be relieved of authority?

Such is not the case. Gomulka’s problems with the riots were actually symptomatic of a lengthy series of conflicts. Gomulka, a conservative if not reactionary politician, had increasingly grown out of touch with the masses, pursuing poor managerial and economic policies that not only were unprogressive but also were not geared significantly toward improving the Poles’ standard of living. Polish industry was continually plagued by low production, poor quality manufacturing, and inefficient planning. These factors hurt not only Poland’s domestic economy but also its foreign economic relationships. It apparently came to be the case that the
Gomulka government accepted many of the nation’s economic failures as routine; therefore, continued failures led to new errors in planning.\textsuperscript{36} It is evident, then, that Gomulka’s mismanagement of the economy and insensitivity to the populace reached a climax of sorts in his sanction, if not promotion, of the price increases.

**Soviet Pressure for Gomulka’s Ouster**

As the Soviets considered the general problems the Polish regime faced in handling the unrest and Gomulka’s inability to calm the riots, it was probably clear to them that Gomulka had to be relieved of power. There was some speculation that Brezhnev may have flown to Warsaw or had met with Polish leaders before the 19th to discuss possible candidates for Gomulka’s position. Probably not wishing to recall in the minds of the Poles Khrushchev’s October 1956 visit to Poland, it is more likely, commented East European diplomats at the time, that Moscow through the Soviet embassy in Warsaw urged that Gomulka be relieved if he were not able to control the riots. This inability became obvious soon after the riots had begun; the speed with which he was ousted was said by many Western analysts to be indicative of the seriousness with which his Politburo colleagues viewed his inability.\textsuperscript{37}

Given the Soviet desire for stability in Eastern Europe, the likelihood that they did not want to have in office someone who could not manage his government, and the possibility that they very likely communicated this position to members of the Politburo or Central Committee, how successful was their probable influence attempt? In this case the situation in which both parties had the same objectives and essentially the same timetable again obtains. Gomulka was not firmly supported by his Politburo colleagues at the time. His political support had been undermined in 1968, and it was even less firm in this crisis, especially as the difficulties began to grow out of control. Furthermore, considering that the price increases had been presented to the Central Committee on the 14th and
that no news of the riots was forwarded to them until late in their meeting on that day, it is easy to imagine that the Politburo and Central Committee members were not disposed to being patient with Gomulka.

Since it appears that both the Soviet and Polish officials wanted Gomulka out and wanted him out quickly, one cannot conclude with confidence that successful Soviet influence occurred.

**Soviet Influence on Gierek’s Election**

Another major issue area in the turnover was the candidate the Soviets and the Polish leaders preferred. The criterion for determining influence here will be whether the Soviets urged the promotion of someone who was not a clear favorite at the time among the Polish leaders. To examine this issue I will compare perceptions of the Soviet and Polish leaders of the prime candidates for the first secretaryship. I will discuss the candidates first as they were viewed by their colleagues and then as they were viewed by the Soviets. Indisputable data on this issue are impossible to obtain, but I will offer evidence to construct an impression about Polish and Soviet preferences for Gomulka’s successor.

Gierek, who had become first secretary of the party in Katowice in 1951 and Politburo member in 1959, had capably led both party and economic affairs in his voivodship. He was known as a proficient politician and adroit manager. He seemed to have a special ability for picking efficient and loyal assistants, and he maintained close contacts with the workers, he was considered to be an "enlightened absolutionist" in his governing, with emphasis on the latter characteristics. Nevertheless, he was credited with maintaining good relations between the party and the state branches of his local government. Gierek provided many fringe benefits for the Silesian miners including housing, athletic events, and well-stocked grocery stores. Economically, Gierek was known as a pragmatist and technocrat, though not a liberal. He let firms conduct
business with an orientation toward their own profit margin, yet he was not in favor of political relaxation to improve economic conditions.  

Gierek’s management of Silesia was so effective that he was able to claim early in January 1970 that total production in his area was up by 7 percent over 1968 projections, while industrial production alone surpassed its target by 3 percent. Furthermore, he reported a 3 percent increase in productivity per worker, while not even using the entire labor force allotted under the 1966-1970 plan. Considering that most other voivodships had exceeded their employment quotas yet had not met their production goals, the economic achievement in Silesia was truly remarkable.  

Nineteen-seventy was not the only year in which Gierek could boast of economic successes. His efficient management and sensitivity to the workers had been generally characteristic of his tenure in Katowice, and it had gained him significant popularity within the PZPR. Gierek became especially prominent in 1968 when he voiced support for Gomulka’s attempt to parry the attacks of Moczar’s partisans. Moczar’s group was especially critical of economic reformers in the government and of Gomulka’s pro-Soviet orientation. Gierek, as leader of the technocrats and young pragmatists, achieved a standoff with Moczar’s supporters during the Fifth PZPR Party Congress in 1968, as measured by the number of Central Committee seats each gained. Gierek then faded somewhat into the background, but during the two years following the 1968 struggle, he increased his party support. It was also during this two-year period that his opposition to Gomulka’s policies developed, as he viewed many of them as based on poor managerial and economic foundations. It is clear, then, that Gierek had much support among both the party regulars and the party leaders.  

What did the Soviets think of him? Gierek was not extremely well-known to the Soviets, but they were probably aware of his managerial and political abilities. Furthermore, he had maintained good relations with the Soviet Union during his tenure as party head in Katowice by hosting numerous Soviet excursion groups, theater ensembles, etc. He was
probably also attractive to the Soviets because of his foreign policy views. Definitely a conservative, Gierek had supported the Czechoslovak invasion and was not a proponent of domestic political liberalization. Nevertheless, his sixteen years spent in France and Belgium before taking the Katowice position had provided him with a better understanding of the West than most of his colleagues possessed. 42

The other major contender for power at this time was Mieczyslaw Moczar. Moczar in the late 1960s was both head of the Polish secret police and Minister of the Interior. Politically he was very much a conservative and a hardline supporter of party discipline. A member of the Polish resistance in World War II, he was also the head of the conservative, nationalistic, somewhat anti-Soviet veterans' organization, the ZBoWID. Directing attacks during the late 1960s at reform-minded Jews in the party apparatus who were friendly with Moscow, Moczar and his partisans tried to capture Central Committee seats by criticizing Gomulka. Although many Jews were dismissed from their jobs and expelled from the PZPR during this period, Gomulka stood firm, and Moczar was thwarted in his drive for full Politburo status. Among the Poles, Moczar had a reputation as "a great Pole and a nationalist," and as a "watchman at Poland's doors against modern world trends and new trends in the socialist community." A fervent political idealist, Moczar however did not have extensive popular support, as people questioned his conservatism and his harsh curtailment of student unrest in 1968. 43

The Soviets were well aware of Moczar's intense nationalism, which undoubtedly had distinctively pejorative ramifications for his attitude to the USSR. In fact, one of the residual antagonisms between the ZBoWID and the Soviets was the fact that members of that organization were passed over for leadership positions when the Soviet Army entered Poland in 1945. 44 The differences between that group and the Moscow policymakers were highlighted when the Soviets backed Gomulka during the Partisans' 1968 quest for power. The Soviets also did not appreciate Moczar's attitude towards the recent issues of domestic economic reform
and rapprochement with West Germany. Moczar's group was in favor of neither, disliking the first because of conservatism and the second because of traditional suspicions of the Germans. Soviet attitudes toward Moczar become further apparent when Moczar's visits to the Soviet Union are considered. The Soviets suppressed virtually all publicity when Moczar visited the USSR prior to December 1970, thereby distinctly indicating their suspicion of him.

Gierek and Moczar were definitely the two foremost contenders for Gomulka's position. There were also other potential leaders such as Kruczek, Kania, Olszewski, and Chylinski, but these did not have the political standing that Gierek and Moczar had. As far as Soviet influence to ensure that Gierek was elected First Secretary is concerned, available evidence from Western analysts and journalists in contact with Polish elites suggests there was very little. Such is the case for two reasons.

First, there are no indications that the Soviets were significantly involved in Gierek's accession to power, and second, Gierek was so strongly the choice of the Politburo and Central Committee that his assumption of power was almost a foregone conclusion. According to reports, Gierek and others opposed to Gomulka's economic policies formed a cabal during the fall of 1970 and held regular meetings at Chorzow in Upper Silesia. This group included Moczar, Jaroszewicz, and several of the Central Committee members. Moczar's joining this group was especially interesting. Apparently he did not think he could attain the first secretaryship, and sought rather to trade the possible support of his security forces in the eventuality of a crisis for a full Politburo seat for himself and Central Committee positions for some of his subalterns.

Most of this cabal, including Gierek and Moczar, were not present at the Politburo meetings of December 9 and 13, or the Central Committee meeting of December 14. They were reportedly about eight miles away in Chorzow, where they were protected by a group of police and army units Moczar had organized. As the events became more serious, however,
Gierek and his group began to organize a rival Politburo, which was moved sometime in December to Legionowo, a city closer to Warsaw than Chorzow. It was in Legionowo that Gierek was allegedly contacted by Brezhnev on December 18.

What transpired during that telephone conversation is unknown, but it is likely that Brezhnev expressed his support for Gierek's group. Gomulka had apparently contacted Brezhnev earlier that day but was not able to elicit any support. Gierek was understood by East European diplomats in Warsaw to be the only possible compromise candidate among the factions of the PZPR. It was Gierek, then, that the Politburo voted into power on the 19th. Gierek arrived in Warsaw that evening and was formally approved by the Politburo on Sunday morning, December 20, and by the Central Committee later that afternoon.

Because of the speed of the events and the support Gierek had, policymakers in Moscow apparently had little choice but to go along with the changes. Especially considering the Soviets' favorable impressions of Gierek and their probable conclusion that he was not going to change the political system in Poland, this speculation seems reasonable. It appears then, that the Soviet input into the leadership change was minimal, considering the concurrence of Soviet and Polish leaders on this issue and the rapid action of the PZPR Politburo.

Soviet Influence and the Improvement of the Polish Political and Economic Situation in 1971

On the issue of Soviet influence on the Gierek leadership, there are three different components to consider. First, there is the immediate issue of the pacification of the workers to prevent future occurrences of violence similar to that of the previous week. Second, there is the Soviet desire that the Poles correct some of the more salient economic problems affecting consumers so that the populace would not continue to chafe under a system constructed so unfavorably toward them. This component
involves issues that are of a longer-range nature, and the time framework I use for this second period involves policy areas reconsidered in the two­to four-month period following the riots. The final component relates to issues and policy areas important to the Soviet leaders in their efforts to maintain Polish long-range cooperation with the USSR. This period involves issues in the five- to ten-month period following the riots.

**Short-Term Objectives**

As to the first component, the Soviets wanted order brought quickly to the troubled areas and preferred this order to be implemented through non-violent means. This preference was communicated to Gomulka, and even assuming the Central Committee was not aware of Brezhnev’s letter, it is very likely that this preference was also communicated to Gierek and his group of leaders through the telephone call on the 18th. The Polish leaders’ cognizance of the Soviet desire is substantiated additionally on March 9, 1971, when Gierek lauded his administration in handling the riots, saying that this group was able "in an unusually complicated situation, to solve the crisis with our forces (emphasis added)."\(^52\)

Were the Soviets successful in encouraging peaceful settlement of the riots? As in the case of Gierek’s promotion, this issue was one on which there was complete agreement between the Poles and the Soviets. The effects of the price increases on the Polish citizens, as Gierek remarked in a speech before the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee on February 6, were apparent to him even before the changes went into effect. According to some reports, Gierek had threatened to resign if prices were increased.\(^53\)

In any case, Gierek took rapid steps to pacify the workers politically and economically. Furthermore, after it had elected Gierek on December 20, the Central Committee charged the Politburo to examine means to improve the conditions of families with low incomes and numerous children. Gierek, in a speech that same day, noted that the disturbances resulted
from "real difficulties" and poorly formulated economic policies. Furthermore, he asserted the need for "broad consultation with the working class and the intelligentsia." These comments indicate that the Gierek group accurately perceived the nature of the complaints, i.e., that they were legitimate, and he made his perception evident to the public. The Council of Ministers on December 22 repealed the December 17 martial law, and the Sejm on December 23 ousted a number of important people connected with Gomulka and his economic policies. These actions, in addition to numerous other actions and statements, indicate that the Gierek government was aware of the political problems affecting the populace and that it needed to take substantial measures to assuage civilian frustration with the government.

The new leadership also displayed both sensitivity to the population’s economic problems and willingness to mitigate some of these financial difficulties. Government officials during the remainder of December consulted with factory representatives and trade union officials concerning plans for higher minimum wages, larger subsidies to very low income groups, and greater allowances for families, handicapped persons, and senior citizens. On January 1, 1971, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution implementing suggestions raised concerning the aforementioned problem areas. The subsidies legislated along with these suggestions totalled 7.4 billion zlotys ($308 million). It is clear, then, that political and economic appeasement of the Polish citizens was in the best interest of Moscow and Warsaw and that the input the Soviet leaders likely exerted was in the form of encouragement and support for the Polish government’s initiatives in this area.

**Middle-Range Objectives**

In the case of those problems included in the mid-range time frame, several unusual conclusions are suggested by the available evidence from Western analysts and journalists. Basically, the concerns in the second
component resemble those of the first: the Soviets wanted the Poles to continue pacifying the citizenry with political reforms that were not too liberal and with economic reforms that did not financially strain Poland or the Soviet Union. The Poles had essentially the same goals, except that they were not as concerned about the Soviet Union’s economic constraints as they were about Poland’s.

Available evidence indicates that while Polish leaders did choose to pursue political reform that avoided liberalization, they exerted enough influence on Moscow to cause Soviet policymakers to grant more economic aid than these policymakers originally had planned to provide. Evidence that the Soviets wanted the Poles to pursue a course of reform that avoided liberalism was abundant in the first few weeks of Gierek’s promotion. Brezhnev’s congratulatory telegram to Gierek on December 22 mentions that the Polish leader was regarded as "a sincere friend of the Soviet Union" and that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was convinced that the PZPR would "be able to overcome successfully the difficulties which have taken place in the life of the country recently and will rally all working people in the struggle for the ideals of socialism" (read: the ideal of working without resort to strikes).56

This preference was further communicated in a December 25 Pravda article in which the newspaper’s Warsaw correspondent notes that "it will take a great deal of effort from party organizations, a strong sense of purpose and constant efforts to improve the style and methods of work to resolve the difficulties that have arisen." The correspondent also notes that this stabilization requires "strict discipline and more ideological control."57

Finally, this preference is evident in TASS’ handling of the riots and governmental changeover and eventual connection of those events to poor consumer conditions. Until December 21, TASS had merely reprinted edited news releases from the Polish press agency which stressed that "hooligans and adventurers" had been those responsible for the recent unrest. The Soviets apparently utilized this tactic to deemphasize the
problems in Poland.\textsuperscript{58} It is clear from the Soviets’ reticence in the press that they wanted to communicate as indistinctly as possible that the change was a major one. The main reason for such action was to preclude East European and Soviet citizens from thinking that the problems were substantially destabilizing.

Gierek was well aware of the need to pursue political and economic improvement without resort to liberal reform. An editorial in a Polish paper on January 7 notes that Gierek in his December 20 speech to the nation commented that the Soviet Union is "the decisive guarantor" of Poland’s security and independence. The editorial states in addition that an upsurge in the Polish economy is necessary not only for Poland’s strength but also for its position in the bloc. Furthermore, the editorial states that Poland bears great responsibility for improving its economic situation.\textsuperscript{59} Gierek’s concern for pursuing political and economic advances in a socialist framework is also illustrated by many of his speeches during the first months of his tenure, but especially by his visits, along with Premier Jaroszewicz, to the Soviet Union and his East European neighbors in early January to inform them of political and economic developments in Poland — that these developments were taking place pursuant to the "inviolable principles forming the foundation of the socialist community."\textsuperscript{60}

In efforts to improve Poland’s economy, there were several important measures he instituted. Shortly after discussion began on the subsidies to lower income groups, he authorized a two-year price freeze on all food except seasonal types, and he later increased numerous forms of governmental service, such as housing, health, and social services.\textsuperscript{61} Furthermore, in an effort to appease 3,000 to 5,000 workers in Gdansk who on January 18 began a slowdown strike, Gierek on January 20 abrogated the new wage incentive system and sanctioned a return to the old one. The workers had been complaining that the new wage increases (averaging about $20 a month more, or 15 percent of the current monthly wage) were accompanied by so many new regulations and production norms that the regula-
tions undercut the increases. The workers also sought the removal of Politburo member and Gdansk party head Stanislaw Kociolek because of his alleged role in the Gdynia killings. The government apparently responded to this pressure on February 7, when Kociolek was released from his Politburo position.62

Problems again occurred on February 12 when 10,000 female textile workers at Lodz factories struck. Apparently inspired by the success of the January 18 strike in Gdansk and earlier slowdown strikes from January 5 to 9 in Gdansk and Szczecin in achieving the desired objectives, the Lodz workers complained about poor wages and unsatisfactory working conditions, and Jaroszewicz and three other Politburo members met for 18 hours with the workers on the weekend of February 15 without reaching an agreement.63 On February 15, the Polish press agency, expanding on a statement by Jaroszewicz, asserted that there was no further possibility of decreasing prices or of increasing wages because the country had no economic reserves. Another reason cited to support this position was that Gomulka had made no allowance in that year’s economic plan for a wage increase.64

A conflict here between Polish and Soviet policymakers was fast developing. Basically this problem was that the Poles needed additional loans to alleviate major economic pressures still annoying the populace, e.g., the high prices for food. The Soviets, through a trade agreement signed with Poland on December 29, had most likely already allocated to the Poles as much help as they could, particularly in the area of grain supplies. Because of two successive bad harvests, the Poles had planned to import more grain than usual from the Soviet Union; after the unrest, the Polish leadership probably perceived the agreed-upon amount of two million tons for 1971 (about twice the average quantity) as particularly necessary because of the importance of improving the domestic food supply.65

The Soviets, of course, have a chronic problem with grain shortages in their own country and therefore are usually not able to export much grain. Furthermore, even though the Soviet 1970 grain harvest had been a record
one, it would not have been ready for export for a year, and low production during the past three years had left Soviet grain coffers with little in storage to offer the Poles immediately.66

The Soviets, then, had numerous agricultural constraints, and the approaching Five-Year Plan called for significant investment increases in the consumer sector, a factor which would have created an additional constraint. The Soviets, therefore, were probably not amenable in early 1971 to granting Poland either more agricultural imports or more financial support. Nevertheless, they did agree on February 14th or 15th both to supply Poland with over $100 million in convertible currencies, to be used at Poland’s discretion, and to absorb Poland’s current part of the Vietnam War costs.67

Gierek undoubtedly had frequently been requesting more aid from Moscow. Apparently after the Lodz strike began, he was able to convince Soviet policymakers of the extent of his need for more aid to insure domestic stability. The importance of the talks in which this assistance was granted was evident by the secrecy which surrounded them. Gierek had previously scheduled a meeting in early February with Herbert Wehmer, leader of the FRG’s Social Democrats, to discuss developments in the treaty the two countries had signed in December. Gierek cancelled this meeting to go to Bialystok near the Soviet border, on account of the "necessity of conducting talks vital to the nation’s economic and political life," according to a Warsaw paper. His activities were not reported during that time, but it is illogical to conclude that business in Bialystok itself was vital to the nation’s economy.68 One assumes he met in Bialystok with Soviet officials to discuss the grant.

This Soviet aid allowed the Poles to bring food prices back to their December 11 level, while maintaining the lower consumer prices on manufactured goods. This assistance was basically dispensed to farmers and meat importers.69

Considering the earlier freeze on prices and the protestations as late as Jaroszewicz’ February 16 statement, the announcement of the price
rollback on the 17th (to take effect March 1) clearly seems to indicate that the Poles were able to persuade Soviet policymakers that Poland needed financial assistance to maintain domestic stability. This assistance apparently did engender a greater stability; the Italian communist paper *L'Unita* stated that the price decreases brought "satisfaction" and a "sense of relief" to the Polish workers.

**Long-Range Objectives**

The final component of the economic readjustments concerns those aspects of the Soviet-Polish relationship that involved long-term political and economic planning. In looking at long-term objectives, the aforementioned general perceptions of the Poles and the Soviets again apply. Chief among these perceptions is that the leaders of the two countries were interested in close cooperation to resolve potential areas of discord.

In the case of the longer-term goals, influence can be assessed from pronouncements of either side about the value of mutual cooperation almost as effectively as it can from analyzing events that suggest the exercise of influence. For example, Soviet media, after a July 1971 meeting with Polish leaders, commented that the "Soviet Union highly values mutual understanding and the constantly growing all-around cooperation with the Polish People's Republic, which are manifested in all the most important fields of political and economic life." In *Pravda* noted after a June 1971 conference that "the steady broadening and deepening of ... cooperation between the two countries is fully in the interests of the Soviet Union and the Polish People's Republic...."

Polish leaders shared this viewpoint about the closeness of Soviet-Polish ties. In addition to Gierek's pronouncements in early 1971 regarding the importance of the Soviet Union in Polish politics, his comments during his speech at the 24th CPSU Congress are especially indicative of Poland's dependence on the Soviet Union. He remarked during the speech that the Soviet Communists' program is a "source of ideological in-
piration for all Communists, for all the forces of socialism, for the freedom of nations, and for peace." A PZPR Central Committee member in charge of the print media stated in March 1971 that the PZPR's programs "assigned decisive significance to the strengthening of relations with the Soviet Union." 

Concerning the implementation in 1971 of Soviet-Polish cooperation, Council of Ministers Chairman Jaroszewicz' comments on the closeness of Soviet-Polish ties and his observation that Polish economists for their planning drew upon "specific conclusions" of the 24th CPSU Party Congress are indeed noteworthy. In accordance with their concern to further ties between Poland and the Soviet Union, Jaroszewicz and other economic officials spent several days in Moscow in June 1971 conferring on the joint Polish-Soviet economic plan for 1971-1975. Finally, the fact that Gierek visited the Soviet Union at least six times during 1971 to consult with Soviet leaders is important to note. At the Sixth PZPR Party Congress in December 1971, Gierek remarked that the "perspective for further development of Poland, the possibility of fulfilling the basic aspirations of our nation, and in particular of the younger generation, have full chances of realization only within the framework of cooperation with the Soviet Union, and only thanks to such cooperation."

These comments from Soviet and Polish officials about cooperation between the two countries underscore the harmony of political perspective of the two leaderships. These assertions of close cooperation suggest that the Polish leadership sought advice and guidance from its Soviet allies to resolve long-term problems and that an important influence relationship was thereby confirmed (or, in this case, reaffirmed). Poland, like other bloc nations, was in many ways economically and politically dependent upon the Soviet Union, with the result that the Soviet leadership was able to exercise what may be termed residual influence with its East European allies.

In the Soviet-Polish case, residual influence may be said to consist of the broad range of Soviet reactions anticipated by the Poles in their long-
term policy planning in 1971. The basic assessment during this longer-range period is that Polish leaders, through their comments on Soviet-Polish relations, revealed the significant consideration they gave to how the Soviets would assess potential policies before the Poles themselves actually instituted those policies.

Since Polish policymakers in the months after the succession probably consulted with Soviet planners on a variety of policy alternatives, and since this consultation probably continued throughout 1971, these consultations can be safely assumed to evidence actual influence in long-term planning.

Conclusions

Judging from those issue areas in which there is enough evidence to indicate that influence was likely exerted, there are several conclusions to be drawn about Soviet-Polish relations during this period.

First, Gomulka, in his failure to recognize the need to pacify the populace at the expense of his own policies, here disagreed with Soviet policymakers. While Gomulka was initially able to resist Soviet pressure to calm the situation, he was later removed as an obstacle to a well-functioning bilateral relationship. His removal, however, was a course of action supported by the Poles as well as the Soviets. The Soviets cannot be said to have exerted influence in this case, as Gomulka’s removal was desired by the Poles as well as the Soviets.

Second, while the Soviets supported the promotion of Gierek as First Secretary, they apparently did not take an active part in insuring that he received the position. Here again is an area where Soviet and Polish views coincided, and, consequently, where Soviet influence cannot be said to have occurred.

Finally, in the case of the Soviet economic assistance to Poland in the spring of 1971, the Poles may have exerted influence on the Soviets by persuading them to be more forthcoming with aid than the Soviets had earlier planned. Here the Poles were apparently able to convince the
Soviets that this aid was necessary to insure continued stability among disaffected workers.

In light of Soviet-East European relations during the previous fifteen years, the 1970-71 instability was clearly the first major East European crisis on a popular level in which the Soviets did not resort to strong political or military intervention. Though the Soviets may have considered strong political or military pressure, the decision not to use such pressure indicated 1) the degree of latitude the Soviets were willing to provide the Poles and 2) a realization of the negative implications of extensive meddling in East European governmental difficulties. The legitimacy of Gomulka's regime was clearly put in question by the events, but the fact that the legitimacy of Communist rule was never a major issue in the unrest (as it was in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or in Poland itself in 1980) provided a cap of sorts to the political volatility of the 1970 crisis. Still, while Poland's status as a socialist country or as a key Warsaw Pact member was never in question during the 1970-71 crisis, the events of this period clearly demonstrated the Soviets' recognition of limits to imperium in their East European backyard.

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Crises in Poland tend to be periodic, and a decade later, the Soviets and the Poles were again dealing with difficult questions of consumer prices and political leadership. In the interim, the Poles were very active in soliciting credits from Western countries to invigorate their economy. While it is hard to say exactly what the Soviet view was toward this debt-led growth, it is likely that they were only supportive of it to the extent the Poles could repay their loans without heavy financial dependence on the USSR. The controversy over price increases in 1976 and again in 1980 indicated that the politico-economic equilibrium in Poland was more unstable during the 1970-1980 period than it seemed at the time.
Part II: The 1980 Succession Crisis

As in the earlier section, the events in Poland during the summer and fall of 1980 will be examined for evidence of Soviet influence. The hypotheses noted previously will guide the investigation.

Gierek's Removal: Domestic Support For The Oust

To understand the Soviets' role in Gierek's fall in September 1980, it is first necessary to understand the Polish leadership's perception of Gierek during the weeks prior to his resignation. This step is important in determining the level of the Polish leadership's support for his continuation in office. During the late 1970s, Gierek's popularity among party and non-party members alike had been declining, primarily because of the country's major economic problems and widespread frustration in the party and in society with political and economic management policies of the PZPR elite. Probably sensing some of this dissatisfaction with his regime, Gierek strengthened his position in the party in February 1980 by the cabinet changes he effected during the Eighth PZPR Party Congress that month. In order to consolidate power among people who were both loyal and effective administrators, he had had Politburo member Stefan Olszowski, Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz, and several other officials dismissed. His plan at the time, as indicated by his speech at the Party Congress, was to continue pursuing fiscally conservative policies necessary to improve the country's economic situation, in particular, the foreign debt. Poland's economic problems were his foremost challenge, and he knew that he would have to make major inroads against these problems to demonstrate the effectiveness of his policies. 77

Decreasing the subsidies for food prices was viewed as an important step in this process, as these subsidies were costing the government $3.3 billion annually. 78 In spite of the economic need for this measure, the
populace was no more inclined to accept the July 1, 1980 increases than they were those in 1970 or 1976.

The prices of some meats increased 80 percent in the process of being moved from state to commercial shops in early July, but these measures did not affect the staple meats of the Polish diet. Moreover, the details of their implementation were left to local authorities. These steps were probably taken to calm objections to the changes, but the response to the increases from the populace was strongly negative. Such was the case not only because of the higher prices, but also because these measures were taken without the broad consultation which Premier Edward Babiuch suggested had occurred. Babiuch had indicated in an address before the Sejm in April 1980, as well as at other times, that food subsidies would eventually be lifted after consultation and discussion with the Polish people about the optimum way to do so. Public announcement of the decision to implement these increases, however, occurred on July 2, the day after the increases had taken effect.79

For the next five weeks, the strikes, which began in the central region of the country, spread so that by early August, opposition to the increases had become nationwide. While work stoppages in many factories were settled by the introduction of wage increases, the resentment against Gierek and his regime for the second unexpected price increase in five years (and the third within the previous decade) grew.

The public reaction was initially misunderstood by the government, a problem increasing the people's sense of alienation from the government and leading to the erosion of popular support for the Gierek regime. On July 3, Interpress head Miroslaw Wojciechowski, characterizing the strikes as only "heated discussions" between management and labor, commented that economically sound policies may not always be popular. A week later Gierek announced that the meat price increases would remain and that wage increases would not be possible except for low income families.80

Over the next few weeks, other political leaders as well as official journals expressed the same hardline sentiment.81
Through mid-August, government officials and spokesmen remained generally adamant in their position on the increases; as the regime had already backed down in 1976 on the same issue, it could not politically afford to do so again. It was not until an August 12 news conference (for Western journalists only) that Politburo propaganda chief Jerzy Lukaszewicz for the first time used the word "strike" to refer to the work stoppages. After the Gdansk workers struck on August 14, Babiuch, while apologizing for inadequately informing the public about the changes, stated that the increases would remain in effect until autumn 1981 and that additional pay raises would not be possible within the current budget. He concluded with a call to return to work to meet production schedules. This speech, poorly received by the workers, was followed by additional exhortations in the media to return to work. Interpress, incidentally, announced on August 16 that the strikes were over but was forced to recant this statement several hours later.

By the time the Gdansk Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS) was established on August 16, the number of striking workers in that city alone had grown to 50,000. Given the growth in the size and frequency of the job actions from early July through mid-August, the increasingly political nature of the strikers' demands, and the government’s policy statements in response to these developments, it is clear that the all-too-familiar gap had developed between the perception of the problem held by the populace and the perception held by the government. Until Gierek’s speech on the 18th, government officials and the official media had clearly done little more than belatedly acknowledge the existence of the strikes and admonish workers to return to work.

Modifying the Perception Gap

With Gierek’s speech on August 18, the government began indicating its attempts to narrow slightly this gap in perceptions, offering the populace a broader share in political decisionmaking and admitting that
the official unions should be more responsive to the workers. Addressing economic and political problems, Gierek offered to stabilize prices for staples and utility rates and to raise wages and family allowances. While stating that force would not be used to break the strikes, he enjoined workers to return to their jobs, warning that challenges to the foundations of Poland’s socialist system would not be tolerated. Although more conciliatory than previous remarks by government officials, Gierek’s speech failed to address the objectives of the Gdansk MKS, which included genuinely representative trade unions and loosening of controls on freedom of speech and information.

On August 21, Gierek replaced the ineffective negotiator Deputy Premier Tadesz Pyka with Deputy Premier and Politburo member Mieczyslaw Jagielski as head of the government’s team meeting with the Gdansk strikers. During the ten days following this move, the government modified its intransigent position in order to bring popular discontent under control. Jagielski agreed to negotiate with the Gdansk MKS, Gierek admitted on the 24th the need for a radical change in the policies of the PZPR and the State, and a number of Politburo and government hardliners were replaced by more moderate politicians. Additionally, the Church was permitted greater access to the media, and official media published several commentaries and editorials presenting the MKS’ objectives in a more favorable light. Finally, the government agreed on August 30 and 31 to the primary demands of the Szczecin and Gdansk MKSs.

In spite of this more tolerant trend and the eventual settlements with the workers, the government had maintained basically the same unsympathetic position toward the work stoppages for a full month and a half, even though, as Lech Walesa commented on the 25th, the populace anxiously sought major policy changes regardless of who was in power. Relating these developments to Gierek’s tenure, it follows that his popular support had rapidly diminished from early July through late August. While some may have been willing to give him a second chance
after the June 1976 price increases, he had become too closely identified with the government's unyielding position to maintain a strong base of support among the populace.

Many events during July and August manifested Gierek's dwindling support. By August 30 his government had acquiesced to a political movement he had earlier characterized as "anti-socialist"; he eventually had to bring into the government people whom less than a year before he had expelled and whose views he admitted he had not heeded (notably those of former Central Committee members Tadeusz Grabski and Stefan Olszowski); and he had to dismiss several of his associates (among the more important were Premier Babiuch and Radio and TV Committee Chairman Maciej Szczepanski). Adding to this erosion, particularly in the party sphere, were the criticism he undoubtedly received in the "sharp and painful" (Gierek's description) Central Committee meeting on August 24, during the presentation of grievances by the party rank and file in Gdansk and Szczecin on August 26, and during the work stoppages beginning in his home base of Katowice Voivodship on August 30.

If the political climate was ripe for Gierek to lose his position as First Secretary, what timetable for his removal could be constructed? As early as August 21, Gierek began encountering suggestions that he step down. One party official on August 29 suggested that Gierek would likely leave in four to five months, and another official indicated to a Western journalist that Gierek would retire "soon, but 'with honor' and at a suitable moment when things were calmer." Knowledgeable government officials in both West and East European capitals reportedly viewed Gierek's departure as inevitable as well.

Gierek, too, apparently saw the handwriting on the wall. After his speech on the 18th, he was reported as being surprised that workers failed to heed his advice to return to work. Subsequent to his speech on the 24th, he allegedly commented that Poland's workers did not trust him and that their refusal to follow his advice was particularly disconcerting.

41
Although the suggestions that he step down continued after the 21st, interest in his removal very likely gained significant momentum after the strike settlements on the 30th (Szczecin) and 31st (Gdansk). The party considered the agreements at Gdansk and Szczecin to be the best they could obtain under the conditions, but Gierek's short-sighted approach to the events of the previous two months, as well as his unpopular management of the economy, made his continuing in office increasingly unlikely. His policies apparently encountered significant criticism in the September 5 meetings of the Sejm and Central Committee. It probably did not take very long for the Central Committee to vote on the 5th to dismiss him, especially if a consensus for this move had previously developed among the members of that body and the Politburo, as may well have been the case. In fact, a Polish journalist with reputedly close party contacts was quoted on September 5 prior to the Central Committee meeting as saying that Gierek "is totally isolated in the Politburo. He has no support left at all." 

It appears, then, that Gierek's slide in popularity during the last part of the 1970s because of the country's economic problems took a precipitous turn for the worse from mid-August to early September. While some Polish officials projected he would leave in late fall or early winter, others thought his departure would be much sooner. If the Polish journalist's comment that Gierek had little Politburo support left by the 5th can be taken at close to face value, it is likely that the majority of the Central Committee also envisioned his departure shortly after the announcement of the strike settlements. If this timetable is generally accurate, we can then assess the impact of the Polish-Soviet relationship on these events.

The Soviet Factor

Even though the Poles may have decided Gierek's fate during the week of September 1, what impact on this issue did the Soviets have? Did the Soviets want him out before the 5th? Did they want him out at all? If
they did want him dismissed, how might they have communicated this preference? The question of Soviet support for Gierek, or conversely, their interest in having him removed, is an issue closely tied with their interest in a conservative settlement of the strikes. Since the latter issue is treated in a subsequent section of the analysis, I will focus here on the former issue.

Clearly, labor unrest in an East European country is always problematic for the Soviet Union, but the July and August work stoppages in Poland were particularly so. Not only was the unrest taking place in a country where workers on other occasions had tasted their political potential, this unrest was also developing less than three months after the Soviets reportedly had their own bout with this problem on a much smaller scale in Togliatti and Gorky. Prior to their August 19 reporting of Gierek’s August 18 speech, Soviet media had not mentioned the strikes for either foreign or domestic consumption. The Soviets did, however, publicly imply their disapproval of the unrest in Poland on several occasions. On July 21, the Soviets downgraded their representation to Poland’s National Day ceremonies at the Moscow embassy. Instead of sending at least one person from the Politburo, which had been the practice for several years, they sent a deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet and a deputy premier.  

Additionally on July 31 after Gierek’s conference with Brezhnev in the Crimea, the TASS report from the meeting stated that the talks had been characterized by "cordiality and complete mutual understanding" instead of "cordiality and complete unity of views," the phrase used to describe both the talks between the two the year previous and the 1980 talks between Brezhnev and most of the other Communist party leaders. While the TASS report of the Brezhnev-Gierek meeting commented only that the two had exchanged information about the "state of affairs in their respective countries," Brezhnev almost certainly discussed his apprehension about the Polish unrest with Gierek. Babiuch implied this topic was discussed when, during his speech on August 15 — the eve of Gierek’s
return from the Soviet Union — he referred to Poland’s "allies, who also worry about our troubles."98

Continuing from August 19, though, the Soviets followed basically a two-track policy in their media coverage of the developments. On the one hand, they called attention to the "irresponsible," "anti-socialist" elements operating in Poland and the need for strong action against the "work stoppages" which had been taking place. Most of the remarks which appeared during the rest of the week of the 18th were selectively emphasized commentaries taken from speeches by Gierek and from Polish media editorials.99

Beginning on the 25th with a harsh commentary on Western subversion in Poland by Yuriy Kornilov, followed by similarly critical articles by "A. Petrov" on September 1 and Viktor Glazunov on September 2, Soviet media intensified its coverage with analyses by its own commentators.100 Furthermore, virtually all the reporting in the Soviet press was shorter and less explicit in the versions for domestic than for international audiences. When Soviet media reprinted speeches of the Polish leadership and Polish media commentaries that explicitly mentioned the strikes or measures suggested to resolve them, these references were generally attenuated or dropped.101 The Soviets additionally emphasized their view that these events were unpalatable for domestic audiences (and therefore a potential security threat) when they renewed their jamming of VOA, BBC, and Deutsche Welle on the 20th.102 As part of their detente policy, the Soviets had not jammed these stations since 1973.

The second track consisted of Soviet attempts to indicate that the Poles’ problems were their own to handle. On August 22, two Soviet officials told a Western journalist that the Soviet leadership was taking a calm approach toward events in Poland and was relying on Gierek to manage the crisis. On August 26, a spokesman of the USSR’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Polish unrest was "completely the internal affair of that state" and that Soviet-Polish relations remained characterized by "full mutual cooperation in all spheres."103 There were also
several indications that the Soviets took steps to signal that neither "Brotherhood-in-Arms '80" (September 8-12) nor the preparation for these exercises could be taken as precursors to an invasion of Poland. In keeping with their outwardly low-key approach to the crisis, Soviet leaders during July and August maintained travel schedules that frequently kept them away from Moscow. Brezhnev was in the Crimea from July 24 to August 25, then spent only one day in Moscow before traveling to Alma-Ata on the 27th. Chernenko joined him in the Crimea from July 24 through at least August 18. Other Politburo members traveled extensively during August as well, especially Shevardnadze, Aliyev, and Rashidov. Furthermore, a large part of the Politburo was in Alma-Ata from August 27 to August 31 for the Kazakh Republic's anniversary celebrations. During this period in late August, Kirilenko, another key Politburo member, was in the RSFSR's Belgorod oblast from August 28-30. The Soviets were probably indicating through their business-as-usual schedules that the Polish events did not constitute a major crisis requiring key decisionmakers to remain in Moscow. The fact that most of the Politburo members were attending festivities in Kazakhstan during the critical weekend of the strike settlement is a clear indication that the Soviet leadership wanted to demonstrate a "hands-off" attitude toward the Polish problems. To note that these leaders were frequently traveling during the primary crisis periods is not, of course, to suggest that they did not stay in contact with one another and Moscow — or Warsaw — only that they wanted to give the appearance that the Polish unrest did not necessitate an inordinate amount of attention on their part.

The growing severity of the Soviet media criticism of the Polish situation as the number of strikers increased, and as the MKSs continued to hold out for their demands, indicated the Soviet government's negative attitude toward the instability. Although the Soviets were sending two different signals with their Polish policy during the latter part of August, the growing disapproval was clearly the more important one. Calling the problem a "Polish" one, a tactic basically for Western consumption, was an
approach that certainly would have been discarded had the situation severely destabilized and the Soviets found it necessary to come to the aid of a "fraternal" ally.

How much of this general criticism may also have been particularly intended for Gierek is open to speculation. It seems clear that the Soviets did support him throughout most of the crisis. This support was suggested by their publication of an anthology of his speeches in mid-August, by their prompt reporting of his August 18 speech and August 24 announcement of the cabinet changes, and by Yuriy Kornilov’s remarks in his August 25 commentary that Gierek had "laid out a strategic course" that could rectify the situation. 106

This coverage, however, started to take a different course after the settlements in Gdansk and Szczecin. On August 31, instead of a report on the strike settlements, Pravda published a reprint of an article by American Communist Party Secretary Gus Hall, charging that Poland’s problems occurred not because of defects in the socialist system, but because of weaknesses in the Polish leadership. 107 Later that same day, TASS still ran no news of the agreements, but instead broadcast through Radio Moscow a long commentary by the authoritative "A. Petrov" which was especially critical of "anti-socialist elements" and the Polish workers' damaging "political demands". 108 East German media, drawing upon a Pravda commentary of September 1 which stated that government negotiators had imprudently agreed to examine the demands of "anti-socialist elements," altered the wording so that the sense was that Gierek had personally acceded to the untenable demands of the workers. It is unlikely that such an editorial change could have slipped by without Moscow’s approval. Most importantly, Gierek’s name did not appear in the Soviet press from September 1 to September 6. Thus, the post-settlement coverage of Gierek indicates that the Soviets no longer considered Gierek’s continued tenure desirable. 109

In addition to indicating through the media their indirect disapproval of Gierek, it is also possible, as suggested by Western journalists, that the
Soviet leadership had had contact with him at Bialowieza, in eastern Poland, during the week of September 1 and once several weeks previously.\textsuperscript{110} While Polish party sources denied these rumors, they did indicate that Gierek continued to be in close contact with Moscow through the Soviet Union's Warsaw embassy.\textsuperscript{111} Regardless of the channel, though, it is almost certain that Gierek was in contact with the Soviet leadership during the three weeks prior to his ouster. While they may not have used these opportunities to threaten Gierek with withdrawal of Soviet support, it is very likely that they would still have communicated their increased dissatisfaction with the strike developments. Furthermore, the Soviets could have communicated their interest in having Gierek removed to any number of Polish leaders at other times.

While the Soviets were willing to give the Poles a fair amount of latitude in negotiating the strike settlements, it is clear from their reaction to the crisis, evidenced in the media and elsewhere, that they strongly disapproved of the agreements reached. Although Polish negotiators probably worked to frame agreements that the Soviets would not find objectionable, Soviet opposition to the agreements cannot but have redounded to Gierek's disfavor. Adding to the Soviet disappointment with Gierek was undoubtedly their realization during late August of his lack of support among the populace.

**Conclusions on the Strike Settlements**

The Soviets had begun in mid-July to signal their reservations about developments in Poland, and they significantly increased their public manifestations of this concern after the August 19 publication of Gierek's August 18 speech. In their selection of articles from the Polish media to replay and in their commentaries beginning on August 25, their growing discomfort with the direction of the negotiations and the political situation in general was patent. One may easily conclude from the abundance of evidence in the Soviet media prior to the settlement of the strikes that the
Soviets desired early, conservative settlements with the main committees of strikers.

The Polish leadership preferred conservative settlements as well, but they did not want to risk the extremely serious political and economic turmoil that would have resulted had their bargaining positions been obdurate. Given the Polish leadership's growing understanding of the depth of popular discontent and the pressing need to reach a reconciliation, it becomes clear that the Poles and the Soviets differed in their views of acceptable solutions to this facet of the crisis. From the Soviets' critical presentations of the settlements in their media on August 20 and thereafter, it is obvious that their influence attempt on the strike negotiations was a distressing failure.

Conclusions on the Cabinet Changes

Concerning the Soviet attitude toward the cabinet changes on August 24, an indistinct picture develops. Gierek's basic intention with these changes was to appease the workers by dismissing several economic hardliners and thereby signal a willingness for reconciliation. In addition to bringing into the government two former opponents, Olszowski and Grabski, Gierek hoped to engender support for government policies by making the Politburo seem more representative of divergent views and more responsive to the workers' grievances. Although this move weakened his own political position, he likely saw it as a move essential to coming to terms with the workers. He may also have taken this step to strengthen his position by coopting opponents into the leadership and thereby decreasing important vocal opposition.

As indicated earlier, the Soviets reported these changes quickly and forthrightly, indicating a readily given stamp of approval. There do not seem to be any significant preferences which the Soviets held concerning specific individuals affected by the changes that weekend; the Soviets' major goal at this time was a conservative settlement for the strikes, and
they likely would have been agreeable to any reasonable change Gierek desired as a stabilizing measure. Furthermore, there do not seem to be any indications that the Soviets sought these changes any sooner or later than Gierek saw fit to effect them. Gierek probably checked with the Soviet leadership before making the changes, and from the Soviets’ quick reporting of the developments, it would be difficult to assume disagreement on their part. Because of this lack of evidence that the Soviets tried to pressure Gierek to make certain changes by specific deadlines, however, no case can be made for a Soviet influence attempt in this development of the crisis.

Conclusions on Gierek’s Ouster

It is likely, then, that the Soviets wanted Gierek removed soon after August 31, primarily because of their ideological problems with the agreements in Gdansk and Szczecin and his lack of domestic political support, but also because of complications involving an aid package the Poles and the Soviets had been discussing. The Soviets were probably not in favor of granting credits to an administration that was losing or had lost its popular (and party) support. Indeed, while a Soviet hard currency loan of $100 million (relatively small in light of Poland’s needs) was publicized on September 3, talks concerning additional aid (foodstuffs and consumer goods) needed in the wake of the strikes did not begin until September 10, a week after Gierek’s ouster.\(^\text{112}\)

Given the Soviets’ delay in publicizing the strike settlements and their criticism of them, their failure to mention Gierek’s name during the week of September 1, and their quick publication of the news of Kania’s succession, it is apparent that the Soviets decided a change was necessary in Warsaw. That they decided to send a get-well message to Gierek later on the 6th detracts little from this conclusion. Whether they may have hoped Gierek would have been removed sooner is difficult to say.\(^\text{113}\) If they had made Gierek’s departure a precondition for the economic aid, it could be
suggested that the Poles saw it in their own best interest to remove Gierek as soon as possible. Given the sum of the political and economic factors already in the picture, however, it is most likely that both the Soviets and the Poles wanted Gierek out quickly and arrived at that conclusion at approximately the same time.

As the Poles read the Soviet press during this period, the Polish leadership was particularly aware of Soviet sensitivities regarding the strike problem. References, oblique and otherwise, to a possible Soviet invasion frequently appeared in officials’ speeches and media commentaries, and the specter of an invasion was surely a strong argument for conservatives and moderates alike to counsel against destabilizing changes. That these sensitivities could have contributed to support for Gierek’s removal as well as for a conservative settlement to the strikes is certainly possible. However, while most of the Polish leadership was probably as much aware of Soviet sensitivities about Gierek during the week of September 1 as they were of Soviet sensitivities about strikes earlier, it does not seem that fear of an invasion provided the primary momentum for Gierek’s removal. Moscow may have been advised about the impending change, but it is improbable that the actual decision to remove Gierek was imposed from Moscow.

Kania’s Election: His Domestic Support

Within the Polish Politburo, the principal candidates for the position of First Secretary were Stanislaw Kania and Stefan Olszowski. Olszowski was far better known outside the party, but there were a number of reasons that Kania was more appealing to both the Poles and the Soviets.

Prior to his appointment as First Secretary, Kania was not a well-known politician, as he had rarely appeared in public. Nevertheless, he had made a mark for himself in several important areas. First, he had established for himself a reputation as a political conservative. He took
over the position as Central Committee secretary for security and the military from Mieczyslaw Moczar in early 1971, and by June of that year added to those responsibilities the task of church affairs supervision. He also reportedly had developed a reputation as a proponent of economic reform in spite of his political conservatism.\textsuperscript{116} He allegedly had opposed the Pope’s visit to Poland in 1979, but several church administrators interviewed after the succession characterized him as tough but fair.\textsuperscript{117} While Kania also had taken a hardline approach to the dissident intellectual movement, he apparently counseled against using police force against striking workers at a critical point early in the Gdansk negotiations.\textsuperscript{118}

Kania’s ability to manage the police force at Gdansk and at other cities affected by the strikes brought him additional recognition within the party; when the cabinet changes occurred after the Central Committee plenum on August 24, Kania received the important Central Committee portfolio for supervision for the trade union federation. Some American officials at this time indicated that Kania was already being ranked in the Politburo as second in line to Gierek.\textsuperscript{119} One of the principal bases for this observation was the fact that Kania, not Gierek, delivered the main address at the plenum.

Olszowski, on the other hand, was viewed by Poles and Western observers alike as a strong rival to Kania. As Minister of Foreign Affairs from late 1971 to 1976, he had developed broad experience in international affairs at a time when Poland was greatly expanding its foreign relations. Olszowski, who had experience as an economic manager, was known as a major proponent of economic changes during his 1976 to 1980 tenure as Central Committee Secretary responsible for economic policy. Although known as well as an ideological hardliner, he was also a supporter of the reform-minded discussion group "Experience and the Future". His criticism of Gierek’s economic policies, however, led to his dismissal from the Politburo and the Central Committee in February 1980 and to his appointment as ambassador to East Germany,\textsuperscript{120} where he would be away from the centers of power in Warsaw.
In spite of the political momentum Olszowski derived from his recall from the GDR to his old Central Committee secretaryship, his August 24 reappointment to the Politburo, and Gierek's public apology for "not listening" to critical opinions, there were a number of factors which may have tipped the scales in Kania's favor.

In addition to the increased respect Kania had as a result of his careful management of the security forces during the Gdansk strike, he also had had nine consecutive years on the Secretariat (1971-1980), compared with Olszowski's four (1976-1980). Although both had moved up within the central party apparatus, Kania probably had had a broader range of experience in domestic party affairs than Olszowski, whose primary areas of expertise were economics and international relations. Additionally, Kania may in fact have benefitted from the infrequent publicity he had received because of the image he acquired during the succession crisis as a "safe" or "compromise" candidate. Olszowski, on the other hand, had a reputation as a particularly ambitious politician, a factor which undoubtedly created apprehensions among his Politburo colleagues.

Acceptability to Moscow

For many of these same reasons, Kania, at the time, was probably also more acceptable to Moscow. In addition, although Olszowski was better known in Western diplomatic circles, Kania was better known to the Soviets. Because of his responsibilities for Poland's security apparatus, he probably had had extensive contact with KGB Chief Yuriy Andropov and was therefore better known to other Soviet Politburo members as well. Olszowski's March 1977 meeting with Brezhnev was assumed by many to suggest Soviet support of Olszowski, but Kania's party responsibilities had given him more consistent exposure to the Soviet leadership. In any case, the Soviets at the time at least viewed Kania as the better prospect to press for a restrictive yet evenhanded interpretation of the agreements with the workers and to keep under control currents of political liberaliza-
tion inspired by the agreements. Kania's comment in his September 6 speech to the Central Committee plenum that the Soviets, particularly Brezhnev, had been "understanding" of Poland's problems during the current crisis suggests that he may have been in contact with Brezhnev during the week of the 31st about these issues. Moscow's approval of Kania was well reflected in Brezhnev's congratulatory message which commented that Soviet Communists knew Kania as a "staunch" fighter for "strengthening the leading role of the Communist Party in Poland" and as a strong supporter of "proletarian internationalism and Soviet-Polish friendship."

Conclusions on the Successor Question

Here again one finds Soviet and Polish accord on a crisis solution; Moscow probably did not pressure the PZPR Politburo and Central Committee into choosing a candidate they did not desire. In the case of the choice of successor, the question remains of the extent to which Kania's appeal to the Soviets may have improved his appeal to his Polish colleagues over and above the other qualifications he demonstrated. It seems reasonable to conclude that Kania's close ties with Moscow, his anti-dissident attitude, and his affiliation with the internal security apparatus were several reasons for which his election as First Secretary may have been intended as a symbol to the Soviets of his colleagues' willingness to keep Soviet-Polish relations on an even keel. Regardless of Olszowski's popularity, foreign affairs experience, or interest in economic reform, he was probably not regarded by his Politburo colleagues as being as attractive to the Soviets as Kania was. Therefore, while the Soviets did not pressure the Polish leadership to accept Kania, the assumption that Kania's attractiveness to the Soviets was an important factor in his election leads to the conclusion that the Soviet viewpoint was probably given strong consideration, but that this influence was not determinative in Kania's selection.
Epilogue to the 1980 Succession

Though the Soviets were willing to give the Poles some latitude in resolving the succession question and related problems during the August-September 1980 stage of the crisis, they frequently manifested their grave concern for developments in Poland after that time. As Solidarity grew to be an important political force and successfully challenged the government on a variety of issues, the Soviets, during the period prior to the imposition of martial law, often took the opportunity to communicate clearly their strong preferences for conservative resolutions to the government-Solidarity confrontations. Visits by high-level Soviet officials for discussions with Polish leaders and harsh Soviet media criticism of Solidarity were clear indications of strong, almost desperate attempts by the Soviets to influence the Poles to curtail the advance of liberalization.

While available evidence suggests little direct Soviet involvement in Kania's resignation as First Secretary on October 18, 1981, evidence for the Soviet role in the imposition of martial law is clearer. Concerning Kania's election, one observes that published Soviet commentaries from late 1980 to October 1981 criticized Kania's administration for concessions to Solidarity, but through the spring of 1981 the Soviets in general had not singled out Kania for attack while sparing Jaruzelski and other administration officials. Available evidence suggests, however, that Soviet support of Polish leaders in opposition to Kania had gelled by late spring. The publication of the June 5, 1981 letter by Soviet Party leaders to the PZPR Central Committee suggests that the Soviets by this time had become completely dissatisfied both by Kania's handling of the political opposition within and outside of the PZPR and by his concessions to Solidarity. This negative opinion of Kania persisted through the summer and into the fall.

Articles in the Polish press prior to the October 16, 1981 plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, as well as proceedings of the plenum itself, suggest that the determinative groundswell of sentiment against Kania
developed as the plenum began and was not orchestrated by the Soviets. There is some evidence that the Soviets supported Olszowski during this plenum, primarily since Olszowski and the Soviets were espousing similarly negative views about the dangers of continued compromise with Solidarity. As events at the plenum developed, however, it seems that moderates in the party apparently were disinclined to elect Olszowski First Secretary after Kania had offered his resignation, and Jaruzelski therefore became a compromise candidate of the moderates and hardliners. Soviet influence here is uncertain; they clearly did not support Kania, but it does not appear that they actively pushed any other candidates. The Soviets were principally concerned with stabilization of the Polish political situation, as is clear in the articles on the plenum both during and after it.

Evidence surrounding Jaruzelski’s declaration of martial law on December 13, 1981, presents a somewhat different picture. Sidney Ploss, in his analysis of Polish politics in the Solidarity period, suggests that through statements in the Soviet media about the deteriorating situation in Poland in December 1980 and the spring of 1981, one can identify precedents for Soviet support for a martial law initiative in Poland. These indications, Ploss suggests, became much more substantial in mid- to late fall 1981, as fissures between Solidarity and the government reached major proportions.

Ryszard Kuklinski, a colonel on the Polish general staff who defected to the West in November 1981, makes a very convincing case that plans for martial law were drawn up by the Polish military and political elite as early as August 1980, after the Central Committee plenum on August 24. Kuklinski indicates that he was intimately involved in the preparation of these plans, so his testimony on this issue should be given weight. Kuklinski asserts that after failure of administrative steps in September 1980 to deal with the increasingly difficult political situation, the Polish leadership began preparations on October 22, 1980 to impose martial law the next month. The leadership in November, however, decided not to ex-
execute these plans because members were not sure martial law could be successfully imposed at that time, given the growing strength of anti-government sentiment among the populace. The judgment that failure of the plans to impose martial law would certainly have precipitated a Soviet invasion was the principal factor in this decision, comments Kuklinski. The Soviets were much opposed to this decision, according to Kuklinski, and their plans in December to invade were postponed only because of serious lobbying by Minister of Defense Jaruzelski and strong warnings by U.S. President Carter.

The Soviets continued to pressure the Polish leadership during the following months to impose martial law, states Kuklinski, but General Jaruzelski, by late February 1981 the country’s Premier, continued to argue to them that martial law could not be imposed without a devastating effect on Polish society and the country’s civilian leadership. Kuklinski discusses the continued Soviet pressure on the Polish leadership during the spring and summer of 1981 and reports that the final decision to impose martial law in December of that year was taken in mid-September. The general impression one develops from Kuklinski’s account is that while the Soviets throughout 1981 continued to exert pressure on the Polish leadership to declare martial law, the very top political and military elite in Poland perceived the imposition of martial law as an increasingly appropriate policy to pursue in the context of the deteriorating domestic political situation, and they were convinced of the appropriateness of this policy after the events of the summer of 1981, which included Solidarity’s congress and increasing radicalization of the movement.

Hints of continued Soviet concern and support for martial law appeared on occasion in open sources throughout the late fall. Apart from the indications in the Soviet media that Ploss reports, the presence of Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief Viktor Kulikov in Warsaw during the week prior to the declaration of martial law and the support for Jaruzelski’s move offered afterwards by official Soviet media suggests continued Soviet encouragement and assistance in planning this operation.
Additionally, U.S. officials, on several different occasions in late 1971, strongly implied Soviet complicity in the crackdown. 135

The conclusion about influence that the currently available material on martial law suggests is that if the Polish leadership had imposed martial law in November 1980 or in the spring of 1981 — periods when the leadership thought this declaration was too risky — then one could say that the Soviets were successful in influencing the Poles. Kuklinski's testimony that there was significant support for martial law within the Polish leadership beginning as early as late summer 1980 indicates that martial law was largely a Polish decision, and this conclusion is confirmed by what is known of the determinations made in September 1981. One cannot but note, however, that those involved in making the September 1981 decisions were only too well aware of Soviet views on this issue during the previous nine months, and they certainly thoroughly understood the likely international consequences if they failed to check the growing domestic turmoil in Poland.

In the post-martial law period, the Polish leadership has maintained fairly tight reins on popular political activity in order to preserve its control over order within the country as well as to assuage the Soviets. 136 Amnesty granted to most of the government’s political opponents incarcerated during the martial law period, as well as some toleration of dissident political activity and the underground press, has served to a degree as a social pressure valve. The government, however, still exercises this firm control over the society, particularly in areas where fractiousness on the part of the populace could lead to larger difficulties for the government domestically and for its relations with the Soviet Union. Most of the laws instituted during the martial period, for example, were still in effect at the time of this writing. Although the current Polish leadership will continue to pursue a fairly orthodox political course, the extent to which Polish regimes in the future will be able to accomplish their political objectives without significantly alienating the Polish people or attracting extensive
Soviet criticism will continue to be an area of prime concern to the Poles and the West alike.

Conclusions: A Comparison of Soviet Influence in the 1970 and 1980 Successions

In both the 1970 and 1980 succession cases, the Soviets demonstrated restraint in their approach to the crises. Although a Soviet invasion was not clearly imminent in 1970, the threat of one was certainly implied in statements by Polish officials in August 1980. In the series of events surrounding both successions, though, Soviet forbearance in the decisions to let the respective Polish governments handle the situations without overt interference was an important factor in the resolution of the crises. In the 1970 succession, the Soviets had fewer opportunities to exert influence than in the 1980 crisis because of the rapidity of events involving Gomulka’s ouster and Gierek’s succession. (The period from the initial signs of unrest to the succession was less than a week.) Additionally, the outbreak of violence during the 1970 crisis undoubtedly contributed an element of caution to considerations in the Soviet Politburo of alternatives for handling the Polish problem. In the 1980 crisis, the Soviets had sufficient opportunities to communicate their preferences, yet again they chose not to intervene militarily when it was clear the situation was developing unfavorably. While specific reasons for non-intervention are clear in both cases, the fact that the Soviets did not intervene in either reflects their decisions that the USSR’s national interests and the security of the bloc would be better preserved by avoiding military action even though the political cost of non-intervention increased.

This calculus shifted for the Soviets during the winter of 1980 and spring of 1981 as Solidarity took an increasingly activist role in Polish politics. Judging from the military preparations in December 1980 and March 1981, it appears that invading might have become a more acceptable option because of the political turmoil in Poland. The stakes were
clearly higher in 1980 and 1981 than they were a decade before: the legitimacy of the PZPR as a viable governing organization was being questioned by some sectors of Polish society, and ultimate Soviet control in Poland was at risk. Perhaps because the stakes were indeed higher in 1981 than they had been earlier, the Soviets were bolder then about trying to shape Polish politics through their probable advocacy of and assistance to the martial law initiative. Still, invasion was essentially perceived as an inappropriate option because of its political and military unattractiveness.

Now that the situation in Poland has been "stabilized," the Soviets will probably exercise more tolerance in letting the Poles handle their own political problems, though they will no doubt make the boundaries of this tolerance clear to the Polish leadership. Gorbachev seems to be following a firm but not overbearing approach in dealing with his various East European allies, and it seems highly unlikely that Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe would assume an interventionist character.138

Therefore, while Soviet involvement in the establishment of martial law seems likely, Soviet policy to avoid invading suggests that the Soviet approach to Polish politics will continue to be characterized more by influence attempts than by the direct military or economic coercion the Soviets have used previously in Eastern Europe. While extensive Soviet involvement in Polish politics is certainly not a desirable status quo, the Soviet leadership's lessons from the 1970 and 1980 successions of the limits of their direct political control in Eastern Europe are of major significance for the evolving relationships between the USSR and its East European allies.

The question of the limits of control is the one on which also turn the most relevant implications for theorizing on the phenomenon of influence. Events of these crises emphasize the fact that the design and exercise of influence are far more a function of the relationship between the two parties than of relative military or economic capability. The Soviet Union in many ways was stronger than Poland, yet it cannot be demonstrated in either succession crisis that the Soviets tried to pressure the Poles strong-
ly to take certain actions or that Poles clearly and immediately followed Soviet bidding when objectives of the two leaderships diverged, however the Soviets may have expressed their preferences. Furthermore, the multiplicity of means of communicating influence and the carefulness of thought given to who the best recipient would be are other important facets of the crises that can be explored in developing theory on the exercise of influence.

The two crises would also be useful for the study of residual influence — the realm in which influence occurs because a weaker party in its decisionmaking anticipates the reactions of a stronger party. Residual influence is clearly an implicit facet of an alliance relationship such as the Warsaw Pact/CEMA network, where the principal nation has the amount of relative strength the Soviet Union does in comparison to its allies.
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NOTES


2. I assume here it makes a significant difference to the Soviets which particular candidate is chosen. Some people, however, may argue that supporting a particular candidate for an East European party first secretaryship is not a pressing concern for the Soviets because the Soviet leadership realizes it can exert control over an East European country regardless of who is in power. The assumption that the Soviets may not care who in particular is chosen would probably imply, however, that East European elites would always try to select a candidate who would be acceptable to the Soviets.


16. "Commentary on Recent Retail Price Hikes."

17. Ibid.


20. Ibid.


27. Ibid.


32. Bethel, "The Downfall," 12. The Soviets may also have communicated their interest that the problems be handled quickly but leniently through Foreign Minister Jedrychowski, who flew to Moscow on the 14th and returned to Poland later that day, and through Jaros-
zewicz, who was in Moscow for a CEMA meeting from December 15-18 (see Pelczynski, 2, 17-18).


37. Schwartz, "No Easy Solution," 8; and Situation Report No. 65: Poland, Radio Free Europe, 20 December 1970, 1. Concerning Soviet interest in Gomulka's ouster, one could also argue that the Soviets knew the Poles would remove Gomulka and did not need to provide their advice and opinions on this topic to Polish Politburo members.


41. Maneli, 29; and "Poland's New Leader," 4.


45. Davy, 10.


47. "Changing Some More of the Guard," Economist 239 (22 May 1971): 37. Some Western observers have even suggested that Cyrankiewicz may have been a contender for the First Secretary position.


49. Ibid.


55. Zamierski, 1-3.


One of the important ongoing controversies in understanding the prelude to the 1980-82 events as well as developments during that period involves the levels-of-analysis question, i.e., is the Polish crisis of 1980-81 and the imposition of martial law best understood in terms of systemic Soviet-East European or Soviet-Polish relations, or in terms of
specific political and economic mistakes made by Gierek, then by Solidarity and Kania? This controversy is nicely raised by George Sanford in his October 1984 *Soviet Studies* article, "The Polish Communist Leadership and the Onset of the State of War" (Vol. 36, 494-512). See Paul Lewis' criticism of Sanford's article in the July 1985 issue of *Soviet Studies* (Vol. 37, 437-439) and Sanford's response in the October 1985 issue (Vol. 37, 541-543).

My assessment implicitly looks at both these levels of understanding, though there is more explicit focus on the specifics of the crisis. I agree with Sanford and Lewis that the jury is still out about the relative explanatory power of these two levels, but I think a more interesting and important methodological question here is where and how these levels of analysis might intersect.


85. On July 18, a governmental commission, headed by Deputy Premier and Politburo member Mieczylaw Jagielski was sent to Lublin to negotiate with strikers there. Before the advent of the MKS, however, most strike settlements were negotiated by the management of the affected enterprises.

86. Basically the only published expressions of concern for the strikers' position until this speech were a July 5 commentary by Polityka editor-in-chief Mieczyslaw Rakowski which called for economic reforms and a July 19 Radio Warsaw commentary by Jerzy Handbowski that closer cooperation between trade unions and party organizations could have averted some of the current unrest. See 'Polityka's Rakowski Discusses Economic Problems," Warsaw Polityka, 5 July 1980 (FBIS Eastern Europe, 17 July 1980), G17; and "Economic Problems Examined," Warsaw Domestic Service, 19 July 1980 (FBIS Eastern Europe, 21 July 1980), G4-6.


94. Lewis, 4. For a good summary of the agreements and their significance, see de Weydenthal, 10-22.

95. John Darnton, "Gierek Ousted from Post as Head of Polish Party; Security Chief Given Job," New York Times, 6 September 1980 [hereafter Darnton], 4; and "Doctors Con-

That Gierek's removal was due to politics rather than to illness, even if he indeed had been ill, is clear from several factors. The announcement of his removal did not indicate he had asked to resign for reasons of health, and the fact that he lost both his Central Committee secretaryship and his position on the Politburo so quickly after his alleged hospitalization make the report of illness almost too convenient. Furthermore, while there were rumors that he had checked into Emilii Plater Hospital in Warsaw on the 5th, he had suffered no known health problems since a case of lumbago in 1978. He may have taken the reported two-week trip to a Czech spa in 1979 partly to aid his recovery from this illness. Finally, Ryszard Wojna and Andrzej Bilik, two Central Committee officials interviewed in early September by French and Italian news services, respectively, indicated that Gierek's illness was not the only cause for his dismissal. If the Politburo consensus for Gierek's removal had coalesced before the 5th, Gierek's illness, if it had indeed been real, might have been precipitated by his awareness of the success of the move to unseat him.


97. "Friendly Meeting," Pravda, 1 August 1980, 1; and "Friendly Meeting," Pravda, 5 August 1979, 1. In an article entitled "The Teaching of V. I. Lenin -- The Scientific Basis of the Development of Real Socialism" (Voprosii Historii KPSS, 1980, No. 10, 3-16), O. B. Borisov (a pseudonym for Oleg Rakhmanin, of the Department for Liaison with Communist and Worker Parties in the CPSU Secretariat), citing unhealthy developments in socialist countries such as occurred in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, notes that indigenous communist parties must work hard in defense of revolutionary achievements and rely for assistance on friends in the international arena. While the most current problem Rakhmanin mentioned was Afghanistan, he almost certainly was also writing for the benefit of Polish party leaders. This article was signed to press within the first week of August. See Sidney Ploss' discussion of this article in Moscow and the Polish Crisis (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986) [hereafter Ploss], 13.

98. Ibid.; and Babiuch, G5.


108. Petrov, 5.
109. Ibid.; and "ADN Cites Pravda, Trybuna Ludu Articles on Polish Crisis," ADN International Service, 1 September 1980 (FBIS Eastern Europe, 3 September 1980), E1; and "The Situation in Poland," Pravda, 2 September 1980, 4 (reported by TASS on September 1). Ploss (23) comments that a series of Pravda articles in the last week of August and first week of September headlined "Events in Poland" or "Situation in Poland" revealed significant leadership concern about political developments in Poland. Ploss argues that Pravda ran articles with these headlines only when the Soviet leadership was most anxious about events in their western neighbor.

110. Newsweek, 47; and Darnton, A4. Some authors, such as Daniel Singer in The Road to Gdansk (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981) suggest that the two Soviets who met with Gierek at Białowieza were Andrey Kirilenko and Mikhail Suslov.

111. Darnton, A4.


It may have been the case that pressure from the Soviets helped create the aforementioned consensus in the Polish Politburo that Gierek had to be out very shortly after the strike settlement. It can be argued, on the basis of this assumption, that Gierek may have been able to fight off opposition to his continuing in office had not the Soviets pressured Politburo members to vote him out. Information to evaluate this hypothesis, however, is not currently available.

115. Politburo member Mieczyslaw Jagielski and newly installed Deputy Prime Minister and Central Committee member Tadeusz Grabski were other possible alternatives. Jagielski's health problems and Grabski's relative lack of national level government experience, however, made these two candidates unlikely.


117. Ibid.; and Darnton, A22.

118. Darnton, A22.


120. Robinson, 335-337; and Graham, A20.

121. Olszowski had earlier served on the Secretariat from 1968-1971.

122. *Newsweek*, 47.

123. Binder, A5.


125. "Kania Plenum Address" (read by announcer), Warsaw Domestic Television Service, 6 September 1980 (FBIS Eastern Europe, 8 September 1980), G4. Virtually the entire text of Kania's address was reprinted in *Pravda* on September 8 (2). Ploss (19) notes that when *Pravda* reprinted Kania's inaugural speech, it deleted comments Kania made in which he assured his audience he would not attempt to be an autocratic leader. Ploss suggests that *Pravda*'s deletion of these comments indicates the Soviet leadership did not want *Pravda* readers to think that Kania would not take full charge of the Polish political scene to contain or reverse gains made in concessions to the shipworkers. Ploss reasonably concludes that such remarks probably made the Soviets even more suspect about Kania's conciliatory approach to regime opponents.
126. "To Comrade Stanislaw Kania, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party Central Committee," Pravda, 7 September 1980, 1 (reported by TASS on September 6).


131. Ploss, 128-132. George Malcher, in Poland’s Politicized Army (New York: Praeger, 1984), argues that Jaruzelski, as head of the Polish Army, is very strongly concerned about carrying out Soviet wishes in Poland, xv-xvii, 1-8.

133. The comments by Kuklinski that follow in the text are taken from his interview with Kultura. (See note 23 above.)


136. See, e.g., Situation Report No. 10: Poland, Radio Free Europe, 30 May 1984; and for a good summary of the roles of various political factions in Poland during the martial law period, see Casimir Garnysz, "Holding a Bear by the Tail," Encounter 54 (September-October 1982): 73-86.
