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For the Revolution Redeemed

The Workers Opposition in the Bolshevik Party 1919-1921

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No one will liberate us,
Neither God nor the tsar nor a hero!
We will achieve liberation
By our own hand. — *The Internationale*

Our task is to study the state capitalism of the Germans, to spare *no effort* in copying it and not to shrink from adopting *dictatorial* methods to hasten the copying of it. Our task is to hasten this copying even more than Peter hastened the copying of Western culture by barbarian Russia, and we must not hesitate to use barbarous methods in fighting barbarism. — V. I. Lenin¹

After the October Revolution, Party members debated the proper relationship among the Communist Party, state apparatus (the soviets), and organized labor. From 1919 to 1921, sharp differences of opinion developed between the Party's leadership and the Workers Opposition.

This conflict has been extensively discussed in Soviet and Western historical literature. What is missing is an awareness of the gravity of the differences separating the Party's leadership and the Workers Opposition, an appreciation of the dominant personality behind the Opposition movement, and an explanation for the limited resonance of the Opposition's program among Party members and among union rank and file.² This essay proposes first that the Workers Opposition developed its own ideological variant of Marxism-Leninism. Its success in doing so accounts for the heated rhetoric of the exchanges between it and Lenin. Secondly, the Workers Opposition emerged largely as an extension of the ideas and personality of A.G. Shliapnikov, Chairman of the Metalworkers Union in 1917 and first Commissar of Labor. It was he who gave the Opposition its program, audacity, and drive. Thirdly, the Opposition's very ideology, which gave it strength, limited its ability to cope with the realities of Party politics and the changing nature of the working class. In its own time, a period of Civil War and economic ruin, the Opposition's message had little

appeal to the very class it claimed to represent. In the end, it could claim success only as a keeper of a Marxist vision and prophet of another way suitable, perhaps, for better times.

Three sections follow. The first concerns the political and ideological challenge mounted by Shliapnikov and the Workers Opposition when addressing fellow Party members. It relies extensively on familiar sources: newspapers and journals published in Moscow and records of Party conferences and congresses. The second section places the debate over labor policy in its social dimension. It examines the effect of volatile socio-economic conditions on policies pursued by the Party and organized labor. Labor union journals and local newspapers are used extensively with special attention to publications from those unions and localities in which the Workers Opposition had an extensive following. These same sources are critical to the final section which examines what the Workers Opposition was prepared to do in presenting its concerns to workers. It analyzes the reasons for the disparity between the Opposition's bold proposals at Party gatherings and its refusal to launch a public campaign among workers. To the Party, the Opposition demanded the proletariat's control of industrial administration; to workers, it emphasized the importance of labor discipline. The difference was not a result of deliberate deception; rather, it was a product of the Opposition's own politics and ideology and a sign of its weakness.

The Political and Ideological Realms

Shliapnikov and the Origins of the Opposition

From 1917 to 1920, decrees and directives made factory committees subordinate to national trade unions and Party fractions in labor organizations beholden to the Party's leadership. Official policy required a reliance on bourgeois specialists, piece rates, labor books, and concentration of

managerial authority in the factories in a single director. None of these efforts went unchallenged within the Party. In early 1918, the Left Communists objected to excessive centralization, the use of specialists, and piece rates. Another group, the Democratic Centralists, protested against bureaucratic suppression of initiative in unions, in soviets, and in the Party. But of all dissenting groups, only the Workers Opposition distinguished itself with an ideological alternative and with corresponding revolutionary proposals for administering industry.

The Workers Opposition consisted largely of Party officials in organized labor including S.P. Medvedev from the Metalworkers Union; Iu. Kh. Lutovinov, a member of the governing body of the Metalworkers Union and of the Trade Union Council; I.I. Kutuzov, head of the Textile Workers Union; and A.S. Kiselev, leader of the Miners Union. In early 1921, Aleksandra Kollontai, head of the Party's Women's Department (*Zhenotdel*) joined the group. But it was Shliapnikov who first articulated its radical program as he rapidly moved from Lenin's loyal critic to ideological antagonist.

The son of Old Believers, Shliapnikov became a metalworker and joined the Social Democratic Party in the early 1900s. After several arrests and two years in prison, he left Russia in 1907. Travelling about Europe and the United States, Shliapnikov raised money for the Bolsheviks, and, when in Finland and Scandinavia, helped establish a route for the smuggling of materials and people between Party headquarters in Switzerland and cells in Russia. Following the collapse of autocracy in February 1917, Shliapnikov headed the Petrograd Metalworkers Union and, from July, the newly organized All Russian Union of Metalworkers.³

Appointed the Soviet state's first Commissar of Labor, Shliapnikov accepted without complaint a subjugation of organized labor to Party control. Within months of the October revolution, he appealed to workers to work for less pay and declared that strikes had acquired a reactionary character.⁴ In January 1918, he urged the state to adopt measures that were "highly severe toward...separate groups of workers whose desires

frequently depart radically from our tasks.”⁵ Two months later, Shliapnikov called for “the most rigorous measures for reestablishing labor discipline...at any cost” on the nation’s railways.⁶ Early the following year, he claimed that strikes “play into the hands of our enemies.” Shliapnikov blamed local union leaders who failed to follow instructions banning work stoppages.⁷

Shliapnikov’s approach toward organized labor nevertheless differed from that of Lenin. Shliapnikov’s Metalworkers Union had been, even before the October revolution, one of the largest and most successful in winning substantial economic gains for its members.⁸ These achievements conditioned him to think of workers as a class that could, through its own efforts but without violence, improve its life and create a new society. While Lenin demanded political action and, by October, armed insurrection, Shliapnikov doubted the wisdom of the revolt and told Lenin so.⁹ Ten days after the revolution, he endorsed the resignation of seven of the fifteen new commissars. Shliapnikov himself did not resign, but he agreed with their declaration that Lenin’s policies would mean a government “by means of political terror [that] leads to the mass proletarian organizations being cut off from the leadership of political life...and to the destruction of the revolution and the country.”¹⁰ Shliapnikov asserted that workers could act responsibly if given the opportunity to control the production and distribution of goods.¹¹ When demanding that organized labor obey instructions from above in January 1918, Shliapnikov simultaneously cautioned officials in the Commissariat of Labor not to abuse their dominant position. He insisted that they rely on the “creative initiative of the laboring masses” and provide unions with a guaranteed role in factory management.¹²

Nothing that Shliapnikov said at this time, however, distinguished him from many other Bolsheviks who extolled the virtues of the working class while restricting its freedom and authority. Until 1919, he accepted without public complaint the main features of the regime’s labor policies. Early that year, a sharply worded article on specialists changed all that.

His remarks, published in *Izvestiia* on March 27, opened with four lines from the International: "No one will liberate us, Neither God nor the tsar not a hero! We will achieve liberation, by our own hand."¹³ Specialists lacked sufficient commitment and enthusiasm to build a new order.

In 1917, the Party had relied on the initiative (*samodeiatel'nost'*) of the working masses. The future success of socialist construction depend on a continuation of such a policy. Any other notion was "pure intellectual twaddle."

Emergence of a Program

Shliapnikov had only begun. In measured but firm steps, he moved from praise for workers initiative to radical proposals for the reorganization of government. In early 1919, Shliapnikov presented theses, "On the Question of the Relationship of the Communist Party, Soviets, and Industrial Unions," to a meeting of the Communist fraction of the All-Russian Trade Union Council. In broad terms, he proposed that unions manage the economy, soviets control the state apparatus, and the Communist Party exercise political and ideological guidance over both.¹⁴ The theses lacked specificity as to how it all could be implemented and administered. It hardly mattered to the Trade Union Council which rejected on principle union supervision of the industrial economy. At the Ninth Party Congress (March-April, 1920), delegates summarily dismissed his suggestions as "generally absurd" and a "deviation from Marxism toward bourgeois trade union prejudice."¹⁵ Even before the Ninth Congress, the Party had assigned Shliapnikov to Norway for about a year, perhaps with his permission, but surely to be rid of him and his remarks.¹⁶ He remained undaunted; others added their voice to his. By the time of the Ninth Party Conference (September 22-25, 1920), it was generally acknowledged that the labor leaders, Shliapnikov, Lutovinov, Medvedev, and Kutuzov were part of a "workers opposition."¹⁷

The labor union controversy now dominated much of the Party's business. Until December, Leon Trotsky's plans for the militarization of labor more so than the efforts of the Workers Opposition made for what Lenin called a crisis and a sickness within the Party. That month, the Workers Opposition took preeminence. Shliapnikov led the way with an article for a special collection, *The Party and Trade Unions*.¹⁸ He charged that the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus, especially the Supreme Economic Council, adopted bourgeois practices when it sought to make unions into "simple technical appendages of the apparatus."¹⁹ It was not so much that individual bureaucrats were personally to blame. Rather Shliapnikov singled out a system that allowed administrative offices to be "the hub of the universe around which revolves the sun, moon, and other Soviet planets."²⁰ Shliapnikov readily acknowledged the radical nature of his proposals. Putting unions at the head of industry, he wrote, required fundamental changes in Soviet governance. It would produce "a kind of 'revolution' in the interrelationships of economic institutions and, perhaps, will require even some changes in our Soviet constitution."²¹ Shliapnikov promised that the result would be a more efficient industry, the result of workers' creativity and initiative. His language recalled that of Marx. Soviet workers would be converted "from appendages of the machine into conscious creators of communism."²²

Several weeks later, Shliapnikov provided the specificity heretofore lacking in his grand vision. On December 30, at a meeting in the Bolshoi Theater of trade union representatives and the Party fraction of the Eighth Congress of Soviets, Shliapnikov set forth a blueprint for union control of industry.²³ His report, "The Economic Organization and the Tasks of Unions," recommended self-governing trade unions and inter-union "administrative organs" elected by the unions, to plan and coordinate the efforts of various industries. Executive bodies of unions and administrative organs would exist at five levels (district, county [*uezd*], province [*guberniia*], region [*oblast'*] and nation). At the bottom, an administrative organ would function alongside executive committees elected by each

union's district congress. At the apex, stood the national organizations of each union and a Congress of Producers (*S'ezd proizvoditelei*). Shliapnikov proposed the application throughout of "workers centralism." All workers, including white collar personnel, would participate in elections of factory committees, which served as union locals. Each of the union's territorial congresses would elect representatives to the union's next highest unit. All union organizations within a given region would elect delegates to the corresponding administrative organ. Shliapnikov insisted on the right of recall of delegates elected to the union's own hierarchy and of representatives sent to administrative organs.

Shliapnikov assigned the task of national economic planning to commissariats, the Supreme Economic Council, and soviets. He failed to specify just how extensive this responsibility might be, but clearly intended that it not infringe on the right of unions to govern themselves and industry. To reinforce union preeminence, he granted them the right to appoint and recall an unspecified number of individuals to the Supreme Economic Council and its regional affiliates.²⁴ The theses did not assign any role to the Bolshevik Party or to its fractions.

Shliapnikov insisted that these proposals would unify "industrial centralism with local initiative and self-activity."²⁵ The last section of his theses recommended free distribution of rations, kitchen utensils, meals, theater tickets, clothes, transportation, housing, and utilities. It also called for the construction of workers' villages and communal residences near the workplace. The factory would thereby become the center of a rewarding life that ended the alienation of workers from their own labor.²⁶

The Workers Opposition adopted almost word for word Shliapnikov's proposals as its platform, "Tasks of Unions," which was published in *Pravda* on January 25, 1921, and upon which it campaigned for delegates to the Tenth Party Congress. It added several flourishes by appealing for the abolition of the "bureaucratic machine of officials, appointees, and skeptical specialists." Drawing from Shliapnikov's article of December 13, it

called for the transformation of “the worker from an appendage of a lifeless economic machine into a conscious creator of communism.”²⁷

The intensity of the debate and gravity of the issues involved led to an important addition to the Workers Opposition. In late January, Aleksandra Kollontai joined.²⁸ Her most significant contribution came in the form of a pamphlet *The Workers Opposition*, 1500 copies of which were distributed by the opening of the Tenth Party Congress.²⁹

In this pamphlet, Kollontai eloquently summarized the complaints previously set forth by the Workers Opposition, while she broadened its perspective. More sharply than Shliapnikov, she blamed the Party and advocated its reform. Her proposals became the basis for a “Resolution on Party Construction,” prepared for presentation to the Tenth Party Congress.³⁰ It demanded the right of intra-Party criticism, elections, and a purge of all non-proletarian and non-peasant individuals, “careerist elements,” who had joined the Party after mid-1918. The resolution went so far as to demand three months of manual labor from each Party member annually.³¹ Kollontai hoped that these proposals would end the separation of the Party from the proletariat and the Party’s leaders from the rank and file.

The Tenth Party Congress

With its two resolutions, the Workers Opposition approached the Tenth Party Congress with a coherent program for sweeping change of industrial administration and of procedures for conducting state and Party business. The sharp exchanges that followed drove the Party’s leadership and the Workers Opposition further apart on a personal and ideological level. The issues were too important, the differences too profound for anything else.

Lenin commenced a vigorous response in early 1921. In *Pravda* on January 21, he charged that attempts by Shliapnikov and the Workers Opposition to “unionize the state” amounted to syndicalism and would

make the Party superfluous.³² A day or so later, he clashed with Shliapnikov and Kiselev at a meeting of the Party fraction of the Second Congress of Miners. Lenin asserted that the Workers Opposition threatened the dictatorship of the proletariat.³³ According to Lenin's later recollection, Shliapnikov and Kiselev responded: "This is a means of intimidation; you terrorize us."³⁴ On January 24, Lenin accused Shliapnikov of demagogery and, on the following day, announced that the Workers Opposition would have to be dealt with by a special propaganda effort.³⁵

On the eve of the Tenth Party Congress, Lenin began maneuvers designed to isolate, persuade, intimidate, buy off, and suppress the Workers Opposition. At a closed meeting of his own supporters, Lenin urged that they endorse the nomination of Shliapnikov, Kutuzov, and perhaps Kiselev to the Central Committee.³⁶ Lenin probably hoped that membership in the Central Committee would restrain Shliapnikov and others from any additional outbursts. Four members of the Workers Opposition (including Shliapnikov and Medvedev) issued a defiant declaration of non-cooperation.³⁷ Kutuzov and Shliapnikov were nevertheless elected to the Central Committee and Kiselev a candidate member. On the final day of the Congress, Lenin attempted to administer the *coup de grace* with two resolutions, "On Party Unity" and "On the Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviations in the Party," the latter of which he directed specifically at the Workers Opposition. Both passed by overwhelming margins.³⁸

Several days after the close of the congress, the Central Control Commission declared the Party to be a "single united army." Its conclusion was more fantasy than fact. Some Oppositionists including Kiselev, Lutovinov, and Kutuzov withdrew; others, including Shliapnikov, Kollontai, and Medvedev refused to surrender. That July, Kollontai and Shliapnikov spoke of the suppression of workers' initiative and, for good measure, assailed the New Economic Policy (NEP) as a return to capitalism.³⁹ The following year, Shliapnikov appears to have spearheaded the effort leading to the Declaration of Twenty-Two, a protest document presented to the Executive Committee of the Comintern on

February 26. He later recalled that one evening, with the help of colleagues, he wrote a statement containing a litany of familiar complaints concerning the growth of bureaucratism and suppression of workers' initiative, workers' democracy, and the right of expression.⁴⁰ The original twenty-two signators included Shliapnikov, Medvedev and five others who had earlier signed the "Tasks of Unions."⁴¹ Somewhat later, following her removal from *Zhenotdel*, Kollontai signed the Declaration.

The Comintern's Executive Committee condemned the attempt, as did the Eleventh Party Congress a month later. Many Oppositionists nevertheless remained unrepentant. A commission appointed by the Congress found that those it grilled often acted as if they appeared before the "bureaucrats (*chinovniki*) of some kind of bourgeois judicial or investigative organ."⁴² Shliapnikov and Kollontai proved especially troublesome.⁴³

The Eleventh Party Congress marked the end of the Workers Opposition as a distinct group within the Communist Party. Some of its spirit and ideas lived on in the efforts of G.T. Miasnikov and the Workers Group of the Russian Communist Party.⁴⁴ Shliapnikov became a memorist and historian of note with the publication of articles and books, most notably his four-volume *Semnadtsatyi god* (1917) on the 1917 revolution.⁴⁵ In 1926, he and Medvedev were forced to confess to leadership of an "*ultra-right* group of capitulationists" that allegedly harbored hopes for the liquidation of the Comintern and opposed the alliance (*smychka*) of the proletariat and peasantry.⁴⁶

With the First Five-Year Plan, Shliapnikov found official policies that he could support. His articles in *Pravda* on December 16 and December 26, 1929 extolled the Plan's emphasis on heavy industry and collectivization and claimed that only the exploiting part of the peasantry were opposed. Shliapnikov specifically approved extreme measures for grain collection.⁴⁷ The effort did not save him from continued rough treatment. At the Sixteenth Party Congress (June-July 1930), Yaroslavsky condemned him and Medvedev for failing to report a purported conversation with representatives of an underground remnant of the Workers Opposition.⁴⁸

Both Shliapnikov and Medvedev were expelled from the Party in 1933. The former may have been reinstated to become Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Arkhangel'sk Soviet.⁴⁹ If so, it was a brief respite. In 1937, the Military Collegium of the USSR sentenced Shliapnikov and Medvedev to death for plotting terrorist acts against Party and state leaders. They were shot soon thereafter.⁵⁰

Other prominent members of the Workers Opposition fared no better. Lutovinov committed suicide in 1924; Kiselev, who served as the first Chairman of the Little Council of People's Commissars from 1921 to 1923, was executed in 1938; Kutuzov died in prison in 1943, if not earlier. Kollontai survived the purges, serving in the diplomatic corps as Soviet ambassador to Norway and Mexico. She died in 1952. More recent times have been kinder. In 1988, Shliapnikov, Medvedev, and several other Workers Oppositionists were cleared of criminal charges.⁵¹ Political rehabilitation may soon follow.⁵²

The Ideological Challenge

An ideological chasm separated the Workers Opposition from the Party's leadership. Lenin insisted on the necessity of political organization, discipline and, if need be, compulsion from above. The Workers Opposition emphasized the importance of initiative and enthusiasm from below. "The illness observable in our Party," Shliapnikov declared at the Tenth Party Congress, "consists in the isolation of our centers from the Party masses and of the entire Party apparatus from the working masses."⁵³ "It is impossible to decree communism," Kollontai declared in her pamphlet, "it can be created...only by the creative powers of the working class itself."⁵⁴

Once given the right of self-management, all workers, including technicians and white collar personnel, would become a homogeneous class of producers. This ability of labor to become one, as it were, could even bridge the gap between the working class and Party. The "Tasks of

Unions” made no provision for representation of the Party or of different strata of workers in a union, administrative organ, or Congress of Producers. Lenin scoffed at these ideas. He rejected the notion of a single body of “producers” as a denial of the class struggle at the very moment when Soviet Russia experienced a “rabid class struggle.”⁵⁵

A split between the Party’s leadership and the Workers Opposition occurred over the recent past. The Workers Opposition insisted that it preserved Bolshevism and promoted the ideals of the 1917 revolution. It claimed specifically to teach the historical importance of workers control over the production and distribution of goods. For the Workers Opposition, of course, this meant union not Party control. On the other hand, Lenin stressed domination by a political vanguard. Prior to the revolution, Lenin had tolerated intra-Party debate. After 1917, he regarded it as a luxury the Party could ill afford.⁵⁶ “We are not a discussion club,” Lenin declared at the Tenth Party Congress.⁵⁷

In one very significant way, the Workers Opposition snapped any bonds with Leninism, past or present. Lenin and other Bolsheviks had avoided setting constitutional or legal limits on the power of the Party’s leading organs. The Workers Opposition promoted a comprehensive program of guarantees for working class control of unions, union control of industrial administration, and freedom of criticism within the Party. Shliapnikov spoke aptly of a “kind of ‘revolution’” and for “changes in our Soviet constitution.” Bukharin put it just as well, if negatively, at the Tenth Party Congress. He rejected demands for the establishment of “definite rights fixed in law [*zafiksirovany zakonodatel’nym poriadkom*] by a Soviet constitution.”⁵⁸

Another opposition group within the Bolshevik Party, the Democratic Centralists, understood the novelty of the Workers Opposition program. Both groups seemed similar. Democratic Centralists called for workers’ democracy, freedom of discussion within the Party, and an end to bureaucratism. But they stopped far short of guarantees for the participation of workers in industrial administration. Thus their “Theses on

Unions," presented to the Tenth Party Congress, left considerable authority in the hands of the Supreme Economic Council.⁵⁹ It proposed a limited role for unions and that to be exercised chiefly by the Trade Union Council and the central committees of individual unions. Democratic Centralists also insisted on Party control over unions through its fractions.

At the Tenth Party Congress, Democratic Centralists dismissed proposals permitting working class but non-Party elements to direct the industrial economy. For this group, the key issue was a proper organization of authority within the Party and not a sharing in any form of its dictatorial powers.⁶⁰ Ia. N. Drobnis, a delegate from Odessa, put it best. Commissioned, he said, by the Democratic Centralists to speak, Drobnis declared that the matter at hand concerned a crisis within the Party and had nothing to do with labor unions as such.⁶¹ With the issue so cogently (and disingenuously) clarified, other Democratic Centralists condemned the Workers Opposition for its alleged appeals to non-Party masses.⁶² As we will see, the Workers Opposition in fact scrupulously avoided launching a campaign for support outside the Party. Angered by the rival group's refusal to consider significant change in industrial administration, the Workers Oppositionist from Khar'kov, I.N. Perepechko, accused the Democratic Centralists of supporting the very bureaucratism it pretended to condemn.⁶³

When confronted with biting criticism at the Tenth Party Congress, Shliapnikov exhibited his own gift for the disingenuous. He claimed that the Workers Opposition disagreed with the Party's leadership not on fundamental issues but only over tactical questions.⁶⁴ When pressed further, he allowed for control over unions "through the [Party] fraction, as we have always done it."⁶⁵ But this concession, important as it was, understandably did not satisfy the majority. They understood that domination by Party fractions did not guarantee control by the Party's machinery if the full weight of the "Tasks on Unions" took effect. With the application of "workers' centralism" in industrial administration and of "workers'

democracy” in the Party, union fractions might control the Party itself. Once again, Bukharin put it succinctly when he declared that the Workers Opposition proposed that unions exercise a leading role over the Party.⁶⁶

Small wonder, then, that little or no chance for compromise existed as the major combatants came to recognize their differences. Shliapnikov might surrender some points rhetorically at the Tenth Party Congress, but he rejected any modification of the program then or later before the Comintern or the investigative commission of the Eleventh Party Congress. Nor would Lenin budge. At one point during the exchange at the Tenth Party Congress, the Party’s leader commented that it was necessary, figuratively speaking, to use machine guns to achieve Party unity.⁶⁷ When Kiselev criticized him for such language, Lenin apologized and solemnly promised not to use such again.⁶⁸ But at the following Congress, Lenin broke his promise. Resorting once again to military metaphors, he acknowledged that the NEP was a retreat and charged that the Workers Opposition spread panic by breaking rank. “When a real army undergoes a retreat, machine guns are employed, and when an orderly retreat becomes disorderly, the command is given: ‘Fire.’ And rightly so.”⁶⁹ Shliapnikov objected to the language as well as content of these remarks.⁷⁰ This time, Lenin did not apologize.⁷¹

Political Failure

Why did the Workers Opposition fail? An accounting of its strength reveals a limited base of support. As Appendix A shows, representatives of unions in heavy industry and mining dominated the list of thirty-eight who signed the “Tasks of Unions.”⁷² Six leaders of the Metalworkers Union, Shliapnikov and Medvedev included, signed. It was not surprising. On December 16, 1920, the Bureau of that union’s Party fraction had urged all fractions in the union’s district committees to make every effort to send representatives of the Workers Opposition to the upcoming Tenth

Party Congress.⁷³ Led by Kiselev, eight members of the Central Committee of the Miners Union signed the same document.

The Workers Opposition gained noticeable support in Party organizations in Nizhnii Novgorod, Samara, the Don Basin, Omsk, Riazan, Krasnodar, Vladimir, Moscow, Khar'kov, and Odessa.⁷⁴ It dominated preciously few. Before the Tenth Party Congress, the Workers Opposition enjoyed a majority in the Party's municipal and provincial committees in Samara and Omsk.⁷⁵ It continued to control the Samara provincial committee for a time after the Congress.⁷⁶ Its support in this area stemmed largely from the energetic efforts of Iurii K. Milonov, head of the provincial committee since late 1920.⁷⁷ Early in March, the Workers Opposition garnered 21 of 28 votes cast at a meeting of the Party fraction of the Nizhnii Novgorod Provincial Council of Trade Unions.⁷⁸ In Moscow city and province, the Workers Opposition, in alliance with a like-minded group headed by E.N. Ignatov, maintained a substantial though minority voice at the Party's provincial conferences in November 1920 and February 1921.⁷⁹ Following the Tenth Congress, the Opposition retained control of the Party organization in Moscow's working class Bauman district.⁸⁰ These were hard-won but rare accomplishments. I.M. Vareikis, a delegate from Vitebsk at the Tenth Party Congress, commented that if the Workers Opposition appeared at all in the provinces, it was an oddity at which everyone laughed.⁸¹

The contest certainly was not a fair one. Prior to the Tenth Congress, the Central Committee majority used Party funds, facilities, and agents to its own advantage.⁸² It blocked the publication and distribution of the literature of opponents, held secret meetings, and called for proportional representation in the selection of delegates only when it was in its favor to do so. Higher Party organs demanded the submission of lower, dissenting bodies. Union fractions were told to follow orders from above. After the Congress, the Central Committee and its Central Control Commission dispatched special emissaries and commissions, which included such well-known Party figures as V.V. Kuibyshev, M.I. Kalinin, V.A. Antonov-Ov-

seenko, and I.I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, to enforce Party discipline. The Party's center removed or transferred recalcitrant leaders.⁸³ Moscow either ignored or sent out its own hand-picked teams to investigate complaints of persecution.⁸⁴

After the Congress, it took crude intervention from above to remove Shliapnikov from leadership of the Metalworkers Union and his supporters from its Central Committee.⁸⁵ On May 28, at a meeting of the Party fraction of the Fourth All-Russian Congress of Metalworkers, Shliapnikov proposed a list of candidates for the union's Central Committee. It included a majority thought by the Party's leadership to be supportive of the Workers Opposition. A special commission of the Party's Central Committee compiled its own slate with fewer Oppositionists included. Shliapnikov's list was nevertheless approved by a vote of 120 to 37.⁸⁶ Undaunted, the Central Committee's commission met later that day with selected members of the fraction. When the entire fraction next met, Shliapnikov and Medvedev convinced it to refuse to discuss the offending list. The Party commission responded simply but decisively. It demanded and received, on order from the Politburo, acceptance of its nominees by the union without benefit of a vote or discussion. The same arbitrary behavior on a broader scale occurred during the last five months of 1921. The Party purged about 20 percent of its membership including many who were or had been affiliated with the Opposition.⁸⁷

The Workers Opposition also experienced difficulties because it demanded a devolution of power in a period when the Party felt considerable pressure to "get things done" by administrative fiat. The reigning ideology and personal characteristics of those at the top contributed to this authoritarian impulse. There were, however, other sources. Recent works by Carmen Sirianni, Thomas Remington, William Husband, and Robert Service point to the role of economic, social, and military conditions and demands from rank and file Party members in bringing about dictatorial initiatives by Moscow on a whole range of issues.⁸⁸ The pro-

gram of the Workers Opposition seemed impractical to these Bolsheviks at a time when the Party and infant republic struggled for survival.

Other analysts make a similar argument. Theodor Von Laue, Rudolf Bahro, and Teodor Shanin regard Russia as a developing (or what Shanin calls a “peripheral”) society, requiring policies of modernization imposed by a regime not squeamish about the use of force.⁸⁹ Lenin understood these needs, so this thesis goes, the Workers Opposition did not. According to Bahro, the Bolshevik task was not yet the construction of “socialism but rather the rapid industrial development of Russia on a non-capitalist road”;⁹⁰ “modernize, industrialize, make wooden Russia into iron Russia, the imperative to ‘catch up and overtake’ — that is the basic text of this history.”⁹¹ At the Tenth Party Congress, Bukharin once again drove right to the heart of the matter. He charged that the Workers Opposition ignored conditions requiring “again and again a change of policy toward more centralization and militarization of our apparatus.”⁹²

The Social Dimension

But these reasons only scratch the surface in explaining the failure of the Workers Opposition to garner more support. It is not enough to point to the machinations of the Party’s leadership, to the vote tally at the Tenth Party Congress, or to a perceived need for rule by fiat. The Opposition’s problems went far beyond the political realm. Its failure had an important social dimension. Dramatic socio-economic changes made its program increasingly impractical and irrelevant, a point painfully acknowledged by many of the Opposition’s leaders.

While the Opposition spoke of the power of a working class fueled by numerical strength and political consciousness, the proletariat’s number, confidence, and *esprit de corps* rapidly eroded.⁹³ From 1917 to 1920, the population of such major industrial centers as Petrograd, Orekhovo-

Zuevo, and Kolomna fell by over 50 percent.⁹⁴ In the words of one Soviet historian, the village "swallowed up workers" desperately searching for food.⁹⁵ Many stayed in the countryside or migrated to other industrial locales in pursuit of employment and decent rations. Others volunteered or were drafted into the army. And still others, often the most politically active, took up permanent positions in the military or civilian bureaucracy, the very apparatus under attack by the Workers Opposition.⁹⁶ A recent study by William Chase reveals the consequences of these developments on Moscow's proletariat. Well over half of the capital's workers in their twenties served in the Army during the Civil War.⁹⁷ While the number of workers in the Party's Moscow organization doubled from 20,000 to 40,000, only 6,000 of the latter figure worked in factories and half of them held managerial posts.⁹⁸

Many factories continued to operate because new workers supplanted the old coterie lost to the village, war, or bureaucracy. This was indeed the case by 1920 with the metal and textile industries in Moscow.⁹⁹ Many new workers voluntarily or under compulsion came from the countryside, with which they still maintained contact, or from the non-proletarian strata of urban areas.¹⁰⁰ Thus transformed, the proletariat became less skilled, more feminized, less proletarian in its self-identity, and far less likely to be attracted to the Opposition's proposals for working class control of industry. They had other, more immediate, concerns.

New workers suffered from the very conditions from which their predecessors had fled.¹⁰¹ Inadequate clothing and housing were the least of their problems. Workers suffered from disease and hunger. Depleted supplies of fuel and raw materials posed a constant threat of factory closure and unemployment. At the Tenth Party Congress, Bukharin mentioned workers' dissatisfaction with these multiple shortages.¹⁰² He understated the problem by a wide margin. During the first six months of 1920, strikes occurred in 77 percent of the medium-sized and large industrial plants of Soviet Russia often in response to the lack of food and

clothing.¹⁰³ On the eve of the Tenth Party Congress, a wave of strikes engulfed Petrograd and Moscow.

Unions at the Food and Labor Fronts

Labor unions faced a difficult task. The Party and state demanded mobilization of union members for greater productivity and production. Yet workers expected their organizations to address the crises in fuel, food, clothes, footwear, and housing. In response to this dual pressure, unions attempted a delicate balancing act. They responded to pressure from below by acknowledging the immediate needs of workers. They responded to pressure from above, from a Party that dominated the union's leadership, by compelling greater discipline and production. The result was an intriguing mixture of panic and optimism, distrust of workers and faith in the working class.

This dual response was no less true of the Metalworkers, Miners and Textile Workers Unions where the Workers Opposition had marked support at the top. Their major publications, conferences, congresses, and central committees quite literally mixed martial metaphors, combining a concern for the "food front" with demands to end "desertion at the labor front." The call went forth in *Metallist*, *Gornorabochii* and *Tekstil'shchik*: Provide more clothes, bread, and housing and curb sharply, by compulsion if need be, absenteeism, job mobility, and flight.¹⁰⁴ Local newspapers jointly sponsored by Party and governmental organs repeatedly carried the same message. Such was the case with *Nizhegorodskaia kommuna* in Nizhnii Novgorod and *Kommuna* in Samara, areas where the Workers Opposition had noticeable strength in the Party.¹⁰⁵ In 1920, for example, the Central Committee of the Metalworkers Union followed a condemnation of "deserters from the labor front" with a shrilly positive note: "Long live labor; Long live the victory over hunger! Long live the victory of the Red Army."¹⁰⁶ Not to be outdone, the Central Committee of the Miners Union issued an appeal in 1920 to its membership ending with "long live

labor in a labor country. Long live union discipline.”¹⁰⁷ Locals of the Textile Workers Union responded in the same way.¹⁰⁸

There was the occasional dissenting voice. One Metalworkers Union local complained that given the absence of food it made little sense to ask factory committees to strengthen labor discipline.¹⁰⁹ But this attitude was as exceptional as it was realistic. Most metalworkers locals linked demands for fuel and food with a call for greater vigor at the workplace.¹¹⁰ The Orlov branch spelled out precisely what it required of workers. It demanded a cram course in the capitalist work ethic.

All must sacrifice for the economic improvement of the country. Let there be a guarantee of comradely discipline and a maximum increase in productivity...Down with tardiness...Down with ending work before the set signal. Down with reading newspapers and unnecessary conversations and meetings during work time. Down with laziness.¹¹¹

In the Don Basin, a conference of metalworkers complained about shortages and called for a “merciless struggle with absenteeism.”¹¹² Several locals exhibited a special penchant for mobilization. In mid-1920, a municipal conference of metalworkers in Nikolaev and a provincial conference in Olonetsk approved forced transfer of workers to factories where they were needed.¹¹³ Later that year, the union’s Moscow branch declared its intent to forcibly transfer some of its member to the Don Basin if the number of volunteers did not suffice.¹¹⁴

Nationally and locally, unions left industrial administration largely up to the state bureaucracy and factory management. In so doing, their leaders responded to pressure from the Party, of which many were members, and to demands by workers that unions focus on improving their living conditions. By 1920, limp proposals for participation (or its semblance) in management had become a monotonous refrain. That year, the Third Congress and the Fifth Conference of the Metalworkers Union, the First Congress of Miners, the Central Committee of the Miners Union, and the Third Congress of Textile Workers urged the appointment of an unspecified number of workers to factory and higher administrative

organs.¹¹⁵ By the same token, the Bolshevik fraction of a Conference of Factory Committees of Moscow's metalworking enterprises believed that a few workers placed in the Commissariat for Food might alleviate hunger.¹¹⁶

If the suggestions were sincere, the hopes behind them were chimerical. Union leaders were not immune to a belief in scientific planning from above as a cure-all. They believed that workers holding administrative posts would always represent their class, and, by virtue of their moral force and historical law, exert a powerful influence on their fellow bureaucrats. No less than Lenin himself retained this faith to the very end. Struggling with what he called the "cancer of bureaucratism" during the last days of his life, Lenin proposed to overcome the problem in the Party's Central Committee by adding to it 50 to 100 workers and to the Central Control Commission 75 to 100 workers and peasants.¹¹⁷ The Workers Opposition, as we have seen, shared this belief in the mystical power of the proletariat. To a great extent, its ideology emerged from it.

The public posture of those unions in which the Workers Opposition had strength changed remarkably little during the union controversy. The Miners Union, Metalworkers Union, and Textile Workers Union continued to seek fuel for the factory, food for workers, discipline at the workplace, and placement of a few workers on administrative boards. In February 1921, the All-Russian Council of Textile Workers made precisely these points while the Union's Central Committee declared that the crisis was "one of production, not of management."¹¹⁸ Dissenting voices were summarily dismissed. In December 1920, the Miners Union's *Gornorabochii* featured an article by S. Arutiuniats, a member of the union's Central Committee and a signatory to the "Tasks of Unions." He asked rhetorically whether unions would participate in administration or would continue "to play a deceitful role as a supplier of an organized working force...Will unions live or die?"¹¹⁹ An uncompromising rebuttal followed. The working class was not prepared to restore a devastated economy. Rather, its task was to do everything "to aid production and not count the

quantity of its candidates [for positions] in administrative organs.”¹²⁰ At the same time, *Gornoe delo*, a publication of the Supreme Economic Council, reported favorably that the Miners Union focused on increasing production.¹²¹ Shliapnikov’s Metalworkers Union behaved no differently. *Metallist* featured a two-part article by an efficiency expert, A. Tiktin, demanding that the proletariat work harder.¹²² At a Metalworkers Conference in Moscow, delegates expressed their overriding concern for food.¹²³ When the Union’s Don Basin Southern Bureau complained that factory managers neglected to consult factory committees, a union commission recommended that committees use the time freed from administrative duties to find more bread for their workers.¹²⁴

In regions where the Workers Opposition had a marked following, union locals and Party organizations focused on discipline, production, food, and clothing. In Samara in mid-March 1921, the Council of Labor Unions, a Congress of construction workers, and a Municipal Conference of Factory Committees did not stray from the norm.¹²⁵ In Cheliabinsk, union locals for the metal, leather, construction, and transportation industries likewise embraced the familiar formula of food and production.¹²⁶ In Nizhnii Novgorod, something approximating a public discussion of the Workers Opposition platform occurred, but with predictable results. In November 1920, *Nizhegorodskaia kommuna* published a condemnation of bureaucratism by a “group of union workers.” They demanded that union locals exercise control over the planning and processes of production.¹²⁷ Although modest in comparison with the Workers Opposition’s “Tasks of Unions,” this proposal failed to carry the day. In December, *Nizhegorodskaia kommuna*, featured a damning indictment of anyone, specifically Shliapnikov, who dared to right the wrongs of bureaucratism with administrative reform. The author, a certain “B,” put the entire matter back on familiar rails: “Our bureaucratism is the bureaucratism of poverty.” He proceeded to combine a request for boots with demands for greater production.¹²⁸ Party locals reached the same

conclusions, sometimes declaring that workers were unable to manage the production and distribution of goods.¹²⁹

The Workers Opposition and the Workers

In the Field

When addressing workers, Kutuzov, Kiselev, Lutovinov, Milonov, and Shliapnikov behaved no differently than other union leaders. They had great faith in the working class as an abstraction, but little desire to present their program to individual workers. They avoided the very items that made the Workers Opposition distinctive in an ideological and programmatic sense. Rather than discuss institutional guarantees of workers' democracy, they seemed content with appeals for food, clothes, housing, discipline, and vague proposals for the appointment of workers to managerial and administrative posts. Kiselev repeatedly followed this course in late 1920 and early 1921.¹³⁰ So did Lutovinov as the Secretary of the Trade Union Council in instructions issued in January 1921 for the "All-Russian Labor Movement Week."¹³¹

Kutuzov appealed for greater efforts to help workers.¹³² The Central Committee of the Textile Workers Union, presumably in the person of Kutuzov, received daily 30 to 40 representatives from locals all asking that something be done about the shortage of food.¹³³ Yet Kutuzov combined this concern with an equally insistent demand for labor discipline.¹³⁴ In late 1920, he reported favorably that a conference of textile workers in Nizhnii Novgorod had decided to contribute to Bolshevik victory in the Civil War by working ten rather than eight hours a day for the next two months.¹³⁵ He added that the conference had ended on something of a higher note with the singing of the *Internationale*. Kutuzov's later presence in Nizhnii Novgorod, an area of Opposition strength, did not publicly embolden him. A meeting of the Union's managerial board, oc-

curring on the heels of the Tenth Party Congress, heard him go no further than a recommendation for “working closely with administrative organs.”¹³⁶ Nor had Milonov behaved differently in his remarks to the Samara municipal council on December 9 and 13. He appealed not for a new constitution but for the production of consumer articles, the manufacture of agricultural machinery, and an end to the destruction of the region’s forests.¹³⁷

In similar circumstances, Shliapnikov hardly distinguished himself. To his own union, he had long seemed the disciplinarian and authoritarian leader. Like so many other Bolsheviks in 1919, he condemned strikes and required that in all matters union locals submit to orders from headquarters.¹³⁸ That same year, *Metallist* featured his article praising the Ford plant in America for its efficiency. There, Shliapnikov mused, a scientific division of labor meant that one worker had only to insert repeatedly a single peg (*gvozd*). He recommended the same process for Soviet Russia’s factories.¹³⁹ For Shliapnikov, as for Kutuzov, a trip to Nizhnii Novgorod in 1920 failed to arouse from him bolder public statements. On November 15, he lectured the municipal council on the relatively safe topic, “On the Situation of the Working Class in Western Europe.”¹⁴⁰

It certainly should be asked whether Shliapnikov’s public behavior and that of fellow Oppositionists was a function of the source of information. I think not. There were far too many recorded instances for it to be the result of manipulation of the press. The Party’s leadership lacked the means for firm control over such journals as *Metallist*, published by a union in which the Opposition had strength, or such newspapers as *Nizhegorodskaia kommuna* and *Kommuna*, appearing in areas where the Opposition had a noticeable following in the Party. Moreover, the press published lengthy summaries of comments in full by Kieselev, Kutuzov, Milonov, and Shliapnikov. This was the case, for example, with Shliapnikov’s remarks in Nizhnii Novgorod on November 15 and of Milonov’s remarks in Samara on December 9 and 13.

The Opposition's reluctance to campaign for its program was its deliberate choice. Shliapnikov, Kiselev, Kutuzov, and Milonov did not always avoid the critical issues. Rather they picked carefully the forum in which to present them. Choosing to live within the confines of party discipline, as they understood it, they did not discuss their proposals outside the Party. They refused to use articles in union journals, or opening speeches at union conferences and congresses, or presentations to municipal councils, even in Nizhnii Novgorod and Samara, to argue their case. They selected Party functions, and rather important ones at that, to do so. Thus while Shliapnikov avoided the Opposition's arguments in articles for *Metallist* or at the municipal council of Nizhnii Novgorod, he presented them to the Communist fraction of the Central Council of Trade Unions in 1919, to the Communist fraction of the Eighth Congress of Soviets in late 1920, and to the Tenth Party Congress in 1921.

Workers Oppositionists had different agendas at a single meeting if it featured separate non-Party and Party functions. It was a readily apparent ritual. Kiselev sidestepped oppositional issues in his general remarks to the Second All-Russian Congress of Miners in January 1921.¹⁴¹ The matter flared up in the Party's fraction in a nasty encounter between Kiselev and Lenin. Much the same train of events occurred at the Fourth All-Russian Congress of Metalworkers, May 26-30, 1921. In an article devoted to the upcoming congress for *Metallist*, Shliapnikov referred to the Opposition's program, obliquely, if at all, with an appeal for workers' unity, self-activity, and creativity.¹⁴² His opening remarks at the Congress spoke only of matters of general concern: economic recovery, safety on the job, the divisive nature of differentiated pay scales, and the material needs of workers.¹⁴³ The same concerns dominated the daily proceedings of the Congress.¹⁴⁴ While its resolutions called for joint meetings of union and administrative personnel at the factory and district levels, they stopped far short of anything proposed by the Workers Opposition.¹⁴⁵ The struggle over the Workers Opposition became apparent, as we have

seen, in a dispute within the Party's fraction over rival lists of nominees for the Union's Central Committee.

One other factor played a critical role in the Opposition's avoidance of workers. Its leaders understood well the limited appeal of a program for administrative reform for workers who had more mundane considerations in mind. The gap between ideology and reality was so obvious that it, more than demands for Party unity, may have led Kutuzov, Kiselev, and Milonov to disassociate themselves from the Opposition shortly after the Tenth Party Congress. Kutuzov's union had already reminded him of what it thought important. Its Economic Department, the organ responsible for developing relations with management, insisted that he devote his attention to providing immediate relief to hungry, cold, and diseased workers and to enhancing labor discipline.¹⁴⁶ Beginning with Kiselev, three successive heads of the Miners Union in 1921 acknowledged the irrelevance for most workers of proposals for workers' democracy. Kiselev stressed hunger in his address to the Second All-Russian Congress of Miners.¹⁴⁷ His successor, F.A. Artem (and then Iu. Remeiko, after Artem's death in an air accident on July 24) blamed miners' disaffection with the Soviet state and union leadership on an inadequate supply of bread, boots, and clothes.¹⁴⁸ Their comments matched concerns expressed to and by the union's Central Committee and its locals.¹⁴⁹

Shliapnikov understood exceptionally well that workers had little enthusiasm for the change he advocated. His long association with workers, beginning with his own experience as a metalworker, allowed him to appreciate their primary interest in material gain. In 1917, under Shliapnikov's leadership, the Metalworkers Union focused its efforts on gaining economic benefits for its members.¹⁵⁰ Months later at the First All-Russian Congress of Commissars of Labor in January 1918, Shliapnikov took note of a preoccupation by workers with little else than wages. It was not their fault — for what else could be realistically expected “in a country raised in darkness and ignorance.”¹⁵¹ A year later, while condemning violations of labor discipline, he acknowledged that declining

production and strikes resulted from the lack of fuel and food.¹⁵² He should not have been surprised when, in early 1921, Bolshevik metalworkers in Nizhnii Novgorod and Samara demonstrated little interest in the Opposition's program.¹⁵³

Later that year, a local leader in the Don Basin reinforced this message. In a letter to Shliapnikov and Medvedev, F.A. Mitin, chairman of a district committee of the Metalworkers Union, reported on an unusual attempt to gain support in factory committees. This effort and political disputes in general seemed irrelevant to workers caught in desperate circumstances without food, clothes, or shoes. Not administrative reform, but the search for food prompted wives of workers, often with children in hand, to seek the help of factory committees.¹⁵⁴ Shliapnikov followed by blaming any decline of the union's membership on the dismal economic situation and on mobilization.¹⁵⁵

Reality and Ideology

Yet Shliapnikov the realist, when assessing the everyday plight of workers in the union forums, gave way to Shliapnikov the visionary, when fighting for the Workers Opposition in the Party forums. He would not surrender the concept of a working class that lay at the basis of the Opposition's ideology, one which had little in common with what Soviet Russia's industrial proletariat could measure up to in the foreseeable future, if ever. The class was not what the "Tasks on Unions" presumed it might be — a homogeneous, united, and politically conscious element, prepared to administer the industrial economy. Shliapnikov and his fellow Oppositionists believed that through the exercise of administrative responsibilities, the proletariat could develop the confidence and consciousness necessary for running industry. It would learn by doing. It would, in the best Marxist sense, change itself by changing the world. But realities of the present were not encouraging to this faith in the future.

The Bolshevik leadership understood better than the Workers Opposition the immediate needs and capacities of workers, which did not include industrial administration. “We are after all materialists,” Lenin declared in late 1920, “and workers are materialists.”¹⁵⁶ A few months later, at the Tenth Party Congress, Bukharin and Lenin characterized the working class with an abrupt but effective phrase: They referred to a “declassed proletariat.”¹⁵⁷ William Husband’s study of the textile industry between 1918 and 1920 makes a similar judgment. Unskilled workers lacked the knowledge and consciousness “to perform administrative, not to mention managerial, functions effectively.”¹⁵⁸ Victoria Bonnell points to the importance of skilled labor, urban roots, and long association with the workplace in the formation of working class consciousness — precisely the factors at a premium from 1919 to 1921.¹⁵⁹

Perhaps Shliapnikov, if not many of his colleagues, confused the proletariat with many of the skilled, literate, and confident members of the Metalworkers Union in 1917. The head of the Trade Union Council, M.P. Tomsky, certainly sensed this when at the Tenth Party Congress he accused Shliapnikov of adhering to a “metallurgical ideology” and “an ideology of skilled workers.”¹⁶⁰ At any rate, Shliapnikov stubbornly held on to his own faith in the power of the proletariat to redeem the revolution. In 1929, he even thought it possible to compel from the working class a creative burst in the service of the First Five-Year Plan. He counted mobilization as a factor critical to the plan’s success.¹⁶¹

Another Workers Oppositionist, Milonov, moved in another direction. In July 1921, *Kommuna* published his two-part article, “*Chto delat*” (What Is To Be Done).¹⁶² As Milonov explained it, a concern for partiality replaced a passion for ideology and caused him to think again about the nature of the working class. The low level of technical expertise, the absence of education, a weakly developed spirit of labor collectivism, and continuing ties with the countryside all made the proletariat incapable of what the Workers Opposition had expected of it. With all of its faults, only the Party unopposed, Milonov now believed, could manage the industrial

economy and the nation. While Shliapnikov and other Oppositionists condemned the NEP, Milonov approved it on pragmatic grounds. The revolution was threatened; it needed to be secured by dictatorship before workers could redeem it.

Conclusion

In its brief life, the Workers Opposition issued a stern challenge and set forth an ideal that remains its enduring legacy. It stood for the redemption, in Soviet Russia and beyond, of what it believed were the cardinal principles of Marxism and of the 1917 revolution. It engaged in rhetorical flourishes about a homogeneous working class and the creativity of the laboring populace. At the same time, it exhibited a certain contempt for the proletariat by excluding it from the campaign for changes in industrial administration. For all of its talk about the importance of debate, initiative, and democracy, the Workers Opposition exhibited an authoritarian streak of its own toward the working class. It thereby accepted, even trumpeted, coercive labor policies and sought the introduction of workers' democracy and workers' centralism by Party dictate.

In their own way, the Workers Opposition tried hard to be good Bolsheviks. Too hard, perhaps, for their own good. Despite their ideological differences with the Party's leadership, they proceeded in conformity with the gospel of Party discipline. Their proposed revolution was first and foremost a Party matter. For this ideological reason, workers were not asked to participate in a process leading to their own control of industry. The Opposition also refused to appeal to the class, in whose interests it said it acted, out of an awareness of the irrelevance of its message to inexperienced workers faced with hunger, cold, and the threat of unemployment. Thus the Workers Opposition found itself suspended between its program and the means it adopted to achieve it. Critics rushed

to take advantage of its predicament. Disregarding the Opposition's eschewal of public campaigns but emphasizing its call for shared power with the industrial proletariat, Party leaders attacked it for catering to a whole host of sinful groups from the "non-Party masses" to the "peasant partisan movement."¹⁶³ The worse the conditions, the more effective this abusive line became. A devastated economy, the Civil War, labor unrest, and the Kronstadt revolt all reinforced for many Bolsheviks the desirability of an uncritical acceptance of a "single will" and "iron discipline." In this context, proposals for substantive checks on the Party's authority seemed especially ill-advised.

Isolated from the Party's leadership and majority, the Workers Opposition could not, by its own choice, turn to the proletariat. Even Shliapnikov could not and did not. His own negative attitude toward the working class accounted in part for the allure of the Ford plant's assembly line. Shliapnikov's attitude matched that of another reformer metalworker, A.K. Gastev. Founder and director of the Central Labor Institute from 1921, Gastev believed workers would become like machines, performing their task in the most efficient fashion, relying on predesigned movements monitored by stopwatches.¹⁶⁴

Yet this comparison is not entirely fair. There were important differences. Shliapnikov and the Workers Opposition believed that it would take more than mechanical precision to achieve a better and more productive world. They insisted on a revolution from below in workers consciousness, not one imposed from outside by the clock, machine, or political regime. Only by control of their own lives and of industry could workers learn to create a truly liberated world of material plenty.

In the end, the Workers Opposition and Party leadership came to represent two distinct Marxist ideologies, one designed for the realization of a visionary future, the other for the harsh realities of the present. No compromise proved possible between them. Perhaps that was a tragedy for the Bolshevik regime as well as for the Workers Opposition.

The Workers Opposition had a short life of two years. Later, many of its adherents saw their lives cut short, when under Stalin, Lenin's military metaphors turned literal. And yet the ideals and the ideology have not been forgotten, living on for a time when they might be more appropriate. The current reappraisal in the Soviet Union of Shliapnikov, Medvedev, and the Workers Opposition may yet mean that its examples of personal courage, vision and proposals will greatly benefit the Soviet people.

Appendix : Signatories to the Workers Opposition's "Tasks of Trade Unions"

1. *Metalworkers Union*

From the Central Committee of the Union of Metalworkers:

A. Shliapnikov, Chairman
M. Vladimirov, Deputy Chairman
A. Skliznev, Secretary
I. Koriakin, Member
V. Pleshkov, Member
S. Medvedev, Member

From the Moscow Division's Committee:

N.I. Ivanov, Member

From the Department of Production Propaganda:

N.V. Kopylov, Head

2. *Miners Union*

From the Central Committee:

A. Kiselev, Chairman
M. Mikov, Member
S. Losev, Member
V. Sivert, Member
S. Arutiuniants, Member
A. Gorbachev, Member
A. Strozhenko, Member
V. Voronin (Also a member of the Collegium of the
Mining Council of the Supreme Economic Council)

From the Managing Board of the Usol'e District:

V. Storkin, Chairman

From the Kizel District Committee:

I. Ialunin, Chairman
S. Rychkov, Member
A. Mironov, Member
I. Lagunov, Member
P. Fedurin, Member
A. Ziburdaev, Member

3. *Textile Workers Union*

From the Central Committee:

I. Kutuzov, Chairman

4. *Others*

From the Central Managing Board of Artillery Factories:

A. Tolokontsev, Chairman

P. Borisov, Member

G. Bruno, Member

Ia. Kubyshkin, Member

From the Council of Military Industry:

K. Orlov, Deputy Chairman

From the Main Aviation Committee:

Mikhailov, Director

From the State Engineering Factory:

A. Vasil'ev, Director

From the Central Managing Board for Heavy Industry:

I. Kotliakov, Chairman

From the Main Managing Board of the Association of Engineering Factories:

I. Barulin, Chairman

From the Managing Board of Sormov Factory:

Chernov-Greshnev, Chairman

From the Central Committee of the Union of Agricultural and Forestry Workers:

N. Kuriak, Chairman

Khitrov, Member

From the Kursk Provincial Committee for the Provisioning of Workers:

Izvorin, Chairman

From the Control Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party:

M.I. Chelyshev, Member

Source: *Desiatyi s"zed RKP (b) (mart 1921 goda). Stenograficheskiy otchet* (Moscow, 1963), p. 691.

Acknowledgement

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Notes

1. VI. Lenin, *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii*, 5th ed. (Moscow, 1970) [henceforth *PSS*], Vol. 36, p. 301.
2. Standard secondary works tend to underestimate the importance of the Workers Opposition. E.H. Carr regarded it as just another opposition group which “endorsed the most extreme economic and financial policies of war communism”: E.H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. II (New York, 1952), p. 225. Isaac Deutscher in *Soviet Trade Unions: Their Place in Soviet Labour Policy* (New York, 1950) dismissed the Workers Opposition platform as impractical (p.47). In *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy* (New York, 1965), Leonard Schapiro observed that the Workers Opposition failed to question the dictatorship of the proletariat (pp. 222, 294). It is true that the Opposition did not call into doubt the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but as this essay demonstrates, it demanded a radical transformation of Lenin’s version of that dictatorship. Jay B. Sorenson, *The Life and Death of Soviet Trade Unionism, 1917-1928* (New York, 1968) also thought the Workers Opposition impractical. The best treatment can still be found in Robert V. Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960). Daniels observes that at the Tenth Party Congress, the Workers Opposition was “the most dynamic and threatening segment of the Opposition” (p. 146). More recent studies provide a similar view. Robert Service in *The Bolshevik Party in Revolution: A Study in Organizational Change, 1917-1923* (London, 1979) noted that “the Workers Opposition was the sole group of internal critics who looked the party’s problems squarely in the face” (p.210). Thomas F. Remington in *Building Socialism in Bolshevik Russia: Ideology and Industrial Organization, 1917-1921* (Pittsburgh, 1984) concluded that despite its “hazy democratic proposals” the Workers Opposition did represent the “most radical incarna-

tion of the democratic Left" (p. 144). Two recent biographies of Kollontai refer to the ideological challenge presented by the Workers Opposition. See Beatrice Farnsworth, *Aleksandra Kollontai* (Stanford, 1980) and Barbara Evans Clements, *Bolshevik Feminist: The Life of Aleksandra Kollontai* (Bloomington, 1979). See also the introduction by Oskar Anweiler to *Arbeiterdemokratie oder Parteidiktatur*, ed. by Frits Kool and Erwin Oberlaender (Walter-Verlag Olten und Freiburg in Breigau, 1967), especially pp. 60-67. Also note recent remarks by Sheila Fitzpatrick and the critical response by Daniel Orlovsky in *Slavic Review*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Winter, 1988), pp. 605-606, 621-622.

3. For more information and a bibliography on Shliapnikov, see the *Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History*, Vol. 35 (Gulf Breeze, FL, 1983), pp. 10-15.

4. A. Shliapnikov, "Ko vsem rabochim," *Izvestiia*, December 22, 1917, p. 11; *Vestnik Narodnogo Komissariata Truda*, No. 2-3 (February-March, 1918), pp. 215-217, 232, 238.

5. *Vestnik Narodnogo Komissariata Truda*, No. 2-3 (February-March, 1918), p. 217.

6. James Bunyan and H.H. Fisher, eds., *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918* (Stanford, 1934), pp. 44-45.

7. A. Shliapnikov, "Nashi zadachi," *Metallist*, no. 4 (12) (April 15, 1919), p.2.

8. For information on this union, see John H. L. Keep, *The Russian Revolution: A Study in Mass Mobilization*, (New York, 1976), pp. 101-103; William Rosenberg, "Workers and Workers Control in the Russian Revolution," *History Workshop*, No. 5 (Spring, 1978), pp. 94-95; and S.A. Smith, *Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories, 1917-1918* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 121-129.

9. See the minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee, October 16, 1917, in *The Bolsheviks and the October Revolution*, trans. Ann Bone (London, 1974), p. 99.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 141-142.

11. A. Shliapnikov, "Ko vsem rabochim," p. 11.

12. *Vestnik Narodnogo Komissariata Truda*, No. 2-3 (February-March 1918), pp. 215, 217, 238.

13. A. Shliapnikov, "O spetsialistakh," *Izvestiia*, March 27, 1919, p. 1.

14. See comments by N. Krestinsky in *Pravda*, March 12, 1920, p. 1 and by Kamenev and Riazanov at the later Ninth Party Congress, *Deviatyi s'ezd RKP (b) (mart-aprel' 1920 goda). Protokoly* (Moscow, 1960), pp. 70, 235. Also reference note 32 in the earlier edition of the protocols of the same Congress, *Deviatyi s'ezd RKP (b) (mart-aprel' 1920 g.) Protokoly* (Moscow, 1934), p. 564.
15. *Deviatyi s'ezd*, p. 559.
16. For Shliapnikov's brief account of his trip to Norway then Germany, see his report, "On the Situation of the Working Class in Western Europe," delivered on November 15, 1920 to the Nizhnii Novgorod municipal council: *Nizhegorodskaiia kommuna* [henceforth NK], November 19, 1920, p.1.
17. *Deviatyi s'ezd*, p. 559.
18. A. Shliapnikov, "Pozitsiia 'rabochei oppozitsii,'" *Diskussiia o profsoiuzakh: materialy i dokumenty, 1920-1921 gg.* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1927), pp. 175-187.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 183.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185
22. *Ibid.*, p. 186.
23. Shliapnikov's presentation may be found in *Deviatyi s'ezd RKP (b) (mart 1921 goda). Stenograficheskiĭ otcet* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 819-823.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 820-821.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 820.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 822
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 687-688.

28. Kollontai may have refrained from close association with the Workers Opposition out of a concern for her responsibilities at *Zhenotdel* and because of discrimination against women by labor leaders (Farnsworth, pp. 216-218). Immediately upon affiliating with the Workers Opposition, she demanded that women have a voice in the organization of production and called for improved safety measures for women on the job. Kollontai made these comments at the Second All-Russian Congress of the Miners Union, January 25-February 2, 1921: *Gornorabochii*, no. 1-3 (4-6) (January-March, 1921), p. 24. See Clements, pp. 178-201, for Kollontai's contributions to the Workers Opposition.
29. The I.W.W. sponsored the pamphlet's translation into English: A. Kolontay, *The Workers Opposition in Russia* (Chicago, 1921).
30. *Vsesoiuznaia Kommunisticheskaia partiia (b) v rezoliutsiakh i resheniakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, Vol. I (Moscow, 1932), pp. 780-784. (Hereafter *VKP v rezoliutsiakh*.)
31. *Ibid.*, p. 783.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 241; *Pravda*, January 21, 1921
33. *VKP v rezoliutsiakh*, p. 251, 253.
34. *Desiatyi s"ezd*, p. 28.
35. Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 42, pp. 260, 303.
36. Anastas Mikoyan, *Mysli i vospominaniia o Lenine* (Moscow, 1970), pp. 139-141, 143.
37. *Desiatyi s"ezd*, p. 790. The other two: I.N. Perepechko, a delegate from Khar'kov, and E.N. Ignatov from Moscow.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 773-774, 778. Of over 400 ballots cast, only 25 opposed the first and 30 the second of Lenin's resolutions. Many of the 717 delegates with voting privileges had already departed for home. This included some supporters of the Workers Opposition, among them, apparently, the outspoken delegate from Samara, Iurii K. Milonov.
39. M.S. Zorky, "*Rabochaia oppozitsiia*"; *materialy i dokumety 1920-1926 gg.* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1926), pp. 90-94; Clements, pp. 204-207; M.M. Vasser, "Razgrom anarkho-sindikalistского uklona v partii," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 3 (1962), p. 72; S. N. Kanev, *Bor'ba*

partii protiv anarkho-sindikalistskogo uklona, (Moscow, 1976), p. 147; *Moskovskie bol'sheviki v bor'be s pravym i "levym" oportunizmom, 1921-1929 gg.*, (Moscow, 1969), p. 35; Zorky, pp. 48-49.

40. *Odinnadtsati s"ezd RKP (b). Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1961), p. 189.

41. The declaration and list of all who signed it is in *Izvestiia TsK*, No. 3 (39) (March, 1922), pp. 69-70.

42. Zorky, p. 45.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 44, 47. Kollontai went so far as to express dismay that in recent elections to the Moscow soviet there had been no groups opposed to the Communists and no separate groups contending among Communists.

44. Paul Avrich, "Bolshevik Opposition to Lenin: G.T. Miasnikov and the Workers Group," *Russian Review*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (January, 1984), pp. 1-29.

45. Larry E. Holmes, "Soviet Rewriting of 1917: The Case of A.G. Shliapnikov," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June, 1979), pp. 224-242.

46. *Pravda*, July 30, 1926, p. 1.

47. *Ibid.*, December 16, 1919, p. 2 and December 26, 1929, p. 4.

48. *Shestnadtsati s"ezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi partii. Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1931), pp. 337-338.

49. Roy A. Medvedev, *On Stalin and Stalinism* (New York, 1979), p.6, n. 10.

50. *Pravda*, November 2, 1988, p.1.

51. *Ibid.* In addition to Shliapnikov and Medvedev, G.I. Bruno and M. F. Mikhailov, who signed the opposition's "Tasks of Unions," were cleared.

52. *Pravda*, November 2, 1988, p. 1.

53. *Desiatyi s"ezd*, pp. 70, 72.

54. *Kolontay*, p. 32.

55. *Desiatyi s"ezd*, p. 380. For Shliapnikov's defense of the term "producers," see pp. 518-519. Shliapnikov maintained that Engels had used the term; Lenin countered that Engels had in mind "producers" existing only in a classless society. Shliapnikov replied that he recognized the existence of a class struggle in Russia, but that the Congress of Producers would include representatives only from the industrial work force.

56. See Moshe Lewin's discussion of Leninism before and after 1917 in "Leninism and Bolshevism: The Test of History and Power," in Moshe Lewin, *The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia* (New York, 1985), pp. 191-208.

57. *Desiatyi s"ezd*, p. 521.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 330.

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 823-825.

60. For more general treatment of this very point, see Ekkehard Klug, "Die 'Gruppe des Demokratischen Zentralismus und der 10. Parteitag der KPR(B) im Maerz 1921,'" *Jahrbuecher fuer Geschichte Osteuropas*, vol. 35, No. 1 (1987), pp. 40, 57. Also Daniels, p. 115.

61. *Desiatyi s"ezd*, p. 367.

62. See comments by V.V. Osinsky and V. Maksimovsky, *Desiatyi s"ezd*, pp. 77-78, 248.

63. *Ibid.*, p 91.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 388.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 333.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 543.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 544.

69. *Odinnadtsatyi s"ezd*, p. 24.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
72. *Desiatyi s"ezd*, p. 822.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 846.
74. Kanev, *Bor'ba partii*, pp. 38, 49-51, 65; Mikoyan, pp. 124-128; Vasser, "Razgrom," pp. 67, 71; Vasser, "Bor'ba," p. 173; Dmitrenko, pp. 122, 149.
75. *Desiatyi s"ezd*, pp., 846, 866; M. M. Vasser, "Razgrom," p. 71. On January 31, 1921, the Party's provincial committee for Samara voted eight to four in favor of the Workers Opposition program over the Leninist one: *Ocherki istorii Kuibyshevskoi organizatsii KPSS* (Kuibyshev, 1967), p. 310. In late February, at the provincial party conference, 64 delegates voted for the Leninist platform and 41 for the Workers Opposition (eight supported Trotsky's proposals). Nevertheless, a provincial committee of 25 members elected by the conference contained sixteen supporters of the Workers Opposition: M. M. Vasser, "Bor'ba Kommunisticheskoi partii protiv antileninskoi 'rabochei oppozitsii' i ee raznovidnostei v pervye gody NEPa (X-XII s"ezdy partii)," *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, istoriko-filologicheskaiia seriia*, No. 4 (1957), p. 170,.
76. Vasser, "Razgrom," pp. 69-70; *Ocherki istorii Kuibyshevskoi organizatsii*, pp. 317-319.
77. *Ocherki istorii Kuibyshevskoi organizatsii*, pp. 310-313.
78. *NK*, March 9, 1921, p. 2. Also Mikoyan, p. 206-209.
79. Kanev, *Bor'ba partii*, p. 43; *Desiatyi s"ezd*, pp. 869-871.
80. *Moskovskie bol'sheviki*, pp. 38-39.
81. *Desiatyi s"ezd*, p.286.
82. For glimpses of the severity of the struggle, Kanev, *Bor'ba partii*, pp. 50-51; *Ocherki istorii Kuibyshevskoi organizatsii*, p. 312; the memoir by T. F. Liudvinskaia, "Iz istorii bor'by za edinstvo partii v 1920-1921 gg.," *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, No. 2 (March-April, 1960), pp.

159-166; the memoir by Mikoyan, a Party official in Nizhni Novgorod in 1921, pp. 127-128; S. Kanev, "Partiinye Massy v bor'be za edinstvo RKP(b) v period profsoiuznoi diskussii (1920-1921)," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2 (February, 1956), p. 24.

83. Kanev, "Partiinye Massy," pp. 24-25; Kanev, *Bor'ba partii*, p. 63; Mikoyan, pp. 207-209; *Moskovskie bol'sheviki*, p. 39; *Ocherki istorii Kuibyshevskoi organizatsii*, pp. 318-319.

84. Mikoyan, p. 207.

85. Vasser, "Bor'ba Kommunisticheskoi partii," pp. 174-176; *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol. 36 (Moscow, 1959), p. 247; and *Odinnadtsatyi s"ezd*, p. 189.

86. *Odinnadtsatyi s"ezd*, p. 189.

87. Dmitrenko, p. 142.

88. Carmen Sirianni, *Workers Control and Socialist Democracy: The Soviet Experience* (Thetford, Norfolk, 1982); Remington, *Building Socialism in Bolshevik Russia*; William Husband, "Workers Control and Centralization in the Russian Revolution: The Textile Industry of the Central Industrial Region, 1917-1920," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, No. 403, 1985); Service, *The Bolshevik Party in Revolution*; and Robert Service, "From Polyarchy to Hegemony: The Party's Role in the Construction of the Central Institutions of the Soviet State, 1917-1919," *Sbornik of the Study Group on the Russian Revolution*, No. 10 (Summer, 1984).

89. Theodore H. Von Laue, *Why Lenin? Why Stalin? A Reappraisal of the Russian Revolution, 1900-1930*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1971); Rudolf Bahro, *The Alternative in Eastern Europe*, trans. David Fernback (Thetford, Norfolk, 1977); and Teodor Shanin, *Russia as a "Developing Society"* (Basingstoke, 1985).

90. Bahro, *The Alternative*, p. 50.

91. Rudolf Bahro, *Socialism and Survival* (London, 1982), p. 123.

92. *Desiatyi s"ezd*, p. 219.

93. K. Leites, *Recent Economic Developments in Russia* (London, 1922), pp. 147, 154, 165; William J. Chase, *Workers, Society, and the Soviet State: Labor and Life in Moscow, 1918-1929* (Urbana, 1987), p. 35.

94. Leites, p. 194. See figures on the decline of workers employed in Moscow in Chase, p. 33 and for other cities in D. A. Baevsky, *Rabochii klass v pervye gody sovetskoï vlasti (1917-1921 gg.)* (Moscow, 1974), p. 253.
95. Baevsky, p. 255.
96. Ibid., pp. 259, 265.
97. Chase, p. 32.
98. Ibid., p. 50.
99. Ibid., p. 45.
100. Baevsky, pp. 249-259.
101. See issues of *Ekonomicheskaiia zhizn'* [henceforth EZ]; Leites, pp. 151-152, 175, 180, 195-199; Chase, pp. 25, 30, 31; and sources cited below in n. 103 and n. 104.
102. *Desiatyi s"ezd*, p. 323.
103. Leites, pp. 195-197; Chase, p. 48. See also *Gomorabochii*, no. 1 (September, 1920), p. 21.
104. See all issues of the journals *Metallist*, *Gomorabochii*, and *Tekstil'shchik* for 1920 and 1921. Especially *Metallist*, no. 3 (11) (March, 15, 1919) and no. 6 (14) (July 1, 1919); *Gomorabochii*, no. 1 (September, 1920), pp. 19-21 and no. 3 (December, 1920), p. 20; *Tekstil'shchik*, no. 1-2 (11-12) (April 20, 1919) and no. 3-4 (13-14) (July, 1919). Reports filed by union locals made the same point: *Metallist*, no. 6-7 (27-28) (June-July, 1920), pp. 29-32 and no. 8-9 (29-30) (August-September, 1920), pp. 21-26 and no. 1-2 (January-February, 1921), pp. 24-26; *Gomorabochii*, no. 1 (September, 1920), pp. 21-22 and no. 2 (November, 1920), pp. 27-28; *Tekstil'shchik*, no. 6-7 (20-21) (September-October, 1920), pp. 25-29. See also considerable union news in *EZ* and *Gomoe delo*, both publications of the Supreme Economic Council.
105. See issues from late 1920 and early 1921 of *Kommuna*, especially of October 16, 1920, p. 2 and October 23, 1920, p. 1 and of *NK*, especially November 7, 1920, p. 4. Also n. 125 below.

106. *Metallist*, no. 6-7 (27-28) (June-July, 1920), p. 2. Other combined appeals for food and discipline in *Ibid.*, no. 14 (22) (January 20, 1920), pp. 3-6 and no. 3 (24) (March 31, 1920), pp. 4-5, 14.
107. The pamphlet accompanying *Gornoe delo*, no. 2-3 (June-July, 1920).
108. *Tekstil'shchik*, no. 1-2 (15-16) (April-May, 1920), pp. 19-23; no. 4-5 (18-19) (July-August, 1920), pp. 21-22.
109. *Metallist*, no. 3 (24) (March 31, 1920), p. 14.
110. *Ibid.*, no. 5 (13) (June 15, 1919), pp. 13-16; no. 4-5 (25-26) (April-May, 1920), pp. 29-32.
111. *Ibid.*, no. 3 (11) (March 15, 1919), p. 21.
112. *Ibid.*, no. 10-11 (November-December, 1920), p. 28.
113. *Ibid.*, no. 8-9 (29-30) (August-September, 1920), pp. 24-25.
114. *EZ*, December 14, 1920, p. 1.
115. *Ibid.*, no. 4-5 (25-26) (April-May, 1920), pp. 23-27; no. 10-11 (November-December, 1920), p. 28; *Gornoe delo*, no. 1 (May, 1920), pp. 23-24; *Gornorabochii*, no. 2 (November, 1920), pp. 16-17, 24; *Tekstil'shchik*, no. 1-2 (15-16) (April-May, 1920), p. 9. Also pronouncements of the Central Committee of the Metalworkers Union in *Metallist*, no. 8-9 (29-30) (August-September, 1920), p. 27 and no. 10-11 (November-December, 1920), p. 25.
116. *Metallist*, no. 14 (22) (January 20, 1920), p. 13. It also recommended placement of several workers in the Commissariat of Transport.
117. Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 45, pp. 343, 384.
118. *Tekstil'shchik*, no. 2-3 (25-26) (February-March, 1921), pp. 24-25, 29-30, 32. Direct criticism of Shliapnikov's proposals in *Tekstil'shchik*, no. 1 (24) (January, 1921), p. 2.
119. *Gornorabochii*, no. 3 (December, 1920), p. 2.

120. *Ibid.*, no. 3 (December, 1920), p. 12.
121. *Gornoe delo*, no. 1-2 (7-8) (January-March, 1921), p. 73.
122. *Metallist*, no. 10-11 (November-December, 1920), pp. 4-9 and no. 1-2 (January-February, 1921), pp. 3-7.
123. Chase, p. 49.
124. *Metallist*, no. 1-2 (January-February, 1921), p. 23.
125. *Kommuna*, March 12, 1921, p. 2; March 15, 1921, p. 4; March 25, 1921, p. 3; March 17, 1921, p. 3.
126. *Krasnyi trud*, no. 14 (December 11, 1920), p. 13; no. 16 (January 16, 1921), pp. 10-11; no. 17 (February 1, 1921), pp. 5-8.
127. *NK* November 21, 1920, p. 1. Local Party meetings issued similar appeals: *Ibid.*, January 22, 1921, p. 4.
128. *Ibid.*, December 14, 1920, p. 1.
129. See especially: *Ibid.*, January 22, 1921, p. 4 and March 9, 1921, p. 2.
130. *Gornorabochii*, no. 2 (November, 1920), p. 1 and no. 3 (December, 1920), pp. 10-11. *Gornoe delo*, no. 5 (October-November, 1920), pp. 2, 193.
131. *Kommuna*, January 18, 1921, p. 1.
132. *Tekstil'shchik*, no. 3-4 (13-14) (July, 1919), pp. 10-11 and no. 9 (23) (December, 1920), p. 26.
133. *Ibid.*, no. 5-6 (28-29) (May-July, 1921), p. 22.
134. *Ibid.*, no. 3 (17) (June, 1920), pp. 4-5 and no. 9 (23) (December, 1920), p. 26.
135. *Ibid.*, no. 9 (23) (December, 1920), p. 26.
136. *Ibid.*, no. 5-6 (28-29) (May-July, 1921), p. 31.

137. *Kommuna*, December 11, 1920, p. 1 and December 17, 1920, p. 1.
138. *Metallist*, no. 4 (12) (April 15, 1919), pp. 2-3.
139. *Ibid.*, no. 5 (13) (June 15, 1919), p. 3.
140. *NK*, November 19, 1920, p. 1.
141. See reports in *Gornoe delo*, no. 6 (December, 1920), p. 256 and *Gornorabochii*, no. 1-3 (4-6) (January-March, 1921), p. 24.
142. *Metallist*, no. 3-4 (April-May, 1921), p. 2.
143. *EZ*, May 28, 1921, p. 2.
144. See reports in *EZ*, May 28, 1921, p. 2; May 29, p. 2; May 31, p. 2; June 1, p. 2.
145. *Metallist*, no. 5-6 (July-August, 1921), pp. 13-15. Of 356 delegates, 262 or 74 percent were members of the Communist Party: *Ibid.*, no. 5-6 (July-August, 1921), p. 1. Of the total of 297 voting delegates, 78 percent were Communists.
146. *Tekstil'shchik*, no., 2-3 (25-26) (February-March, 1921), pp. 23-25, 30; *Ibid.*, no. 5-6 (28-29) (May-June, 1921), p. 31; *EZ*, June 3, 1921, p. 2.
147. *Gornorabochii*, no. 1-3 (4-6) (January-March, 1921), p. 24.
148. Remarks by Artem in *Gornorabochii*, no. 1-3 (4-6) (January-March, 1921) and by Remeiko in *Ibid.*, no. 7-9 (10-12) (July-September, 1921), p. 33.
149. See issues of *Gornoe delo* and *Gornorabochii* for the summer of 1921. Also *Donetskii shakhter*, no. 2 (November 28, 1921), pp. 30-33 and *Sibirskii gornorabochii*, no. 4-5 (10-11) (July-October, 1921), pp. 231-233 and no. 6 (12) (November-December, 1921), pp. 320-321.
150. *Keep*, pp. 101-103.
151. *Vestnik Narodnogo Komissariata Truda*, no. 2-3 (February-March, 1918), p. 217.

152. *Metallist*, no. 4 (12) (April 15, 1919), p. 2; no. 5 (13) (June 15, 1919), p. 3.
153. *NK*, March 9, 1921, p. 2; *Kommuna*, February 23, 1921, p. 2.
154. *Zorky*, pp. 52-53.
155. *EZ*, May 28, 1921, p. 2.
156. Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 42, p. 212.
157. *Desiatyi s"ezd*, p. 220 and Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 43, p. 42.
158. *Husband*, p. 42.
159. Victoria E. Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion: Workers Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-1914* (Berkeley, 1983) and Victoria E. Bonnell (ed), *The Russian Worker: Life and Labor Under the Tsarist Regime* (Berkeley, 1983).
160. *Desiatyi s"ezd*, p. 369.
161. *Pravda*, December 16, 1929, p. 2.
162. *Kommuna*, July 24, 1921, p. 1 and July 26, 1921, p. 1.
163. See comments by Bukharin, Yaroslavsky, Radek, and others in *Desiatyi s"ezd*, pp. 223, 262, 266, 285, 289, 292, 309.
164. Kenneth E. Bailes, "Alexei Gastev and the Soviet Controversy over Taylorism, 1918-1924," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July 1977), pp. 373-394; Richard Stites, *Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1989), pp. 149-155.