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Murmur and Whispers:
Public Opinion and Legitimacy Crisis in Hungary, 1972-1989

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Introduction

The collapse of public confidence in the political regime was a major, though not the only, precipitant of the radical political transformation of Hungary between 1989 and 1990. The purpose of this paper is twofold. It is to reconstruct and analyze the initially muted, but by the late 1970s semi-public, dialogue between the regime (by way of propaganda messages) and the public (by way of responses to survey questions) during the "mature" Kádár era in Hungary. The second objective is to trace the Hungarian people's beliefs about politics, society and living conditions, and the way these orientations changed between 1972 and 1989.

Central to the inquiry is the need to assess the changing public perceptions of the rightful political authority, or legitimacy, of the political system under which Hungarians lived. (1) The subjects of the following discussion are men and women and their opinions are articulated in their multiple roles as Hungarians, as citizens of a socialist state, as members of a social class, as members or nonmembers of the communist party, as incumbents of an occupational group, and as parts of the elites and nonelites, or of the "attentive" and "general" public. (2)

It must be stated at the outset that, however desirable, pre-1990 and essentially historical Hungarian data cannot be usefully compared with similar surveys that might have been conducted (all, but in the 1980s in Poland, secretly) by pollsters typically working for the communist political incumbents. (3) From this it also follows that this *sui generis* database is equally unsuitable to prove or disprove the findings of surveys taken since the fall of the old regimes in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. The same is true for the published results of pre-1990 Soviet emigré interview projects and the like. (4)

To make my case on public opinion in Hungary, I seek to advance and test five general propositions on the sources, determinants, trends, and outcomes of changing mass and elite views on politics and public affairs. Some of these propositions will be presented as formal hypotheses on value change and citizens'

attitudes toward political institutions, particularly in the waning years of communist rule. The propositions are as follows:

1. A political community's opinions on public affairs are embedded in its political culture. Hungary's political culture is a hybrid of historically evolved regionwide mass and elite orientations toward political institutions, processes and incumbents and of indigenous formative national experiences. The operative terms and processes were subject political culture; nationalism; a heightened sense of ethnic, linguistic, and religious identity; and cyclical changes in public behavior from pathologies of adaptive-survivalist apathy to those of anomic outbursts for the achievement of national emancipation and social autonomy.

2. The process of opinion formation in a communist state may be seen as partial manifestation of a complex interplay between political communications of all kinds from official propaganda to private information sharing and the public's embedded core, and situationally determined issue-specific personal beliefs. Core beliefs, in Inglehart's sense, provide the attitudinal context for Materialist and Postmaterialist values. (5) The dominance of Materialist values was a paradigm condition for Hungary in the era of economic reforms.

3. Values, beliefs, and opinions change over time. External stimuli, such as political mobilization and demobilization, large-scale social mobility and restratification, sharp discontinuities and shifts in official ideologies and legitimating principles, fluctuations in satisfied and frustrated economic expectations -- all contribute to changing opinions. However, when the stimuli impact the recipient publics too rapidly for the normal processing of cognitive and affective inputs -- hence the public's cognitive capacity for gradual adaptation to new realities -- the results are disorientation and diminished capacity to form efficacious opinions on public affairs. (6) These conditions were present in Hungary. Therefore the public, as the recipient of censored and uncensored information and disinformation overload, though "attentive" in its own way, was never adequately informed, and consequently was not a "competent" judge of events beyond the narrow confines of immediate home, workplace, and social environments. (7)

4. The principal determinants of Hungarian public opinion have been, in a more or less descending order, formal education, place in occupational hierarchy, income, place of residence, age, gender, and party membership. (8) The salience of these determinants for public opinion is axiomatic. Whereas the first four connote the main cleavages between elite and mass opinion, the last three tend to cut across "class" lines and are, therefore, salient for most issues on which opinions are formed.

5. The overall trend in the evolution of Hungarian public opinion between 1972 and 1989 may be characterized as the gradual politicization of critical opinions on economic and welfare issues and latent attitudinal change from unfocused critical views on regime shortcomings to more overtly articulated opinions on the regime's specific policy outputs. The main source of object specificity and public assertiveness was a major "shift in political skills" (9) of growing numbers of well-educated citizens with positive experience in one or more "bargaining environments." The latter were loci of mainly private, though occasionally public, interaction between the citizens and the powers that be. The subject of such dialogues was mainly economic, such as wages, hours, and working conditions, but in the realms of censorship and similar intelligentsia concerns, political rights as well. (10) In all cases at issue -- as Hungarian reform sociologists put it -- was the citizens' enhanced "capacity for the realization of interests" in various public milieux. (11)

The following discussion is divided into three parts and will consider:

— Public opinion with reference to political culture, value change, political communication, and the main themes of the regime's political propaganda betweeen 1962 and 1980;

— Public opinion in terms of basic dispositions and attitudes toward economic conditions, social values and aspirations, political institutions, and political processes between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s;

— The transformation, politicization, and gradual radicalization of public opinion between 1983 and 1989 as seen through the prism of national polls on the public's assessment of "existing socialism," of the regime's and János Kádár's overall record, and of the country's key legitimacy dilemmas in spring 1989 on the eve of

the National Roundtable (NRT) negotiations between the outgoing and incoming leaders of Hungary. (12)

Public Opinion: Cultural, Value and Political Context

From the viewpoint of political analysis, public opinion can be seen as the sum of individual opinions on public concerns. Such opinions are rooted in personal attitudes and predispositions "of the individual to evaluate some symbol or object or aspect of his world in a favorable or unfavorable manner." (13) Opinions, attitudes, and predispositions are products of individual endowments and life experiences, processes of socialization, including the acquisition of political beliefs and preferences, and of ways in which the values of the national community's political culture are internalized and articulated by individuals. All opinions are manifestations of private motives but, for our purposes only those that, in Harold Lasswell's terms, are "displaced on public objects" and therefore are measurable in public opinion surveys, are of interest. (14)

At issue are the processes and conditions that inform private values and beliefs and transform them into overtly articulated judgments about matters in the public arena. Whereas socialization is a learning process that imparts to individuals the necessary skills to function in various social and economic settings, political socialization represents a different kind of learning. It is, as Dawson and Prewitt explain, a "process which provides the individual with his political self as he advances through childhood, adolescence and adulthood." In the lifelong learning process, an individual becomes a citizen who "acquires basic political loyalties and identifications . . . more specific understanding of political events . . . and orientations and reactions to political policies and personalities." On the societal level, the process also transmits and "shapes of the political culture of the nation as a whole." (15)

Public opinion and political culture

The subject of political culture as an appropriate analytical tool for the study of political behavior has been a contentious issue. The question of the usefulness of this concept for the analysis of political beliefs of people living under communist rule has generated spirited debates among scholars. (16) This study is not designed to make choices among competing definitions because the unavailability of data -- that is, machine-readable data base on surveys taken before 1989 -- on Hungary do not permit the empirical retesting of the results of such pathbreaking studies as Gabriel A. Almond's and Sidney Verba's classic *Civic Culture* or works of such kind. (17) As shown below, much of the case for explaining changes in Hungarian public opinion in the era of reforms rests on a topical overview and secondary analysis of public opinion surveys conducted by Hungarian scholars under difficult conditions of political censorship and prudent self-restraint.

According to Almond and Verba, "The political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation." Orientations may be "cognitive," that is, "knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs and its outputs"; or "affective," that is, "feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel and performance"; or "evaluational," involving "judgments and opinions about political objects"; or all three. (18) As Almond and Verba explain, the *frequency* of different (cognitive, affective, and evaluative) orientations of an individual toward various aspects of the political system is causally linked with the individual's sense of *efficacy* in influencing political outcomes, and thus defines the quality of political culture as "parochial," "subject," or "participant" -- or a mixture of the last two. (19)

As Lucian W. Pye saw it, political culture, in a more general sense, is "a product of [the] collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members of that system," adding that "the content of political cultures is in large measure unique to each particular society." (20) Archie Brown's definition seems

somewhat more explicit. By "political culture" he understands "subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups." (21)

In sum, Almond and Verba tell us that political cultures of all types shape judgments on political institutions, political incumbents, and political processes. Pye calls attention to the uniqueness of each nation's political culture, and Brown expands the argument with the explicit inclusion of such vital matters as previous political experience, fundamental values and beliefs, the question of national identity, and the elusive concept of expectations. The last, particularly the "subject-citizen's" sense of efficacy, is central to the understanding of legitimacy dilemmas arising out the built-in dichotomy of "public expectations versus regime performance" of the reform era in Hungary.

Hungarian attitudes toward politics have been shaped by geopolitical realities, complex cycles of national history, economic backwardness, and a legacy of political and social inequality. These conditions were embedded in an areawide pattern of what the late István Bibó, the leading twentieth-century Hungarian scholar of politics, called the "misery of small East European nations." (22) The East Europeans' shared experience of foreign oppression, poverty, and external constraints on the development of national identity were major obstacles to the realization of common elite aspirations for the overcoming of the peoples' "subject" orientations to politics.

The indigenous elites' historic goal has been the achievement of national independence and, as a strategic objective, the creation of "participant" political cultures of self-reliant citizens in their part of the world. Polish, Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian intellectuals have had their own ideas on "nation and progress." Some of these met the criteria of liberal democratic "participant" values of citizen efficacy, and some did not. (23) In either case, all strove for emancipation of their peoples from foreign rule and for enhancement of the people's right to self-government.

Given this common background, efforts seeking to attach labels to national political cultures from the patching together of negative or positive precedents of

"authoritarian" or "democratic" historical traditions to demonstrate one or another postcomunist state's fitness or unfitness to qualify as a "new democracy" miss the mark in at least two respects. (24) Granted, the dual burden of authoritarian traditions and the legacy of communist rule are formidable handicaps to the creation of participatory polities. However, it is also true that generational change and the incremental impact of the participatory values of the post-Cold War Europe on East European publics do have capacity to attenuate, if not necessarily immediately overcome, the illiberal cognitive and affective heritage of the distant and the recent past. (25)

The imposition of extraneous cultural criteria, such as the Anglo-Saxon model of liberal democratic participatory politics as a yardstick of political correctness tends to raise doubts about the legitimacy of other, less-"textbook-perfect" forms of citizen-government interaction in a new East European democracy. For these reasons, V. O. Key's caveats about the pitfalls of interpreting the results of survey research seem relevant to the issue at hand. As he explained, "Characteristics, beliefs and attitudes attributed to the masses of the people are often only projections of the anxieties, the preferences, or the fantasies of the intellectual analyst." (26)

Hungary's political culture has been the subject of countless treatises -- mainly in the form of literary disputes about the people's "national character." (27) However, the matter of the people's and the elites' modal orientations to politics has been addressed by only a handful of scholarly observers. Of these, three perceptive commentaries, written in 1947, 1975, and 1985, are helpful to the identification of the salient characteristics of Hungary's contemporary political culture.

István Bibó, writing in 1947, sought to make a balanced case for the continued political efficacy of the Hungarian people to adapt to and overcome the burdens of their national history. On the one hand, he conceded that the necessity to make the most of its adversities had in the past driven the nation to misuse its constrained choices by seeking freedom (or at least semi-sovereignty) at the expense of others. Bibo had the Compromise of 1867 with Austria in mind and the Hungarian ruling elites' denial of first-class citizenship to members of non-Hungarian ethnic

communities during the Age of Dualism (1867-1918). He also conceded that both the elites and the people had fallen prey to post World War I irredentist ideologies and, from there, to the lure of a *mesaliance* with Nazi Germany in the late 1930s. On the other hand, he rejected the communist claim that Hungary was a "guilty nation" that lacked the inner resources to make judicious use of its opportunity to build a working democracy in Hungary after World War II. (28)

George Schöpflin's thoughtful diagnosis of the state of Hungary's political culture in the mid-1970s hints at a stalemate between the traditional and the new official values in public orientations toward politics in Hungary. As he explained,

> The ceasuras of [the democratic interlude] 1944-48 and 1956 and the changes they produced have, in effect, cancelled one another out. Under Rakosi, total mobilization backed up by terror forced Hungarian society into acquiescing in a Stalinist ideology as the ruling value system. The system was dismantled in and after 1956 as unworkable and under Kádár a new and at the same time familiar political system was built up along the lines rather congenial to Hungarian society. . . . The caesuras have, however had their legacy in reinforcing an already strong sense of insecurity about political change . . . [therefore] consolidation carried out by Kádár has been welcomed in so far as his policies did not diverge substantially from dominant values. (29)

Schöpflin's case for "contingent consent" was further extended and partly refined by Iván Völgyes. Writing in 1985, Völgyes discerned important generational cleavages along a "rejection-acquiescence-support" continuum of popular attitudes toward the incumbents, political institutions, and political processes of the late Kádár era in Hungary. (30) He also called attention to increased elite participatory opportunities *qua* policy lobbies and interest groups. As for the non-elites, "[T]hey evaluate the benefits extended to them as largely commensurate with present political stability and social equilibrium, they neither endorse, nor overwhelmingly withhold legitimacy from this object of political culture." (31) He concludes his case by

allowing for the possibility of "an impending crisis of legitimacy in the political culture . . . [that] lies in the wide gap that exists between the cognitive and the emotional orientations of the population; simply, the people do not feel that these domestic objects of political culture are legitimate." (32)

What emerges from these perceptive but unavoidably impressionistic commentaries (none of which had been informed by data on public opinion) is a pattern of behavior by people struggling to come to terms with difficult realities. Much of this was also true for all societies living under communist rule in eastern Europe. A combination of overt compliance and, at times willing support of the political incumbents and private misgivings about the legitimacy of their rule may best describe the East European publics' adaptation to, yet ambivalent attitudes toward, the regimes' official political culture. In any case, as Pye submits, "The content of political cultures is in large measure unique to each particular society." (33) In the above context what seemed to be different about Hungary was the way in which the *second* of Schopflin's caesuras became internalized by the regime and the people. According to Herbert C. Kelman, "[I]nternalization can be said to occur when an individual accepts influence because the induced behavior is congruent with his value system." (34)

The immediate result of the 1956 revolution was a political and psychological stalemate between the people and the regime. However, the long-term outcome was a converging process of internalization, in the form of a mutually reinforcing negative consensus, by all political actors on the inadmissibility of another revolution. The consonance of official and public beliefs on this matter gradually coalesced, by means of precedent-setting historic compromises between the rulers and the ruled, into what the elites called "soft dictatorship," and what we might label as Kádár's brand of domesticated socialism with an ersatz political culture of its own. Indeed, as will be shown below, the substance of Hungary's political culture in the 1970s was more of a pragmatic survival pact between two exhausted pugilists clutching each other to stay standing than the people's and the regime's shared vision of either a socialist or a democratic future.

Value change in western Europe and Hungary

For the first 950 years of its existence as a state Hungary was a European nation, and its pre-communist political culture was part of a common European experience of nation-building, economic modernization, and social and cultural change. There is reason to suppose that the communist interlude -- however deeply it transformed the country's political institutions, economic system, and social structure -- failed to effect comparably far-reaching changes in the society's values and core beliefs. (35) As will be shown below, this was particularly true for the public's notions of national identity and the people's affective orientations toward political authority.

By "values" I mean "criteria for selection in action." (36) More specifically, as Robin M. Williams explains,

> [V]alues as empirical elements in human behavior . . . arise out of human experience and hence may be affected by any conditions, including social conditions that affect that experience. Values may therefore be analyzed as dependent variables, subject to changes that are consequent to changes in population, economic production, political organization and so on. (37)

Depending on one's disciplinary perspective, values may be classified in different ways. For purposes of the following discussion the listing of three basic types -- "connotive" (likes versus dislikes), "achievement" (success versus failure) and affective (pleasure versus pain) -- and "self-realization" values should be sufficient for the task at hand. (38)

Other than some otherwise very convincing electoral statistics on what Hungarians thought of communism -- the Communist Party received only 17 percent of the vote at the first free postwar elections in November 1945 -- we do not have data on how the Hungarian people felt about communism before the Rakosi regime took over the country in 1947-1948. Thus, in the absence of longitudinal data on

changes in political beliefs that may be causally attributed to the people's experiences between 1945 and 1989, one must make do with what is available on Hungarian public opinion under communism. (39)

It may be argued that with the post-Yalta division of Europe into two qualitatively different paths of sociopolitical development, over time there evolved in each half a number of indigenous, yet comparable, social responses to economic development. The principal western European trends were overall modernization, social differentiation, rapid technological and educational development, and, as a consequence, the crossing of the threshold between industrial and postindustrial society. (40) In the East the regimes' system-building efforts yielded considerable results. These included the transformation of predominantly traditional societies into highly stratified social entities organized along lines of political power, educational attainment, occupation, place of residence, age, and gender.

The Western and Eastern developmental scenarios do not seem comparable at the outset. However, when we control for differences in terms of economic development, material well-being, societal autonomy, and human rights, we are still left with sufficient common ground for informal comparisons and prudent inferences from the available data.

Changes in values and political orientations in postwar western Europe are analyzed in Ronald Inglehart's important study, *The Silent Revolution*. (41) Inglehart makes a compelling case for a historic "shift in concerns from material well-being to quality of life" and the consequent rise of new values among the publics of postindustrial western Europe. These new values caused "a decline in the legitimacy of hierarchical authority, patriotism, religion, etc.," and became manifest by a "shift in the political skills between elites and mass." (42) The main causes of value change were those in "occupational structure, economic growth, education, mass communication and distinctive cohort experiences." These contributed to enhanced citizen efficacy in public affairs and resulted in growing demands for more inclusive patterns of political participation. The latter, in turn, led to the revival and increased

importance of local politics and to a shift in citizens' priorities from national to community issues. (43)

The complex process of social and value change in western Europe became discernible in terms of new needs and value preferences. Whereas traditional value priorities tended to emphasize such concerns as social stability and economic well-being, the citizens' new values centered on "self-actualization needs," such as free speech and efficacious political participation for the enhancement of the citizens' and their communities' "quality of life." These new value priorities that Inglehart called Materialist and Postmaterialist (M and PM hereafter) and their interaction in the public arena became the new motive forces of postindustrial western Europe's political culture.

In terms of economic growth, occupational structure, educational mobility, and distinctive cohort experiences, the Hungarian public was exposed to changes that were in some ways similar to those that took place in western Europe after the Second World War. The question is whether these processes of Hungary's socio-economic transformation, particularly after 1968, yielded similar shifts in values and, if so, how might these be measured by the use of Inglehart's indices of change from M to PM values in Hungary.

Values and value change in Hungary were the subjects of a major multi-year (1977-1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981) survey by Elemér Hankiss and research associates at the Sociology Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. (44) The study was prompted by what the authors perceived as "the crisis of values and morals" in Hungary in the late 1970s. As they saw it, this issue was "at least as important as economic restructuring and the renewal of social and political institutions." (45)

Their most important finding was the widespread internalization of M values by Hungarian citizens. A related process was the sharp bifurcation between traditional and modern, rural and urban, poor and affluent, and male and female value dispositions toward most issues on the people's private and public agenda. The authors speak of the absence of public institutions for the free sharing and

reconciliation of divergent citizen concerns and of the consequent rise of "hollow" and "wild" individualism in the society's ruthless pursuit of personal interests. In the realm of connotive (pleasure versus pain) values, the dominant tendency was the instant gratification of needs -- be these the acquisition of material possessions or the satisfaction of physiological urges. Whereas intellectual values were cherished, the acquisition of knowledge was motivated more by the preservation of occupational status and social prestige than by the educated citizens' desire for the socially useful application of specialized skills. Although the majority of the four samples called themselves religious in one way or another, their responses attested to predominantly agnostic-secular dispositions and a pronounced incapacity for value sharing with anyone beyond the narrow confines of immediate family and closest friends. (46)

The Hungarian respondents' fit in an European matrix of value orientations may be partly demonstrated by the data shown in Table 1. The rather astonishing disparity between the Hungarian responses on matters of "trusting other people," of relating to those outside the family, and of a kind of "survival-of-the-fittest" mentality instilled in children speak volumes about the regime's success in breaking down traditional horizontal links and personal ties among Hungarian citizens. This evidence also hints at the great psychological obstacles that the community must overcome in building a civil society in Hungary.

The vast gap between Hungarian and northern European (Denmark, the Netherlands, and Britain), and the relative proximity between Hungary and southern European (Spain and Italy) levels of tolerance for people with different views and ideologies serves as additional evidence of the continued survival of authoritarian personality traits among Hungarians. In several of his follow-up studies and interim reports on the Hungarian value survey, Hankiss offered insightful pathologies of distorted value and social behavior. He diagnosed these as evidence of "political infantilism," "defenselessness," and profoundly flawed value priorities and called them manifestations of "dysfunctional social mechanisms." (48)

Table 1

VALUE ORIENTATIONS IN TEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE LATE 1970s (47)

	Respondents by Country									
	UK %	IR %	FR %	B %	FRG %	NE	SP %	D %	IT %	H %
"Most people can be trusted."										
- Yes.	43	40	22	25	26	38	32	46	25	32
"Is there anything, other than your family, for which you would sacrifice everything including your life?"										
- There is not.	60	55	64	61	53	54	38	49	45	35
"It is the parents' duty to do everything for their children even at the cost of their material well-being."										
- Yes.	72	74	73	63	46	55	76	46	65	48
"How do you want to bring up your children?"										
- To respect others.	62	56	59	45	52	53	44	58	43	31
- To be loyal and trusting	36	19	36	23	22	24	29	24	43	10
"How do you like to spend your leisure time?"										
- Alone	11	12	10	9	8	12	7	8	20	10
- With the family	48	39	47	51	52	49	53	53	36	72
- With friends	27	27	22	18	27	15	23	12	29	10
- With different people	11	12	8	7	5	12	4	4	8	3
"How disturbed are you by people with different worldviews?"										
- Very much/a great deal.	7	13	10	13	12	6	22	4	22	32

Note: UK=Great Britain, IR=Ireland, FR=France, B=Belgium, FRG=[West] Germany, NE=The Netherlands, SP=Spain, D=Denmark, IT=Italy, H=Hungary.

Political discontinuities, generational change and related "unique cohort experiences" all played a role in the shaping of M and PM value preferences in Hungary. Hungary's position in the M - PM value continuum placed the respondents, together with those from Germany and Austria, firmly in the predominantly M cluster. (see Table 2)

Table 2

"MATERIALIST" AND "POSTMATERIALIST" RESPONSES, SIX COUNTRIES, BY INGLEHART'S VALUE ORIENTATION INDEX (49)

Country	Value Orientation				
	Materialist (M)		Postmaterialist (PM)		
	"Pure %	"Mixed %	Pure PM" %	"Mixed PM" %	No data %
The Netherlands	17.9	29.7	27.5	19.7	5.2
England	28.7	35.9	23.5	7.3	4.5
United States	38.3	30.4	19.1	9.4	2.8
West Germany	4.0	27.1	11.0	5.9	1.9
Austria	38.2	34.3	17.2	4.2	6.1
Hungary	40.0	32.6	16.7	1.9	9.8

This was to be expected in a "state of existing socialism" with chronic scarcities of goods, services, and self-actualization opportunities. Indeed, as

Inglehart's "security hypothesis" submits, "An individual's priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment: one places the greatest subjective value on things that are in relatively short supply." (50) This proposition might be amended with the question: "Yes, but in what order?" What comes first: food, shelter, and clothing, or political rights? Both, particularly the latter, were in short supply in Hungary.

A partial answer -- in addition to the social consequences of economic development that has been the Western analysts' central explanatory device for value shifts over time -- may be obtained by singling out the role generational change played in this process. Everything being equal, it is axiomatic that early childhood experiences in the formation of values tend to become manifest as more "modern" and increasingly PM value preferences in the beliefs of the young "successor generation."

In the 1970s "pure PMs" were hard to find in Hungary, even among members of the youngest age cohort. (see Table 3) However, with the addition of ambivalent "mixed" PMs in the third category, we have an interesting and in some ways intriguing distribution of PM value preferences among members of the six age cohorts. The point is that whereas an inverse relationship between age and PM value inclinations has been a global trend, the data on the Hungarian 45 to 55 age cohort represent an interesting "tip-of-the-iceberg" kind of anomaly of value preferences in Hungary. The perceptible discrepancy between this cohort's M - PM orientations and those of the preceding and following age clusters seems to correlate with the positions in the occupational hierarchy of incumbents in this age group. In the 1970s and the 1980s middle-aged but still upwardly mobile managers and executives were about the only elite group in Hungary with the motive, opportunity, and positional power to promote and actually effect *changes* of any kind. As the politically "least unempowered" group, its members were active on many fronts -- not the least among these was their willingness, from the mid- 1980s on, to speak up on behalf of PM causes such as societal autonomy and by having "a say" in political decisions. Virtually all independent candidates for the 1985 parliamentary elections and the vast majority of those five years later came from *this* age cohort.

The Hungarian people's value orientations, just as those in western Europe, were determined by the cognitive and affective consequences of socioeconomic modernization, including the secularization of values, social mobility, and generational value shifts. As shown in Walter Connor's study on the beliefs of eastern Europe's "successor generation" in the 1970s, the Hungarian situation was rather similar at least to that of Poland's. (52) In my view, the main differences between Hungary and its neighbors consisted of (a) the younger generation's "distinctive cohort experience" of *not* being exposed to the value-shaping turmoil of the 1956 revolution and its aftermath, and (b) the involvement of all -- young and old -- age cohorts in a regime-sponsored socioeconomic experiment (the NEM) that raised societal expectations for positive change regarding the gratification of M values.

The reception, selective internalization, and overt public reactions to various external stimuli, particularly the regime's political messages in the media, were also conditioned by the recipients' social background and class status. (53) In any case, it should be apparent from the foregoing that the comparability of the M - PM value criteria with those of other methods of inferring meaning from value preferences is, at best, tenuous. It is tempting to read too much into opinions that seem supportive of PM values. However, the political salience of earnest endorsements of needing "more say" in community and workplace affairs and of the respondents' affirmation of transcendental verities, such as "happiness," "freedom," "inner harmony," "love" and "salvation" that one finds in the 6th, 13th, 14th, 23d and 36th positions in the rank order of 36 Hungarian value preferences is open to considerable doubt. (54) The central issue is whether and under what circumstances might these faintly endorsed -- "murmured" and "whispered" -- PM value orientations coalesce into widely shared public skepticism, let alone open criticism, of the political regime and its right to rule the country.

Table 3

MATERIALIST - POSTMATERIALIST VALUE CHANGE IN WESTERN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND HUNGARY, BY AGE COHORT (51)

Age cohort	Country				
	Western Europe (1979)	Japan (1972)		Hungary (1981?)	
			Age cohort		
	%	"4" %		"3+4" %	
15-24	21	11	20-29	4	25
25-34	17	12	30-39	1	18
35-44	13	2	40-49	3	19
55-64	8	4	60-69	-	15
65-	5	2	70-	-	12

Note: For western Europe, "Pure Postmaterialists" according to Inglehart four-item battery. For Hungary, survey taken with Inglehart twelve-item battery; Data recalculated and presented as "pure" and "pure + mixed" Postmaterialist values of Inglehart four-item battery.

Political communication: trends and policy priorities

During the Kádár era the Hungarian people were the recipients of vast amounts of regime-sponsored political communication that sought to convey the party leadership's values and policy preferences. The regime's print and electronic media dispensed information as well as ideologially biased interpretations of the same.

Beyond the transmission of information and disinformation, the regime sought to mobilize the population for specific actions (agitation), to popularize its ideological and policy objectives (propaganda), and to reshape the society's values through utilization of sophisticated methods of political persuasion. As Ithiel de Sola Pool explained, the communist regimes' main objective was the promotion of "cognitive and characterological" changes "in the direction of discipline and conformity." (55)

A political regime's communications output can enhance or ameliorate realization of the leadership's policy objectives. In a positive sense, political communication can strengthen official norms and social stability, aid social mobilization, impede threats to social stability, solidify social cohesion, and, in general, "soothe the public." (56) In a negative sense, such messages can undermine social stability, foster panic, increase social conformism, augment processes of social atomization, and imbue distorted values in the public. (57)

The Leninist notion of the press as a "collective propagandist and organizer" for utilization of the regime's proprietary communications resources to obtain positive or negative sociopolitical outcomes confers on the leaders of a communist state unlimited powers either to enlighten or to indoctrinate the public. By all appearances, the Kádár regime was a dutiful player in the Soviet bloc's "red orchestra." Until the onset of *glasnost'* in 1987-1988, the media's propaganda output was quite similar to that of Hungary's neighbors. In fact, until early 1989 Hungary also observed the unwritten rule of not publishing anything about another socialist state that was deemed unfit to print in the domestic press of that state.

The Kádár regime's program of political communication was a major undertaking that made full use of the print and electronic media. In the mid-1980s 95.6 million copies of books of all kinds; 29 daily, 58 weekly and 110 fortnightly newspapers; 511 monthly journals; and approximately 1,000 periodicals were available to Hungarian readers. (58). The combined daily output of the three main and several regional radio stations was about 70 hours, and TV (2 channels, 5 regional studios, and 28 community cable studios) transmitted a daily total of 105 to 115 hours of original and repeat programs. (59) The entire communications program

was coordinated through a highly structured network of policy guidance, preventive censorship, and facilities for audience-feedback evaluation. (60)

All the players in the national communications orchestra were important for the transmission of the official score, but the most important performer was the "concert master," the HSWP's official daily *Népszabadság*, with a daily circulation of 900,000 copies in the 1980s which provided the correct "pitch" for the rest of the instrumentalists. Whereas the other four national dailies tended to cater to specific constituency interests (the government, the trade unions, the Patriotic People's Front, and the National Council of Agricultural Cooperatives), *Népszabadság* was the authoritative source of the party line on all key issues.

It is axiomatic that, to be effective the political message, very much like commercial advertising, must "confirm preexisting beliefs" to neutralize the recipients' affective resistance to the cognitive substance and the action implications of the message. (61) Thus, given the central policy intent of consensus building through mutual accommodation of the regime's strategic goals and the public's personal values, the effective "selling" of the party line to the public was an extremely complex task. The effort called for the constant reaffirmation of the core elements of the regime's official political culture, as well as for flexibility to avoid alienating the public and "losing touch with the masses." As will be shown below, in political and ideological terms the outcome of the regime-public dialogue -- the former through the censored media, the latter by way of critical "whispered" word-of-mouth communication and, at the end, through samizdat -- was at worst a stalemate, and at best the regime largely adapting to what the public was prepared to hear, see, and read in the electronic and the printed media. In any case, because of the sheer volume of the regime's communications output, the only feasible approach to the study of the incumbents' message is to focus on what *Népszabadság* had to say to its readers during selected periods of the Kádár era in Hungary.

With the help of an important study, "Economic and Social Concepts in Political Propaganda, 1962-1980" by László Reisz, a social scientist on the staff of the Hungarian National Statistical Office, the regime's general policy preferences and

its changing priorities over time may be reconstructed with a great deal of precision. (62) The study is based on content analysis of 65 propaganda themes in 1984 articles (2 articles per week, 104 articles per year) for the period between 1962 and 1980. The total number of occurence of the 62 themes (see Table 4), which served as coding units for analysis, added up to a sample of 28,372 coding units for 18 years. The sample was clustered under nine main subjects and three principal analytical categories marked as A, B, and C (see Table 5).

The study's central hypothesis is that the appearance of *any* theme in the party's official daily was intended to serve one or more political objectives. The policy intent (whether explicit or implicit in a given textual context) was one of three types:

"A," denoting coding units that either carried factual information or acknowledged the existence of facts. These we may call affirmative "is" or "there is" type of messages.

"B," denoting coding units that appeared as goal, or action-oriented, expressions of official wishes and expectations vis-a-vis the readers. These we may call "ought to" types of messages.

"C," denoting items that deny or reject the existence, importance, relevance, and so on of alleged facts, beliefs, and behaviors with a view to persuading the reader to share this attitude. These we may call "denied/rejected" or "there isn't," "should not," "must not," and "don't" type of messages.

The assignment of individual coding units to one of three categories -- "there is," "ought to," and "denied or rejected" -- permits consideration of each concept within a subject and time-specific context of an A-B-C official attitudinal continuum.

Table 4

CONCEPTS USED AS CODING UNITS FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA MESSAGES IN HSWP DAILY *NÉPSZABADSÁG*, 1962-1980 (63)

Code	Concept	Code	Concept
6	Party work, party propaganda	45	Central guidance
7	Building of socialism	47	Culture, education
8	Plan, plan fulfillment	48	Diligence
9	Oversight by party	49	Satisfaction
10	Economic effficiency	50	Socialist democracy
12	Substantive party work	51	Undesirable political belief
13	Ideological commitment	52	Spirit of socialism
14	Leninist norms	53	Marxism-Leninism
15	Party with the masses	56	Socialist brigade movement
18	Personality cult/lawlessness	57	Emphasis on individuality
19	Collective party leadership	58	Emphasis on community
20	Party in the people's service	60	Working conditions
21	(Antidemocratic) one-man decision	61	Activity
23	Communist morality/party unity	62	Confidence
24	Societal consensus	63	(Political) consciousness
25	Alliance policy	64	Voluntariness
26	Increased production	65	Honor
27	Trade union activity	66	Legality
28	Modern products	67	Responsibility
29	Observation of deadlines	68	Volunteer work
70	Standard of living	69	Worker-peasant alliance
30	Socialist transformation of agriculture	72	Objective difficulties
33	Revenues/profit	74	Work
34	Expenditures	75	Nationalism, "country," "nation"
35	Quality	76	Political continuity
36	Investments, development	77	Justice
37	Material Incentives	78	Patience
38	Organization of work	80	Bureaucracy
39	Sectarians, dogmatists, "leftists"	82	Regulative role of the market
42	Stability of socialism	83	Risk-taking, competitiveness
43	Stability, balanced economy		
44	Self-reliance		

Table 5

CONCEPTS IN POLITICAL PROPAGANDA IN HUNGARY, BY GENERAL SUBJECT MATTER AND HYPOTHETICAL OFFICIAL EVALUATION CRITERIA, 1962-1968 (64)

Subject Matter	Evaluation Criteria						
	Numbers Coding Units				Distribution Units		Coding
	A	B	C	Total	A%	B%	C%
Society	3,767	2,856	1,445	8,068	46.7	35.4	17.9
Youth	824	1,024	685	2,533	32.5	40.5	27.0
Party	2,442	1,562	858	4,862	50.3	32.1	17.6
Intellectuals	473	691	314	1,478	32.0	46.8	21.2
Workers	1,505	747	295	2,547	59.1	29.3	11.6
Peasants	467	147	100	714	65.4	20.6	14.0
Subtotal	9,478	7,027	3,697	20,202	46.9	34.8	18.3
Economy	931	1,602	758	3,291	28.3	48.7	23.0
Industry	779	1,044	804	2,627	29.7	39.7	30.6
Agriculture	1,125	668	459	2,252	49.4	29.7	20.4
Grand total	12,313	10,341	5,718	28,372	43.4	36.4	20.2

Note: A = coding units (concepts) with factual information or statement of facts;
B = "ought to" and goal-oriented concepts; and
C = concepts that imply in textual context denial or disapproval of specific facts and behaviors.

The task is to decipher the veracity as well as the real intent behind the official use of each theme or concept. As Reisz explains,

> From the frequency of occurrence of coding units we can infer as to which of the three [A, B, C] orientations is the most likely to influence the aggregate occurrence of each category. When can we accept as true the values of one or another concept? This is possible only by the juxtaposition of all three orientations. The unusual intensity of rejected themes is likely to signal the existence of genuine convictions. As for items that are deemed to be true, care must be taken. . . . The most frequently occurring concept [in the entire survey] is that of "community" presented as an ["A" category] fact. Why mention it so frequently, if the existence of "community" is supposed to be self-evident? (65)

Comprehensive analysis of the internal correlations of propaganda themes, stated and hidden official intentions, the cyclical intensification of emphasis on one or another of the nine main subjects, and the linkage of each to the regime's strategic decisions is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will briefly discuss:

- the regime's overall political preferences and ideological expectations, as these may be inferred from the distribution of "A," "B," and "C" orientations and the rank order by frequency of each concept, in each category;

- the political regime's positive and negative propaganda postures toward specific social groups, as these may be inferred from the distribution of "A," "B," and "C" orientations to specific social groups;

- the relative importance of various concepts to the regime's policy dilemmas, as it may be inferred from the distribution and frequency of various concepts between 1970 and 1980.

First, let us specify the meaning of the concepts that serve as coding units of Reisz' content analysis of *Népszabadság*'s political messages. As shown in Table 4, the concepts, as parts of the regime's ideational universe, pertain to choices and dilemmas of political steering, system maintenance, and ultimately, to core problems of political legitimacy. As befitting the party's premier propaganda vehicle, *Népszabadság* gave issues of political management and ideology prominence -- as it

did to such concerns as economic development and values ("community," "honor," "legality," "justice," "patience") -- of a yet to be born socialist civil society.

Most of these concepts were intended to buttress the political status quo and strengthen values of a demobilized society's pseudoparticipant and basically *subject* political culture. Concepts with Postmaterialist value content are few and far between. The concept of "individuality" was most often linked in the communist press with notions of "arbitrariness" and "selfishness." The idea of "risk-taking and competitiveness" was invariably neutralized with caveats about "responsibility" and "party oversight," while *pro bono* "volunteer work" was perceived by all concerned as involuntary unpaid labor in aid of plan fulfillment. (66) The Kádár regime had neither the resources nor the inclination to promote PM values in Hungary.

The party devoted two and one-half times more attention to the society and the communist party than to the state's economic institutions. (see Table 5). However, what is of interest here is the way the regime sought to address the society and, within it, members of three occupational clusters as well as the under-30 age cohort. A closer scrutiny of the volume and distribution of coding units within each official attitudinal orientation, that is, of the "A," "B," and "C" type, and the temporal changes in the regime's political expectations of each of these constitutiencies, positions one well to discern the regime's *real* intentions. (67)

From the juxtaposition of ratios of the volume of coded items under "A" and "C," we can obtain an informal "approve/ disapprove" index for each subgroup in Table 5. By this criterion, the leadership's clear favorite was the peasantry, followed by blue-collar workers, the "society" as such, intellectuals and young people. The peasantry's most favored position is also measurable by the leadership's benign neglect; it received one-third and one-half less agit-prop attention than did the workers and intellectuals.

What did the regime want of the peasants? In 1962, the party wanted higher technical qualifications, acceptance of the "socialist transformation of agriculture," confidence in the regime, and higher living standards in the countryside. In 1968 the party had only *one* goal for the peasants; more education. During the years of

agricultural recentralization and the forced merger of agricultural cooperatives (1972-1975), the peasants were told to have faith in the "worker-peasant alliance" and "socialist democracy", and were asked to keep up the good work. In the next five years the peasants were either left alone -- there were no "ought to" messages in 1977-1978 -- or urged to make better use of their resources. In sum, sufficient food was central to political stability and the regime wisely avoided making Rákosi's mistake of crippling the hands that fed the country. Indeed, in the years of price rises for basic food staples between 1975 and 1979 there was not a single critical "C"-type propaganda comment about Hungary's farmers in the party's daily. (68)

The industrial workers were treated well by the party propagandists. (69) In the 1960s much was said to them about "socialist democracy," work ethic, and community values. In the early 1970s they were reminded of the importance of the worker-peasant alliance and were asked to keep the community's rather than their own personal interests in mind. The emphasis of the early reform years on "material incentives" had vanished by 1976 as one of the top-five items in the annual rank order of "ought to" issues. Toward the end, quality production, community spirit and the formation of "socialist work brigades" were the party's goals for the industrial workers.

The intellectuals were the second most criticized social group in *Népszabadság*. (70) From a review of critical items in the "C" column, it appears that in the 1960s the intellectuals were guilty of harboring "undesirable political beliefs" (the top item in 1962, 1963, and 1966) and of not having enough trust in the regime. This bill of particulars was extended in the following years to include selfish individualism and unjustified dissatisfaction with white-collar incomes. Nationalism, in a pejorative sense, was a recurring theme until 1977, when Kádár decided to readmit the prodigal intellectuals into the political fold. At that point a switch was turned and the previously criticized intelligentsia shortcomings became "A" category "facts," or rather expectations, such as "ideological commitment, "honor," and emphasis on "culture and education."

The young generation was the recipient of the party's most critical messages aimed at any social group. (71) The central themes of the party's harsh evaluation of the role that young people had played in the 1956 revolution, that is, "C" category concepts, such as (lack of) "responsibility," "satisfaction," "diligence," and "political consciousness," endured well into the early 1970s. At that point the emphasis, pursuant to the HSWP's new youth policies of 1972-1973, shifted to "education and culture," "socialist democracy," and "spirit of socialism" in the "B" category "ought to" sense of these concepts. However, as late as 1980, one-third of the critical themes were those of addressing issues of "working conditions" and the way young people kept aloof ("individualism") from the rest of the "community."

Unlike the regime's differentiated, supportive or critical, propaganda approach to members of various social groups, its essential message to the society was unambiguous. The five most frequently occurring propaganda concepts among the total of 8,068 coding units in the "Society" cluster in the "is," "ought to," and "reject/deny" categories are community; nationalism, country and nation; alliance policy; socialist democracy; and building of socialism (see Table 6).

The gist of the above can be summarized by paraphrasing the political message of the first two columns: "The party perceives Hungarian society as a patriotic community of people of goodwill who ought to embrace the spirit of socialist democracy and stand aloof from undesirable political beliefs." From the perusal of "mood reports" in the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party central archives in the early 1980s there is every reason to state that this is *not* what the party leaders really thought. (73) On the other hand, this is what they said to the public.

In sum, the central objective of the Kádár regime's comprehensive program of political communication was consensus building through persuasion and appeals to national unity. The people of rural Hungary and the food- producing branch of the national economy were the primary recipients of supportive political propaganda. And the intellectuals and the youth were targets of incessant criticism and ideological disapproval.

Central to the entire effort was neutralization of hostile public views toward the party's intrinsically unpalatable ideological core values of Marxism-Leninism by appeals to *preexisting values* of national and cultural identity and toleration of public

Table 6

RANK ORDER AND FREQUENCY OF CONCEPTS IN PROPAGANDA MESSAGES ADDRESSED BY THE KÁDÁR REGIME TO THE "SOCIETY" BY TYPE OF POLICY INTENT, 1962-1980 (72)

Rank Order	Policy Intent		
	A "is" (code no., and meaning)	B "ought to" (code no., and meaning)	C "reject/deny" (code no., and meaning)
1.	58 "Community"	50 "Socialist democracy"	51 "Undesirable political beliefs
2.	75 "Nationalism, country and nation"	58 "Community"	80 "Bureaucracy"
3.	25 "Alliance policy"	52 "Marxism-Leninism"	63 "Political consciousness"
4.	50 "Socialist democracy"	67 "Responsibility"	37 "Material incentives"
5.	7 "Building of socialism"	64 "Voluntariness"	61 "Activity"

Note: A = coding units (concepts) with factual information or stattement of fact;
B= "ought to" and goal-oriented concepts; and
C = concepts that imply in textual context denial or disapproval of specific facts and behaviors.

pressures for consumerist personal autonomy. As will be shown below, the propaganda effort was largely successful in depoliticizing the cognitive dimensions of public opinion by rechanneling the public's critical views toward *objects* of the regime's policymaking output (price rises and shortages of goods), and away from the authoritarian essence of its processes of decision making by a handful of aging politicians.

Public Opinion: Political Communication, National Identity, and Socioeconomic Aspirations, 1972-1985

In what follows I will consider survey data on what the Hungarian people, as participants of a public-regime "meta-dialogue," thought of their country, of themselves as its citizens, and of how they lived. The main themes are national identity, political socialization, public reactions to the regime's economic policies, and views on Hungary's social problems in the 1980s. These are complex issues and the meanings that one might infer from the data are often somewhat ambiguous.

The difficulties of interpretation are exacerbated by situational factors. The potential pitfalls of trying to elicit truthful opinions from respondents in the habit of concealing their true beliefs from the authorities and of trying to ascertain the share of the "attentive public" in national samples of respondents of opinion polls are self-evident. Avid newspaper readers and consumers of radio and TV news and propaganda programs were bound to have opinions different from the opinions of those who chose not to be exposed to political communications in the media. For these reasons, questions of measurement of the attentive public will be preceeded by the following discussion on substantive issues of opinion formation by members of the public.

Political information: from the NEM to *glasnost'*

The amount and distribution among various social groups of attention paid to media messages of various kinds help distinguish among the "attentive," "less attentive," and the "inattentive" segments of the public. It is axiomatic that members of the "attentive public" were not only better informed but more likely to assume an active role in the public arena than were those who chose to learn less or nothing about political issues from the media.

A 1974 survey sought to elicit how well respondents remembered the essence of news items that they had read in the newspapers or had heard in radio and TV news broadcasts on the previous day. The sample was divided into (a) "informed" news consumers of two types: those whose primary source of information was the print media, and those who received their information from the electronic media; (b) "news-poor" consumers of information, who remembered little of what they had read, heard, or seen; and (c) those who had only occasional or no exposure to information from any media (see Table 7). Eighty percent of the population fell into the last category.

As can be expected, patterns of news consumption had a high correlation with level of education. As seen in indices of "communication efficacy," the regime did get through to about four-fifths of the high school and university graduates, but to only about half of the less-well-educated population. Among members of various occupational clusters, intellectuals, and upper- and midlevel executives were intensive news consumers, but only 32 percent of the blue-collar and 22 percent of the agricultural workers chose to devote time to receive news and information from the offical media. (75)

Between the end of 1985 and the spring 1989 there was a dramatic decline in the number of "don't know" answers to questions posed by pollsters. A combination of mounting economic difficulties, the Kádár regime's eroding authority, and the impact of Soviet reforms on Hungary, particularly that of *glasnost*, were responsible for the drop. From the viewpont of cognitive changes, the most

important development was the acquisition and absorption by the public of long-suppressed facts, especially about the Rákosi years between 1949 and 1956, the revolution of 1956, the persecution of Imre Nagy, and the thousands of victims of the early Kádár years.

Table 7

CONSUMPTION OF NEWS IN PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA BY RESPONDENT LEVEL OF EDUCATION, 1974 (74)

Type of news Consumption	Level of Education			
	<8 grades	8 grade	high school	University
	n= 518	446	160	51
	%	%	%	%
A. Informed readers of newspapers	9	15	30	43
B. Informed mainly from the electronic media	14	21	27	37
C. "News poor": occasional exposure to news media	29	34	24	14
D. "News poor": no exposure to news media	49	30	19	6
CEI:	0.46	0.51	0.80	0.85

Note: CEI = Communication Efficacy Index.

$$CEI = \frac{A + B}{A + B + C}$$

The collapse of the HSWP in 1988-1989 must be credited in part to adverse public opinion fueled by *glasnost*-inspired documented exposes of instances of institutionalized corruption, nepotism, and abuse of power by officials of the Kádár

regime. The appearance of the democratic opposition in the political arena was made possible by the total lifting of censorship in May 1989. From then on there were no forbidden subjects in the media. (76)

The availability of an uncensored press does not, in itself, make for a well-informed, let alone articulate, public. Deeply ingrained habits of keeping one's beliefs to oneself or, at best, sharing these with only family and trusted friends were difficult to overcome. In 1989 the flood of uncensored news and information created an inordinate information overload that few people could shape into a coherent picture of the new political realities of the "pretransition" period in Hungary.

Because of extensive commitments of time in the first and the second economy, few working-age people had the opportunity to read in the press, hear on the radio, or view on TV enough news to make up their minds as to what to think about new developments in Hungary, in eastern Europe, and in the Soviet Union. (In the preceding decade the average Hungarian's workweek had increased by ten to fifteen hours.) The phrase "increasingly attentive but still semicompetent" seems appropriate when describing the mind-set and informational resources of the average Hungarian respondent to questions posed by opinion polls.

Public opinion: Core beliefs and national identity

Core beliefs are the basic dispositions and diffuse orientations toward "nation," "country," and "motherland," its history, language, culture, and visual symbols such as the flag and certain objects like the Parliament building in Budapest or, in Poland's case, the Wavel Castle in Kraków. All of these contribute to the formation of popular attitudes toward the nation and the world beyond the national boundaries. One central aspect and type of overtly articulated manifestation of such dispositions is one's sense of national identity.

The question of national identity and the intensity with which respondents relate to statements like "my country, right or wrong" or, in Hungary's case, attempt to compensate for the country's small size by making excessive claims for its history, culture, and the achievements of compatriots, or by making disparaging remarks about other states and peoples, all fall within the area of ethnocentrism. This phenomenon was a political challenge to a leadership that was ideologically committed to the philosophy of "internationalism." The philosophy was not widely shared or deeply internalized among Hungarians.

In a 1978 survey of a national sample of young people (ages 12 to 18) (858), three statements, deliberately couched in a "Hungarocentric" language, were offered: (77)

- 1. "There is no other small nation which gave so many great men to the world as did Hungary."
- 2. "The survival, in the sea of alien peoples and without any ethnic kin in the area, of the Hungarian people for over one thousand years merits recognition and praise."
- 3. "There is an unique Hungarian spiritual quality."

Twenty-five percent of the respondents said, "I don't know" to one or another of the three statements; 38 percent agreed with all three statements, and 3 percent disagreed with all three. Twenty percent agreed with two of the three statements, and 16 percent disagreed with two of the three statements. Although the survey detected a shift away from an ethnocentric posture by students in the upper grades, their didactic and ethnocentric history curriculum was held responsible by the analyst for slowing down the youngsters' progression in a more "internationalist" direction.

To control the findings of this survey, the Netherlands (another small European country) and the people of Holland were substituted for Hungary and Hungarians with reference to the "small nation, great men" and the "spiritual quality" questions (see Table 8).

Under the joint sponsorship of the Study Group on Comparative Public Opinion, International Political Science Association (IPSA), and the Mass Communications Research Institute (MCRI), Budapest, a somewhat different kind of survey was undertaken by the noted social psychologist György Csepeli and me. Our survey, "Our Place in the World: National Identity and National Consciousness in Hungary, 1984," was administered in September-October 1984 to a national representative sample of 967 persons. (79) Respondents of the were asked (1) what they were "proud of" and "satisfied" (or contented) with in Hungary; (2) to what extent they tended to trust people from ten foreign countries; (3) whether they would want to live in another country, and if so, where; (4) whether they regarded themselves as belonging primarily to (a) humankind, (b) the Hungarian nation, (c) a state of the socialist camp, (d) Europe, or (e) a specific region of Hungary.

Table 8

RECEPTION ACCORDED TO ETHNOCENTRIC STATEMENTS BY YOUNG PEOPLE, HUNGARY AND THE NETHERLANDS, 1978 (78)

	Small Nation/Great Men		Spiritual Quality	
	Hungarian N=858 %	Dutch N=353 %	Hungarian N=858 %	Dutch N=353 %
Agree	64	12	62	42
Disagree	25	48	21	17
Don't know	11	40	17	41

Table 9

SENSE OF BELONGING, BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION, HUNGARY, 1984 (80)

Place in World	Level of Education				
	1-7 Grades	8th Grade	High School	Univer-sity	National Sample
	Affective Rating				
Hungarian Nation	3.76	3.56	3.72	3.65	3.69
Humankind	3.44	3.34	3.57	3.55	3.52
Region of Hungary	3.46	3.37	3.13	2.94	3.27
Socialist camp	3.26	3.25	3.20	2.77	3.22
Europe	3.16	3.17	3.21	3.05	3.17

Note: N = 967. Responses coded on a scale of 1 (complete disagreement) to 5 (complete agreement).

Public opinion: the childrens' world of prestige, power, and affection

Two aspects of the survey are of interest for the purposes of this study. One is that a very high percentage (94 percent) of the respondents wanted, if born again, to be Hungarians. The other is the matter of identity with respect to sense of primary affiliation, as revealed in the responses to the fourth question (see Table 9).

The data in Table 9 is self-explanatory, although they tend to understate the qualitative difference between the respondents' identification with the "Hungarian nation" and any other option presented. The ranking of regional affiliation over "socialist camp" and "Europe" seems to indicate resistance to

propaganda efforts to achieve internalization by the Hungarian public of *any* kind of external "regional identity" -- be it "socialist" or "Western."

Responses of people with different educational backgrounds tend to reconfirm the basic propositions of the general sociological literature on lower-class conservatism, ethnocentric patriotism, and ambivalence toward any transnational, or indeed "international," identity. The rejection of a "socialist camp" identity by Hungarian university graduates was to be expected, though their low rating of "Europe," given the alternative options, seems indicative of cultural parochialism among people who called themselves "intellectuals."

The adult population's concern about the well-being of the Hungarian diaspora in Eastern Europe generated supportive, albeit faint, sentiments among young Hungarians. The matter at hand involves a 1983 survey of 10 to 14 year-old Budapest schoolchildren (approximately 450) and their affective orientations toward explicitly political terms and symbols. (81) Twenty-six such categories were tabulated, in descending order, along a "likes it" - "dislikes it" continuum. (See Tables 10 and 11).

The issue here is not necessarily that God was "liked" or "disliked" enough to earn the sixteenthth place between "trade union" and "Party secretary." Rather, it is the extraordinarily high level of support for *national* symbols and abstract notions as well as the equally pronounced rejection of any kind of political confrontation such as "strike" and "demonstration," and of the perceived coercive content of "capitalism," "politics," and "military." Table 11 arranges the somewhat disparate data according to thematic clusters to aid closer inspection of the evidence. The rank order of the respective "affection indices" of national symbols, school-related activities, and the regime's official ideologies and political institutions hints at the measurable success of the regime's political socialization programs among members of the youngest generation.

Table 10

10- TO 14-YEAR-OLD SCHOOLCHILDREN'S AFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO POLITICAL CONCEPTS, HUNGARY, 1983 (82)

Concept	Likes It %	Doesn't Like it %	Can't Decide %
1. National anthem	99	-	-
2. National flag	98	-	2
3. Marching (parade)	88	6	6
4. Red flag	81	7	11
5. Voluntary work	81	7	13
6. Pioneer kerchief	76	14	10
7. Socialism	76	12	13
8. Money	70	15	15
9. Party (HSWP)	66	15	19
10. Working class	65	15	20
11. National Assembly	60	15	25
12. Cabinet minister	54	22	24
13. Police	50	34	16
14. Official speech	45	40	15
15. Trade union	45	21	34
16. God	42	29	29
17. Party Secretary	40	30	30
18. Revolution	38	47	14
19. Politician	28	44	28
20. Council president	28	40	32
21. Military	26	61	13
22. Politics	23	58	19
23. King	21	63	16
24. Capitalism	11	68	22
25. Demonstration	7	89	5
26. Strike	4	91	6

Note: N = approximately 450.

Table 11

FACTOR ANALYSIS OF 10- TO 14-YEAR-OLDS' AFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO POLITICAL CONCEPTS, 1983 (83)

Factor	Variables	Factor Weight	Affection Index*
Factor 1: Organizational-ideological elements	-party	0.748	0.63
	-working class	0.743	0.62
	-socialism	0.697	0.72
	-trade union	0.543	0.36
	-cabinet minister	0.532	0.42
	-National -Assembly	0.478	0.60
Factor 2: School and demonstrative elements	-marching	0.707	0.87
	-pioneer kerchief	0.656	0.69
	-voluntary work	0.644	0.84
	-red flag	0.545	0.84
	-official speech	0.445	0.06
Factor 3: Representatives of political power	-police	0.608	0.19
	-council president	0.593	-0.18
	-party secretary	0.482	0.14
Factor 4: Politics in general	-politics	0.708	-0.43
	-politician	0.612	-0.22
Factor 5: Confrontational elements	-strike	0.725	-0.92
	-demonstration	0.708	-0.43
	-money	0.487	0.65
	-revolution	0.479	-0.91

Table 11 (continued)

FACTOR ANALYSIS OF 10- TO 14-YEAR-OLDS' AFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO POLITICAL CONCEPTS, 1983 (83)

Factor	Variables	Factor Weight	Affection Index*
Factor 6: Categories of the "other society"	-king	0.752	-0.50
	-capitalism	0.674	-0.72
	-God	0.567	0.18
Factor 7: The military	-military	0.559	-0.40
Factor 8: National symbols	-national anthem	0.759	0.99
	-national flag	0.704	1.00

Note: N = approximately 450

* Data for "affection index" were obtained by dividing the difference between the "I like it" and the "I don't like it" answers by the sum of "I like it" and "I don't like it." Thus: a-b/a+b

The data discussed above are useful for a preliminary identification of some of the key elements of Hungarian attitudes toward nationalism and national identity in the early 1980s. The evidence is quite persuasive with respect to Hungarians' extremely high level of identification with their native land.

The regime was making progress by gaining relatively high levels of acceptance of "national yet socialist" symbols and values among party members and young children. The youngsters, still living in a sheltered and depoliticized family environment, were not yet aware of the political agenda of the national anthem and that of the national flag. The coexistence of the "red flag" and the red pioneer kerchief with national symbols posed no cognitive difficulties to Hungarian children in the early 1980s.

Economic conditions and living standards

Public reactions to the regime's economic policies were the subject of several polls between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s. The first were commissioned by the party to measure the impact of the introduction of the NEM on various social groups. (In 1970-1972 there was a widely perceived gap between the industrial workers' take home-pay and farmers' incomes, which had been derived in part from the second economy.) Survey questions of this period carefully probed the respondents' views on whether there existed "tensions" among social classes and, if so, over which issues. One-third of the national sample (N = 1,307) of a 1973 poll responded in the affirmative, and over half spoke of income inequalities between urban and rural wage earners. (84) Because official propaganda sought to intimidate white-collar employees and to persuade the farming population to refrain from profiting from temporary food shortages, many conformist non-blue-collar respondents felt encouraged to echo faithfully the party line on this matter.

The era of steadily rising living standards, stable food prices, affordable housing, and low inflation rates came to an end in the mid-1970s. The first, albeit selective, price rises were announced in 1975. Though consumers were unhappy, they expected the government would soon overcome these difficulties. Yet a second round of major price rises was announced in July 1979. This time, the effect was widespread and in many ways traumatic. Indeed, in terms of responses to economic polls, from then on it was downhill until late 1989.

The findings of two sets of surveys will be discussed below to trace the evolution of public and elite attitudes toward Hungary's and the respondents' personal economic problems. Shown below are summary reports on these surveys. The first offers the aggregate results of twelve surveys on public reactions to economic difficulties; and the second a set of combined "optimism-pessimism" indices on the country's and the respondents' personal economic situation between 1975 and 1986.

To obtain a comprehensive picture of public opinion on the regime's declining economic performance over time, the dynamics of six longitudinal trends

between 1980-1986 and 1975-1986 are analyzed. "Trends" are the changes in the aggregate values of semiannual responses to eleven economic polls between 1980 and spring 1986 (see Table 12).

Some observations about the hidden dimensions of certain responses to the survey questions are in order. The most obvious point is the Hungarian public's confusion about economic matters. To have 80-plus percent of the respondents saying that Hungary had "economic problems," yet a virtually identical percentage believe that the economy would either "grow" or "not change" calls for an explanation.

A mix of adroit propaganda, censorship, and periodic infusions of Western credits into the economy and the combined effect on public opinion might be one explanation. (86) Another might be that the "lean years" since 1980 had not been, at least until the fall of 1987 when everything seemed to have collapsed, so "lean" after all. As elsewhere in the communist bloc since the late 1970s, the principal victims of the regime's declining economic performance were the elderly, young people between 20 and 30, and unskilled workers. Their understanding of the regime's difficulties was, at best, limited to the deterioration of their *personal* living standards. (87) Subsidized food prices and rent-controlled dwellings helped soften the blow for many people in the low-income categories. The rest of the work force tried to cope as best as they could by working more or consuming less and, increasingly so, by doing both.

In the mid-1980s most people coped with rising prices and inflation by cutting back on the consumption of many desirable, and some necessary, things in life. According to a 1986 survey, members of a national sample "could not afford" to spend on new clothing (45 percent), vacation and holiday travel (52 percent), recreation (38 percent), home maintenance (39 percent), durable consumer goods (30 percent), furniture (38 percent), and gifts for family occasions (29 percent). Those who had been accustomed to higher levels of consumption, such as managers and the university graduates, seem to have fared even worse. The percentage of "can't afford" answers were 10 to 20 percent higher in each of the above categories of consumption. (88)

Table 12

ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES IN HUNGARY, PUBLIC OPINION, 1980-1986

	1980	1981		1982		1983		1984		1985		1986
	S	S	F	S	F	S	F	S	F	S	F	S
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Are there economic problems?												
-yes	78	76	74	80	85	84	85	85	88	88	87	88
-no	14	12	16	13	9	9	6	9	7	7	6	7
-d.k	8	11	10	7	6	-	8	5	5	5	7	5
Are these problems												
-great	16	15	19	13	23	21	23	22	27	22	25	23
-middling	55	53	55	54	58	56	56	58	57	59	57	58
-small	6	6	6	10	3	5	4	4	3	4	3	6
-d.k.	3	4	3	4	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	2
-n.a.	20	22	26	19	14	15	15	14	11	13	13	12
These problems will be												
-lasting	21	20	18	22	25	28	29	32	35	32	34	27
-temporary	54	49	62	49	55	50	50	49	48	50	47	56
-d.k.	5	9	4	9	6	7	6	4	6	6	6	6
-n.a.	20	22	26	20	14	15	15	15	11	13	13	12
Living standards in next 1-2 years will												
-rise	32	33	33	35	31	25	27	28	32	30	31	33
-not change	48	45	45	39	37	36	35	43	40	42	38	42
-decline	12	13	11	18	27	30	31	25	24	23	24	19
-d.k.	9	9	10	8	5	9	8	5	5	5	7	6
Economic growth in next 1-2 years will												
-accelerate	45	39	43	33	31	27	27	33	37	37	34	42
-not change	34	35	39	41	42	44	43	45	41	43	42	41
-slow down	10	1	8	12	18	16	18	13	11	10	12	7
-d.k.	11	15	11	14	9	13	13	10	11	12	10	9
Compared to last year from your income can you buy												
-more	9	11	10	6	3	5	5	4	4	5	6	6
-the same	26	30	27	21	20	23	22	19	18	20	22	24
-less	62	56	50	70	74	70	71	74	76	74	70	69
-d.k.	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	2	1
Your shopping difficulties this year have												
-increased	49	37	37	38	51	37	48	42	51	46	46	38
-been the same	35	46	47	42	32	43	36	42	34	38	37	44
-decreased	2	12	11	10	11	9	8	10	10	9	8	9
-d.k.	5	5	6	6	7	4	8	4	5	7	7	8
Do incomes match price raises?												
-yes	27	21	26	15	13	14	11	12	11	10	13	10
-no	65	68	65	75	81	76	82	81	85	86	83	84
-d.k.	9	10	9	10	7	10	7	8	4	3	4	6

Note: N= National representative samples.
S= spring; F= fall; d.k.= don't know; n.a.= question not asked

Data in Table 13 show an unambigous trend of declining confidence in the regime's ability to provide for the people. A parallel, and even more pronounced, trend was indicative of the growing pessimism among average Hungarians about their ability to cope with the *personal* consequences of the gradual collapse of the national economy. The gap between the "personal" and "national" indices may be credited to censorship and fear. Citizens of a socialist state had the right to complain about their lot, but they were a great deal more circumspect about laying the blame for their troubles at the regime's door. In any case, by the mid-1980s the socioeconomic stakes were raised for many Hungarians: the days of total job security were over, and the threat of unemployment was clearly visible on the horizon.

The people's agenda: social values and aspirations in the 1980s

When societal expectations of a better life under socialism are frustrated by economic stagnation and deterioration of living conditions, people, when asked by pollsters, develop an agenda of their own. By this I mean the listing and the assignment of priorities to social problems in responses to survey questions about such matters. The "people's agenda" may also be seen as specific criticism of the regime and its creature, the omnicompetent party-state. In the final analysis, the two are seen as one and the same and, as will be shown below, both were held responsible for the ruin they brought upon Hungary. The data in Table 14 provide insights into the daily concerns of the Hungarian people in the first half of the 1980s. The assignment of numerical values to social problems permits us to see the importance that they attached to the twenty issues posed by the polls in 1980, 1983, and in 1986. Changes in rank order and in the values assigned to social problems enable us to trace shifts in the intensity of public feelings about these matters.

Table 13

OPTIMISM/PESSIMISM REGARDING NATIONAL ECONOMY AND CITIZENS' OWN PERSONAL FINANCES, HUNGARY 1975-1985 (89)
(MCRI "Optimism/Pessimism Index")

Year	OPINION ON National economy	Finances
1975	+34.5	-20.9
1976	+19.9	-35.5
1977	+46.3	-16.9
1978	+41.8	-12.3
1979	- 2.2	-50.3
1980	+22.5	-38.0
1981	+26.2	-63.0
1982	+ 7.8	-55.3
1983	+ 3.0	-59.7
1984	+ 9.8	-64.7
1985	+17.0	-60.0

Note: MCRI's (Mass Communications Research Institute Budapest)"optimism/pessimism index" was generated from poll data on the respondents' views on Hungary's and their own financial situation; in both cases, the index is the difference between "optimistic" and "pessimistic" responses in each year.

Table 14
SOCIAL PROBLEMS RANKED BY SERIOUSNESS, HUNGARIAN PUBLIC OPINION, 1980, 1983 and 1985 (90)

Rank	YEAR 1980		YEAR 1983		YEAR 1985	
	Problem	Assigned Value	Problem	Assigned Value	Problem	Assigned Value
1.	Law and order	(3.48)	Law and order	(3.70)	Law and order	(3.67)
2.	H'way accidents	(3.43)	Alcoholism	(3.59)	Drugs	(3.67)
3.	Environment	(3.41)	Drugs	(3.59)	Environment	(3.55)
4.	Drugs	(3.39)	Environment	(3.56)	Neuroses	(3.55)
5.	Unemployment	(3.35)	Neuroses	(3.52)	Alcoholism	(3.52)
6.	Neuroses	(3.35)	H'way accdts	(3.50)	Family	(3.46)
7.	Alcoholism	(3.31)	Unemployment	(3.44)	H'way accdts	(3.45)
8.	Housing	(3.19)	Family	(3.40)	Housing	(3.43)
9.	Morals	(3.14)	Housing	(3.39)	Unemployment	(3.41)
10.	Living stndrd	(3.07)	Living stndrd	(3.34)	Living stndrd	(3.38)
11.	Human rights	(3.05)	Morals	(3.33)	Morals	(3.36)
12.	Family	(3.04)	Patriotism	(3.24)	Suicides	(3.22)
13.	Patriotism	(2.99)	Humans rights	(3.23)	Patriotism	(3.21)
14.	Suicides	(2.95)	Suicides	(3.21)	Human rights	(3.16)
15.	Inequalities	(2.87)	Inequalities	(3.16)	Birth rate	(3.12)
16.	Young vs. old	(2.84)	Young vs. old	(2.98)	Inequalities	(3.09)
17.	Pornography	(2.66)	Birth rate	(2.95)	Young vs. old	(3.08)
18.	Birth rate	(2.61)	Gypsies	(2.81)	Gypsies	(2.84)
19.	Gypsies	(2.31)	Pornography	(2.77)	Pornography	(2.51)
20.	Religiosity	(1.73)	Religiosity	(2.08)	Religiosity	(2.13)

Note: Responses were given on a scale of 1 (least important) to 4 (most important). Values represent national averages.

The decline of law and order, the growing number of highway fatalities, the deterioration of the environment, drugs, alcoholism, and the spread of neuroses were global concerns that were also felt in Hungary. Though many Hungarians tended to blame the politicians for all of their personal problems, expressions of public concern on these matters need not be seen as signs of the regime's illegitimacy. The respondents' relatively muted concern with Postmaterialist issues of "human rights" and "patriotism" hints at public awareness of, but not preoccupation with, *this* dimension of citizenship under existing socialism. One the other hand, in combination with the state's defaulting on such social contract guaranteed bread-and-butter issues as decent housing, constantly improving living standards, the elimination of economic inequalities among people, and the right to work, all such manifestations of social disquiet tend to acquire political salience.

The question is which of the issues might contribute to political instability -- and under what circumstances -- or, under extremely stressful conditions, to a full-fledged legitimacy crisis. A partial answer may be inferred from responses to statements concerning the "realization of 12 social values and aspirations in Hungary" in national surveys in December 1985 and March-April 1989 (see Table 15).

The evidence reveals that even in 1985 the people had no illusions about prospects of income equality. They were skeptical about their chances to form organizations on behalf of the public's economic and political interests. The respondents' sense of constricted autonomy may best be seen from the "more or less" responses to the question about the state's interference in their private lives. In this category, as in all others but two, we witness astonishing downward changes in positive public attitudes.

Between late 1985 and early 1989 perceptions of job security, well-being, opportunities for rest and leisure, and of living under settled circumstances changed radically. The change was most pronounced in the area of public perceptions of possibilities of organized-interest representation. The 15-point jump in the value of the aggregate index of responses to this statement took place most likely in the days

Table 15
REALIZATION OF SOCIAL VALUES AND ASPIRATIONS, HUNGARY, 1985 AND 1989 (91)

To what extent can it be realized in Hungary in Dec. 1985, that:	Completely %	More or less %	Not at all %	Don't know or NA %	Total %	Dec. 1985 %	March 1986 %
Everyone has a job	86	10	1	3	100	94	60.0
People have full access to further education	73	21	-	9	99	86	76.5
People can have rest and leisure	52	39	5	4	100	74	56.3
People can live under settled circumstances	48	43	4	4	99	73	52.8
People can freely voice their opinions	38	47	10	5	100	65	63.8
People can live well	30	60	6	4	100	62	36.3
The state does not interfere with people's private affairs	27	50	16	8	101	56	46.2
People are not subject to the whims of the authorities	27	47	18	8	100	55	42.0
Everyone has a say about the conduct of public affairs	22	63	14	2	101	54	45.1
People are seen as equals	20	48	28	5	101	46	32.9
People could form organizations to protect their interests	21	37	29	13	100	45	60.1
There aren't great differences among people's incomes	9	41	45	6	101	31	33.6

Note: 1985, N = 996; 1989, N: = 1,000. The index was formed as follows: the number of those saying "completely" was multiplied by 2, of those saying "more or less" by 1, and of those saying "don't know" by 0; each product was then divided by the number of respondents, and the weighted average thus obtained was multiplied by 50; producing an index from 0 to 100. The index value can be 0 if everyone says "don't know" and 100 if everone says "completely." The index values for March 1989 are aggregates of responses to these questions.

between the party's endorsement of the principles of political pluralism in February 1989 and when the second "Citizens' Opinions" survey was taken in March.

The 1985 and 1989 national polls also asked the following question: "To what extent are twelve societal values and aspirations being realized in Western countries?" The responses indicated vast changes between 1985 and 1989 in the Hungarians' perception of Western living conditions. The percentage of those who agreed "completely" that in the West everyone had a say in public affairs, increased from 7 percent to 26.3 percent; that people in the West were "equal" was affirmed by 2.9 and 10.5 percent; that they lived under "settled circumstances," was affirmed by 8 and 26.1 percent; that they were free to "form organizations" was believed by 22.8 and 51.1 percent; and their opportunities for educational and cultural growth (a central theme in Hungarian official propaganda) were seen fully realized in the West by 22.1 and 42.7 percent. (92) In March 1989 the West seemed to be a much more attractive sociopolitical alternative to the Hungarian public than it had been in 1985.

People and politics

The evolution of Hungarian attitudes toward the regime, its incumbents, and political processes between 1972 and the collapse of the Kádár regime in May 1988 was a complex and multifaceted process. Although few people, and invariably those of low social status, found themselves incarcerated for their critical political opinions after 1973-1974, politics was a touchy subject that one rarely discussed with strangers. When a pollster came around, most respondents either pretended ignorance or told the interviewer what they thought she or he "wanted to hear." Still, the evidence, such as it is, is helpful in tracing the average Hungarian's path from the "don't know" answers of 1970 to the self-confident responses of nineteen years later.

Unlike political processes, especially the behind-the-scenes flow of power and influence in a communist state, political authority figures were, or ought to have been, readily identifiable by the citizen. There was János Kádár, but other than this

self-effacing politician, the rest of his Politburo colleagues were virtually unknown to the average Hungarian. In 1966 only 8 percent could pick out the Politburo members from a set of six pictures; in 1972 only 30 percent could correctly identify the Prime Minister, and in 1980, 66 percent of skilled-worker respondents could identify no more than *one* member of the Politburo. Even Kádár was identified by only 74 percent of the national sample and 88 percent of the "worker" sub-sample. (93)

Because it was very difficult to identify even the principal actors of Hungary's "invisible leadership," surveys of this kind sought to focus on popular perceptions of the leaders' *responsiveness* to the people's (rarely articulated) wishes. As a result, survey questions were usually phrased somewhat wistfully: "Do you think that persons who are making decisions about matters of national importance are generally aware of what the people think?" According to a 1970 survey, only 25 percent of the agricultural worker, 23 percent of blue-collar worker, and 32 percent of secondary school teacher subsamples answered in the affirmative. (94)

The party's congresses of 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985 had been ushered in by major propaganda campaigns, so most people knew about these events. However, considerably fewer could claim to have read the "theses," "declarations," and "resolutions" of these ritualized rallies of the political faithful. (95) In any event, Kádár's closing congressional speeches usually attracted the attention of about 40 percent of the adult population. It had been a considerably higher figure than the percentage of nonparty people (28.1 percent) who took the time to watch his televised burial on July 14, 1989. (96)

For most people in Hungary an "authority figure" meant one's boss (*főnök*) at one's place of employment. To questions such as "Whose interests do the bosses represent?" and "Is their right to tell you what to do based on their skills, experience, and seniority, or on their political connections?" it is difficult to give honest answers, even in a postcommunist Hungary in the early 1990s. From the voluminous survey literature on "workplace democracy" in the 1970s, it appears that with the exception

of the habitually deferential and untruthful respondents, most people had doubts about their superiors' right to rule their lives.

The word "life" meant meant just that, because prior to 1988 everything, *be* it an application for a bank loan or travel abroad, required written character references from one's employer. The total overlap of economic (workplace supervisor), political (party secretary and trade union steward), and internal security (personnel departments and police informers) authorities bred ambivalence and latent hostility toward authority figures of all types.

Public opinion: a moving target

Data for the preceding discussion on information flows, *glasnost'*, national identity, and opinions on economic, social, and political issues were extracted from responses to several scores of national, regional, and local polls taken between 1970 and 1989. From these I sought to identify some of the basic tendencies of opinions and opinion change on issues that were widely shared concerns among Hungarians.

On the whole, answers to most poll questions were determined mainly by factors of educational background, place in occupational hierarchy, age, and place of residence rather than by party membership and gender. Although only one-fifth of the public could be seen as "attentive" regular consumers of news and information, all of them knew that they were, above all, Hungarians. Indeed, the citizens' emphatic affirmation of national identity was the critical litmus test of the efficacy of the regime's (not particularly vigorous) efforts to inculcate internationalist values in the citizens. Though the public's enthusiasm for the regime was not exactly widespread, people nevertheless perceived themselves as deserving dependents of the state with ironclad entitlements for the delivery of economic security and social stability.

Prior to 1985 survey questions were designed to avoid straightforward references to the political incumbents and specific political institutions, and answers were directed to nonconfrontational general observations about the "way things were" or were "likely to be." Consequently, the respondents to economic polls were manipulated into citing *symptoms* rather than the underlying structural causes, such as central planning, or political causes, such as the regime's impenetrable decision making institutions, of the economic malaise. Trends in the economic "pessimism/optimism" indices were indicative of a gradual decline in citizens' self-confidence in their ability to make ends meet, as well as of wishful thinking about the country's economic prospects. In any case, citizen demands on the regime focused almost exclusively on preservation of Materialist values by the omnicompetent state.

In the early 1980s the community's social aspirations were overwhelmingly in favor of shoring up the status quo rather than of demanding the protection of human rights, let alone the advocacy of political freedoms. Although relatively few respondents seem to have attached significance to the multicandidate elections of 1985, most respondents saw through the charade of artificial electoral contests between two "look- alike" party-sponsored candidates for the Parliament. All of this changed between 1985 and 1989. Complacent opinions on job security, poverty, sense of well-being, and routine endorsement of public institutions gave way to new concerns, new social priorities, and new social preferences.

The Hungarian public's cognitive and affective transformation from "steady-state" to crisis conditions was an extremely complex process. The available survey data can document only selected aspects of the realignment of public beliefs during the last decade of the Kádár regime. Of these, the most important were those held by members of the political "first society," the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

Public Opinion in the 1980s: Velleity, Politicization and Reassessment

The regime's most ambitious opinion survey undertaking was the HSWP-commissioned poll of its membership's views on "existing socialism" in 1983-1984 in Hungary. (97)

In addition to a national representative sample of party members, another national representative sample -- 13 percent of which were party members -- was also polled. The stated objective of the survey was to determine the extent to which party members and nonmembers had internalized the regime's official ideologies and thus adopted these as their own personal beliefs. The survey was concerned with three main topics: respondents' evaluation of various phases of Hungary's postwar political history, their thoughts on the future of the system and orientations toward existing socialism in Hungary. It is the answers to the third, "here and now" part of the survey that is of interest for the reconstruction of the respondents' opinions about the leading issues of the early 1980s in Hungary.

Members of the two samples were invited to comment on statements pertaining to the political system, the manner in which the authorities exercised their power, economic policies, interpersonal relations, and certain political-ideological concepts, such as freedom, equality and justice (see Table 16). The respondents were asked to indicate on a 9-point (1 = strong disagreement; 9 = strong agreement) scale what they thought of the survey's propositions.

The "don't know" answers (given in the survey report, but not reproduced here) show considerable divergence between party member and nonmember respondents. Here only 5 percent of the party members but up to 25 percent of the nonmembers refused to comment on existing socialism. The report states that follow-up questions failed to elicit any mention of notions regarding "abolition of religion" and "permanent price stability." Ten other attributes, (rank order 22, 18, 21, 26, 23, 20, 13, and 7) were mentioned by fewer than fifty respondents from

either sample. On the other hand, more than fifty party members volunteered additional attributes of their own, including "disappearance of exploitation," "equal chances for social mobility," and the "exemplary" nature of Hungarian socialism that others ought to emulate.

The data reveal only marginal differences between the "socialism images" of the two samples. The nonparty respondents tended to emphasize economic and material-security aspects of the system. Party members were more prone to "ideologize" their characterization and stressed property relations, dictatorship, democracy, and freedom as system attributes. Another interesting aspect of the data is the *intensity* (assignment of importance at the 8-plus level) with which both kinds of respondents asserted the *essential* nature of as many as eighteen system attributes. Most of these vigorously endorsed attributes may also be seen as citizen expectations for the delivery of an extremely wide range of benefits (mainly economic) by the socialist welfare state.

Table 16

SOCIALISM, HIERARCHY OF ATTRIBUTES AMONG PARTY MEMBERS AND THE NATIONAL SAMPLE (98)

Attributes	Party Members (average)	Rank Order	National Sample (average)	Rank Order
The factories and enterprises ought to be owned by the state.	8.8	1	8.5	8
Incomes should be according to work performed.	8.8	2	8.7	2
People ought to be free.	8.7	3	8.7	3
Democracy ought to be realized.	8.7	4	8.6	5
Everyone ought to have a chance for employment	8.7	5	8.8	1
People should be free to say what is on their minds	8.6	6	8.6	7
Medical care ought to be free	8.5	7	8.6	6
People shoud be educated and culturally aware.	8.4	9	8.4	10

Table 16 (continued)

SOCIALISM, HIERARCHY OF ATTRIBUTES AMONG PARTY MEMBERS AND THE NATIONAL SAMPLE (98)

Attributes	Party Members (average)	Rank Order	National Sample (average)	Rank Order
The dictatorship of the working class should be realized.	8.4	10	8.2	15
Peopole should be prosperous	8.4	11	8.5	9
Agriculture should be collectivized.	8.3	12	8.0	19
The society ought to be able to (generate) still more reforms.	8.3	13	8.2	15
All people should be equal.	8.3	14	8.3	13
There should be constant economic growth	8.2	15	8.3	12
People's well-being should improve constantly	8.2	16	8.3	11
There should be no inequalities among social classes and strata.	8.2	17	8.2	14
People ought to be interested in public affairs.	8.1	18	8.1	17
The workers ought to have a say in the management of factories and enterprises.	8.0	19	7.6	22
Everyone should subordinate his interests to those of the society.	7.9	20	7.7	20
Factories and enterprises ought to be autonomous.	7.8	21	7.6	23
Crimes and criminality ought to cease.	7.8	22	8.1	18
Society ought to be capable to (generate) revolutionary changes.	7.7	23	7.4	27
There should be only one political party.	7.7	24	7.5	24
Social classes should disappear.	7.4	25	7.6	21
There ought to be a centralized planned economy.	7.1	26	7.5	26
The price of goods should be constant and unchanging.	6.8	27	7.5	25
Private property should not exist in any form.	5.6	28	6.2	28
Religion ought to disappear.	4.7	29	3.6	29

Note: Party members, N= 967; national sample, N= 1000. Responses were given on scale of 1 ("complete disagreement") to 9 ("complete agreement") scale; values represent averages for each sample.

At the other end of the spectrum, it is important to note that both samples assigned much *less* importance to central planning, price stability, and the abolition of private property and religion. The ambivalence on these matters was suggestive and indicated the existence of very narrow constituencies that tended to be supportive of high mobilization and, generally, of coercive methods of building socialism in Hungary. More to the point, the ranking by both samples of the one-party system to 24th place, when contrasted with the *state's* prominent position as owner of factories and provider of full employment (the top items for the party and non-party samples), serves as key evidence of the *declining* importance that the people attached to the party -- by then in full retreat from the political scene as hands-on manager of the economy.

As the principal author of the survey pointed out, the differences in emphasis between the two samples can be explained by place of residence (salient in twenty-four answers), occupation (in twenty-three), age (in nineteen), party membership and formal education (in fifteen), and gender (in ten). (99) Thus, there was greater assertiveness in the identification with "socialism attributes" among the less-well-educated, the older generation, rural residents, party members with official positions, and women than there was among the well-educated, young, Budapest-resident nonparty males. The elderly rural apparatchik and the male university student in Budapest symbolized the opposite poles of the ideological spectrum. In any case, from the viewpoint of both party and nonparty respondents, the defining characteristics of the system seem to have been *state ownership* of the means of production and social equality -- and the political guarantees of the same.

Upon further analysis of the ranking of the twenty-nine attributes of socialism shown in Table 17, the principal author of the survey report distilled five types of "socialism images" (or ideologies) held by members of both samples. The political substance of these ideologies may be summarized as follows:

- Holders of "traditional socialism images" were similar to the "anticapitalists" but believed that citizens were entitled a degree of social autonomy,

including the freedom to "have a say" in public affairs and the right to be left alone in matters of religion and family life.

- The "antipaternalists" took a differentiated view of socialism by partly rejecting the citizens' total dependency on the welfare state and emphasizing notions of equal social opportunities, political self-renewal, and the abolition of social differences by the application of principles of human solidarity and social justice. With these realized, freedom and democracy were to prevail.
- The "antireformers" rejected any and all manifestations of economic and social reforms, insisted on the restoration of a well-ordered political system, and demanded enforcement of explicitly traditional norms of social conduct.

Table 17

TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES AMONG PARTY MEMBERS AND NONMEMBERS, BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION, 1983-1984 (100)

	< 8th grade		8th grade		high school		university		Total	
	PM	NP	PM	NP	PM	NP	PM	NP	PM	NP
N =	92	185	355	376	371	188	265	49	1074	805
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
TYPE										
Anticapitalist	74	37	56	35	45	26	32	23	48	33
Traditional	18	42	27	42	18	31	16	18	20	37
Antipaternalist	2	4	2	2	5	3	4	5	4	3
Antireform	3	13	9	16	13	18	14	5	11	15
Democratic socialist (pro-reform)	3	4	6	5	19	22	34	49	17	12

Note: PM = party member; NP = not party member.

• The proreform "democratic socialists" tended to view public affairs mainly through the prism of *reforms*. They supported policies that contributed to social, material, and cultural progress and guaranteed substantial amounts of personal and political autonomy for all citizens.

• Those who held "anticapitalist" views were firmly opposed to private property and religion and took pride in the regime's achievements in the early 1950s. They were supportive of a strong communist party but were willing to tolerate "principled" debates within the party.

From the distribution of these beliefs according to respondents' party membership and education level, we may discern the existence of a rudimentary but quantifiable conservative-liberal ideological cleavage both in the party and in the society. As indicated above, members of four of the five ideological clusters supported, with varying degrees of intensity, the way the political system, the economic institutions, and the social welfare delivery system worked. In this sense, there was little difference (only 5 percent) between the party membership and the general public. The nonparty "anticapitalist" and "antireform" (33 and 15 percent) were not an aberration but evidence of hostility toward *any* kind of change, mainly, one suspects, of the economic kind.

On the other hand, the distribution of the educated elites' political beliefs showed remarkable similarities. In *both* party and nonparty groups the largest percentages were in favor of "democratic socialist" ideologies and were committed to evolutionary change of the system -- principally by elite-guided reforms. Specifically, the important, but not insurmountable, 15-point difference between the "democratic socialist" persuasion of *both* party and nonparty university graduates is central to an understanding of the motivations behind the pragmatic working relationship between these two elites in the late 1980s and since the instauration of postcommunist political institutions after the free elections of March-April 1990. The business-like conduct of the National Roundtable (NRT) negotiations, especially the constructive quality of the dialogue among the representatives of the three sides (all

Table 18

CUI BONO? INTERESTS OF GROUPS AND SOCIAL CLASSES REPRESENTED BY THE HUNGARIAN RULING PARTY, AS SEEN BY THE PEOPLE, PARTY MEMBERS, AND INTELLECTUALS, 1988 (103)

Beneficiaries	National sample N = 744 Rank Order		Party members N = 732 Rank Order		Intellectuals N = 231 Rank Order	
Top party leaders	1	2.89	1	2.81	1	2.91
Party apparat	2	2.81	2	2.73	2	2.84
Enterprise directors executives	3	2.66	3	2.52	3	2.50
Party members	4	2.57	5	2.41	4	2.42
Intellectuals	5	2.33	6	2.35	7	1.86
(Manual) workers	6	2.26	4	2.46	5	2.18
Young people	7	2.14	8	2.22	8	1.81
Peasants	8	2.11	7	2.31	6	2.00
The old folks	9	2.03	10-11	2.11	11	1.67
Small businessmen	10-11	1.97	10-11	2.11	9	1.80
Non-party people	10-11	1.97	9	2.14	10	1.77

Note: Averages pertain to those respondents who agreed to qualify their opinions on a scale of 1 ("not at all"), 2 ("to a small extent"), and 3 ("to a large extent").

Table 19

ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF PAST THIRTY YEARS, BY POPULACE, PARTY MEMBERS, AND INTELLIGENTSIA, 1988 (104)

Responsible Person(s)	National Sample N = 744 Rank Order Sucesss Failure		Party Members N = 732 Rank Order Success Failure		Intellectuals N = 231 Rank Order Success Failure	
János Kádár	1	2.82	4	2.42	1	2.88
	4	2.40	1	2.72	4	2.46
Top party leaders	2	2.64	1	2.71	3	2.68
	1	2.69	5	2.46	1	2.77
Workers	3	2.63	7	1.77	2	2.72
	8	1.84	2	2.57	7-8	1.72
Enterprise directors	4	2.54	3	2.56	5	2.48
	2	2.51	6	2.41	2	2.55
Intellectuals	5	2.51	6	2.03	6-7	2.47
	6	2.10	4	2.44	6	1.79
Peasants	6-7	2.50	10	1.65	4	2.60
	9	1.78	3	2.47	9	1.59
Party members	6-7	2.50	5	2.29	6-7	2.47
	5	2.15	8	2.18	5	2.22
Party apparat	8	2.30	2	2.59	9	2.23
	3	2.54	11	1.90	3	2.57
Young people	9	2.25	9	1.66	10	2.20
	10	2.20	9	2.07	10	1.48
Nonparty people	10	2.18	8	1.75	8	2.28
	7	1.86	7	2.20	7-8	1.72
Small tradesmen	11-12	2.04	12	1.58	12	1.86
	12	1.52	10	1.92	12	1.42
Old folks	11-12	2.04	12	1.58	11	2.00
	11	1.62	12	1.80	11	1.44

Note: Averages pertain to those respondents who agreed to qualify their opinions on a scale of 1 to 3 ("had no role at all"); 2 ("had a small role"); and 3 ("had a great role").

of the same universities) between June 14 and September 18, 1989, offered persuasive evidence of a *preexisting* elite consensus on many, though far from all, issues of a reform agenda. (101)

A report card on the regime and the society

The ouster of János Kádár as Secretary General and his election to the honorific position of party chairman by his party's "successor generation" in May 1988 marked the end of an era in Hungary. The new leadership under Prime Minister and Secretary General Károly Grósz embarked on a last-ditch effort to salvage what they could from the political and economic wreck that Kádár and the old guard had bequeathed. The emboldened pollsters took advantage of this opportunity to conduct an "exit poll," asking the public to pass judgment on the Kádár record. (102)

The survey also served as a vehicle for societal self-examination. The people's judgments on the winners and the losers of the regime's policies and their assignment of credit and blame were important indicators of the residual goodwill and the benefit of doubt that Kádár's heirs had available to build public confidence in the new leadership. The survey was administered between November 24 and December 16, 1988 (see Table 18 and 19).

From the response data in Table 18, it is clear that in the judgment of all three samples, the party had existed mainly for the benefit of the top leadership, the full-time party employees, and the managerial elite. Party membership was seen by the general public more than by the intellectuals and the party members themselves as a source of influence. On the other hand, there was absolutely no doubt in anyone's mind that the workers, the peasants, and the young belonged to the "other society" of politically powerless citizens.

However, the chronically status and insecure intellectuals assigned higher positions to manual workers and peasants than did the national sample. With the

self-ranking of seventh place, they chose to overlook the obvious: that under a different political regime, such as an established *Western-style* liberal democratic one, the intellectuals would never exercise as much influence, however indirectly, on political outcomes as they had exercised under a regime led by the even *more* insecure 8th grade dropouts belonging to the ruling party's Politburo. In any case, by late 1988 the public was convinced that the regime had been led by a cabal of the party apparat and the "red barons" of Hungary's military-industrial complex at the expense of the nonparty majority.

The public's verdict on the regime's successes and failures is shown in Table 19. Kádár was gone, but he was still credited as the man responsible for keeping the country afloat since 1957. His personal immunity from criticism was solid evidence of widespread perceptions of his "residual charisma" as the "good king" of Hungary, as well as of the citizens' low sense of self-esteem and consequent political infantilism. Thanks to their collective invisibility, Kádár's Politburo colleagues were perceived, in both a positive and negative light, as protagonists or culprits for what the regime had and had not achieved in the three preceding decades.

Paradoxically, industrial workers emerged as the social group mainly credited for Hungary's (economic?) accomplishments. Moreover, they were also exonerated of substantial responsibility for the regime's failures. The real villains were the apparatchiki -- even in the eyes of the party's rank and file. On the whole, whereas the data in Table 19 are, at best, weak predictors of the specific political outcomes of 1989-1990, three hidden issues of the poll results merit brief discussion.

The first may be called the "reification of Kádár" because of way the man became in the next several years a source of nostalgic myths of depoliticized public life and modest economic security and thus an embedded part of Hungary's new-old political culture in the transition period.

The second may be called "political scapegoatism" because of the transference of lingering public guilt for having gone along with the old regime to designated villains, such as Kádár's septuagenerian colleagues, the party apparat, and the captains of socialist industry.

The third may be called a preliminary "hit list" in the form of a new political agenda of the intelligentsia. Their designation of culprits -- top party leaders, enterprise directors, the party apparat, Kádár (already out), and the party members -- for past failures also denotes the sequence in which these political and social entities had to be overcome (or neutralized) to clear the field for Hungary's newly emerging political leadership.

In the early to mid-1980s the Hungarian public was in the process of transition between two ideological paradigms. The citizens' comfortable "consolidated" cognitive universe, subject sense of political efficacy, and well-hidden private opinions were confronted with the threat of economic instability and were challenged by new prospects of political liberalization and social change. The new paradigm -- a combination of emerging values of a civil society and those of the citizens' enhanced political efficacy -- was still in a nascent form and was but dimly understood even by the "democratic socialist" one-tenth of the public.

"Velleity" -- a term that Webster's New World Dictionary defines as "a mere wish that does not lead to the slightest action" and coined by the Hungarian political scientist Csaba Gombár -- helps capture the public mind-set of that period. (105) As Gombár saw it, "velleity" was the manifestion of a cognitive stalemate of public perceptions of positive developments such as the regime's pragmatic approach to politics, incremental growth of *nyiltság* ("openness" -- the Hungarian word for *glasnost*), the revival of reforms, more realistic foreign policies, growing dimensions of personal autonomy, and consensus-seeking leadership. On the other hand, the still unresolved legacy of 1956, the lack of intraparty democracy. and the party leadership's chronic self-doubts about the regime's legitimacy were counterweights that helped thwart the gradual unfolding of much needed ideas for change.

The cognitive dilemmas of the pretransition period sharply divided the Hungarian public into an "apolitical" and "prepolitical" majority, and an even more fragmented "political" minority. According to an important 1986 survey, in terms of educational background the "apoliticals" (46 percent of the national sample), consisted of respondents with 0-7 grade, 8 grade, high school, and university

education for 66, 46, 34, and 23 percent of this cohort, respectively. The somewhat more alert "prepoliticals" (25 percent of the national sample) were divisible into 26, 30, 16 and 12 percent according to their respective educational background. The "attentive" -- and potentially politically active -- "politicals" (29 percent of the national sample) were divisible into 8, 24, 50 and 65 percent according to their respective educational background. Thus, in terms of receptivity to change, the defining cleavage was that between the politically aware party and nonparty university graduates and the rest of the society still under the spell of the "good king" and the provider of last resort, the socialist state. (106)

The "people's agenda," whether in the sense of "socialism images" or in terms of priorities assigned to specific items in comprehensive inventories of sociopolitical issues, consisted of economic security, social entitlements, social deviance, and concerns about law and order well into the mid-1980s. Human rights, community spirit, and demands for self-government, social autonomy, and freedom of conscience were latent elements in the pretransition societal consensus on public affairs. On the other hand, these concerns were vigorously articulated by growing numbers of young and middle-aged proreform intellectuals. (107) Their message helped shape a new party and nonparty intellegentsia platform on the tasks that needed addressing in order to facilitate the transformation of the "democratic socialist" agenda into a postcommunist action program in Hungary.

An "exit poll": issues and public/elite choices

The old regime's political disintegration, though had been in progress since the early 1980s, began in earnest in February 1989 when the HSWP reluctantly conceded the public's right to establish political parties to compete in the electoral process. The decision to open the floodgates and to accord de facto legitimacy to noncommunist political organizations also inaugurated a six-month process of

protracted secret, and subsequently public, negotiations between the regime and the eight opposition groups that constituted the Opposition Roundtable (ORT).

The open phase heightened public awareness of the possibility of the regime's drastic, yet peaceful and negotiated transformation, was inaugurated in June 1989 with the commencement of National Roundtable (NRT) negotiations among representatives of the ruling party, those of the ORT, and the "third side" that spoke for the regime's social interest groups, such as the Trade Union Federation and the Young Communist League. The affair culminated with the signing of the National Roundtable Agreement on 18 September -- a key political pact that laid the groundrules for the transition to free elections in March-April, 1990. (108).

Students of cosmology, particularly those seeking to understand the dynamics of events that took place micro- or nanoseconds after the "big bang" that spawned the universe, are still searching for answers. On the other hand, social scientists seeking to reconstruct and understand the public mindset at the "moment" -- actually, more like months -- of an East European "new democracy's" *status nascendi* may have access (and partial answers) to the findings of an excellent April-May 1989 survey on what the pollsters called "post-paternalist" political orientations in Hungary. (109)

Although I am in general agreement with the principal investigators' (László Bruszt and János Simon), thoughtful and methodologically sophisticated discussion of their data, they, too, were political actors, and therefore were as much subjects as objects of scrutiny. For this reason, I question the appropriateness of the label "paternalist" -- a standard epithet used by Hungarian reform intellectuals to characterize the regime's policies in the 1980s. In my view, the term tends to obfuscate the coercive essence of Kádár's reign in Hungary from 1957 to the mid-1980s. Whereas since 1974 intellectuals, save a handful of dissidents occasionally detained for a day or two, did enjoy de facto immunity from arbitrary arrest, the regime still locked up each year one to two hundred low-status individuals for alleged political transgressions. As discussed below, this caveat helps explain the substantial divergence of views on several issues between the national and elite

samples of the Bruszt-Simon survey taken on the eve of the regime's collapse in 1989. (110)

With the important East German, Czechoslovak, and (partial) Romanian exceptions, it was the political elites rather than the general public which shaped political outcomes in eastern Europe in 1989-1990. The "Citizens' Opinions, 1989" poll sought to ascertain the the views of four incumbent and emerging political and economic elites of Hungary. These were: 113 top party officials ranging from Politburo members to leading county and municipal party executives (OPE hereafter); 102 leaders, about ten each, of the new opposition parties and of "alternative" social organizations (NPE hereafter); 103 directors of large state enterprises (ENT hereafter); and a representative sample of small businessmen in the private sector (SBM hereafter).

The OPE and, to a lesser extent the NPE, were the most visible participants of Hungarian politics in 1989. The ENT -- dubbed by Hungarian economists as "red barons" -- and the SBM were the key state and the still fledling private sector economic decision makers in Hungary. The views and political choices of these elites had major influence on public opinion and on political outcomes including the campaign postures and the post-election strategies of political parties in Hungary. In fact, in can be safely asserted that the country's postcommunist political, economic, and social agenda that confronted Hungary's freely elected legislature of 1990, had lain buried in the clashing, yet often surprisingly consonant, responses of these key elites to questions and statements which had been posed in this poll.

A comprehensive analysis of the divergencies and the similarities of views of the four elites is not feasible within the confines of this study. Instead, it is proposed to discuss the four elites' (a) basic ideological preferences and policy postures as may be inferred from the data shown in Table 20; (b) satisfaction with and confidence in Hungary's political, economic, social, and cultural institutions as may be seen in data shown in Tables 21 and 22; and (c) general attitudes toward politics and political participation and speficic postures on the ten leading "transition issues" of 1989 in Hungary as indicated in responses shown in Tables 23 and 24.

The Hungarian public was -- and in many ways still is -- far more conservative and deferential to political authority than were the elites. The public was less committed to a multi-party system, private enterprise, and civil liberties than were the elites. Perhaps the most striking contrast between the views the national and the elite samples was the public's insistence on egalitarian wage policies and the somewhat demagogic support of the same by the NPE. Planned economy, regardless of its well-known shortcomings, was far more preferable to the general public and, not surprisingly, to the OPE, than to the NPE and *both* kinds of business elites. The high level of public support of the principle of "rewards according to performance" poses yet another contradiction between the endorsement, by somewhat less than one-half of the national sample, of the old regime's utopian goal of "payment according to needs."

The people's abiding faith in COMECON stands in sharp contrast to their low confidence in the WTO. The latter may have been perceived by the OPE as the regime's last refuge - in the event of a worst-case scenario, such as East German-style mass demonstrations and the threat of total collapse between mid-1989 and the promised multiparty elections in 1990. At any rate, the most striking aspect of the general public's attitudes toward politics was their distrust of the incumbent politicians, at a level almost identical to that of the NPE and the SBM. On the other hand, what the people clearly wanted was full representation of their interests -- no matter by whom -- in the legislature and the government.

The gravity of Hungary's economic situation in early 1989 compelled all, old and new, political parties to adopt virtually the same stance on most outstanding economic issues. (113) Though the temptation was there to exploit the public's desire for prosperity and economic security, neither the OPE, nor the NPE was ready to make campaign promises of this kind. Therefore, it is understandable that at the time when this poll was taken, 47.6 percent of the public endorsed the ruling party. It was a modest vote of confidence in the lesser, but known, political evil.

Table 20

TO LIVE IN A GOOD SOCIETY IN HUNGARY - WHAT DOES IT TAKE? RESPONSES BY THE HUNGARIAN PUBLIC AND FOUR ELITES (National representative samples; March-April, 1989) (111)

STATEMENTS	NS* N=1000	OPE 113	NPE 102	ENT 103	SBM 102
The existence of several political parties competing with each other	62.6	72.6	91.4	92.1	93.2**
Citizens have a say about decisions made by the government	86.7	91.2	96.1	75.2	86.4
Freedom of speech	93.4	97.3	99.0	96.0	97.1
Leading role of the party (HSWP)	46.9	39.9	7.8	23.8	8.7
People obey the government	75.9	45.1	50.0	67.3	65.0
The regime's opponents are denied access to the press	45.2	23.0	6.9	22.8	19.4
The dominance of state property in the economy	50.1	69.9	12.7	42.6	15.5
Private ownership of the means of production	51.3	65.5	61.8	69.3	79.6
Planned economy	65.7	57.5	14.7	41.6	30.1
Free economic competition	84.5	77.0	87.3	93.1	95.1
The principle of rewards according to performance	92.9	97.3	86.3	93.1	96.1
Wages be paid according to the people's needs	46.2	8.8	19.6	5.0	13.6

* Abbreviations: NS = national sample; OPE = old [HSWP] political elite; NPE = new political elite [leaders of new parties]; ENT = managers of state enterprises; SMB = small businessmen.

** Percentage of respondents agreeing with, or approving of, statement

Table 21

HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE DO YOU HAVE IN THESE INSTITUTIONS?
RESPONSES BY THE HUNGARIAN PUBLIC AND FOUR ELITES
(National representative samples; March-April, 1989) (112)

INSTITUTIONS	N=1.00	NS* 113	OPE 102	NPE 103	SMB 102
Churches	57.9	64.6	60.8	58.4	**66.9
Educational system	49.2	23.0	2.9	11.9	13.6
Legal system	55.5	71.7	17.6	41.6	20.4
Press, radio and TV	72.9	41.6	39.2	54.4	62.2
Trade unions	37.2	35.4	10.8	29.7	9.7
Parliament	64.5	63.7	9.8	51.5	22.3
Local councils	43.5	59.3	12.8	27.7	11.7
Military	58.0	86.7	24.5	56.4	26.2
Police	57.5	85.9	18.6	53.5	22.3
State organs and ministries	57.9	28.3	7.8	16.8	11.7
Large enterprises	48.6	37.2	6.9	28.7	12.6
Warsaw Treaty Organization	35.4	69.9	12.7	32.7	6.8
COMECON	31.0	8.8	3.9	2.0	1.9
HSWP	47.6	85.8	9.8	54.5	10.7
Hungarian Democratic Forum	34.5	21.2	66.7	23.8	48.5
Hungarian Social Democratic Party	32.4	22.1	39.2	17.8	34.9
Independent Smallholders' Party	25.6	13.3	46.0	25.9	24.3

* Abbreviations: NS = national sample; OPE = old [HSWP] political elite; NPE = new political elite [leaders of new parties]; ENT = managers of state enterprises; SMB = small businessmen.

** Percentage of respondents saying "to a large extent" and "rather"

There seemed to be remarkably little disagreement among the four elites about the essential policy ingredients of a "good society" in Hungary. They, including the OPE, strongly favored the establishment of a multiparty system and were equally supportive of basic civil rights, such as free speech, and of the citizens' opportunities to influence the government. Elite consensus also extended to wage policies and the principle of free competition in the economic sphere. The main difference between the OPE and the three other elites lay in their respective views on central planning and the dominance of state ownership in the economy. For the OPE, the abandonment of central planning amounted to surrendering a critically important "commanding height" of political control. (The issue was subsequently finessed by regime-sponsored "self-privatization" of many enterprises by, and for the benefit of, the incumbent management.) The ENT, still unsure whether self-privatization was the answer to rescuing their influence for the postcommunist period, were of two minds about this issue. Here one expected the managers of giant (and invariably loss-making) enterprises to support central planning, and those in charge of profitable medium-size firms to oppose it.

The four elites' comparable level of endorsement of the proposition that people "obey" the government authorities, provides an extremely important insight into the dynamics of Hungarian politics in the early transition period. As borne out by the outcome of the NRT negotiations, the Hungarian elites had a shared interest in having a free hand to negotiate the transfer of political and economic power from the communist to the postcommunist period without undue interference from the average citizen. The latter were excluded, by way of a news blackout, from much of the NRT negotiations in June-September; from the HSWP's last and its successor party's (Hungarian Socialist Party) first congress in October; and from the Parliament's deliberations in October-November, 1989. The (still disoriented) public's only substantive say in political decisions of 1989 was via the national plebiscite of November 26 when it denied, by an extremely narrow margin, the reform socialist Imre Pozsgay his chance to be elected president of the Republic prior to the March-April, 1990 elections.

Table 22

HOW SATISFIED ARE WITH THESE INSTITUTIONS? RESPONSES BY THE HUNGARIAN PUBLIC AND FOUR ELITES
(National representative samples; March-April, 1989) (114)

INSTITUTIONS	NS* N = 1,000	OPE 113	NPE 102	ENT 103	SBM 102
Churches	53.9	76.1	35.3	49.5	63.1**
Patriotic Peoples' Front	26.1	9.7	2.9	6.9	8.7
Young Communist League	13.4	6.2	3.9	3.9	---
Trade unions	24.1	15.0	6.9	29.9	7.8
HSWP	28.8	16.0	4.9	15.8	3.9
Local councils	30.0	23.0	3.9	12.9	6.8
Parliament	49.2	34.5	10.8	27.7	16.5
Government	49.7	19.5	6.9	11.9	10.7
New political parties and alternative organizations	20.7	11.5	48.0	13.9	22.3

* Abbreviations: NS = national sample; OPE = old [HSWP] political elite; NPE = new political elite [leaders of new parties]; ENT = managers of state enterprises; SMB = small businessmen.
** Percentage of respondents saying "fully" and "to a great extent"

Table 23

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THESE STATEMENTS? RESPONSES BY THE HUNGARIAN PUBLIC AND FOUR ELITES
(National representative samples; March-April, 1989) (115)

STATEMENTS	NS* N = 1,000	OPE 113	NPE 102	ENT 103	SBM 102
As long as things are going well I don't care who governs in Hungary	**60.3	10.6	6.9	19.8	37.9
The politicians are only too happy if people dont't get involved in politics	60.1	15.9	62.7	46.5	62.1
Today everyone can have a say about the running of the country's business	34.7	31.9	13.7	21.8	10.7
It is better not to get involved in politics; it gets you into trouble	49.2	2.7	13.7	10.9	18.4
You must never fully trust politicians	64.0	45.1	73.5	61.7	6.7
Politicians would do everything to learn more about what the people think	74.2	38.9	38.2	56.4	68.9
Even if you try you'll never find out what the politicians are up to	74.2	38.9	38.2	56.4	68.9
The average people are always denied power	77.0	27.4	56.9	64.4	77.7
Only the careerists get involved in politics today	38.4	1.8	7.8	11.9	26.4
The politicians are only interested in what people think when there is trouble	66.1	23.0	46.1	52.5	64.1
It is our patriotic duty to become involved in politics	55.8	54.9	64.7	53.5	57.3

* Abbreviations: NS = national sample; OPE = old [HSWP] political elite; NPE = new political elite [leaders of new parties]; ENT = managers of state enterprises; SMB = small businessmen.
** Percentage of respondents saying "I agree"

As to whom and what the elites trusted may be inferred from responses given to questions in Tables 22 and 23. These may be seen as the four elites' diagnosis, as well as critique, of what they perceived as Hungary's legitimacy dilemmas in the twilight months of the *ancien regime*.

Organized religion was about the only institution in which all four elites had confidence, though the NPE had much less trust in the (hitherto fellow-traveling) churches than did the others. There was virtual unanimity concerning the uselessness of the regime's transmission belt agencies, such as the Patriotic People's Front, the Young Communist League, and in the economy's "fifth wheel," the COMECON. The elites *knew* that these institutions did not work. The contrast between the public's (still middling) satisfaction with the government and the elites' virtual dismissal of the same was a telling indication of the people's pathetic dependence on their employer of last resort, and that of the well-informed insiders' contempt for the performance of the bloated state bureaucracy. There was some ambivalence about the Parliament, but the elites seem to have concluded that, everything considered, it was an useful safety valve until a better one came along.

The sharpest dividing line between the old and the new elites concerned the legal system and the coercive organs of the state. The OPE's high confidence in the army and the police (and the somewhat lukewarm support of the ENT for the same) were irreconcilable with the NPE's and the SMB's dim opinion of the regime's HSWP-dominated armed personnel. The division of elite opinion was quite similar on the WTO and on the local governments.

It was, however, the HSWP itself which truly separated the "incumbent" from the "insurgent" political elites. In this context the ENT's supportive attitudes toward the communist party seemed far from convincing with respect to their loyalty to the party-state. Paradoxically, the OPE were more supportive of the large enterprises than were the people who actually ran them, that is, the ENT. Moreover, it is worthy of note that the ENT found it necessary to part company with the OPE in their evaluation of the country's educational system, state administration, and COMECON. On the other hand, it was only the ENT which liked OPE's tame

company unions; in fact, just a bit more than did the egalitarian and politically passive blue-collar respondents that comprised 40 percent of the Hungarian national representative sample in the 1980s. (116)

My earlier proposition on the underlying intraelite consensus on limiting the number of competent political participants to those already in power and those who represented socio-political forces of evolutionary change was borne out by the sharp cleavages between the national sample (NS) and the four elites on the general subject of politics. (See Table 24). As the NS saw it, politics, and especially professional politicians were not to be trusted. Most politicians were perceived as opportunists who would rather have the people remain powerless outsiders than to become participants in the political decision making process. The elites, all four of them, naturally disagreed, particularly on the matter of their respective motivations to become involved in politics. Moreover, unlike the general public, the elites *did* care about who and which political parties governed, though all five samples, at a somewhat muted level of 53 to 64 percent, agreed that it was everybody's "patriotic duty" to engage in political activities.

The elites were, and had become, elites because they had either established positions to protect -- such as the OPE and the ENT -- or had the courage of their convictions (or entrepreneurship), such as the NPE and the SBM, to strive for political power and profits, respectively. Therefore, the four elites considered politics to be a great deal less risky and more of a respectable enterprise than did members of the general public. Predictably, it was on the ten key political issues of 1989 that the OPE parted company with the three other elites. On the one hand, the OPE seemed anxious to relinquish its sole responsibility for Hungary's near-bankrupt economy and barely legitimate political system, therefore willingly endorsed the principles of free elections and those of a multiparty system. On the other hand, the OPE -- disciplined appratchiki to the end -- stubbornly insisted that the 1985 two-candidate elections had been legitimate and that the HSWP would preserve its influence at free elections.

Table 24

THE KEY POLITICAL ISSUES OF 1989, AS SEEN BY THE HUNGARIAN PUBLIC AND FOUR POLITICAL ELITES
(National representative samples; March-April, 1989) (117)

STATEMENTS	NS* N = 1,000	OPE 113	NPE 102	ENT 103	SBM 102
Most people participate in the elections because they think it is expected of them	66.2**	41.6	67.6	54.5	67.0
In Hungary the communists would receive the majority of votes even if other parties were competing at the ballot box	38.8	67.3	11.8	43.6	25.2
Only under the leadership of the communist party can socialism be built in Hungary	29.5	45.1	9.8	13.9	4.9
Only those parties exercise legitimate power which were elected by the people from among several competing parties	69.4	63.7	89.2	80.2	82.5
If several parties could enter the elections the socialist sytem would be at risk	26.5	8.0	36.3	7.9	9.7
There is no law saying that in a socialist country the communist party must have the sole authority	67.8	72.6	75.5	72.3	83.5
It does not matter which party comes to power, but whose interests it represents	74.2	31.9	15.7	38.6	35.9
The only reason that people voted for the HSWP HSWP [in 1985] because there was no other party to vote for	71.9	26.5	88.2	62.4	89.3
If several parties could compete at the elections the communist party would be in a minority	44.2	15.0	78.4	27.7	54.4
Only the leading role of the communist party can guarantee the power of the working class	31.5	26.5	8.8	18.8	4.9

* Abbreviations: NS = national sample; OPE = old [HSWP] political elite; NPE = new political elite [leaders of new parties]; ENT = managers of state enterprises; SMB = small businessmen.
** Percentage of respondents saying "I agree"

The other elites were either skeptical, or strongly disagreed with these self-serving propositions. The critical change here was the defection of the regime's "red barons" from the sinking ship of the HSWP apparat. The managerial elites' faint support, at 13.9 percent, of the idea of building socialism in Hungary under communist auspices was probably the single most conclusive bit of evidence for what proved to be the irreversibility of the entire process of political transformation which took place in Hungary between 1989 and 1990.

In sum, 1989 was the year of Hungary's negotiated revolution and that of slow public and rapid elite awakening to the promise (and challenge) of the nation's coming political transformation from "soft dictatorship" to parliamentary democracy. The society was divided into a mainly silent and nonparticipant majority and an increasingly vocal and politically assertive minority. In the course of the NRT process the new and the old elites' respective values and preferenced coalesced and found common ground on many procedural and substantive aspects of the country's transition scenario from one political system to another.

The elites agreed to disagree on many things. Yet, as members of Hungary's traditionally "competent public," they all chose to cooperate. Their shared objective was the forging of a new intraelite consensus along the lines of the above discussed shared understandings on Hungary's postcommunist political, economic and social agenda.

Conclusions

The foregoing discussion sought to develop a selective analytic overview of changes in Hungarian public opinion between 1972 and 1989. The main themes of inquiry were methodology and concept formation, political culture, the regime's propaganda priorities, and the public's core values and evolving views on several economic, social, and political subjects. Interim summaries were provided throughout

to facilitate the cumulative comprehension of the survey data employed to document specific developments.

My understanding of value and opinion formation in Hungary in the late Kádár era was based on five general propositions. With some exceptions, to be noted below, these have been validated by the data presented in the narrative. However, before proceeding further, I wish to register four caveats to explain the limitations on the scope and depth of my analysis.

- Survey data shown in this paper (with the exception of polls taken in 1989) represent public responses to censored and self-censored questions. Though most of the Hungarian pollsters were proreform academics, they avoided raising politically sensitive questions until they were permitted to do so in 1985-1986.

- Without access to raw data, which, for political and proprietary reasons, were (and still are) closely controlled by the sponsoring institutions and their successors, the discussion was bereft of critically important refinements that only standard techniques of data manipulation can provide. For this reason, I cited results of data manipulation (multiple regression, factor analysis, and so on) in only a few cases when the introduction of such data seemed indispensable to calling attention to one or another hidden dimension of the evidence.

- For the sake of parsimonious presentation, I elected not to discuss the findings of surveys on international relations, "war and peace" issues, public perceptions of foreign states and foreign nationals, and opinions on the USSR, the United States, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. In my view, the omission of data on the international dimensions of Hungarian public opinion has not invalidated my case.

- By focusing on what the party's official organ, *Népszabadság*, had to say to the public -- the regime's half of a "mass dialogue" between the rulers and the ruled -- I chose not to consider the message of the top half dozen literary-political journals and that of several academic but public policy-oriented publications. These journals and publications were the primary sources of (most often esoteric) information -- the regime's half of a "sectoral dialogue" between the political

leadership and the party and nonparty elites -- for members of the well-educated public. By virtue of their specialized readership, these sources had relatively less influence on the thinking of the vast majority of the otherwise attentive public.

The original propositions addressed themes of political culture, values and processes of opinion formation, information flows and cognitive disturbances, and key determinants of public opinion and attitudinal change from unfocused views to openly articulated beliefs with explicit political content.

- With respect to Hungary's political culture, the hypothesized "operative terms and processes" were adequately demonstrated by the data cited on core beliefs, national identity, attitudes toward politics, political processes, and various inventories of social values. On the other hand, the public's postulated latent propensities for "anomic outbursts" were only faintly discernible from "militant-fundamentalist" kinds of responses to poll questions on law and order issues. Among symbols of legitimation the person of János Kádár stood out -- not so much as the father figure that the Hungarian sociologists' use of the term "paternalism" implies, but as a benevolent autocrat in the manner of a latter-day Emperor Franz Joseph and as a guardian of the "little people's" (*kisemberek*) interests.

- The general public's predominantly Materialist values and preoccupation with economic issues were manifest from responses to polls on living standards, price rises, and shortfalls in social-welfare services. Human rights, political freedoms, and other Postmaterialist self-actualization values first emerged in the context of individual situations (that is, "chances for the realization of interests"), but in the mid-1980s these concerns were increasingly linked with demands for collective autonomy and other quality-of-life issues.

- Opinion changes in Hungary correlated highly with increased amounts and higher factual content of official information flows. From 1980 on, propaganda messages were dominated by change and action-oriented terms, such as "reform," "new development path," and similar remedies for Hungary's ailing economy. Well before the onset of *glasnost'* in Hungary there had been a great deal of cognitively destabilizing information that the public could not -- either then or after 1988 --

absorb and articulate in competent opinions on poll questions. Consequently, the views of the inattentive and apolitical three-fifths of the public did not surface until almost the very end of the old regime's rule in Hungary.

- Of the several social, economic, spatial, demographic, and political determinants of public opinion, educational background was the most important variable that separated mass and elite views on virtually every subject save those of national identity and widely shared pessimistic assessments of economic affairs. Both party and nonparty university graduates were evenly divided between those with "anticapitalist-traditional" and "democratic socialist" beliefs. Both were "political," yet supportive of the social status quo that conferred on them higher economic benefits and social status than it did on the less well educated "apolitical" and "prepolitical" four-fifths of the populace. Their shared concerns addressed the regime's delivery, in terms of differentiated living standards and group autonomy, on various elite "subcontracts" rather than the authoritarian essence of the political system. (118)

- Party membership proved to be a weak predictor of public attitudes toward economic issues, though it had a more pronounced effect on positive views about the political legitimacy of the Kádár regime. Age, gender, and place of residence were key indicators of party rank-and-file opinions on reforms and on prospects of change of any kind. Old people, rural residents, and women in general were far more attached to the way the system worked than were the young and middle-aged urban, educated males.

- The politicization of Hungarian public opinion between 1970 and 1989 was a slow and uneven process. In the 1980s the regime was preoccupied with tasks of economic retrenchment and presuccession political turf battles and lost control over public opinion. In doing so, the regime largely relinquished the tasks of articulation and criticism of new policy initiatives to the vocal opinion makers of various pro- and anti-reform intelligentsia groups. The most important of these were the mainly Postmaterialist *and* politically highly competent university students and young intellectuals. Thus, the glacial motion of the gradually politicized mainstream public

opinion was bounded, on the one hand, by the proreform intellectuals and, on the other, by the embattled but still vociferous party apparat.

- At the end, the facade of the top political and economic-managerial incumbents' unaniminity collapsed and created political space for a new spectrum of incumbent and insurgent elite views and policy preferences. By mid-1989 the old and the new elites' views of basic political and social institutions began to approximate, and occasionally overlap, one another. From this, *ex ante* pacts, commonly endorsed transition scenarios, and, after the free elections, new forms of postcommunist political power sharing were born. (119)

The above summary of findings on trends and social characteristics of Hungarian public opinion is incomplete in at least two respects. To make a comprehensive case, it ought to have considered the beliefs and values of the noncommittal and possibly intimidated, or hostile, "don't know" respondents. At issue are not only the analytical imponderables that one associates with any society's "silent majority" but those of the uncharted cognitive and affective properties of the "spiral of silence" phenomenon. (120)

The invisible macroscale movement of diffuse public sentiments are measurable through frequent polling of controlled samples over time, but such was not and probably could not have been carried out in Hungary before 1989. Yet the affective equivalents of undersea earthquakes surface only when such latent and long-concealed sentiments reach the "shore" of cathartic events. In Hungary these were occasioned by the official reevaluation of 1956 from "counterrevolution" to "popular uprising" in February 1989, by Imre Nagy's reburial on June 16, and by the renaming the state from People's Democracy to Republic on October 23, 1989.

The other missing element is a demonstration of linkages between indigenous trends in value and opinion change in Hungary and comparable phenomena in western and central Europe. To my knowledge, there is no such collection of survey data for the rest of the communist regimes for the two decades preceding their collapse in 1989-1990. Therefore, other than showing, as did Hankiss' value survey (for Hungary) and several Radio Free Europe-sponsored polls administered in the

1980s to Hungarian and East European tourists in the West, that Hungarian respondents held views that were in some ways similar to those of their European neighbors, particularly the Polish and the Czechoslovak publics, I am not in the position to place the Hungarian data in a regional context. (121)

Having said this, I submit that *some* aspects, albeit at the expense of extremely time-consuming research, of the pre-1989 national "dialogues" between the the Soviet and East European regimes may be reconstructed by dedicated students of mature communist politics and societies. Content analysis of *Pravda, Rude Pravo, Neues Deutschland, Trybuna Ludu*, and the rest of the party dailies say, for 1975-1988, is a feasible proposition. (122) And so is the perusal of readers' letters to the editors of these newspapers in the Soviet and East European party archives. For the want of survey data, such grassroots communications can serve as adequate substitutes for the study of the public's side of the regime-people dialogue in the waning years of "existing socialism" in that part of the world.

In the meantime, although bereft of such potentially useful external referents, my interpretation of the Hungarian evidence might be considered as a useful overview of one small central European nation's experience in terms of its citizens' changing -- "murmured," "whispered," and at the end shouted -- opinions in the last two decades of the *ancien regime*.

Notes

1. There are no Hungarian or English-language studies on the general subject of public opinion and political communication in Hungary during the Kadar era (1956-1989). Robert Blumstock's "Public Opinion in Hungary" in Walter D. Connor and Zvi Gitelman, eds., *Public Opinion in European Socialist Systems*, (New York: Praeger, 1977) 132-166, offers a useful summary of several public opinion and audience research surveys in the 1970s. English-language studies by György Csepeli, *Structures and Contents of Hungarian National Identity. Results of Political Socialization and Cultivation*, (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter Lang, 1989) and Ildikó Szabó, *Political Socialization in Hungary. The Duality of Institutional and Non-Institutional Processes*, (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter Lang, 1989) are mainly concerned with value formation in the early 1980s. Thus far, Hungarian public opinion and value survey data have been most exhaustively utilized by Elemer Hankiss in his *East European Alternatives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

2. Almond makes an important distinction between the "attentive public" and the "general public" and designates the former as the "policy-bearing part of the population." Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1960) 138. As Donald Devine explains, "[A]ttitudes of the relevant [attentive] public can be empirically identified and are relevant to policy output." Donald J. Devine *The Attentive Public*, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970) 35. See also, V.O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, (New York: Knopf, 1964) 546.

3. Exceptions, (but for the temporal mismatch), to this proposition are polls taken by Czechoslovak social scientists during the Prague Spring in 1968 and surveys by Polish scholars in the 1980s. The main findings of the latter were utilized most prominently by David Mason in his *Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Also, there is anecdotal and, in the Hungarian case factual, evidence that some of the East European ruling parties, typically the Central Committee's Agit-Prop Department, commissioned confidential surveys on the "public mood." Several such surveys may be found in the Hungarian National Archives among materials of the HSWP CC's Agit-Prop Department for the 1970s.

4. In addition to the Times-Mirror- and the Freedom House-sponsored surveys, the most useful polls on postcommunist developments have originated with University of Stratchlyde's *Studies in Public Policy* (262 published research reports to date); the United States Information Agency (several Opinion *Research Memoranda* in each year with summaries of surveys by subcontracting East European polling firms); *Eurobarometer*; and scores of east

and west European polling organizations with findings reported in English language scholarly journals. A particularly useful summary of recent literature may be found in David S. Mason, "Attitudes towards the Market and Political Participation in the Post-Communist States *Slavic Review* 45, 2 (Summer, 1995) 385-407. However, neither these postcommunist surveys, nor, for example, James R. Millar, ed., *Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR: A Survey of Former Soviet Citizens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), however useful, (in the latter case as a kind of "exit poll,") can be retrofitted to illuminate pre-1990 time- and place-specific survey data in a communist state, such as Hungary.

5. Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977)

6. See, Harry Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," *American Political Science Review* 82, 3 (September 1988) 789-804.

7. On the notion of "competent public" see, Angus Campbell *et al*, *The American Voter*, (New York: Wiley, 1960)

8. Whether or not this ranking of of socio-political attributes, particularly the relative importance of party membership to opinion formation in "cadre" versus "mass" parties, held for the rest of pre-1990 East European and Soviet publics cannot be determined. On the other hand, this rank-order has been held as axiomatic by Hungarian sociologists for *both*, pre- and post-1990, periods.

9. By "change in political skills" Inglehart refers to "formal peripheral groups [that are] able to act as participants with an unprecedented degree of organizational skill." Inglehart, *op cit*, 15.

10. See, Rudolf L. Tőkés, *Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Succession, 1957-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Introduction.

11. Tőkés, "Hungary's Negotiated..." ch. 3.

12. On this see *Ibid* chs. 6-8.

13. Daniel Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes" in Morris Janowitz and Paul M. Hirsch, eds., *Reader in Public Opinion and Mass Communication*, 3d ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1981) 41.

14. For the purposes of this study I am using Lasswell's formula of "political man," p} d} r = P ["the displacement (d) and rationalization (r) in terms of public interests, of private motives (P) on public objects (P)"] in the widest sense to denote all 'yes' and 'no' types of respondents to survey questions with explicitly political content. Harold Laswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*, new ed. (New York: Viking Press, 1960) 74-76.

15. Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, *Political Socialization*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969) 36.

16. Of the literature on this subject perhaps the most incisive contributions have been Mary McAuley, "Political Culture and Communist Politics: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," and Archie Brown, "Conclusions," in Archie Brown, ed., *Political Culture and Communist Studies*, (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1984) 13-39 and 149-204, and Gabriel A. Almond and Laura Roselle, "Model Fitting in Communism Studies," in Thomas F. Remington, ed., *Politics and the Soviet System: Essays in Honor of Frederick C. Barghoorn*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989) 170-224.

17. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, (Boston: Little and Brown, 1965) and Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited*, (Boston: Little and Brown, 1980)

18. Almond-Verba, *op cit*, (1960) 13-14.

19. *Ibid*, 16ff

20. Lucian W. Pye, "Political Culture" in David Shils, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12, (New York: Macmillan and The Free Press, 1968) 212, 218.

21. Archie Brown and Jack Gray, eds., *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, (London: Macmillan, 1977) 1.

22. István Bibó, "A kelet-európai kisállamok nyomorúsága" (The misery of small East European states) in István Bibó, *Összegyüjtott Munkái*, (Collected works) vol 1. (Bern: EPMSZ, 1981) 202-251.

23. In the absence of a comprehensive study on the history of libertarian ideas in Eastern Europe, one may refer to two excellent collections of studies on this matter. See Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds., *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, (Seattle: Washington University Press, 1969) and Stephen Fischer-Galati, ed., *Men, State and Society in East European History*, (New York: Praeger, 1970).

24. I sought to make this point in an earlier context of human rights struggles in Eastern Europe in the 1970s in "Human Rights and Political Change in Eastern Europe," in Rudolf L. Tőkés, ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1977), 1-25. The reference to the postcommunist states' "suitability for democracy" pertains mainly to recent speculation and earnest "how to build democratic institutions in Eastern Europe" prescriptions that one finds in congressional testimonies of American academics on U.S. foreign policies toward Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

25. Recent surveys on East European public views on progress made in the areas of personal liberties, freedom of the press, and institutional changes demonstrated growing acceptance and increasing support of political changes since 1990. See, Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, "Endorsing the 'Churchill Hypothesis'" *The Public Perspective* 5, 6 (September/October 1995) 3-11.

26. V.O. Key, *op cit*, 49.

27. See Mihály Babits, "A magyar jellemről" (On Hungarian national character) in Mihály Babits, *Esszék, tanulmányok* (Essays and studies) (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1978), László Németh, *Magyarság és Europa*, (Hungarians and Europe) (Budapest: Franklin, 1935), Dezső Keresztury *Helyünk a világban*, (Our place in the world) (Budapest, 1946). Hungary's political culture in a regional context was discussed in a influential study by Jenő Szücs, "The Three Historic Regions of Europe" in John Keane, ed., *Civil Society and the State. New European Perspectives*, (London: Verso, 1988) 291-332. The subject of political culture was discussed in perceptive essays by Csaba Gombár, Mihály Bihari, György Csepeli and László Lengyel in the 1984-1985 issues of *Társadalomkutatás* (Budapest). See also, Miklós Szabó, "Magyar nemzettudat problemák a huszadik század második felében" (Problems of Hungarian national self-awareness in the second half of the 20th century) in Miklós Szabó, *Politikai Kultúra Magyarországon*, 1896-1986, (Political culture in Hungary, 1896-1986) (Budapest: Atlantis 1989) 225-252.

28. István Bibó, "Eltorzult magyar alkat, zsákutcás magyar történelem" (Distorted Hungarian character, dead-end history) in Bibo, *op cit*, vol. 1, 255-288.

29. George Schopflin, "Hungary: An Uneasy Stability" in Brown-Gray, eds., *op cit*, 153.

30. Ivan Volgyes, "Political Culture" in Klaus-Detler Grothusen, ed., *Ungarn. Sudosteuropa Handbuch*, vol. 5 (Gottingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987)

31. *Ibid*, 211

32. *Ibid*

33. Pye, *op cit* 221.

34. Herbert C. Kelman, "Processes of Opinion Change" in Janowitz and Hirsch, eds., *op cit*, 58.

35. One example might help validate this proposition. According to a 1973-1974 national survey on "patriotism, Hungarian identity and internationalism," with the partial exception of the youngest age group, such core values and beliefs (25 years after the instauration of communist rule) were still firmly held among all respondents. György Hunyadi *et al Nézetek A Hazafiságról, A Magyarságról és Az Internacionalizmusról* [Mass Communications Research Institute, Hungarian Radio] for (MSZMP Kozponti Bizottsaga, Agit. Prop. Osztaly [HSWP, CC, Agit-Prop Department]. Zárt Kiadvany! A benne foglaltak semmiféle formában nem tehetők közzé az MSZMP Agit. Prop. Osztálya előzetes engedélye nélkül! [Restricted publication. (Copy No. xy) Its contents may not be made public without advance permission from the HSWP, CC, Agit-Prop. Department.] (Budapest, 1974).

36. Robin M. Williams, "Value" in David Shils, ed., *op cit*, vol. 16, 283.

37. *Ibid*, 286.

38. Katz, *op cit*, 43.

39. Before 1988 opinion polling in Hungary was done mainly by the Mass Communications Research Institute (MCRI); its predecessor, the Hungarian radio-TV audience research department; the Sociology Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; and the Central Statistical Office. MCRI was a semi-academic government agency under the administrative authority of the Public Information Department of the Office of the Prime Minister. Most of its efforts were designed to satisfy requests (see above) from the Department of Agitation and Propaganda at the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP), for reliable data on public opinion. Some of the non-classified data and interpretation were

published in limited circulation, in-house research reports and, in the 1980s, in a monthly journal, *Jel-Kép*. Many of the leading public opinion experts in Hungary, such as Róbert Angelusz, Róbert Tardos, Géza Lajos Nagy, Ildikó Szabó, Ágnes Bokor, and Tamás Terestyéni were full- or part-time scientific associates of MCRI. Their valuable analyses, as well as those of Professor György Csepeli (Department of Sociology, Loránd Eötvös University, Budapest) will be cited in the narrative.

40. By "postindustrial society" I refer to the societal consequences of occupational restratification from the agricultural-industrial to the service sectors. Other indices of modernization, such as the predominance of urban settlements, are additional attributes of a postindustrial socièty. See Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, (New York: Basic Books, 1973)

41. Inglehart, *op cit.*

42. *Ibid*, 4. In Inglehart's taxonomy Materialist value priorities emphasize order and economic stability, while Postmaterialist values give priority to free speech and political participation. From responses given to two Materialist ["maintaining order in the nation" and "fighting rising prices"] and two Postmaterialist ["giving people more say in immportant political decisions" and "protecting freedom of speech"] statements, Inglehart constructed a range of value-preference categories from the "pure" Materialist through four mixed Materialist/Postmaterialist to the "pure" Postmaterialist. Half of his western European samples from the early 1970s fell into the mixed categories and the other half were distributed unevenly (in favor of Materialist values) between the two "pure" types. On this, see 28-29.

The basic list of four statements was subsequently expanded to twelve statements -- also evenly divided between Materialist and Postmaterialist value preferences. The exponential increase in the number of possible answers was controlled by factor analyis that ranked the respondent's preferences among the twelve statements. On this, see Ronald Inglehart, "Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity" *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 75 (1981) No. 880-900. It should be noted, however, that some of Inglehart's propositions, particularly those concerned with linkages between civic culture and democracy, have come under vigorous criticism. See, Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships" *American Political Science Review* 88, 3 (Septemeber 1994) 635-652. However, Muller's and Seligson's case has, at best, marginal significance for the issue at hand.

43. Inglehart, *op cit* 6-13.

44. Elemér Hankiss, Robert Manchin, László Füstös and Árpád Szakolczai, *Kényszerpályán? A magyar társadalom értékrendszéréenek alakulása 1930 és 1980 között*, (On a forced path? Changes in the value structure of Hungarian society between 1930 and 1980) (Budapest: Sociology Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1982)

45. *Ibid*, 20.

46. Hankiss, *et al*, *op cit*, 258-331. The pathologies of family-centered extreme individualism bear uncanny resemblance to those that Banfield described as "amoral familism" among members of a rural community in southern Italy in the 1950s. The salience of one of Banfield's "predictive hypotheses" -- "In a society of amoral familists the weak will favor a regime which will maintain order with a strong hand" -- for the social bases of manifest political stability in Hungary in the 1970s seems axiomatic. See Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, (New: The Free Press, 1958) 93.

47. Elemér Hankiss, "East European ..." *op cit*, 36. The last question and the responses are from Elemér Hankiss, *Diagnozisok 2.* (Diagnoses #2) (Budapest: Magvetö, 1986) 197-198.

48. Elemér Hankiss, "Társadalompatológia" (Social pathology) in Elemér Hankiss, *Diagnozisok 2.*, 99-218, and Elemér Hankiss, "Társadalmi Csapdák" (Social traps) in Elemér Hankiss, *Társadalmi Csapdák. Diagnózisok*, 2nd ed. (Social traps. Diagnoses) (Budapest: Magvető, 1983) 5-144. See also, Elemér Hankiss, *Hongrie Diagnostiques. Essai en pathologie sociale*, (Geneva: Georg Eshel, 1990)

49. Hankiss, *et al*, *op cit*, vol. 2. 355.

50. Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution", 12.

51. Hankiss *et al*, *op cit*, 356. The number of variables used in this survey necessitated utilization of multidimensional scaling and other techniques of data manipulation that yielded "weak partial and strong overall correlations" 22). To control their findings for those of another survey instrument, the authors also administered the survey, including one with a subsample of university students, with the use of Inglehart's twelve Materialist and Postmaterialist statements. The results were collapsed into four (one "pure," two "mixed," and one "pure") Materialist-Postmaterialist categories, the last two of which are shown as "category 3 and 4" values in Table 3.

52. Walter D. Connor, "The Successor Generation in Eastern Europe" in Stephen F. Szabó, ed., *The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans*, (London: Butterworths, 1983) 146-169.

53. Hankiss, *et al*, *op cit*, vol. 1, 199.

54. *Ibid*, vol. 1, 35-36.

55. Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Mass Media and Their Interpersonal Social Functions in the Proces of Modernization" in Dexter and White, eds., *op cit*, 432-433.

56. Charles R. Wright, "Functional Analysis and Mass Communication" in Dexter and White *ibid*, 100-101.

57. *Ibid*

58. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, *Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkönyv, 1986*, (Hungarian Statistical Handbook, 1986) (Budapest: Statisztikai Kiadó, 1987) 75-84.

59. "Mass Media in Hungary" (Budapest: Mass Communication Research Institute, 1987) Unpublished MS; Tamás Váczi "Hat csatornán at a világ" (The world through six channels) *Petőfi Népe*, February 23, 1987; István D. Dénes, "Televizió kábelen" (Cable television), *Magyar Nemzet*, February 26, 27, 28, 1987; and János Nemes, "Mindenki radioja" (Everybody's radio) *Jel-Kép*, vol. 8 No. 2 (1987) 95-100.

60. Ultimate policy guidance for all forms of communications came from the HSWP Politburo and the Central Committee through the line secretary for Ideology and the Department of Agitation and Propaganda. In addition to the Prime Ministers's Office, at least two government ministries (Interior, and Culture and Education) had line authority on clandestine information gathering and censorship, respectively. Audience feedback evaluation was the electronic media's responsibility, and communications from (usually irate) citizens with reference to the daily press was summarized by the national dailies' readers' departments and forwarded to the Department of Agitation and Propaganda for further evaluation and follow-up action. Foreign broadcast- and press-monitoring services were provided by the Ministry of Defense and MTI, the national news agency. The latter published for selected readers up to sixty different types of uncensored press and wire service material.

61. Lewis Anthony Dexter, "Introduction" in Dexter and White, *op cit*, 12. As Dexter explains, this proposition was originally developed in W. Waples, B. Berelson and F. Bradshaw, *What Reading Does to People*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940).

62. László Reisz, *Gazdasági és Társadalmi Koncepciók a Politikai Propagandában, 1962-1980*, (Economic and social concepts in political propaganda, 1962-1980) (Budapest: KSH Könyvtár és Dokumentációs Szolgálat, 1988). Exluded from the survey were items on foreign policy, technical information, sports, and historical topics. I am grateful to Dr. Reisz of the Main Department for the Social Sciences, National Statistical Office, for his advice on certain methodological questions of his study.

63. *Ibid*, 121.

64. *Ibid*.

65. *Ibid*1, 3-14.

66. On the author's analytical correlation of the most frequently used propaganda themes, see 53-118.

67. *Ibid*, 133.

68. For a breakdown into A, B, and C categories by year of coding units on "peasants," see 128.

69. For a breakdown into A, B, and C categories by year of coding units on "workers," see 127.

70. For a breakdown into A, B, and C categories by year of coding units on "intellectuals," see 125.

71. For a breakdown into A, B, and C categories by year of coding units on "youth," see 124.

72. *Ibid*, 122.

73. The leadership's thinking on public opinion may be inferred from the HSWP, CC Agit-Prop Department's internal reports on the "public mood" that had been extracted from monthly reports from forty-five local and regional organizations reporting regularly to the

Department. My assessment of public reactions to the regime's policies are based on analysis of such reports from five representative county-level party organizations, for the months of March and November between 1980 and 1986. These may be found in the Hungarian National Archives under OL 288 f22/1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986 under miscellaneous font numbers.

74. Robert Angelusz, *Kommunikáló Társadalom* (Communicating society) (Budapest: Gondolat, 1983), 147.

75. Ibid, 148.

76. Editors-in-chief of major newspapers and journals were a cautious lot. Therefore, in the absence of censorship on subjects such as the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary and policy disputes among top politicians, self-censorship prevailed between June 1988 and June 1989. At that point, MTI, the official news agency, consented to the forwarding to the press statements from the new political parties under the aegis of its new OSS (National Press Service) distribution network.

Hungary's offical answer to *glasnost'* was formulated in Law II On the Press (1986), in *Magyar Közlöny,* No. 18 (April 22, 1986), 429-433; and in Decree No. 5 of the Presidential Council, Hungarian People's Republic, "On State Secrets" in Magyar Közlö ny, No. 20 (June 9, 1987) 339-361. This law and decree, though not invoked until January 1990, (then to indict a cashiered officer of the internal security organs for sharing confidential documents with the democratic opposition), had nonetheless a chilling effect on those who might have attempted to divulge "state secrets" for unauthorized purposes.

77. György Csepeli, "Szociológiai és szociálpszihológiai támpontok a fiatalok hazafias neveléséhez" (Sociological and socio-psychological aspects for the patriotic education of the young) *Köznevelés*, March 16, 1984.

78. *Ibid.* Csepeli calls the "undertaking aimed at bringing to the surface the remnants of national ideologies formulated by different interest groups during different periods" "cognitive archeology." The "Dutch substitution" is a technique of this method. On this, see György Csepeli, *Structures and Contents...*, 90-91

79. Győrgy Csepeli and Rudolf L. Tőkés, "Our Place in the World: National Identity and National Consciousness in Hungary" (1985) Unpublished MS. This paper was to have been presented at the meeting of the International Political Science Association in Paris in June 1985. Because of its "sensitive" subject matter, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences vetoed

Professor Csepeli's presentation. Thus deprived of the participation of my colleague, I elected to withdraw from that meeting.

80. *Ibid.* In a 1981 twenty-two nation survey on national pride, Hungary, together with Ireland, came in third, with 67 percent of the respondents saying "very proud." See Ronald Inglehart and Karlheinz Reif, "Analyzing Trends in West European Public Opinion: the Role of the Eurobarometer Surveys" in Karlheinz Reif, ed., *Eurobarometer*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991) 19.

In a 1975 survey on national pride, the respondents were asked what had been responsible for national progress in Hungarian history. Of the three possible answers ("periods of peace," "struggles for national independence," and "revolutionary [class] struggles"), the second was chosen by 33 percent of young blue-collar workers, 28 percent of older blue-collar workers, 54 percent of university students, and 52 percent of intellectuals, with a four-sample average of "don't know" answers by 18 percent. Ratios of "national" : "revolutionary" responses were 33:34, 28:27, 54:27, and 52:24, respectively, among the four samples. György Hunyadi et al "Patriotism..." For published extracts see, György Hunyadi, Endre Hann, and Katalin Pörzse, "Hazafiság és internacionalizmus, nemzeti hagyományok, büszkeség es szégyen," (Nationalism and internationalism, national traditions, pride and shame) *Radio és TV Szemle*, vol. 7 No. 4, (1975) 22-23.

81. Ildikó Szabó and György Csepeli, *Nemzet és politika a 10-11 éves gyerekek gondolkodásában*, (Nation and politics in *the* thinking of 10 to 11 year-old children) (Budapest: MCRI, 1984) 55-57. See also, Ildikó Szabó, "Állandóság a változásban - avagy politikai szocializácio Magyarországon" (Continuity and change, political socialization in Hungary) *Világosság*, no. 6, 1987, 370-377.

82. *Ibid.* Another test instrument offered twenty pairs of antinomous adjectives, e.g., "happy/unhappy," "loyal/disloyal," and so on, from which members of a national sample could choose. The respondents chose mainly the positive adjectives, of which "happy," "friendly," and "patriotic" were at the top, with respective average weights of 4.57, 4.56, and 4.55 on a 5-point scale. See Csepeli, *Structures...*, 69.

83. Szabó-Csepeli, *ibid*, 57.

84. Katalin Gallay, *Vélemények a szövetségi politikáról,* (Opinions on the policy of [class] alliances) (Budapest: MCRI, 1974) 33.

85. *Mérce*, (trial issue) (Budapest: MCRI, March, 1987)

86. From his review of articles on economic problems in the Hungarian press, Robert Angelusz concluded that "from 1972 to 1975 (especially in 1975) the share of articles dealing with declining wages and living standards diminished -- that is, articles dealing with subjects that could have helped [the readers] to make judgments on the relationship between national and personal economic problems." In the next five years the percentage of news items on the subject of living standards declined from 11 percent (1976) to 6 percent (1981). In the same period the share of positive news items in the media on the national economy declined from 70 to 50 percent, and that of negative items increased from 4 to 6 (!) percent. Robert Angelusz, *et al, Gazdaság és életszinvonal a közgondolkodásban,* (Economy and living standards and the public) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1984) 43, 166, 178.

87. The gap between a respondent's evaluation of the country's and his or her own economic situation widened in a direct ratio to level of formal education. Thus, university graduates gave much lower marks to the regime's economic performance than did persons with less than an eighth-grade education. On this, see Angelusz, *et al, Ibid*, 57. From this it also follows that a well-educated person refused to accept the regime's hidden message, "If you are less well off than you were before, you must be doing something wrong," and the sense of guilt to which a less well-educated person might succumb. Kádár's favorite formulation, "We have consumed more than what we produced," as his all-purpose explanation for Hungary's economic difficulties was not openly challenged until 1988. At that point the *state's* excessive consumption of the country's scarce investment resources was the economists' answer to Kádár's "blaming the victim for the crime." This answer was *not* contradicted by the regime in the fall of 1988.

88. Farkas-Pataki, *Ibid*, 9.

89. *Mérce, Ibid.* This index was first proposed in Katalin Farkas and Judit Pataki, *A városi lakossag gazdasági közhangulatáról,* (On the economic mood of the urban population) (Budapest: MCRI, 1981) 7. A consistent feature of these indices was the discrepancy between the views of the Budapest and provincial city respondents on the national economy. The ratio of pessimistic/optimistic views held by members of these two samples was 2-3.5 to 1 in the early 1980s

90. Guy Lázár, ed., *Társadalmi-gazdasági fejlődésünk ideológiai kérdései közgondolkodásban*, (Ideological questions of socio-political development in public opinion) (Budapest: MCRI, 1986) 83.

91. Guy Lázár, *Állampolgári vélemények a politikai rendszerről* (Citizens' opinions about the political system) (Budapest: Social Science Institute, CC, HSWP, 1987), 11. and data calculated from responses to a follow-up national survey of March, 1989.

92. *Ibid.*

93. Cited in Guy Lázár, *A magyar lakosság politikai-történelmi tudata a közvélemény-kutatás tükrében* (The Hungarian population's knowledge of history and politics in the mirror of public opinion polls, 1969-1980) (Budapest: MCRI, 1983) 22.

94. *Ibid*, 35.

95. László Kulcsár, *Vélemények a kongresszusi irányelvekben megfogalmazott néhány politikai és gazdasági kérdésről*, (Opinions on certain political and economic questions in the congressional [12th HSWP congress] theses) (Budapest: MCRI, 1980) 21.

96. *Kapu* (Budapest), August, 1989, 21.

97. The results of this survey were written up in two versions. The first was by Géza Lajos Nagy, Csaba Gombár, and Judit Vágó, "A párttagság szociólizmus képe. Egy empirikus felmérés tanulságai" (The party membership's views on socialism. Lessons of an empirical study" (Unpublished MS), 1986, the second by Lajos Géza Nagy, *Történelem képek és jövő-képek*, (Images of history and ideology. The stratification of ideological beliefs in the early 1980s), Budapest, 1989; Dissertation for the degree of Candidate of Sociological Sciences. (Unpublished) 155. My thanks to Dr. Nagy for making a copy of his work available to me.

98. *Ibid*, 182-191.

99. *Ibid*, 193ff

100. *Ibid,* 196

101. Tőkés, "Hungary's Negotiated..." ch. 7.

102. Géza Lajos Nagy, "A másik társadalom. A lakosság, a párttagság és az értelmiség képe a pártról" (The other society. Views of the public, party members and the of the intellectuals on the party) (Unpublished MS) 1989

103. *Ibid*, 31.

104. *Ibid,* 13, 16.

105. The term, "velleity" is defined in *Webster's New World Dictionary*, (Cleveland: World, 1960). See also Csaba Gombár, "Velleitásaink" (Our velleities) *Századvég*, No. 4-5 (1987) 5-26.

106. Lázár-Nagy, *op cit*, 80-81.

107. In June 1988 the rank order of persons demanding "drastic" economic reforms was intellectuals, young people, blue-collar workers, nonparty people, small entrepreneurs, peasants, party leaders, party members, enterprise managers, party apparatchiki, and old people. See, Nagy, "The other society" 36.

108. Tőkés, "Hungary's Negotiated.." chs. 7 and 8.

109. László Bruszt and János Simon, "Post-paternalist political orientations in Hungary (1990)" in László Bruszt and János Simon, *The Change in Citizens' Orientations During the Transition to the [sic] democracy in Hungary. (Reflected by public opinion survey and election studies, 1990-1991)* (Budapest: Institute of Political Science of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1991) 3-21.

110. For purposes of the following discussion on mass and elite views I am drawing on the original Hungarian language manuscript version, "Állampolgári Vélemények, 1998" (Citizens' Opinions, 1989) of the Bruszt-Simon survey that Dr. Bruszt was kind enough to make available to me in 1990. Although Bruszt and Simon have made use of these data in their "Post-paternalist" and other publications, data (hereafter "Citizens' Opinions") shown in Tables 20-24 have not, to the best of my knowledge, been published elsewhere.

111. "Citizens' Opinions"

112. *Ibid.*

113. Tőkés, "Hungary's Negotiated..." ch. 7.

114. "Citizens' Opinions"

115. *Ibid.*

116. On the socio-demographic components of a representative Hungarian adult national sample in the 1980s see, Judit Pataki and Edit S. Molnar, *Közvéleménykutatás a lakáshelyzetről* (Opinion survey on housing) (Budapest: MCRI, 1986).

117. "Citizens' Opinions"

118. On the notion of "elite subcontracts" see Tőkés, Hungary's Negotiated..." ch. 3.

119. *Ibid,* ch. 9.

120. On this, see Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann, *The Spiral of Silence - Our Social Skin*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), and Charles T. Salmon and Chi-Yung Moh, "The Spiral of Silence: Linking Individual and Society Through Communication," in J. David Kennamer, ed., *Public Opinion, The Press, and Public Policy*, (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 1992) 145-191.

121. RFE's Audience Research Department conducted several kinds of surveys, including telephone polls among East European listeners and hour-long interviews with tourists during visits in Western Europe in the 1980s. Reports on the latter, especially those on votes cast in hypothetical multiparty elections and attitudes toward the communist political incumbents, did show a clear pattern of outright rejection, a mixture of rejection and grudging acceptance, and toleration/support among the Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian respondents, respectively. Walter D. Connor's study (cited above) makes use of some of these data.

122. Milton C. Lodge's pioneering empirical study "'Groupism' in the Post-Stalin Period" on the of several Soviet elite journals in the 1950s in Frederick C. Fleron, ed., *Communist Studies the Social Sciences: Essays on Methodology and Empirical Theory* (Chicago: Rand McNally 254-278, demonstrates the feasibility of this approach.